Rubber Workers Local 510

RUBBER WORKERS LOCAL 510 United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum and Plastic Workers of America, Local 510, AFL-CIO (Uniroyal, Inc.) and Sophia M. Coats. Case 21-CB-3230 November 24, 1970 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS BROWN AND JENKINS On May 14, 1969, Trial Examiner E. Don Wilson issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision and a brief in support thereof. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and brief, and the entire record in this case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner only to the extent consistent herewith: The Trial Examiner found that the Respondent violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by imposing an unreasonably excessive fine upon its member, Sophia M. Coats, the Charging Party, for crossing its picket line at Uniroyal, Inc., Coats' place of employment, and by attempting to collect said fine. For the reasons more fully explicated in Arrow Development Co.,' which issued after the Trial Examiner's Decision herein, we disagree with the Trial Examiner's findings and shall dismiss the complaint in its entirety.2 In that case the Board held that where, as here, a fine seeks to implement a legitimate union rule which is not in conflict with any policies of the Act, the Board is without authority to determine whether the fine is reasonable in amount. Accordingly, we shall dismiss the complaint in its entirety. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor 765 Relations Board hereby orders that the complaint herein be, and it hereby is, dismissed in its entirety. I International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, Local Lodge No 504 (Arrow Development Co), 185 NLRB No 22 2 In view of our conclusion herein , we deem it unnecessary to consider or pass upon the Respondent's contentions that this action is barred by Section 10(b) of the Act , and that, in any event, the fine did not exceed Coats' total earnings for the period she worked behind the picket line and therefore, was not excessive TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE E. DON WILSON, Trial Examiner : Upon a charge filed by Sophia M. Coats, an individual , herein Coats, on October 9, 1968, the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board, herein the Board, issued a complaint dated December 20, 1968, alleging that United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum and Plastic Workers of America, Local 510, AFL-CIO, herein Respondent, violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended , herein the Act. Pursuant to due notice a hearing in this matter was held before me, at Santa Ana, California, on March 4, 1969. General Counsel and Respondent fully participated, and each submitted a brief on April 17 , 1969. The briefs have been considered. Upon the entire record in the case and from my observation of the witnesses , I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. THE BUSINESS OF UNIROYAL, INC. Uniroyal, Inc., herein the Employer, is a multistate and multiplant corporation with a place of business, inter alia, in Santa Ana, California . In the course and conduct of its business it annually purchases goods, materials, and supplies valued in excess of $50 ,000 directly from points outside California. It also annually sells products valued in excess of $50,000 directly to purchasers outside California. At all material times, it has been an employer engaged in commerce and in a business affecting commerce within the meaning of the Act. U. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION At all material times, Respondent has been a labor organization within the meaning of the Act. III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The Issue Is attempted court enforcement of a fine of $525 imposed by Respondent on Sophia M. Coats, a member of Respondent, for crossing Respondent's picket line during a strike called by Respondent, and working for the Employer, a violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act, because the fine, in the circumstances of this case was arbitrary, unreasonably large, excessive, and unreasonable discipline adversely affecting her employment status? 186 NLRB No. 106 766 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD B. The Facts Coats has been an employee of the Employer, at its Santa Ana plant, since the fall of 1961, and since that time until the present has been a member of Respondent. Her initiation fee was $4.25 and since she became a member, her monthly dues have been $4.25. Respondent has been the bargaining representative for the Employer's production employees for a number of years. On April 21, 1967, Respondent went on strike at the Employer for a contract and the strike continued until July 26, 1967.1 Coats left work with the other strikers on April 21, 1967. On June 20, 1967, Coats crossed Respondent's picket line and returned to work, working the next 21 working days, through July 15, 1967. Her hourly rate of pay was $2.31 an hour. She performed some overtime work during these 21 days. Her total earnings for this time were $425, $55 of which was for overtime. On June 29, 1967, Respondent notified Coats that charges of engaging in conduct unbecoming a union member2 in violation of the Respondent's International's Constitution had been brought against her by Respondent's vice president, Rosa Lee Blair. Coats was further advised that Respondent's Executive Committee intended to proceed on the charges. A Trial Board was selected and Coats was notified that a trial would be held on July 30, 1967. On July 30, 1967, the trial opened at 11:30 a.m., and adjourned at 12:15 p.m.3 Coats was present and protested the legality of the proceedings. Blair listed the days Coats worked during the strike and pointed out that it was a total of 21 days. The Trial Board found Coats guilty of the charges of crossing the picket line and recommended a penalty of suspension from Respondent for 1 year during which time she would be debarred from taking part in Respondent's activities but would have to pay her regular monthly dues, and a fine of $25 for each of the 21 days she worked, for a total of $525. Payment of the fine was to be made within 30 days, or court action would be instituted to collect it. On August 13, 1967, the membership adopted the recommendations of the Trial Board. Coats exhausted her appeal remedies and her appeal was denied on November 29, 1967. Coats, as of the date of the hearing, had not paid the fine. Respondent initiated legal action against Coats on September 17, 1968, by filing a complaint in the Municipal Court of the Anaheim-Fullerton Judicial District of California, seeking recovery of the fine, plus interest and costs. On October 14, 1968, Coats filed answer denying the material allegations of the complaint with the exception of approval of the fine by the membership. The proceeding was pending at the time of the hearing herein. Prior to learning that charges had been filed against her by Blair, Coats had no notice of any kind that Respondent would take action against her for crossing the picket line. The Respondent's president, Medina, knew that during a previous strike in 1959, employees had crossed the picket I Respondent believes it got a good contract from the Employer, as a result of the strike. 