Superior Roofing Co.

542 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Superior Roofing Company and Orland R. Cooley ORDER United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, Local No. 751, AFL-CIO and Orland R. Cooley. Cases 20-CA-3460 and 20-CB-1334 November 12, 1970 SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION AND ORDER BY MEMBERS FANNING, BROWN, AND JENKINS Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that the Respondent Employer, Superior Roofing Company , San Francis- co, California, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, and Respondent Union, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, Local No. 751, AFL-CIO, San Francisco, California, its officers, agents, and representatives, shall pay to Orland R. Cooley, the amount set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Supplemental Decision. On May 4, 1966, the National Labor Relations Board issued a Decision and Order, finding inter alia, that the Respondent Union by demanding and securing Orland R. Cooley's discharge because he was not a member of the Union violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, and that the Respondent Employer by discharging Cooley in compliance with the Respondent Union's demand violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. The Board directed that the Respondent Union and Respondent Employer jointly and severally make Cooley whole for any pay losses he may have suffered hereby.' Thereafter, on May 1, 1969, by a consent decree in Case No. 23,322, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit enforced the Order of the Board. On January 16, 1970, the Regional Director for Region 20 issued and on January 23, 1970, the Respondents filed an answer and counterspecifica- tion and served on the parties a Backpay Specification and Notice of Hearing, to the backpay specification. Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held before Trial Examiner Richard D. Taplitz on February 24, 1970, for the purpose of determining the Respondents' backpay obligation to Orland R. Cooley. On April 22, 1970, the Trial Examiner issued the attached Supplemental Decision in which he found the discriminatee herein to be entitled to backpay in the amount specified. Thereafter, Respondents filed joint exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Supplemental Decision and a supporting brief. The General Counsel has filed an answering brief in the form of a letter. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the Act, the Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel. The Board has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner at the supplemental hearing and finds no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the entire record in this case, including the Supplemental Decision, and the exceptions and briefs, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommenda- tions of the Trial Examiner. 1 158 NLRB 657. TRIAL EXAMINER'S SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE RICHARD D. TAPLITZ, Trial Examiner : This supplemental proceeding to determine the amount of backpay due Orland R. Cooley was tried in San Francisco , California, on February 24, 1970, on the Backpay Specification of the General Counsel dated January 16, 1970 , as amended at the hearing, and an answer filed by Superior Roofing Company, herein called the Company, and United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, Local No. 751, AFL-CIO, herein called the Union.' Orland R. Cooley, the Charging Party, testified at the hearing but did not enter an appearance. All parties were afforded a full opportunity to examine and cross-examine witnesses, to introduce evidence, to present oral argument and to file briefs. Briefs which have been carefully considered were filed on behalf of the General Counsel and Respondent. Upon the entire record2 before me, and from my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT A. The Board Order and Court Decree On May 4, 1966, the Board adopted the findings, conclusions and recommendations contained in the Decision of Trial Examiner James D. Barker .3 After a hearing, the Trial Examiner had found "that the Union demanded and secured Cooley's discharge because he was not a member of the Union . . ." and "that the Company discharged Cooley not because his work was unsatisfactory, but to comply with the unlawful request of the Union." By this conduct, it was found that the Union violated Section 8(b)(2) and (1)(A) and the Company violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. To remedy the unfair labor practices, the Company and Union were ordered jointly and severally to reimburse Cooley for the loss of pay he suffered by paying to him the sum of money he normally I The Company and the Union jointly are referred to herein as Respondent. 2 [Certain errors in the transcript are hereby corrected.] 3 158 NLRB 657. 