Monroe Auto Equipment Co.

90 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Monroe Auto Equipment Company, Hartwell Division and International Union, United Automobile, Aero- space and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, UAW. Case IO-CA-6705 October 27, 1970 SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION AND ORDER BY MEMBERS FANNING, BROWN, AND JENKINS On May 25, 1967, the National Labor Relations Board issued its Decision and Order in the above- entitled proceeding,' finding that Respondent violat- ed Section 8(a)(5) and ( 1) of the Act, by refusing to bargain with the Union after it had been certified by the Board and ordering Respondent to take specific action to remedy such unfair labor practices . There- after the Board filed a petition with the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for enforce- ment of its Order. On January 17, 1969, the court handed down its Decision 2 remanding the matter to the Board for further hearing on certain issues with respect to the validity of the second election and certification. Consistent with the court's remand the Board, on April 15, 1969, issued its Order reopening record and remanding proceeding to Regional Direc- tor for hearing. On November 12, 1969, Trial Examiner James F. Foley issued his Supplemental Decision , attached hereto, in which he recommended that the election be set aside, that the Board's certification of the Union be vacated, that a new election be ordered, that the Board's Order be vacated, and that the complaint in this unfair labor practice proceeding be dismissed in its entirety . Thereafter, the Charging Party filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Supplemental Decision and a brief in support thereof. The Respon- dent filed a brief in support of the Trial Examiner's Supplemental Decision , cross-exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Supplemental Decision and a brief in support thereof, and an answering brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three -member panel. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed . The rulings are hereby affirmed . The Board has considered the Trial 1 164 NLRB 1051 2 406 F 2d 177 3406F2d177 4 The court further found that the remainder of the Company's objections were insubstantial and required no further consideration by the Board Accordingly, we find no merit in the Respondent 's contention that Examiner's Supplemental Decision, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in this case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recom- mendations of the Trial Examiner, only to the extent consistent herewith. The court3 listed the issues it deemed to require a hearing as follows: 1. The Union, its agents, members and em- ployees engaged in conduct alien to Section 7 of the Act by making threats to company employees that they would lose their jobs unless they voted for the Union. 2. Anonymous telephone calls were made to employees threatening bodily harm and loss of jobs unless they voted for the Union. 3. The Union instigated, condoned, ratified and acquiesced in the action of some of its people in false statements that salaried employees of the Company at Hartwell paid Union dues. 4. The Union instigated, condoned, ratified, and acquiesced in the action of some of its people who demonstrated payroll deduction slips of salaried employees of the Company, reporting that certain entries on the slips were in payment of union dues when in reality the deductions were for Georgia income tax. 5. Board agents in going about the plant alerting the employees to vote sought advice and direction exclusively from the Union representa- tive and permitted the Union observer to speak, holler at, wave his hand, and otherwise campaign with the employees in the plant during the voting. 6. Board agents permitted the ballot box to be left completely unattended in a room with an open door.4 The Trial Examiner found and we agree that there is no substantial evidence to support the allegations of Objection 5 that the Board agents in releasing employees to vote sought advice and direction exclusively from the union representative and permit- ted the union observer to speak, holler at, wave his hand at the employees, and otherwise campaign during the voting and that therefore Objection 5 should be dismissed. We also agree with the Trial Examiner's finding that there is no substantial evidence to support the allegation in Objection 6 that the Board agents permitted the ballot box to be completely unattended in a room with an open door. In his Conclusions of Law 1, 2, and 3 the Trial Examiner found with respect to Objection 1 that union-supporting employees threatened other em- it is entitled to a hearing on all of its objections The Trial Examiner treated each of the issues listed by the court as a separate objection using the numbers assigned by the court For the sake of uniformity, we shall do likewise . It should be noted that these are not the same numerical designations employed by the Respondent when it filed its objections 186 NLRB No. 18 MONROE AUTO EQUIPMENT CO. 91 ployees of the Respondent with "loss of jobs and physical injury if they did not support the Union in the election." With respect to Objections 3 and 4 he found that the union-supporting employees threatened (emphasis supplied) other employees "by representing to them that foremen and other salaried personnel were members of the Union and paid union dues, and showed them check stubs . . . for foremen or other salaried personnel listing a deduction under the heading `Union dues or other' and falsely represented the deduction to be for union dues when it was for Georgia Income Tax." And that "[t]his conduct conveyed to the other employees that employees who did not support the Union would be discriminated against by foremen and other salaried personnel." The Trial Examiner concluded that the threats of the union-supporting employees "considered cumulative- ly made a pattern of conduct." The Trial Examiner's finding with respect to Objections 1, 3, and 4 makes reference only to "employee union supporters." In fact, the Trial Examiner specifically concluded that the Union cannot be held accountable for any misconduct in this case (see Trial Examiner's Conclusions of Law 10, 11, and 12).5 In view of the Trial Examiner's findings, it becomes necessary to discuss the reasons given by the court for remanding Objections 1 through 4. With respect to the purported threats (Objections 1 and 2) the court found that "since the facts in this case are not clear as to the source of the threats, particularly the anony- mous telephone calls,6 it appears that Respondent would be entitled to a hearing on the agency dispute alone." In connection with Objection 1, however, the court citing Home Town Foods, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 379 F.2d 241 (C.A. 5, 1967), added that "even if the threats did emanate from the rank and file employees that would not be enough to dismiss the objection." As noted the court used the above language concerning agency in discussing Objection 1 (threats). It discussed separately the allegation of union misrepresentation in regard to the foremen's check stubs (Objections 3 and 4) and indicated that a question of fact arises as to whether the Respondent had sufficient opportunity to correct the misrepresen- tation. The court in no way suggested that the standards it found applicable to threats should also be applied to an alleged misrepresentation or that an alleged misrepresentation might constitute grounds for setting aside an election whether attributable to the Union or not. However, the Trial Examiner not only did not discuss Objections 3 and 4 under the standards generally applied to misrepresentation but also found the representations made by union supporters 7 "threatened other . . . employees." At this point suffice it to say that in our opinion the Trial Examiner's finding not only is erroneous but would do grave harm to the law concerning misrepresenta- tion as it has been developed by both the Board and the courts. Inasmuch as the tests set forth by the Fifth Circuit in some respects vary from those customarily applied by the Board in determining whether the laboratory atmosphere surrounding the elections was disrupted, a discussion of some of the applicable Fifth Circuit decisions appears to be in order. The language of the court in Home Town Foods, Inc., supra, appears particularly relevant. The court said (379 F.2d at 244): It is not the effect of any one of the objectionable acts standing alone, however, but the combined effect of all of them, which must be considered . .. . One of the important issues is the effect of the election and pre-election practices of union sup- porters on the minds of the voters. The Courts have usually applied an objective test to determine whether interference with an election is sufficient to set it aside .. . . Subjective evidence of fear and coercion, however, may carry the day as well ... . We are not impressed with the argument that all coercive acts must be shown to be attributable to b To the extent that the Trial Examiner's Conclusion of Law 5 is inconsistent with his finding that the Union was not responsible for any misconduct we must reject it. Conclusion of Law 5 states: The known identity of the Union supporting employees making the threats, the engaging in a pattern of conduct, and their attendance at Union meetings, and the failure of the Union before and on the day of the election to disavow their conduct, gave the impression to other employees that their conduct had the support or at least the endorsement of the Union. There is no record evidence whatsoever which reveals that the Union had knowledge of any of the purported misconduct . In fact, the unrefuted testimony of the International representative , Louis Echols, indicates the contrary. 6 The court pointed out, citing N.L.R.B. v. Tampa Crown Distributors, 272 F.2d 470 (C.A. 5, 1959), that with respect to anonymous telephone calls (Objection 2) any exact application of the agency test is impractical or impossible. The anonymous calls are discussed infra. 7 As noted above, the Trial Examiner found that the Union was not responsible for the alleged misrepresentation. This normally would have ended the matter since Objections 3 and 4 alleged that the Union "instigated, condoned, ratified and acquiesced" in the alleged misrepresen- tations : However, the Trial Examiner added as another objection "representations by employees to other employees that foremen and other salaried employees were members of the Union and paid union dues and the false representations of employees to other employees that the deductions under `Union dues and other' on check stubs of foremen and other salaried personnel was for Union dues .. (see In. 9 of Trial Examiner's Decision). His justification for so doing was that it was placed in issue by Respondent's evidence, and litigated by all the parties. The Union excepts, contending that the Trial Examiner has no authority to add to the Respondent's objections and that the addition is beyond the scope of the court's remand . The Union adds that nothing occurred at the hearing that would entitle the Trial Examiner to infer that the parties were litigating matters beyond the Respondent's objections or the court's remand. Although we are inclined to agree with the Union's contention, we decline to pass on it. Moreover, in accordance with the Fifth Circuit's holdings we are obliged to consider whether the combined effects of all the alleged misconduct may have contributed to an atmosphere which rendered a free election impossible. (See Home Town, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 379 F.2d 241 (C.A. 5, 1967)) 92 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD the union itself, rather than to the rank and file of its supporters. . . . The important fact is that such conditions existed and that a free election is thereby rendered impossible. The court remanded that case to the Board for a hearing. Using the court's holding as the law of the case, the Board,8 after extensively modifying the Trial Examiner's Decision, again overruled the Respon- dent's objections and reaffirmed its certification of the Union . When the case went back to the Fifth Circuit the courts again denied enforcement of the Board's order on the grounds that the standards of campaigning and conduct had dropped too low and the Board's requisite laboratory conditions were not present. The Board subsequently filed a petition for rehear- ing. The court 10 in denying the petition stated: The Board complains that the Court imposes on the Board an "unrealistically `ideal' standard." We do not so intend . We are in full agreement with the Board's explanations of its "laboratory" standard in Morganton Full Fashion Hosiery, 1954, 107 NLRB 1534, 1538,1 and in Liberal Market, Inc, 1954, 108 NLRB 1481 , 1482.2 As indicated later by the Board in International Mfg. Co., 1967, 167 NLRB No. 105, from which we quoted in footnote 14 to our original opinion, the task is ". . . to evaluate properly the probable effect of conduct which is coercive in nature. . . . The controlling factor here is whether the conduct involved tends to interfere with a free and uncoerced choice by the employees." The test was more elaborately stated by this Court in a case decided shortly after our original decision in the instant case: the ultimate question here is not whether any improprieties occurred during the campaign , but whether under the circum- stances, the particular conduct complained of `created an environment of tension or coercion such as to preclude employees from exercising a free choice . For conduct to warrant setting aside an election , not only must that conduct be coercive , but it must be so related to the election as to have had a probable effect upon the employees' actions at the polls.' N. L. R.B. v. Zelrich Company, 344 F.2d 1011, 1015 (5th Cir. 1965)." 8 172 NLRB No 126 9 416 F 2d 393 tU 416 F 2d 392 at 400 (October 1, 1969) It In the court's second Home Town Food decision it found it unnecessary and unwise to comment on the employer 's charge that the Board employed a double standard The court added "It would seem to us, however, that the Board should apply a single standard against which it will measure the campaign conduct of all parties who might have interfered with employee free choice weighing the conduct of each individual party N. L.R.B. v. Golden Age Beverage Co., 5th Cir. 1969, 415 F.2d 26. t ". the adoption of a laboratory standard should not be construed to mean that the Board will ignore the realities of industrial life In this respect , we are not unmindful of the fact that the `laboratory' for election purposes is unually an industrial plant where vigorous campaigning and discussion normally take place " 2"in decidmg 'whether the registration of a free choice is shown to have been unlikely, the Board must recognize that Board elections do not occur in a laboratory where controlled or artificial conditions must be established We seek to establish ideal conditions insofar as possible , but we appraise the actual facts in light of realistic standards of human conduct " In Golden Age, supra, 415 F.2d 26, the court also indicated that the burden is on the party objecting to the conduct of the election. It continued: This is a heavy burden; it is not met by proof of mere misrepresentations or physical threats. Rath- er specific evidence is required, showing not only that the unlawful acts occurred, but also that they interfered with the employees' exercise of a free choice to such an extent that they naturally affected the results of the election (citations omitted). The Court then alluded to the Board's expertise which arises from the fact that it supervises and reviews thousands of representation elections each year and noted that the Board has not followed a "double standard" or abused its discretion in apply- ing its expertise. It stated: An employer is an unorganized plant, with his almost absolute control over employment, wages, and working conditions, occupies a totally differ- ent position in a representation contest than a union, which is a mere outsider seeking entrance to the plant. The opportunity for employer domi- nation and misrepresentation is manifest.. . .11 In summary, it appears that within the framework laid down by the Fifth Circuit, we are obliged: (1) to consider the objections or incidents cumulatively rather than as isolated individual incidents; (2) in addition to the objective evaluation normally em- ployed, to consider subjective evidence of fear and coercion in determining whether interference suffi- cient to warrant setting aside the election occurred; 12 and finally and most important (3) to determine not only whether the conduct complained of was coercive but also whether it was "so related to the election as to have a probable effect on the employees' actions at the polls," or "created an environment of tension or coercion such as to preclude employees from exercis- according to the particular power he might possess " This is precisely what the Board has attempted to do in this case 12 In remanding this case, the Fifth Circuit cited its first opinion in Home Town Foods, supra, where it had indicated that the Board should consider subjective evidence of fear and coercion in addition to applying the customary objective test to determine whether there had been fear or coercion The Board having accepted the remand, those holdings are the law of this case, and therefore we have in fact considered the subjective evidence. MONROE AUTO EQUIPMENT CO. 93 ing free choice." With the foregoing in mind we proceed with a discussion of the objections. In considering these objections we have accepted the Trial Examiner's credibility resolutions. Where relevant we have discussed other testimony of the credited witnesses which is pertinent to the issues to be resolved. The Threats As found by the Trial Examiner, employee Teel testified that about a week before the election employee Fulgam told him if he did not join the union and sign a card they would get 17 employees against him and have him fired and that 2 days later he was told the same thing. Teel testified that he believed Fulgam and was concerned about his job. On cross- examination, however, he testified that although he "thought about it [the threat] there one time" he voted his convictions. Employee Jordan testified that prior to the election about four or five employees standing at the coke machine were talking about things they could do to employees who did not vote union if the union got in, and one of them said the union would get names of seven employees against them, make it hard for them and put them out of their jobs. Fulgam, one of these employees, said they could beat up people with tire chains. Jordan further testified that he voted accord- ing to his convictions and added, "It is a free country." Jordan did not testify that he believed these employees or that he was concerned with respect to their remarks. We note that what the employees said the Union could do was conditional on the Union's winning the election. We further note that such remarks by employees are more likely than not to elicit a negative rather than a positive response toward unionization. Employee Howard Sanders' testimony does not read the way it was set forth by the Trial Examiner. Sanders testified that Ralph Vickery told him he wouldn't be around long and would have to sign up if he wanted to do well around here; and Ray Vickery told him if you are going to do well you have to buddy up with them. Sanders replied that maybe he would not do well and that "that is your opinion [Vickery's], my opinion is that the company is nice to me and I can't see [the Union's] point." Sanders emphasized that there were no hard feelings between himself and the Vickerys . In our opinion, this can hardly be considered a threat; moreover, Sanders' testimony indicates that he did not feel that his job was threatened in any way. He informed the Vickerys that that was their opinion and that his was different. In our opinion the Trial Examiner's finding that Sanders was coercively threatened with the loss of his job has no support on the record. Sanders also testified, as found by the Trial Examiner, that employees Jerry Garland and Britt Sorrells tampered with his machine for quite a long period of time but that they discontinued it when they saw he would not change his position. Sanders testified that he felt their mood was one of spite because he was not on their wagon. Sanders added that he had no falling out with Sorrells but that "there was just a while I figured [Sorrells] was doing me wrong in the machine business." Sanders never told his foreman about the tampering although it some- times took him an hour to get his machine running. He also indicated that he considered this "devilment." It should be noted that Sanders never mentioned that Garland or Sorrells told him that they were for the Union, asked him to support or vote for the Union, or discussed his position on the Union. At best the record reveals only that Sanders assumed they were union supporters. Nor is there any other evidence on the record which supports their description by the Trial Examiner as "union supporting employees." And while at the same time there is no evidence that Sanders' apparent assumption was incorrect, the unequivocal attribution to the "union supporting employees" of the conduct of Garland and Sorrells is not supported by the record. Employee Holbrook, after much confusion, testified that employees Harvey Sanders and Reed Ayers told him that he had been referred to in union meetings in connection with his not getting a job in Hartwell and that they would organize other plants in Hartwell after Respondent's plant was organized and would take care of him by seeing that he did not get a job in Hartwell. Holbrook testified that he voted according to his convictions. Holbrook did not indicate that he took these remarks seriously or that he was concerned for his job. Moreover, this so-called threat was conditioned not only on the Union' s organizing Respondent's plant but all the other plants in Hartwell. In our opinion these remarks can only be classified as "puffing" and do not support the Trial Examiner's finding that Holbrook was threatened that he would lose his job if he did not vote for the Union. Our comments with respect to the statements made to employee Jordan are likewise applicable here. Employee Gerald Craft testified that, 2 or 3 weeks prior to the election, employee Ayers told him that if he did not vote for or join the Union he could be rolled or bumped by employees with seniority. He testified only that he did not know if this could be done. In our opinion this evidence does not support the Trial Examiner's finding that Holbrook was threatened with the loss of his job if he did not support the Union. Employee Johnson testified some employees in the voting line on election day told him if he did not vote 94 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD for the Union he would lose his job. He told them that they would not know how he voted. Someone in the group told him that there were mirrors in the booth. Although not mentioned by the Trial Examiner, Johnson further testified that he voted according to his convictions, that the remarks of the employees did not change his mind, and that he voted just the way he intended to vote. He also testified, contrary to the Trial Examiner's finding, that he did not tell his supervisor about the incident and that he discussed it with other employees about a week after the election, only. Clearly the remarks by Johnson's own testimony had no effect on him or any other employees who voted. At this point we note that this was the only evidence of the alleged rumor that there were mirrors in the voting booths with which the court was concerned. Since Johnson provided the only evidence on this point and he neither talked to other employees nor believed it himself that particular allegation would appear to be of no merit. As found by the Trial Examiner, employee Bowen testified that a week or two before the election employee Adams told him he would lose his job if he did not vote for the Union and sign a union card. He further found that Bowen voted his convictions but, while not physically afraid of Adams, he was afraid, having a family, he would lose his job. The Trial Examiner's summary of Bowen's testimony is not accurate, for Bowen did not say he was afraid he would lose his job. Rather Bowen testified that it (the alleged threat) upset him a little because 10 or 12 years earlier when he first came to Hartwell "he couldn't buy a job in Hartwell." Bowen further testified on cross-examination that he voted his convictions and was not influenced by Adams' remark. Finally, he admitted that he was not afraid he would lose his job if the Union won the election. Also contrary to the Trial Examiner's finding, Bowen said he couldn't recall discussing Adams' remark with anyone. Clear- ly, if Bowen is to be believed, Adams' remark neither created fear or tension in his mind nor in the mind of any other employees.13 Employee Mize14 testified that employee Adams told him about the benefits to be had under a union 13 The testimony of employees Phillips and Madden will not be discussed since the Trial Examiner credited neither of them with respect to the threat of job loss Nor will the testimony of employee Morns, who testified only that it was common gossip that if an employee did not vote for the Union he would be looking for another job , since the Trial Examiner did not rely on his testimony with respect to his findings on threats. 