J. P. Stevens & Co.,

180 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD J. P. Stevens & Co., Inc. Gulistan Division and Textile Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO. Case 10-CA-8108 October 30, 1970 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS BROWN AND JENKINS On June 29, 1970, Trial Examiner John M. Dyer issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices in violation of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. Thereafter, the Respondent, the General Counsel, and the Charging Party filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Deci- sion and supporting briefs. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in this case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the Recommend- ed Order of the Trial Examiner, and hereby orders that the Respondent, J. P. Stevens & Co., Inc., Gulistan Division, Statesboro, Georgia, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order, as modified below: 1. Add the following as paragraph 1(c) of the Recommended Order: "(c) In any other manner interfering with, restrain- ing, or coercing its employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act." 2. Substitute the following as new paragraph 2(b) of the Recommended Order and redesignate present paragraph 2(b) and the following paragraphs accord- ingly: "(b) Reinstitute at its Statesboro, Georgia, plant the wage structure of unit employees which existed immediately prior to July 7, 1969." 3. Substitute the Notice to All Employees, atta- ched hereto , as Appendix, for that recommended by the Trial Examiner. APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency 'of the United States Government After a trial in which the Company, the Union, and the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board participated and offered evidence, the Nation- al Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the law and has ordered us to post this notice and we intend to carry out the order of the Board and abide by the following: WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with Textile Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive representative of all employees in the bargaining unit described below with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other terms and conditions of employment, in- cluding any changes in the wage structure. WE WILL NOT change the wage structure of unit employees without first bargaining with the Union about such changes. WE WILL NOT in any other manner engage in conduct which interferes with, restrains, or coerces you in the exercise of your rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act. WE WILL bargain collectively with the Union before modifying or changing wages, hours, or other terms and conditions of employment in the appropriate unit described below, particularly including any changes in the wage structure, and, if an understanding is reached, WE WILL sign a contract containing such understanding. The appropriate unit is: All production and maintenance employ- ees at Respondent's Statesboro, Georgia, plant, including shipping clerk, shipper-re- ceiver, stockroom employees, dyehouse em- ployees, quality control department employ- ees, production control department employ- ees, and specifically including sample clerks and clerk-typists or clerks in said depart- ments, leadmen, and fixer-leadmen, but excluding office clerical employees, industri- al engineering department employees, per- sonnel office employees, professional em- ployees, watchmen-boilermen, guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act. 186 NLRB No. 34 J. P. STEVENS & CO., INC. 181 WE WILL reinstitute the old wage structure which was changed on July 7, 1969. WE WILL make whole all employees whose wages were reduced by the July 7, 1969, change in the wage structure from that time until we reinstitute the old wage structure. All our employees are free to become or remain union members. J. P. STEVENS & CO., INC., GULISTAN DIVISION (Employer) Dated By (Representative )! (Title) THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE This Notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. Any questions concerning this Notice or compli- ance with its provisions, may be directed to the Board's Office, Room 701 Peachtree Building, 730 Peachtree Street, N.E., Atlanta, Georgia 30308, Telephone 404-526-5760. TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE JOHN M. DYER, Trial Examiner: On January 2, 1970, the Textile Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO, herein called the Union, filed the charge herein alleging that J. P. Stevens & Co., Inc. Gulistan Division, herein called Respondent, or the Company, violated Section 8(a)(3), (5), and (1) of the Act by cutting employees' wages on July 7, 1969, and refusing to bargain with the Union concerning the matter. On March 2, 1970, the Regional Director for Region 10 issued the complaint, which besides the standard allegations concerning service of the charge, the interstate nature of Respondent's business and the Union's status, alleges that the Union has been the majority representative of an appropriate unit' at Respondent's Statesboro, Georgia, plant since March 18, 1968. The complaint alleges that on or about July 7, 1969. Respondent unilaterally and without notice to, or consultation with, the Union changed the wage structure of its employees in that unit, and that such change reduced the pay of its unit employees in violation of Section 8(a)(5), (3), and (1). Respondent's answer admitted the union status, the commerce facts, but not the conclusion, and that on or about March 26, 1968, the Regional Director of Region 10 had issued a Decision and Direction of Election in which the bargaining unit set forth in the complaint was found to be appropriate. The answer admitted that the Company 1 The appropriate unit at Respondent's Statesboro, Georgia, plant