Dewey Brothers, Inc.

DEWEY BROTHERS, INC. Dewey Brothers, Inc. and International Union of District 50, Allied and Technical Workers of United States and Canada. Cases 11-CA-3751 and I1-CA-3790 December 11, 1970 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS FANNING AND JENKINS 137 Order of the Trial Examiner set forth in his Supple- mental Decision and hereby orders that the Respon- dent, Dewey Brothers, Inc., Goldsboro, North Caroli- na, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in that recommended Order. i The findings and conclusions of the Trial Examiner which we adopt are based, in part, upon his credibility determinations , to which Respondent has excepted After a careful review of the record herein, we conclude that the Trial Examiner 's credibility findings are not contrary to the clear preponderance of the relevant evidence and, accordingly, we find no basis for disturbing them Standard Dry Wall Products, Inc, 91 NLRB 544, enfd 188 F 2d 362 (C A. 3) On April 29, 1969, Trial Examiner Marion C. Ladwig issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. He also found that the Respondent had not engaged in other unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint and recom- mended that those allegations be dismissed. Thereaft- er, the General Counsel and the Respondent filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision and supporting briefs. On August 11, 1969, the National Labor Relations Board issued an Order Remanding the Case to the Trial Examiner for the preparation and issuance of a supplemental decision setting forth the resolution of certain credibility issues discussed therein. On July 28, 1970, the Trial Examiner issued his Supplemental Decision finding that the Respondent had engaged in additional unfair labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Supplemental Decision. Thereafter the Respondent filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Supplemental Decision and a supporting brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the Natiortal Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision, his Supplemental Decision, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions,' and recommendations of the Trial Examiner. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its order the recommended TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE MARION C. LADWIG, Trial Examiner: These consolidated cases were tried at Goldsboro, North Carolina, on March 18-19, 1969,1 pursuant to charges filed by International Union of District 50, United Mine Workers of America, herein called the Union, on October 7 and November 29 (amended, respectively, on October 23 and January 31), and pursuant to a consolidated complaint issued February 12. The primary issues are whether the Respondent, Dewey Brothers, Inc., herein called the Company, discriminatorily discharged two employees in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended. Upon the entire record, including my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, and after due consideration of the brief filed by the Company, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. THE BUSINESS OF THE COMPANY AND THE UNION INVOLVED The Company, a North Carolina corporation, is engaged in the fabrication of steel and metal building supplies at its Goldsboro, North Carolina, plant and foundry where it annually receives raw materials valued in excess of $50,000 directly from outside the State and from which it ships annually finished goods valued in excess of $50,000 directly to points outside the State. I find that the Company is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act and that the Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. II. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Discharge of Miller Johnson Miller Johnson (hired about 1959) has worked for about 7 years in the foundry, lining the holding ladle and pulling the bull ladle. During the summer and fall of 1968 , he took an active part in the Union's organizing campaign , signing a union card, attending most of the union meetings, and talking to fellow employees about signing authorization cards. About November 1, a week before his discharge, he asked his new foreman, James A . Coley (who had attended several union meetings with him before being promoted to i All dates, unless otherwise indicated , are in the penod from October 1968 to March 1969 187 NLRB No. 17 138 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD foreman on October 14), "Coley, it is just about union time, ain't it?" Coley answered (indicating knowledge of Johnson's continued union support), "Yes. Have you got your boys ready?" Johnson smiled and walked away. On November 8, Foreman Coley discharged Johnson-allegedly for failing to follow instructions for lining the ladle. Thereafter , on February 6, the Company reinstated Johnson to perform similar work, lining two small ladles and pulling the bull ladle , at the same $1.75 hourly rate. Johnson was disqualified from receiving unemployment compensation from November 9 through January 3. The question is whether the assigned reason for Johnson's discharge was pretextual. Johnson testified that about 5:30 p .m. on November 7 (the day before his discharge) he overheard President William R. Helms talking in the foundry to Coley and Mill Foreman Frank Wiggins. At the time, Johnson was taking a break, standing a few feet away. He overheard Helms ask Wiggins, "Who's in charge of Johnson?" Wiggins pointed to Coley. Helms asked, "Coley, can you discharge Johnson?" Coley, kicking his feet against the ground, said he could if he had to. Helms responded, "That is all I want to know, because if you can't I will get somebody who could." Helms then left. About 30 minutes later , Johnson walked out to the scrap iron pile where Foreman Coley was standing and asked, "Coley, were you all talking about discharging me? If you were, I won't come back to work, I will stay