186 NLRB No. 74 SUPERIOR ROOFING COMPANY 543 would have earned from the date of the discrimination against him to the date of the Company's offer to reinstate him, less net earnings. Loss of pay was to be computed in accordance with the formula set forth in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289, together with interest at the rate of 6 percent per annum as set forth in Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716. On May 1, 1969, by a consent decree in Case 23,322, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit enforced the order of the Board and ordered Respondent to abide by and perform the directions of the Board as contained in the Board's order. B The Backpay Specifications, the Answer and the Issues The Backpay Specification issued by the General Counsel sets forth the backpay period as November 17, 1964, through December 22, 1966. Under the backpay formula used in the specification, it is alleged that at the time of his discharge Cooley was the Company's second senior roofer and that the measure of hours that Cooley would have worked from November 17, 1964, to March 17, 1965, was the number of hours worked by the second most senior roofer employed by the Company at its Santa Rosa location during that period. According to the specification, the most senior employee was terminated on March 17, 1965, and the second most senior roofing employee on that date became the senior roofer, therefore, the appropriate measure of hours that Cooley would have worked was measured by the weekly hours worked by the senior roofer from March 17, 1965, to December 22, 1966. The appendices to the specifications set forth the weekly hours of employment of a number of employees that fit into the General Counsel's theory. Thus, it is alleged that on November 30, 1964, employee D. O. Mott replaced Cooley as the Company's second most senior roofer at its Santa Rosa location; that on December 2, 1964, R. H. Bridges replaced D. O. Mott as the second most senior roofer; that on March 19, 1965, the senior roofer, B. R. Jones, was terminated and at that time R. H. Bridges became the most senior roofer; that during the week ending May 5, 1965, R. H. Bridges ceased working for the Company and was replaced by E. L. Scnvner as most senior roofer; that during the week ending May 11, 1966, E. L. Scrivner ceased working for the Company and was replaced as most senior roofer by R. H. Bridges in the week ending May 25, 1966; that E. Daniels replaced R. H. Bridges as most senior roofer during the week ending July 6, 1966; and that A. Pimey replaced E. Daniels as the Company's most senior roofer the week ending September 21, 1966. The specification does 4 During the hearing, the General Counsel moved to amend Appendix C of the specification by adding to the second quarter of 1966 an interim earnings of $120 that Cooley received from Hedman Construction Company The General Counsel also moved to amend the subsequent computations to reflect the additional $120 interim earnings , particularly changing the total on the last page of Appendix C to $7,143 , the net interim earnings for the second quarter of 1966 on Appendix D to $1,245, the net backpay for that quarter to $68 (incorrectly set forth in the transcript as $67), and the total net backpay to $5,470 In the absence of any objection, the motion was granted. s Sec 102 54 (b) Contents of the answer to specification -The answer to the not claim any pay for Cooley from the week ending April 14, 1965, to September 8, 1965, and for the period from December 1 to 22, 1966, on the ground that Cooley was ill and would not have been able to work during those periods. The amended specification concedes that Cooley had certain interim earnings which are set forth in detail in an appendix to the specification.4 In addition to specifying the theory used by the General Counsel to compute backpay, the specifications detail the hours worked which were relied on by the General Counsel, the rates of pay the General Counsel thought applicable to those hours, and computa- tions showing what the General Counsel believed to be due to Cooley. In response to the backpay specifications, Respondent filed an "Answer and Counter-Specification Re Backpay" which read as follows: It is the contention of respondents herein that the only replacement of Orland Cooley was D. O. Mott, and therefore Orland Cooley is entitled to only nineteen hours of backpay. There is no evidence upon which a conclusion can be based that R. H. Bridges, E. L. Scnvner, E. Daniels, or A. Pimey were in any way replacements for Orland Cooley. The backpay specification is further in error since it bases its conclusions on a concept of seniority-seniority is not applicable under the collec- tive bargaining agreement in this case, and roofers are hired by the day. Except as alleged hereinabove, each and every, all and singular of the allegations contained in the backpay specification and notice of hearing in the above matter are denied. Prior to the opening of the trial, the General Counsel filed a motion which in part requested that the Trial Examiner issue an order "specifying that the only issue to be litigated is whether the backpay specification sets forth an appropriate method for determining backpay liability." After a hearing on the motion on February 24, 1970, I granted the motion to limit the issues in part by finding that the only issues raised by the answer were as follows: (1) Whether the only replacement of Orland Cooley was D. O. Mott thus entitling Cooley only to 19 hours of backpay; (2) whether or not R. Bridges, E. L. Scrivner, E. Daniels, or A. Pimey were in any way replacements of Cooley; (3) whether the concept of seniority is applicable to the case; and (4) the amount of interim earnings. As to all issues other than the four set forth above, I found that Respondent's answer did not meet the requirements of Section 102.54(b) and (c) of the