14 This objection, threats of physical injuries by employees to other employees, was added by the Trial Examiner as another objection (see fn 9 of the TXD) The Union, as with the other objection added by the Trial Examiner, excepts, contending the Trial Examiner has no authority to add to the Respondent's objections (the objection would not be timely filed under the Board's rules) and that such an addition is beyond the scope of the court's limited remand Although not necessarily agreeing with the contract. Mize replied that he didn't see it that way and that we would regret it (the Union) because they (the Respondent) will see fit to move the work elsewhere. When Adams replied that they could not do that Mize told him "there is one thing I know for sure, that this little machine I am operating is here because of the terrible thing they had up at Monroe [a reference to the Respondent's plant or former plant at Monroe, Michigan, which figured prominently in the Respondent's propaganda during the first election campaign] and it is here and I am operating it, and I know that for sure." 15 Adams then said, "It looks like I am going to have to whip your ass." Nothing further was said, but Adams returned about 30 minutes later and stood about 3 feet from Mize and looked at him for a minute or two with one hand in his pocket. Mize testified he did not recall what Adams said when he returned but that Adams never threatened him. He did testify, however, that the peculiar look in Adams' eyes disturbed him. On cross-examination Mize testified that his prior relationship with Adams, although limited, had been friendly. He also testified that the comment he made to Adams about what Respondent did do in Monroe (Michigan) and could do in Hartwell was general information. Mize did not mention whether he discussed Adams' remark with any of the other employees. Finally, Mize testified that he voted according to his convictions. Although Mize said he was disturbed by Adams' conduct he also indicated that he had other concerns if the Union won, and that he voted according to his own convictions. In our opinion this is the type of vigorous discussion among employees of different views which will occur during a heated campaign in an industrial plant and which therefore must be appraised in light of realistic standards of human conduct.16 In conclusion, it does not appear that Adams' remark had a probable effect on the actions of Mize or any other employees at the polls. In summary, the Trial Examiner found that 7 employees in a unit of 647 eligible voters were threatened and coerced when they were told by other employees who were union supporters that they would lose their jobs if they did not support the Union. Implicit in such a threat is the fact that the Union's contention, we will discuss the objection 1s Employee Lewis, a union supporter who was apparently not involved in any of alleged misconduct, testified (he was neither credited nor discredited by the Trial Examiner) that the only rumor he heard prior to the election was that the plant would close if the Union won Threats that the plant would close if the Union won were one of the grounds for setting aside the July 1964 election The Respondent did not file exceptions to the Regional Director's report and the Board decision was not published The Union also filed 8(a)(1) and (3) charges after the 1964 election (see Monroe Auto Equipment Co, 159 NLRB 613) 16 See Morganton Full Fashioned Hosiery, 107 NLRB 1534 and Liberal Markets, Inc, 108 NLRB 1481, which were cited with approval by the court in Home Town Foods, Inc, 72 LRRM 2465 MONROE AUTO EQUIPMENT CO. 95 Union must win the election to effectuate the threat. Of these seven, four, Teel, Jordan, Johnson, and Bowen, testified that in spite of the threats they voted according to their convictions. Jordan did not indicate that he was at all concerned by the purported threat. Johnson added that the purported threat in no way changed his mind and that he voted just as he intended. Bowen, on cross-examination, indicated he was not influenced by the purported threat and admitted he was not afraid he would lose his job if the Union won the election. Of the remaining three employees the Trial Examiner found were threatened with loss of jobs, Sanders told the employees who purportedly threatened him that that was their opinion and his was to the contrary and emphasized that there were no hard feelings between these employees and himself. Sanders' testimony indicates that he in no way felt threatened. Holbrook testified that he was told that after Respondent's plant was organized the Union would organize the rest of the plants in Hartwell and he would not be able to get a job. Thus, the purported threat to Holbrook was conditioned not only on the Union's winning the election but on organizing the other plants in Hartwell. Holbrook in no way indicated that he took these threats seriously or was concerned for his job. The remaining employee, Craft, testified that he was told that if he did not support the Union he could be rolled or bumped by employees with seniority. We observe, further, that contrary to the Trial Examiner's findings, there is no evidence that these purported threats were widely circulated. Two of the seven employees said they told no one of the purported threats until after the election. None of the others indicated that they discussed the purported threats with anyone, except, in a few instances, their foreman. Only employee Davis, whose testimony the Trial Examiner did not mention with respect to this finding, indicated that the purported threats were common gossip.17 On the witnesses' own testimony they did not take the purported threats seriously. Nor, by their own admission, did the purported threats affect their votes. It would, therefore, appear unlikely that the threats could have a probable effect on the actions of the other employees at the poll. We are, therefore, unable to conclude that the conduct alleged in Objection 1, standing alone, interfered with or tended to interfere with the results of the election or created a "general" atmosphere of confusion and fear of reprisal which rendered impossible a free election. 17 In his Conclusion of law 6 the Trial Examiner stated in part: The evidence of the threats made by the Union supporting employees and the circumstances in which they were made , and who made them, reveal that they were made not only to the employees who gave testimony regarding them but to many other employees as well. In our opinion such a finding is total conjecture . It is one thing to say The Anonymous Telephone Calls As found by the Trial Examiner, employee Jordan testified that, on the Sunday before the Tuesday election, he received a telephone call at Terry's Service Station, where he was helping out, and that upon his identifying himself, the caller cursed him, said that he had been running his mouth, that they were watching him and would get him if he did not vote for the Union. The caller would not give his name. Although Jordan testified that the telephone call caused him some concern he further testified that he voted according to his convictions and added, "It's a free country." Employee Sanders testified that early one morning, during the organizational campaign, while he was sleeping, he received a telephone call and that the caller asked him if he was going to sign a card. Sanders testified that he replied, "You are talking to the wrong man, every man to his own opinion.. . . I am satisfied with what Monroe is paying me." Whereupon the unidentified caller replied, "Go to hell, God damn you," and slammed down the receiver. Sanders further testified that the unidenti- fied caller didn't make any threats. Sanders' descrip- tion of the conversation was that, "I told him how I stood. He told me how he stood, and slammed the phone down in my face." Sanders indicated that his only real concern was that he wanted to know who it was that called. In our opinion the Trial Examiner's finding that the anonymous telephone call to Sanders was a threat and coercive is without record support. Sanders testified that the call had no effect on his vote. Employee Madden, who worked the 4 p.m. to 2 a.m. shift, testified that 2 weeks before the election he received one to three telephone calls each night. The first would be around 11 p.m. and the last about 3 a.m. He refused to answer them. His wife was frightened. She received the I 1 p.m. calls while he was at work. That was the extent of Madden's testimony on the anonymous calls; the Trial Examiner did not credit his earlier testimony with respect to a threat that he would lose his job if he did not support the Union. As concerns the anonymous calls, Madden's testimony is of small import; he gave no indication whatsoever as to the nature of the calls. He did not indicate what the caller said, whether the calls involved threats, or whether the caller mentioned his supporting the Union, except possibly by reference to his earlier testimony which the Trial Examiner did not credit. He knowledge of threats may have been widely circulated and have an impact on employees who acquire knowledge of them, and quite another thing to find that because threats were made to some employees they were likewise made to other employees. The Trial Examiner's conclusion finds no support in the record. 96 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD did not state whether he told anyone about the calls. While the record supports a finding that Madden received anonymous calls, it does not support a finding that he was threatened in these calls with reprisals if he did not support the Union. At 7:30 p.m. on the day of the election employee Kay received a telephone call on the outside phone which was available to employees in his department. After Kay identified himself the unidentified caller said he would kill him at 1 a.m. for what he did outside the plant gate that afternoon. Kay testified that he had stood outside the plant gate and attempted to persuade employees to vote against the Union. The Trial Examiner further found that Kay voted that night at 11:30 p.m. and the next day he told Barry Reed, an employee, and plant manager Gordon about the telephone call. Contrary to the Trial Examiner's finding, however, Kay testified that he had voted at the afternoon voting session prior to receiving the call.is Also contrary to the Trial Examiner's finding, Kay did not tell Barry Reed, an employee, but rather Benny Reed, the night superintendent, about the call and then only on the day after the election. Kay further testified that he did not mention the telephone call to any of the employees in the phone area. Thus, although the telephone call received by Kay was certainly a threat (and coercive), it could not have affected either his own vote or, by his own admission, anyone else's vote since he told no one about the call until the day after the election. In conclusion, in a unit of 647 eligible employees there were anonymous calls made to 4 employees. The Trial Examiner found the anonymous calls to be threats and coercive as the employees who received the calls were cursed and told they would suffer reprisals if they did not support the Union. Of these four employees, one, Sanders, testified that he was not threatened in any way by the caller and that the call had no effect on his vote. Another, Madden, gave no indication of the nature of the anonymous calls he received and there is not sufficient evidence to attribute these calls to union-supporting employees. Contrary to the Trial Examiner's finding the record shows that Kay received his anonymous call after he had voted and did not mention it to anyone until the day after the election. We are therefore left with one anonymous call, that to Jordan, which might support the Trial Examiner's findings; but even Jordan 18 Q Did that [the call ] have any effect on your vote or have any effect on how you voted9 A [Kay ] No, sir f had already voted 19 See N L R B v Tampa Crown Distributing Inc, 272 F.2d 470 (C A 5, 1959) 20 The Trial Examiner's Conclusion of Law 7 deserves comment in this regard Conclusion of Law 7 states in part The nature of the threatening anonymous telephone calls and the testified that in spite of the call he voted his convictions. Except in aggravated situations the Board has applied the same rationale to anonymous telephone calls as it has to threats by rank-and-file employees and other persons who are not parties to the election. To set aside an election because of anonymous phone calls, except in the most compelling case, would render the election proceeding vulnerable to the acts of cranks, pranksters, and anyone else who for some reason wishes to sabotage an election. The Fifth Circuit may have taken a somewhat different view of anonymous calls,19 although in the Board's view Tampa Crown can be considered an exaggerated case since in that case a fourth of the eligible voters received anonymous threatening calls. Moreover, in that case the court emphasized that the union officials, in contrast to the instant case, did not take the stand and deny knowledge of or responsibility for the telephone calls. Here on the other hand, at the most 2 of 647 eligible voters received anonymous calls. And, as indicated above, there is no evidence that knowledge of the anonymous calls was widely circulated; the record does not support the Trial Examiner's finding that "the nature of the threats . . . very likely led to their prompt and wide circulation, and their restraining effect was not limited to those directly involved." Those directly involved, in fact, admitted that they were not restrained.20 In conclusion we are unable under any standards to agree with the Trial Examiner's finding with respect to the anonymous telephone calls. In our opinion, the record does not support a finding that the anonymous telephone calls "created an environment of tension or coercion such as to preclude employees from exercis- ing a free choice" or "destroyed the atmosphere necessary to the exercise of free choice." The Alleged Misrepresentations As indicated above the Trial Examiner found that the Union was not responsible for the conduct alleged in Objections 3 and 4. He then added to the objections by including misrepresentations made by employees to other employees. As indicated above (see fn. 7), we agree that the addition was beyond the scope of the court's remand. We further note that in its remand the court did not discuss the allegation of union misrepre- sentation in the same context as the alleged threats. The court indicated that the allegation of union circumstances in which they were made reveal they were made not only to the employees who gave testimony regarding them but to many other employees as well This finding not only is not supported by the record but is without precedent To conclude that because some employees received anonymous telephone calls others also must have received such calls because of the nature of the calls is not only illogical but is contrary to the most basic rules of evidence (See fn 17, supra) MONROE AUTO EQUIPMENT CO. misrepresentation with respect to the foremen's check stubs "appears to be more of a rumor." It indicated that there was a factual issue as to how widespread the rumor was and that, "applying the misrepresentation test" cited in Pepperell Manufacturing Co. v. N.L.R.B.,21 ". . . a question of fact arises as to whether the employer had sufficient opportunity to correct the misrepresentation." Pepperell is quite pertinent to this discussion because of the similarity of the circumstances therein. In Pepperell, ' as here, the union lost the first election. As in the instant case, the employer in the first election waged an intensive campaign which included threats of plant shutdown and consequent economic disaster if the union won the election. As here, the Board set the first election aside. Unlike Pepperell, however, in the instant case the Respondent did not file exceptions to the Regional Director's report on objections to the first election. In Pepperell, as here, the union won the second election and the employer filed objections, which were overruled by the Board. The objections in the Pepperell case alleged misrepre- sentation of a material fact by the union (the misrepresentation involved wage rates in surrounding union companies). The court adopted the Board's findings and granted enforcement. In Pepperell the court set forth the three criteria or tests, adopted by the court herein, for evaluating misrepresentations. These criteria are: "1. Is the misrepresentation of a material fact? 2. Did the misrepresentation come from a party who has special knowledge of the true facts? and 3. Did the opposing party have sufficient opportunity to correct the misrepresentation?" The court concluded that the test "is not that when false statements are made they constitute an interference with free choice, but that when false statements are made which constitute an interference with free choice . . . an election should be set aside." It should further be noted that in Pepperell the union and not union-supporting employees made the misrepresenta- tions. Applying the criteria of Pepperell we would agree that the representation herein was of a material fact. But, we cannot say that it was an invalidating misrepresentation as there is no evidence that the employees who made the representation knew that it was false. Certainly it cannot be said that the representation came from a party who had special knowledge of the true facts.22 In fact, the Respondent was responsible for making such a representation possible; the check stubs were its own and it placed the deduction for Georgia tax under "Union dues and other." Finally, it appears that the Respondent had a 21 403 F.2d 520. 22 Had the Union been responsible for this rumor, it would be a 97 sufficient opportunity to correct the misrepresenta- tion and the Trial Examiner so found. The Trial Examiner found that four employees were told by union-supporting employees that manage- ment paid union dues and it was noted on their pay stubs. Four other employees testified that there was such a rumor around the plant . Employee Davis testified that he heard about the rumor a few weeks before the election but knew it was not true because he discussed it with his father who is a foreman. Teel also indicated that he spoke to his supervisor about what he had been told. Employee Jordan testified that when he was told by employee Fulgam that foremen belonged to the Union and paid dues he didn't believe it. Jordan testified he voted according to his convic- tions, as did Teel and Holbrook. The Trial Examiner found that the misrepresenta- tion concerning the foremen's check stubs constituted threats and coercion notwithstanding the fact that none of the employees considered the misrepresenta- tion as a threat. There was no evidence to support the Trial Examiner's finding that the employees who were told about the foremen considered that if they did not support the Union they would be discriminated against by foremen . Nor do we believe that in view of Respondent's known attitude with respect to the Union, as demonstrated in the first election, such a finding finds rational support (see Pepperell Mfg. Co., supra). The Trial Examiner found that Respondent must have been aware of the rumor and that the use of the check stubs lent weight to the rumor. He further found that since it knew of the misrepresentations it had a duty to explain the deduction . The Trial Examiner then ignored well-established principles of both the Board and the courts with respect to misrepresentations, by concluding that even though the Respondent knew of the misrepresentation and had failed to reply, the objection should not be overruled because otherwise the employees ' exercise of free choice would not be protected . This is directly contrary to the court's holding in Pepperell. And, as the court therein stated, not only must there be false statements, but the false statements must constitute an interference with free choice . In conclusion, the Trial Examiner's finding that misrepresentations by union-supporting employees constituted threats and coercion which warrant setting aside the election is, in our view, not supported by either the facts herein, or the applicable law. We have concluded, contrary to the Trial Examiner, that none of the objections standing alone warrants setting aside the election. We are likewise unable to agree with his finding that the conduct of the union- somewhat different case as it would at least have more knowledge of the true facts. 98 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD supporting employees when viewed cumulatively "resulted in the standards of election campaigning and conduct dropping too low" or that the conduct "was of so serious a nature that it could only result in widespread confusion and fear of reprisal and render impossible a rational, uncoerced choice by employ- ees." All of the alleged misconduct was committed by rank-and-file employees whose power to effectuate their action and words the other employees could certainly evaluate. These employees indicated that they did evaluate the conduct of their fellow employ- ees since they indicated that their action at the polls was not affected by the conduct.23 Other than a few statements concerning common gossip or general rumors there is no evidence that knowledge of the alleged misconduct was widely circulated. We must also consider the background of this case and particularly the attitude of the Respondent with respect to the Union as demonstrated in the first election campaign and an earlier unfair labor practice case (159 NLRB 613). Threats of plant closure or of vast reductions in the workforce by those who possess the power to effectuate their words do not die easily. The only serious misconduct involved was the one, or possibly two, threatening anonymous telephone calls. Such activity is certainly never to be condoned; however, here in a unit of 647 employees the one or two calls can only be considered isolated. In conclu- sion, we are unable to find that the alleged miscon- duct "created an environment of tension and coercion such as to preclude employees from exercising free choice." Accordingly, we shall overrule the objections to the election and affirm our certification of the Union and our Order of May 25, 1967. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board hereby overrules the objections to the election; reaffirms the certification of Internation- al Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agri- cultural Implement Workers of America, UAW, as the representative of the employees in the appropriate unit; and orders that the Respondent take the action set forth in the Order previously issued herein on May 25, 1967. 