at home and then you won't have to discharge me. You is my brother at the [Masonic] Lodge ." Coley responded, "No, Johnson, I am not going to tell you to stay home." (Coley, when called as a defense witness, admitted part of this conversation . Coley testified that on the evening before the discharge, Johnson "came to me and said he had heard Mr. Helms instruct me to discharge or fire him, and he said if that was so, he wouldn't come back the next day; and I said that that wasn't true.") The Company argues in its brief that Johnson's testimony should not be credited, and that there was no such conference in the foundry between Helms and the two foremen. However, in reciting the facts, the Company ignores Coley's testimony (confirming Johnson's) that Johnson "came to me and said he had heard Mr. Helms instruct me to discharge or fire him." The Company offers no explanation for such a discussion between Johnson and Coley if Johnson had not overheard the foundry conference concerning Johnson's discharge. Moreover, Johnson impressed me as an honest, trustworthy witness . I credit his testimony about Helms' statements in the foundry and discredit the denials of Helms and Coley, neither of whom impressed me as a credible witness. (Wiggins did not testify.) Johnson further credibly testified that the next morning, November 8, about 7 :30, Foreman Coley called him over to where the slag and iron had been dumped from the holding ladle. (The ladle, which collects molten iron pouring from the cupola, is dumped out daily to remove the remaining iron and slag. Not all the iron is drained from the holding ladle when the iron is poured intermittently during the day from the holding ladle to the bull ladle, which is pulled along a track to where the molds are filled. Dirt is thrown on the track to prevent the dumped slag and iron from damaging the track.) Coley pointed out the dumped slag and iron and said, "Johnson, it looks like I am going to have to let you go." Johnson responded, "It's just a little bit, it isn't as much as it has been, is it?" Coley answered, "It isn't as much, but it is too much . I am going to have to let you go." Johnson asked, "Well, why didn't you tell me when I finished raising the dam like you asked me. . . . I asked you was it right, was this like the way you wanted it, you says, yes, it was fine.... Why didn't you tell me to raise it, and then I could raise it some more." Coley said, "Well, I can't help it, I am going to have to let you go. Go punch out and come back at 9 o'clock and get your money." As Johnson was leaving, he asked Foreman Wiggins, "Why did you all fire me?" Wiggins answered, "I didn't have nothing to do with it." Johnson credibly testified that Coley , his new foreman, had talked to him only once about the way he lined the holding ladle. That was a few days earlier. Coley told him to raise the dam, so that more of the iron would drain into the bull ladle. "I raised the dam, and I called Mr. Coley over to the holding ladle, and I asked him was that like that way he wanted it, and he said yes, that was just fine." Coley told him that he was a good ladle liner. (Johnson gave undenied testimony that the day before the trial, there was "a whole lot more" iron and slag which had been dumped from the holding ladle than there had been on the day he was discharged. He called this to Coley 's attention, but Coley did not criticize the person who had lined the ladle.) Foreman Coley gave this account: Q. Will you describe what happened when you saw that iron spilled on the track? A. Yes, at the time I observed this amount of iron on the track, Johnson was working on the upper holding ladle, and I called him over, and I showed him the iron on the track, and I told him it didn't seem he was going to try to follow my instructions, and I was going to have to discharge him. Q. Did Mr. Johnson make any remark to you after you discharged him? A. No. Coley did not claim that the track was damaged on this occasion. He did claim that he had criticized, or warned, Johnson three times in the previous week and a half, but he did not give any details, nor explain how Johnson (who had been lining the ladle for 7 years) was doing it wrong. From his demeanor on the stand, he impressed me as being most unassertive, and not one who would take it on himself to discharge such an experienced workman. He appeared to be trying to give answers which would please the Company, rather than attempting to give an accurate account of what happened. I discredit his version of the incident, his testimony that he had warned Johnson three times , and his claim that all the iron would drain into the bull ladle if the holding ladle is properly lined. On the basis of all the credible evidence, I find that Johnson was a good, efficient employee and that the reason for his discharge was clearly pretextual . Having credited Johnson's testimony , which indicates that President Helms did instruct Foreman Coley to discharge Johnson, I find that the real reason for the discharge was Johnson's union support. (Having found that Helms was not a credible DEWEY BROTHERS, INC. witness, I discredit his denial of knowledge of Johnson's union activity.) The Company's discriminatory motivation is further demonstrated by the conduct of President Helms thereaft- er. Johnson credibly testified that about 10 days after the discharge he talked to Helms first at his home and later at the office, stating "I have just got to have a job." As they were talking in the office, Helms said, "Johnson, I went out and I checked your case out. You are a good worker and you are a good ladler." The conversation was later interrupted when Helms was told he had a "mighty important" and "urgent" telephone call. Helms left the office for about 5 minutes. Upon returning, he said, "Yes, Johnson, that was a mighty important telephone call. Johnson, I am so mad I don't know what to do. That telephone call we had. You had the damned union man running around