Board 's Rules and Regulations 5 and that this failure to adequately answer was specification shall be in writing, the original being signed and sworn to by the respondent or by a duly authorized agent with appropriate power of attorney affixed, and shall contain the post office address of the respondent The respondent shall specifically admit, deny, or explain each and every allegation of the specification , unless the respondent is without knowledge, in which case the respondent shall so state, such statement operating as a denial. Denials shall fairly meet the substance of the allegations of the specification denied When a respondent intends to deny only a part of an allegation, the respondent shall specify so much of it as is true and shall deny only the remainder As to all matters within the knowledge of the respondent, including but not limited to the various factors entering (Continued) 544 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD to be deemed an admission of all the figures, computations, and calculations contained in the backpay specifications and of all other matters contained in the specifications other than as indicated above. As to interim earnings, based on the assertion of Respondent that it had no knowledge of what Cooley's interim earnings in fact were, I ruled that the answer was specific enough to allow Respondent to adduce evidence on the record as to interim earnings. C. The Appropriate Formula for Determining Backpay As indicated above, the answer filed by Respondent puts in issue only two matters-the appropriateness of the formula the General Counsel has used to determine backpay and the amount of interim earnings. The General Counsel's formula is based on the allegation that Cooley should be credited with the hours actually worked by the second senior man employed by the Company at its Santa Rosa location during a certain portion of the backpay period and the hours of the first senior man during another portion of that period. In applying this formula, the General Counsel used various hours worked by D. O. Mott, R. H. Bridges, E. L. Scrivner, E. Daniels, and A. Pimey. Respondent answered the ° backpay specifications by asserting that the concept of seniority was not applicable and that only Mott should be considered a replacement for Cooley (which would limit the number of hours lost by Cooley to 19). In addition, in its brief the Respondent contended that Bridges, Scrivner, Daniels, and Pimey worked in a different category of employment than Cooley and therefore should not be considered Cooley's replace- ments. 1. Seniority There is a conflict in testimony as to whether the Company used seniority to determine which employees were to work. During 1964 and part of 1965, Victor Jones was a shop foreman and manager of the Company's Santa Rosa shop.6 He left the Company's employ in 1965 but Hayden J. Ponder, the president of the Company, testified that employment practices at Santa Rosa were the same during 1964, 1965, and 1966. In an affidavit that Jones gave to a field examiner of the Board on December 12, 1966, Jones mentioned a conversation that he had with Cooley in January 1965 when Cooley returned to work for the Company for a few days, in which Jones "told him that he was the last hired so he would be the first to be let go." After some equivocation and having his memory refreshed by the affidavit, Jones acknowledged that he probably did make such a statement to Cooley. However, as to the actual practice engaged in, Jones testified that roofing trade employees are hired and fired in accordance with their ability to produce and that it didn't have anything to do with how long the employee worked for a company. As to the Company's practice, Jones' testimony was somewhat confused as he averred that employees were kept on the payroll "on the basis of ability more so than seniority. I wouldn't say it's a complete rule but it's -." The only other witness to testify concerning seniority was Anni Hann, the Company's office manager. She was in charge of the office in November 1964.7 She testified that after Jones left she did the hiring and firing of employees and she based her decisions on the abilities of the employees. The Union's contract with the Company does not provide for company seniority. Section IV(b)(4)(a) of the contract that is binding on the Company and the Union (Exh. R-I in evidence) provides for a preference in referral from the hiring hall to employees who had previously worked in certain geographical areas but that provision has little to do with company seniority as such. The Company is also bound by a contract between various locals of the United Slate Tile and Composition Roofers, Damp and Water Proof Workers Association, and the Associated Roofing Contractors of the Bay Area Counties, Inc. That contract (Exh. R-3 in evidence) provides for a distinction between permanent employees who had worked in an area covered by the agreement for a certain period and temporary employees who had not had such employment and further provides that temporary employees are to be the first laid off and last rehired. The contract also provides for the preferential referral from the referral hall of permanent employees. However, all the seniority considerations are keyed to industry employment and not to employment with the Company. Jones credibly testified without contradiction that once an employee is hired