2 Crossing the picket line and working for the Employer. line, but he did not know whether they were brought to trial by Respondent.4 Another member besides Coats crossed the picket line in 1967, Bussey, and he was fined for the most part at a slightly higher rate than Coats. Medina did not know why the fines differed. In addition to supporting herself, Coats had to support four minor children. She had no husband at home, but he provided $56 a week support at the time. She had no other source of income but her job. Since she did not picket, she received no strike benefits. During the spring or winter preceding the strike, her home was damaged by the elements and it cost her $750 to have it repaired. The Trial Board, at her trial, made no inquiry into the above facts and obviously did not consider them or anything else concern- ing Coats' financial circumstances in determining the amount of fine it would recommend. There is some evidence in the record of picket line disorder and an assault on Coats by a picket and a subsequent arrest of the picket. Coats engaged in no misconduct on the picket line and did not cause the arrest of the picket. After appeal, and about a year later, Coats received unemployment compensation for the period starting with the beginning of the strike and ending with the time she returned to work. CONCLUDING FINDINGS Simple arithmetic shows that Respondent fined Coats $100 more than she earned, including overtime, during the strike. As General Counsel points out, the fine of $525 would have paid Respondent's initiation fees for about 123 members and amounted to about 10 years dues for one member. It is noted that Coats was required in addition to pay $51 in dues for a year, while she was unable to participate in Respondent's activities. Further, Respondent now seeks interest on the $525 fine plus unknown costs. Since the fine exceeds the total amount of Coats' earnings for the 21 days she worked, I find the attempted court enforcement of it affects her employment status even more than if the Union had caused the Employer to lay her off from her job without pay and even more than if it had coercively restrained her from exercising her Section 7 right to work during the strike. Such action by Respondent violated Section 8(b)( I)(A) of the Act. The Supreme Court stated in N. L. R. B. v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Compa- ny, et. al., 388 U.S. 175, that by enacting Section 8(b)(IXA), Congress intended to bar "enforcement of a Union's internal regulations to affect a member's employ- ment status." By fining Coats $100 more than she earned, Respondent sought to foreclose Coats in particular, and all its members, from exercising their statutorily protected right to work during a strike. The fine of $525 was not a mere deterrent. Itsl excessive nature was not a reasonable exercise of internal union discipline but was a device designed to affect the employment status of all members during any strike. Imposing a fine amounting to $100 more than Coats' earnings during the strike makes illusory the Board's long-established holdings that Section 8(b)(1)(A) 3 The transcript is in evidence as Resp. Exh. No. 12. { Medina was only a member and not an officer in 1959. RUBBER WORKERS LOCAL 510 767 protects an employee's right to work during a strike. International Longshoremen 's and Warehousemen 's Union (Sunset Line and Twine Company), 79 NLRB 1487. The fine in this case, being clearly excessive, it is necessarily unreasonable. It has been noted that in imposing this fine on Coats, Respondent made no effort to determine her economic or family circumstances . There is no evidence that anyone had ever been fined before by Respondent for working during a strike. Bussey was fined at a different5 rate than Coats and there is no explanation in the record for the difference. Indeed it may be that Bussey's financial condition was much better than that of Coats. No warning that any sort of fine would be imposed was given to Coats before she returned to work . Respondent's action in imposing the excessive and unreasonable fine on Coats was arbitrary and amounted to nothing more than a bare fiat . There is no evidence that Respondent resorted to any standard or rule of reason in fining Coats almost 25 percent more than she earned during the strike . Such an arbitrary, excessive fine can act only as a total deterrent to exercising the protected right of a union member to work during a strike and the attempted court enforcement constitutes restraint and coercion within the meaning of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. The fine of Coats was clearly unreasonable and the fact that the imposition of the fine took place beyond the 10(b) period does not negate the finding of a violation because the attempted court enforcement establishes the continuing nature of Respondent's efforts to collect the arbitrary and unreasonable fine. The Boeing Company, 173 NLRB No. 71. The Supreme Court in Allis-Chalmers, supra, 65 LRRM 2451, stated: It was because the national labor policy vested unions with power to order the relations of employees with their employer that this Court found it necessary to fashion the duty of fair representation. That duty "has stood as a bulwark to prevent arbitrary union conduct against individuals stripped of traditional forms of redress by the provisions of federal labor law ." Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182... . Integral to this federal labor policy has been the power in the chosen union to protect against erosion its status under that policy through reasonable discipline of members who violate rules and regulations governing membership.... [Emphasis supplied.] I read the Court's decision as holding that a union may fine a member to protect its status but not at an arbitrary or unreasonable rate which affects the member's employment status. Coats was engaging in statutorily protected activity and Respondent violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) by court action to collect an excessive, arbitrary , and unreasonable fine imposed on her by Respondent's mere fiat. In Scofield et. al. v. N.L.R.B., 70 LRRM 3105, the Supreme Court, in discussing its holding in Allis-Chalmers, supra, stated, "A union rule, duly adopted and not the arbitrary fiat of a union officer , forbidding the crossing of a picket line during a strike was therefore enforceable against voluntary union members by expulsion or a