Northrop Corp.

172 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Northrop Corporation, Ventura Division and Interna- tional Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, UAW and Northrop Ventura Employees Union, Party in Interest and Walter E. Kniffen Northrop Corporation, Ventura Division and Interna- tional Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, UAW, Petitioner. Cases 31-CA-1289, 31-CA-1298, 31-CA-1304, and 31-RC-854 December 14, 1970 DECISION, ORDER, AND DIRECTION OF SECOND ELECTION By CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS FANNING AND BROWN On July 21, 1970, Trial Examiner Maurice M. Miller issued his Decision in the above-entitled cases, finding that Respondent had engaged in certain unfair labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. He also found that Respondent had not engaged in certain other unfair labor practices and recommended that the allegations of the complaint pertaining thereto be dismissed. The Trial Examiner further recommended that certain objections to the election conducted in Case 31-RC-854 be sustained and that the election be set aside and a second election conducted. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision with supporting brief; the General Counsel filed an answering brief; and the Charging Party, UAW, filed exceptions with a brief in part supporting its excep- tions and in part supporting the Trial Examiner's Decision. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with these cases to a three- member panel. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in these cases,' and hereby adopts2 the findings,3 conclusions,4 and recommendations of the Trial Examiner.5 ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the Recommend- ed Order of the Trial Examiner and hereby orders that 187 NLRB No. 26 Respondent, Northrop Corporation, Ventura Divi- sion, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the election conducted in case 31-RC-854 on December 18, 1968, be, and it hereby is, set aside. [Direction of Second Elections omitted from publication.] i Respondent's motion for oral argument is denied, as the exceptions, briefs, and the record as a whole adequately present the issues and the positions of the parties 2 Chairman Miller would not find that Respondent's December 16 speech created the impression that support for the UAW was futile In his view, the rhetorical questioning as to why the Company should give different bargains to different groups of employees conveyed nothing more to the work force than the legitimate observation that selection of one bargaining agent rather than another does not automatically guarantee superior gains at the bargaining table 3 These findings and conclusions are based , in part, upon credibility determinations of the Trial Examiner, to which Respondent has excepted Having carefully reviewed the record, we conclude that the Trial Examiner's credibility findings are not contrary to the clear preponderance of all the relevant evidence . Accordingly, we find no basis for disturbing those findings Standard Dry Wall Products, Inc, 91 NLRB 544, enfd 188 F 2d 362 (C A 2). 4 in the absence of exceptions, we adopt pro forma the Trial Examiner's findings that Respondent did not violate Sec. 8 (aX3) of the Act by changing employee Walter Kniffen's working conditions or by including a maintenance-of-membership clause in its contract with NVEU 5 The Trial Examiner inadvertently omitted, and we add, the following to Conclusions of Law 4 "by granting wage and fringe benefits to technical and office workers, while withholding comparable benefits from production and maintenance workers to influence their choice in a Board election," 6 In order to assure that all eligible voters may have the opportunity to be informed of the issues in the exercise of their statutory right to vote, all parties to the election should have access to a list of voters and their addresses which may be used to communicate with them Excelsior Underwear Inc, 156 NLRB 1236, NL.R.B v Wyman-Gordon Company, 394 U S 759 Accordingly, it is hereby directed that an election eligibility list, containing the names and addresses of all the eligible voters, must he filed by the Employer with the Regional Director for Region 31 within 7 days after the date of issuance of the Notice of Second Election by the Regional Director The Regional Director shall make the list available to all parties to the election No extension of time to file this list shall be granted by the Regional Director except in extraordinary circumstances Failure to comply with this requirement shall be grounds for setting aside the election whenever proper objections are filed TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE The Representation Case MAURICE M. MILLER, Trial Examiner : On June 12, 1968, International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace, and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, UAW, (designated as UAW, Petitioner, or Complainant Union herein), filed with the Regional Director for Region 31 of the National Labor Relations Board (designated as the Board herein), a petition for certification as the representa- tive of certain production and maintenance workers employed by Northrop Corporation, Ventura Division (designated as Respondent or Company herein), within its Newbury Park, California, facility. Thereafter, following a formal hearing conducted between July 22 and August 9, the Regional Director issued his Decision and Direction of Election on November 29, 1968. The election was NORTHROP CORPORATION conducted on December 18; company production and maintenance workers within the facility designated were given a choice between the Petitioner , UAW, the Interve- nor, Northrop Ventura Employees Union (designated as NVEU herein), or no union . Because 43 ballots were challenged, the vote was not determinative . On December 24, 1968, Petitioner UAW filed timely objections regarding the election. The Complaint Case On December 26, UAW filed unfair labor practice charges (Case 31-CA-1289) directed against Respondent herein; Respondent was charged with Section 8(a)(1), (2), (3), and (5) violations of the statute. These initial charges were subsequently amended on January 14, January 27, March 3, and April 2, 1969, respectively. Thereafter, UAW filed a second charge (Case 31-CA-1298), dated January 7. On January 13, 1969, Walter E. Kmffen filed a third charge (Case 31-CA-1304), directed against Respondent herein. All charges were duly served. The Consolidated Cases On April 8, the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board, through the Regional Director for Region 31, caused an Order Consolidating Cases , Consolidated Complaint, and Notice of Hearing to be issued and served upon Respondent herein . Therein, Respondent was charged with unfair labor practices affecting commerce, within the meaning of Section 8 (a)(1), (2), and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended . 61 Star. 136, 73 Star . 519. On April 18, 1969, the Regional Director published a Supplemental Decision, dealing with various questions raised in connection with UAW's representation proceeding . Challenges filed with respect to certain ballots were determined. Further hearing' was directed with respect to four UAW election objections , the remaining objections having been withdrawn . The Petitioner's repre- sentation case was, thereupon consolidated with those complaint cases which had previously been consolidated, for the purposes of hearing , ruling, and decision by a Trial Examiner. The Regional Director, further, directed that Case 31-RC-854 should be transferred to Washington, D.C. for Board disposition , thereafter. Responses filed on behalf of Respondent and Northrop Ventura Employees Union were subsequently duly received ; therein, certain factual statements in General Counsel's consolidated complaint were conceded ; Respondent, however, denied the commission of any unfair labor practices. Subsequent Proceedings Pursuant to notice, a hearing with respect to these consolidated matters was held both at Thousand Oaks and Los Angeles, California, on various dates between July I and August 25, 1969, both dates inclusive, before me. The General Counsel , Respondent, UAW, and NVEU were represented by counsel. Walter E. Kniff en represented himself. Kniffen had, further, requested recognition as the representative of the Organization of Northrop Employees, 173 Ventura Division, Inc., a labor organization designated as ONE within this decision . His right to claim recognition as such a representative was left "open" subject to subsequent determination in connection with specific rulings which might conceivably be required . No final determination with respect to his claim has, however, been found necessary. Each party was afforded a full opportunity to be heard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses , and to introduce evidence pertinent to the issues. Since the hearing 's close, briefs have been received from General Counsel's repre- sentative, UAW, NVEU, and Respondent's counsel; these briefs have been duly considered. FINDINGS OF FACT Upon the entire testimonial record, documentary eviden- ce received, and my observation of the witnesses, I make the following findings of fact. 1. JURISDICTION Respondent raises no question , herein, with respect to General Counsel's jurisdictional claims. Upon the Consoli- dated Complaint's relevant factual declarations, which have not been controverted, I conclude, therefore, that Respondent was, throughout the period with which this case is concerned , an employer within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act, engaged in commerce and business activities which affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act, as amended. This basic conclusion rests, further, upon relevant factual determina- tions detailed within the Regional Director's initial Decision and Direction of Election in the representation matter, previously mentioned, with respect to which I have taken official notice. With due regard for this Board's presently applicable jurisdictional standards, I find its assertion of jurisdiction, with respect to this case, warranted and necessary to effectuate statutory objectives. It. THE LABOR ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace, and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, UAW, and Northrop Ventura Employees Union, concededly function currently as labor organizations, within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act, as amended; they both admit certain of Respondent's Newbury Park employees to membership. Within their respective answers , Respondent and NVEU have denied General Counsel's contention that ONE herein-likewise -constituted a functioning labor organi- zation, within the statutory sense, throughout the period with which this case is concerned; they would have me find that the organization was, for practical purposes, defunct. The question posed by their suggestion, however, requires no extensive discussion. The present record, within my view, more than warrants a determination that, throughout the period with which this case is concerned, ONE has remained a viable labor organization, with respect to which employees have participated -one which continues to exist 1 Certain transcript corrections are duly noted 174 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with Respondent herein, specifically, concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work. I so find. Crane and Breed Casket Company, 175 NLRB No. 35; Moore Drop Forging Company, 168 NLRB No. 134; News-Press Publishing Company, 145 NLRB 803; Dorado Beach Hotel, 144 NLRB 712, 714; Hershey Chocolate Corporation, 121 NLRB 901, 911-912. Compare Universal Tool and Stamping Company, Inc., 182 NLRB No. 38. Though, conceivably, this employee group might currently merit a trier of fact's characterization as dormant, otiose, or etiolated, the record does not-within my view-call for a conclusion that it completely lacks ability or willingness to represent Respon- dent's employees, or that it lacked such ability or willingness, previously, at material times. III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES Facts A. Background 1. The Respondent Company Respondent, Northrop Corporation, maintains three major Southern California manufacturing divisions, with other divisions and facilities located throughout the country. The corporation's Southern California divisions compass Norair Division, with headquarters in Hawthorne, California; Nortromcs Division, with Palos Verdes, Cali- fornia, headquarters; and Ventura Division, headquartered in Newbury Park, California. The division last designated maintains the plant facility with which these cases are concerned. Respondent's Newbury Park plant complex consists of three main buildings-devoted to manufacturing, engineer- ing, and administration, respectively-plus a maintenance and test facility. Therein, Ventura Division produces four basic product lines: radio-controlled drone aircraft, underwater target activity, subcontracts on Boeing 747s, and astronaut recovery systems. These factual determinations, together with some which will be found set forth below, derive from the Acting Regional Director's Decision and Direction of Election in Case 31-RC-854, received for the record herein, with respect to which I have taken official notice. The division-which had been located in Van Nuys, California, previously-was moved to Newbury Park in January 1963 when it took over the present plant complex which another firm, Radioplane Company, had previously maintained. When the current representation matter-with which this case is concerned-was heard, Respondent's Newbury Park employee complement approximated some 1800 workers ; about 600 of these were employed within the Company's engineering department, while some 700 held manufacturing department classifications. 2. Collective-bargaining history Between April 27, 1943, and August 18, 1968, wages, hours, and working conditions for many Newbury Park workers were governed by collective-bargaining contracts. During this period, 13 collective-bargaining agreements had been negotiated. Eleven of these had been negotiated between Radioplane Company and RPA, Inc., a California nonprofit corporation functioning as collective-bargaining representative for that firm's workers. The last two contracts-effective August 10, 1964, and August 22, 1966, for 2 year periods, respectively-were negotiated between Respondent and ONE, functioning as RPA's successor. Respondent's counsel has conceded that-when Respon- dent and ONE negotiated their most recent 1966-1968 collective-bargaining contract-the latter was a labor organization within the meaning of the statute. Though no replacement contract has since been negotiated, ONE has not been formally dissolved. Respondent's Newbury Park workers are still admitted to membership, and the organization has continued in existence-so I find-for the purpose of representing these employees, in dealing with Respondent herein. ONE has filed, with the United States Labor Department's appropriate section, those documents which labor organizations are routinely required to file. These contracts, between Respondent and ONE specifi- cally, have contained union-security clauses which have required ONE membership by represented employees after 30 days, together with checkoff clauses. Upon the pre- sent record-which includes a relevant stipulation -determination would seem warranted that all Re- spondent's workers, covered by ONE's most recent contract, had customarily signed voluntary dues-deduction authorizations consistent with their representative's con- tractual checkoff provision; these were routinely delivered to Respondent, and were "customarily" honored. The historical bargaining unit defined within ONE's two successive contracts compassed all of Respondent's hourly employees, with certain specified exclusions. When the representation matter with which we are concerned herein, was heard, some 790 of Respondent's 1800 divisional employees held job classifications within the historical bargaining unit. Approximately 470 employees-so I find-held classifications listed on Respondent's hourly production and maintenance roster, while some 320 were listed on the division's technical and office roster. The designated contractual unit compassed Respondent's production, maintenance, technical, and clerical workers within a single bargaining group. B. General Chronology 1. UAW's organizational campaign During January or February 1968, ONE representatives initiated a series of so-called "pre-negotiation" meetings with Respondent's designated spokesman. These prepara- tory meetings were, primarily, conducted to determine and define the matters with which their future contractual bargaining sessions would be concerned, when ONE's then - current contract was formally opened for renegotiation. Between February and May, some eight such prenegotia- tion meetings were held. Both Respondent's director of industrial relations, Rex Fairless, and Bernard Swift, Respondent's chief of employee relations and compensation, suggested-while witnesses-that these consultations did not constitute NORTHROP CORPORATION 175 "bargaining" within the statutory sense, because they were not conducted formally, like previous negotiations which had directly preceded Respondent's execution of collective- bargaining contracts. General Counsel, however, would have me find that-since wage rates were a subject of substantive discussion during the last "pre-negotiation" session -the suggested distinction should be considered more apparent than real. There can be no doubt, however, that-throughout the period in question-ONE was a contractually recognized bargaining representative; I find no necessity, therefore, to resolve these divergent views. Meanwhile, during March 1968, UAW commenced an organization campaign at Respondent's Newbury Park facility. So far as the record shows, this campaign began with a union newspaper distribution-conducted on or about March 15 specifically-with UAW designation cards attached. Thereafter, on March 26, Respondent's supervi- sors received a small card-which Swift had prepared-purporting to provide "Employee Relations Guidelines For Supervision (in The Event Of Outside Union Activity)." And the following day, leaflets were distributed to Respondent's hourly-rated personnel regard- ing the UAW distribution. Respondent's production and maintenance ("P & M") workers, together with technical and office ("T & 0") workers covered by ONE's contract, were advised regarding their right to sign UAW designa- tions; they were cautioned, however, to consider carefully what they signed. Both groups of workers were told, inter aha, that, should UAW obtain authorization cards from more than 50 percent of Respondent's personnel within "the" bargaining unit, that labor organization could--under current Board decisional doctrine-become their representative without a secret ballot election. Their right to freedom of choice with respect to representation was reaffirmed; Director of Industrial Relations Fairless, however, suggested that they sign UAW's cards only if they honestly wanted that organization to represent them. Subsequently, on April 9 or 10, Respondent distributed a detailed "Employee Relations Fact Sheet" containing a lengthy list of "Do's" and "Don't's" for supervisors. The latter were advised, among other things, that they might ,.with immunity from being charged" with an unfair labor practice: Advise employees of your feeling, and that of the Division, that we would rather deal with them through our established union organization than an outside organiza- tion [Emphasis supplied]. Respondent's supervisors were further told that they could inform workers regarding the division's "strong non- solicitation rule" which proscribed the distribution of unauthorized printed material in work areas or verbal solicitation in work areas during working time. They were informed that-should they encounter violations of this rule-- they were to pick up written material being distributed and bring the distributor to Respondent's employee relations office; should verbal solicitation during working hours be discovered, supervisors were requested to find witnesses , and call Respondent's employee relations office. Thereafter-throughout April particularly-the cam- paign continued. UAW letters were dispatched to some workers; small utility gifts, bearing Union emblems, were provided for workers to use or wear ; various notices were distributed . One campaign meeting was scheduled. Late in May, Respondent retained a law firm to conduct several so-called "instructional" sessions for supervisors. These sessions-for which all divisional supervisors concerned with hourly rated personnel were scheduled in groups-compassed lectures regarding employee relations, coupled with directives concerned with proper conduct by supervisors during election campaign. Respondent's list of supervisors present during these various sessions, proffered for the record, included the names of General Foreman Glen Estes , W. Lange, John Green, L. J. Sessions, S. Wrubel, R. Burdette, R. F. Byram, R. K. Snohr, and J. F. Pulver. The significance of their presence will be noted hereinafter. Respondent's supervisors were directed to be "absolutely impartial" regarding their treatment of workers subject to their supervision . Further, they were advised to be "very careful" regarding any conversation with such workers, regarding any matter which might be considered related to his interest in unionization, or his lack of interest with respect thereto. On June 12, 1968 , UAW filed a petition with the Board's Regional Office, seeking certification as representative of Respondent's Newbury Park production and maintenance workers, but excluding Respondent's hourly-rated techni- cal and office personnel . Notice regarding the filing of UAW's petition was received by Respondent the following day. 2. ONE's reaction Throughout the period with which we are now concerned, Walt Kniffen, Complainant herein, was ONE's president. In that capacity-so his testimony shows-he was responsi- ble for conducting grievance proceedings, negotiating contracts, and representing Respondent's contractually- covered workers generally, in dealing with Ventura Division's management and supervisors. Kniffen's work history with Respondent dates back to his January 1960 hire date. Between 1960 and 1965, he had been a full-time milling machine machinist . When first designated ONE's president, for a term which compassed calendar years 1965-66, Kniffen had been notified that he would be permitted to spend full time servicing his union post, while retaining his position in Respondent 's hire; the record will warrant a determination that this arrangement was consistent with Respondent's previous practice. Thereafter, Kniffen was reelected as ONE's president for a successive