consists of all production and maintenance employees including shipping clerk, shipper-receiver, stockroom employees, dyehouse employees, quality control department employees, production control department employees, and specifically including sample clerks and clerk-typists or clerks in said made some changes with respect to the wage structure at the Statesboro, Georgia, plant on or about July 7, 1969. During the hearing, which was held April 21, 1970, at Statesboro, Georgia, Respondent made several motions to dismiss the complaint or parts of the complaint and to postpone the proceeding, all of which were denied. Respondent was permitted to amend its answer concerning the effect of the wage structure changes and admitted that the changes affected the pay of some of the employees adversely and some favorably. All parties were afforded full opportunity to appear, although no witnesses were produced or examined, and the record was made through stipulations and argument on the various motions. General Counsel filed a brief which has been considered. On the basis of the record in this case, which must include the prior Board proceeding regarding this Respondent, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT AND THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED Respondent is a Delaware corporation with one of its plants located in Statesboro, Georgia, where it is engaged in the manufacture of textile products. During the past calendar year, which period is representative, Respondent sold and shipped goods valued in excess of $50,000 from its Statesboro plant to customers located outside the State of Georgia. I find that Respondent is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. Respondent admits, and I find, that Textile Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of the Act. II. THE FACTUAL BASIS OF THE CASE The Board in the preceding case involving Respondent's Statesboro, Georgia, plant, 179 NLRB No. 47, affirmed Trial Examiner Mullin's findings that Respondent had violated Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (5) of the Act. In particular, the Board stated that Respondent resorted to a campaign of extensive and egregious unfair labor practices to thwart the Union's organizational drive, and dissipated the majority which the Union had acquired between February 18 and March 18, 1968. The Board determined under the Gissel doctrine that a bargaining order was required to repair the effects of Respondent's unfair labor practices, finding that Respondent had refused to bargain since on or about March 18, 1968. Examiner Mullin's decision was issued on June 6, 1969, and the Board's decision issued on October 22, 1969. Respondent refused to comply with either the Trial Examiner's decision or the Board decision and the Board has moved for enforcement of its order in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. On the basis of the pleadings in this matter and the departments, leadmen , fixer-leadmen, but excluding office clerical employees, industrial engineering department employees, personnel office employees, professional employees, watchmen-boilermen, and guards and supervisors as defined in the Act. 182 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD stipulations, I conclude and find that Respondent, on or about July 7, 1969, unilaterally and without notice to, or consultation with, the Union, changed the wage structure for unit employees, it was using prior to that time (an incentive system) to another system (flat rate), and that as a result of such change, some of the employees' take-home pay was adversely affected while the take-home pay of some other employees may have increased. On the basis of these pleadings and facts, General Counsel urges that the unilateral change of a mandatory subject of bargaining while a duty to bargain with the Union existed was a further violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. General Counsel also urges that an action which results in the lessening of employees' wages is an act which carries with it, its own antiunion discriminatory motivation, and as such is an independent violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act, citing Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 65 LRRM 2465. General Counsel additionally relies on the prior unfair labor practice history of J. P. Stevens, both at this plant and at others for the discriminatory motivation. In essence then, General Counsel's case is based on a finding by the Board, which is now in the enforcement stage, that Respondent since March 1968 has had a duty to bargain with this Union, and that by unilaterally changing wage rates in July 1969 Respondent has further committed 8(a)(5), (3), and (1) violations. Respondent argues that it has no duty to bargain with the Union until a final determination of such duty has been made by a circuit court of appeals and that a Board order is of no effect until a court so states and to proceed on a case which is based on a case not yet passed on by a circuit court of appeals denies Respondent due process of law. In support of these positions Respondent moved to postpone the case and to dismiss the complaint and various parts of the complaint, which I denied. Respondent argued that on July 7, 1969, when it made its unilateral change of the wage structure, only the Trial Examiner's June 6, 1969, decision had issued. Respondent contends that neither a Trial Examiner's decision nor a Board decision and order confers a bargaining right and duty. In support of its position Respondent cited five cases. In Porter v. Investors Syndicate, 286 U.S. 461 (1931), a State commissioner of insurance determined to revoke a permit to do business of an investment company. The company went into a United States District Court for an injunction against the commissioner's action, claiming that the statute stated the commissioner's