Mitchell Manufacturing, Inc.

MITCHELL MANUFACTURING, INC. Mitchell Manufacturing, Inc. and Amalgamated Cloth- ing Workers of America, AFL-CIO. Case 26-CA-3506 October 31, 1970 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS FANNING AND BROWN On June 4, 1970, Trial Examiner Milton Janus issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had not engaged in the unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint and recommending that the complaint be dismissed in its entirety, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. Thereafter, the General Counsel filed exceptions, and the Charging Party cross-exceptions, to the Trial Examiner's Decision, and supporting briefs. The Respondent filed cross-exceptions to the Decision and a brief in support thereof and in answer to the General Counsel's exceptions. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds no prejudi- cial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Exam- iner's Decision, the exceptions, cross-exceptions, and briefs, and the entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommenda- tions of the Trial Examiner, with the modification noted herein.' ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that the Respondent, Mitchell Manufacturing, Inc., Corinth, Mississippi, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Threatening employees with loss of job opportu- nities because of their union activities. (b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action, which is deemed necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Post at its plant in Corinth, Mississippi, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 2 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 26, after being duly signed by the 186 NLRB No. 42 261 Respondent's representative, shall be posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (b) Notify the Regional Director for Region 26, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps have been taken to comply herewith. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint be dismissed insofar as it alleges violations of the Act other than those found herein. ' The Trial Examiner found, for reasons stated in his Decision , that the Respondent Company's president, James Mitchell, did not violate Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, when, in a speech given to employees on September 30, 1969, he said that "if we [employees ] messed around with the union and lost our jobs there , that no one else would hire us because we had worked for the union, or helped to organize the union," or " if we lost our job because of the union, that nobody would hire us " We disagree with the Trial Examiner's conclusions In our view, President Mitchell's remarks contained a veiled threat both that they would suffer loss of employment by virtue of their union activities and that he would use his influence to prejudice the employees' opportunities for employment elsewhere We find, therefore, contrary to the Trial Examiner, that these remarks were coercive, and constituted a clear violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act 2 In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board " shall be changed to read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board " APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government WE WILL NOT threaten our employees with loss of job opportunities because of their union activities. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with , restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act. All our employees are free to become or remain members of Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, AFL-CIO, or any other union, or are free to refrain from becoming or remaining members of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, AFL-CIO, or any other union. MITCHELL MANUFACTURING, INC. (Employer) Dated By (Representative) (Title) 262 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD This is an official notice and must not be defaced by anyone. This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. Any questions concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions may be directed to the Board's Office, 746 Federal Office Building, 167 North Main Street, Memphis, Tennessee 38103, Telephone 901-534-3161. TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE MILTON JANUS, Trial Examiner : Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, AFL-CIO (hereafter called the Union), filed a charge on October 27, 1969, and an amended charge on December 8, 1969 . A complaint based thereon was issued against Mitchell Manufacturing, Inc. (hereafter, the Respondent or the Company) on December 10, 1969, alleging violations of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act. I conducted a hearing in this matter at Corinth, Mississippi, on March 10 and 11, 1970 . The General Counsel argued orally at the close of the hearing , while the Respondent filed a brief thereafter . The arguments thus presented have been fully considered. Upon the entire record in this case, and from my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. THE BUSINESS OF THE EMPLOYER Respondent is a corporation with its principal office located at Corinth, Mississippi, where it is engaged in the manufacture of men's shirts. During the past year it received at its Corinth location goods and materials valued in excess of $50,000 directly from points outside the State of Mississippi, and during the same period of time, it sold and shipped from its plant, goods and materials valued in excess of $50,000 directly to points outside the State of Mississippi. I find that Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act. supervisory status is in question, but for reasons to be explained later, I find it unnecessary to resolve that issue. Mitchell has operated the Corinth plant about 7 or 8 years, and during that period he has heard rumors about incipient or actual union organization which, according to him, he has always ignored. The latest attempt at organization began in September 1969, when union organizers got in touch with Margie Suggs, then an employee of the Company, at her request. She met with organizers Davis and Forsyth on September 8, and she