term; during the calendar year period with which we are now concerned, he was serving a term with a scheduled December 31 termination date. While a witness, Kniffen testified that UAW's organiza- tional campaign came to his notice sometime during the middle of April; he then believed-so he testified-that UAW was seeking representation rights for Respondent's complete plant. The present record, dispassionately considered, provides some ground for doubt with regard to Kniffen's necessarily implied disclaimer that he'really became aware of UAW's campaign directly following its March commencement; ONE's March membership meeting minutes reflect a 176 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD presidential reference to some "present" threat. For present purposes, however, questions regarding the date when Kniffen became aware of UAW's campaign need not, within my view, be resolved. Late in April, Kniffen, together with ONE Vice President Sklar, met with Swift; they discussed the UAW campaign. When Swift requested Kniffen to state ONE's position, the latter disclaimed any position "at this time" because ONE had no knowledge regarding UAW's strength. By early June, however, ONE's leadership seems to have become cognizant of the likelihood that UAW's campaign would be confined to production and maintenance workers and would successfully raise a question concerning representation. With the concurrence of ONE's board of directors, Kniffen retained the law firm of Loeb & Loeb; Mr. Alan Friedman, with that firm, was consulted regarding possible courses which ONE might pursue. On June 11-so I find-Freedman, together with ONE representatives, met with UAW spokesmen. The following evening - during ONE's scheduled June 12 membership meeting specifically-Kniffen introduced Friedman to discuss ONE's situation. The recital which follows, summarizing some relevant and material developments during the June 12 meeting, derives primarily from minutes contemporaneously taken and subsequently transcribed in typewritten form by Jean Thompson, ONE's secretary. The present record does contain considerable verbal testimony calculated to convey a somewhat different picture regarding the meeting's course; much of it, however, comes from witnesses concededly given a chance to read and review Thompson's minute records before being required to take the stand. Such testimony-though supposedly based upon refreshed recollection-fails to persuade. To the extent that witnesses may have proffered purported recollections differing from Thompson's record, their testimony seemed either tailored by post facto rationalization or colored by partisan considerations. Thompson, however-while a witness- impressed me as dedicated, competent, dispassionate, and free of guile; ONE's Vice President Sklar, sum- moned as Respondent's witness , conceded that her membership meeting minutes had been reliable, fair representations of whatever had taken place at prior meetings during which he had been present. Despite this, Respondent's counsel, with whom NVEU's counsel joins, would have me find her minutes generally deficient, with respect to both verisimilitude and completeness. Such contentions are rejected. Friedman, substantially, reported that UAW seemed "strong" within the Newbury Park facility's so-called "P & M" group ; he recommended, for various reasons which he detailed, that ONE's best interest would be served should it decide "not to take on a battle" which the organization would have little hope of winning. Inter alra, ONE's membership was told that UAW's petition for certification, limited to Respondent's production and maintenance workers, had been filed earlier that day. During the floor discussion which followed, questions were raised regarding the prospect for Respondent's so-called "T & 0" workers, with respect to whom UAW was making no representation claim. Friedman declared, so the minutes show, that most "T & 0" workers "will not have any union" should the UAW win representative status for the bargaining unit defined within its petition, but that "if and when the "T & 0" people show an interest in representation " UAW would be happy to organize them. When challenged with a member's comment that Respondent 's technical and office workers would merely be ignored, Friedman declared his view that there did not seem to be much support for unionization, generally, within the "T & 0" group, but that, if this were not so, such workers could join "this [UAW] local" later. He noted the possibility that, should such a development take place, the represented "T & 0" group would have a separate contract, but declared that both contracts could be negotiated simultaneously. The discus- sion continued, with several membership viewpoints, pro and con, noted, regarding Friedman's suggestion that ONE would be well-advised to refrain from "fighting" both Respondent's management and UAW, concerning the latter organization's representation claim. One member noted his "feeling" that ONE's decision "to go on or stay off the ballot" should be made by a majority of the members. Thompson's minutes, however, warrant a determination that no firm decision regarding this sugges- tion, nor with regard to what further steps ONE might take, was reached during the meeting in question. Early the following morning, Don Eldridge, then a ONE director, sought Fairless; he declared his concern regarding these developments. Inter alia, Eldridge reported his determination to contest Freedman's suggestion , saying, "I think ONE should stay in existence, and remain the collective-bargaining representative out here , and I am going to do everything I can to make sure that takes place." Fairless commented, so his testimony, which I credit in this connection, shows, that Eldridge's problem concerned a so- called "internal union" matter, and that he (Eldridge) would probably find it very difficult to counter what ONE's current leadership seemingly desired. Almost simultaneously , so I find, during the morning of June 13, Kniffen and Sklar sought a conference with Welko Gasich, Respondent's general manager, purportedly to define what General Counsel has herein characterized as their organization's "watch and wait" position . Kniffen told Gasich that, during their previous night's meeting, ONE's members had been advised it would be better if they did not try to challenge UAW's representation claims ; Gasich was told, therefore, that ONE would take no position regarding UAW's campaign. The present record provides no reliable basis for a determination regarding the date when this Kniffen-Sklar- Gasich conference took place. Kniffen, while a witness, first placed it on June 18; Sklar had no recollection; Gasich , while a witness, was not questioned regarding this conference. Fairless, though he recalled receiving a telephone call from Gasich following the conference's conclusion , could not recall the date ; he declared his "belief" that Kniffen and Sklar had conferred with Gasich on June 13, basing that "belief" upon hearsay reports received from Gasich's secretary. Kniffen, during his penultimate witness chair appearance, concurred with a suggestion that June 13 was the correct date. This question, within my view, really requires no present resolution. Since narrative presentations, however, must necessarily "march" NORTHROP CORPORATION 177 pursuant to some consistent chronology, I have designated June lath the relevant date; the logic of probability suggests that Kniffen and Sklar would have been most likely to seek a conference with Gasich directly following ONE's regular June membership meeting, rather than six days later. The record contains some variant testimony regarding Gasich's rejoinder. According to Kniffen, Respondent's general manager replied, "If you are not going to fight them, get the hell out of the way, because we don't want our plant run from Detroit." However, Sklar's composite testimony, during direct and cross-examination, would warrant a determination, rather, that Gasich said, "Well, if you are not going to fight them, step back out of the way, because I'm not going to take any orders from Detroit" Respondent's general manager, as previously noted, was never questioned regarding this matter. He may have declared his position forcefully. Nevertheless, this trier of fact finds no present necessity to conclude that Respon- dent's general manager reached for profanity; Sklar's testimonial recollection, regarding his remark, merits credence. When Kniffen and Sklar were leaving, Gasich was asked, by the latter whether Respondent would consider the situation "advantageous" should there be no union within the division's Newbury Park facility. Gasich replied affirmatively; Kniffen and Sklar then departed. The following Monday, June 17, Kmffen sent Respon- dent a written notice regarding ONE's "intent" to "terminate and modify" their current contract. Respon- dent's management was, additionally, notified that: We further intend to sign the resulting modified contract after the matter presently before the National Labor Relations Board has been settled. The commencement of negotiations was suggested. On June 18, Fairless replied. He declared Respondent's readiness to begin negotiations covering wages, hours, and working conditions for employees whom ONE represented; noted Respondent's hope to have a signed contract before their current agreement's terminal date; but further noted Respondent's recognition that the pendency of UAW's representation petition might preclude the "timely" negoti- ation of such a contract. Within a few days following his receipt of Fairless' June 18th letter, Kniffen communicated with Swift, requesting that arrangements be made for the commencement of contract negotiating sessions. Swift declared, so I find, that he would try to schedule such sessions; none, however, have been held. Sometime during this period, under circumstances never clarified for the present record, certain of Respondent's workers began to circulate petition cards to recall ONE's officers. On the afternoon of June 25, during a meeting of ONE's board of directors, Kniffen displayed a copy of the petition card, reported that he had witnessed certain people from Respondent's engineering and administration build- ings circulating it within the division 's manufacturing building during working hours, and complained that Respondent could properly be charged with statutorily- proscribed discrimination, because of its seeming permis- siveness in this respect, since both UAW and ONE spokesmen had previously been warned not to conduct such business during normal working hours . One director present, reported a previously-held private conference of directors; the minutes, which have not been challenged in this connection, reflect his declaration that ONE's directors had reached a unanimous decision "to keep ONE off the ballot" should a representation election for "P & M" workers be directed. Later that evening, dunng a special membership meeting which some 150-200 Newbury Park workers attended, Kniffen read a statement "giving [ONE's] position" regarding their so-called "current" problem; the present record warrants a determination that he reported the director's purported decision "at this time" that ONE would not participate , should some "P & M" representation election be subsequently scheduled . During a spirited floor discussion which followed, conflicting points of view regarding the wisdom of that decision were presented. Those opposed criticized ONE's leadership , inter alra, for presuming to reach such a decision without a membership vote ; Kmffen defended the propriety of the leadership's procedure. ONE's membership was further advised that their directors' decision "at this time" not to seek a place on the Board's prospective representation ballot had been "based on" legal counsel . Attorney Friedman was, once more, permitted to address the membership . Substantially, he recapitulated the considerations which had previously persuaded him to recommend that ONE refrain from contesting UAW's representation claims . Secretary Thompson's minute record regarding this portion of ONE's meeting, which I consider worthy of credit, reveals a further comment by ONE's counsel, substantially as follows: The T & 0 people do not support unionism . An internal split now only benefits the Company. If you petition the Board to represent the T & 0 unit on this election and lose, you can't reorganize for a year . When union backing is apparent in the T & 0 you or the UAW can go in then and organize. During the discussion which followed , several members voiced their dissatisfaction when told that a Board -directed vote, premised upon UAW's petition, would necessarily be limited to "P & M" workers , plus related plant clericals; Friedman was questioned regarding some possible proce- dure which might permit "T & 0" workers, likewise, to register their choice . He suggested, so the minutes show, that, should such workers desire union representation, they should "sign cards" calling for a separate election. When the meeting adjourned, however, no clear-cut consensus had been reached; the minutes merely reflect a Kmffen declaration that "all the people" would be informed later, regarding ONE's final decision. Early the next morning, June 26, Fairless received a number of reports, both from subordinates and concerned workers, regarding the decision announced the previous night that ONE would not seek a ballot place should a secret vote for "P & M" workers subsequently be conducted. Two particular workers who conferred with Respondent's director of industrial relations , Frances Martinez and Dale Roepke , declared their purpose to pursue a course reasonably calculated to protect the presumed interest of Respondent's technical and office workers, who, so they understood , would no longer have 178 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD union representation should ONE refrain from seeking a place on whatever "ballot" might be forthcoming. While a witness, Fairless declared that when these developments were brought to his notice he knew that UAW's representation petition sought a vote within a bargaining group limited merely to production and maintenance workers, plus certain "clerical support" classifications in Respondent's manufacturing, quality control, warehousing, and storage facilities. Thus, when Martinez and Roepke conferred with him, he knew, so he testified, that UAW's petition would leave, unaffected, some currently represented worker group within Respon- dent's total employee complement, which had not yet, however, been clearly defined. Fairless' testimony, with respect to this matter, merits credence. Respondent's director of industrial relations, however, told Martinez and Roepke that since they were concerned with ONE matters solely they would not be permitted to post notices with respect thereto on company bulletin boards. Fairless recommended that they consult, rather, with ONE's president. He may have suggested further that they might visit the Board's Regional Office for consulta- tions regarding their rights. 3. NVEU's formation In point of fact, so the record shows, Martinez had communicated with Kniffen; the previous night, following the meeting's conclusion, she had queried ONE's president, so I find, regarding his willingness to take steps calculated to protect those technical and office workers who might wish to retain collective bargaining representation. Kniffen had suggested that Martinez, together with other concerned workers, might circulate designation cards within Respon- dent's Newbury Park facility. Martinez had protested that she would need help, Kniffen had offered to provide her with a book for guidance. The following day, so I find, Kniffen did provide Martinez with "Organizing and the Law," by Samuel Schlossberg, UAW's general counsel. Her testimony regarding Kniffen's book loan stands without contradic- tion; while a witness, ONE Vice President Sklar reported a comment by Kniffen, shortly following their June 25 membership meeting, that he had loaned Martinez a union book dealing with organizing techniques. On June 26, ONE's president suggested that Martinez circulate a prepared "ONE" designation card; whether this suggestion was made before or following her conference with Fairless the record does not show. Producing a blank UAW card, Kniffen helped Martinez mask that organiza- tion's letter initials and seal; the letters "ONE" plus that designated organization's insignia were substituted. Knif- fen and Martinez then carried the revised card to Respondent's reproduction section; there, ONE's president personally requested a member of Respondent's reproduc- tion crew to duplicate a small supply of these "ONE" designation cards, for which Martinez would subsequently call. This was done. The following morning, June 27, Kniffen, together with five fellow ONE spokesmen, directors, officers and chief steward, met with Fairless and Swift, pursuant to ONE's request. The union president, so I find, raised two principal questions. First: ONE's current status as collective-bargain- ing representative for Respondent's technical and office workers was discussed. Second: Protests were lodged that Respondent's management was failing to restrain or forbid the circulation of so-called "impeachment" petition cards, directed against Kniffen and three other ONE officers, during working hours. Respondent's spokesmen, testifying herein, recalled Kniffen as most perturbed over what he considered "violations" with respect to Northrop Ventura's no-solicitation rule; with due regard for the record considered in totality, however, I am satisfied that Respondent's policy with regard to recognizing and dealing with ONE was first discussed. My factual determinations, regarding this conference, primarily derive, once more, from Thompson's secretarial notes, substantially corroborated by Kniffen's testimony. When queried regarding the conference's course, neither Fairless nor Swift could recall a discussion, couched in terms comparable with those set forth in Thompson's record, regarding ONE's representative status vis-a-vis Respondent's technical and office workers. Former ONE Vice President Sklar, summoned as Respondent's witness, first denied hearing Kniffen's purported comments with regard to this subject; later, however, he conceded that a conversational exchange dealing with "T & 0" representa- tion might have taken place, but testified that he possessed no witnesschair recollection, despite his prior review of Thompson's transcribed notes, with respect thereto. Former ONE Chief Shop Steward Mertus, proffered as NVEU's witness, conceded a failure of recollection regarding this particular conference; when queried further, however, he recalled, vaguely, that during some June meeting with management representatives Kniffen had "asked ... to represent" technical and office workers. With matters in this posture, I am satisfied that Fairless, Swift, and Sklar could not recall the conference discussion regarding "T & 0" representation, which I find took place, presumably because their principal focus of concern may, then, have been centered upon Kniffen's strong representa- tions regarding the so-called "impeachment" petition's circulation. Fairless, while a witness, conceded that he could not proffer a positive denial, with regard to Kniffen's testimony on this point, because he had not been "primarily concerned" with that question at the time. Further, I note that Thompson's notes do not really reflect any positive stand taken by ONE's president during this June 27 conference regarding ONE's representative status, so far as technical and office workers were concerned; neither do her notes, reasonably construed, reflect any forthright demand for "immediate" negotiations. The testimonial denials proffered by Fairless, Swift, and Sklar, therefore, since they were clearly presented to negate purported representations and demands which Kniffen did not really make, must be considered wide of the mark, and, consequently, lacking in relevance. Fairless, so I find, first noted that Respondent would "continue to administer" ONE's contract, for the balance of its term. ONE's representatives were told, however, that since they had decided "to keep ONE off the ballot" with respect to UAW's representation petition management saw no further need to negotiate a replacement contract. With NORTHROP CORPORATION respect to Kniffen 's reply, Thompson's contemporaneous notes, which I find completely reliable, read as follows: P & M unit has been petitioned. We are trying to petition Eng [sneering] - T & 0 - to be rep [resented] by ONE. [Emphasis supplied.] ONE's president then registered his complaint regarding Respondent's seeming policy of permissiveness, with respect to the purported circulation of so-called "impeachment" petitions during working hours. When Fairless, thereupon , suggested that they discuss "one item" at a time, Kniffen first declared ONE's desire to begin negotiations. Thompson's notes show Fairless replying, "OK - rep [resenting] T & 0 people." Despite Fairless' testimonial failure of recollection , with respect thereto, determination is found warranted that he proffered the response noted. The significance of this conversation exchange will be discussed, further, in this decision. For the present, however, we need note, merely, that Thompson's notes will not really support a conclusion that ONE's president was, during this conference , presenting any clear-cut recognition demand ; since his conference remarks, considered in totality, clearly reflect references to a card solicitation campaign currently in progress, within the so-called "T & 0" group with respect to which UAW was making no representation claim , his comment that ONE "wanted" to begin negotiations could reasonably be considered both precatory and conditional. And Fairless' reply, therefore - within my view - may properly be construed as reflective of nothing more than Respondent's readiness to begin contractual negotiations, covering Newbury Park's techni- cal and office workers, whenever ONE might, thereafter, present a definite, properly grounded , recognition demand. I so find. Thompson's notes reveal a further comment by ONE's president regarding "authorization cards" from technical and office workers. These people were "upset" Kniffen declared; he remarked that they "should" sign ONE cards. Regarding these comments , Thompson's notes, once more, reflect Fairless' mere acquiesence ; within my view, Respondent's director of industrial relations was signifying thereby nothing more than his willingness to abide the result of Kniffen's presumptive procedure. The discussion then turned to Kniffen's complaint regarding the impeachment petition card circulators. Substantially, ONE's president contended that they were being permitted to conduct "union" business on company time, without hindrance, though three-rank-and-file work- ers within Respondent's plastics department had recently