decision should remain in full force and effect in the interim and that such would mean irreparable injury and harm to it, claiming that the local state court did not have power to issue a stay of execution. The Supreme Court determined that the district court in granting the injunction and the company in seeking it had misread the applicable statute and stated that the State court had authority to issue interlocutory relief to stay the action of the commissioner if it felt it was necessary. The second case of Myers v. Bethlehem Ship Building, 303 U.S. 41 (1937), involved an NLRB case in which an 8(a)(2) complaint had issued. The question was whether a United States District Court had jurisdiction to enjoin a Board proceeding to prevent the hearing of the case. The circuit court said it did and enjoined the action on the basis of constitutionality. The Supreme Court reversed the action of the circuit court and the district court. In its decision the Supreme Court noted that the Board had been granted no power to enforce its own orders and that "[t]o secure enforcement, the Board must apply to a Circuit Court of Appeals for its affirmance. And until the Board's order has been affirmed by the appropriate Circuit Court of Appeals, no penalty accrues for disobeying it. The independent right to apply to a Circuit Court of Appeals to have an order set aside is conferred upon any party aggrieved by the proceeding before the Board." 2 The Court also stated "The findings as to the facts are to be conclusive, but only if supported by evidence. The order of the Board is subject to review by the designated court, and only when sustained by the court may the order be enforced. "3 In the third case of Inland Empire District Council v. Millis. 325 U.S. 697 (1944), a labor union sought circuit court review of a Board order of certification. The union sought injunctive relief against the Board or in the alternative an order declaring the Board order null and void on the basis of lack of due process, affirming that it had been deprived of an appropriate hearing prior to an election under Section 9(c) of the Act. The case involved the appropriateness of the hearing in the representation area and the Supreme Court after discussing the language of Section 9(c) stated that nothing required a preelection hearing since it is all part of an investigation and that the requirements are met if there is an adequate hearing with due notice at some point before the investigation is completed and the certification issued. The Court said: "We think no substantial question of due process is presented. The requirements imposed by that guaranty are not technical, nor is any particular form of procedure necessary." In Whitney National Bank v. Bank of New Orleans, 379 U.S. 411 (1964), a New Orleans bank wished to expand into another parish and formed a holding company which organized a new national bank to operate in the other parish. The Federal Reserve Board after favorable advice from the Comptroller held hearings and approved the plan. The new bank needed a certificate of authority from the Comptroller to begin business. Three state banks went into Federal court to enjoin the Comptroller's issuing the certificate and two of the banks filed a motion for reconsideration with the Federal Reserve Board which was denied. At that point the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was asked to review the Federal Reserve Board's action under the Bank Holding Company Act. At the time the case came before the Supreme Court that suit was still pending. Following the original Federal Reserve Board's approval, the State of Louisiana passed a law making it unlawful for a bank controlled by a holding company to open whether it had a charter or not. The district court decided that, since the Bank Holding Company Act had reserved some authority to the States to bar subsidiaries of holding companies from operating 2 Myers at 48-49. (Emphasis supplied.) 3 Myers at 49. (Emphasis supplied.) J. P. STEVENS & CO., INC. banks that the Louisiana law should prevail and issued an injunction prohibiting the Comptroller from issuing the certificate. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the new bank would be but a branch of the old original bank and such was prohibited by the Banl, Holding Company Act and decided the case on this different basis, sustaining the injunction against the Comptroller. The Supreme Court decided that the district court did not have jurisdiction and that the controversy should be before the Federal Reserve Board which should consider the Louisiana law and since a suit for review of the Federal Reserve Board's action was pending in the Fifth Circuit, the Fifth Circuit could appropriately remand the case to the Federal Reserve Board to consider the impact of the Louisiana law which had not existed at the time of the Federal Reserve Board's action. The Supreme Court stated it would stay its decision for 60 days and that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit could issue appropriate orders to preserve the status of the proceeding and its jurisdiction pending final determination. The Supreme Court particularly noted that the issues should be resolved by the Federal Reserve Board and not by a district court since the views of the Federal Reserve Board as an expert body were desired, and that a collateral attack in a district court to the Federal Reserve Board rulings would not be permitted. The Court said that any positions should be made before the Federal Reserve Board itself, subject only to review by the court of appeals. Considering what could be done if the Comptroller issued a certificate in the interim, the Supreme Court noting the wide discretion of the court of appeals said the court could stay the order of the Federal Reserve Board and that any issuance by the Comptroller would not be lawful. The fifth case cited by Respondent was