reasonable fine." (Emphasis supplied.) The Court further stated that a union may enforce a rule which "is reasonably enforced against union members." (Emphasis supplied.) The Court further noted that in the case before it, "there is no showing in the record that the fines were unreasonable or the mere fiat of a union leader." Such is not the situation in the instant case. The evidence establishes that Coats' fine was unreasonable and was the mere fiat of the Respondent which made no inquiry into her financial circumstances. The court action to collect the arbitrary and unreasonable fine affects the employment status of Coats and all Respondent's members and is proscribed by Section 8(b)(1)(A). Coats' membership in Respondent did not amount to a consent for the imposition of such a fine. A finding and conclusion contrary to the one I have here made would completely eliminate Coats' Section 7 right to exercise her individual freedom to work during the strike and render Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act ineffective and meaningless in a case like that of Coats. IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The unfair labor practices of Respondent set forth in section III, above , occurring in connection with the operations of the Employer, described in section I, above, have a close, intimate and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States , and tend to lead to labor disputes, burdening and obstructing com- merce and the free flow of commerce. V. THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices, it will be recommended that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. Upon the basis of the above findings of fact, and on the entire record in the case , I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The Employer is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act. 2. Respondent is a labor organization within the meaning of the Act. 3. By seeking court enforcement of the arbitrary, unreasonably large, and excessive fine it imposed on Coats for exercising her Section 7 right to work during a strike called by Respondent, thereby affecting Coats' employ- ment status, Respondent did and has been restraining and coercing Coats and the Employer's other employees who are members of Respondent, in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, and thereby has been engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b)(I)(A) of the Act. 4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 5 Slightly higher 768 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD RECOMMENDED ORDER Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and upon the entire record in the case, it is recommended that Respondent, its agents, officers, representatives, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Seeking court enforcement of arbitrary, or unreason- ably large, or excessive fines imposed upon Coats or any other employee members of Respondent for exercising the right to work during a strike called by Respondent, thereby affecting Coats' and other members' employment status and restraining and coercing Coats and other employee members in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. (b) In any like or related manner, restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action which I find will effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Expunge from any of its records any and all reference to the fine imposed on Coats and Respondent's attempts to collect it through a court. (b) Withdraw and seek dismissal of its court suit against Coats to collect the fine imposed on Coats by Respondent, pending in the Municipal Court of the Anaheim-Fullerton Judicial District, California. (c) Institute no further action to collect the fine imposed on Coats. (d) Reimburse Coats, with 6 percent interest, for any expenses she may have incurred in defending against Respondent's court action against her. (e) Post at its offices in conspicuous places including all places where notices to members are customarily posted, copies of the notice attached hereto and marked "Appendix."6 Copies of said notice on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 21 shall, after being duly signed by a representative of Respondent, be posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for a period of 60 consecutive days thereafter. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that such notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (f) Promptly mail to said Regional Director signed copies of the Appendix for posting, the Employer willing, at conspicuous places in the Employer's Santa Ana plant, where the Employer posts notices to its employees. (g) Notify said Regional Director in writing, within 20 days from the receipt of this decision, as to what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith.? 6 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the notice . In the further event that the Board's Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals, enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision and Order." T In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, this provision shall be modified to read : "Notify the Regional Director for Region 20, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps it has taken to comply herewith." APPENDIX NOTICE To ALL MEMBERS Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify you that: WE WILL NOT seek court enforcement of an arbitrary, and unreasonably large, and excessive fine we imposed upon Sophia M. Coats for exercising her right to work during the strike we had at Uniroyal, Inc., in 1967, thereby affecting her employment status at Uniroyal, Inc., and restraining and coercing Coats and our other employee members in the exercise of their rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner restrain or coerce Coats or other employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act. WE WILL expunge from any of our records any and all reference to the fine we imposed on Coats and our attempts to collect it through court action. WE WILL withdraw and seek dismissal of our court suit against Coats to collect the fine we imposed on Coats, now pending in the Municipal Court of the Anaheim-Fullerton Judicial District of California. WE WILL institute no further action to collect the fine we imposed on Coats. WE WILL reimburse Coats, with 6 percent interest, for any expenses she may have incurred in defending against our court action against her. UNITED RUBBER, CORK, LINOLEUM AND PLASTIC WORKERS OF AMERICA, LOCAL 510, AFL-CIO (Labor Organization) Dated By (Representative) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. If members have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions, they may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, Eastern Colum- bia Building,849 South Broadway, Los Angeles, California 90014, Telephone 688-5229.