23 See In 12, supra TRIAL EXAMINER'S SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE JAMES F. FOLEY, Trial Examiner: This proceeding involves a hearing on certain objections filed March 11, 1966, by Monroe Auto Equipment Company, Hartwell Division (herein called Respondent), to conduct preceding and during an election conducted by the National Labor Relations Board (herein called the Board) on March 3 and 4, 1966, at Hartwell, Georgia, to determine whether the International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, UAW (herein called the Union), is the collective-bargaining representa- tive of a unit of the production and maintenance employees of the Respondent. The hearing was held June 4 through 7, 1969, pursuant to the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit on January 17, 1969,1 denying enforcement of the order of the National Labor Relations Board of May 25, 1967, 164 NLRB No. 144, ordering Respondent to bargain with the Union, and remanding the petition for enforcement to the Board for further hearing on 6 of the 12 objections filed by Respondent on March 11, 1966. The court was of the opinion that the evidence presented in the affidavits supporting the six objections warranted the taking of additional evidence at an oral hearing to provide an adequate basis for a determination whether there were present or not present during the election of March 3 and 4, 1966, the laboratory conditions established by the Board as requisite for enabling employees voting to register a free and untrammeled choice for or against a bargaining representative. The court stated that the remaining six objections were insubstantial, and required no further consideration by the Board. In accordance with the court's opinion, the Board, on April 15, 1969, issued an order reopening the record in the unfair labor practice proceeding, 10-CA-6705, for a hearing before a Trial Examiner on the six objections in issue, and for the Regional Director to arrange for the hearing, and to issue a notice of hearing. The unfair labor practice proceeding stemmed from the refusal of Respon- dent to bargain with the Union after the Board certified the Union as bargaining representative on August 18, 1966, following the Regional Director's report that the 12 objections filed on March 11, 1966, were lacking in merit, and the Board's adoption of the report after consideration of Respondent's exceptions to it. The hearing was held before me, from June 4 through 7, 1969, as stated, in Hartwell, Georgia. Evidence was presented by Respondent, the Union, and the General Counsel. Briefs were filed by the Respondent and the Union after the close of the hearing. The Board's order of April 15, 1969, provides for a supplemental decision by the Trial Examiner containing findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendations on the evidence received. It further provides that upon its issuance and service on the parties, further proceedings shall be in accordance with ( N L R B v Monroe Auto Equipment Co, Hartwell Division, 406 F 2d 177 MONROE AUTO EQUIPMENT CO. 99 Section 102.46 of the Board's Rules and Regulations, Series 8, as amended. I. THE SIX OBJECTIONS The six objections concerning which the court decided additional evidence should be taken, and concerning which the additional evidence was received, are as follows: (1) The Union, its agents, members and employees engaged in conduct alien to Sec. 7 of the Act by making threats to company employees that they would lose their jobs unless they voted for the Union. (2) Anonymous telephone calls were made to employees threatening bodily harm and loss of jobs unless they voted for the Union. (3) The Union instigated, condoned, ratified and acquiesced in the action of some of its people in false statements that salaried employees of the Company at Hartwell paid union dues. (4) The Union instigated, condoned, ratified, and acquiesced in the action of its people who demonstrated payroll deduction slips of salaried employees of the Company, reporting that certain entries on the slips were in payment of union dues when in reality the deductions were for Georgia income tax. (5) Board agents in going about the plant alerting the employees to vote sought advice and direction exclu- sively from the Union representative and permitted the Union observer to speak, holler at, wave his hand and otherwise campaign with the employees in the plant during the voting. (6) Board agents permitted the ballot box to be left completely unattended in a room with an open door. II. THE EVIDENCE2 A. Background Evidence In the second Board-conducted election held on March 3 and 4, 1966, there were 647 eligible voters: 342 votes were cast for Petitioner Union; 264 votes were cast against the Union as bargaining agent; 11 votes were challenged. They were not counted as they were not sufficient to affect the results of the election. The court's decision on January 17, 1969, denying enforcement of the Board's 1967 Order, the Board's Order of April 15, 1969, and the Regional Director's notice of hearing set in motion the preelection activity or conduct of union representatives and employee union supporters, and of employees opposed to the Union or opposed to representation by a collective-bargaining representative. The rank-and-file employees who were eligible to vote and who voted were employed in approximately 14 departments spread over a wide plant area under the supervision of foremen. There was considerable activity by the Union and employee union supporters, and to some extent by employees who did not support the Union or who were against representation by a collective-bargaining represent- ative. The election was held on the afternoon of March 3, 1966, from 2 until 5 p.m., and from 11:30 p.m. on March 3 until 12:15 a.m. on March 4. There was a preelection conference on the morning of March 3 which began about 10 a.m. and ended shortly after 11 a.m. The conference was attended by union representatives, Respondent's representatives, Board agents, and observers representing the Union and Respon- dent. Three Board agents supervised the election. They were Thaddeus R. Sobieski, the Chief Board Agent, Louis M. Keynard and Maynard Holbrook Jackson, Jr. They were Board attorneys attached to the staff of the Board's Regional office in Atlanta, Georgia. They had had extensive experience in conducting Board elections. They were assigned by the Board's Regional Director in Atlanta, Georgia. The observers representing the Union were Respondent's plant employees Donald Alewine and William J. Phillips. The observers representing Respondent were Respondent's office employees Mrs. Lessie Ann Brown and Mrs. Virginia Brown Welborn. B. The Evidence on the First Objection (1) The Union, its agents, members and employees engaged in conduct alien to §§7 of the Act by making threats to company employees that they would lose their jobs unless they voted for the Union. Employee Lawrence Edward Teel was employed by Respondent in department 12 on the second shift beginning at 4 p.m. at the time of the election, March 3 and 4, 1966. He had been employed by Respondent for about 4 years prior to that time. Teel testified that employee Claude Fulgam said to him about a week before the election that if he did not join the Union and sign a card they would get 17 names of employees against him and have him fired, and 2 days before the election Claude Fulgam, the same employee, and employee Charles Ward said to him that if he did not join the Union, sign a card, and vote for the Union they would get 17 names of employees against him and have him fired. Teel testified he voted his convictions although he believed Fulgam and Ward, and was concerned about keeping his job. Employee Walter Jordan was also employed by Respondent in department 12 on the second shift at the time of the election, March 3 and 4, 1966. He had been employed by Respondent for about 4 years prior to that time. He testified that prior to the election about four or five employees standing at the Coke machine were talking about things they could do to employees who did not vote union if the Union got in. They would get names of employees against them, make it hard for them, and put them out of their jobs. Claude Fulgam, one of the group talking, said they could beat up people with chains. Employee Howard C. Sanders, was employed on the second shift by Respondent in department 11 at the time of the election. He had been employed by Respondent about 2 years prior to that time. He testified that a few days before the election employees Ray and Ralph Vickery spoke to him about supporting the Union. They said he would not be around long if he did not support the Union. Ralph said he 2 The witnesses were separated . By agreement, Respondent's Plant Manager Charles Gordon and George E. Roper, its industrial relations manager, and union observers , Alewine and Phillips, were present in the hearing room during the taking of all evidence. 100 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD would have to sign with them if he wished to do well around there. A few days later Ray said that if he wished to do well he would have to buddy up to them. Sanders also testified that employees Jerry Garland and Britt Sorrels tampered daily for quite a long period of time with the automatic controls on his machine. It would take him an hour every evening, when he began work on the 4 p.m. to midnight shift, to correct what they did. They discontinued when they saw he would not change his position because of what they were doing. Sanders testified they called the mood that caused them to tamper with his machine one of spite because he was not on their wagon. Employee William Barry Holbrook was employed by Respondent in departments 12 and 17 at the time of the election. He had been employed by Respondent for about 10 years prior to that time. He testified that employees Harvey Joe Sanders and Reed Ayers said to him about once a day for 30 days prior to the election that he had been referred to in meetings of the Union in connection with his not getting a job in Hartwell, Georgia. They said they were going to organize Hartwell. They would organize the Marathon Company and Bell Brothers Sewing Plant in Hartwell, after Respondent's plant was organized. They would take care of him. They would see he did not get a job in Hartwell. Sanders was a witness for the Union. He testified he spoke to some employees on behalf of the Union. He denied he said to Holbrook that if he did not vote for or join the Union or sign a card, he would lose his job, or he would not be able to get a job in the Hartwell area. He testified he did not hear Reed Ayers make such a statement. He testified that he or Reed Ayers told Holbrook that when Respondent was organized that they would try to help get other plants organized. Employee Gerald Dan Craft was employed by Respon- dent on the second shift in departments 12 and 13 at the time of the election. He had been employed by Respondent for 8 years prior to that time. Craft testified that 2 or 3 weeks prior to the election employee Reed Ayers said to him that if he did not vote for orjoin the Union he could be rolled or bumped by employees with seniority He testified that he did not know whether it could be done. Employee Mark Louis Johnson was employed by Respondent at the time of the election in department 13. He had been employed by Respondent about a year prior to that time. He voted about 4:30 p.m. on March 3. Johnson testified he went to the polling area in the company of employee Junior Blackwell. He did not stay with the group of employees from department 13. He was not with Blackwell when he was in the line in the polling area waiting to vote. Some employees in the line said to him that if he did not vote for the Union he would lose his job. He said to them that they would not know how he voted. Someone in the group said there were mirrors in the booth. He did not know the names of the employees in the group making the statements to him. He told his supervisor a week later what was said to him. He mentioned the incident to other employees when they talked about the Union. Employee John William Mize was employed by Respon- dent in departments 10 and I 1 on the first shift at the time of the election. He had been employed 10 years by Respondent at that time. On March 2, 1966, he was assigned to operate a screw machine in department 10. Employee Andy Adams who worked in department 10 on the other side of the entrance way came over to the machine and told him about the benefits to be had under a union contract. Mize replied that he did not see it that way, that, if they had the Union, Respondent could move some of the machinery, and some employees would not have employ- ment. Adams said that they could not do that. Mize said he knew what they did do, that he meant that the machine he was operating was brought there because of some great differences, and he knew he was there operating it. Mize testified he knew this from general information that some of the industry was coming south for that reason. Adams, according to Mize, then said "It looks like I'm going to have to whip your ass." Nothing else was said at this time. 1 It was near a break. After a break of 20 or 30 minutes, Adams returned and 1 It was near a break. After a break of 20 or 30 minutes, Adams returned and stood 2-1/2 to 3 feet from him, looking at him for a minute or two minutes with a peculiar look on his face, and one of his hands in a pocket. He did make some remarks, but what he said was very little. He did not recall what he said. The peculiar look in his eyes disturbed him. Mize testified he voted his convictions.3 Andy Adams, as a witness for the Union, testified about the incident. He was self-employed at the time of the hearing. He was a machine operator when employed by Respondent Adams said that on March 2, 1966, Mize called him to the machine Mize was working on. It was employee Seawright's machine. Adams was near the machine to collect some metal boxes. Mize said to him that he wanted to get the other man's view. When Mize said something good against the Union, Adams laughed and said he guessed he would have to whip his ass. He had three discussions with Mize on March 3. These were the only discussions he had with Mize. All of them were held prior to the time Adams said he would have to whip Mize. Mize has not spoken to Adams since the latter made the statement about whipping him. During the time following the March 2 incident that Adams remained in Respondent's employ, Mize did not look in his direction when he came into department 10. Employee Jesse Seawright, a witness for the Union, was employed by Respondent in department 10 as a machine operator on the first shift on March 2, 1966, when the incident involving Mize and Adams occurred. He had been employed 9-1/2 years by Respondent. He testified he overheard only one conversation between them. He heard Adams say he was going to whip Mize' s ass. Adams said to him "Seawright it looks like I am going to have to whip old John's D.A.," and Mize looked up at him, smiled and said, "You might have to catch me first." The incident occurred about 5 minutes before breaktime. According to Seawright, Mize took what Adams said to him with a smile, which was the way Adams gave it to him. Mize, who was a setup man, left the machine he was working on shortly after. Seawright did not see him the rest of the day. Mize on direct examination testified that Seawright 3 Mize is a bigger man physically, but is substantially older than Adams MONROE AUTO EQUIPMENT CO. 101 operated a small milling machine next to the machine he was operating . Adams testified that Mize was working on Seawright's machine. According to Mize, Seawright was present only during the beginning of the conversation. On redirect examination, Mize testified that he was active in his church as a Sunday school superintendent, and a teacher of young men from 17 to 24 years of age. Employee Charles E. Bowen was employed by Respon- dent as a materials handler in departments 10 and 11 on the first shift, from 8 a.m. to 4:30 p.m., at the time of the election. He began his employment in 1961. Bowen testified that a week or two before the election employee Andy Adams said to him that he would lose his job if he did not vote for the Union and sign a union card. He discussed Adams' statement to him with other employees. He testified he voted his convictions, but while not physically afraid of Adams, he was afraid, having a family, he would lose his job. Ten or twelve years prior to the election, he could not obtain a job in Hartwell after he had been working on a pipeline in Wisconsin. Bowen testified that other employees also said to him that he would lose his job if he did not vote for the Union. Employee Jack Phillips was employed by Respondent at the time of the election operating an automatic boiler, on the second shift beginning at 4 p.m. He had been employed 7 years prior to that time. He voted at the second voting session from 11:30 p.m. to 12:15 a.m. Phillips testified that on the day of the election and many times before some employees said to him that if he did not vote for the Union they would see that he was thrown out of his job the day the Union came in. He refused to disclose the identity of the employees who made this statement to him. He testified he liked his job, and thought that disclosure of the identity of the employees would cause trouble in the plant. He started to talk to his foreman about what was being said to him, but his foreman stopped him and said it was up to the employees. He voted his convictions, but did not know if he would lose his job if the Union came in as he had never worked under a union. Employee Tommy Madden was employed by Respon- dent as a Yoder Mill operator on the second shift beginning at 4 p.m. at the time of the election. He had been employed by Respondent since 1957. He voted between 2 p.m. and 5 p.m. on March 3. Madden testified that a week before the election an employee, whom he referred to as "a boy," said to him that they would vote the Union in, and if successful he would have to join the Union or lose his job. He testified he knew the employee's name but refused to disclose his identity. He testified he refused to disclose his identity because he had to work with him, and because of anonymous telephone calls he received that worried his wife. The calls were received less than 2 weeks before the election. One to three calls were received each night. The earliest was at 11 p.m. and the last was about 3:30 a.m. Employee Reuben Davis Morris was employed by Respondent at the time of the election as an experimental mechanic in department 17 on the first shift beginning at 8 a.m. He had been employed 6 years prior to that time. He voted about 3 p.m. on March 3. Morris testified that it was common gossip voiced by employees in any group congregating in any area of the plant that, if an employee did not vote for the Union, he would be out looking for another job and would not find it in Hartwell. He testified that this gossip was so common that it did not stand out much in his mind. It began to stand out in his mind about 2 months after the election. Counsel for the Union asked witnesses called by the General Counsel the question whether they had knowledge of any employee being threatened with the loss of his job if he did not vote for or join the Union or sign an authorization card. The witnesses were Employees Strick- land, Brooks, Hendrix, Jesse L. Phillips, Beebe, Coile, Norman Sanders, Lacin Lewis, Charles Alexander Ayers and Alton Barton Craft. They answered "No." These employees supported the Union in the election. Donald Alewine, the union observer, when recalled as a witness by the Union, was asked by counsel for the Union if he had heard Louie Echols, coordinator for region 8 of the Union and International representative of the Union, who was in charge of the organizational activity at Respondent's plant, say that an employee of Respondent who did not vote for the Union or sign an authorization card would lose his job if the Union won. Alewine answered "No." He was also asked by counsel for the Union if he heard Tom Stallings and Joe Mooney, union officials who assisted Echols, or any union employee, make such a statement, and he answered "No." Counsel for the Union asked Echols, who was called as a witness for the Union, if he, or any employee of the Union in his presence, told any employees of Respondent that if they did not vote for or join the Union, or sign an authorization card, they would lose their jobs if the Union won the election. Echols answered, "It was to the contrary, we did not." Echols was asked if he told any employees of Respondent to make similar remarks to other employees. He answered, "We did not." Echols also testified that, at the six or seven meetings held by the Union, employees who attended the meetings were given instructions as to the rights of employees, and what employees could do and could not do. He and the other representatives of the Union told the employees at the meetings not to be around the polling place intimidating other employees who did not necessarily talk the way they did. Echols testified that union representatives also talked to the union observers prior to the time they received instructions. They were asked to conduct themselves in a proper manner. In response to a question by counsel for the Union whether any employees of Respondent received "a fee, salary or remuneration" for acting on behalf of the Union in the organizational campaign , Echols answered "No, not even a beer." Echols also testified that no employees of Respondent were given authority to act on behalf of the Union in the organizational campaign. C. The Evidence on the Second Objection (2) Anonymous telephone calls were made to employees threatening bodily harm and loss of jobs unless they voted for the Union. Employee Walter Jordan testified that Sunday evening prior to the election on Thursday, March 3, 1966, he received a telephone call while he was working at Terry's Service Station in Hartwell. He was helping Terry out as his 102 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD father and sister were ill. When the telephone rang, he answered it with the words , "Terry's Service Station." The caller asked who he was and he identified himself. The caller thereupon cursed him and called him a name, and said he had been running his mouth, and they were watching him and were going to get him if he did not vote for the Union. He said Jordan was his man. Jordan asked the caller who he was, and he answered "Wouldn't you like to know?" Employee Howard C. Sanders, who worked on the second shift, testified that while he was sleeping early one morning during the organizational campaign the telephone rang. When his wife answered the telephone, the caller asked to speak to him. After he identified himself the caller asked him if he was going to sign a card. He answered that he was satisfied with what he was being paid, and the caller replied "Go to hell, God damn you," and slammed down the receiver. Employee Tommy Madden who worked on the second shift, 4 to 12 p.m., testified that about 2 weeks before the election he received one to three anonymous telephone calls each night. The first would be around 11 p.m. and the last one about 3 a.m. He refused to answer them . His wife was frightened. She received the 11 p.m. calls as he was working. Employee William P. Kay, an employee of 7 years at the time of the election, worked in department 12, on the second shift. He was called to the outside telephone in department 13, which was available to employees in his area, by employee James Allen about 7:30 p.m. on the day of the election. The caller asked twice who he was and he identified himself each time. The caller said he would kill him at 1 a.m. for what he did outside the plant gate that afternoon. Kay asked the caller who he was, and he answered "Wouldn't you like to know." Kay testified he said to the caller that he would be off work at 1 a.m., and would like to meet him. Kay voted that evening at 11:30 p.m. Kay testified that he was outside the plant gate that afternoon as the employees came into the plant , and he said to them to vote and think for themselves. Sobieski, the Board agent in charge of the election , testified that employee Tommy Hendrix, a witness for the General Counsel, came into the voting area the afternoon of March 3, after he had voted, to complain about Kay's conduct at the plant gate, but he told him it was not the proper time or place to make a complaint, and asked him to leave the voting area. Hendrix left. Kay testified that the next day he told employee Barry Reed and Plant Manager Gordon about the anonymous telephone call. Counsel for the Union asked General Counsel 's witnesses named supra, if they had any knowledge of anonymous telephone calls, and, they answered, "No." He asked Union International Representative Echols if he, or any employee or member of the Union, had asked any employees to contact other employees by telephone, and he answered that neither he nor they asked this of any employee. He testified that, in his case, there was one exception. He asked Alewine to contact employees to get the word out about union meetings. This testimony is corroborated by Alewine's testimony. Alewine testified, in response to Union counsel's questions, that he called other employees whom he knew, and who attended union meetings with him, and discussed things with them. He always identified himself, and never made