Harris- Woodson Co., Inc., 77 NLRB 819. In that case a prior Board case involving a refusal to bargain was unremedied at the time that a new refusal-to-bargain charge was processed based on a new majority. The Board's order in the first case was enforced in a circuit court of appeals between the date of the hearing and the date of the decision in the second case. The Board's decision states that as a matter of law the union continued to be the representative of the employees from the date of its original decision and order. None of the cases cited by Respondent appear to support Respondent's contention. In fact most of the cases mention that a decision remains in force and effect and where necessary an appropriate motion may be made for the court to issue a stay. Respondent has misconceived the nature of the decision and order of the Board and mistaken an enforcement proceeding for the original decision. Where a Respondent will not abide either the Trial Examiner's decision or the Board decision, it becomes necessary for the Board to secure enforcement of its decision and order through action of an appropriate circuit court of appeals and such enforcement is granted by the court on a showing of substantial evidence. The operable matter is the facts as found by the Trial Examiner and the Board and the facts determine under the law whether a violation has occurred. In a refusal-to-bargain case, the facts determine when the duty to bargain was present and when the refusal occurred. 183 The violation takes place at that time, not later when a Trial Examiner spells out the facts and the violation or when the Board affirms or makes such a finding. The Board decision is an affirmance that the duty existed at the prior instant and that Respondent violated the Act by negating its duty. Where the duty exists whether or not such has been articulated by a Trial Examiner, the Board, or a court, Respondent acts at its peril if it does not meet that duty. On occasion the Section 10(b) limitation might pass canceling that peril, but otherwise Respondent must act in accord- ance with the duty imposed by the Act. In N.L.R B. v. Winn-Dixie Stores Inc., 361 F.2d 512, 62 LRRM 2218, (C.A. 5, 1966), cert. denied 385 U.S. 935, the court enforced the Board order after modifying it. The Board found that a union represented a majority of employees in an appropriate unit and that the company had violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act by refusing to bargain. A second charge of refusal to bargain was processed by the Board, and the Court in enforcing the second case specifically noted that the failure to bargain upon which the second case rested "occurred during the period the proceedings for enforcement of the earlier order were pending in this Court." The Court took note of the company's contention that it was under no duty to bargain with the union during the pendency of such proceedings, but the Court cited Section 10(g) of the Act which states "The commencement of proceedings under subsection (e) or (f) of this section shall not, unless specifically ordered by the court, operate as a stay of the Board's order." The Court then said: "We hold Winn-Dixie was not relieved of its duty to obey the order to bargain during pendency of the proceedings to enforce the earlier order." The present proceeding is in the same judicial circuit and appears to me to fall squarely within the ambit of the Board and the Court's rulings in Winn-Dixie. The Board in Quaker Tool and Die, Inc., 169 NLRB No. 166, held that an employer's contest of the validity of a Board bargaining order in a court of appeals does not serve to relieve the employer of its duty to bargain in the interim. "The fact that an employer is contesting in a court of appeals the validity of a Board determination that it has the duty to recognize and bargain with a labor organization should not be viewed as a bar to the latter's invoking the Board's remedial processes where the employer, as here, has allegedly engaged in subsequent acts derogating from its duty to bargain in good faith which are different in nature from those covered by the existing Board order. As the unilateral action which is the subject of the instant complaints has a tendency to undermine and disparage the Union in the eyes of employees in the bargaining unit, it is our opinion that issuance of an order to offset the effects of any unlawful action by Respondent will effectuate the purposes of the Act." In the instant case Respondent has been under a duty to bargain with the Union since March 1968. The Board affirmed the Trial Examiner's June 1969 decision in October of that year. In July 1969, following the issuance of Trial Examiner Mullin's decision, and more than a year after its duty to bargain was established by the facts of the situation, Respondent violated that duty again by unilater- ally changing wage structures to the detriment of some of 184 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD the unit employees without any notice to , or consultation with, the Union. Clearly this is an independent violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) and could only serve to further derogate the Union in the eyes of the employees and is once again an arrogation to itself by this Respondent of duties and responsibilities which under these circumstances are meant to be shared with the Union. It is possible that the Employer here acted as the Union alleges, that is to drive down wages in this particular plant in order to have something to bargain back up to when it has to begin bargaining. Whether this was Respondent's intention or whether Respondent is merely continuing to assert rights which it refuses to share with the Union in violation of the Board's order, Respondent is, in any event, guilty of a further refusal to bargain with this Union. I therefore conclude and find that Respondent by engaging in