been given formal written warning notices ("boom sheets") because of their suspected participation in conversations, during working hours, related to UAW's campaign. Fairless invited Kniffen to file formal complaints regarding the conduct which ONE considered violative of company rules. This, ONE's president promised to do. Such a complaint letter was, subsequently prepared later during the day and submitted. The record shows that Respondent's industrial relations department, through Swift particularly, notified the workers charged regarding Kniffen's complaint, by letters bearing July 1st dates, and 179 suggested a conference of those concerned , to resolve the matter. No such conference, however, was ever held. Responding to Kniffen 's concern, with regard to the formal disciplinary notices given three plastics department workers, Fairless suggested that Respondent 's grievance procedure should be used to handle the matter. The conference closed , so Thompson's notes show, with Fairless' comment that he would re-evaluate Kniffen's so- called "request" from a legal standpoint only. With due regard for the record , considered in totality, I am satisfied that this remark, since its relevance in connection with Kniffen's complaint about "petition" circulators can hardly be considered clear, represented a restatement of Respon- dent's position with regard to ONE's possible "T & 0" representation claims. Within the week which followed, some of Respondent's workers, their number never specified for the present record, did sign ONE designation cards. These cards, presumably the cards produced for Martinez at Kniffen's request, had been distributed to "all members of the ONE including office and technical personnel" pursuant to posted declarations that they would be used "to maintain ONE as a recognized union" by this Board. The card signers seem to have been scattered throughout the corporation's Newbury Park facility; the record provides no basis for a conclusion , however, that they were limited to presumptive technical and office worker classifications. Early in July, Martinez, together with several other workers, visited this Board's Regional Office; the testimoni- al record, though not detailed with regard to this visit, will support a determination that some Regional Office representative was asked whether ONE could be designated a ballot choice, based upon signed designation cards. So far as the record shows , those workers who visited the Regional Office were not , specifically, seeking a separate representation election for Respondent 's technical and office personnel not compassed within UAW's current "P & M" representation claims ; they were, rather, seeking to determine whether this Board would consider their card showing sufficient to warrant a ballot designation for ONE, in connection with any vote which might thereafter be directed for Respondent's production and maintenance workers. The workers were told, substantially, that since ONE's duly-constituted leadership had not , formally, made their organization's position known designation cards solicited without official sanction could not be relied upon to promote a ballot designation. This news, so I find, produced a consensus, within the disaffected ONE group, that legal counsel should be sought with regard to possible alternative courses which they might pursue. On July 8, Respondent sent a four-page letter to each hourly-rated worker, declaring the corporation's position regarding UAW's representation petition . (The letter's primary recipients were Newbury Park production and maintenance employees, together with most technical and office workers.) Therein, the workers' need for "giant international union" representation was decried; certain results which might flow from UAW's selection as their bargaining representative were detailed. Most significantly, however , Respondent's general manager described the 180 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD workers' possible choice, merely, as a choice between representation or nonrepresentation. ONE was never mentioned ; nor was any reference, whatever, made to Respondent's collective-bargaining relationship with that organization since its Newbury Park move. The following day, during their lunch hour , several of Respondent's technical and office workers, Frances Martinez, Grady Means, and Dale Roepke, met near Respondent's plant cafeteria. They decided to form a new union. Later that day, having sought and procured legal counsel, they determined to designate their new organiza- tion Northrop Ventura Employees Union, (NVEU), drafted and signed three designation cards, and authorized their counsel to notify the Board's Regional Office regarding NVEU's wish "to intervene for all purposes" in UAW's representation proceeding. The letter in question was, so I find, drafted by Charles H. Goldstein, NVEU's counsel, on July 9; the record, however, reveals that the Board's Regional Office received it 2 days later. Martinez was presumably delegated to complete arrange- ments whereby further authorization cards would be printed, for distribution to Respondent's Newbury Park workers. This was done . The record reveals a substantial testimonial conflict as to whether Martinez, following the conference with Attorney Goldstein noted , arranged to have NVEU's entire designation card supply prepared by a small job-shop printer within her home community, or whether some designation cards were subsequently printed, pursuant to her request, within Respondent's reproduction section, during working hours. The testimonial conflict in this connection will be discussed , further, within this decision. During the next 2 days, NVEU's organizing committee designated their "acting" leadership for the fledgling organization. Those designated were : President, Grady Means; Vice Presidents, Don Eldridge and Joe Millner; Secretary, Frances Martinez ; Treasurer, Dale Roepke. So far as the record shows. these officers-save for Martinez, who later became NVEU's business representative-have continued to serve , pursuant to their designations, through- out the period with which this case is concerned. Meanwhile, on July 9, Fairless and Swift had scheduled a further conference with Kniffen ; various ONE directors and officers were likewise present. Respondent's director of industrial relations told ONE's president that he would, thereafter, be required to perform his regular milling machine machinist's work in Respondent's machine shop, and that he would no longer be allowed to circulate freely throughout Respondent's Newbury Park facility. Kniffen was told further, however, that he would be given whatever "time off" he might require to police ONE's contract, process contractual grievance matters, and transact other company-union business . Fairless declared, so testimony, which I credit, shows, that Kniffen's previously-recognized privilege, whereby he was permitted to spend "full-time" during working hours performing duties connected with his union position, was being rescinded because Respondent did not wish to be considered in violation of the Landrum- Griffin Act through paying Kniffen's full-time salary for such union connected services. Previously, during a 2- month period within calendar year 1967, Kniffen had likewise been required to perform shop work. Following this 2-month stint, however, Respondent's requirement had been relaxed, and ONE's president had been permitted to resume full-time service, in connection with his union- related responsibilities. The following day, ONE Vice President Sklar and Thompson sought a further conference with Fairless. Sklar requested that Kniffen be permitted to work in some classification other than milling machine machinist, doing desk-type work, so that he could wear a business suit during working hours. Respondent's director of industrial relations conceded that this might be possible. On July 11, Kniffen did resume work with a manufactur- ing control coordinator classification. In a letter which he received that day, ONE's president was told, once more, that his work assignment was not intended to restrict him in conducting "Company/Union" business in his presidential capacity. He was told, further, that while functioning as ONE's president he would be given any necessary paid timeoff to conduct company-union business as it pertained to ONE's current contract. Kniffen was advised, likewise, that should he experience any timeoff difficulty in fulfilling his presidential duties he could communicate with Respon- dent's director of industrial relations. Meanwhile, before work began that day, letters prepared by NVEU's organizing committee, with blank authoriza- tion cards attached, had been distributed at various plant gates, to Respondent's arriving day shift workers. Respon- dent's so-called "hourly-paid" workers were told about NVEU's formation, its plan to provide Respondent's employees with a ballot choice "other than UAW" during the forthcoming representation election, and its campaign for worker support. Interested employees were invited to submit their authorization cards, signed, between Monday, July 15, and Friday, July 19; they were told that a table would be set up in Respondent's cafeteria during lunch periods, where "signature" cards, whether signed or unsigned, might be returned. 4. The representation case hearing On July 22, the Regional Office's hearing on UAW's representation petition was convened. NVEU, represented by Charles H. Goldstein, presented a formal "intervention" motion, supported by some 500 signed designation cards. When presenting these cards, off the record, Goldstein declared with dramatic vigor that NVEU's card supporters would constitute a majority of Respondent's workers, within "any unit" which might be found appropriate for collective-bargaining purposes; he "defied" the parties present, before the Regional Office's Hearing Officer, to check the cards and question this claim. ONE's comparable motion to intervene was vigorously contested; counsel for Respondent and NVEU contended that the organization's decision not to seek ballot designation had previously been publicized, and that ONE's leadership had proclaimed their purpose to go out of business. ONE's president denied, categorically, that the organization was contemplating or moving toward dissolu- tion. President Kniffen was in attendance throughout the Regional Office hearing, between July 22 and August 9, NORTHROP CORPORATION 181 having been granted "leave without pay" status for this purpose. ONE was, likewise, represented by counsel. When questioned, regarding his prior comments in this connection purportedly made during ONE's June 25 meeting, Kniffen first testified that ONE's membership had then been told that their directors had made a decision "at this time" that they were "considering withdrawing" their organization's name from any possible forthcoming ballot. The president was then asked whether ONE's membership had been told, merely, that their board of directors was "considering" such a decision, or whether they had been told that such a decision had really been made; ONE's president conceded that he could not recall his phraseology precisely, and that the membership "could have" been told a decision had been reached. With matters in this posture, ONE was, so the record shows, permitted to intervene . However, no formal statement regarding the organization's desire or lack of desire for ballot designation was proffered, thereafter, while the hearing was in progress. For the most part, the representation case hearing seems to have been devoted to resolving unit placement questions. With respect thereto, the Acting Regional Director's final Decision and Direction of Election, which I have officially noted, contains certain factual determinations relevant herein: The historical bargaining unit . . . included clerical, professional, and production and maintenance employ- ees in the same unit. However, none of the parties contend that the historical bargaining unit is an appropriate unit at this time, and the parties are in disagreement both as to the scope and the composition of the appropriate bargaining unit . O.N.E. takes no position with respect to unit placement of any employees. The other parties agree that the appropriate unit should be comprised of all production and maintenance employees . The parties have stipulated that certain employees should be excluded by virtue of the fact that they are executive, administrative, or professional employees, and that certain other employ- ees should be excluded by virtue of the fact that they are either office clerical employees or guards within the meaning of the Act . . . Similarly, the parties stipulated to the inclusion of employees in classifications listed on the hourly production and maintenance roster of the Employer. [Emphasis supplied.] With these matters resolved by stipulation, there remained some 30 job classifications with respect to which unit placement was disputed . Considerable testimony regarding these classifications was taken ; ONE President Kniffen, so the record shows, testified at length . While a witness herein, Kniffen declared that ONE's position throughout the representation case hearing reflected its purpose "to keep as many of the classifications in the technical and office category" as could possibly be done. Reliable, probative, and substantial evidence sufficient to warrant a conclusion that this. was ONE 's purpose has not, however, been proffered ; I find no factual determination necessary in this regard. On July 26, while the representation case hearing was in progress, ONE's regular July membership meeting was held. The present record with respect thereto merits characterization as limited. Fairless had been invited to address the meeting, along with a UAW. representative . Respondent's director of industrial relations had declined the invitation. Thompson's notes reveal, however, that Kniffen prof- fered a statement calculated to clarify what he had said during ONE's June membership meeting ; that he reported briefly regarding the Regional Office's representation case proceeding, and that he read an open letter to ONE's members. Treasurer Leonard Estes then gave his report. Among other things, so the record shows, he declared that a court would decide the disposition of money left in ONE's treasury after "the" election ; presumably, his reference was to the forthcoming "P & M" bargaining unit vote, premised upon UAW's representation petition. I so find. The representation case hearing was concluded on August 9. On August 14, 5 days thereafter, ONE's counsel advised the Board's Regional Office by letter that the organization did not desire a ballot designation in connection with the forthcoming "P & M" representation vote. This letter, so the record shows, was sent at Kniffen's direction ; ONE's official position was stated. 5. ONE's contract termination On Thursday, August 15, President Kniffen, on behalf of ONE, sent Fairless another letter . Therein, Respondent's director of industrial relations was advised that ONE would continue to represent all of its members, not only until its current agreement terminated, but thereafter "as permitted by law" until such time as the Board might certify that another Union had become their appropriate representa- tive. The letter continued as follows: Should the NLRB direct an election in a unit comprising less than all of our members, and should another Union be certified to represent employees in such a unit, it is further our present intention to continue to represent those of our members who are not in that unit. As you know, there is a strong possibility that the latter group will be comprised of Office and Technical employees. [Emphasis supplied.] Fairless, though declaring in his prior affidavit that he had received this letter on August 15, probably received it, so I find, some time on Friday, August 16. ONE's president was not, however, vouchsafed any direct, personal reply. So far as the record shows, Respondent's director of industrial relations merely communicated, promptly, with Lyman Powell, Respondent's labor relations counsel . Fairless was advised that, since NVEU had demonstrated "apparent majority" status during the Regional Office's recently concluded representation case hearing, and since ONE's declaration of representational interest had not been substantiated, the division's management was free to consider that declaration nothing more than a mere "naked claim" which should be disregarded. With such counsel, Fairless forwarded Kniffen's letter to Powell for response. On Friday evening, August 16, 2 days before ONE's contract with Respondent was due to terminate, the organization held a special membership meeting. Thomp- son's notes with respect thereto, which I credit, reflect a report by President Kniffen regarding the general course of 182 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD the Regional Office's representation case hearing. Those present were told, inter aka, that, historically, so-called "T & 0" workers were not properly considered within defined "P & M" bargaining units; that, so far as Newbury Park was concerned, the facility's conceded "T & 0" workers had been stipulated out, while Respondent's conceded "P & M" workers had been recognized as compassed within the projected bargaining unit for representation election purposes, both by UAW's petition and by stipulation. ONE's members were further advised that the Board would finally decide the bargaining unit placement of workers in certain "grey area" classifications. With respect to Knif- fen's further remarks, Thompson's minute record reads as follows: Since NVEU is in competition with UAW and those people not in one union will not be in the other union either. [sic] We decided on a course of action that may be discussed for years to come by labor attorneys. (Pres. read letter to Fairless.) We will rep[resent] people at NV until our term of office runs out. We will begin negotiations for these T & 0 people as soon as possible. A question was then raised regarding dues-deduction procedure: ONE's members were advised that dues deductions, pursuant to their checkoff authorizations previously filed, would cease with their contract's termina- tion. Those wishing to maintain dues payment currently were advised to proffer dues directly to ONE's officers. These factual determinations rest upon Thompson's minute record, supplemented by Kniffen's testimony, which I have credited wherever I have found consistency with Thompson's notes. ONE's president did testify, further, that he told the members present that no one would be formally deprived of his or her ONE membership for failure to pay dues. Since Thompson's minute record, however, reflects no such significant pronouncement, Kniffen's testimony with respect thereto has not been credited. Several persons concededly present during this meeting did proffer testimony which substantially varied from Thompson's minute record. They described the meeting as brief, with but a small number of persons present, and characterized the discussion as subdued. And their composite testimony, should I consider it worthy of credence, would warrant a determination that President Kniffen, following his brief description of the Regional Office's representation case hearing, stated that "this would be the last ONE meeting" which would be held; further, their testimony would warrant a determination that nothing whatever was said regarding ONE's plan to continue representing Respondent's technical and office workers. With due regard for the record, considered in totality, I am satisfied that the membership meeting now in question was comparatively brief; that it was attended by comparatively few ONE members; and that the meeting's general tenor was, indeed, subdued. Further, I have noted, previously, my conclusion that Kniffen made no comment that workers failing to pay dues currently would, nevertheless, not be deprived of their membership. Within my view, however, no credence can be given testimony that he characterized the meeting as ONE's last. I am satisfied that Kniffen may well have described the session as ONE's last meeting before their contract's termination date. The record, however, will, within my view, support a determination that the meeting had been scheduled, inter alia, to tell Respondent's workers excluded from the prospective "P & M" unit what this would mean to them; further, it will support a determination that reference was made to ONE's continuing representation claims compassing the division's "T & 0" workers, for whom negotiations would be undertaken shortly. Under such circumstances, comments calculated to suggest that no further membership meeting would be held could hardly have been proffered responsi- bly. No such representation was, so I find, made. Of those present, some eight members proffered their dues for September, prospectively. The meeting concluded with several presidential references to working conditions which would presumably prevail at Newbury Park pending the forthcoming "P & M" representation vote. Meanwhile, earlier that same day, H. E. Riggins, Jr., Respondent's vice president and assistant general manager, dispatched a letter bearing a prospective August 18 date, directed to ONE, but marked for President Kniffen's perusal, had-wherein reference was made to ONE's prior June 17 notice regarding its desire "to terminate and modify" their current contract. Following a further reference to that contract's "duration" clause, Riggins declared that: In compliance with your letter and in accordance with the provisions of the aforementioned Agreement, this memorandum will serve as a Notice honoring your request for termination of the Agreement between the parties effective midnight, 18 August 1968. This letter, sent by special delivery, was received by Kniffen the following day, Saturday, August 17. It contained no reference to Kniffen's August 15 letter, previously noted, purportedly because Riggins had neither seen nor been told about Kniffen's most recent communication before his "termination" letter was dispatched. 