any remarks to them that could be construed as threats. He denied he ever telephoned Jordan, Madden, or Kay. He testified he heard no rumors in the plant that they had been called by telephone and threatened. D. The Evidence on the Third and Fourth Objections (3) The Union instigated, condoned, ratified and acquiesced in the action of some of its people in false statements that salaried employees of the Company at Hartwell paid union dues. (4) The Union instigated, condoned, ratified and acquiesced in the action of its people who demonstrated payroll deduction slips of salaried employees of the Company, reporting that certain entries on the slips were in payment of union dues when in reality the deductions were for Georgia income tax. It is undisputed that Respondent paid foremen with checks that had vouchers or stubs attached showing the deductions taken from the gross amount of the checks. There is no place on the voucher or stub to show the deduction for Georgia income tax. Respondent showed this deduction in a space headed by the words "Union dues or other." Employee Teel testified that Claude Fulgam stated to him that management paid union dues, it was on their check stubs, and they received better benefits because they belonged to the Union. He saw Fulgam showing a check voucher or stub to other employees, but he put it in his pocket when he approached these employees. He talked to Gerald Davis, his foreman, about what Fulgam said to him and the other employees. Davis came to him and the other employees with check stubs he had taken from his billfold to show them the deduction under the heading of union dues or other was for Georgia income tax. Fulgam was present. He said "I don't give a damn what you got, I am for the Union, I am going to vote for it and I don't give a damn who knows it." Employee Jordan testified that Claude Fulgam was showing the check stub in his department, department 12, a week or two before the election. He showed it to him, and said foremen belonged to the Union. Jordan replied that he did not believe it. He went to the bank at the time, and when he returned there was a stub on his machine. He pushed it on the floor. In the statement Jordan gave to Board Agent Watson on March 22, 1966, there is no reference to the check stub. Jordan testified that he disclosed what happened to Watson, but the latter did not include it in the statement he wrote up for him and which he signed. Employee Gerald Dan Craft testified that 2 weeks before the election Harvey Joe Sanders told him that foremen and supervisors belonged to the Union and he could prove it by check stubs. Sanders said the foremen and supervisors had more benefits than rank-and-file employees. They had retirement and insurance, and more benefits than the rank- and-file employees had. The statement that Craft gave to Board Agent Watson refers to his being informed by four MONROE AUTO EQUIPMENT CO. 103 or five unidentified employees about foremen and supervi- sors belonging to the Union but not by Sanders. Sanders testified that he knew Craft and that he talked to employees about the Union a month before the election. Craft testified he talked to employee Reuben Morris about it after the election, and he said the deduction under the heading of union dues was the Georgia state tax. Employee William Barry Holbrook testified that the day before the election Harvey Joe Sanders said that foremen and salaried people were paying union dues and drawing better benefits than they were. Several employees had talked to him about foremen paying union dues. It was general talk until the day of the election. Sanders denied he told Holbrook that foremen and salaried persons were paying union dues. Employee Odell Thompson Harmon, who had duties throughout the entire plant, testified that prior to the election he heard the rumor about the plant that salaried personnel were members of a union. Employee Reuben Davis Morris testified that 2 weeks before the election it was common gossip that salaried employees paid union dues. He testified he knew it was not so as his father was a supervisor. Union Observer Alewine, an employee of Respondent, testified he heard rumors before the election of check stubs of foremen and salaried personnel that showed they paid union dues. He never saw a check stub. Employee John T. Price testified that 2 weeks before the election a group of employees said to him that foremen and straight salaried employees belonged to the Union and paid union dues. The employees had kept trying to get him to sign a card to get an election. After they told him about the foremen and straight salaried employees being members of the Union, he signed a card. He did not remember the names of employees in the group. He asked foremen after he signed a card if they belonged to the Union. He voted in the election according to his convictions. E. The Evidence on the Fifth Objection (5) Board agents in going about the plant alerting the employees to vote sought advice and direction exclu- sively from the Union representative and permitted the Union observer to speak, holler at, wave his hand and otherwise campaign with the employees in the plant during the voting. Most of Respondent's employees who voted on March 3 and 4, 1966, voted on company time. Those on the day shift from 8 a.m. until 4 p.m. voted from 2 until 5 p.m. on March 3. Those on the shift from 4 p.m. until midnight voted, where they so desired, from 4 until 5 p.m. on March 3 or 4 Several sections of the Board's Internal Instructions and Guidelines for Representation Proceedings (1967) are applicable to the issues raised by the fifth objection . Section 11330 provides that where it is decided that voters may vote on company time specific arrangements must be made for doing so. Section 11330.2 provides that the employer will usually prefer to shut down a whole department or work unit for the few minutes it will take for all that department or work unit to vote , and that, assuming adequate checking tables, good eligibility lists, and minimum challenges, 90 to 100 can be scheduled to vote in each 15-minute period, and it can be assumed that any given voter may be expected to be away from his workplace no more than 10 minutes plus travel time. Section 11330.3 provides that in preparing the voting schedule the time just before and after a change of shifts should be left open for those who-prefer to vote on their own time either before reporting for work or after leaving work. Section 11330.4 from 11:30 p.m. on March 3 until 12:15 a.m. on March 4. Those on the shift from 12 until 8 a.m. voted between 11:30 p.m. on March 3 and 12:15 a.m. on March 4 or voted on their time from 2 until 5 p.m. on March 3. The employees, who worked in approximately 14 departments, that voted on company time voted by departments. The employees eligible to vote who were on the 8 a.m. to 4 p.m. shift numbered approximately 350, on the 4 p.m. to midnight shift approximately 250, and on the make-up shift from 12 to 8 a.m. approximately 40 to 47. The employees in each department were released by a team consisting of a Board agent and an observer for the Union and an observer for the Respondent .4 Sobieski assigned Board Agent Maynard Holbrook Jackson, Jr., the job of obtaining the release of the employees by departments to vote. Union Observer William J. Phillips and Respondent's Observer Ann Brown assisted him from 2 p.m. until 4 p.m. on March 3. Union Observer Alewine replaced Phillips for the period from 4 p.m. to 5 p.m. on March 3. Jackson and Brown worked with Alewine during this hour. Board Agent Keynard replaced Jackson for the voting session from 11:30 p.m. on March 3 to 12:15 a.m. on March 4. He was assisted by Union Observer Alewine and Respondent Observer Brown. At the commencement of the first voting session, Maynard was handed a schedule showing the departments in numerical sequence, and their locations, which was prepared by Respondent. Observer Ann Brown testified that Board Agent Jackson was handed the list of departments and their locations, and he and Phillips went where they wanted to go, and she trailed along behind. They went to the department head or foreman of the department. Part of the time she, Jackson, and Phillips traveled the aisles designated as passageways between and among departments, and from one area of the plant to another, but at times they would take shortcuts from one department to another by cutting through the people in working areas. She kept asking them to slow down because she could not keep up with them, and did not know where they were going because they would not let her see the list. They would slow up for a minute and let her catch up with them and then "would take off again." Phillips told Jackson where to go because she was not close enough to tell him. When they went through the areas Phillips was waving and speaking "to the people," and she had been told not to speak to anybody, and that they were to keep their mouths shut. Sobieski said they were not supposed to say anything, that Jackson would do the provides that releasing of employees to vote may be done via a public address system or by a traveling group of observers representing each party who may or may not be accompanied by a Board agent. If the observer method is used the releasers should, if possible, follow the preset schedule, staying together at all times. After first telling the applicable supervisor of their intentions, they should notify the employees by word or sign, that "You may go to vote now, if you wish." No one should be ordered to go to the polling place, ' and the releasing should be done by the releasing crew, and not by the supervisor. And Section 11326.2 provides that observers may not electioneer during their hours of duty, whether at or away from the polling place. In order to remove any possibilities of electioneering, an observer away from the polling place for any reason during his duty hours should be accompanied by observers representing the other parties. 104 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD talking. She did not say anything to Jackson about Phillips talking to the people. On cross-examination, Brown testified that Phillips waved to employees in half of the departments. They went to 10 departments. She did not recall anybody by name to whom Phillips waved. Some employees waved back. Phillips spoke to these employees, but she did not remember their names. She did not put any names in the affidavit of March 22, 1966, which she prepared personally and in private. She did not think names were important. There were too many of them. She could not remember them all. Brown testified that the plant employees who worked the 4 p.m. to midnight shift were released to vote between 11:30 p.m. and 12:15 a.m. by Board Agent Keynard assisted by her and Observer Alewine. She testified she had no complaints about the conduct of this group. Plant Manager Gordon testified he was in department 14 about 4 o'clock in the afternoon, and observed Phillips and Jackson going through that department, with Brown 3 or 4 feet behind them. Gordon saw Phillips wave and wink to somebody behind him, and say "hi" to him. Gordon was only a few feet from them. Employees Beebe, Coile, and Jesse L. Phillips, who is the brother of Union Observer Phillips, testified that they did not remember seeing Gordon in department 14 when the releasing team including Union Observer Phillips came to department 14 on March 3 to release the employees in that department to vote. They were in department 14 at the time. They were witnesses for the General Counsel, and supported the Union in the election. Employee Teel testified that he voted between 4 and 4:30 p.m. on March 3. He was on the 4 p.m. to midnight shift in department 12. He testified that around 3:30 p.m. when he came to work he saw Phillips walking through department 12 with Jackson and Brown, and Phillips nodded his head and raised his hand to employees as they went down the aisle that led to the voting area. Teel said he was standing at the inspection desk in department 12 about 6 to 8 feet from Phillips. He did not know if he spoke to any particular person. The statement prepared by Board Agent Watson after interviewing Teel and which Teel signed contains no reference to conduct by Phillips such as raising his hand or finger or nodding to other employees. Employee Jordan testified that he was working in department 12 on March 3. He worked 12 hours a day from 4 p.m. until 4 a.m. the next morning. He worked near the aisle through which the group of Jackson, Phillips, and Brown came, "carrying" people to vote. Phillips was in front. Jordan was within 6 feet of them. There were three or four working near the aisle with Jordan. He did not recall the time they came. Phillips smiled as he came by, and one or two times he nodded his head, and one time he raised up his finger. Employee Odell Thompson Harmon testified he was working in department 17 on March 3, 1966, when Jackson, Phillips, and Brown were releasing the employees in that department to vote. Harmon was an experimental mechan- ic, and worked throughout the plant. He voted about 3 p.m. He began work at 6 a.m. and finished at 4:30 p.m. Jackson, Phillips, and Brown were standing as the employees in department 17 approached them and gathered in a group. Phillips was speaking and waving his hand at them as they approached. He was about 19 feet from Phillips when he saw Phillips speaking, and waving his hand by holding it waist high and flipping his wrist from side to side three times. Employee Reubin Davis Morris, an experimental me- chanic based in department 17, also voted at 3 p.m. on March 3. He worked from 8 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. About 16 to 20 employees went to the polling area. The voting area was about 400 yards from department 17. Jackson, Brown, and Phillips led the way to the voting area. When the employees in department 17 were assembling to leave, Phillips threw up his hand and said "Howdy." He was about 2 feet away from Phillips. Phillips also spoke to employees who were not in department 17 group going to the polls. They were employees standing by the coffee machines and water fountain. On the way to the voting area, he threw up his hands to employees working near the aisle to the voting area. Employee Gerald Dan Craft testified that he voted in the afternoon of March 3. He worked in departments 12 and 13 as an inspector. He saw Jackson, Phillips, and Brown in department 13. They were in the aisle. He saw Phillips wave a friendly wave to two or three persons. He did not see him talking to anybody. In the affidavit written by Board Agent Watson after interviewing Craft, and which Craft signed, there is no mention of Craft's seeing Phillips waving to employees, or engaging in other communication with other employees. Employee Jack Roper, who worked from 8 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. on March 3 as an inside maintenance man with plantwide duties, testified he voted in the morning about 10:30 a.m. to 11 a.m. His home location was department 73. He was released to vote by Harry Bannister, his foreman. Phillips, Alewine, Welborn, and another person whom he presumed was the Board Agent came to department 73 to have the employees released to vote. They led his department back to the voting area. Phillips was throwing up his hands, nodding, and talking. The election party and officials were talking together. Roper told Harry Bannister on March 3 about Phillip's talking. He saw Phillips four times as Phillips was in a group obtaining the release of employees to vote. Alewine was not with him every time. Brown was with him some of the time. The only time he saw Welborn with the group was when she directed it to the voting area away from the office. The group was taking the wrong side. He was in department 11 at the time. When he voted Brown was sitting at the table. Board Agent Jackson is a large person. He has an outgoing personality, is articulate, and walks with large strides as though in a hurry. Jackson testified his duties were releasing departments of employees to vote. He was present in the voting area prior to the opening of the polls at 2 p.m. when the observers were told what they could do and could not do, when the ballot box was set up and sealed, and the voting area was inspected. He was present in the voting area for about 10 minutes before the polls were closed at 5 p.m. on March 3. He observed what took place, and helped in any way he could. Brown, an observer for Respondent, and Phillips, an observer for the Union, MONROE AUTO EQUIPMENT CO. 105 accompanied hun when he released the voters in the various departments. Jackson was given a releasing schedule on which were listed the departments in Respondent's plant in numerical sequence There was no designation on the schedule of the time for the release of employees of each department or of the manner in which they were to be released. Before the polls were opened Brown, Phillips, and he agreed that the first department released would be the one nearest the polling area, and each thereafter would be released in accordance with its proximity with the one they had just released. If the numerical sequence on the list had been followed, at times they would have had to go from one extreme end of the plant to the other, unnecessarily "criss crossing the plant." They had to walk as quickly as they could to get the departments released. Jackson's recollection was that they showed the schedule to Brown voluntarily. There was constant communication among the three of them. Brown had indicated to him that Phillips probably knew more about the location of the departments than she did. Jackson would turn to Phillips and ask him where the next nearest department was located or a similar question, and after he had answered he would turn to Brown. He did not recall her ever having to ask for the schedule because it was always there for her to see and it was always available to her. Three or four times Brown made suggestions which were very helpful. Brown request- ed a few times, perhaps three or so, that he slow down. There was little time and many departments to release. He slowed down to the extent that getting to the departments and in the time allotted would permit. Jackson testified that Phillips' conduct was consistent with the instructions Sobieski and he gave to Brown and Phillips that they should not converse with their fellow employees. At no time did Phillips converse with employ- ees. Employees waved at him, and on a couple of occasions Phillips nodded his head but did not smile, wave, or wink, and kept on walking. They never stopped or slowed down when employees waved or spoke. In the majority of cases one or both of the observers were walking along with him because he did not know where he was going Sometimes he would ask where they were going, and on being told would move ahead a step or so There were some close passages where they had to move Indian style. There was no set pattern as to who went first and who followed. There might have been one or two occasions when they were near the polling area that they went back to the area and checked with Sobieski. He did not recall any complaint made to him about the conduct of Phillips. Observer Alewine, a witness for the Union, testified that he replaced Phillips at 3:55 p.m. in the group releasing the voters at the balloting on the afternoon of March 3. All the day shift, about 300, had voted by that time, and some of the night shift came in early and voted. About 400 employees voted between 2 and 4 p.m. Jackson, Brown, and he may have taken one department back to the polling area, after he had taken over from Phillips. There was a lull. They were in department 14 5 Hayden testified first Then Cordon and Roper testified Gordon and Roper were in the hearing room while Hayden testified When asked on cross-examination to explain a variation between the statement of an event As a witness called by the Union, Phillips denied that he waved at any employee, spoke to any employee, or winked at any employee or gestured to any employee. He testified that once when an employee spoke to him he reacted by nodding his head before he would catch himself. It was then they were in department 10. He spoke to Fred Harris, a group leader in the department for which Harold Walker was the foreman. Walker was not present when they went to his department to release the employees. Harris was behind a machine, and he leaned over the machine and said to him that the Board agent wished to talk to him. He talked to Jackson when Jackson talked to him. A time or two, he, Jackson, and Brown chatted. He walked with Jackson the way he usually walked. Harvey Joe Sanders, department 12, called as a witness by the Union, testified that he spoke to Phillips, when the group of Jackson, Brown, and Phillips appeared in his department to release the employees to vote, but Phillips ignored him. Jessee L. Phillips, department 14, the brother of Observer Phillips, called as a witness by General Counsel, testified he spoke to his brother, but he did not answer. Employees Hendrix, department 13; Ginn, depart- ment 18; and Lewis, department 19, who were witnesses for the General Counsel, testified that they spoke to Phillips but he ignored them. Employees Strickland, Brooks, Hendrix, Jessee L. Phillips, Beebe, Coile, Norman Sanders, Ginn, Lewis, Alton Barton Craft, Charles Alexander Ayers, Marett, T. Osborne, and N. S. Osborne, as witnesses called by the General Counsel, testified that they did not see Phillips speak, smile, wave, or gesture to any employee when Phillips, Jackson, and Brown appeared in their departments on the afternoon of March 3, 1966, to release employees to vote. They were in departments 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 18, 19, 73, and 79. These witnesses testified that they supported the Union in the election. F. The Evidence on the Sixth Objection (6) Board agents permitted the ballot box to be completely unattended in a room with an open door. Three witnesses testified for Respondent that they saw the ballot box left untended in the office of Charles Gordon, Respondent's plant manager, in the period between 11 and 11:25 p.m. immediately preceeding the beginning of the second session of the election that began at 11:30 p.m. on March 3, 1966, and ended at 12:15 a.m. on March 4, 1966. They were Neil S. Hayden, publisher of the Athens, Georgia, Banner-Herald and Daily News, who was editor and publisher of the Hartwell, Georgia Sun at the time of the election; Plant Manager Gordon; and George E. Roper, industrial relations manager of Respondent.5 Respondent's Observer Brown and Welborn gave testimo- ny about the condition of the ballot box at the beginning of the second session of the election beginning at 11:30 p.m. on March 3, 1966, and its condition at the end of the election at 12:15 a.m. on March 4, 1966. Board Agents Sobieski, Keynard, and Jackson and Union Observers Alewine and Phillips testified in rebuttal. in his affidavit that he gave the Board agent shortly after the March 3, 1966, election, and his testimony at the hearing, Gordon stated he was influenced by Hayden's testimony 106 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Plant Manager Gordon testified that he returned to the plant about 11 p.m. on March 3. It was raining. The gate he approached was locked, and he unlocked it. There were two other cars waiting at the gate. After he unlocked the gate, the three cars were driven to the parking area. He and John E. Tate, one of Respondent's attorneys, who was in his car, and the occupants of the other cars ran in the rain to the door of the plant which was unlocked. He saw Keynard running with the ballot box in his arms. Another person was with him. The door was an entry to a foyer about 10 feet wide. On the left side was the wall of his office, and on the right side the wall of the general office. Directly ahead was the wall of the quality control office, about 18 feet from the door he entered. The wall of his office on the left was 15 feet long and the wall of the General Office on the right ran the full length of the 18 feet. The space of 3 feet between the end of his office wall and the wall of the quality control office directly ahead was part of a hallway of that width running at right angles to the space from the door to the wall of the quality control office. On this hallway to the left fronted offices, including Gordon's. The hallway ended to the right in the doorway to the general office. The general office, like his office, could not be entered from the foyer. The door to his office was right next to the junction of his office wall on the left side of the foyer with the wall