in your car, in your front seat, going around to the homes of my employees, from house to house. I was going to be fair with you, but I cannot do it now." (The day before, Johnson had driven an NLRB field examiner to a witness' home and back to the motel. No union representative was in the car.) Johnson denied the accusation, and Helms said, "Maybe this will blow over in about two or three weeks. You can call me back again." Several days later, Johnson did call back, saying he still could not find ajob. Helms responded, "Johnson, I haven't got over that deal we talked about the other day." The Company did not reinstate Johnson until February 6. (When Helms testified as a defense witness, he admitted having postdischarge conversations with employees. He did not deny Johnson's testimony about his postdischarge conversations with Johnson.) I accordingly find that the Company discriminatorily discharged Miller Johnson on November 8 and refused to reinstate him until February 6, in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. B. Discharge of Foy J. Peel, Jr. During the election campaign, the Company discharged Foy J. Peel, Jr., who had not signed a union card or engaged in any union activity, but whose wife participated in an organizing drive at another plant . The General Counsel contends that he was discharged because of his wife's union support , whereas the Company contends that he was a supervisor and discharged because his attitude was poor and because he was complaining about his job and his rate of pay. Of course, if he were in fact a supervisor, his discharge for the reason alleged by the General Counsel would not be illegal. Three days before Peel was discharged, counsel for the Company and the Union agreed at the hearing in the representation case that he was a supervisor and should be excluded from the unit. Peel had worked in the steel shop, where the metal was cut, since 1959. He spent part of his time doing manual labor, operating various machines . The remainder of the 139 time he directed the work of five or six lower-paid employees and handled orders from customers. According to Peel's testimony, his direction of the work was merely routine, and he had no supervisory authority. He appeared, however, to be deliberately attempting to belittle his status. After considering all the evidence, I find that he responsibly directed the work of the others in the shop and that he was therefore a supervisor, as previously agree by the Company and the Union. Accordingly, I find that his discharge, as a supervisor, did not violate Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. There being no allegations in the complaint of any Section 8(a)(1) violations directed toward Peel as a supervisor, and no evidence to support the Section 8(a)(1) allegations concerning conduct directed toward "employees," I shall recommend that the separate Section 8(a)(l) allegations be dismissed. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. By discriminatorily discharging Miller Johnson on November 8 and refusing to reinstate him until February 6, the Company engaged in unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Sections 8(a)(3) and (1) and 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. The October 11 discharge of Foy J. Peel, Jr., a supervisor, did not violate the Act. THE REMEDY I shall recommend that the Respondent be ordered to cease and desist from the unfair labor practices found and from like or related invasions of the employees' Section 7 rights; to give to Miller Johnson backpay, from November 8, 1968, through February 6, 1969, computed in the manner set forth in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289, plus interest at 6 percent per annum as prescribed in Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716; and to post appropriate notices. Accordingly, on the basis of the foregoing findings and conclusions, and on the entire record, I recommend pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, issuance of the following: ORDER Respondent, Dewey Brothers, Inc., its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Discharging or otherwise discriminating against any employee because of his membership in or activities on behalf of International Union of District 50, United Mine Workers of America, or any other labor organization. (b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their rights under Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Make Miller Johnson whole for his lost earnings, in 140 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD the manner set forth in the section of the Trial Examiner's Decision entitled "The Remedy." (b) Preserve and make available to the Board, or its agents, upon request, for examination and copying, all payroll records and reports, social security payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all records necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of this Order. (c) Post at its Goldsboro, North Carolina, plant copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."2 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 11, after being duly signed by an authorized representative of the Respondent, shall be posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicu- ous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 11, in writing, within 20 days from the date of the receipt of this Decision, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith.3 IT IS ALSO ORDERED that the complaint be dismissed insofar as it alleges violations of the Act not specifically found herein. 