then spoke to a number of employees, some of whom agreed to help in preliminary organization. A meeting with the union organizers was held the evening of September 16 at the labor center in downtown Corinth. It was attended by 13 employees, including Suggs. Literature and authorization cards were handed out for distribution to other employees, and those present were advised to be careful about their activities so that company officials would not become aware of them. Suggs and another volunteer, Virginia Carter, spoke to employees outside the plant entrance during the lunch periods for the next 3 days, September 17-19, and obtained a few signed authorization cards. The following Monday, September 22, shortly before noon, Suggs was discharged. The critical issues as to the discharge are whether the Company knew of her activities on behalf of the Union by that date, and whether that caused her discharge. About a week later, on September 30, Mitchell made identical speeches to the assembled employees on the two floors of the plant regarding the Union's campaign, he spoke without notes or a prepared text. The content of the speeches, at least in certain critical parts, is in dispute. The complaint alleges that Mitchell in these speeches violated Section 8(a)(1) by threatening the employees that if they selected the Union, it would be unable to obtain any benefits for them, and there would be frequent strikes; that there would be less work, loss of jobs, and plant closure; and that other companies would not hire them because of their union activities. The Union's campaign at the plant continued thereafter, with the distribution of literature and solicitation of employees. It was apparently still active in March 1970, at the time of this hearing. No additional violations of Section 8(a)(1) or (3) are alleged to have occurred after September 30. H. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America , AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of the Act. III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES BACKGROUND AND ISSUES From 450 to 500 employees, mainly women, are employed at the Company's Corinth plant in the prod- uction of men's shirts. James Mitchell is the company president and its main operating official. He is assisted by four supervisors, among them his wife, Opal, who is in charge of pressing, and Hazel Benjamin, in charge of stitching. There are also a number of floor-ladies whose The discharge of Margie Suggs The events of September 22 Suggs had been employed at the plant about 4 years, her last job being as operator of a manual front button hole machine. The Company had recently installed two automatic button hole machines capable of much greater production with a single operator than the old type of machine. The new machines were not yet in full operating condition, and on September 22, one of them was shut down. Suggs was working at the only old type front button hole machine on the second floor. Mitchell testified that with one of the new machines out of commission, he was worried about meeting the plant's requirements for button MITCHELL MANUFACTURING, INC. hole panels, since he had no inventory of such panels, and whatever was produced was sent immediately to the next operation, assembling the shirt. Working hours were from 7 a.m. to noon, and from 1 to 4 p.m. Employees were expected to be at their stations and ready to begin work by 7 a.m. There was an official break about 9:30 a.m., but employees were not prohibited from leaving their machines at other times. Smoking stands were available and employees could leave their machines without permission, either to smoke or to go to the restrooms. There were no stated rules about the frequency of visits to the restrooms, but management did what it could to discourage excessive resort to these facilities since it was aware that they were also used as a general meeting place. Women employees had been warned in the past about excessive use, and over the past few years, four or five employees had been discharged for continued abuse of their privilege to go there without pernussion. Nevertheless, it was not uncommon for some of the women, including floor-ladies, to retire to the restrooms on fairly predictable schedules, and to spend more time there than was strictly necessary. Monday morning, September 22, Suggs began work at her machine at 7 a.m., as scheduled. Mitchell was on the second floor about 10 minutes later, and saw Suggs away from her machine, talking to Virginia Carter, whose machine was three or four rows away from that of Suggs. Mitchell watched them for a few minutes and then went over to ask Suggs what she was doing. Suggs said she was looking for thread. Mitchell told her that she couldn't find any thread at Carter's machine, to get her thread (which was kept in boxes nearby) and to get back to work. Suggs' testimony as to this incident is that she had to find suitable thread and had gone over to the boxes near Carter's machine, and had said no more than "hello" to her friend before Mitchell came up to her. I credit Mitchell's version of the incident, and find that Suggs was standing at Carter's machine engaged in conversation with her while Mitchell watched them. I believe that Suggs' primary purpose in leaving her machine just a few minutes after work had started was to talk to her friend rather than to find thread, since it is unlikely that she would have begun work just a few minutes earlier without checking whether she already had the thread needed to operate her machine. Mitchell had occasion to return to the second floor that morning three or four times, and each time found Suggs away from her machine. Suggs admitted that she had gone to the restroom that morning about 8:30, 10:30 and 11:30 a.m., besides taking her official break at 9:30, which she spent talking to friends. When Mitchell observed Suggs' latest absence about 11:40, he sent for Hazel Benjamin, the stitching supervisor, and told her to ask Suggs if she was ill, and if she was not, to discharge her. Benjamin did so, and when Suggs said she was not ill, Benjamin said that Mitchell had said to fire her. Suggs asked Benjamin if she was being fired for going to the restroom, and Benjamin said yes. Suggs then asked