of his office facing the small hallway. People in the foyer could not see into his office. To look in, they would have to come to the small hallway and turn left, and either stand at an angle or stand in front of his office door. Gordon and Tate entered Gordon's office from the small hallway, and shook their coats and hung them on a rack in the corner. When they were coming through the foyer to Gordon's office there were persons in the foyer. He could not recognize them because of rain on his glasses. They stayed in the foyer. One of them came to the door of his office, and he asked him if he could use the restroom, and he told him to go ahead. Keynard came into his office with the ballot box, and placed it on a chair. He did not recall that Sobieski came in with him. Gordon did not recall Sobieski although he recalled Board Agent's Keynard and Maynard Jackson. Sobieski did not recall Gordon when he testified. Keynard had shaken the rain from his coat in the foyer, and had placed the coat over the back of a chair in the foyer. Keynard left the office immediately. Hayden, the newspaper editor and publisher, came into the office. He placed his coat on the ballot box. He, Gordon, told Hayden to get his coat off the ballot box. At this time, he realized that Hayden, one other person connected with Respondent, and himself were alone in the office. Gordon said to them that they should get out of the office, that they should not be in the office alone with the ballot box. He went looking for Keynard to tell him the ballot box was in his office with no one there to watch it. He looked into an office called the executive office, which was down the hallway from his office toward the plant, and saw persons in it drinking coffee. He also looked into the IBM room. There were some persons in there drinking coffee. He did not go into the executive office or the IBM room with Hayden or the other person who was with him. The other person could have been Tate as he had come in with him. He went to the coffee machine, in the plant, about 120 feet from his office, and had coffee. He returned to his office about 11:25 p.m. Keynard was sitting in the office guarding the ballot box. His recollection was that Sobieski was not with him. Gordon was away from his office about 15 minutes. At 11:25 p.m., Keynard motioned to everybody it was time to go to the voting area, and they started down the hall to that destination in a group. On cross-examination, Gordon's recollection was re- freshed by reference to his affidavit which he gave to a Board agent on March 31, 1966. It contained his recollection at that time of what happened in connection with his return to the plant about 11 p.m. to the time the Board agents and observers went to the polling area. Gordon stated that the statements in the affidavit were more accurate because they were made closer to the happening of the events on March 3, 1964. Gordon signed the affidavit after making corrections of the Board agent's writing of what happened as he understood Gordon's statements to him. In his affidavit, Gordon stated that he did not recall seeing Hayden during the period from I 1 p.m. to the time the Board agents and observers went to the polling area about 11:25 p.m. This statement was brought to his attention in connection with his direct testimony that Hayden came into his office after Keynard brought in the ballot box, and Hayden placed his coat on the ballot box and he told him to remove it. Gordon testified that 3 years had elapsed since the election, and apparently he testified as he did on direct after listening to Hayden's testimony of what had occurred. In the affidavit, Gordon stated that both Keynard and Sobieski came into his office with the ballot box. He testified on direct examination that he recalled that Keynard only came into the office. Gordon stated in his affidavit that he did not know the time the Board agents and observers went to the polling area. Gordon testified on direct examination that they went to the polling area at 11:25 p.m. Hayden testified that he arrived at the plant at I 1 p.m. In the lobby or foyer were two men whom he later found to be the two union observers, Alewine and Phillips. He walked into Gordon's office, took off his hat and raincoat, and laid the raincoat on the ballot box. Tate said to him that he had put his raincoat on the ballot box. His recollection was that Gordon was also in the office. He and Gordon and Tate walked down to the executive room, an extra office at the time. It was 11:10 to 11:15 p.m. A short time later he walked back to the lobby (foyer) to look at the clock. He looked at the clock in the lobby and saw it was 1 1 :25 p.m. The two men he saw in the lobby when he came in were still in the lobby. As he walked by Gordon's office he saw there was nobody in the office. Within a minute or two, two NLRB people came in and took the box that was in Gordon's office and went back into the plant. It was the box that Tate had told him was the ballot box. He also went back into the plant but did not recall where he stood. He was present in the polling area when the ballots were counted, but did not watch the counting. He took a picture of the persons counting the ballots over the heads of the large number of people watching the counting. He wrote a story about the election. MONROE AUTO EQUIPMENT CO. 107 On cross-examination by the Union's attorney, Hayden testified he was in Gordon's office for 5 to 10 minutes after arriving there at 11 p.m. He recalled someone coming to the door of Gordon's office and asking a question and then going back toward the plant. He remained 10 to 12 minutes in the executive room. There were some persons in this room having coffee and holding a discussion. He did not recall who they were. He knew Joseph S. Skelton, one of Respondent's attorneys, was somewhere, but he did not know where. Then he went to the lobby to see what time it was. He looked into Gordon's office and saw the ballot box on a chair. There were no persons in the office. He could see all of the office. When he went to the lobby to look at the clock, he saw the same two men there whom he had seen when he entered the plant at 11 p.m. He saw it was 11:25 p.m. He could have had a wrist watch on his arm, but went to look at the clock to have something to do. He returned to the executive room and saw the same people drinking coffee and making small talk. Tate and Gordon were there. He thought Roper and Skelton were there but he was not sure. He knew the box he saw in Gordon's office was the ballot box because it was the box that the Board representative picked up and carried to the polling area. He had left the executive room and was in the hall outside Gordon's office when the two NLRB men came in, through the front door. He believed they were wet. On cross-examination by counsel for the General Counsel, Hayden testified he went back to Gordon's office at 11:25 p.m., and at that time the Board agents appeared to come in from the outside. He was standing in the hall outside Gordon's door. It was 11:25, 26, 27, or 28. He believed he looked in Gordon's office on the way back from looking at the clock instead of when he was on the way to look at it. He believed that when he, Tate, and Gordon first left Gordon's office there was not anyone left in the office. There might have been seven or eight people in Gordon's office, including Sobieski and Keynard, when he first arrived there about 11 p.m. Counsel for General Counsel referred Hayden to the affidavit he had signed and had given to a Board agent shortly after the March 3 election. After reading it, Hayden testified he was in Gordon's office only 3 or 4 minutes, not 10 to 15 minutes, from the time he first arrived there, 11 p.m., until he went to the executive room. He testified that 5 minutes, not 15 minutes, elapsed between the time he left Gordon's office, at 11:03 or 11:04 p.m., until he went back to look at the clock, as he had testified. He testified it was 11:15 p.m. when he saw the two Board agents in the hall outside Gordon's office, and not 11:25 p.m. as he had testified on direct examination, and that the Board agents were in Gordon's office about 10 minutes after he saw them at 11:15 p.m., and did not pick up the ballot box when he first saw them, allegedly 11:25 p.m., and carry it to the polling area, as he had testified on direct examination. Roper testified that he and Skelton, one of the attorneys who represented Respondent, returned to the plant at approximately 10:45 p.m. on March 3. They went to Gordon's office. Board agents and union people came into the foyer at approximately 11 p.m., and he and Skelton went to the foyer and greeted them. Between 11 p.m. and the time the balloting began he was in and out of the various offices, making telephone calls, and checking with people to try to assure everybody a place to sit down if he so desired, and engaging in other similar activity. He acted as office manager as well as industrial relations manager. Between the time he greeted the people in the foyer at 11 p.m. and the time the Board agents went back to the voting area he went past Plant Manager Gordon's office. The door was open and he saw the ballot box on a chair in his office. He saw no one in the office. The wall of Gordon's office facing the small hallway was comprised of sections of frosted glass, and the figure of anyone in the office not visible through the door could be seen through the glass. On cross-examination by the attorney for the Union, Roper testified that when he went into the foyer at 11 p.m. he saw two Board agents, and Alewine and Phillips whom he considered to be the union observers. He considered the union observers to be union people. He did not know if there were other union people present. He saw the ballot box unattended on one occasion only in the interim between I1 p.m. and the time the Board agents and observers went to the voting area, which was 11:20 or 11:25 p.m. Gordon and Tate appeared after he had greeted the Board agents and union people. He saw the observers for Respondent later. When he saw the ballot box he was going to the front office from the data processing office (IBM room). He did not see anybody in the hallway. There were people in the foyer. He did not know if the Board agents were there. The union observers were in the foyer but he did not recall where they were standing. Counsel for the Union referred Roper to an affidavit he gave Board Agent Watson on March 26, 1966. The reference in the affidavit about Roper seeing the ballot box unattended included a statement that he did not see whether anyone was or was not in Gordon's office when he saw the ballot box. Roper testified that this language was Board Agent Watson's, that he said to Watson that he did not see anyone in the room. He further testified that he questioned Watson about the language, and he replied that it was irrelevant, that they were going to get another election anyway. Roper was also referred to a statement in the affidavit that he saw the Board agents in the foyer. He recalled making this statement to Watson. On cross- examination by counsel for General Counsel, Roper testified that the Board agents were in the foyer at the time he saw the ballot box unattended. He testified on redirect that everybody in the foyer was standing to his right as he approached the foyer, and it would be impossible for them to see anyone who came up the hallway and enter Gordon's office. He gave the same testimony on recross-examination. Roper again testified that he questioned Watson's writing of events as he related them to Watson, and that Watson said that the way it was stated was irrelevant, that they were going to get another election anyway. Respondent's Observer Brown was asked a leading question on direct examination in regard to an event that occurred about the time the observers and Board agents went to the voting area that evening of March 3, 1966, for the second voting session. She was referred to 11:30 p.m. as the time when they went to the voting area. She, in answering the question, left the impression that her testimony was that they went to the voting area at 11:30 108 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD p.m. In an affidavit dated March 22, 1966, which Mrs. Brown gave, and which she personally prepared, Mrs. Brown stated that they went to the polling area at 11:15 p.m. Mrs. Virginia Welborn, the other observer for Respondent, testified that they went to the polling area at 11:15 to 11:20 p.m. Roper testified on cross-examination by the union attorney that they went to the voting area at 11:20 to 11:25 p.m. On direct examination, Keynard testified that he and Sobieski arrived at the plant at 11 p.m. on March 3, 1966. He removed the ballot box from the trunk of the automobile they were using. It had been there at all times since the end of the first voting session at 5 p.m. They walked into Plant Manager Gordon's office. Skelton, Tate, and Gordon were there. He placed the ballot box on a chair and sat down near it. Sobieski came in with him. He recalled that someone came in Gordon's office after they did. This person asked Sobieski whether he could use the bathroom, and asked for directions. Tate told him it was all right after he had inquired where the person was going, and had been told the person wished to go to the bathroom. Sobieski and he stayed in Gordon's office until about 11:15 p.m. At or about 11:15 p.m., all the observers, the company officials and attorneys, and he and Sobieski gathered together, and proceeded to the voting area. Keynard recalled that during the time he and Sobieski were in Gordon's office a man came in and placed his hat on the top of the ballot box. Tate, Respondent's counsel, jumped up, and he jumped up and said "That box has got to be free and clear and nobody is supposed to be anywhere near the box except a Board agent." The man removed his hat. Keynard then testified that from 11 p.m. when he first entered Gordon's office until they proceeded to the voting area he was right next to the ballot box in Gordon's office, and the ballot box was not out of his sight or his reach. He testified that Sobieski remained in the room with him, but might have gone as far as the door when an observer asked him about going to the bathroom. Sobieski testified that he and Keynard returned to the plant at approximately 11 p.m. on March 3, 1966. They took the ballot box out of the trunk of the automobile they were driving. They brought it into Plant Manager Gordon's office. He was not positive whether he or Keynard carried it. They met Skelton and Tate in Gordon's office. It was raining. Somebody entered Gordon's office while he and Keynard were there. He placed his hat and raincoat on the ballot box. Those present made a joke of this incident. It was remarked by someone present that he had put his hat and coat on hallowed ground. One of the union observers came to the door of Gordon's office, and asked if he could go to the men's room, and he allowed him to do so as they had some time before moving to the polling area Tate went after the observer, and asked him where he was going Sobieski said he let him go to the "head" because there was time. Tate said he did not want him running around the plant. Alewine's and Phillips' testimony discloses they told Tate they were going to the restroom in the plant, and Tate told them to use the restroom on the hallway close to Gordon's office. At 11:15 p.m. Sobieski, Keynard, Skelton, Tate, and the observers moved toward the voting area. Sobieski testified he did not know Plant Manager Gordon, that he believed he was the gentleman sitting next to Tate at the counsel table . He recalled there were others in Gordon's office besides Tate, Skelton, Keynard, himself, and the person who put his coat on the ballot box. He recalled he had a conversation with Skelton about his helping him cash a check at a local bank sometime during the day. He testified he was in the office from the time he arrived there until they went to the polling area back in the plant, and that the ballot box was sitting in a chair during that time. The closest he was to leaving was when he talked to the union observer at the door about the latter 's request to go to the restroom . He testified that Tate was also present during this time except when he went after the observer who was on his way to the restroom in the plant. Sobieski testified on cross-examination that he did not recall whether the union observers were present in the foyer when he and Keynard entered the plant at 11 p.m. He testified he expected them to be there as he had told them he would be there at I I p.m. Union observer Donald Alewine testified that he returned the evening of March 3 to the plant for the second voting session. He arrived at the plant about 11:10 p.m. Union observer William J. Phillips was there with his brother. He and Phillips went in together . They walked through the door leading to the foyer . He wished to go to the restroom, and went to the door of Gordon's office, stuck his head in , and asked if he and Phillips had time to go to the waterhouse. The men's restroom in the plant was called the waterhouse . Sobieski said they still had a few minutes, and they started toward the plant . Tate stopped them and asked where they were going. When he learned where they were going, he told them to use the office restroom across the hallway from Gordon 's office. He remembered that Sobieski, Keynard, Tate, and Gordon were in the office . When he and Phillips came out of the restroom the Board agents, the two observers for Respon- dent, and Tate were standing in the hallway. Sobieski said "Let's go." It was about 11:15 p.m. He and Phillips, Respondent's observers Anne Brown and Virginia Wel- born, Sobieski , Keynard, and Tate went to the polling area immediately. Union observer Phillips testified that he and Alewine returned to the plant around 11 :05 to 11:10 p.m. on March 3, and went to Gordon's office door about 11:10 p.m. He corroborated the remainder of Alewine's testimony except that he testified he saw Skelton in Gordon's office in addition to the others Alewine named, and saw Skelton in the group leaving for the polling area in addition to those Alewine named. He testified he did not see the ballot box when he looked in Gordon's office at the time Alewine asked if there was time to go to the waterhouse . Alewme did not testify as to whether he saw the ballot box when he looked in Gordon's office. There is undisputed evidence that at the conclusion of the first voting session at 5 p .m. on the afternoon of March 3, Board Agent Sobieski sealed the slit on the top side of the ballot box through which the voters placed their ballots in the box. He sealed it with a piece of masking tape 2-1/2 inches in width, and each of the four observers wrote his or her signatures on the box left of the tape and close to the slit, across the tape over the slit or close thereto, and on the MONROE AUTO EQUIPMENT CO. 109 box on the right side of the tape and close to the slit. No one complained at this time that the slit was not sealed, or not properly sealed. At the time the box was sealed at the close of the first voting session at 5 p .m., or at the time just before the commencement of the second voting at 11:30 p.m., a certification on conduct of election for the first voting session was signed by each of the four observers and by Sobieski. They certified that the balloting at the first session of the election from 2 p.m. to 5 p.m. on March 3, 1966, was fairly conducted, that all eligible voters were given an opportunity to vote their ballots in secret, and that the ballot box was protected in the interest of a fair and secret vote.6 Keynard had custody of the ballot box from the time it was sealed at 5 p.m. on March 3, 1966, to the time it was placed on a chair in the voting area about 11:20 p.m. During the period from 5 until 11 p.m. Keynard had it under lock and key in the trunk of the automobile he was using. There is the issue of course whether the ballot box was left unattended by Keynard and Sobieski for a period of 5 to 10 minutes after Keynard had placed it on a chair in Plant Manager's Gordon's office about 11 p.m. Although the ballot box was exposed to the view of the group that went to the voting area from Gordon's office, when it was carried from Gordon's office to the voting area for the second voting session, and to the view of others as well when it was in Gordon's office, no complaint or other comment was made that the seal was any different than when affixed by Sobieski and when the observers wrote across it. Sobieski testified that he showed the ballot box to the observers and Board Agent Keynard about 11:30 p.m. after they had arrived at the voting area, and he thereupon removed the seal and announced that the polls were open. Keynard, Alewine, and Phillips corroborate this evidence. Keynard testified he was the one who removed the seal, but I credit Sobieski. Observers Brown and Welborn testified that they did not see the seal removed, and were not given 6 Section 11332 of the Board's Internal Instructions and Guidelines for Representation Proceedings (1967) provides: At the close of a voting session which is not the last one, observers should sign the certification on conduct with the added notation "Session #I " or "a.m . session." The ballot box slot should be securely sealed , and observers should be encouraged to make any markings thereon which will assure them, upon resumption of voting, that the box has not been tampered with. Badges should be collected. Between voting sessions the ballot box is retained by the Board agent who is solely responsible for the custody of the box. 7 Testimony was given of the events that transpired in connection with the closing of the polls at 12:15 p.m., and the counting of the votes and the signing of the tally of ballots. This evidence shows clearly that these events were conducted in accordance with the laboratory conditions in the Board's instructions and guidelines , and I so find. The court found it unnecessary to take evidence on objections of Respondent regarding these events, holding that the objections were insubstantial. I do not make specific findings in regard to these events, as they are not in issue. Mrs. Welborn testified she found a marked ballot on the floor the next day, and that it was marked against representation by the Union. However, this ballot, which could not have decided the election , could have been on the floor due to any one of a number of reasons . Mrs. Welborn also testified that at the same time the next day she saw the ballot box with one of the sides open . When the ballot box was upturned by Sobieski on the morning of March 4, and the ballots were dumped on the table in the voting area preparatory to their being counted, Sobieski hit the box hard with his fist to dislodge any ballots that may have been stuck in the flaps inside the box. This action by Sobieski opened up the side of the box. Observers Welborn, Brown, Alewine and Phillips, and Sobieski , at the conclusion of the opportunity to do so. I find they had the opportunity, but may not have taken advantage of it. Brown, Welborn, Alewine, Phillips, Sobieski and Keynard, and Tate went to the voting area in the group from Gordon's office about 11:15 p.m. Skelton may have also been in the group. Any tampering of the seal would have been noticed at this time by one of the persons representing Respondent. The ballot box rested on a chair in the voting area from the time the group reached the voting area, about 11:20 p.m. until Sobieski showed it to those present just before removing the seal and announcing that the polls were open. Tate, Respondent's attorney, was present until just before Sobieski removed the seal, checking to see that everything was in order. It is difficult to believe, and I do not believe, that any tampering with the seal would have been unnoticed by him.7 G. Credibility Resolutions Upon evaluation of demeanor testimony and oral and written evidence in context I make the following credibility resolutions.8 1. The first objection I credit the testimony of Respondent's employee witnesses Teel, Jordon, Howard Sanders, Gerald Dan Craft, Johnson, Holbrook, and Bowen that employees supporting the Union said to them they would lose their jobs if they did not vote for the Union in the March 1966 election. The employee union supporters making these statements were Harvey Joe Sanders, Reed Ayers, Claude Fulgam, Charles Ward, Ray Vickory, Ralph Vickory, and Andy Adams. I do not credit the testimony of Phillips and Madden that employee union supporters said to them they would lose their jobs if they did not support the Union. They refused to the voting, the counting of the ballots, and the signing of the tally of votes, signed a certification on conduct relating to the voting at the second session from 11 :30 p.m. on March 3, 1966, to 12:15 p.m. on March 4, 1966. Like their certification for the first voting session that was held from 2 to 5 p.m. on March 3, it was a certification that the balloting was fairly conducted, all eligible voters were given an opportunity to vote their ballots in secret, and the ballot box was protected in the interest of a fair and secret vote. No one complained. 