6. NVEU's recognition demand On August 17, NVEU dispatched a letter to Respondent's director of industrial relations, which had been drafted and dated the previous day. Therein, NVEU claimed representative status for a majority of Respondent's workers in both production and maintenance ("P & M") classifications and technical and office ("T & 0") classifications. With particular reference to Respondent's technical and office workers, President Grady Means claimed majority designations within each of two separate groups. First: he claimed designation by a majority of Respondent's workers employed in various so-called "Group A" job classifications; these compassed some 78 workers within classifications which had been specifically "excluded" from UAW's proposed production and mainte- nance bargaining unit, during the Regional Office's representation case hearing, pursuant to stipulation. Second: he claimed representative status within a so-called "overwhelming majority of clerical and technical employ- ees" whose disputed unit placement had been litigated during the representation case hearing, then recently concluded. NVEU's president declared his belief that these workers, designated "Group B" workers for reference purposes, would finally be excluded from whatever defined NORTHROP CORPORATION production and maintenance unit might subsequently be found appropriate for collective bargaining purposes. With regard to various classifications of so-called "Group A" workers, NVEU demanded immediate recognition as bargaining representative; Respondent was told that NVEU was prepared to demonstrate its majority status within this defined group of workers through a card-check, conducted by a responsible, disinterested person. With regard to so-called "Group B" workers, Respondent was put on notice that NVEU was demanding recognition as their bargaining representative, currently, while conceding that Respondent could not grant such recognition until such time as the Board s Regional Director might determine the propriety of their exclusion from whatever production and maintenance unit he might thereafter find proper for collective bargaining purposes. Respondent was told, therefore, that "when the scope of Group B is defined by the NLRB by its ruling" with respect to UAW's representation petition, NVEU would demonstrate its majority status through a card check of those "Group B" workers who had "as of the date of this letter" signed designation cards. The letter continued as follows: Please treat each request for recognition as the majority representative of the employees in Group A and B respectively, as continuing requests; and if you are not prepared to allow us to prove our majority to you at this time in some feasible manner - but wish to do so in the future -please contact me at once by phone or letter at the above city address and phone number. Since your contract with the Organization of Northrop Employees expires August 18, 1968, from our authoriza- tion card count and other information, no other person or organization presently represents a majority of Group A or Group B employees described above. Therefore, we caution you against entering into any contract or collective bargaining negotiations with any other organization presuming to act for or behalf of any such employees. [Emphasis supplied. I Respondent's management, should it decide to recognize NVEU as bargaining representative for the Newbury Park facility's Group A workers, was requested to bargain collectively and negotiate a contract to completion. The list of so-called "Group A" classifications with respect to which NVEU had requested recognition accompanied President Means' letter. That list compassed some 49 job classifica- tions; these represented approximately 24 percent of those 207 classifications with respect to which the representation case parties had stipulated "exclusion" from UAW's proposed bargaining unit of production and maintenance workers. This letter was, so credible testimony shows, received by Director of Industrial Relations Fairless through Respon- dent's normal mail distribution, sometime after 10 o'clock during the morning of Monday, August 19. It had been drafted, primarily by NVEU's counsel, sometime during the daytime hours of Friday, August 16; the letter's final draft, however, had not been signed and committed to the mails until Saturday afternoon, August 17, as previously noted. Whether Respondent's director of industrial relations had, nevertheless, received some notice regarding the 183 letter's content, before he received President Means' signed original copy through the Newbury Park plant' s regular morning mail distribution, was a subject of testimonial controversy herein. I note, inter alia, that Fairless' pretrial affidavit, dated February 11, 1969, reports his receipt of the latter on August 16th. My factual conclusions in that connection, however, will be noted, subsequently, within this decision. Following the letter's Saturday dispatch, various NVEU officers, so I find, had taken a duplicate, separately signed, copy to a print shop; there they had had letter copies together with a handbill directed to their fellow workers prepared for distribution the following Monday morning. 7. ONE's renewed representation claim Early that morning, August 19, shortly after Respon- dent's day shift started, Kniffen telephoned Riggins; he requested a conference to discuss the latter's August 16/18 letter. The requested conference convened at 9 o'clock in Riggins' office. Kniffen, Sklar, and Thompson, plus one or two ONE directors, represented that organization; Riggins, Fairless and Swift were present for Respondent' s manage- ment. President Kniffen told Respondent's vice president that his construction of ONE's June 17 letter had not been correct; he declared that ONE's letter had been drafted, with conventional verbiage, merely to initiate contract negotiations. Riggins was further told that, if Respondent wished the contract terminated, they should have said so, without trying to imply that ONE had been responsible. Riggins, however, characterized the situation as one which had become a very involved legal matter; further, he declared that Respondent was seeking the advice of counsel before taking any action, and suggested that "this matter" should be handled through counsel representing the parties. Regarding the conversation which followed, the present record once more presents serious testimonial conflict. With respect thereto, my factual determinations again derive from Thompson's summary notes; Fairless, Respon- dent's principal witness in this connection, conceded, both within his prior pretrial affidavit and during his witness chair testimony, that he was not "certain" regarding the substance of Kniffen' s statements. Thompson's notes w1th respect thereto show a conversational exchange which follows: Walt-We intend to continue to represent all the hourly people at NV until the NLRB tells us otherwise. We also intend to continue to represent those people who are not included in the bargaining unit decided upon by the NLRB. We have had nothing to say about the fact that a part of our unit has been split off and will be represented by some other union. We will serve as the representatives of those remaining people. Rex - You say you wish to represent these people. We have received a letter from NVEU saying they also wish to represent these same people and that they have a majority of the people signed up indicating their preference for NVEU. I am not sure how the law reads in a situation like this and feel this is a matter for the attorney to settle. [Emphasis supplied] Kniffen then asked Fairless whether, since Respondent had 184 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD made clear its intention to have no further dealings with ONE as a union, that organization's plant office would have to be vacated and its files and equipment removed. Respondent's director of industrial relations characterized that as a fair assumption; he requested a schedule stating how much time ONE would require to accomplish such a removal. Kniffen was told that any time he spent away from his job, for which Respondent might pay, would have to be spent on "company-union" business. When he reminded Fairless that he would need time to check and process currently outstanding grievances, plus time off to meet with ONE's counsel, Riggins declared Respondent's willingness to "work out" such matters. ONE's president was told, however, that while Respondent wished to allow him "ample" time his supervisors would be notified that he was not to be permitted leave from his work station without their specific permission, and that any time spent away from his station would have to be cleared through a designated industrial relations department representative. Later the same day, Lyman Powell, Respondent's labor relations counsel, dispatched a letter to Kniffen regarding the latter's August 15 letter, previously noted. ONE's president was reminded that Respondent could no longer recognize or bargain with his organization on behalf of production and maintenance workers, legally, while the current Board proceeding remained pending, since a question concerning their representation existed: As to technical and office employees, my client has reliable information indicating that the vast majority of such employees no longer desire representation by your O.N.E., and that they have transferred their allegiance to and sought representation by, the Northrop-Ventura Employees Union (NVEU). Accordingly, since you no longer represent a majority of such employees, we cannot recognize the O.N.E. as their bargaining representative. Powell conceded that while Respondent would have to decline ONE's request for recognition and bargaining, with regard to both groups mentioned in Kniffen's letter his organization might, nevertheless, have certain residual vested rights to process, through arbitration if necessary, grievances previously filed, before the termination date of ONE's collective-bargaining contract. Kniffen was advised, however, that, save for his privilege to conclude grievance matters previously initiated, neither he personally nor his fellow ONE officers or stewards would, thereafter, enjoy any representative status within Respondent's plant, and that they would not be considered authorized to conduct further union business or process new grievances. 8. NVEU's recognition Sometime during the day now in question, August 19, Fairless drafted and dispatched another letter, directed to NVEU President Means, which the latter received "on or about" that date. Means was advised that Respondent could not recognize and bargain with NVEU, unless it could demonstrate representative status for a clear majority of workers holding positions in listed "Group A" classifica- tions. Fairless declared, however, that Respondent was prepared to participate in a cardcheck, conducted by some impartial third party, for the purpose of determining whether NVEU did or did not enjoy such majority status: If the card check of Group A reveals that a clear majority of such employees have designated your Union as their bargaining agent, we will honor our legal obligation and bargain in good faith with your Union on their behalf. Regarding NVEU's representation claim for so-called "Group B" workers, Fairless declared that Respondent could not recognize such claims "at this time" since the proper unit placement of workers holding the classifica- tions in question was currently being litigated. President Means was told, however, that, when the Regional Director's decision was handed down, NVEU might "feel free" to renew its recognition request. Likewise, sometime during the day in question, Respon- dent's management distributed a formal announcement designated "Collective-Bargaining Agreement Termina- tion" which General Manager Gasich had signed. Respon- dent's workers were notified that ONE's contract together with all contractual provisions, including the provision for union dues checkoff authorizations had terminated. They were, however, reassured that Respondent's personnel policies and procedures, which had governed their employment relationship, would continue "until the question of employee representation has been resolved" through Board procedures. New grievance procedures, patterned upon those maintained for Northrop's two other Southern California divisions, were instituted, with provi- sions for terminal arbitration. Thereafter, during a 2-day period, August 20/21, Bernard Swift of Respondent's industrial relations department and NVEU President Means completed their preparations for a cardcheck of NVEU designation cards, submitted by workers with so-called "Group A" job classification. A local minister, who had signified his willingness to serve, was supplied with a payroll roster, prepared at Swift's request, which listed the workers currently holding positions in those "Group A" classifications NVEU claimed to represent; Means supplied him with NVEU's purportedly matched authorization cards. The record contains testimony and documentation that Respondent's prepared payroll roster contained 78 names. A count of the actual roster reveals 96 names, with 17 stricken, for a net total of 79 names. NVEU's president supplied 48 signed designation cards. The record will warrant a determination, however, that Reverend Rehnberg, the minister conducting the cardcheck, was never furnished with sample signatures for workers listed on Respondent's prepared payroll roster, nor was he given any directions regarding the necessity of checking NVEU's card signatures. He merely checked workers' names on proffered NVEU cards against Respon- dent's payroll roster; no attempt whatever was made to compare those job classifications which were shown on NVEU's cards with those which Respondent's roster revealed for listed workers. On August 21, Reverend Rehnberg reported, personally and by letter, that those workers whose names had been found on NVEU designation cards, (48), were likewise listed on Respon- dent's payroll roster. Further, Dr. Rehnberg reported that 61.5 percent of those workers, (78), who had been listed on NORTHROP CORPORATION 185 Respondent's presumptively relevant roster had been matched by NVEU cards. Later that day, August 21, Respondent and various NVEU representatives signed a recognition agreement; Respondent, thereby, conceded that NVEU had estab- lished its right to function as exclusive bargaining representative for workers holding positions in various designated "Group A" job classifications, based on Reverend Rehnberg's cardcheck. Respondent further agreed to meet NVEU representatives for the purpose of commencing contract negotiations. 9. Subsequent developments Within I day following NVEU's August 21 recognition as collective-bargaining representative for this limited group of technical and office workers, so I find, the organization's leadership requested Respondent to provide it with enclosed bulletin board space, within all buildings through- out the Newbury Park facility. By August 23, this request was granted. Glass enclosed bulletin boards; fitted with locks, were provided. Previously, during ONE's lengthy tenure as the contrac- tually recognized representative of Respondent's hourly- rated workers, that organization had similarly been provided with glass-enclosed, lock-fitted, bulletin boards. Three of these had been located in Respondent's manufac- turing building. On Monday, August 19, Respondent's first working day which followed ONE's contract termination date, these bulletin boards had been physically removed. Within Respondent's manufacturing building, particular- ly, NVEU's new bulletin boards substantially comparable in size, shape, and construction with ONE's boards which Respondent had recently removed - were placed at five separate, well-distributed, locations. When this was done, so the record shows, no more than three workers, with manufacturing building work stations, held job classifica- tions within the so-called "T & 0" employee group, with respect to which NVEU had just been recognized. 10. NVEU's contract negotiations On September 13, President Means provided Respon- dent's director of industrial relations with the names of ten Newbury Park workers who would serve on NVEU's bargaining committee. Shortly thereafter, contract negotia- tions started; Respondent's representatives met with NVEU's negotiators on September 23, for the purpose of negotiating a collective-bargaining contract which would cover currently represented "Group A" technical and office workers. The negotiators convened in rented quarters within a motor hotel, located several miles from Respondent's Newbury Park facility. Most of their subsequent bargaining sessions, so I find, were conducted, completely or partially, during Respondent's regular day shift working hours. During their first session, Attorney Goldstein, speaking in NVEU's behalf, specifically requested Respondent's concurrence with a suggestion that the NVEU negotiators should receive their regular pay for time spent during normal working hours while participating in bargaining sessions. Respondent's director of industrial relations, so I find, conceded the point. Though the record will not support a determination that those present during the first bargaining session were so compensated , determination is found warranted that NVEU's representatives who attend- ed subsequent sessions were paid consistently with Goldstein's suggestion. On October 16, Riggins, Respondent's assistant general manager, notified Respondent's full employee complement that a work schedule had been established which would permit all employees (save for a few scheduled to work because of critical production requirements) 4 consecutive days off in conjunction with the forthcoming Thanksgiving Day holiday. Describing this so-called "nonstandard holiday schedule" for Respondent's full employee comple- ment, Riggins declared that it had been negotiated with NVEU for employees whom that organization represented. On October 29, Respondent's labor relations department distributed a bulletin "announcement" that six bulletin boards were being installed , throughout the facility, for postings by parties or persons interested in the forthcoming representation election . These boards were divided into four sections, for postings by Respondent, NVEU, UAW, and Respondent's employees, respectively. So far as the record shows, these boards were generally used , thereafter, for posting "pertinent information" designed to assist Respondent's workers in determining their election choices. On November 13, thereafter, following eight bargaining sessions with November 8th the last, Respondent and NVEU representatives signed a negotiated collective- bargaining contract, scheduled to remain in full force and effect for a 3-year term following its November 18, 1968, effective date, with provisions for annual renewal, thereaft- er, from year to year, on the contract's anniversary date, absent timely written notice by either party of their desire that the contract should be modified , amended, or terminated. The document, inter alia, contained "maintenance of membership" provisions, whereby, save for a right to resign granted members during two designated escape periods, workers holding NVEU mem- bership 30 days following the contract 's effective date, together with present or future employees who might thereafter become NVEU members, would be required, as a condition of continued employment , to maintain their NVEU membership following their first 30 days of employment. Voluntary checkoff provisions, with respect to NVEU dues, bottomed upon written dues check-off authorizations filed consistently with statutory require- ments, were likewise compassed within the document. The following day, November 14, Respondent published and distributed a bulletin setting forth the significant "economic" provisions of this contractual settlement. The division's publication, though it declared the new contract applicable merely with respect to hourly-rated workers holding technical and office job classifications for which NVEU had previously been recognized as collective- bargaining representative was distributed to all Respon- dent's Newbury Park employees, not merely those "Group A" workers whom the contract covered. Respondent's bulletin, which was lengthy, noted several wage, hour and fringe benefit "improvements" compared with ONE's terminated contract, particularly the provision for general 186 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 6.4 percent wage increases with August 19 retroactive dates. Previously, within this decision, reference has been made to the fact that, during Respondent's last springtime "pre- negotiation" session with ONE representatives, wage rates had been discussed; Kniffen's testimony regarding that discussion, which I credit in this connection, would warrant a determination that Fairless had, then, stated ONE could not reasonably expect more than a general three percent wage boost. Further changes, noted in Respondent's bulletin, com- passed such matters as special skill adjustments for six labor grades, bereavement pay, changes in group health and medical insurance programs, and modified retirement plans plus a new paid holiday. 11. UAW's wage increase proposal Shortly before Respondent's announcement regarding NVEU's contract, UAW's volunteer organizing committee had distributed a leaflet bearing a November 11 date wherein Respondent was notified that UAW would file no Board unfair labor practice charge, regarding any wage increases which the firm might grant, provided such increases were given promptly and not just before the forthcoming election in an attempt to buy votes. Within a reply dated November 15, directed to UAW's Regional Director Paul Schrade, Respondent's corporate director of industrial relations and assistant general counsel, Frank R. Smith, noted that Respondent's general manager had been advised of his "opinion" that the statutory provisions governing the conduct of unions and employers during the period preceding a representation election could not be legally "waived" by the parties concerned. He declared, however, that: Mr. Gasich, despite my legal opinion, is desirous of finding a legal way to grant wage, skill trade, and fringe adjustments to Northrop-Ventura employees who are being denied such adjustments through no fault of their own. Smith then declared that Respondent would grant all Newbury Park workers the wage, skill trade, and fringe benefits negotiated within NVEU's newly-signed contract, retroactive to August 19, upon receipt of written statements from UAW, NVEU President Means, and the Board's Regional Director, respectively, that no unfair labor practice charges or prospective election objections would be filed, entertained, or sustained, consequent upon such grants. Copies of this letter were, likewise, posted on bulletin boards throughout Respondent's Newbury Park facility. With matters in this posture, UAW, seemingly, scheduled a campaign meeting concerning wage increase prospects for Respondent's production and maintenance workers; within a November 21 letter, directed to Respondent's hourly employees, Fairless mentioned such a prospective UAW- sponsored meeting. Respondent's workers were told that UAW's promise not to file NLRB charges, should Respondent grant the suggested retroactive wage increase, "was nothing more than a crude attempt to trick and mislead you" because this Board could not give "assurances" that charges would not be filed. Respondent's director of industrial relations, further, declared that: If the Company could have given you these increases without violating Federal law, it would have done so directly-as a decision by the Company . . . The Company intends to obey Federal law. Unfortunately, for the time being, changes in wages and benefits will have to await proper negotiation with your elected representative, whoever that may be (as determined in the forthcoming NLRB election). Thereafter, within a November 22 letter directed to Frank R. Smith, UAW's counsel notified Respondent's corporate director of industrial relations of UAW's contention that, consistently with the statute' s intent, wage increases should neither be "given or withheld" for the purpose of influencing any worker's representation election vote. Smith was further told that: We have advised the Union that your letter of November 15, 1968, in which you concede that the retroactive wages and fringe benefits are due, requires that you give the wage increases at this time. Your failure to do so would itself be an unfair labor practice. We have further advised the Union that unless such adjustments are immediately made, that it is their obligation to file unfair labor practice charges for the protection of the production and maintenance employ- ees. Somewhat later, however, Paul Schrade, UAW's western regional director, within a December 9 letter to General Manager Gasich, repeated UAW's pledge that it would not file unfair labor practice charges or objections, with this Board, provided Respondent made effective promptly for all production, maintenance, and plant clerical workers those retroactive wage increases and fringe benefit changes which "certain office workers" had been granted. 