her whether she didn't usually warn people before firing them, I Suggs' production record for the previous week indicates that she averaged about 860 panels per day If Suggs had been permitted to finish out the day, she would apparently have produced about that number Her 263 and Benjamin said she did but that Mitchell didn't. According to Benjamin, she told Suggs at this point that Mitchell had already spoken to her that morning about being away from her machine. Suggs then went to the office and received three checks, two of which were already prepared, covering her pay for periods which were already due but were customarily held back. The third check was for 5 hours pay that morning, and was signed by an office employee while Suggs waited. Suggs did not know whether the third check had been fully prepared, except for signature, before she arrived at the office. The only significant variation between the testimony of Suggs and Benjamin is whether Suggs was asked before her discharge what her production had been that morning. Suggs testified that first her floorlady, Hogan, and then Benjamin had asked her what she had turned out so far. Suggs told them it was about 600.1 Hogan did not testify, and Benjamin denied asking Suggs about her production. Suggs also testified, this time without contradiction, that no one had told her that morning that more production was needed from her machine because of the shutdown of one of the automatic machines. She also testified that she had not gone to the restroom any oftener that morning than was her usual practice, and that she had never been warned before that she was going too frequently. Respondent contends that Mitchell decided to discharge Suggs because of her continued absences from her machine at a time when her production was especially needed. Yet it is strange, if that was the only reason, that neither Mitchell nor Benjamin told her that her production was needed more that day than any other day, and neither asked her to make a special effort to increase her production. If Mitchell was searching for a pretext to fire her, it seems he was having trouble finding one to fit the situation that morning, since her production was average, she had not been told that there was any shortage of panels, and she was not away from her machine oftener than usual or oftener than many other employees. But Respondent does not attempt to argue that Mitchell's decision was arrived at rationally and dispassionately. Rather, it is argued, Mitchell was initially angered by Suggs leaving her machine so soon after the start of work to talk to another employee, and became progressively more upset to find that every time he went upstairs he found her away from her machine. His decision to fire her was not premeditated but resulted from his anger and frustration at the moment. But Respondent's argument cuts both ways, and the General Counsel contends that Mitchell's anger, because it was disproportionate to Suggs' actions that morning was, in fact, selfinduced. Thus, the lack of previous warnings, and the fact that Suggs had not really abused the restroom privileges at the cost of her normal production indicate, in the General Counsel's view, that Mitchell was relying on a pretext to conceal his intention to punish Suggs for her union adherence. Respondent's rejoinder to that argument is that it knew nothing about any connection between Suggs and the Union. quota was 1100 but she rarely if ever made that figure, apparently without objection from the Company. Part of the reason for her failure to make her quota was that sufficient work was not always available 264 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD The evidence as to Respondent's knowledge of union activities up to September 22 Benjamin testified that she passed on to Mitchell a rumor, passed on to her by another supervisor, that there had been a union meeting downtown, and that she had probably heard this before Suggs was discharged. She denied, however, that anyone had told her who was at the meeting or that Suggs had been involved in it. Benjamin also testified that she ate her lunch in the plant and had not seen Suggs talking to employees in front of the plant on any of the 3 days following the meeting of September 16. Direct observation by supervisors of Suggs' solicitation of employees outside the plant is also not established by the evidence. On one of these days a floorlady, Beulah Mitchell (not related to the president of the Company), was sitting in her car with her brother in front of the plant talking to him about personal matters. She did not recall seeing either Suggs or Carter at that time, which is understandable in view of the movement of employees around the plant entrance during the lunch hour. I credit her testimony, thus making it unnecessary to decide whether floorladies are supervisors. Mitchell's office is just inside the plant near one of the two sets of steps leading into the building. Suggs and Carter were on the steps leading to Mitchell's office one of the days when they were soliciting employees on behalf of the Union, but neither could say that Mitchell had seen them. As a matter of fact, Suggs testified that they could not have been observed on the steps since the windows in Mitchell's office did not overlook their position. An employee, Devers, testified that she had told Hazel Benjamin that another employee, Rushing, had asked her to sign an authorization card and had also told her that she ought to sign because James and Opal (Mitchell) were for it. Neither Devers nor Benjamin would admit that Suggs' name had come up in this connection. In any event, it is probable that Devers passed her information on to Benjamin after Suggs was discharged, since Benjamin had passed on to Mitchell the rumor going around that he and his wife were for the Union just a day or two before Mitchell, according to his testimony, decided to scotch the rumor by calling the employee meetings of September 30. Benjamin specifically testified that Devers spoke to her after Suggs had been discharged. There is then no evidence, direct or circumstantial, that any supervisor observed Suggs or Carter on any of the 3 days they solicited for the Union at or near the plant entrance, nor is there