2 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, the words "a Decision and Order " shall be substituted for the words "the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the notice. In the further event that the Board's Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing and Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision and Order " 3 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, this provision shall be modified to read : "Notify the Regional Director for Region 11, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith." APPENDIX NOTICE To ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board, an agency of the United States Government. WE WILL PAY Mr. Miller Johnson for the earnings he lost as a result of his November 8, 1968, discharge, plus 6 percent interest. WE WILL NOT discharge or discriminate against any employee for supporting International Union of District 50, United Mine Workers of America, or any other union. WE WILL NOT interfere with our employees' union activities. DEWEY BROTHERS, INC. (Employer) Dated By (Representative ) (Title) This is an official notice and must not be defaced by anyone. This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. Any questions concerning this notice may be directed to the Board's Regional Office, 1624 Wachovia Bldg., 301 North Main Street, Winston-Salem, North Carolina 27101, Telephone 919-723-2303. TRIAL EXAMINER'S SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION MARION C.LADWIG,Trial Examiner: On August 11, 1969, the Board issued its Order Remanding Proceeding to Trial Examiner,' for the preparation and issuance of a Supple- mental Decision, stating: "In his [April 29, 1969] Decision, the Trial Examiner concluded that Respondent [Dewey Brothers, Inc.] had not violated Section 8(a)(3) or (1) of the Act by discharging Foy J. Peel, Jr., whom he found to be a supervisor. However, the record contains testimony that Peel was given instructions to find out how the employees felt about the Union [International Union of District 50, Allied and Technical Workers of United States & Canada2], which instructions Peel refused to carry out. The General Counsel contends, inter alia, that Peel was unlawfully discharged because of his refusal to carry out these instructions . He also alleges Peel was unlawfully discharged because of his wife's union activities at another plant. The testimony in the record bearing upon the issue of whether or not instructions to report on employee union activity were ever in fact given Peel and that testimony concerning the actual reason Respondent discharged Peel is in conflict in material respects and no resolution on these matters, including conflicts in the testimony, has been made by the Trial Examiner." The Board's Order requires that the Supplemental Decision set forth "the resolution of the credibility issues discussed above and subsequent findings and conclusions with respect to the unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint." (As amended at the trial, the complaint alleges that the Company unlawfully discharged Peel because it "suspected said employees joined or assisted the Union or engaged in union activities or concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or mutual aid and protection, and/or because of said employee's wife's union activity.") Credibility Findings Foy J. Peel, Jr., testified that on the afternoon of October 8, 1968 (following the hearing that morning in the representation proceeding), Foreman Allen Barwick told him to accompany Barwick to President William R. Helms' i Although promptly served on the parties, the Order was not called to the attention of the Trial Examiner until July 22, 1970. 2 Formerly, International Union of District 50, United Mine Workers of America DEWEY BROTHERS, INC. office. When they reached the office, Helms was not there, but "there were two lawyers that Mr. Barwick identified as company lawyers." (They were Attorneys Robert D. Wilkins and Michael L. Lowry.) After telling him that the Company and the Union had agreed that morning that he was a supervisor and that he could not vote in the election, Attorney Wilkins asked him if his wife worked at General Electric and if she was active in the Union down there. He answered yes, said that she attended meetings and handed out leaflets, and asked "what that had to do with Dewey Brothers." Wilkins answered, "Not anything." Wilkins then asked him what he thought about a union at Dewey Brothers, and he answered that he would not express an opinion. Wilkins stated that he could not be "half-pregnant about it," that he had to be "all of the way or none at all." Wilkins said "he wanted me to know that I was with the Company and he didn't expect me to campaign for the Union. I told him I wouldn't campaign." Wilkins then told him that he could go, and told Foreman Barwick to wait. Peel further testified that about an hour later he asked Foreman Barwick "why they brought my wife into it, and he said Dewey Brothers and GE had company lawyers fighting the union so they could run their business like they wanted to." Peel stated that he supposed that since "they brought my wife into it," he would probably be looking for a new job, that "They will probably put me on the list .. . since they've brought my wife's name into it, since my wife is in the union at GE, they will think I am trying to bung one in here." Barwick responded, "You won't be on the list, if anybody gets more money you probably will too." Barwick then asked him how the men he worked with felt about the Union, and "asked me couldn't I talk to them and find out how they felt about the Union." Peel said no, that he was going to have to work with the men after this thing was over with and that he was not a stool pigeon. Barwick said the Company had to know how they felt, and Peel responded, "Well, then, damn it, you will have to ask them, because I ain't going to." That ended the conversation, but later that afternoon, Barwick called him into Barwick's office, "told me that the lawyer had called him back into Mr. Helms' office, and they had two reports out of the shop and one out of the foundry, that I was a union leader, that I was a leader for the Union." Peel "told him he could believe what he wanted to, that I didn't even know the name of the Union." (As found in my original