12. The representation case decision Meanwhile, on November 29, the Board's Acting Regional Director had issued his Decision and Direction of Election in Case 31-RC-854; therein, determination was made that "all production and maintenance employees" working at Respondent's Newbury Park facility, with certain designated exclusion, constituted a unit appropriate for collective-bargaining purposes. With regard to some 30 so-called "grey area" classifications, determination was made that 22 should be considered compassed within the defined bargaining unit, while 8 were designated for exclusion therefrom. Shortly thereafter, during a Regional Office conference conducted on December 9, consensus was reached that the directed election would be conducted on Wednesday, December 18, at Respondent's Newbury Park facility. The following day, General Manager Gasich prepared a letter to Respondent's workers declaring his "deep personal interest" regarding the prospective election's outcome. Gasich noted, inter alia, that Respondent's wages and benefits "have always been very competitive" with other major aerospace companies. He commented further, however, that: Unfortunately, the current NLRB proceeding has held up the adjustments you would have received through negotiations in late summer of 1968. [Emphasis supplied. ] NORTHROP CORPORATION 187 Praising Respondent for leadership within the aerospace industry with regard to fringe benefit programs, wages and freedom from strikes, while reiterating his "personal concern" for Respondent's workers, Gasich went on to declare his position regarding UAW's representation claims. He noted, among other things, that: I would hate to see a new era dawn at our plant, in which a giant militant union like the UAW would constantly stir up distrust and try to pit us against each other . . . From my observation and talking with employees, you seem to feel the need for group representation. In the past, you have achieved this through your own independent union. I felt, until recently, that arrangement worked reasonably well .. . You want wages and benefits that are constantly improving and that are in line with what you could get elsewhere in this type of work. You want a pleasant, secure place to work, a place where you look forward to coming to work each morning. You want a good relationship, based on mutual respect. You want the problems and disputes that come up to be worked out promptly and fairly. I truly believe that these goals can be achieved without the drastic step of bringing the militant UAW into our atmosphere . . . I predict that you will choose your own independent union to represent you, rather than the UAW . . . This letter, so the parties stipulated, was mailed to the homes of all Respondent's Newbury Park production and maintenance workers, on or about the date which it bears. 13. NVEU's second recognition Meanwhile, however, within a letter dated December 2, NVEU President Means had notified Fairless that his organization represented a majority of Respondent's workers excluded from the prospective "P & M" bargaining unit, pursuant to the Acting Regional Director's Decision and Direction of Election; NVEU claimed that these excluded workers constituted an appropriate unit for collective-bargaining purposes, and demanded recognition as their statutory representative, based upon a card check conducted by some impartial third party. With his letter, Means submitted a list of 45 job classifications purportedly "released" by virtue of the Acting Regional Director's Decision. This list was subse- quently modified, substantially, under circumstances which will be noted hereinafter. On December 4, Fairless replied; NVEU's president was notified that Respondent could not recognize and bargain with his organization "unless you demonstrate that you represent a clear majority of employees" holding positions within the listed classifications. Respondent's director of industrial relations, however, declared Respondent's will- ingness to determine NVEU's majority status through card count procedures. The letter continued: In Exhibit "A" we have a question on several of the classifications listed which the Division considers confidential, and several classifications where the parties during the NLRB hearings stipulated to the inclusion of these employees in the Production and Maintenance Unit. Also, it is not immediately clear from your letter whether you propose to represent this new group of employees as part of your existing contract unit, or as a separate appropriate unit. If you will contact us at your earliest opportunity we will clarify these questions and arrange for the details of the necessary card count verification by an outside third party. NVEU was reassured that, should the cardcheck confirm its representative status, with respect to a clear majority of designated workers "either as part of an existing unit or as a separate appropriate unit" the Division's management would recognize and bargain with NVEU on their behalf. Thereafter, on December 5, Respondent requested a second minister, Reverend Le Breton, to perform the requisite cardcheck; he was supplied, that same day, with two company personnel rosters and NVEU designation cards. The minister was requested merely to check NVEU's cards against the printed rosters; he was never requested to verify the authenticity of workers' signatures on NVEU's submitted cards, nor was he supplied with data which would have facilitated such signature verification. Further, no request was made that he compare the job descriptions set forth on NVEU's cards against those listed for workers on Respondent's personnel roster. Reverend Le Breton was supplied with Respondent's previously prepared roster, listing "Group A" workers holding positions within the job classifications with respect to which NVEU had first claimed representation rights. Secondly, he was supplied with a further roster, which presumably listed "Group B" workers compassed within NVEU's new recognition and bargaining demand. The record shows that some names listed on the latter roster had previously been stricken, presumably pursuant to consen- sus. The names thus stricken were disregarded, while the minister was completing his cardcheck. The following day, December 6, Reverend Le Breton prepared a letter detailing his card count results; this letter was hand delivered to NVEU President Means, along with a company representative, at Respondent's Newbury Park facility. Therein, the minister reported that he had been supplied with a position roster containing a total of 258 names; that he had further been supplied with 176 signed designation cards; that 155 names listed on Respondent's position roster had been verified as card signers; and that this latter number constituted 60 percent of the total number of names listed. Subsequently, on December 10, Riggins, along with six NVEU representatives, signed an amended recognition agreement. Thereby, Respondent recognized NVEU's representative status for employees within two designated job classification lists. Respondent further agreed to meet with NVEU representatives for the purpose of commencing negotiations looking toward "appropriate amendment" with regard to their existing collective-bargaining agree- ment, concerning the accretion of so-called "Group B" workers under that contract. There were 17 job classifica- tions for which NVEU was, thus, newly recognized. As previously noted, NVEU's second recognition demand, when presented, had compassed 45 so-called "Group B" classifications. Sometime between December 2 and 5, however, consensus had been reached, presumably between Swift and NVEU's president that 25 of these 188 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD classifications should be stricken. Of those stricken, two classifications, area dispatcher and clerk, stock, were presumably stricken because the representation case parties had previously stipulated their inclusion within a production and maintenance bargaining unit ; five classifications, manufacturing order planner, manufacturing methods planner B, material planner, quality control planner senior, and metrology technician, were presumably stricken because the Acting Regional Director had specifically found them properly includable within the production and maintenance group. Five classifications were stricken despite the fact that the representation case parties had previously stipulated for their exclusion from the production and maintenance bargaining unit; two of these, duplicating machine operator (engineering) and timekeeper, clerk, were classifications compassed within the so-called "Group A" list for which NVEU had initially been recognized; three of the five, personnel record clerk, security clerk, and compensation and benefits assistant, were presumably stricken because Respondent considered them confidential workers. The further classifications stricken, 13 in number, were classifications with respect to which no mention whatever can be found within the Acting Regional Director's Decision and Direction of Election. NVEU's December 2 recognition demand, therefore, was finally limited to 20 classifications. The December 10 recognition agreement, however, as has been noted, compassed only 17 new classifications . Those deleted when the recognition agreement was signed were engineering drawing coordina- tor, which the Acting Regional Director had designated a production and maintenance classification, draftman, detail, and technical illustrator both of which had been covered within NVEU's first "Group A" recognition. The 17 job classifications with respect to which Respondent was, thus, newly conceding NVEU's represent- ative status compassed 6 classifications , development planner, junior buyer, and manufacturing control coordina- tor A,-plus three secretarial positions, regarding which the representation case parties had previously stipulated exclusion from any production and maintenance bargaining unit; these classifications, nevertheless, had not been listed in NVEU's first "Group A" recognition demand. The new list covered five classifications, procurement clerk, tool designer, and development laboratory technician, plus two research technician, electronics positions, which the Acting Regional Director had found properly excludable from a defined production and maintenance group; further, it compassed one classification, manufacturing control coordinator B, regarding which no decisional determina- tion had been made. There were, additionally, five classifications, logistic support specialist, and statistician, plus three broad clerical classifications with respect to which no definitive mention can be found within the Acting Regional Director's Decision and Direction of Election. The three clerical classification may, conceivably, have been listed for NVEU contract coverage mistakenly. The Acting Regional Director had listed several clerical categories, with comparable titles, as properly includable within Respondent's production and maintenance bargain- ing unit. One specialized category of statistician had been found properly excludable therefrom. Respondent's December 10 recognition, now under consideration, did not, however, cover three job classifica- tions which the Board's Acting Regional Director had found properly excludable from UAW's proposed prod- uction and maintenance bargaining group. These were clerk group---experimental fabrication, spares follow up, and statistician-productions projects group, specifically. These classifications had not been listed in NVEU's recognition demand for so-called "Group B" workers; the record provides no clue, however, regarding whatever reason there may have been for NVEU's failure to list them when presenting its second bargaining demand. Following Respondent management's extended recogni- tion, representatives of the parties present reached a consensus that NVEU's previously signed contract, with its retroactive wage increase provisions, would be thereafter construed to cover workers holding positions within the 17 newly-added job classifications previously noted. Respon- dent's negotiators were told, through NVEU's counsel, that the workers concerned had been most patient, but that management was being urged most strenuously to prepare and distribute their retroactive paychecks as soon as possible. Attorney Goldstein had concededly demanded during earlier bargaining sessions that any wage settlement reached should be retroactive, and that checks covering any retroactive payment should be issued as soon as possible following a contractual consensus. NVEU's counsel requested, further, that "everything possible" should be done to insure that Respondent's retroactive paychecks for covered workers would be issued before the scheduled representation election. Fairless replied, so I find, that the possibility of doing so would be investigated and that he would see "what could be done" regarding compliance with Goldstein's request. No firm committment was made. But Charles Hass, Respondent's director of general accounting and policy, did declare, either during this meeting or even afterwards, that it was his intent to get these retroactive checks to Respondent's concerned workers as soon as feasible and prior to the holidays. 14. Further preelection developments In a bulletin dated December 13, distributed to Respondent's production and maintenance workers, the division's management announced that "to encourage all eligible employees to vote" during the forthcoming representation election, every eligible employee voting would receive a ticket for a lottery drawing. Four merchandise prizes were to be awarded; the retail price which each would normally command was stated, and was compared with "one year's" UAW dues. When the election was held, subsequently, those workers who were present and eligible to cast ballots were provided by their supervisors with double-stub lottery chance tickets, with one stub marked for deposit within a receptacle or receptacles located in Respondent's manufacturing build- ing. The promised lottery drawing was held 1 day thereafter. The parties have stipulated that Respondent's bulletin, dealing with this subject, was not, however, mailed or NORTHROP CORPORATION 189 distributed to workers on sick leave or layoff, or otherwise absent from the plant. Nor were any provisions made whereby such workers would be provided with lottery chance tickets should they present themselves, directly, at designated polling places on the scheduled election date. December 13 was Respondent's regular payday. When the division's production and maintenance workers re- ceived their regular paychecks that day they likewise received a fictitious paycheck stub which contained a union dues deduction notation. This entry was specifically marked, with the following legend printed nearby: This is the approximate amount which the UAW would in all likelihood want us to deduct from your pay each and every month if the UAW represented you. You don't need to pay this amount to enjoy the benefits you have here. Vote against this UAW tax on your family earnings next Wed., Dec. 18, '68. The so-called "prize" lottery bulletin previously noted was followed, the next day, by a letter to Respondent's employees from General Manager Gasich, detailing "one of the biggest reasons" why he did not want UAW representation for Respondent's workers; the reference was to UAW's strike history, which Gasich summarized, supporting his summary with an attached BNA special project report listing UAW's strikes within a previous 2- year period, plus relevant reproductions from two UAW publications. Respondent's workers were reminded of certain possible consequences, should UAW make "unreasonable" demands which could only be "enforced" through strike action. In closing, Respondent's general manager noted once more his "hope" that Respondent's workers would vote against UAW thereafter. On Monday, December 16, Gasich delivered a speech to 2espondent's production and maintenance workers, gath- ;red within the Newbury Park facility's cafeteria. The speech was based, so I find, upon a prepared text, which Gasich had supplemented with certain marginal notes. The speech was delivered twice, during each of Respon- dent's two shifts. The present record contains testimony, regarding its content, primarily from day shift workers. This trier of fact is satisfied, however, that Respondent's general manager delivered substantially the same speech both times. First, the division's general manager reaffirmed Respon- dent's determination to honor its workers' choice; he declared that Respondent would bargain in good faith with whichever union they might select. Then, he denied that Northrop was antiunion, adding that: In a plant of this size, and with your past traditions, I think you will probably want to continue to have a union represent you. The question you will decide is: which one . . . I feel that selecting the UAW would be a very bad mistake [Emphasis in original]. Respondent's general manager referred once more to UAW's previous suggestion that Respondent grant wage increases before the election, but noted that organization's refusal to give any written "waiver" of charges, coupled with its failure to "get [Board] authority" regarding its suggestion. In this connection, Gasich further declared that: The UAW says the NVEU contract is so good that it should have defied the law and put it into effect for the Production and Maintenance employees as well. Then they go even further to say this will only be a "down- payment" on what the UAW will get if it is elected. Well, I would like to know why the Company should make one bargain with one group of my fellow employees, and a different bargain with another group. Douglas has 2 unions, and its contracts are almost identical. Why should I do differently? Respondent's general manager denied UAW contentions that Respondent was sponsoring NVEU's campaign; he declared that he would not "endorse" the latter organiza- tion. Nevertheless, he praised NVEU's leadership as "people who have negotiated with my staff in a constructive manner" fighting hard for what they thought was right, but without slandering Respondent or trying to tear it down. Gasich characterized the result as "the best contract and highest wages" in Northrop history. Conceding that Respondent's management was not perfect, and that the Division's Newbury Park facility had problems, Respon- dent's general manager noted, nevertheless, that the firm's "T & 0" workers had had many similar problems; that these problems had been discussed in bargaining negotia- tions; and that many had been "eliminated" by NVEU's contract. He decried the possibility that Respondent might find itself in a situation "where a militant union from Detroit like the UAW will try to bully the Company and create hostility" where none had existed previously. General Counsel has proffered testimony that Respon- dent's general manager, during the course of his speech, told each shift that, should UAW win the forthcoming election, it would get no better contract than NVEU had negotiated. This testimony, however, has not been credited. Sometimes a witness' personal "understanding" with regard to the thought purportedly conveyed by a speaker becomes his recollection of the spoken word. With due regard for the record, considered in totality, this trier of fact is satisfied that General Counsel's witnesses, in this connection, were merely placing their subjective gloss upon Gasich's conceded rhetorical comment that he could see no reason why Respondent should strike a bargain with one employee group and then make a different bargain with another group. Whether Gasich's conceded comment, however, should be considered, within its context, reasonably calculated to interfere with, restrain, or coerce Respon- dent's production and maintenance workers with respect to their exercise of statutorily-guaranteed rights will be considered, further, within this decision. The record contains further testimony, proffered by two witnesses, that Gasich, during his day-shift speech, stated Respondent would not be run by Detroit, and that, should UAW demand more than "he" could give, he would have no choice but to close the Newbury Park facility's doors. Respondent's general manager, however, denied any deviation, save in certain minor respects, from his written text. His denial is credited. Gasich's prepared text had previously been drafted, preliminarily, with knowledgeable professional help; Respondent's labor relations counsel, further, was present while his speeches were being delivered. When reviewed with due regard for these circumstances, General Counsel's proffered testimony that 190 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Respondent's general manager, willy-nilly, departed from his previously prepared remarks to project a crass, blatant, clearly proscribed threat strains credulity. Further, nothing within the present record would support a determination that Gasich, personally, possessed the requisite authority to make any plant-closure decision; lacking the power to do so, he would hardly have been likely, within my view, to proffer what could only have been considered a supereroga- tory comment. In closing, Respondent's general manager reaffirmed his desire to keep Newbury Park a good place to work; he requested the support of Respondent's workers in keeping out the "Detroit dominated" Petitioner-Complainant herein. Likewise, on December 16, Respondent's management distributed "Employee Change Notification Cards" to some 140 so-called "Group B" workers, with a note attached. The workers in question were told that their cards showed their new pay rates, resulting from the December 10 negotiations previously noted. They were further advised that their negotiated retroactive pay would be distributed "this week" pursuant to plan. The following day, December 17, Respondent's second round of retroactive paychecks was, indeed, distributed to these "Group B" workers. The date in question was not a regular payday. Retroactive checks for the first group of technical and office workers covered by Respondent's contract with NVEU previously negotiated had been distributed on Thursday and Friday, December 12 and 13; the latter date had been a regular payday for Respondent's workers. This distribution coincided, so I find, with NVEU's most ambitious and costly handbill distribution concerned with the forthcoming election; the handbill in question dealt, primarily, with Respondent's distribution of retroactive paychecks, and was headed with a notation that "P & M" workers would vote December 18 for theirs. Further, on December 17, Respondent distributed, to each Newbury Park production and maintenance worker eligible to vote, through their supervisors, an olive-green card picturing a simulated Federal Reserve Note with a $2,100 denomination. The card, likewise, listed 21 employ- ee "fringe" benefits. These were given a total stated value of $2,100 yearly equivalent to $1.13 per hour worked. Respondent's workers were, further, reminded, "Remember, most of these benefits were negotiated with your independent union" this legend being printed in large type. A review of the benefits listed reveals three; workmens compensation, unemployment compensation and social security, which derive from statutes. One, the rest period provision, derives from a statute, so far as Respondent's women workers are concerned, but constitutes a negotiated benefit for male employees. One, suggestion awards, designates a division sponsored program neither estab- lished pursuant to, nor confirmed by, contract. Six compass various facets of Respondent's unilaterally established group health and medical insurance program, which prior ONE and current NVEU contracts have merely incorporat- ed by reference. Three designate benefits which Respon- dent unilaterally provided, with mere contractual refer- ences thereto. Six denominate benefits previously negotiat- ed with ONE, and renegotiated with NVEU for Respon- dent's technical and office workers. One, bereavement pay, represents a fringe benefit newly-negotiated in NVEU's contract. Distributed at the same time and to the same employees was a genuine Federal Reserve Note in the sum of $1, to which Respondent's management had scotch taped 13 cents in coin. On the same date, Respondent's labor relations department distributed a further memorandum, detailing the history of a UAW-sponsored strike at Northrop Nortromcs' east coast precision products facility, and the consequent difficulties experienced by the UAW local concerned. 