8 Witnesses were questioned on cross-examination on their testimony on direct in relation to statements taken by Board Agent Watson regarding the preelection conduct and conduct during the election. Watson had asked the witnesses questions and they answered . Watson then reduced the answers to writing in the form of narrative statements , and the witnesses signed them. A verification before Watson is present on the statements. Some of the witnesses gave testimony at the hearing not included in their statements. Unless the : demeanor and other testimony of these witnesses showed they were not reliable, and there is evidence that Watson completely exhausted their knowledge of events at the time the statements were taken, I do not consider their testimony regarding events to be lacking in probative value merely because there are no references to the events in the statements. This applies even where a sentence is present above the signature of a witness that the statement or affidavit includes his complete knowledge of what occurred or there is present some other boilerplate sentence of the same meaning. The Board agent may not have asked the questions that would have elicited the answers about the events which he then would have reduced to writing. Affidavits are not a substitute for affirmative oral testimony in a hearing for the taking of oral testimony. An exception is where the affidavit or statement is an admission against interest by a party, and properly identified. Affidavits or statements may be used to refresh the recollection of a witness or to impeach him. 110 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD disclose the identity of the employees making the statements to them. Phillips refused because he wished to avoid causing trouble in the plant. Madden refused because of fear of reprisals in the form of resumption of anonymous telephone calls which he and his wife received for about 2 weeks before the election . His wife received the calls made about 11 p .m. when he was working on the second shift. He received the later calls made as late as 3 a.m. in the morning. Mark Louis Johnson who was told while waiting in line to vote by other employees that he would lose his job if he did not vote for the Union did not know the identity of the employees making the statement to him . I credit his testimony as corroborative testimony. I credit the testimony of employee Jordan that Claude Fulgam, as a member of a group of employee union supporters talking to him, said to him that employees who did not support the Union could be beaten up with chains. I further credit the testimony of employee Mize that employee Andy Adams said he would have to whip him when he spoke against selecting the Union to represent the employees. I find further from all the evidence , including demeanor testimony, that Adams' statement was not friendly. I do not credit Adams' and Seawnght's testimony that it was friendly. I credit the testimony of employee Howard Sanders that employees Jerry Garland and Britt Sorrells tampered daily with his machine for a period of time before the election because he did not support the Union, and that he had to spend an hour each day at the beginning of his work shift to correct the results of the tampering in order to begin normal machine operation. 2. The second objection I credit Jordan's testimony that on the Sunday evening before the Thursday on which the election was held he received a telephone call by an unidentified caller at Terry's Service Station in Hartwell where he was helping out the owner who was ill, and the unidentified caller cursed him and promised "to get him" if he did not vote for the Union. The caller made these statements after saying Jordan was "running his mouth" and they were watching him. I credit the testimony of Howard C. Sanders, who was employed on the 4 p.m. to midnight shift, that while sleeping early one morning during the period of the organizational activity preceding the election, an unidentified caller telephoned his home, and, when he was called to the telephone by his wife, asked him if he was going to sign a union card , and when he replied that he was satisfied with what he was being paid, the caller said "Go to hell, God damn you." I credit Madden's testimony that within the 2-week period before the election telephone calls were made to his home by unidentified callers. As many as three were made daily. The first call was around 11 p.m. when he was still working on the second shift, and the last about 3 a.m. in the morning. The 11 p.m. call was received by his wife and frightened her. I credit employee Kay's testimony that about 7:30 p.m. on March 3, the day of the election, when he was working on the second shift, he received a telephone call by an unidentified caller who stated that he would kill him at 1 a.m. for what he did outside the plant gate that afternoon. Kay had been at the gate that afternoon, and had said to the employees as they entered that they should vote and think for themselves. Employee Hendrix appeared in the polling area that afternoon, after he had voted, and attempted to complain to Board Agent Sobieski about Kay's conduct at the plant gate , but Sobieski refused to listen and requested him to leave . Hendrix complied with his request. 3. The third and fourth objections I credit Teel's testimony that Claude Fulgam said to him and other employees in department 12 before the election that management paid union dues, it was on their check stubs, and they received better benefits because they belonged to the Union; that he saw Fulgam show the other employees a check stub or voucher of a supervisor's paycheck, that he spoke to Gerald Davis, his foreman, about what Fulgam said to him and the other employees; and that Gerald Davis came to him and the other employees with check stubs, showed them the deduction under the heading of union dues or other, and said it was for Georgia income tax. I credit Jordan's testimony that, a week or two before the election , Fulgam made the same statement to him about foremen and supervisors being members of the Union, and having more benefits because they were members, and left a check stub on his machine for him to look at. I credit Craft's testimony that about 2 weeks before the election, Harvey Joe Sanders told him that foremen and supervisors belonged to the Union, and he could prove it by check stubs, and that he also said to him that they had more benefits than rank-and-file employees had because they had membership in the Union. I credit Holbrook's testimony that the day before the election Harvey Joe Sanders said to him that foremen and salaried people were paying union dues and drawing better benefits than they were . I do not credit Sanders' denial that he made this statement to Holbrook . I also credit the testimony of Harmon, Reuben Davis Morris, and union observer Alewme that there was a general rumor in the plant before the election that salaried personnel were union members and paid union dues. I do not credit employee John T. Price's testimony that 2 weeks before the election a group of employees that had been trying to get him to sign a card, but whose names he did not remember, said to him that foremen and other straight salaried employees belonged to the Union and paid union dues, and that following this representation to him he signed a card, or his testimony that after he signed the card he asked foremen if they were members of the Union and paid dues to the Union . In these circumstances, Price's failure to remember the names of the employees is the same as a refusal to disclose the names . It appears to me that Price could have remembered, upon reasonable effort, the names of employees who had tried a number of times to persuade him to sign a union card. 4. The fifth objection Upon evaluation of the testimony of all the witnesses who gave testimony at the June 1969 hearing in regard to union observer Phillips' conduct when releasing voters on the MONROE AUTO EQUIPMENT CO. 111 afternoon of March 3, 1966 to vote in the election held at Respondent's plant on that date I make, in the following paragraphs, findings with respect to this conduct. The team of Board Agent Jackson, Respondent's observer Brown, and union observer Phillips left the polling area to release voters shortly after the polls were opened at 2 p.m., and did this work until approximately 3:55 p.m. At this time union observer Alewine replaced Phillips as the second shift employees who began work at 4 p.m. voted from that time until the polls were closed at 5 p.m. Alewine who worked on the second shift had a better knowledge of the second shift employees. Jackson, Brown, and Alewine released voters until 5 p.m. At the second voting session which began at 11:30 p.m. and ended at 12:15 a.m. the team releasing the voters consisted of Board Agent Keynard, Brown, and Alewine. Alewine's conduct in releasing voters either during the period from 4 to 5 p.m. on March 3, 1966, or from 11:30 p.m. to 12:15 a.m. on March 3 and 4, 1966, is not in issue. The team of Jackson, Brown, and Phillips visited 10 to 14 departments on the afternoon of March 3. Jackson talked to the foremen of each department to inform him that it was time for the employees in his department to vote. The employees in the department were informed by Jackson, and in a few instances by Phillips to assemble at the foreman's desk. Then Jackson told the employees they were released to go to the polling area to vote, they should leave as quietly as possible, and they should return to their work locations as quickly as they could. Jackson was a stranger to the layout of the plant area and the locations of the departments. Brown was not familiar enough with the plant area to give quick instructions to Jackson as she had been an office employee since September 1963, and had worked in the plant area only from May 1963 to September 1963. Phillips, on the other hand, was familiar with it. He had been employed by Respondent at the time of the election in the plant area for a total of 3 years. Jackson relied on Phillips for the locations of the departments and the quickest route to each of them. Phillips on many occasions walked abreast with Jackson to be of assistance to him. Brown walked behind, and had difficulty in keeping up with the long quick strides of Jackson. There were times when Brown walked abreast of Jackson. On occasion the team would use intradepart- ment aisles instead of general lanes or interdepartmental aisles as short cuts to save time. The team did not lead the departmental groups from their respective departments to the voting area. There were three or four occasions when Jackson was of the opinion that further instructions from Sobieski were necessary and they returned to consult with him. They also returned to the voting area about 3:50 p.m. so that Alewine could change places with Phillips. With Alewine as a member, it returned to the polling area shortly before 5 p.m. upon completing all releasing assignments. When Jackson, Brown, and Phillips returned to the voting area, it appeared they were leading the employees down the general lanes in the direction of the voting area. I credit employee Teel's testimony that about 3:30 p.m. he saw Jackson, Phillips, and Brown in the general lane leading to the voting area from the place he was standing in the vicinity of department 12, and that Phillips was about 6 to 8 feet from him when he passed by. I credit his testimony that Phillips nodded his head and raised his hand. I do not credit Teel's testimony that the nod and raising of the hand were directed at employees. It is undisputed that Jackson with his effervescent personality talked with Phillips as they moved from one location to another. The nod and gesture were physical movements of Phillips connected with his conversation with Jackson. I credit Jordan's testimony that he saw Phillips the afternoon of March 3 when he was releasing employees to vote along with Jackson and Brown. He was returning to the voting area, and Jordan was standing about 6 feet from him in the vicinity of department 12 when he saw him. Jordan began work at 4 p.m. while Phillips ceased releasing employees to vote about 3:50 p.m. However, I credit Jordan's affirmative testimony that he saw Phillips. Teel's testimony discloses that the releasing team was in the vicinity of department 12 between 3:30 and 4 p.m. Jordan had arrived about this time, like Teel, to be ready for work at 4 p.m. I credit Jordan's testimony that Phillips smiled as he passed him, nodded his head twice, and raised his finger once. I do not credit his testimony that the smiling, nodding, and raising of the finger were directed at the four employees nearby. I find they were physical movements related to his conversing with Jackson. I make the findings on Teel's and Jordan's testimony, partly on the testimony of Jackson, Phillips, and the witnesses for the General Counsel who were in the vicinity of department 12 at that time. General Counsel's witnesses were Strickland and Brooks. I credit employee Harmon's testimony that he was about 19 feet from Phillips when he, Jackson, and Brown arrived in department 17 to release the voters, and that he was saying something to the employees in department 17, and signaling to them by flipping his wrist, as they approached Phillips and the others, where they were standing near the foreman's desk. The employees were informed by Jackson that they were being released to vote, were to go as quietly as possible to the voting area, and were to return as quickly as possible to their work locations. I credit Harmon's testimony he did not hear what Phillips said. I find that Phillips by word of mouth and by signaling with his hand was merely directing the employees to go where Jackson, Brown, and he were standing. This is permissible conduct for an observer under the Board's Internal Instructions and Guidelines referred to supra, footnote 4. I rely partly on the testimony of Jackson and Phillips for this finding. I credit the testimony of Reuben Davis Morris, who like Harmon, was in department 17 when Jackson, Phillips, and Brown arrived to release the employees in that department to vote, that as many as 16 to 20 employees were assembling in a group where Jackson, Phillips, and Brown were standing, and the assembling was being done partly in response to Phillips' direction by word of mouth and signaling. Phillips said "howdy" as the employees were assembling. I also credit Morris' testimony that Jackson, Phillips, and Brown were in front of the employees 2 feet from Morris, at least part of the way to the voting area, and that Phillips said "howdy" to employees of other depart= ments standing at the coffee machines and water fountain 112 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD as he and the others in the releasing group passed them, and also that, while Phillips and the others in the group were in front of Morris and the other employees, Phillips raised one of his hands a couple of times. I do not credit Morris' testimony that Phillips raised his hand in the direction of employees working near the aisle when he passed them. The raising of the hand could well have been in connection with a conversation between Jackson and Phillips. In making these findings I also rely in part on the testimony of Jackson and Phillips, and the Board's internal instructions and guidelines referred to supra, footnote 4. I do not credit employee Craft's testimony that he saw Phillips in the aisle in department 13 along with Jackson and Brown on the afternoon of March 3, and that, although he did not see him talking to anyone, he did see him waving a friendly wave to two or three other people. Craft was employed on the second shift which began work at 4 p.m. Phillips was not in the group releasing employees after 3:50 p.m. There is no testimony of the time Craft was in the vicinity of department 13 before he began work at 4 p.m. In any event, if he was present and saw Phillips moving his hand toward employees, this movement was a signal to them to assemble or to start moving toward the voting area. It was in connection with his duties as a member of the group releasing the employees. I make this finding partly on the testimony of Jackson, Phillips, General Counsel's witness Hendrix, and the Board's Internal Instructions and Guidelines supra, footnote 4. I do not credit the testimony of Plant Manager Gordon that he was in department 14 about 4 p.m. on the afternoon of March 3 and saw Phillips wave and wink to somebody behind Gordon, and wave and say "hi" to him. Phillips was not releasing employees at 4 p.m. He was back in the voting area at 3:55 p.m. to take over Alewme's duties in the voting area. I credit Alewine's testimony that Phillips, Brown, and he, as a releasing team, were in department 14 shortly after 4 p.m. and went from there to the voting area in front of the department 14 employees they released to vote. There is no issue with respect to Alewine's conduct. In making this finding I also rely on Gordon's demeanor testimony as a witness and his faulty recollection at the hearing of events that occurred on March 3, as will be disclosed in connection with his testimony relating to the objection that Board agents left the ballot box unattended. The third basis for rejecting his testimony is the testimony of Jackson, Phillips, and General Counsel's witnesses Beebe, Coile, and Jesse L. Phillips. The latter witnesses were in department 14 at the time the releasing team, including observer Phillips, came to that department. They testified they did not recall seeing Gordon in that department on the afternoon of March 3. Respondent offered no testimony to corroborate Gordon's testimony of his claimed coincidental appearance in department 14 at the time the releasing team including Phillips was present there, and his hearing Phillips say "hi" to an employee, and seeing him wave at him. None of the employees who testified for Respondent were employed in department 14. Neither did Respondent offer evidence, nor did Gordon testify, regarding what brought him to a department and his watching what was taking place there when the employees were allegedly grouping to go to the voting area. His presence could well have a persuasive impact on the minds of the employees with respect to their decision to vote against or for the Union. I do not credit the testimony of Jack Roper who testified for Respondent because of his faulty recollection and general, evasive answers. His recollection was that he voted between 10:30 to 11 a.m. on the morning of March 3. As found, the election did not begin until 2 p.m. He recalled seeing a group consisting of Phillips, Alewine, Welborn, and Jackson coming from the office to the polling area. Phillips and the others were chatting and throwing up their hands. They were going down the wrong aisle, and Welborn stopped them and directed them to the aisle which led to the voting area. During the preelection conference that was held between about 10 and 11:30 a.m. representatives of Respondent and the union and Board agents went to the voting area in a group to inspect the voting area, and to discuss procedures to be followed in that area when the voting began. They went in a group from the office to the voting area. The group included Board agents, Phillips, Alewine, Brown, and Welborn, as well as other representatives of Respondent and the Union. The group went from the office at the front of Respondent's place of business to the voting area in the plant area at the rear of the building. This was the group that Roper saw. It included Alewine as well as Phillips and Welborn as well as Brown. They were chatting and talking as they had a right to do. Their conduct between 10:30 to 1 I a.m. in the morning of March 3 has no relevancy to the question whether the union observer engaged in conduct that interfered with the right of employees to exercise a free choice in the election. I do not credit the conclusionary testimony of Brown, Respondent's observer, who was a member of the releasing team or group that also included Jackson and Phillips, that Phillips waved to employees in 5 of the 10 departments they visited, and spoke to these employees, except insofar as it corroborates the testimony I have credited of plant employees who testified for Respondent. I premise this finding on Brown's demeanor testimony, and the testimony of Jackson, Phillips, General Counsel's witnesses, the testimony of other employee witnesses for the Respondent, and the Board's Internal Instructions and Guidelines. I do not credit Respondent's observer Brown's testimony that Jackson did not permit her to look at the list of departments on the releasing schedule when Jackson, Phillips, and she released employees to vote from 2 to 4 p.m. on March 3, and, as a result, she did not know where she was going, or that Jackson sought advice and direction only from Phillips and ignored her, or that Jackson and Phillips walked fast purposely so she could not keep up with them as they traveled to and from departments, and through departments. I credit the testimony of Jackson whom I find to be a highly credible witness 9 that he did not knowingly keep the list of departments from Brown, that it was always available to her if she wished to look at it or indicated she wished to 9 Jackson was not with the Board when he gave testimony at the June matters not relevant or material to the issues before me presumably to test 1969 heanng Respondent's Counsel Tate asked Jackson questions about Jackson's memory or recollection of events on March 3, 1966, that are in MONROE AUTO EQUIPMENT CO. look at it. There is no evidence she asked Jackson for the list and that he refused her request. In any event the list had lost a good deal of its importance by reason of the agreement reached by Jackson, Brown, and Phillips that the departmental employees would not be released in accord- ance with the numerical sequence of their respective departments, which is the way the departments were typed on the releasing list, but by starting with the department closest to the voting area, and then by the next closest, etc. Some departments although next to each other numerically were separated by substantial distances even to the width or length of the plant. To have followed the numerical listing would have meant the unnecessary loss of a substantial amount of the available 2 hours from 2 to 4 p.m. for the releasing of the day shift to vote. I credit Jackson's testimony that Brown acknowledged she was not as familiar with the plant area as Phillips was, and that Jackson relied on Phillips for the identification of the department closest to the voting area and closest to the department just released. Jackson testified that Brown did request him to slow down three or four times, and he did. His testimony does show, however, that he had the objective of releasing to vote all the employees on the day shift, about 350, before 4 p.m., the end of the workday for that shift, and slowed down to meet Brown's request to the extent that the objective of releasing all the day-shift employees to vote would not be defeated. I find that the objective was accomplished at 3:50 p.m., and would not have been accomplished had Jackson slowed down any more than he did. Jackson's demeanor testimony showed him to be an unusually personable person with natural courtesy and charm. He would not intentionally have moved ahead of a member of the opposite sex if he had not been on a mission, and had not set out to accomplish it in a fast moving natural gait. Under more appropriate circumstances, I am sure that Jackson would have extended more adequately his natural charm and courtesy to Mrs. Brown, a personable and charming lady. I do not credit Brown's testimony that Sobieski instructed her and the other observers to keep their mouths shut and not say anything about anything or in any circumstances. Sobieski testified that he said to the observers that they should not talk to anyone, but refer any questions to Jackson for him to answer. Phillips testified that they were instructed as to what they could say or not say, and what they could do or not do. Phillips also testified that when Harold Walker, a