the unilateral act of changing the wage structure of its unit employees at this plant without notice to, or consultation with, the Union, the duly certified bargaining agent of the unit of employees , violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. The General Counsel as noted above also urges that the action taken by Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. In his brief the General Counsel states "It is further contended that where an employer discriminatorily reduces the wages of its employees immediately following an adverse Trial Examiner's decision, so that it may be in a better position at the bargaining table, such reduction in wages violates Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. Such contention should not fall for lack of independent evidence of anti- union motivation when one considers the continuous nature of Respondent's past unfair labor practices together with the language of Great Dane Trailers Inc. "4 The General Counsel states as facts conclusions which he has drawn, but not from testimony . It is true that the change was made following an adverse Trial Examiner's decision, but this falls short of proof that it was done so that Respondent could be in a better position at the bargaining table, this being an assumption apparently made by both the Union and the General Counsel. There are statements in the record that the change of wage structure at this plant was made at the same time that a wage increase was given at other J . P. Stevens plants and it was stipulated that some of the wage earners were adversely affected by the change whereas some may have benefited from the change. It appears that in answering the question of whether Respondent's conduct is inherently disruptive of a collective-bargaining relationship, or of employees' reliance on their bargaining agent , and in considering whether Respondent's conduct would have such unavoidable consequences which Respondent could have foreseen or intended, the context in which that decision was made must be considered. The prior proceeding held in Statesboro, Georgia, which forms the cornerstone of the instant case, took a large number of trial days running through a 6-month period involving three different cases with numerous allegations of 8(a)(1),(3), and (5) conduct by Respondent. Such a proceeding in Statesboro , Georgia, would have been a major topic of conversation among Respondent's employ- ees. When coupled with the number of unfair labor practice cases in which J. P. Stevens & Co., Inc. has been a Respondent over the last 5 or 6 years , together with the known efforts by the Union to organize and represent Respondent's employees, the issuance of the Trial Examin- er's decision in June 1969 would have been noticed by employees and residents of Statesboro , Georgia, and engendered some commentary in the plant and the community. When within a month of such decision, and despite the fact that Respondent was ordered to bargain with the Union, Respondent unilaterally changed the employees' pay structure without offering any explanation for its action to its employees or the Union , and the pay of employees was adversely affected, this action must have been a further topic of discussion by the employees. Where those two actions were coupled, as it would be reasonable to assume employees would do , there would be unavoidable conclusions that Respondent was again demonstrating its resistance to sharing any control over the employees' rights and welfare with their selected bargaining agent and was in effect demonstrating its contempt for the Board's order to it to bargain with the Union. The damage to some employees' pay is direct and obvious. I conclude and find that Respondent's unilateral act in the circumstances prevailing was discriminatory and could not be otherwise viewed by those involved . There is no doubt that Respondent's act at the very least had the potential for adverse effect upon employees ' rights of which Great Dane speaks. I conclude that Respondent's act here is inherently discriminatory and with no explanation of any sort by Respondent as to the reasons for its action, I conclude and find that Respondent 's action also violated Section 8(a)(3) and ( 1) of the Act. If Respondent's action was not considered a separate violation of Section 8(a)(3), it would still call for an 8(a)(3) type remedy to make Respondent's employees whole for Respondent's violative conduct and I will recommend such a remedy. III. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of Respondent set forth in section II, above, and therein found to constitute unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8(a)(5), (3), and (1) of the Act, occurring in connection with Respondent's business operations set forth in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. IV. THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent engaged in unfair labor practices as set forth above , I recommend that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act as follows: Having found that Respondent refused to bargain with the Union in good faith as the representative of its 4 N.L.R.B. v. Great Dane Trailers Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 65 LRRM 2465. J. P. STEVENS & CO., INC. 185 employees in an appropriate unit by unilaterally and without notice to or consultation with the Union changing the pay structure of its unit employees on or about July 7, 1969, at a time when it was obligated to bargain with the Union.5 I recommend that Respondent reinstitute the pay structure and procedures which it followed at the Statesboro, Georgia, plant prior to July 7, 1969. If Respondent or the Union desires changes in such pay structure, the proper procedure of collective bargaining about such matters is to be followed. I further recommend that Respondent make whole those employees whose pay was decreased by Respondent's change of