15. The election On December 18, the election was held. With approxi- mately 675 eligible voters, 629 cast ballots; of these, 260 were cast for UAW-Petitioner, 314 were cast for NVEU, and 12 were cast against both participating labor organiza- tions, while 43 were challenged. Since NVEU, thus, fell one vote short of bare majority designation, some disposition would have to be made with regard to challenged ballots. 16. Subsequent developments On December 24, before UAW's 5-working-days time limit for filing election objections had passed, Respondent distributed a so-called "Union Election Status Report" to Newbury Park workers through supervision. Therein, Fairless answered a purported series of worker's questions. Regarding the possibility of retroactive paychecks before Christmas, Fairless noted that Respondent could not properly commence negotiations with NVEU pending its formal certification; that UAW had 5 working days (which would run until the close of day on December 26) within which to file election objections; but that UAW could "eliminate this wait" by waiving its right to file. About Respondent's failure to grant a retroactive increase without waiting for the election results to become final, Fairless noted "some danger" that such unilateral conduct by management would be considered an unfair labor practice. Regarding a prospective contract with NVEU, however, Fairless reiterated, among other things, Respondent's previously-stated belief that, with regard to wage and benefit provisions, it would not be right to negotiate one bargain with one group of employees and a different bargain with another. Thereafter, within a January 2, 1969, bulletin distributed to Respondent's workers, General Manager Gasich pointed out that UAW's previously filed battery of election objections and charges would stop Respondent from "negotiating an improved contract" with NVEU for production and maintenance workers. He characterized Complainant-Petitioner's position as "this attempt by the UAW to punish Northrop Ventura Employees for voting against the UAW, "further declaring that the designated organization was "trying to take from you the fruits of your vote, injure the Company and deprive the hourly employees of an improved new contract " Respondent's workers were reassured, however, that, should these pending matters not NORTHROP CORPORATION 191 be promptly resolved, the division would do "whatever is necessary" to protect its economic well-being and that of its employees. Within a followup bulletin dated January 24, Gasich, once more characterized UAW's currently pending objec- tions and charges as "road blocks in the path of negotiations" belying its claimed interest in making retroactive wage and benefit increases available to Respondent's hourly-paid workers. On February 25, however, Respondent's general manager did announce that wage and fringe benefit adjustments would be made effective for Respondent's production and maintenance workers. His announcement was confirmed within a bulletin dated and distributed February 27; therein the designated wage and fringe benefit adjustments were described in detail. As described, they were subsequently made effective March 3, 1969, retroactive to August 19, 1968. The designated adjustments compassed a general 6.4 percent wage increase, along with special skills adjustments, retroactive to the designated date, plus a number of fringe benefit changes promulgated prospectively. Issues With matters in this posture, General Counsel's Consoli- dated Complaint, herein, presents a number of closely related questions. Specifically, General Counsel, with UAW support, presently contends, while Respondent herein, with NVEU's concurrence, vigorously denies: 1. That Respondent committed Section 8(a)(1), (2) and (3) violations when it recognized NVEU as bargaining representative for a group of Newbury Park technical and office workers and when it negotiated and subsequently gave effect to a collective-bargaining contract with that organization containing union security and checkoff provisions drafted to cover such workers since all this had been done while ONE, with its substantial claim to continued representation of Respondent's technical and office workers, was raising a real question concerning their representation. 2. That Respondent's management-for the dual purpose of countering UAW's campaign to win representation rights for Newbury Park production and maintenance workers, and concurrently securing NVEU's entrenchment as their bargaining representa- tive, actively supported the latter organization's repre- sentation campaign: (a) by publicizing various written and oral announcements reasonably calculated to reveal its representational preference; (b) by notifying its production and maintenance workers that, through NVEU's negotiations with Respondent, they had been granted an improved Thanksgiving holiday schedule; (c) by granting retroactive wage and fringe benefit adjustments to Respondent's technical and office workers, with respect to whom NVEU's representative status had been recognized, while concurrently notify- ing its Newbury Park production and maintenance workers that comparable increases and benefit adjust- ments could not be granted them because of UAW's campaign; (d) by notifying Respondent's production and maintenance workers that, even should they vote for UAW representation, Respondent would not negotiate wage and benefit changes, with that labor organization, more favorable than those already provided in NVEU's current contract; (e) by distribut- ing retroactive paychecks to technical and office workers whom NVEU purportedly represented 1 day before the scheduled representation vote for Respon- dent's production and maintenance workers; and (f) by declaring that retroactive wage increases for these production and maintenance workers would be with- held, thereafter, pending a final resolution of represent- ation questions which UAW's petition and subsequent filings had previously raised. 3. That Respondent's management, during this pen- od, refused to allow ONE President Kniffen permission to devote his full working time to administering ONE's contract, because he and his organization were purportedly failing and refusing to support Respon- dent's effort calculated to counter UAW's organization- al campaign within Newbury Park's production and maintenance bargaining group. Considerable testimony and documentary material will be found, within the present record, proffered both to support and rebut UAW's contention that for various reasons the representation election result herein should be vacated. With respect to certain conduct charged to Respondent's management and various lower-level supervisors, in this connection determinations could conceivably be consid- ered warranted that unfair labor practices were committed. Respondent's counsel, however, strenuously contends that UAW's presentation, specifically proffered in support of its representation case objections herein, cannot properly be considered a predicate for unfair labor practice determina- tions beyond those which General Counsel's Consolidated Complaint, fairly construed, would require. To forestall the possibility that supplementary unfair labor practice find- ings might be made, counsel moved, while the present hearing was in progress, that UAW's testimonial presenta- tion should be completely precluded, since "otherwise" the Complainant Union-Petitioner would be permitted to prosecute, under the guise of proving its basis for objections, further unfair labor practices which General Counsel had not, herein, set forth to plead and prove. This motion, when made, was rejected; my determination with respect thereto is reaffirmed. Respondent's counsel has, however, been reassured that UAW's record presentation, specifically that portion proffered to support its representa- tion case objections herein, would not be considered a basis for supplementary unfair labor practice determinations, beyond those required to resolve General Counsel's specific contentions, fairly pleaded. 192 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Review and Conclusions A. Respondent's Conduct Affecting Technical and Office Workers 1. Respondent's decision to grant NVEU recognition a. Was respondent confronted with substantial rival claims? Comparatively few principles can be considered more firmly established, within the field of labor relations law than the statutory obligation of concerned employers to maintain positions of strict neutrality when faced with conflicting representation claims presented by two or more rival unions, which have created a real question concerning representation, within a unit appropriate for collective- bargaining purposes. Midwest Piping & Supply Company, Inc., 63 NLRB 1060. Decisional doctrine, first formulated within the cited case and reaffirmed since with judicial concurrence, teaches that firms confronted with such conflicting representation claims violate Section 8(a)(2) and (1), should they recognize or negotiate a contract with a concerned labor organization before its right to be recognized has been determined finally under those special procedures which the statute provides. The concept of neutrality with which we are here concerned, however, necessarily derives from a preliminary determination that rival representation claims have, indeed, given rise to some real representation questions. And decisional doctrine teaches, in this respect, that the filing of a formal representation petition by one or more of the rival claimants, something never undertaken herein, so far as Respondent's technical and office workers are concerned, may not be considered a sine qua non with respect to raising a genuine representation question. Novak Logging Compa- ny, 119 NLRB 1573, 1574, fn. 4, and cases therein cited; Compare American Bread Company, 170 NLRB No. 20, in this connection. Most significant, rather, is the character of the rival claim. The present record, within my view, clearly warrants a determination that the situation which Respondent con- fronted on August 19, with respect to conflicting represent- ation claims for Newbury Park's technical and office workers, commanded strict neutrality. Further, well settled decisional doctrine dictates a conclusion, within my view, that Respondent's duty to maintain such neutrality was, herein, breached. First: There can be no doubt that, when ONE's contract terminated and notice regarding NVEU's recognition demand reached management, Respondent was confronted with rival labor organizations. The division's counsel contends, with NVEU's vigorous support, that when ONE's contract ended and Respondent's contractual obligations with respect to dues checkoff for that organization ceased, nothing remained but a shell, lacking any desire or capacity to deal further with Respondent's management as collec- tive-bargaining representative for Newbury Park's so-called "T & 0" workers. The contention must be rejected. True, ONE's leadership had formally declared their organiza- tion's refusal to contest UAW's representation claim, but merely with respect to Respondent's production and maintenance workers. That decision, following hard upon some lengthy discussion within ONE's directorate, disputa- tion, and division within the organization's membership, consultation with legal counsel, and participation in UAW's vigorously contested representation case proceed- ing, had clearly disenchanted many ONE members, sparking NVEU's formation meanwhile. No concrete steps looking toward ONE's formal dissolution had, however, been taken. During the organization's July membership meeting, Treasurer Leonard Estes did declare that a court would decide the disposition of whatever money might be left in the treasury following the forthcoming "P & M" represent- ation vote. So far as the record shows, however, this was merely a personal statement. ONE's bylaws provide that "all corporate powers" shall be exercised by the organiza- tion's board of directors; these powers would presumably compass, among others, the power to vote dissolution. Respondent's management had been notified, in ONE's June 17 letter, that the latter did "intend to sign" whatever contract might result from forthcoming negotiations, after the UAW's representation case, then pending before the Board's Regional Director herein, was settled; no formal notice disavowing that intention was subsequently sent or received. True, Respondent's management representatives did receive various hearsay reports and rumors, coupled with statements from concerned workers, between June 13 and August 19 specifically, that ONE would not contest UAW's representation claim within a bargaining unit confined to production and maintenance workers; that some workers were curious regarding "what would happen" with respect to ONE's treasury, should that organization cease to function; and that President Kniffen had characterized their August 16 membership meeting as ONE's last. No factual determination would be warranted, however, that Respondent's management ever learned, from presumptively authoritative sources, that ONE's dissolution or disbandment, de jure or de facto, was contemplated. The reverse, rather, was true. Within President Kniffen's August 15 letter, Respondent was told that ONE would continue to represent "all of its members" beyond their contract's termination date, so far as law might permit. This statement of purpose was reaffirmed, so I have found, during ONE's August 19 conference with Respondent's management representatives. No one pres- ent, so far as the record shows, then raised any question whatsoever regarding ONE's continued viability. Rather, ONE's so-called "residual vested rights" with regard to processing certain still unresolved grievances, were tacitly conceded. And in Counsel Powell's August 19 letter, dispatched to ONE's president, those residual vested rights were specifically acknowledged; the organization's willing- ness and capacity to function were nowhere questioned. With matters in this posture, Respondent's present contention, that management had reasonable grounds to consider ONE legally "defunct" following the develop- ments noted herein, merits characterization as strained. Second: Respondent's management was, indeed, con- fronted with conflicting claims, regarding the representa- tion of Newbury Park's technical and office workers. NORTHROP CORPORATION 193 NVEU's claim, defined within its August 16 letter, was patent; we are concerned, herein, with ONE's demand for continued recognition. That demand, with respect to divisional workers not compassed, presumptively, within the bargaining unit defined in UAW's recently filed representation petition, had certainly been subsumed, though not specifi- cally presented, in Kniffen's June 17 letter. During the parties' June 27 conference, further, ONE's demand had, likewise, been prefigured. Previously, within this decision, Kniffen's June 26 comment regarding his organization's desire to represent Respondent's so-called "T & 0" workers, and to begin contract negotiations in their behalf, has been characterized as precatory and conditional. The record will not, within my view, really support General Counsel's contention that Kniffen was, then, definitively claiming ONE still repre- sented a specifically designated group of technical and office workers; Respondent's director of industrial relations was being told, rather, that ONE's leadership planned to predicate such a claim, thereafter, upon newly-signed designation cards. Conceivably, some contention might be made post facto, that Kniffen lacked any properly cognizable right to make such a representation, since the designation card campaign then underway had rank-and- file sponsorship; the fact remains, however, that ONE's desire to maintain its representative status for technical and office workers was reaffirmed. And Fairless' reply, previously noted, reflects Respon- dent's tacit concession , within my view, that, should ONE, thereafter, present a definite, properly-grounded, recogni- tion demand covering technical and office workers, the requested recognition might be granted. By August 15, however, following NVEU's formation, ONE's recognition demand could no longer be predicated upon signed designation cards; the rank-and-file group responsible for their circulation had long since shifted course, becoming NVEU supporters. Nevertheless, Kniffen's August 15 letter, previously noted, reiterated ONE's "present inten- tion to continue to represent those of our members" who might be excluded from a prospective bargaining unit limited to Respondent's production and maintenance workers. And this demand, so I have found, was verbally reaffirmed when ONE representatives confronted Respon- dent's management, during their August 19 conference. The present record, within my view, fully warrants a conclusion , therefore, that ONE's finally formulated position constituted a specific demand for recognition, timely and properly presented, with respect to Respon- dent's workers, previously compassed within a bargaining unit which ONE had historically represented, who would presumably be denied representation within the bargaining unit with respect to which UAW was seeking certification. Third: The group of workers with which we are now concerned, subsumed generally within the designation "technical and office workers" quoted throughout this Decision, clearly constituted and still constitute a unit appropriate for collective-bargaining purposes. General Counsel, within his Consolidated Complaint, so contends; Respondent and NVEU, within their respective responsive pleadings, so concede. Well-established decisional doctrine teaches that con- flicting claims by rival labor organizations give rise to real questions concerning representation only when they concern workers within units which may properly be deemed appropriate for collective-bargaining purposes. See William Penn Broadcasting Co., 93 NLRB 1104, 1106, in this connection. These workers, save for certain secretarial classifications with respect to which ONE had never previously been granted representational rights, constituted the complete residual group, previously compassed within the historical bargaining unit herein, which would presumptively be denied representation within a bargaining unit limited to Newbury Park's production and maintenance workers. When ONE's contract terminated, some classifications, ("Group A"), which would fall within this residual group were known; their exclusion from a prospective production and maintenance unit had been stipulated during the recently completed representation case hearing. Regional Office determinations regarding the prospective unit placement of some 30 so-called "gray area" classifications, ("Group B"), were pending. With respect to both groups, however, ONE's timely demand for continued recognition was comprehensive; no differentiation in Northrop-Ventu- ra's response was requested. NVEU did demand, in its August 16 letter, immediate recognition as collective- bargaining representative for Respondent's workers hold- ing "Group A" classifications, while proffering a deferred request, with respect to "Group B" workers, which Respondent would be expected to grant following that group's final definition. There can be no doubt, neverthe- less, that NVEU's request for two-step recognition reflected no subdivided unit concept, but derived from presumptive- ly practical considerations merely. Throughout the period with which this case is concerned, so I find, the latter organization did consider both groups within a single appropriate bargaining unit with respect to which "Group B" classifications would constitute a so-called "accretion" when ultimately designated. With matters in this posture, we reach the most significant question which this phase of General Counsel's case presents: Did ONE's claim for continued