foreman, was absent from his depart- ment, he said to Harris, the group leader, who was in charge in Walker's absence, that the Board agent wished to talk to him. Section 11330.4 of the Board's Internal Instructions and Guidelines for Representation Proceedings permits observers, with or without a Board agent accompanying them, to inform the foreman that they were releasing the employees, and to notify the employees by word or sign that they could go to the voting area if they wished to do so. I construe this section to permit the observers, where a Board agent accompanies them, to, at least, assist the Board issue. He answered forthrightly that he did not recall or did not know. I find that these questions and answers are not substantial evidence of Jackson's inability to recall March 3, 1966, events as they occurred 113 agent in this work, including informing employees by word or sign to assemble in order to hear what the Board agent has to say in regard to their going to the voting area and their return, or saying to an acting foreman that the Board agent wished to talk to him. I do not construe Sobieski's instruction to have banned observers Brown and Phillips from exercising the duties normally performed by observ- ers, which would include their assembling the employees by word or sign, where the Board agent could tell them they were free to go to the polls, to go quietly and to return as quickly as possible, or in some circumstances where the Board agent is momentarily absent, to convey the above information to the employees. There was nothing objection- able in Phillips informing Harris that Jackson wished to talk to him. 5. The sixth objection To support its sixth objection that Board agents left the ballot box completely unattended in a room with an open door, Respondent relies on the testimony of Newspaper Publisher and Editor Hayden, and of Respondent's Plant Manager Gordon and its Industrial Relations : Manager Roper. In Respondent's effort to show that the ballot box could have been tampered with while it was allegedly unattended, Respondent's witnesses Hayden, Gordon, and Roper testified that Alewine and Phillips, union observers, were in the lobby which was close to Gordon's office, during the time the box was allegedly unattended. And in Respondent's efforts to show that the ballot box had been tampered with, Respondent's witnesses Brown and Wel- born testified as to what they considered to be the flimsiness of the box and their lack of opportunity to see it when it was brought into the polling area for the second session of the election that began at 11:30 p.m. on March 3, 1966. It is undisputed that the time union observers Alewine and Phillips were in Respondent's plant from the time they arrived shortly after 11 p.m. until they left for the voting area was spent in the lobby except for the time, which was approximately 5 minutes, when they went to the door of Gordon's office, and Alewine asked Sobieski for permission to go to the plant employees' restroom in the plant, and with Tate's permission they used the restroom off the hallway and close to Gordon's office. There is not a scintilla of evidence that they were in any place where they did not have a right to be prior to the time they, Respondent's observers, Sobieski, Keynard, Tate, and Skelton went to the polling area. I further find that the testimony of Sobieski, Keynard, Welborn, Alewine, and Phillips shows that Sobieski, Keynard, Welborn, Brown, Alewine, Phillips, Tate, and Skelton left from the hallway, directly in front of Gordon's office at 11:15 p.m. on the evening of March 3, 1966, for the polling or voting area, and arrived there by 11:20 p.m. As previously found, observer Brown did not testify as to the time the group, including her, left for the polling area, except to respond to a question of Tate with a reference in it to her arrival at the polling area at 11:30 p.m. Brown, concerning which he testified, and do not establish a substantial foundation for argument by Respondent's Counsel that Jackson is not a reliable witness of these events of March 3, 1966. 114 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD however, in the affidavit of March 22, 1966 , which she personally typed, and signed in the presence of Board Agent Watson, stated that she and Welborn led the group to the voting area at 11:15 p.m Tate and Skelton did not testify. Hayden testified that he saw two Board agents pick up the ballot box at 11 :25 p.m. and take it to the polling area. However, on cross-examination he was shown his affidavit which he gave to a Board agent in March 1966. He identified the affidavit as his. In the affidavit is the statement that the two Board agents appeared at the entrance to Gordon's office at 11:15 p.m. Gordon testified that the Board agents and the observers went to the polling area at 11:25 p.m . However, in his affidavit of March 1966, which he gave to Board Agent Watson, he stated that he did not know when the Board agents and the observers went to the polling area. When shown his statement, Gordon testified that his recollection was faulty because of the lapse of time, that the statement better disclosed his knowledge of the events , and that he was influenced by Hayden 's testimony. Both Gordon and Roper were present in the hearing room when Hayden testified . Roper testified that the group went to the voting area at 11 :20 to 11:25 p.m. I do not credit Roper's testimony as no foundation was laid for this conclusionary statement. Roper was Respondent's office manager as well as industrial relations manager , and was spending his time going from one place to another in the plant in performance of many duties as office manager. No probative evidence places him in the vicinity of Gordon's office from 11:20 to 11:25 p.m., nor does evidence disclose particular circum- stances from which an inference could be drawn that he was there at 11:20 to 11:25 p.m. On evaluation of all the testimony, including demeanor testimony, I have made the finding that the Board agents, observers, Tate and Skelton went to the polling or voting area at 11 : 15 p.m. I have found, supra, and I hereby affirm the finding, that there is no substantial evidence that the ballot box, sealed at 5 p.m. on March 3, 1966 , at the conclusion of the first voting session, was tampered with from the time it was in the custody of Sobieski and Keynard starting at 5 p .m. until it was placed on a chair in the voting area at approximately 11:20 p.m., or that the box unsealed under proper conditions when brought to the voting area was tampered with from that time until the polls were opened at 11:30 p.m., or from 11:30 p.m . until the box was opened by Sobieski to disgorge all the ballots on the table in the voting area so they could be counted . Sobieski hit the box with his huge strong hand to dislodge any ballots stuck inside the box. This accounted for the opened seam Welborn saw the next morning. The box had not been destroyed as was the custom, but deposited in a trash basket where it was retrieved by Respondent the next morning The box was offered in evidence by Respondent, and received in evidence after it was identified by Sobieski as the ballot box. I credit Hayden's testimony that he came into Gordon's office shortly after II p.m. on the evening of March 3, 1966, and placed his raincoat on the ballot box which was resting on a chair, that someone said he had placed his coat on the ballot box, and he removed the coat and hung it on a rack located in a corner of the office. I credit his testimony that while he was in the office someone came to the door and made an inquiry of someone who was in the office with him, and who went to the door, and I credit Hayden's testimony that Tate and Gordon were in the office when he entered it, and that others were in the office at this time in addition to Tate and Gordon. This testimony of Hayden is corroborated by the testimony of Sobieski and Keynard. Sobieski and Keynard testified that Gordon and Tate were in Gordon's office when they entered it with the ballot box, and that they, Gordon, and Tate were in Gordon's office when Hayden entered it and placed his raincoat on the ballot box, and removed it after someone said to him that he had placed his coat on the ballot box. Sobieski testified that he went to the door of Gordon's office, where union observer Alewine requested of him permission for him and Phillips , the other union observer, to go to the restroom in the plant , and Tate told them to go to the restroom on the hallway close to Gordon's office. I do not credit Hayden's testimony that at 11:10 to 11:15 p.m. he left Gordon's office in the company of Gordon and Tate and went to the executive room which was down the hallway from Gordon's office in the direction of the plant and the polling or voting area, returned after a stay in the executive room by way of the hallway past Gordon's office on to the foyer or lobby to look at the clock which showed the time of 11:25 p.m., that when he went past Gordon's office toward the lobby he looked in Gordon 's office and saw therein the ballot box on a chair, but also saw there were no persons in that office. Nor do I credit Gordon's testimony that Keynard only brought the ballot box into his office when he and Tate were present there shortly after 11 p .m. and that Keynard left immediately, and that he, Hayden, and someone else who could have been Tate, as he came into the plant with him, left Gordon's office at Gordon's suggestion when he saw that they were in the office alone with the ballot box, that he went alone to the coffee machines in the plant and met and talked to people in that area, and returned 15 minutes later to his office and found Keynard there guarding the ballot box, and that the Board agents and observers went to the polling area at 11 :25 p.m. upon instruction of Keynard. I do not credit Roper's testimony that in performing many duties as office manager between the time the Board agents, observers, Gordon, and Tate came into the plant about 11 p.m. and the time when the Board agents, observers, and others went to the polling area about 11:20 to 11:25 p in., in going from the IBM room , which was down the hall from Gordon's office in the direction of the plant, up toward and beyond Gordon's office to the front of the plant he looked in Gordon's office, and saw the ballot box, but also saw there were no persons in Gordon 's office. There are too many conflicts between this testimony of Hayden, Gordon, and Roper and their testimony on cross- examination, and between their testimony on direct and cross with the statements in their affidavits of March 1966 regarding the events concerning which they gave testimony. There is also the conflict between their testimony and the unequivocal testimony of Sobieski and Keynard that at no time did they leave the presence of the ballot box from the MONROE AUTO EQUIPMENT CO. 115 time they brought it in Gordon 's office to the time they brought it to the voting or polling area in the company of the observers, and Tate and Skelton . I credit this testimony, including demeanor testimony, of Sobieski and Keynard upon its evaluation in context . In addition, neither Tate nor Skelton, Respondent's attorneys, although material wit- nesses with personal knowledge of the events under scrutiny, testified. I recognize that it is not desirable for an attorney presenting a case for a party to be a witness in behalf of the party. Here, however, Tate could have testified regarding the objection under consideration, which was the sixth, and Skelton could have presented this particular part of the case. On cross-examination by counsel for the Union , Hayden testified that he may have seen the ballot box unattended after he saw the clock in the lobby registering 11:25 p.m. and walked back from the lobby past Gordon's office, and not on the way to the lobby to see what time the clock registered, as he testified on direct . He had testified on direct that 1 or 2 minutes after he looked in Gordon's office from the hallway on the way to the lobby two Board agents came in, took the box, and went back in the plant. On this testimony the ballot box was gone when he walked back from the lobby, and looked in Gordon's office. No testimony was given on direct or cross as to the condition of the lighting in Gordon's office or in the hallway, or as to the conditions for accurately identifying by sight an object resting on a chair in Gordon's office by a person looking in Gordon's office as he walked by the office door on the hallway either to or from the lobby . Hayden identified an affidavit shown him as an affidavit he gave to Board Agent Watson in March 1966, about the matter concerning which he testified . The affidavit bears the statement that the clock in the lobby registered 11:15 p.m., not 11 :25 p.m. So his testimony does not show that Sobieski and Keynard picked up the ballot box to go to the polling area as late as 11:25 p.m. as he had testified. I have found that the observers, Sobieski, Keynard, Tate, and Skelton went to the polling area at 11:15 p.m. According to Hayden's testimony on direct examination he did not leave Gordon 's office for the executive room until 10 to 15 minutes after he first entered Gordon's office shortly after 11 p.m. Hayden's direct examination is silent as to whether Sobieski or Keynard was present or anyone was present other than himself, Gordon, and Tate, when he left Gordon's office to go to the executive room . Gordon's testimony on direct examination is that Sobieski and Keynard were not present and only he, Hayden, and someone else, possibly Tate, were present. On cross- examination Hayden testified that he believed only Gordon, he, and Tate were present. Gordon in his statement which he gave Board Agent Watson in March 1966 stated that he did not recall seeing Hayden at all until after the observers and Board agents had gone to the polling area. Gordon testified on cross that his statements in his March 1966 affidavit more accurately disclosed his knowledge of what happened as the lapse of 3 years from the election until he testified at the June 1969 hearing had dulled his recollection of what occurred. He also testified on cross that he was influenced by Hayden 's testimony. As previously stated both Gordon and Roper were present in the hearing room when Hayden testified. I have found that Tate was with the observers, Board agents, and Skelton when they went to the voting area at 11:15 p .m. Tate, therefore, could not have left with Hayden at 11:10 to 11:15 p.m. for the executive room. He could not have been in two places at the same time. While Gordon testified he did not recall Sobieski being in his office shortly after 11 p.m. with Keynard and the ballot box, in his March 1966 affidavit he stated that Sobieski and Keynard entered together and were both in the office. He testified on direct examination that he left his office with Hayden and another person possibly Tate when he saw that they were alone in the office . As previously stated, he stated in his March 1966 affidavit he had no recollection of seeing Hayden until after the observers and Board agents had gone to the polling area . He testified they went to the polling area at 11:25 , but in his March 1966 statement he testified he did not know when they went to the polling area. He testified there was a third person in the office with him and Hayden at the time he said they should leave, but he did not know for sure who it was . The third person who had a connection with Respondent with whom he had a conversation at the time he, this person, and Hayden allegedly left the office was not Tate as Tate did not go with him in the direction of the plant and stop off at the executive room. Tate and Skelton left with the Board agents and observers for the polling area at 11 : 15 p.m. By his testimony Roper was engaged in office manager duties from at least I1 p.m. to the time the observers and Board agents went to the polling area which he testified was 11:20 or 11 :25 p.m. On a trip from the rear of the plant building to the front of the building where the offices were located, some time during this period, he looked in Gordon's office and saw the ballot box there, but did not see any persons in the office . He declined to state what specific time during the period from 11 to 11:20 or 11:25 p.m. that he saw the ballot box in Gordon's office unattended. The observers, the Board agents, Tate, Skelton, and the ballot box went to the voting and polling area at 11:15 p.m. If Roper went past Gordon's office on the way to the front of the building and looked in Gordon 's office between 11:15 p.m. or 11 :25 p.m. he would not see anybody or the ballot box in the office. Even Gordon and Hayden, by their own testimony, had left Gordon's office and did not return until 11:25 p.m. No evidence was offered to or received in the record showing that Roper at any time was close to the ballot box, or close to it when it was in Gordon 's office, so he would be able to identify it, or know where it had been placed by Keynard in Gordon's office and where it was resting, if in the office, when passing Gordon's office on an assignment and looking in Gordon's door as he passed. Nor was any evidence offered of the lighting or other conditions in Gordon's office or in the hallway which would permit Roper to identify the ballot box resting on a chair in Gordon's office and not mistake some other object for it. He testified he could identify a person in the office, if he was there, by his image showing through the frosted glass wall. He did not claim he could see the image of the ballot box through the wall. As stated supra, I do not credit Roper's testimony. 116 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD III. ANALYSIS , FINDINGS , AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND FACT On the foregoing evidence, evidentiary findings, and credibility resolutions, I make the analysis, findings, and conclusions of fact and law in the following paragraphs. I find and conclude that employees Teel, Jordan, Howard Sanders, Gerald Dan Craft, Johnson, Holbrook, and Bowen were told in the period prior to the March 3, 1966, election that they would lose their jobs if they did not support the Union by a militant group of union employee supporters including Harvey Joe Sanders, Reed Ayers, Claude Fulgam, Charles Ward, Ray Vickory, Ralph Vickory, and Andy Adams. I find and conclude that during the preelection period Fulgam also stated to Jordan and other employees that they would suffer reprisals by union supporters including beatings with chains, if they did not support the Union; 10 that employee Andy Adams threat- ened employee Mize with a physical whipping for opposing the Union, and that union employee supporters Jerry Garland and Britt Sorrells tampered daily with the machine which Howard Sanders operated because he did not support the Union, and required Sanders to spend an hour's time daily to restore the machine to a condition for normal production. I find and conclude that employee Jordan received an anonymous telephone call the Sunday evening prior to the March 3, 1966, election at Terry's Service Station in Hartwell, while helping the owner who was ill, and in the telephone call was cursed by the unidentified caller for speaking against the Union, was told he was being watched, and would suffer reprisals if he did not vote for the Union. I find and conclude that on an early morning during the preelection period employee Howard Sanders received an anonymous telephone call, and the unidentified caller cursed him when he answered in the negative his question whether he would support the Union. I find and conclude that employee Madden, who did not support the Union, received, in the 2-week period prior to the election, as many as three harrassing anonymous telephone calls daily, the first call being received about 11 p.m. and the third call about 3 a.m. I find and conclude that about 7:30 p.m., on March 3, 1966, the day of the election, while he was working on the second shift, employee Kay received an anonymous telephone call in which the unidentified caller told him he would kill him when he finished work at I a.m., for his standing at the plant gate that afternoon and advising employees coming into the plant to vote and think for themselves. I find and conclude that in the period prior to the election of March 3, 1966, union employee supporter Claude Fulgam said to employee Teel and other employees in department 12 that management paid union dues and received better benefits because they belonged to the Union, and that Fulgam showed to the other employees a foreman's or other supervisor's check stub or voucher 10 1 consider threats of physical injury by employees to other employees who did not support the Union, representations by employees to other employees that foremen and other salaried employees were members of the Union and paid union dues, and the false representation by employees to other employees that the deduction under "Union dues or other" on check stubs of foremen and other salaried personnel was for union dues to be bearing the gross amount of the foreman's or other supervisor's paycheck, amounts deducted under headings describing the deductions, and one deduction which was for Georgia income tax was under the heading "Union dues or other." Fulgam made the same statement to employee Jordan about a week or two before the election and left one of the check stubs or vouchers on his machine.ii In neither instance did Fulgam disclose that the deduction under "Union dues or other" was for Georgia income tax. In view of his oral statement about foremen and other salaried personnel belonging to the Union and paying union dues he left the impression that the deduction was for union dues. I find and conclude that union employee supporter Harvey Joe Sanders said to employee Craft about 2 weeks before the election that foremen and supervisors belonged to the Union, and he could prove it by check stubs, and that they had more benefits than rank-and-file employees because they had membership in the Union. I find and conclude that the day before the election Harvey Joe Sanders said to employee Holbrook that foremen and salaried people were paying union dues and drawing better benefits than rank- and-file employees. I also find and conclude that there was a general rumor in the plant before the election that salaried personnel were members of the Union and paid union dues. I find the preelection statements of the employee union supporters that there would be loss of jobs and other reprisals if the Union was not supported which were made to other employees who appeared to be against representa- tion by the Union to be threats and coercive. I find the promises of union employee supporters of physical beatings and whipping to employees if they did not support the Union, and the tampering by union-supporting employees with an employee's machine because he was not supporting the Union to be threats and coercive. I find to be threats and coercive the statements by the employee union supporters that foremen and other salaried employees were members of the Union and paid union dues, and their use of the vouchers or check stubs of paychecks issued to foremen and salaried personnel showing a deduction from the gross amount of wages under the heading "Union dues or other" to misrepresent that deductions were made by Respondent for union dues. The deduction was for Georgia income tax. The significance to employees of representa- tions by the union supporters that foremen and other salaried employees were union members and paid union dues and seeing a check stub ostensibly showing a deduction for union dues was that employees who did not support the Union would be discriminated against by foremen and other salaried personnel if they did not support the Union. I find to be threats and coercive the anonymous telephone calls in which the unidentified callers cursed the employees and told them they would suffer reprisals if they did not support the Union in the election . The calls which were made to Jordan and Howard Sanders are considered objections added to the first four objections set down for further hearing by the court by their being placed in issue by Respondent's evidence, and the litigation of them by all the parties 11 There is no evidence showing where or from whom the vouchers or stubs attached to checks of foremen and salaried personnel were obtained MONROE AUTO EQUIPMENT CO. 117 in context with the statements made to them by the union supporters and with the tampering of Sanders' machine by union supporters Garland and Sorrells. Even though it was only coincidental that the receivers of the anonymous telephone calls were