any evidence that Respondent interrogated anyone about the September 16 union meeting, or about the later activities of Suggs or Carter. Nor can the presumption be indulged in that Respondent must have learned about Suggs because it had quickly learned that a union meeting had been held. Assuming that the Company learned about the meeting from an employee 2 Kayser-Roth Hosiery Co., Inc., 166 NLRB 372; Saxon Paint Stores, Inc., 160 NLRB 1757; N.LR.B. v. Joseph Antell, Inc. and N.LR.B. v. Malone Knitting Company, 358 F.2d 880 (C.A. 1). Cf. Howard Knit Products, Inc., 174 NLRB No. 68, a case somewhat similar to this, where the Board affirmed a Trial Examiner's finding that the Company knew of an employee's support for a union despite the lack of any direct evidence on the point. In that case, the dischargee had made little or no effort to informer, it cannot also be assumed that he would also have revealed the names of any of those attending. It is of course possible that there was an informer since Suggs had talked to at least 20 employees, each of whom could have passed it on to others, so that it should surprise no one familiar with plant grapevines if a supervisor quickly became aware of what was going on. However, a finding that the Company had learned before September 22 that it was Suggs who had brought the Union in or who had solicited employees among the crowd near the plant entrance can be based only on what I regard as a likely possibility. But what is possible, or what may even seem to be probable is not, we have been taught, a substitute for evidence. I have also considered whether the possibility of company knowledge of Suggs' union activities is not reinforced by disbelief of the Company's explanation for the discharge. If the explanation were shown to be false, then an inference is warranted that another reason was being concealed. There is an element of arbitrariness about the discharge of an average employee without prior warning for what had not previously been considered egregious conduct, but it can also be viewed as a spontaneous reaction by Mitchell to his frustration over the shortage of button hole panels that morning and Suggs' repeated absences from her machine. It is true that Suggs was not wholly responsible for that shortage nor was she asked to extend more than normal effort to relieve it. But granting all this, I do not find that Mitchell's stated reasons for the discharge are so implausible that he must have had a concealed reason for getting rid of Suggs. On the whole, I am not satisfied that the General Counsel has established by a preponderance of the testimony, that Mitchell discharged Suggs because she had collaborated with the Union, and I shall therefore recommend dismissal of the Section 8(a)(3) allegation.2 Mitchell's speech of September 30 The testimony on behalf of the General Counsel as to Mitchell's speech comes from employees Bonnie Smith, Virginia Carter, Margaret Jones, and Zona Richards, all of whom work on the second floor and heard the same speech. Smith and Richards gave the most detailed reports, and I will set them out below, almost verbatim, as the best way to appreciate their total impact. Smith testified as follows about the speech: He came up the stairs and he told us to turn off our motors and all gather round, that he was going to talk to us . . . that he guessed some of us already knew what he was going to tell us, but if he had a battle to fight, he didn't want to fight it in the dark; he wanted to know what he was fighting, was the reason he hadn't already spoke to us. He said, "You know there's a union trying to get in down here," and he said, "We don't need a union. They conceal her activities, had been active in solicting other employees for about a month and, on the day of her discharge , gave an employee a union card within 30 feet of a supervisor. In any event, the Trial Examiner also found the discharge unlawful even if the Company had no knowledge of her union activities because the Company's "crackdown" program, pursuant to which she was discharged, was instituted for antiunion reasons. MITCHELL MANUFACTURING, INC. 265 can't do anything for us. They'll just take your money and make you big promises. They can't help you any." He said that the reason he couldn't pay us any more than he was paying us was on account of the foreign markets ; . . . they could make the shirts so much cheaper and ship them to the United States than they could be made here. He said if we messed around with the union and lost our jobs there, that no one else would hire us because we had worked for the union, or helped to organize the union .. . And he said that we'd probably be out on strike the biggest part of the time, and while we were out there walking the picket line he'd just be hiring new hands and working right along . . . and that we couldn't draw our unemployment compensation. Then he was talking about a plant up at Selmer, that the reason they had to close down was because they were organized, they didn't get orders after they were organized at the plant . Said the man tried to sell it to him, and he didn't need it, and a few days later he was in Atlanta, met the same man on the street , and they had one down there that had been organized, and asked him about selling him that one, and he told him he still didn't need it ... . Well, he told us several different times that we didn't need a union down there; that they couldn't do anything for us; that they'd only take our money and make us big promises, but they wouldn't help us any. Richards' testimony as to Mitchell's speech is as follows: He said that when he had something to fight he wanted to know what he was fighting . . . that we all knew that the union was trying to come in . He said we didn't need a union, we couldn't afford a union, ... some of us, our husbands was working and making a living, and that some of us made our own living and that if we went on strike, who would pay our bills, that the union would not pay our bills. He also said that if we were on strike we could not draw our unemployment and that if we lost our job because of the union, that nobody would hire us. From this he went into the imports that was brought into the United States, and about how cheap