Decision, Peel had not signed a union card or engaged in any union activity.) Thus, according to Peel, Company Attorney Wilkins (in the presence of Attorney Lowry and Foreman Barwick) asked Peel on October 8 if his wife was active in the union at General Electric, and, when Peel later asked Barwick "why they brought my wife into it," Barwick told him that "Dewey Brothers and GE had company lawyers fighting the union so that they could run their business like they wanted to." (Peel's wife credibly testified that an election was held at the General Electric plant on October 3 and that election objections were filed.) Company Attorneys Wilkins and Lowry did not testify; they represented the Company at the trial. When Foreman Barwick was called as a defense witness, the company counsel did not interrogate him about this testimony-despite the fact that 141 the complaint specifically alleges, in the alternative, that Peel was discharged because of his wife's union activity. Also, according to Peel's testimony, Foreman Barwick asked him to talk to the employees he worked with and "find out how they felt about the Union," and Peel refused to do so. Although the complaint does not specifically allege that Peel's refusal was a reason for his discharge, the complaint alleges that Peel was unlawfully discharged, and the Company litigated this basis for the discharge when its counsel asked Barwick the question on direct examination, "Did you have a conversation with Mr. Peel in which you asked him about the union activities of his fellow employees?" Barwick answered, "Not that I recall." (On cross-examination, when asked about this, Barwick first repeated, "I testified I could not recall." However, later, when asked if it was possible that he might have mentioned the Union to Peel, he answered "No, sir," and when asked, "You never said a word to him about the Union, is that your testimony," he answered positively, "Right.") Barwick impressed me generally as a credible witness, and I credit other parts of his testimony (particularly his, rather than Peel's, testimony about Peel's supervisory status). However, he did not appear to be entirely candid when he twice claimed that he did not remember talking to Peel about the Union, but when pressed further, positively denied ever saying a word to Peel about the Union. As found in my original Decision, Peel appeared to be deliberately attempting to belittle his supervisory status. He impressed me as being less than forthright when giving that testimony on cross-examination. However, I do not believe that he was fabricating the above-quoted testimony given on direct examination, concerning the conversations with Company Attorney Wilkins and Foreman Barwick. I therefore credit this part of his testimony. Pretextual Basis for Discharge Three days after Company Attorney Wilkins questioned Peel about his wife's union activity in another plant and Peel refused Foreman Barwick's request to find out how employees felt about the Union, Barwick discharged him. Peel, the only witness who gave testimony about what was said at the time of the discharge, credibly testified that on October I1 Barwick told him "that if I wasn't satisfied with my wages, he thought I would be better off if I left . . . You can probably find anotherjob, you :aught not be making as much as you are, but in a year or so you will be making more." Peel responded, "Well, there is nobody satisfied with what they are making, everybody wants more . . . I haven't been looking for a job," and he did not have one. He then added, "If you are going to start that junk, why don't you just go ahead and tell me it is on account of the Union?" Barwick answered, "You are correct, you didn't take the best interests and consideration of the company into account," and handed him his final paycheck. Peel's October 15 separation notice indicated that he was "Fired because of general discontent with wages and working conditions." President Helms testified that he was out of town at the time but that, when he returned, he was told, by Foreman Barwick or Personnel Manager Jones, that "Peel's attitude as supervisor was quite poor, he was quite unhappy 142 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD about his job, he was complaining about his rate of pay; they were the reasons given me." (Emphasis supplied.) The Company did not present any direct testimony why Peel was discharged. When called as a defense witness, Foreman Barwick testified about earlier conversations with Peel, but nothing about why the Company decided when it did to discharge him. He admitted that it had been about 6 weeks since Peel had complained about not getting enough money. After considering all the evidence, including Peel's credited testimony about his conversations with Company Attorney Wilkins and Foreman Barwick on October 8, and his conversation with Barwick at the time of the discharge, I find (a) that the Company seized on Peel's earlier-expressed complaints about the amount of his compensation as a pretext for discharging him, and (b) that his wife's union activity in another plant and his refusal 3 days earlier to question employees about their union sympathies were motivating reasons for the discharge. After further consideration, I also find that these reasons for the discharge were either specifically alleged or duly litigated at the trial and that the discharge of Peel, a supervisor, for these reasons tended to interfere with employees' Section 7 rights, in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. REVISED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. By discriminatorily discharging Miller Johnson on November 8, 1968, and refusing to reinstate him until February 6, 1969, the Company engaged in unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Sections 8(a)(3) and (1) and 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. By discharging Foy J. Peel, Jr., a supervisor, on October 11, 1968, the Company violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. THE REMEDY The Respondent will be ordered to cease and desist from the unfair labor practices found and from like or related invasions of the employees' Section 7 rights; to take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act; to offer reinstatement to Foy J. Peel, Jr., with backpay computed in the manner set forth in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289, plus interest at 6 percent per annum as prescribed in Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716; to give to Miller Johnson backpay, from November 8, 1968, through February 6, 1969, computed in the same manner, plus 6 percent interest; and to post appropriate notices. Accordingly, on the basis of the findings in the original Decision issued April 29, 1969, and the foregoing supplemental and revised findings and conclusions, and on the entire record, I issue pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act the following recommended: 3 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Section 102 46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions, recommendations, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Section 102 48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings , conclusions, and order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes . In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the ORDER Respondent, Dewey Brothers, Inc., its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Discharging or otherwise discriminating against any employee because of his membership in or activities on behalf of International Union of District 50, Allied and Technical Workers of United States & Canada, or any other labor organization. (b) Discharging any supervisor because of his wife's union activity at another plant, or because he refused to interrogate employees concerning their union sympathies. (c) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their rights under Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Offer Foy J. Peel, Jr., immediate and full reinstate- ment to his former job or, if the job no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position, without prejudice to his seniority or other rights and privileges, and make him whole in the manner set forth in the section of the Trial Examiner's Supplemental Decision entitled "The Remedy." (b) Notify the above-named person if presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United States of his right to full reinstatement upon application in accordance with the Selective Service Act and Universal Military Training and Service Act, as amended, after discharge from the Armed Forces. (c) Make Miller Johnson whole for his lost earnings, in the manner set forth in the section of the Trial Examiner's Supplemental Decision entitled "The Remedy." (d) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board, or its agents, for examination and copying, all payroll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all records necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of this recommended Order. (e) Post at its Goldsboro, North Carolina, plant copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix.' 13 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 11, after being duly signed by an authorized representative of the Respondent, shall be posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof and be maintained for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicu- ous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (f) Notify the Regional Director for Region 11, in writing, within 20 days from the date of the receipt of this Decision, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith.4 National Labor Relations Board" shall be changed to read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board " 4 In the event that the recommended Order is adopted by the Board, this provision shall be modified to read. "Notify the Regional Director for Region It, in wnting, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith " DEWEY BROTHERS, INC. IT IS ALSO ORDERED that the complaint be dismissed insofar as it alleges violations of the Act not specifically found APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the National Labor Relations Act by discharging an employee for supporting a union and by discharging a supervisor because he refused to question employees about their union support and because his wife engaged in union activity at another plant. WE WILL pay Mr. Miller Johnson for the earnings he lost as a result of his November 8, 1968, discharge, plus 6 percent interest. WE WILL offer Mr. Foy J. Peel, Jr., full reinstatement and pay him for the earnings lost as a result of his October 11, 1968, discharge, plus 6 percent interest. WE WILL NOT discharge or discriminate against any employee for supporting International Union of Distract 50, Allied and Technical Workers of United States & Canada, or any other union. WE WILL NOT discharge any supervisor for refusing to question employees about their union support or 143 because his wife engages in union activity at another plant. WE WILL NOT unlawfully interfere with our employ- ees' union activities. Dated By DEWEY BROTHERS, INC. (Employer) (Representative) (Title) Note: We will notify the above-named discharged supervi- sor, if presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United States, of his right to full reinstatement, upon application, in accordance with the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Training and Service Act, as amended, after discharge from the Armed Forces. This is an official notice and must not be defaced by anyone. This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. Any questions concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions, may be directed to the Board's Office, 1624 Wachovia Building, 301 North Main Street, Winston- Salem, North Carolina 27101, Telephone 919-723-9211 Ext. 360.