recognition, when countered by NVEU's card-supported representa- tional claims herein, create a real question concerning representation? This Board has held that: an employer does not violate the Act by extending recognition to one of the competing unions where the rival union's claim is clearly unsupportable or specious, or otherwise not a colorable claim... . Under such circumstances, so the Board has declared, no real question concerning representation can be found. The Boy's Markets, Inc., 156 NLRB 105, 107; The Sinclair Manufacturing Company, 178 NLRB No. 29. That situation, so counsel for both Respondent and NVEU contend, must be considered present here. Supporting his contention that ONE's claim should be considered substantial rather than specious, General Counsel notes, first, that organization's contractually "incumbent" status when its claim for recognition, with which we are here concerned, was initially presented. It is well settled, so General Counsel contends, that contractual- ly incumbent labor organizations, as such, have 194 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD "substantial" claims to representation . Air Master Corpora- tion: 142 NLRB 181 , 188; see, particularly, cases cited at fn. 35 there. He would rest, presumably, upon ONE's recent contractually recognized status, which no one herein disputes. Recent Board decisions within this field of law, however, suggest that mere contractual incumbency status, current or recent, may no longer render a representation claim, per se, substantial. The Sinclair Manufacturing Company, supra; Teramana Brothers Coal Mining Company, 173 NLRB No. 93; White Front Sacramento, Inc., 166 NLRB No. 29; The Boy's Markets, Inc., supra. When representation claims derive from a currently effective contract, such claims must be rationally supportable and, therefore, colorable. Compare White Front Sacramento with Boy's Markets in this connection . With respect to claims deriving from recently terminated contracts, or from certifications not followed by contractual recognition during the certification year thereafter, some current "representative interest" must still be present. Such a putative representational interest, however, requires no showing of majority status. Compare Teramana Brothers and Sinclair Manufacturing, previously cited. The record herein, clearly, presents the situation last designated. Upon due consideration, nevertheless, this trier of fact is satisfied that ONE's representative interest within the so-called "T & 0" group during the crucial period which preceded and directly followed its contract termination, though General Counsel may not, properly , bottom his contentions with respect thereto upon the organization 's recent contractual incumbency merely, has been , prima facie, demonstrated. That demonstration , within my view, derives from a rebuttable presumption of continued representative inter- est, buttressed with positive testimony, which Respondent and NVEU have not persuasively rebutted. When a contractual incumbent labor organization, whether previously certified or merely recognized , charges a respondent-employer with a refusal to negotiate regarding a replacement contract, this Board has consistently held that, absent special circumstances , the complainant union enjoys a nonrebuttable presumption that its majority status continues for 1 year from any relevant certification date. Thereafter , the presumption is rebuttable ; but the con- cerned respondent-employer, before he can win a determi- nation that his refusal to bargain was lawful, must demonstrate by objective considerations that he has some reasonable grounds for belief that the majority of workers within the bargaining unit no longer desire union representation . Nu-Southern Dyeing & Finishing, Inc., 179 NLRB No. 96, fn. 1; Terrell Machine Co., 173 NLRB No. 230, enfd . 73 LRRM 2381 (C.A. 4); Valleydale Packers, Inc., 162 NLRB 1486, enfd . 482 F .2d 768 (C.A. 5); Laystrom Manufacturing Co., 151 NLRB 1482, 1484, enforcement denied on other grounds, 359 F.2d 799 (C.A. 7). See also N. L.R.B. v. The Frick Company, 73 LRRM 2889 (C.A. 3); N.L.R.B. v. Gallaro Brothers, 73 LRRM 2043 (C.A. 2); N.L.R.B. v. The Little Rock Downtowner, Inc., 414 F.2d 1084 (C.A. 8); N.L.R.B. v. Gulfmont Hotel Company, 362 F.2d 588 (C.A. 5). Cf. United States Gypsum Company, 157 NLRB 652; Celanese Corporation ofAmerica,95 NLRB 664, 671-673. The burden of proof , therefore, regarding any contention that such reasonable grounds for belief were present, necessarily falls upon the respondent-employer charged. Further, the respondent-employer charged must show that the complaintant union lost its majority status within a factual context free of employer conduct calculated to cause disaffection. See Fremont Newspapers, Inc., 176 NLRB No. 63 Firestone Synthetic Rubber & Lattex Company, 173 NLRB No. 179, in this connection. The Board's policy, underlying this long and unbroken line of precedent, has been persuasively stated: Were employers considered free to withdraw recognition from a contractual incumbent union pursuant to their unrestricted discretion, without any requirement that they demonstrate some reasonable factual basis for doubting that union's contin- ued support, long established bargaining relationships, and the collective rights of workers derived from them could be groundlessly interrupted, while as a direct result, industrial peace could be seriously jeopardized. Regarding the present consolidated case, this Board's previously noted decisional doctrine, that a contractual incumbent's continued representation claims merit a respondent-employer's consideration as substantial despite the fact that they may have been countered with timely presented rival claims, derives from comparable policy considerations. The doctrine, therefore, may reasonably be considered bottomed upon a comparable rebuttable presumption. And, consistently, the decisional principle comparably relevant herein may, within my view, reason- ably be restated as follows: Employers confronted with conflicting representation claims within units appropriate for collective-bargaining purposes, where one claim reflects a contractual incumbent's demand for continued recogni- tion, may not lawfully undertake to resolve for themselves, questions with regard to representation raised thereby, particularly by recognizing the contractual incumbent's rival, unless their resolutions take place within a context free of unfair labor practices, and unless such resolutions are supported by demonstrably objective considerations sufficient to provide reasonable grounds for belief that the contractual incumbent no longer possesses a properly cognizable representative interest within the bargaining group concerned. Compare Shea Chemical Corporation, 121 NLRB 1027, 1029. Measured by this standard, Respondent herein has not, within my view, sustained its burden; the "presumption of continued representative interest" for which General Counsel really herein contends has not been persuasively countered. Respondent contends, substantially, that ONE herein, during the period with which we are now concerned, possessed no properly cognizable representative interest because it was, realistically moribund or defunct. The record, however, will not support such a conclusion. True, some Newbury Park workers may have publicly verbalized their concern regarding the possibility that ONE's leader- ship might consider winding up that organization's affairs. Such concern, however, derived so the record shows from nothing more than speculative projections, based upon statements made during June 1968 membership meetings, that ONE would not "fight" UAW's representation claim covering production and maintenance workers, coupled with further statements by ONE's attorney suggesting that, within his view, residual technical and office workers would NORTHROP CORPORATION 195 no longer be represented. Further, these expressions of concern though some may have been voiced by ONE officers or directors, were nonofficial. When ONE's contract was terminated, that document's union-security and checkoff provisions did, likewise, become inoperative; as a result, the organization did, concededly, lose previously assured financial support. Whether it lost members may be a disputable question. ONE's bylaws designate weekly dues payments as that organization's sole membership obligation. However, no automatic suspension for dues delinquency is prescribed. Nonpayment of dues merely constitutes a ground for charges; such charges, following a hearing, may constitute a basis for suspension or expulsion. Thus, despite my determination, previously noted, that President Kniffen did not specifically promise ONE's members any dues amnesty during the August 16 meeting their retention of member- ship status regardless of their possible failure to maintain future dues payments seems to be theoretically possible. For present purposes, the question need not be decided. Nevertheless, the fact remains that until ONE's contract termination date all Newbury Park's technical and office workers, within the contract unit, remained paid-up ONE members. Further, the record shows that some ONE members, albeit a small number, did pay their September dues voluntarily. Thereafter, beginning on September 11, after a September 5 NVEU-sponsored distribution of forms drafted to constitute ONE membership resignations, President Kniffen received merely 80 signed resignation forms from some 790 workers, within the comprehensive bargaining unit for which ONE had previously been recognized . No more than 19 of these, so Kniffen credibly testified, were received from workers holding "T & 0" job classifications. ONE's board of directors continued to meet, albeit somewhat irregularly and without formality. Follow- ing a 4-month lapse, further membership meetings were scheduled and held. New officers were nominated and duly designated; though certain proper steps, prescribed in connection therewith, may not have been taken in timely fashion, the process was, finally, completed. Most signifi- cantly, however, Respondent' s management did continue to deal with ONE's leadership following NVEU's recogni- tion while processing to conclusion three grievances which had still not been resolved by ONE's August 18 contract termination date. With matters in this posture, Respondent can hardly contend, persuasively, that ONE, throughout the period with which we are now concerned, clearly lacked any representative interest among Newbury Park's techni- cal and office workers. Respondent's further contention, that no real question concerning representation remained pending, when NVEU was first granted recognition, because any such question which might have been present had been completely resolved by Reverend Rehnberg's cardcheck, must likewise be rejected, for several reasons. First: Respondent's claim misconceives the nature of the present litigation. We are not concerned, herein, with a majority issue, but with a possible assistance question. The gravamen of General Counsel's present charge is that Respondent's management, themselves, unlawfully deter- mined the majority issue concerning its so-called "T & 0" workers in the face of ONE's timely presented claim for continued recognition. If respondent-employers find them- selves confronted with rival claims sufficient to establish a real question concerning representation, the majority issue can only be resolved, properly, following the free choice of the workers concerned, revealed through a secret ballot. The quantity or quality of whatever alternative evidence Respondent may have chosen to rely upon, therefore, lacks relevancy; the presentation of rival claims by ONE and NVEU makes their validity the very question at issue, and not something which Respondent can, on its own, determine. See Peter Paul, Inc., Case 20-CA-5000, (TXD.) in this connection. Second: Respondent's contention really begs the ques- tion. Since NVEU did, so counsel' s argument runs, produce a designation card majority, finally, within a truncated group of technical and office workers with "Group A" classifications, determination should be considered war- ranted that no real question concerning representation, with respect to Respondent's technical and office workers, had previously been presented. The record shows, however, that ONE's August 15 representation claim reached Fairless before NVEU's recognition demand; Counsel Powell's August 19 reply, which specifically rejected ONE's claim for Newbury Park's technical and office workers, bottoming that rejection upon purportedly "reliable information" which indicated that a so-called vast majority of the workers' group designated had become NVEU supporters and no longer desired ONE representation, was, concededly, dispatched before any consensus whatever regarding the card count procedure, upon which Respon- dent would now rely, had been reached. Respondent's purportedly "reliable information" relative to NVEU's majority status, then, derived from nothing more than Attorney Goldstein's flamboyant production of some 500 signed designation cards during the previously concluded representation case hearing, coupled with his challenging declaration that such cards would demonstrate NVEU's majority status within "any unit" which might be found appropriate, therein, for collective-bargaining purposes. Nothing within the present record, however, would warrant a conclusion that NVEU's July 22 stack of designation cards compassed a majority of Respondent's technical and office employees, working on that date, or that Respon- dent's management had reasonable grounds for belief that it did compass such a majority. Before Reverend Rehn- berg's card-check, so far as the record shows, these cards had never been reviewed, segregated, or counted on the basis of their "P & M" or "T & 0" classifications. This trier of fact notes, further, that NVEU's cards were produced in connection with a representation proceeding wherein the scope of UAW's proposed production and maintenance bargaining unit would be determined. Within such a context, Goldstein's claim, previously noted, was really nothing more than a claim that NVEU's cards would compass a worker majority within any conceivable "P & M" group which might be found appropriate, thereafter, for collective-bargaining purposes. Confronted with Goldstein's declaration, which inciden- tally, was made off the record, ONE's president, so far as the record shows, said nothing. Respondent's counsel 196 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD would have this Board deduce from Kniffen's silence that ONE could not have challenged Goldstein's claim. Further, so counsel's argument runs, those present when the claim was made were privileged to conclude, from Kniffen's silence, that NVEU's majority status was being, sub silentio, conceded. This line of argument, however, fails to persuade. Within the context of formal representation proceedings concerned with production and maintenance workers, ONE's president faced neither a legal nor practical necessity to counter Goldstein's declaration. His silence, therefore, reflected no concession. Further, such silence, maintained despite Goldstein's broadly-stated majority claim regarding a prospective production and maintenance unit, could not, reasonably, have been considered a tacit concession that NVEU, likewise, represented a majority of Respondent's technical and clerical workers. With matters in this posture, Respondent's contention that any "question concerning representation" which the rival claims herein may conceivably have raised became fully resolved before NVEU was recognized can hardly be deemed persuasive. Third: Respondent's contention, that NVEU's proffered "Group A" designation cards, when cross-checked with reference to relevant personnel rosters, resolved the representation question, lacks merit. This Board has noted several times that dual designations are common when two labor organizations are competing for representative status; with respect to such situations, the Board has held that designation cards constitute a notoriously unreliable method for determining a labor organization's majority status. Midwest Piping and Supply Company, supra, p. 1070; Sunbeam Corporation, 99 NLRB 546, 551; Novak Logging Company, supra, 1574-1575. Further, this Board has held, specifically, that, with respect to competing union situa- tions, the numerical percentage of workers which one of the contending labor organizations purportedly represents does not foreclose the existence of a real representation dispute, so as to privilege a premature recognition. See Higgins Industries, Inc., 150 NLRB 106, 119. The present record, particularly, calls for such a determination, within my view. Respondent, though on notice that ONE and NVEU were rivals with respect to so-called "T & 0" representation, made no effort to determine ONE's representative status; NVEU was, however, recognized, pursuant to Reverend Rehnberg's card count, without a question raised regarding the authenticity of that organization's proffered card signatures. See Teramana Brothers Coal Mining Company, 173 NLRB No. 93 in this connection. Fourth: Respondent's management, so I have found, cannot realistically claim reasonable justification for its presumptive view that NVEU's designation cards clearly reflected their signers' desire to be represented by that organization, within a separate bargaining unit limited to so- called technical and office workers. Within his brief, UAW's counsel notes cogently that NVEU was first organized during July 1968 specifically for the purpose of challenging UAW's representation claims, within a prod- uction and maintenance worker's unit which had not yet been specifically defined. Further, NVEU's designation cards seem to have been solicited, principally, before the concept of separate representation for technical and office workers clearly developed. President Kniffen's patent June 26 comment regarding this possibility has previously been noted. The conception, however, does not seem to have been widely shared. There can be no doubt that Respondent's rank-and-file workers, then busily soliciting ONE designation cards, were really desirous of preserving a single, plant-wide, unit with both "P & M" and "T & 0" workers compassed therein. With matters in this posture, there can be no doubt that Respondent's workers, when they were solicited to sign NVEU designation cards, were essentially being requested to signify their desire for representation through a local, independent union, rather than some national labor organization. NVEU's cards, therefore, could not reason- ably have been construed as revealing their rejection of ONE representation within a conceivable bargaining unit limited to technical and office workers. Certainly, Respon- dent's management could not realistically consider such cards reliably reflective of Newbury Park worker prefer- ences, choosing between NVEU and ONE particularly. In short, Respondent's management could not, reasonably, consider NVEU's cards "reliable information" sufficient to resolve the specific representation question concerning "T & 0" workers with which they were confronted. Respondent contends, further, that Newbury Park's management was privileged to consider ONE's claim "clearly unsupportable or specious" because it was really nothing more than a calculated ploy conceived pursuant to UAW's suggestion; proffered without a hope that recogni- tion would be granted; relegated to limbo promptly thereafter without serious protest; and revived subsequent- ly merely to provide collateral support for UAW's currently pressed representation election contest. These contentions, within my view, lack merit. First: I note that ONE's August 15 claim letter antedated NVEU's recognition demand; the present record, further, will not support determination that ONE's letter was drafted or sent merely to counter some foreseen or foreseeable NVEU recognition demand covering technical and office workers herein. Respondent's counsel, therefore, can hardly con- tend, persuasively, that ONE's claim was proffered merely to forestall some prospective NVEU success. Second: Respondent cannot contend responsibly that ONE's previously revealed posture warranted management's rejection of Kniffen's August 15 letter as nothing more than sham. In this connection, of course, Respondent presuma- bly would have this Board note the remarks of Attorney Friedman during ONE's two June membership meetings; Friedman did suggest, first, that ONE'S membership, within his view, would be well advised not to contest UAW's representation campaign for production and maintenance workers, and, secondly, that following ONE's contract termination the division's technical and clerical workers would, presumably, go unrep- resented. The record, however, will clearly warrant a conclusion that Friedman's last noted remark reflected his legal opinion merely; no decision, chargeable to ONE's leadership, reveals any formal relinquishment of that organization's claim to represent so-called "T & 0" workers. President Kniffen's June 27 comment, rather, NORTHROP CORPORATION 197 suggests his readiness to proceed, via the petition route, for the purpose of establishing ONE's majority status; the fact that ONE thereafter shifted the stated basis upon which it was claiming representative status does not, within my view, warrant a determination that the claim, when presented finally, was totally lacking in substance. Third.