they could sell their product compared to ours because of their labor being so much cheaper than ours; that he definitely could not pay any more because if he raised ... our salaries, he would have to raise the price of his product and, if he raised that, he couldn't sell it and that we wouldn't get any work because of this. From that he went on to tell us about a guy offering to sell him a plant at Selmer, and that he told him he did not need this plant because it was unionized , and then he was offered a chance to buy the Martin Manufactur- ing Company at Ramer and that he didn't need this because it was unionized .. . He asked Tommie Rushing if she wasn't employed at the Selmer Manufacturing Company when they closed the door, and if it wasn't because of the union, and she said that they didn't have any orders and that they were forced to close down. He also asked Hazel Benjamin - that's our main supervisor - if she didn't have a neighbor working at Weaver's, and Hazel told him that she did have one working down there, and that she had worked three days that past week. He said that Weaver had a union product, a brand name that they could sell, and it could afford to be under a union, ... that he just could not unionize and sell his product. He told us that if went on strike, we couldn't draw our unemployment and, if we lost our job because of the union, nobody would hire us and from this he went on to say if we knew him, he would be on strike every 30 minutes. Mitchell testified that he called the meeting of September 30, to answer the rumor which he had heard from his wife, through Hazel Benjamin who had heard it from Devers, who had heard it from Rushing, to the effect that he and his wife were supporting the Union's organizing efforts. Whether the rumor was widespread or whether it was limited to the chain of communication I have noted is not material. Mitchell's true motive for calling the meeting need not be determined; the only question to be answered is whether anything he said in the speech violated Section 8(a)(1). According to Mitchell, substantially corroborated by Benjamin, he started off by telling the employees that he and his wife wanted no part of the Union and that he was opposed to it because of the competition of imports produced at much lower hourly wages than he was paying. He then told them about a mill in Selmer which he had sold some years ago and which he would not buy back, presumably because it was now unionized . He mentioned a number of plants in the area, asserting that those which were unionized were now working part time. Three or four times during the speech, he told the employees that he was not threatening them, and that they could either join or not join the Union. He also told them that he had lost a lot of employees to a new plant in the area which made electric motors, and that the needle industry could not compete with that type of plant, that he hated to see them go but he was proud to see them do better by leaving. He did not recall saying anything about strikes other than that they would not be able to draw their unemployment compensation. He denied saying that if the Union came in there would be less work, loss of jobs or that the plant would close, and he could not recall saying that if the Union came in other companies would not hire them because they had been mixed up with the Union. There is substantial agreement between Mitchell and Benjamin on the one hand, and the General Counsel's witnesses on the other, that Mitchell emphasized in his speech that a unionized plant in the needle industry had more difficulty competing with foreign imports than a nonunion plant, and that it ran the danger of losing orders and going on short time. I think this is a legitimate expression of possible economic effects, whether or not it can be proved to be true in the case of this particular plant. Mitchell was not saying that he would close the plant if the 266 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Union got in, but only that he would have more intense competition from imports. As to the effect of the employees' striking if they selected the Union, much of what Smith and Richards testified to seems to me not to be a threat of reprisals. An employer may replace strikers, which is what Smith reported Mitchell as saying, and strikers are not entitled in most States, to draw unemployment compensation . I see no threat that bargaining would be futile, in the testimony of the witnesses for the General Counsel that Mitchell had said the Union couldn't do anything for them . The context in which it was said relates to what the Union was promising them, how much it would cost the employees , and that foreign competition, in effect, restricted both his and the Union's scope for bargaining. The closest question, in my opinion, is whether Mitchell threatened his employees by telling them that if they lost their jobs because of the Union, no one would hire them. It seems to me, however, that Mitchell was attributing to other employers, over whom he had no control or influence, a disinclination to hire either employees who might be on strike at his plant or who were active union adherents. Such action by other employers could well be an unfair labor practice on their parts , but nothing Mitchell is reported to have said fairly bears the implication that he personally would, in an act of vindictiveness, prejudice their opportunities for employment elsewhere. I find that the versions of the witnesses for the General Counsel, as to Mitchell's speech of September 30, are to be credited over those of Mitchell and Benjamin , but that, for the reasons stated above, I believe that nothing Mitchell said on that occasion constitutes a violation of Section 8(a)(1). As I have found nothing alleged in the complaint to be in fact violative of the Act, I shall recommend its dismissal in its entirety. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Mitchell Manufacturing, Inc., is engaged in com- merce and in activities affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. The Respondent has not engaged in any unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint. RECOMMENDED ORDER It is hereby recommended that the complaint be dismissed in its entirety.