he goes from job to job without clearing back through the Union. After reading his affidavit, his recollection was refreshed that "the practice in Santa Rosa at this period was generally when a man was employed to be sure that he obtained clearance from the appropriate union-unless as when I employed Cooley the first time the two roofing unions had no one to send out to jobs. The practice was that after a man was on the payroll and cleared to continue to employ him without clearance again as long as he continued as an employee , even if for a period he only worked a couple of hours a week, and or missed now and then a week's work." into the computation of gross backpay, a general denial shall not suffice . As to such matters, if the respondent disputes either the accuracy of the figures in the specification or the premises on which they are based, he shall specifically state the basis for his disagreement, setting forth in detail his position as to the applicable premises and furnishing the appropriate supporting figures. (c) Effect of failure to answer or to plead specifically and in detail to the specification. -If the respondent fails to file any answer to the specification within the time prescribed by this section, the Board may either with or without taking evidence in support of the allegations of the specification and without notice to the respondent, find the specification to be true and enter such order as may be appropriate. If the respondent files an answer to the specification but fails to deny any allegations of the specification in the manner required by paragraph (b) of this section. and the failure so to deny is not adequately explained, such allegation shall be deemed to be admitted to be true, and may be so found by the Board without the taking of evidence supporting such allegation , and the respondent shall be precluded from introducing any evidence controverting said allegation. 6 As his uncontradicted testimony establishes that he hired and fired employees, I find that he was a supervisor within the meaning of Sec. 2(11) of the Act. I Hann's uncontradicted testimony establishes that she was given the authority to hire and fire in the latter part of 1965. 1 find that she is a supervisor within the meaning of Sec . 2(11) of the Act. SUPERIOR ROOFING COMPANY 545 In spite of Jones' statement to Cooley that the last hired was the first to go, I find that the practice of the Company with regard to the hire and lay off of employees was not based on seniority. The applicable contract had no mention of company seniority as such and the testimony of Jones and Hann to the affect that they were not concerned with seniority was not contradicted by any other witnesses. Their testimony establishes that the Company' s general practice, once an employee was hired, was to shift him from job tojob as eachjob completed and when a layoff or rehire was required to choose employees on the basis of the Company's evaluation of their ability. However, the impact of this lack of seniority policy on the General Counsel's theory of backpay is yet to be considered. The backpay specification must be reasonably designed to obtain as close an approximation as possible of the money the discriminatee would have received but for the discrimination . The criteria to be applied in scrutinizing the backpay specification is set forth in N.L.R.B v. Brown and Root, Inc., 311 F.2d 447 (C.A. 8), where the court held: Obviously, in many cases it is difficult for the Board to determine precisely the amount of back pay which should be awarded to an employee. In such circum- <, tances the Board may use as close approximations as possible, and may adopt formulas reasonably designed to produce such approximations. N.L.R.B. v. East Texas Steel Castings Co., 5 Cir., 255 F.2d 284; N.L R B. v. Kartarik, Inc., 8 Cir., 227 F.2d 190; Marlin-Rockwell Corporation v. N.L.R.B., 2 Car., 133 F.2d 258. We have held that with respect to the formula for arriving at back pay rates or amounts which the Board may deem necessary to devise in a particular situation, "our inquiry may ordinarily go no further than to be satisfied that the method selected cannot be declared to be arbitrary or unreasonable in the circumstances in- volved." N.L.R.B. v. Ozark Hardwood Co., 8 Cir., 282 F.2d 1, 7. The backpay specifications are based on the premise that Cooley had seniority slots and that other employees who worked in these seniority slots after Cooley's discharge could be used to measure the hours that Cooley would have worked had he not been discharged. This type of "representative employee" formula in itself is neither arbitrary or unreasonable . Carpenters Union Local 180, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO (Golden State Runway and Engineering Compa- ny), 175 NLRB No. 150. The question presented is whether such a formula is appropriate where the Company's practice prior to this determination did not include the use of seniority. In Jack G. Buncher, d/b/a The Buncher Company, 164 NLRB 340, enfd. 405 F.2d 787 (C.A. 3), the Board was faced with a situation where Respondent did not have a seniority system but nonetheless the General Counsel used a seniority standard to determine the availability of employment for discriminatees. As in the instant case, the Respondent maintained that its personal evaluation of the employee's ability was the method used in deciding which employees were to be retained, laid off or recalled. In these circumstances, the Respondent argued that the General Counsel 's use of a seniority system was arbitrary. The Board held: ... In these circumstances, any measure used to determine backpay will be inexact and arguably arbitrary. It is Respondent's violation of the Act which requires the Board to apply a remedy that in its judgment offers a reasonable basis for remedying the violations found . The extensive use of seniority by other employers in determining layoff and recall, the objective nature of the seniority system , and the complete absence of an alternative offered by the Respondent other than personal judgment , made the General Counsel's utilization of seniority in framing the backpay specification not unreasonable . The backpay specification, in any event, did not foreclose the Respondent from establishing a more reasonable alternative theory on which backpay could be calculat- ed. 2. The replacements In this context, the alternative theory urged by Respon- dent must be considered . Respondent contends that employee D. O. Mott was the only employee who could be considered a replacement for Cooley and that therefore Mott's hours of employment, which amounted to 19, were all that could be attributed to Cooley. Respondent urged that there is no evidence that the other employees, whose hours were used in the backpay computations, were identifiable as Cooley's replacements. I cannot find merit to this contention. The seniority slot approach is applicable to this situation even though there was no company practice of seniority. The "representative employee" need not have been hired as a direct "replacement." For the reasons stated above, the seniority system is a realistic one and Respondent's "replacement" theory which would limit Cooley's backpay to approximately 2-1/2 days pay, if adopted, would be arbitrary and unreasonable . Respondent contends that "it cannot be reasonably argued that anyone other than Mott could have been (Cooley's replacement) inasmuch as there were some contemporary periods of employment for all of the men involved. However, the Respondent does not argue that these other employees did not fit into Cooley's seniority slot as alleged in the backpay specifications. There is no evidence in the record to indicate why Mott left the Company's employment. It would be capricious to assume that Cooley would have left the Company's employment on the same date that Mott did. Respondent's argument would in effect require such an assumption. Respondent also alleges in its brief that Cooley was a carpenter and that therefore Bridges , Scrivner, Daniels, and Pimey, who were hot roofers, could not be considered as Cooley's replacements. The Company performed different types of roofing. In one type wooden shakes or shingles were installed and employees to do that work were generally drawn from the Carpenters Union referral hall. The Company also installed composition shingles. As Jones credibly testified , there had always been a dispute about the installation of the composition shingles between carpenters who were referred from the Carpenters hall and "hot roofers " who were referred from the Roofers Union. In addition, the Company put on "hot roofing" of hot asphalt, pitch, or 546 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD other adhesives. That work was performed by employees referred by the Roofers Union. The contracts of the hot roofers and carpenters each spelled out their claimed jurisdiction in general terms. Though Foreman Jones was somewhat equivocal in recalling which employees were hot roofers and which carpenters, he did testify that he thought Mott was a roofer. Hann unequivocally and credibly testified that Bridges, Scrivner, Daniels, and Pimey were all hot roofers. However, Respondent's assertion that Cooley was a carpenter is not supported by the record. The Board found in the initial case that Cooley informed the Company when he was hired on November 13, 1964, that he was a member of Local 236 of the Roofers Union; that he was put to work and assigned to install wood shingles; and that after the Union had complained that he did not have a referral slip, he reported for work on November 17 with a referral form from the Roofers Union. Cooley had worked on composition shingles for the Company, according to the testimony of Jones, and according to his own testimony he has worked for various employers doing every type of roofing. Cooley was a hot roofer even though he had been assigned by the Company to do work on a particular job which was ordinarily done by carpenters. In these circumstances, I believe it was reasonable for the General Counsel to use the hours worked by other hot roofers as a basis for determining the hours that would have been worked by Cooley but for the discrimination. Such a procedure provided a greater chance of accuracy than the use of the hours worked by carpenters or the hours worked by the combination of carpenters and hot roofers.8 3. Other defenses In the pretrial ruling on the motion of the General Counsel to limit the issues, I held that Respondent could adduce evidence on interim earnings. However, Respon- dent did not put in evidence any testimony on that subject and therefore the only figures on interim earnings are those which the General Counsel admitted in the backpay specifications. Where Respondent wishes to add to such admissions the burden is on the Respondent to do so. Respondent has not met that burden and indeed makes no contention in its brief that Cooley had interim earnings that were not included in the backpay specifications. However, in its brief, Respondent does raise five arguments in an attempt to limit Cooley's backpay. None of these proffered defenses relate to anything raised by Respondent in its answer and therefore they are unavailable to Respondent as defenses under Section 102.54(b) and (c) of the Board's Rules and Regulations. These defenses are not only defective procedurally but they lack merit substantively. They are as follows: (a) The Company contends that it was unable to reach Cooley because Cooley did not give a forwarding address, respond to telephone calls, and he did not come to the company office. Supervisor Jones testified that some time after January 20, 1965, he called Cooley to get him back to work. Supervisor Hann testified that about January 30, 1965, Cooley left an address with her; that she tried to reach him by phone but could not do so; and that she called the Post Office and found out that he no longer had the Post Office box number that he had given to her. However, Jones acknowledged that he made no special effort to get Cooley back to work and Hann acknowledged that she did not write to Cooley or attempt to have any communications forwarded to him. At best, the Company's offer of employment to Cooley was halfhearted. It was not calculated to reach a man who might have to wander far afield in the search of interim employment, and it would not be a basis for ending backpay during the backpay period. (b) Respondent contends that Cooley went to Alaska in March 1965 where he got into a fight which left him physically unable to perform work since that time. Cooley testified that he was injured in Alaska but there is no evidence in the record that the injury was caused by a fight. Cooley's credible testimony is uncontradicted that he is physically able to work. The period he was unable to work because of the injury is specifically set forth in the specification and no backpay was claimed for that time. His testimony is corroborated by his interim earnings which establish that he did in fact work after the injury. (c) Respondent contends that Cooley should be limited as to his backpay because he did not contact the Company after his return from Alaska and tell the Company that he was ready for work. Cooley had no obligation to apply to the Company for work. It was the Company's obligation instead to offer Cooley full reinstatement. (d) Respondent contends that Cooley would have continued to work in Alaska if not for his injuries and that therefore the adding of backpay after his injuries was not warranted. The only evidence with regard to the Alaska work was that of Cooley who averred that it was a temporaryjob. In any event, Respondent has not shown that Cooley willfully rejected any interim earnings. (e) Respondent contends that Cooley's injuries were so severe that he was able to become eligible for disability retirement from the Social Security Administration and that he should therefore be ineligible for backpay. I find no merit in this contention. As indicated above, the evidence in this record establishes that Cooley was only disabled for employment for a limited period which was set forth in the backpay specifications and since that time he has been able to perform roofing work. Respondent, through cross-examination of Cooley, did establish that the injury was a serious one, but Respondent has adduced no evidence to contest Cooley's assertion that he is able to work. Cooley did acknowledge that he does get disability retirement from the Social Security Administration but that proceeding was not before me and I must make my determination on the basis of the record of this case. 8 Neither in its answer nor its brief does Respondent propose that the carpenter-hot roofer combination. computations be based on the hours worked by the carpenters or the SUPERIOR ROOFING COMPANY D. Conclusions For the reasons set forth above, I find that the formula adopted by the General Counsel in the amended specifica- tions is reasonably designed to obtain as close an approximation as possible of the amount of backpay due Cooley and that the method selected is neither arbitrary nor unreasonable. I further find that the amended specification correctly states the amount of backpay due to Cooley. Upon the entire record, I find that the Company and the Union's joint and several obligation to Cooley will be discharged by the payment to him of the sum of $5,470, plus interest at the rate of 6 percent per annum to accrue 9 Net backpay by calendar quarter is as follows: Quarter Net Backpay 1964-4th $ 27 1965-1st 766 2nd 2 3rd 387 4th 724 1966-1st 2257 2nd 68 3rd 0 4th 1239 TOTAL NET BACKPAY $5470 547 commencing with the last date of each calendar quarter of the respective backpay periods on the amount due and owing for each quarter as set forth in Appendix D of the amended backpay specification9 and continuing until the date this decision is complied with. E. Recommendation It is recommended that the Board adopt these findings and conclusions and order Superior Roofing Company and United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, Local No. 751, AFL-CIO, jointly and severally, to pay Orland R. Cooley the sum of $5,470 plus interest as indicated.