also threatened by the militant union supporters it would not be illogical for these and other potential voters to believe that both types of threats were related. The telephone call that Kay received during the second shift on March 3 before the election session began for second shift workers could be considered by the employees as being related to the attempt by Hendrix, a union supporter, to complain to Sobieski about Kay's conduct against the Union earlier in the day at the gate of the plant. However, there is no evidence that Kay was aware of Hendrix's attempted complaint, or that any employee voting in the second session was aware of Hendrix's attempted complaint. I find, however, that the call to Kay, received about 7:30 p.m., in an area where the second shift was working and when it was working, was a threat to Kay and the other employees present. Kay did not vote until 11:30 p.m. Other second-shift employees also voted between 11:30 p.m. and 12:15 a.m. I find and conclude that substantial evidence supports the first two objections of the six objections remanded by the court for further hearing, objections three and four to the extent they involve employee conduct, and the two additional objections involving employee conduct added by the parties by their litigation of them (as stated supra, fn. 10).12 There is no substantial evidence that the Union or its agents engaged in any of the conduct alleged in the objections. I have found that there was a general rumor in the plant before the election that foremen and other salaried personnel were members of the Union and paid union dues. Teel spoke to Gerald Davis, foreman of department 12, about the statement by Fulgam that foremen and other salaried employees were foremen, and Davis showed him and other employees his check stubs, and explained that the deduction under "Union dues or other" was for Georgia income tax. There is no evidence of record showing the time when Fulgam made the statement to Teel, and when Teel spoke to Davis about it. It would appear that Teel spoke to Davis about the time Fulgam spoke to him. It appears to me that Respondent must have been aware of the rumor. It must also have been conscious of the fact that the use of the check stub or voucher with a deduction heading "Union dues or other" lent credence to the misrepresentations of the employee union supporters. It should have known that it had a duty to explain the deduction, and to neutralize the fraudulent misrepresentations of the employee union supporters.13 Assistance of an employer to a union in a preelection campaign is sufficient for the Board to set aside an election.14 Such Board action favors the employees who are entitled to conditions that permit the free exercise of their right to select a bargaining representative . Here, however, there is no evidence of employer support of the Union or of collusion between Respondent and the Union. The holding of Respondent's objections involving employee conduct against other employees without merit because of its failure to explain away the misrepresentation of the employee union supporters would harm the employees in the unit by depriving them of the conditions for a free exercise of their rights. In refusing to hold the objections to be without merit because of Respondent's failure to act, the employees are being protected. The objective of the laboratory conditions is realized, even though incidentally the Respondent does not lose the benefit of its objections because of its negligence. I have not credited the testimony of witnesses who refused to disclose at the hearing the identity of employees who threatened them because of fear of reprisals, or of causing trouble in the plant, or because of lack of memory. I have given what I consider appropriate probative weight to the testimony of witnesses who did not know the names of the employees making the threats. Standing alone this testimony which I consider corroborative only would have no probative value. However, there is of record substantial unrebutted testimony by witnesses who disclosed the identity of employees making the threats, and this evidence establishes that threats were being made of the type and nature of the threats concerning which testimony was given by witnesses who did not know the identity of the person or persons making them. This corroborative evidence meets the test of probative evidence in all other respects. I have not considered as lacking in probative weight the testimony of witnesses who disclosed the identity of employees making threats, but who did not disclose the threats or the identity of employees making the threats to foremen or other supervisors. There is a natural reluctance to disclose conduct by a fellow employee to a superior, and to run the risk of being known as an informer.15 The threats instilled fear of, economic and physical reprisals. Standing alone they were hostile and threatening, they were made over a period of time by a recognized group of union-supporting employees, and the types of threats made by each of the union supporters were similar or the same, and made a pattern of conduct. They informed the employees threatened that the consequences threatened would be suffered at the hands of union supporters and by the Union itself. The threat by Harvey Joe Sanders to Holbrook that if he did not support the Union he would not only lose his job but would not be able to obtain employment elsewhere in Hartwell, and Fulgam' s state- ment to Jordan and other employees present that employees who did not support the Union could be beaten with chains as well as suffer other reprisals, are threats that even the most courageous, persons do not take lightly. Nor taken lightly is the threat that is contained in the representation that foremen and other salaried personnel are members of the Union and pay union dues, and the inference that they can be expected to discriminate against employees who do not support the Union. The union supporters making the threats attended union 12 See N.L.R.B. v. Golden Age Beverage Co., 71 LRRM 2924 (C.A. 5, 14 N.L.R.B. v. Lamar Electric Membership Co., 362 F.2d 505 (C.A. 5, 1969). 1966). 13 See Pepperell Manufacturing Co. v. N. LR.B., 69 LRRM 2679 (C.A. 5, 15 See N.L.R.B. v. Golden Age Beverage Co., 71 LRRM 2924 (C.A. 5, 1968). 1969). 118 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD meetings. Sanders said to Holbrook that the type of economic reprisal he talked to him about had been discussed in union meetings. The known identity of the employees making the threats, their known connection with the Union, and their engaging in the same or similar type of conduct, with no disavowal of it by the Union, could cause the average employee eligible to vote to believe that the Union was behind the conduct. Alewine, a union supporter and an observer for the Union, and called as a witness by the Union, testified that there was a general rumor in the plant before the election that salaried personnel were members of the Union and paid dues to the Union. While Echols, the union representative in charge of the Union's campaign prior to the March 1966 election, disavowed at the hearing in June 1969 any knowledge by him or the other union representatives of the threats, the circumstances outlined above which were associated with the threats, the threats themselves, and the silence of the Union regarding them before and on the day of the election, could have led the rank-and-file employees to believe that the union- supporting employees who made them had the support, or at least the endorsement, of the Union. When Sanders told Holbrook that he would not be able to work in Hartwell, he also stated that the other two plants in Hartwell would be organized by the Union. The Union by common knowledge is recognized not only as a powerful labor organization, but also as an economic power, and to have the capacity to accomplish objectives it may undertake. The evidence of the threats, and the circumstances in which they were made, and who made them, reveal that they were made not only to the employees who gave testimony regarding them but to many other employees as well. Moreover, the nature of the threats, especially since they were made in a preelection campaign, and the presence of grounds for a belief by employees that the Union was behind them very likely led to their prompt and wide circulation, and their restraining effect was not limited to those directly involved.16 The conduct of the employee union supporters and the anonymous telephone calls, when viewed cumulatively and their combined effect considered,17 resulted in the stand- ards of election campaigning and conduct dropping too low, and the absence of requisite laboratory conditions. General Shoe Corp., 77 NLRB 124, 127. The conduct involved was of so serious a nature that it could only result in widespread confusion and fear of reprisal and render impossible a rational, uncoerced choice by employees. Certainly the employee conduct involved was sufficient to influence 78 votes, the number by which the Union won the election. For these reasons, the Board-conducted election of March 3 and 4, 1966, in the Hartwell, Georgia, plant of Monroe Auto Equipment Company should be set aside and a new election ordered, the certification of the Union by the 16 Intercontinental Mfg. Co, 167 NLRB No 105, Diamond Stale Poultry Co, 107 NLRB 3, 6, and Poinsett Lumber & Manufacturing Co, 116 NLRB 1732 17 See Trade Winds Company v NLRB, 71 LRRM 3033 (C A 5, 1969), and Hometown Foods, Inc v NLRB 379 F 2d 241, 244 (C A. 5, 1967). 18 N L R B v Monroe Auto Equipment Co, 70 LRRM 2322, 2324 (C A 5, 1969), Hometown Foods, Inc, v N L.R B, 379 F 2d 241 (C A. 5, 1967); Board should be vacated and set aside, the Board's order in the unfair labor practice proceeding should be vacated and set aside, and the unfair labor practice complaint should be dismissed in its entirety.18 The issue on the evidence relating to the fifth objection is whether Board Agent Jackson in releasing employees to vote from 2 to 4 p.m. during the first session of the voting on March 3, 1966, sought advice and direction exclusively from union observer Phillips and ignored Respondent's observer Brown as to the locations of the departments in which the employees worked and the directions to be followed to reach them, and permitted union observer Phillips to speak to, and holler and wave his hand at, employees. The credited testimony shows, and I find, that Jackson depended on both observers for advice and direction, but on agreement consulted Phillips about the department locations and the directions to them as Brown was not familiar with the departments or their locations while Phillips was. Jackson in walking at a fast pace to release the employees on the first shift to vote between 2 and 4 p.m. did walk ahead of Brown who lagged behind while Phillips kept abreast of him. The list of departments which Jackson had was available at all times to Brown, and the few times Brown asked Jackson to slow down he did so. I credit Jackson's testimony that he sought Brown's advice, and it was helpful, and he was grateful for it. I find no merit to the objection that Jackson relied on Phillips and ignored Brown although it may have appeared to have been the case a few times because of the circumstances of the situation. I have evaluated Respondent's testimony and the Union's and General Counsel's testimony regarding Phillips' conduct and have made credibility findings (supra). I have credited Jackson's testimony that he and Sobieski informed Phillips and Brown not to talk to fellow employees. I have credited testimony that Phillips assisted Jackson in assembling employees in department 17 to be informed by Jackson they were being released to vote, and he did so by signaling and by word of mouth, and at the time he gave this assistance he said "howdy" to some of the employees. I have also credited testimony that, when Jackson, Phillips, and Brown returned to the voting area in front of department 17 employees on their way to vote, Phillips said "Howdy" to employees of other departments standing at the coffee machines and the water fountain as he passed them. Phillips testified that he said to Harris, the group leader who was in charge of Foreman Harold Walker's department in his absence, that Board Agent Jackson wished to talk to him. I credit this testimony. Section 11330.4 of the Board's Instructions and Guide- lines for Representation Proceedings (supra, fn. 4) permits observers to release employees with or without the presence of a Board agent They may tell the employees they are free to vote if they wish to do so, and may do this by word or Hometown Foods, Inc, v N.LR B, 71 LRRM 2663 (C A. 5, 1969), Hometown Foods, Inc, v NLRB, 72 LRRM 2465 (C A. 5, 1969); Intercontinental Mfg Co, 167 NLRB No 105, Diamond State Poultry Co, 107 NLRB 3, 6, Poinsett Lumber & Manufacturing Co, 116 NLRB 1732, and N L R B v Tampa Crown Distributors, 272 F 2d 470 (C.A 5, 1959). See also N L R B v Smith Industries, Inc, 69 LRRM 2660 (C A. 5, 1968), and Smith Industries, The, 178 NLRB No 46 MONROE AUTO EQUIPMENT CO. 119 sign, after telling the foremen what they intend to do. I find that, where a Board agent accompanies the observers, the observers by word or sign may ask the employees to assemble to hear this information from the Board agent. I also find nothing objectionable in an observer telling an acting foreman that the Board agent wishes to talk to him. Section 11326.2 of the Board's Instructions and Guidelines for Representation Proceedings (supra, fn. 4) provides that observers may not electioneer during their hours of duty, whether at or away from the polling place. I do not consider as electioneering an observer saying "hello" or "howdy" to employees as he asks them or motions to them to assemble to hear what the Board agent has to say. I find that Phillips did not electioneer when he assisted Board Agent Jackson in assembling employees in depart- ment 17 by word or sign preliminary to their being informed by Jackson that they were being released to vote if they wished to do so. Nor do I find as electioneering Phillips' "howdy" to these employees as they were assembling or when he was about to ask them or to signal to them to assemble. The "howdy" was obviously a way of "breaking the ice." I find Phillips' "howdy" to the employees at the coffee machines and water fountain to be a minor form of electioneering, prompted by greetings of fellow rank-and-file employees. I find that this greeting had no substantial impact on the employees with respect to the way they voted.19 The Board in Milgrim Inc., 170 NLRB No. 46, said that in determining whether certain conduct is electioneering that will void an election it will not consider a chance, isolated, or innocuous comment or inquiry by an employer or union official to a voter as necessarily the type of conduct that will void an election, that it will be guided by the maxim that "the law does not concern itself with trifles." I find Phillips' "howdy" to the employees at the coffee machines and water fountain to be trifling. I find and conclude that substantial evidence does not support the Respondent's fifth objection that "Board agents in going about the plant alerting the employees to vote sought advice and direction exclusively from the Union representative, and permitted the Union observer to speak, holler at, wave his hand and otherwise campaign with the employees in the plant during the voting." I find and conclude that the objection should be dismissed.20 On the evidence offered in support of and against Respondent's sixth objection, I have not credited the testimony of Respondent's witnesses Hayden, Gordon, and Roper that Board Agents permitted the ballot box to be left completely unattended in a room with an open door (supra). If Respondent's evidence supported its sixth objection, the ballot box would have been left unattended for 5 minutes from 11:10 to 11:15 p.m. on March 3, 1966, when it was resting on a chair in the office of Plant Manager Gordon in Respondent's plant building. I have credited the testimony of Sobieski and Keynard that they did not leave Gordon's office from the time they entered shortly after 11 p.m. on March 3, 1966, until they left with the ballot box for the voting area about 11: 15 p.m. on March 3, and that at no la It could be that they had already voted. 20 See N.L.R.B. v. Golden AgeBeverage/Co.,71 LRRM 2924(C.A. 5,1969). 21 See N.L.R.B. v. Golden Age Beverage Co., 71 LRRM 2924 (C.A. 5, 1969); and Polymers, Inc., 170 NLRB No. 33, and 174 NLRB No. 42, enfd. time was the ballot box out of their sight or out of their custody while they were in Gordon's office. I have found that the union observers who were in the lobby close to Gordon's office were at no time in Gordon's office or in the hallway close to it except when Alewine asked permission of Sobieski to use a restroom, and when they joined the Respondent's observers, Board agents Sobieski and Key- nard, and Tate and Skelton to go to the polling area at 11:15 p.m. I have found that the ballot box, including the slit or opening on the top side of the ballot box, was sealed when it was brought to the polling area shortly after 11: 15 p.m. on March 3, 1966, and remained that way until Sobieski removed the masking tape over the slit or opening on the top side of the box just before the polls were opened at 11:30 p.m. for the second voting session which lasted until 12:15 a.m. on March 4. One side of the ballot box opened up when Sobieski hit the box after the polls were closed, and the box had been turned upside down for the ballots to drop on the table to be counted, to cause any ballots stuck in the seams inside the box to fall on the table. Substantial evidence does not support the objection that the ballot box was left unattended by Board agents at any time, including the time it was in an office with an open door. In any event, there is no evidence that any person tampered with the ballot box, while on the other hand, substantial evidence shows it was not tampered with. I find and conclude that in regard to the custody of the ballot box at all times in issue desirable election standards were met, and that no reasonable possibility of irregularity inhered in the conduct of the Board agents or the union observers. I find and conclude that Respondent's sixth objection is not supported by substantial evidence, and should be dismissed.21 CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Known and identified union-supporting employees of Respondent in the period before the Board-conducted election held in Respondent's Hartwell, Georgia, plant on March 3 and 4, 1966, threatened other known and identified employees of Respondent with loss of jobs and physical injury if they did not support the Union in the election. 2. Known and identified union-supporting employees threatened other known and identified employees of Respondent by representing to them that foremen and other salaried personnel were members of the Union and paid union dues, and showed to them check stubs or vouchers of checks for foremen or other salaried personnel listing a deduction under the heading "Union dues or other," and falsely represented the deduction to be for union dues when it was for Georgia income tax. This conduct conveyed to the other employees that employees who did not support the Union would be discriminated against by foremen and other salaried personnel. 3. The same union-supporting employees made the threats in both paragraphs 1 and 2 to employees of Respondent, and the threats made by each union-support- 71 LRRM 3107 (C.A. 2, July 24, 1969). The Board in the Polymers case held that "desirable election standards were met and that no reasonable possibility of irregularity inhered in the conduct of the election." It rejected the per se possibility rule advocated by Polymers. 120 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD ing employee were the same or similar to those made by the other union-supporting employees, and their threats considered cumulatively made a pattern of conduct. 4. Anonymous telephone calls were received by em- ployees in which they were cursed and threatened with physical injury and other reprisals for not supporting the Union, or if they did not support the Union in the election. 5. The known identity of the union-supporting employ- ees making the threats, their engaging in a pattern of conduct, and their attendance at union meetings , and the failure of the Union before and on the day of the election to disavow their conduct, gave the impression to other employees that their conduct had the support, or at least the indorsement, of the Union. 6. The evidence of the threats made by the union- supporting employees and the circumstances in which they were made, and who made them reveal they were made not only to the employees who gave testimony regarding them, but to many other employees as well. Moreover, the nature of the threats especially since they were made in a preelection campaign, and the presence of grounds for a belief by employees that the Union was behind them very likely led to their prompt and wide circulation so that their impact was not limited to the employees to whom they were made. 7. The nature of the threatening anonymous telephone calls and the circumstances in which they were made reveal they were made not only to the employees who gave testimony regarding them but to many other employees as well. The nature of these calls very likely led to their wide and prompt circulation so that their impact was not limited to the employees to whom they were made. 8. The threats of the union-supporting employees and the anonymous telephone calls were of so serious a nature that they could only result in widespread confusion and fear of reprisals which rendered impossible a rational, uncoerced choice by employees in the election of March 3 and 4, 1966, in Respondent's Hartwell, Georgia, plant. 9. The election of March 3 and 4, 1966, should be vacated and set aside and a new election should be directed, and the Board's certification of the Union as bargaining representative, and its unfair labor practice order should be vacated and set aside, and the complaint in the unfair labor practice proceeding should be dismissed in its entirety. 10. There is no substantial evidence to support the allegations in Objection 1 that the Union or its agents engaged in conduct alien to Section 7 of the Act by making threats to company employees that they would lose their jobs unless they voted for the Union, and this part of Objection I should be dismissed. 11. There is no substantial evidence to support the allegation in Objection 3 that the Union instigated, condoned, ratified, and acquiesced in the action of some of its people in false statements that salaried employees of Respondent at Hartwell, Georgia, paid union dues, and Objection 3 insofar as it applies to the Union and its agents should be dismissed. 12. There is no substantial evidence to support the allegation in Objection 4 that the Union instigated, condoned, ratified, and acquiesced in the action of its people who demonstrated payroll deduction slips of salaried employees of the Company, reporting that certain entries on the slips were in payment of union dues when in reality the deductions were for Georgia income tax, and Objection 4 insofar as it applies to the Union and its agents should be dismissed. 13. There is no substantial evidence to support the allegations in Objection 5 that Board agents in going about the plant alerting the employees to vote sought advice and direction exclusively from the union representative and permitted the union observer to speak, holler at, wave his hand, and otherwise campaign with the employees in the plant during the voting, and Objection 5 should be dismissed. 14. There is no substantial evidence to support the allegation in Objection 6 that Board agents permitted the ballot box to be completely unattended in a room with an open door, and Objection 6 should be dismissed. RECOMMENDED ORDER It is recommended that the Board issue an order setting aside the Board-conducted election of March 3 and 4, 1966, in the Hartwell, Georgia, plant of Monroe Auto Equipment Company, ordering a new election, vacating and setting aside the Board's certification of the Union as bargaining representative, vacating and setting aside the Board's order in the unfair labor practice proceeding, and dismissing the complaint in the unfair labor practice proceeding in its entirety. IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the Board in its order dismiss Objections 1 to 4 insofar as they allege any illegal or objectionable conduct by the Union and its agents, and dismiss Objections 5 and 6.