the pay structure on and after July 7, 1969, until the date Respondent reinstates the former pay structure. Such reimbursement is to be computed on a quarterly basis in the manner established by the Board in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289, with interest at the rate of 6 percent per annum to be computed in the manner set forth in Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716. I further recommend that Respondent make available to the Board, upon request, payroll and other records in order to facilitate checking the amounts of backpay due the employees. Having found that Respondent refused to bargain with the Union in regard to the employees' pay structure and further that Respondent's unilateral action in changing the pay structure violated Section 8(a)(3) of the Act as well, and considering Respondent's prior history of Act violations, I am concerned Respondent may further violate its employ- ees' rights. I therefore recommend that Respondent be placed under a broad enjoiner to cease and desist from in this or any other manner infringing upon the rights guaranteed its employees by the Act. On the basis of the foregoing findings and the entire record, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. J. P. Stevens & Co., Inc., Gulistan Division, is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. Textile Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act. 3. All production and maintenance employees at Respondent's Statesboro, Georgia, plant, including ship- ping clerk, shipper-receiver, stockroom employees, dye- house employees, quality control department employees, production control department employees , and specifically including sample clerks and clerk-typists or clerks in said departments, leadmen, and fixer-leadmen, but excluding office clerical employees, industrial engineering department employees, personnel office employees, professional em- ployees, watchmen-boilermen, guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act. 4. At all times since March 18, 1968, and particularly on and since July 7, 1969, the Union has been, and is now, the exclusive representative of the employees in the said unit for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act. 5. Respondent by refusing to bargain in good faith with the Union, which is the exclusive representative of its employees in the appropriate unit stated above, in regard to changing the pay structure of said employees unilaterally and without notification to, or consultation with, the Union, has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Sections 8(a)(5), (3), and (1) and 2(6) and (7) of the Act. RECOMMENDED ORDERS On the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and upon the entire record in this case considered as a whole, it is recommended that J. P. Stevens & Co., Inc., Gulistan Division, of Statesboro, Georgia, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Refusing to bargain collectively in good faith concerning the pay structure, working conditions , rates of pay, hours of employment, and other terms and conditions of employment with Textile Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive representative of the employees in an appropriate unit described in the section above entitled "Conclusions of Law." (b) Unilaterally and without notice to , or consultation with, the Union changing the pay structure or other terms and conditions of employees' work. 2. Take the following affirmative action which is necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Upon request bargain collectively in good faith with the above-named Union as the exclusive representative of all the employees in the appropriate unit concerning the pay structure, employees' working conditions, or any changes Respondent or the Union wish to make in such working conditions. (b) Make its unit employees whole for any loss of pay they may have suffered by reason of Respondent's unilateral change of their pay structure in accordance with the recommendations set forth in the section of this Decision entitled "The Remedy." (c) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all payroll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports and all of the records necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due said employees as set forth in the section of this Decision entitled "The Remedy." 5 The remedy for the unfair labor practices found in this case is not in derogation of the findings, conclusions, and remedies found appropriate by the Board in the prior case, 179 NLRB No. 47, but rather is in addition thereto to remedy a new and distinct unfair labor practice committed by Respondent. 6 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Section 102.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions, recommendations, and Recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Section 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes. 186 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD (d) Post at its Statesboro, Georgia, plant copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 7 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 10, after being duly signed by Respondent's representative, shall be posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, includ- 7 In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD" shall be changed to read "POSTED PURSUANT TO A JUDGMENT OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS ENFORCING AN ing all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (e) Notify the Regional Director for Region 10, in writing, within 20 days from the receipt of this Decision, what steps have been taken to comply herewith .8 ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD." 8 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, this provision shall be modified to read : "Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith."