The Charmin Paper Products Co.

CHARMIN PAPER PRODUCTS CO. The Charmin Paper Products Company and United Papermakers and Paperworkers , AFLr-CIO. Cases 14-CA-5391 and 14-RC-6280 November 17, 1970 DECISION, ORDER, AND CERTIFICATION OF RESULTS OF ELECTION BY MEMBERS FANNING, BROWN, AND JENKINS On July 1, 1970, Trial Examiner Bernard J. Seff issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had not engaged in the unfair labor practice conduct alleged in the complaint and recommending that the complaint be dismissed in its entirety, and that the objections to the election be overruled, as set forth in the attached Trial Examin- er's Decision. Thereafter, the General Counsel filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision and a supporting brief. The Respondent filed a brief in support of the Trial Examiner's Decision. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with these cases to a three- member panel. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and the briefs, and the entire record in these cases, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions,' and recommendations 2 of the Trial Ex- aminer, as modified below. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the Recommend- ed Order of the Trial Examiner and hereby orders that the complaint herein be, and it hereby is, dismissed. As all the objections have been overruled, and as the Petitioner in Case 14-RC-6280 has failed to secure a majority of the valid ballots cast, we shall certify the results of the election. CERTIFICATION OF RESULTS OF ELECTION It is hereby certified that a majority of the valid votes cast in the election has not been cast for United Papermakers and Paperworkers , AFL-CIO, and that said labor organization is not the exclusive bargaining representative of the employees in the unit found 601 appropriate within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act.3 I Notwithstanding abundant testimony to the contrary, the Trial Examiner was persuaded to accept the Respondent 's version of numerous alleged violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act . Among these were the granting of two general wage increases and additional overtime pay benefits prior to the election . Moreover, the Respondent developed a system of individual and private conferences between employees and their immediate supervisors during which, a group of employees testified, the supervisors interrogated, coerced, and threatened the employees with regard to the Union's organizational activity. Because the Trial Examiner's findings and conclusions are based, almost exclusively, upon his broad credibility finding that, "The demeanor of Respondent's witnesses was uniformly impressive. The Union's chief witness appeared to be motivated by a fanatical drive to make a case against Respondent," we are constrained to find that his findings and conclusions are not contrary to the preponderance of all the relevant evidence. Accordingly, we will not disturb the Trial Examiner's recommendations in this case . Standard Dry Wall Products, Inc., 91 NLRB 544, enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (C.A. 3). 2 As the Trial Examiner failed to include the certification of election results in his recommendations, this has been added herein as indicated infra. 3 The appropriate unit was found to be "All production and maintenance employees including plant clericals and laboratory clerks who were employed during the payroll period ending October 19, 1969, but excluding office clerical and professional employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act." TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION REPORT ON OBJECTIONS BERNARD J. SEFF, Trial Examiner: This proceeding tried before me at Cape Girardeau, Missouri, on April 14, 1970 and April 15,1 with all parties present, involves a complaint2 pursuant to Section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, (herein called the Act), alleging that Charmin Paper Products Company (herein called the Respondent or Company), in the course of an organization- al campaign by United Papermakers and Paperworkers, AFL-CIO (hereinafter called the Union), interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act. Respondent by its answer admitted certain allegations of the complaint but denied the commission of any unfair labor practices. Consolidated for trial with the unfair labor practice proceeding were objections to the election by conduct affecting the results of an election conducted among Respondent's employees on November 21, For reasons hereafter stated, I find and conclude that the evidence does not sustain the allegations of the complaint and that, accordingly, no remedial order should issue. As the events forming the basis for that conclusion concerned actions taken by the Respondent before the election petition was filed (prior to September 26, 1969, the date the petition was filed) these actions cannot be considered in passing on the objections to the election. At the trial the parties were represented by their respective counsel, and were afforded full opportunity to ' All dates in this decision refer to 1969 unless otherwise.stated. 2 Issued on January 28, 1970 on a charge filed on, December I and thereafter consolidated with Case No. 14-RC-6280• which involves objections to an election conducted by.the Board on November 21 which election was lost by the Union . The Union filed timely, objections on December 1. 186 NLRB No. 89 602 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD introduce relevant evidence, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, to argue orally on the record, and to file briefs. Oral argument was waived. Briefs have been submitted by the General Counsel and the Respondent which have been duly considered. The General Counsel filed a Motion to Conform the Pleadings to the Proof on May 1, 1970. Respondent filed no objections to the Motion and it is hereby granted. Upon the pleadings, stipulations of counsel, evidence, including my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, and the entire record in the case, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT I. JURISDICTION Charmin Paper Products Company, a wholly owned subsidiary of Proctor and Gamble Company is, and has been at all times material herein, a corporation duly organized under, and existing by virtue of, the laws of the State of Ohio. At all times material herein, Respondent has maintained an office and place of business in the City of Cape Girardeau, in the State of Missouri, herein called the Respondent's place. Respondent maintains other plants in the States of Pennsylvania and Wisconsin. Respondent is, and has been at all times material herein, engaged in the manufacture, sale, and distribution of Pampers and related paper products. Respondent's plant located at Cape Girardeau, Missouri, is the only facility involved in this proceeding. During the year ending October 23, 1969, which period is representative of its operations during all times material hereto, Respondent, in the course and conduct of its business operations, purchased and caused to be transport- ed and delivered at its Cape Girardeau plant, paper and other goods and materials valued in excess of $50,000, of which goods and materials valued in excess of $50,000 were transported and delivered to its plant in Cape Girardeau, Missouri, directly from points located outside the State of Missouri. During the same period Respondent, in the course and conduct of its business operations, manufac- tured, sold, and distributed at its Cape Girardeau plant, products valued in excess of $50,000 which were shipped from said plant directly to points located outside the State of Missouri. Respondent is and has been at all times material here an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6) and (7) of the Act. II. THE UNION United Papermakers and Paperworkers, AFL-CIO, herein called the Union, is, and has been at all times material herein, a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Background Respondent's Cape Girardeau plant was under construc- tion when Respondent began hiring employees on April 7. Employees remained in training sessions within the City of Cape Girardeau until they were moved into the newly completed plant in the country in June. When the events in question occurred, the Charmin plant was quite new. The first employees were hired beginning in early April, 1969 and were trained at a temporary location in downtown Cape Girardeau. The move to the new plant began in June and production on a limited basis did not commence until July. At the time of the election on November 21, 1969, the plant employed a complement of about 220 production and maintenance employees. By the time of the hearing in April, 1970 the number had approximately doubled. There were, at the time of the election, about 25 team managers. From April throughout the remainder of the year and on into 1970 the plant was in a start-up and expansion period. Respondent initially had the critical problem of attempting to attract a substantial number of potentially qualified employees. As stated in Respondent's brief, training costs per employee ran as high as $3,000 to $4,000 and it was therefore necessary to keep abreast of the wage scales of competitors in order to attract and retain workers. Pursuant to this wage policy and based on survey information, wage rates were increased in June, 1969. Employee benefits were increased by the addition of a holiday in September and by certain improvements in the insurance coverage. It is also pointed out in Respondent's brief that the Union started its organizing efforts at a very early date and in fact the organizing efforts commenced even before the Compa- ny began to function in Cape Girardeau. It is significant to point out that the Union campaign was conducted openly and without fear of reprisal. Union adherents among the employees wore Union buttons at work and solicited and passed out Union literature in the plant. It should be emphasized that during the course of the hearing partisan Union witnesses freely admitted that they were not harassed, interrogated, threatened, or penalized in any manner during the campaign and through the election. In fact all of the witnesses who testified received one or more promotions from the time they commenced their employ- ment until the time of the hearing. The General Counsel in his brief starts off initially with the statement that the Respondent committed numerous violations of Section 8(axl) of the Act. Among the violations alleged were two general wage increases. Respondent granted employees additional overtime pay benefits, made favorable comments about its wage increases, and engaged in a widespread campaign of interrogation and threats that employees would lose certain benefits in case of unionization. Additionally, the General Counsel in his brief alleges that the Respondent injected a racial issue into the Union and election situations, threatened to withhold benefits for bargaining purposes in the case of unionization, gave employees the impression of surveillance of their Union activities, suggested that an employee was denied promotion because of his Union activity, asked employees to remove Union insignia, and told employees that Respondent's wage system would not work in the event of unionization. B. Respondent's Alleged Unlawful June Wage Increase The General Counsel takes the position that when the CHARMIN PAPER PRODUCTS CO. 603 Respondent set its first wage rates for its new Cape Girardeau plant in December 1968 that the rates were established as explained by the Company as the result of a survey taken prior to the establishment of the rates. The Union representative, Woodall, contacted the Respondent in the first week in April. Respondent opened its employment office in Cape Girardeau in the middle of February. Newly hired employees were placed in a training program in rented facilities in downtown Cape Girardeau. Plant Manager Bowman testified that some employees went to the new plant on June 19 but the general move into the new plant took place July 14-16. Until mid-July, the bulk of the employees were still in the process of being trained. The record shows that Bowman set forth the Respon- dent's policy as follows: "We pay wages and benefits that are equal to or better than the average of the major companies in the local area where our people might work if they didn't work for us, and regional paper converting plants." It is not denied that the Respondent granted a general across-the-board wage increase on June 24. The General Counsel points out that this wage increase was given only 2 months after the opening of the plant at a time when the Union was already present and before the Respondent had commenced production. Bowman testified that the June wage increases were granted on the basis that the survey of December, 1968, was by that time already 7 months old and had been made from a distant point, Respondent's home office in Cincinnati, and many changes had occurred in the area. The General Counsel argues that the Respondent's use of the survey as the basis for granting wage increases should not be allowed to obscure the fact that its June increase was unlawful. In the view of the General Counsel the changes that occurred since the December, 1968, survey are ascribed to the fact that the Union arrived on the scene very early at Respondent's Cape Girardeau plant. General Counsel points out that a large and sophisticated Company like Respondent would not reasonably set wage rates based on an unreliable survey such as Bowman characterized the December, 1968 survey. General Counsel goes on to point out that Respondent uses the survey and the companies included in it as a pretext to Justify unlawful wage increases designed to thwart Union organizational activity. This conclusion of the General Counsel is predicated on his interpretation of the following facts: A company in Jackson, Missouri, was included in the survey but it had less than 100 employees and Bowman said that by June, 1969 Respondent had only approxi- mately 112 employees. Respondent added West Vaco to the survey even though at the time West Vaco was added it had only 3 employees. The General Counsel points out that West Vaco still isn't an operating company. Furthermore, the General Counsel emphasises that the Respondent has kept Marquette Cement Company, which Company is engaged in an entirely different line of business from Respondent, in the survey even though at present Marquette has only a little over 100 employees. General Counsel states that the Respondent has kept Potlatch Forest Company in the survey even though Bowman admits that he does not know whether the skills required by Respondent or those required by Potlatch have any relation to each other. From Bowman's testimony the General Counsel takes the position that the alleged reliance of Respon- dent on the survey is a sham . He points out that Respondent eliminated the Jackson Plant with 100 employees from its survey, supposedly because it was too small in comparison with Respondent-which at that had approximately 100 employees. But it added the West Vaco plant, at a time when it had only 3 employees, and West Vaco is still not in production. It retained Marquette Cement in the survey, even though Marquette's employment force has fallen from 300 to approximately 100, almost the same number as the Jackson plant which was thrown out of the survey. From this information the General Counsel states that the Respondent uses and manipulates the survey in the companies covered by it as a cloak under which it can hand out wage increases at such times as Union organization efforts appear to be promising. According to the General Counsel the biggest single change in the entire situation from September, 1968 to June, 1969 was the early arrival of the Union at Respondent's door, drawing from the Respondent the reaction of the manipulation of its survey results so that it could grant an across-the-board wage increase to a group of employees who were still in training and had not even gone into production . It is further underscored that Plant Manager Bowman did not deny that the wage increases had any more than coincidental relationship to the actual opening of production in the plant. This action appears to the General Counsel to be an afterthought but he argues that it does not serve the Respondent as a reliable cover for its wage increase, since beneath the transparent cloak of the talk about a survey can readily be seen the skeleton of a wage increase unlawfully granted only to thwart the organizational efforts of the Union which had arrived sooner than Respondent might have contemplated. The General Counsel asked a rhetorical question, "Why else give raises to employees who hadn't produced a thing to that point?" Allegation 5A, sets forth that on some date in June, 1969, the employer granted wage increases for the purpose of influencing employees against the Union. The record is barren of any testimony or any other evidence to support this allegation . The only fact that is not disputed is that there was an increase in wage rates announced in June 1969, effective June 23. According to Respondent the evidence affirmatively shows that the increase was made for business reasons. The Company first started hiring people in February, 1969, for the new plant at Cape Girardeau. The hiring rates for personnel hired between February and June were established in December 1968. The rates established in December were based on a survey made by the Company's home office in Cincinnati which office had no direct information concerning the local conditions prevailing at Cape Girardeau. When the plant manager Bowman came on the job he testified that he found flaws in the survey in that it had included companies which were not comparable and should not have been included. Furthermore Bowman pointed out that the survey 604 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD was also 7 months out of date by June, 1969. It was further pointed out that the employer was under the necessity of recruiting and retaining qualified employees and for this reason it was imperative that the wage rates be brought in line with companies competing for employees operating in the same geographical area. Respondent takes the position that this increase was in accord with the announcement on April 22 that "It is our intent to consider wage adjustments no later than July of this year." There is a further allegation in the complaint, 5C, that the employer granted wage increases in September for the purpose of influencing employees against the Union. Once again there is no evidence in the record to support this charge. The General Counsel sought to evaluate this wage increase as a suspicious act by reference to the April 22 memorandum, which states, inter alia: It is our intent to consider wage rate adjustments in the spring of each year, about April, and to consider benefit adjustments in the fall of the year, about September. However there is other language in this memorandum and the Respondent points out that the General Counsel does not seem to understand the working of the Employer's wage policy which is designed to keep abreast with wage competition in the area and region in which the plant is located. In support of this argument the Respondent states that the April memorandum leads off by making a preliminary statement, as follows: In establishing our wage rates and benefits, we have taken into consideration all known changes at several companies in the community. We shall continue to review this matter and will make adjustments when our information indicates it is right to do so. The Respondent further points out that the June memoran- dum also states that: "wages will be adjusted again when our information indicates that it is right to do so." Plant Manager Bowman's explanation for the September 24 increase is based on the necessity to maintain wage rates at a level sufficiently high to attract potentially good employees. Furthermore Respondent points out that the explanation given by Bowman is unchallenged by any evidence appearing in the record. In further explanation of the September 24 increase Respondent states that when the benefits survey was made in the fall, wage rate information was obtained from the survey companies as well as the general situation. This survey data showed two companies in the survey had made or were making wage increases which were not anticipated when the June survey was made. The record indicates that Marquette C. had concluded a 2-year contract with increases substantially in excess of the 6 percent estimated in June; that West Vaco was informing applicants for employment that it was going to grant a 17 cents per hour increase before January 1970. Respondent offers this information as an explanation of the reason why the increase in September was granted. It points to a memorandum that appears in the record which contains the following statement: Several unexpected and significant changes (in survey companies) have occurred which we could not antici- pate last June, so we are adjusting our wages accordingly. Respondent argues that the employer follows a wage policy based on keeping competitive with a selected list of nine companies in the area or in regional converting plants. The normal operation of this system called for wage adjust- ments when wage survey information indicated it was right to do so. According to the Respondent the wage survey information indicated it was "right" to do so in June, and again in September. Respondent argues that in view of the heavy recruiting in progress and the need to obtain and retain qualified employees, the employer was required, as a matter of business survival, to keep abreast of the wage survey companies competing for the same types of employees. Respondent argues that in the absence of any contrary proof it cannot be found that these wage increases were coercive or unlawful under the Act. The fact that union organization was in progress from the very beginning of the plant is not evidence of unlawful motivation, particularly when affirmative evidence of business reasons for the increase is offered. In support of this position Respondent cites Fairchild Camera v. National Labor Relations Board, 406 F.2d 581, 69 LRRM 2900; Logan Co., 171 NLRB No. 83, 68 LRRM 1141; Brearley Company, 163 NLRB No. 84, 64 LRRM 1474; Sheboygan Sausage, 156 NLRB 1490, 61 LRRM 1299. The Company then argues persuasively that an employer could never grant a wage increase while an organizer was on the scene if what has been stated above were not true. Respondent then emphasizes that it is noteworthy that increases such as these have to be approved by the home office of the Company in Cincinnati, Ohio, and that requests for that approval were made about September 1. The increase was announced on September 24 and the petition was not filed until September 26. Respondent then emphasizes in its brief that the Board has recently held that an employer "has the legal duty to proceed as he would have done had the Union not been on the scene." In support of this argument attention is called to the Gates Rubber Company, 182 NLRB No. 15, 74 LRRM 1049. In that case the Board held that it was an unfair labor practice for an employer during the pendency of an election to withhold an increase in wages that would otherwise have been granted. This ruling negates the drawing of any adverse inference from the fact that the increases were given during a union organizing campaign, which began when the first employees were hired, even before the plant had been opened. C. Interrogation The Employer had divided its unit employees into teams which consist of 1 team manager and 14 employee team members. The team rooms are located on a floor above the production area where the team manager conducts daily meetings with his 14 member team at which meetings a variety of work-related topics are discussed. It is also the team room where most of the "one-to-one" interviews are conducted. Respondent describes the so-called one-to-one meetings as a managerial innovation. The gravamen of the complaint targets around statements or comments attributed to some team managers, one department manager , and one black CHARMIN PAPER PRODUCTS CO. training specialist. The complaint alleges as per se unfair labor practices the following; (a) Asking an employee why she favors the Union. (b) Asking an employee how he felt about the Union. (c) Asking an employee what issues were causing employ- ees to want the Union. (d) Telling an employee he is talking too much and when asked if this meant talking about the Union, replying, "Not exactly". (e) Giving an "impression" of surveillance. (f) Asking an employee why he wanted time off to attend an NLRB hearing to which he was not subpoened. (g) Making favorable references to existing wage rates. (h) Stating an opinion that the company could not operate under its present wage system if unionization would result and compel it to function under a union seniority system. (i) Granting periodic wage increases to employees. (j) Telling an employee that Veteran's benefits could be lost under the type of seniority usually required in union contracts. It was corroborated by the Union witness that the one-to- one meetings took place on a daily basis at the beginning of the shift and the discussions that took place in these meetings concerned themselves with routine questions about the job. In some instances the employees themselves brought up the subject of unions. Whenever this occurred free interchanges of opinion took place completely free from threats or any suggestions of coercion. The atmos- phere surrounding these meetings did not in any case create fear or reprisals and the Union witnesses were comfortable in the exchanges that took place. For example an employee said that early in November Team Manager Popp spoke to him alone in the team room. He asked the employee "How do you feel about the Union, are you for it or against it?" The employee replied that he had not yet made up his mind. Popp went on, "Has the Company done anything to cause you to have doubts?" Popp then went on to say, "I have pamphlets and information about the Union you can look at whenever you want to. You have a right to vote whatever way you choose." It is difficult to imagine a more innocuous conversation or one less calculated to convey any anti union animus. Despite the fact that the complaint enumerates 28 separate allegations of unfair labor practices, viewed superficially a first impression might be that the Respondent engaged in wholesale violations of the Act. Evaluation of the testimony of the witnesses for the General Counsel shows however that there is no substance to the allegations. For example, the complaint sets forth that Respondent created the impression of surveillance. This is based on the testimony of employee Markhart. He testified that in June or July he "and two or three other guys," one of whom was Baugher, were standing outside the Colonial Inn near the intersection of an interstate highway and saw supervisor Fogler driving down the highway. Markhart thought that Fogler looked at the group but admitted that Fogler kept on driving. Markhart stated he wouldn't say Fogler looked "right at us but towards us." Later on while Markhart, Ray Baugher, Don Clifton, and Ray Smith were standing around in the plant talking during work time Fogler said: "You are not at the Colonial Inn. Break it up." There is no other testimony on the matter of surveillance or creating the impression of surveillance. Fogler testified that he 605 frequently drove by the Colonial Inn to visit his service station. He denied that he saw Markhart or that he made any reference to it again. This flimsy thread was sought to be woven into evidence that the Company engaged in creating the impression of surveillance. Note that there is not even a suggestion that Fogler had any idea why they were there or that a union meeting had been or was going to be held in the Colonial Inn. The comment made by Fogler in the plant would appear to have been "small talk". No finding or inference that the Company was engaged in any unfair labor practices from the allegation concerning surveillance can be drawn from the evidence in the record. Fogler allegedly asked an employee why he wanted to attend an NLRB hearing. Employee Baugher testified that the NLRB scheduled a hearing on the election petition for October 21 or 22. Fogler told Baugher that a Union official named Bob Coomer phoned and asked that Baugher be allowed to attend this meeting. Fogler replied that he could not authorize the day off unless Baugher asked for it. Fogler asked why he wanted to attend. Baugher replied he wanted to see how an NLRB hearing was conducted. He was granted the time off. The entire incident concerning Baugher and his desire to attend the NLRB hearing is trivial and not worthy of extended discussion. The complaint takes two paragraphs to set forth a series of alleged conversations involving an employee, Mrs. Nelson, and a black training specialist named Thompson which were offered to show that Respondent was engaged in racial discrimination. Team leader Pollard told Thomp- son that Norma Nelson felt she was being discriminated against in promotions. Thompson, who is black, felt that it would be well if he could arrange an audience with Nelson so that she could ventilate her feelings after which he felt the situation would be clarified. He secured permission from Green, who is Nelson's team manager, to speak to her. Nelson apparently resented the fact that she was being talked to by a black man who was not her regular supervisor and this seemed to her to carry unfavorable racial overtones. A meeting was arranged with the permission of Green. According to Nelson, Thompson opened the conversation talking about a union in Bogalusa, Louisiana where when the union came in there they laid off all the blacks. Thompson then said, "Norma, I don't think you would want that to happen here." She replied, "No, I wouldn't." Thompson then told her that he knew she had been going to all the union meetings. She said she had because she knew nothing about unions and went to find out what the union had to offer as compared with what Charmin had to offer. Nelson then said Thompson told her about the layoff of the blacks at Bogalusa and that if the union was voted in there would not be any blacks in the union. "If there are blacks then, he says, the ones that they hire in will be more white than they are black. In other words, he meant they would be a Tom." In addition he said he understood I had some grievances with the plant and that he wished I would come to him instead of Green. Nelson testified she asked him why. He said he was a black man and that is what he was there for. Nelson rejoined, "I think that is a bad policy of the plant has you there just for the blacks to come to, and Bill Green being white, he is over me, I feel I should be able 606 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD to go to him and explain to him what I want to do. He said, well, some of the other blacks had grievances that had talked to him and he wanted to know if I thought a meeting with the blacks would help. I told him I didn't know, but maybe it would. He suggested having it at the Holiday Inn or the plant and he asked about having it at my home." Apparently the idea of a meeting of blacks with Thompson died aborning because no such meeting ever took place. Thompson testified that he knew Nelson both in the plant and socially having met her with black groups which were meeting on civil rights issues. Initially, in the course of Thompson's conversation with Nelson she opened the talk by saying she knew what he was going to talk about and said, "I am going to tell you like I told Bill Green, I am for the union." Thompson then testified that the conversation turned to the union and he mentioned that he knew a few things he felt she should consider. He said he attended college in Grambling, Louisiana and some students whose parents worked in Bogalusa had to drop out of school because their parents were forced out of work as the result of the strike that took place at the plant. Thompson categorically denied that in his talk with Nelson he said that if the union was voted in there would not be any blacks in the union and if they are they will be more white than black. Thompson said he never spoke to Nelson again. From the above recital General Counsel in his brief argues that Thompson's recital, in speaking about his experience at Grambling College and tying this in with his statement that the advent of a union at Bogalusa caused the layoff there of black employees, constituted a threat that unionization would jeopardize the jobs of other black employees at Charmin. Such an inference from the facts detailed above is neither reasonable nor is it supported by the record. It should be noted that Nelson is a dedicated member of the NAACP and appeared to be hypersensitive on the subject of racial discrimination. If Thompson's recital of the facts in Bogalusa was not misrepresented by him it is not violative of the Act. As between the versions of this conversation given by Thompson and Nelson I credit Thompson whose calm testimony was more convincing than the story told by Nelson. The complaint alleges that Respondent granted general wage increases in June and September and thereafter made favorable references in speeches and in letters to its employees calling their attention to these raises. There is no dispute about these facts nor is there any question that the Union, in its propaganda, told the employees it would improve their wages and other benefits if chosen at an NLRB election. Nowhere in Respondent's communica- tions, either written or oral, were there any threats of reprisal or promises of benefit made to its employees. The Company's actions in these regards were not violative of the Act. General Counsel states that when a wage increase was granted to employees on September 24, just two days before the Union filed a petition with the NLRB, such wage increase was made by the Company during the critical period and as such was violative as per the adjudicated cases under the Act. The case law on this point is clear: changes in wages or working conditions made after a petition is filed do fall within the principles enumerated in well established Board law. But the fact of the matter is that Respondent in the case at bar granted its wage increase two days before the date the Union filed its petition. There is no showing on the record that Respondent learned of the Union's intention to file a petition and then `jumped the gun". The complaint further alleges that the Respondent committed unfair labor practices when it communicated to its employees that its present method of granting individual wage increases would have to be discontinued if the Union became the representative of its employees. The Company's present method is based entirely on merit and it explained that under union contracts individual increases are usually based on seniority. In support of this statement the Company pointed to a contract it now has with the same union in one of its other plants where increases are in fact based on seniority. It is not disputed that the contract presently in force at its other plant does predicate individual wage increases on seniority. Nowhere does the record show that the facts as presented to its employees by the Respondent are not an accurate factual presentation. In further explanation of its position the Company stated that if the Union did become the representative of its employees the present wage progression plan would have to be changed to incorporate the principles of seniority. The General Counsel argues in his brief that by its position on wages Respondent was in fact threatening to take away its wage plan and thus threatening its employees with the loss of wage increases if they chose to be represented by the Union. The Company did not announce an intention to refuse to bargain with the Union if its organizational efforts were successful but on the contrary it stated that it would bargain with the Union on this point. I know of no cases in which the Board has held that a Respondent would be in violation of the Act based on the facts enumerated supra. The record is devoid of evidence that in any of its statements the Company threatened its employees with threats of reprisal or promises of benefit unless the employees rejected representation by the Union. The testimony of the approximately 11 supervisors was in direct contradiction to certain of the statements made by the witnesses for the Union. However in the posture of the case it hardly seems necessary to made extended credibility findings. In any case even if the testimony of the Union's witnesses was to be credited the statements which were advanced as evidence of illegal interrogation attributed to Respondent were within the protection of the free speech provision of the Act and were not violative of the law. The demeanor of Respondent's witnesses was uniformly impressive. The Union's chief witness appeared to be motivated by a fanatical drive to make a case against Respondent. Raymond Baugher, who is the employee referred to earlier in this decision, had asked for permission to absent himself from the plant in order to attend the NLRB hearing on the petition for an election filed by the Union. Baugher was given permission to attend the hearing. Baugher asked his team leader, Pollard, if it was true that "if we went union that we would be denied our Veteran's benefits?". Pollard allegedly replied that he did not know what would happen at Cape Girardeau but that when the Mehoopany, CHARMIN PAPER PRODUCTS CO. 607 Pennsylvania, plant of the Respondent voted for the Union the unionized employees were no longer eligible for Veteran's benefits. When Baugher was in St. Louis after the hearing he paid a visit to the Veteran's Administration to check on the question of possible loss of benefits if the plant went union. The Veteran's official in charge of Charmin's veterans program told Baugher "there was no way that a union could give or take away veteran's benefits." It is interesting to point out in this connection that Baugher applied for and received Veteran's benefits. It would seem in view of these facts that Baugher knew of his own knowledge and experience that the election of the Union could have no effect on the receipt or denial of Veteran's benefits. It should also be pointed out that even though Baugher complained that he had been criticized in one-to-one meetings that his interest and the quality of his job had fallen off. Baugher upon being told this stated on the record that he had been praised only a short time before the complaint was made about his work and he could only account for the remarks made by his supervisor as reflecting Respondent's displeasure with him because of his well known activities on behalf of the Union. Pollard testified that when Baugher asked him why he had not been promoted sooner he replied: "I told him it had been because he did very poorly on the test and because he had not been a good performer during that period of time." Pollard went on that he had had a discussion with Willgrubs about Baugher. He told Willgrubs that Baugher's performance had not been good, that "Ray (Baugher) had taken the basic maintenance test and scored very poorly on the test and showed a lack of technical knowledge to become a mechanic." There is another significant aspect of the testimony of Baugher. He testified that he was in a maintenance assignment and was trying to qualify for the job of basic mechanic. His job rate was $2.76 and the rate paid the mechanic was $2.92. In order to qualify Baugher had to pass a written mechanic's test. He took the test and scored 59 on the first test. He admitted on the stand that he had deliberately flunked the examination. The next time he took the test he made 92. Shortly after passing he was promoted. Baugher said he was not promoted because of his union activities. Baugher testified that team manager Willgrubs told him "the only conclusion he could come to that my union activities had kept me from getting a raise Baugher's testimony that he had deliberately flunked the written examination was peculiar to say the least. I made him my witness to seek clarification of what he had said. TRIAL EXAMINER: Did you testify yesterday that you deliberately failed to pass the first written examination? WITNESS: Yes, Sir. TRIAL EXAMINER: If this is so, by deliberately failing, you penalized yourself in terms of holding off a wage increase, is that correct? WITNESS: Yes sir, I suppose so. TRIAL EXAMINER: Why would you do that? WITNESS: Simply because, sir, in our training and through our training we were advised that these tests were merely to show you and your team manager what you needed to brush up on as far as maintenance is concerned. It had little or nothing to do with your qualifications. TRIAL EXAMINER: Isn't the determination as to whether the test had to do with qualifications something that is made normally by the company? WITNESS: I suppose so, sir. WITNESS: Yes, sir, I had been badgered so much that at that time the test didn't make much difference to me. They told me they didn't make the difference in your qualification and I needed to prove it to the people. Everyone was upset over these tests. They didn't think it was fair that we had to take these tests. From the quoted portion of the transcript which appears supra it is clear that Baugher acted as though he had a mission in life to prove the tests were not important. It was not in his province to make such a determination. When an individual deliberately fails a test and takes a financial penalty for this act he seems to be behaving in an abnormal fashion and thereby marks himself as a zealot. Cool objectivity and accurate testimony are not the habilments normally worn by fanatics. I do not credit Baugher's testimony in any respect not corroborated by other witnesses who are not out to "make a case". The record contains testimony about an episode that took place at Markhart's shop to the effect that team manager Fogler told two employees that employees would lose veteran's benefits if the plant was organized. The three men involved in this incident were admittedly well lubricated with many beers. Fogler categorically denied having made any remarks about veteran's benefits. In any case since the determination regarding such benefits was exclusively within the sole control of the Veteran's Administration and beyond the reach of Respondent any conversation, under these circumstances, could not be violative of the Act. The matter concerning Markhart's shop is too trivial to merit extended discussion. The complaint contains allegations to the effect that plant superintendent both addressed letters on October 29 and November 3, 12, and 17 and made a number of speeches to the employees. The short answer to such allegations can best be expressed in the Regional Director's conclusion to the Union's objections to the election: There is nothing in any of these letters by which the Employer threatened to take any action detrimental to employees if Petitioner were to become the collective bargaining representative of the employees. Further there are allegations that various supervisors asked employees how they felt about the Union; an employee was asked why she believed the employees needed a union; what issues were causing employees to want a union; on another occasion a Company supervisor allegedly told an employee that he was talking too much and after that the employee asked if he was talking too much about the Union, the supervisor said "Not exactly." Nowhere was it proved that the employees were prohibited from union activities or that any threats were made or that an atmosphere of coercion was created or that Respondent entertained any antiunion animus. Strapping away the 608 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD separately stated allegations which appear in the complaint it is clear that the Company did not engage in any activities violative of the Act. Objections to the Election The objections to the election were as follows: (1) That the Company threatened and interrogated individual employees with reprisals if they voted for the Union. (2) The employer made promises of benefits to destroy the Union's majority. (3) Respondent distributed and posted on bulletins false and misleading information at a time and in a manner which did not allow the Union time to deny and disprove them. (4) The Company threatened employees with loss of benefits and earnings. (5) Respondent in its letter to employees and their families threatened employees. (6) Respondent provided the Union with an inaccurate eligibility list. (7) Respondent employed the racial issue in order to destroy the Union majority. The Regional Director dismissed objections 3, 5 and 6. The objections 2, 4 and 7 were found to have raised material and substantial matters and a hearing was directed to take testimony on these and on "Other conduct not specifically alleged." The subject matter of objections 2, 4 and 7 has been dealt with in detail supra. In a word no credible evidence to support these objections was adduced by the General Counsel . The employer made no promises of benefit designed to undermine the Union's majority. No employees were threatened with the loss of earnings or other benefits. No efforts were made by Respondent to destroy the Union's majority by the injection of racial issues . In point of fact the Company did not introduce racial issues into the situation. Further amplification of the material encom- passed in the enumerated objections upon which a hearing was ordered beyond the matters analyzed and disposed of in the body of the instant decision would be repetitious and would serve no useful purpose . It is recommended that the objections to the election be dismissed. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The Respondent is an employer within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act, engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. The Respondent has not engaged in the alleged unfair labor practices. 4. The objections to the election are without foundation in fact. They should be dismissed and the result certified that the Union was not selected as the collective-bargaining representative of the Respondent's employees. RECOMMENDED ORDER It is recommended that the complaint be dismissed in its entirety.