- Though, concededly, ONE filed no petition for certifica- tion, covering a proposed bargaining unit of technical and office workers, following Respondent's August 19 rebuff, such a failure to file provides no persuasive support for Respondent's retrospective contention that ONE's presi- dent had knowingly proffered a baseless claim. Previously, within this decision, reference has been made to well settled doctrine that a claimant organization's failure to file a petition for certification will not preclude a determination regarding the presence of a real question concerning representation. Higgins Industries, Inc., supra, Air Master Corporation, supra,, Novak Logging Company, supra. Re- spondent's management representatives, therefore, cannot claim privilege with respect to their rejection of ONE's repeated recognition demand, merely because no petition for certification followed. Within his brief, General Counsel notes cogently that Respondent's management, itself, could have readily called into play the statutory election machinery. See N.L.R.B. v. Signal Oil and Gas Company, 303 F.2d 785, 788 (C.A. 5), fn. 3, in this connection. Therein the court noted that: An employer who is faced by rival claims can both protect himself from possible unfair labor practice findings and speedily bring an end to the stalemate in the. bargaining process, for Section 9(cXl) of the Act empowers him to file a petition for an election under such circumstances.... Furthermore, until the Board determines that a question concerning representation does not exist, an employer faced with "possible legal jeopardy under the Midwest Piping doctrine" can refuse to bargain with the incumbent union without violating its duty to bargain under Section 8(a)(5). Respondent, therefore, lacks requisite standing to com- plain, currently, that ONE's failure to file a representation petition herein reflected some consciousness that a recognition claim bottomed upon representative interest would be found lacking in substantiality. In this connection, Respondent contends, further, that ONE's more recent history retrospectively reveals the specious quality suffusing the organization's August 15/August 19 claims for continued recognition. The present record, however, does not, when considered in totality, support Respondent's position. True: documentary eviden- ce, together with testimony, has been proffered which would probably warrant determinations that President Kniffen, when told that Respondent's management would recognize NVEU following its first recognition demand, made no protest; that he never, thereafter, reiterated ONE's claim,; that ONE's leadership lodged no subsequent protest when Respondent's management committee, together with NVE1J's representatives, began contract negotiations; that no gauntlet was thrown, or question raised, either when NVEU's contract was consummated or when it was later revised. Further, determination might well be considered warranted that ONE's regular monthly membership meetings were thereafter suspended ; that voluntary dues collections fell off significantly ; that ONE's treasury dwindled. The record, fairly construed, likewise suggests possible determinations that ONE's chief steward was never directed to continue servicing Respondent 's technical and office workers, and that ONE's postcontract financial disbursement reflects no significant representative func- tions discharged . Nevertheless, Respondent's management representatives cannot contend , persuasively, that these subsequent developments, suggesting ONE's drift toward innocuous desuetude provided their reasonable ground for belief that ONE's claim, when made, lacked any good-faith justification. Further, conceding, for argument's sake, that ONE's postcontract course did reflect a significant loss of vitality, responsibility for such loss must, within my view, largely be laid at Respondent's door. Having rejected ONE's claim for continued recognition with respect to Newbury Park's technical and office workers , Respondent's management necessarily deprived that organization's leadership of whatever raison d'etre their claim had been calculated to preserve. Respondent cannot, therefore, reasonably contend now that post hoc developments with respect to which it may properly be held responsible retrospectively validate its prior conduct, challenged herein. With matters in this posture, determination is found warranted that Respondent herein, when it granted NVEU recognition as collective-bargaining representative for a designated group of technical and office workers, and when it negotiated and maintained a collective-bargaining contract with that organization covering the workers designated at a time when ONE by virtue of its substantial "representative interest" claim had raised a real question concerning representation, violated Section 8(a)(1) and (2) of the Act, as amended. b. Was NVEU granted recognition within a proper unit? This Board has held that rival representation claims, when presented, create no duty to refrain from selfhelp with respect to their resolution unless they possess a character and timeliness which raises a real question concerning representation. William Penn Broadcasting Company, supra. And within the cited case , the Board noted, in this connection, that: The existence of such a question concerning representa- tion is determinable by applying the same criteria, contemplated in Section 9 of the Act , that are uniformly applied by the Board in finding a "question of representation" before proceeding to an election. One of the essential elements for a determination that such a "question" exists is that the petitioning union , seeking to displace an incumbent, assert its claim to an appropriate unit of employees. [Emphasis in original.] The decision quoted, therefore, concludes that employer- respondents, when confronted with rival representation claims, may, without running afoul of the statute, disregard claims encompassing merely a segment of some worker's group which this Board would, within a proper case, find appropriate for collective-bargaining purposes. Such claims, since they raise no real representation question, creat no Midwest Piping duty requiring the maintenance of 198 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD strict neutrality. And conversely when employers thus confronted choose to grant one claimant labor organization recognition, within some "inappropriate grouping of a minority of the employees" properly concerned, while concurrently refusing to bargain with their duly designated majority representative within some larger, more inclusive, bargaining group necessarily provide the recognized claimant with statutorily-proscribed assistance and support thereby. This Board has so held. Eastern Massachusetts Street Railway Company, 110 NLRB 1963, 1966-67; compare Tower Iron Works, Inc., 150 NLRB 298, 302-303, in this connection. These cases, within my view, provide a supplementary alternative justification for my conclusion that Respondent herein, when it rejected ONE's claim for continued recognition, and concurrently granted NVEU prompt recognition for so-called "Group A" technical and office workers, violated the statute. The present record, clearly, requires a determination that Respondent's workers with "Group A" job classifications, when NVEU first claimed representative status with respect thereto, constituted "merely a fraction" within a larger group of Respondent's technical and clerical personnel. The Regional Director's representation case decision refers to some 320 workers listed on Respondent's technical and clerical roster. Within this comprehensively defined group, 79 workers held so-called "Group A" classifications when NVEU's demand with respect thereto was presented. Previously, within this Decision, reference has been made to Newbury Park's historical bargaining unit. That contractually defined group, though it did not encompass Respondent's professional, confidential, or managerial personnel, did include production and maintenance workers, together with technical and office personnel, within a single, plantwide unit deemed appropriate for bargaining purposes. Necessarily, therefore, when UAW's representation petition was filed seeking certification within a limited "P & M" bargaining unit the division's presumptively excluded technical and office workers were slated to become a so-called "residual" group, which Complainant Union-Petitioner or some other labor organi- zation which might be certified following a Board-conduct- ed election would not, thereafter, represent. Within this larger class of prospectively "unrepresented" workers, those with so-called "Group A" classifications constituted neither a separate homogeneous craft group with special skills, nor a functionally distinct department. Determination seems clearly warranted, therefore, that when Respondent's management recognized NVEU as their collective-bargain- ing representative it did not constitute a proper "residual" bargaining group. This Board has, consistently, refused to find proposed bargaining groups limited to residual worker classifications "appropriate" when they comprise merely a nondistin- guishable segment within some larger group of unrepresent- ed workers. Horsehoe Club Operating Company, 172 NLRB No. 198, 69 LRRM 1048, 1049; North American Aviation, Inc., 131 NLRB 399, 401-404. Compare Bendix Corpora- tion, 168 NLRB No. 55, 66 LRRM 1332, 1333-34; Budd Company, 154 NLRB 421, 428; Swift Company, 127 NLRB 87; Daily Press, Inc., 110 NLRB 573, 578; Jacobs Manufacturing Company, 99 NLRB 482, 483-488, in this connection. Conversely, proposed bargaining units which comprise "all" currently "unrepresented" workers within a particular plant facility or larger complex have been found proper for collective-bargaining purposes. Compare Hotel Employers Association of San Francisco, 159 NLRB 143, 144, 149, 153, and Pennsalt Chemicals Corporation, 119 NLRB 128, 129, in this connection. The Division's management, when NVEU's August 16 recognition demand was received, must have known that "Group A" workers constituted merely a segment of Newbury Park's total clerical and technical personnel. Further, Respondent may properly be charged with knowledge, within my view, that some additional technical and clerical classifications within ONE's historical bargain- ing coverage, with their prospective unit placement then being disputed, might subsequently be deprived of representation previously enjoyed, through their "exclusion" from UAW's prospective production and maintenance bargaining group . With matters in this posture, Respondent's management was on notice, so I find, that, should NVEU's recognition demand for a bargaining unit limited to so-called "Group A" workers be granted, such a decision might well prove precipitate. Nevertheless, Respondent granted NVEU's request promptly. Thereby, Respondent's management realistically determined at its peril that NVEU's recognition, within a bargaining unit limited to workers with "Group A" classifications, would resolve a real "question concerning representation" for a presumptively appropriate bargaining group. This, Respondent's management need not have done. Previously, within this Decision, reference has been made to NVEU's August 16 letter, in which Respondent was requested to treat that organization's concurrent recogni- tion requests, for both "Group A" and "Group B" workers respectively, as continuing requests; Respondent's manage- ment was told that "if you are not prepared to allow us to prove our majority to you at this time in some feasible manner - but wish to do so in future" notice of management's desire should be communicated promptly by telephone or letter. With this option freely presented, Respondent's management could have chosen to defer recognition, pending a final Regional Office determination regarding the composition of Complainant Union-Petition- er's prospective production and maintenance bargaining group which would necessarily define those "residual" technical and clerical classifications removed therefrom. For reasons not specifically proffered, however, Respon- dent never considered deferral. Instead, Respondent determined to grant recognition forthwith. NVEU's representative status was conceded, following Reverend Rehnberg's cardcheck, within a purported bargaining unit compassing no more than 79 workers with some 49 job classifications, this, despite management's knowledge that a Regional Director's decision regarding unit placement for some 30 disputed classifications, with more than 180 workers concerned, would subsequently be rendered. The present record, summarized in relevant part, previously, within this Decision, will, within my view, fully support a factual NORTHROP CORPORATION 199 conclusion that Respondent, thereby, recognized NVEU for nothing more than a limited number of so -called "T & 0" classifications, which this Board could not, consistently with well-settled decisional doctrine, rationally consider a proper unit for collective-bargaining purposes. With matters in this posture, further, determination seems clearly warranted that Respondent's management, when it purported to resolve a question concerning representation by granting NVEU recognition within a claimed unit not appropriate for collective-bargaining purposes, provided the labor organization designated with statutorily proscribed assistance and support. Eastern Massachusetts Street Railway Company, supra; Tower Iron Works, Inc., supra. I so find. 2. Respondent's contractual union-security committment Within his brief, General Counsel contends that Respon- dent herein since it granted NVEU recognition under circumstances statutorily proscribed and thereafter negoti- ated, maintained and effectuated a collective-bargaining contract with that organization containing union-security provisions, violated, and continues to violate, Section 8(a)(3) of the statute. This charge, within my view, cannot be sustained. Respondent's contractual committment, now in question, contains no conventional 30-day union-security clause, comparable with the provision which ONE's recently- terminated contract had embodied. The division's manage- ment was, rather, committed merely to effectuate certain limited maintenance of membership requirements , coupled with a voluntary dues checkoff provision. General Counsel has cited no decisional support for his sub silentio proposition that, when respondent-employers negotiate, maintain, or effectuate such circumscribed union-security provisions, they are necessarily committed to discrimina- tion statutorily forbidden. My own research has revealed none ; the precise question, indeed, seems never to have been litigated. Relevant precedents suggest, rather, that statutory sanctions predicated upon purportedly coercive union- security requirements cannot stand: unless there is support in the evidence that [union membership status] was induced, obtained, or retained in violation of the Act ... . See Local 60, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO v. N.L R.B., 365 U.S. 651, 655-656. Compare N.L.R.B. v. Adhesive Products Corporation, 258 F.2d 403 (C.A. 2), 42 LRRM 2421, 2425; N.L.R.B. v. Shedd-Brown Mfg. Co., 213 F.2d 163 (C.A. 7), 34 LRRM 2278, 2283; N.L.R.B. v. Braswell Motor Freight Lines, 209 F.2d 622 (C.A. 5), 34 LRRM 2270; Chun King Sales, Inc., 126 NLRB 851, 853-854, and cases therein cited. No such showing can be considered made when the record contains no evidence whatever that Respondent's technical and clerical workers were "coerced" to become NVEU members, or to retain such membership. With matters in their present posture, I find no determination warranted that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) herein. B. Respondent's Conduct Affecting Production and Maintenance Workers Section 8(a)(2) of the statute proscribes employer conduct calculated to "dominate or interfere" with a labor organization's formation or administration, or to "contribute financial or other support" thereto. The relevant cases hold, therefore, that "employer support of an `inside' or `independent' labor organization, even absent company domination, constitutes unlawful interference with employees' freedom of choice" statutorily guaranteed. Irving Air Chute Company v. N.L.R.B., 350 F.2d 176, 181-182 (C.A. 2). The presence of statutorily proscribed interference, moreover, must be determined "by careful scrutiny of all the factors, often subtle, which restrain the employees' choice" for which a particular employer- respondent may fairly be considered responsible. Interna- tional Association of Machinists v. N.L.R.B., 311 U.S. 72, 80. See, likewise, Harrison Sheet Steel Co. v. N.L.R.B., 194 F.2d 407, 410 (C.A. 7); therein the court stated: It has repeatedly been held that an employer may not intrude in matters concerning the self-organization of his employees . He must refrain from all interference. He must maintain a strictly neutral attitude . Especially is this so where the adherence of the employees is being sought by rival labor organizations. See, further, Powers Regulator Company v. N.L.R.B., 355 F.2d 506, 509 (C.A. 7); St. Louis Independent Packing Co. v. N. L. R. B., 291 F.2d 700, 704 (C.A. 7); N. L. R. B. v. Vapor Blast Mfg. Co., 287 F.2d 402, 404-405 (C.A. 7). The rationale which dictates strict neutrality for employers confronted with rival representation claimants has, per- haps, been set forth most cogently within the Supreme Court's decision in I.A.M. v. N.L.R.B., previously cited. Therein, the court observed that: Known hostility to one union and clear discrimination against it may indeed make seemingly trivial intima- tions of preference for another union powerful assist- ance for it. Slight suggestions as to the employer's choice between unions may have telling effect among men who know the consequences of incurring that employer's strong displeasure . The freedom of activity permitted one group and the close surveillance given another may be more powerful support for the former than campaign utterances. See, more recently, Alarm Device Manufacturing Co., 175 NLRB No. 104 (TXD). These decisional guidelines, within my view, provide the touchstone whereby Respondent's course of conduct, herein, must be tested. The present record, considered in totality, fully sustains General Counsel's contention that Respondent's posture throughout the representation election campaign with which we are concerned reflected statutorily proscribed interference, together with contributions of support. Respondent's determination to mount a campaign of resistance, with respect to UAW's representation bid, was foreshadowed within the division's first set of detailed instructions, distributed to supervisors. These management spokesmen were told, inter alia, that they might freely tell employees Respondent would rather deal with them through their established representative, (ONE), than through some "outside" labor organization. That determi- 200 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD nation, further, was given forceful expression when General Manager Gasich told ONE's president and vice president, "Well, if you are not going to fight them, [UAW I step back out of the way, because I am not going to take any orders from Detroit." Thereby, Gasich clearly revealed his disposition to resist UAW's organizational campaign, together with resentment generated by ONE's professed reluctance to join Respondent 's management, behind the barricades. These declarations , considered in themselves, cannot be found unfair labor practices under Section 10(b). They have, nevertheless , been cited for their background relevance and materiality; they provide a context, with relation to which determinations may be reached regarding Respondent's motivation, generally, throughout the period with which this consolidated case is directly concerned. Proceeding consistently with this policy, Respondent's management clearly welcomed NVEU's formation; throughout the representation election campaign which followed, Respondent's written and verbal pronounce- ments directed toward Newbury Park workers generally featured statements calculated to magnify NVEU's pres- tige, while denigrating UAW's worth. These statements compassed more than "slight suggestions" or "trivial intimations of preference" within my view. Respondent's first significant contribution , so the record shows, became manifest when management determined to grant NVEU's August 16 recognition demand covering a limited group of technical and clerical workers . Northrop- Ventura's determination to proceed in this connection, considered without regard to questions of legality , necessar- ily vested NVEU with substantial prestige which Respon- dent's several spokesmen , subsequently, confirmed. Any conclusion that Respondent's August 19/August 21 course of conduct, previously noted herein, developed without management's conscious awareness that NVEU's concur- rent campaign for worker support within a prospective "P & M" bargaining group might be strengthened thereby, would be naive. Within his brief, General Counsel suggests, specifically, that: Respondent seized upon NVEU's demand for recogni- tion in a unit of office and technical employees as a means of defeating the UAW's effort to organize Respondent's production and maintenance employees. This contention, within my view, possesses merit. This trier of fact notes, first, that promptly following NVEU's recognition that organization was provided with five substantial, glass-enclosed, lock-fitted, bulletin boards within a plant facility which housed most Newbury Park production and maintenance workers, but no more than three (3) technical or clerical employees . Further, the present record shows that when Respondent's contractual negotia- tions with NVEU culminated in consensus management publicized the significant "economic" provisions of NVEU's contractual settlement with a bulletin distributed throughout Respondent's Newbury Park facility, not merely to those "Group A" workers whom the contract covered. Previously, before their contractual consensus, noted, was reached, Respondent's management and NVEU representatives had negotiated a revised work schedule calculated to permit workers represented by the latter 4 consecutive days off, in conjunction with their forthcoming Thanksgiving Day holiday. Respondent's bulletin with respect thereto, when distributed, did point out that the schedule in question had been negotiated with NVEU for workers whom that organization represented. Nevertheless, the negotiated holiday work schedule was "established" for all Newbury Park workers, with certain limited exceptions. Nothing within Respondent's published bulletin suggested that such a revised holiday work schedule had been "established" for nonrepresented workers pursuant to management's decision ; Respondent's production and maintenance workers were, rather, permitted to deduce that NVEU's negotiators had functioned , effectively, for their benefit. True, Respondent had previously notified Newbury Park workers generally that a comparably modified Fourth of July holiday work schedule had been "established" for "all" employees through negotiations with ONE pursuant to contract. The messages conveyed within these several bulletins, however, cannot be reasonably compared. When ONE's leadership negotiated the modified Fourth of July schedule, they were functioning, pursuant to contract, for a large constituency. NVEU's representatives, however, could claim no contractual standing for work schedule negotiations ; further, they then represented no more than 79 technical and clerical workers . NVEU's negotiators, nevertheless, were credited, subtly but sufficiently, with obtaining, through bargaining, the publicized Thanksgiving Day holiday schedule for all facility workers, even the production and maintenance workers whom they did not, yet, represent. General Counsel would have me find, with matters in this posture, that, the "intended and calculated" thrust of Respondent's bulletin was to promise production and maintenance workers that they stood to gain special consideration through NVEU representation. With due regard for the record, considered in totality, such a determination may not be warranted . There can be no doubt, however, that Respondent's bulletin , with which we are now concerned, did vest NVEU with significant prestige . Within its relevant context, therefore, Respon- dent's announcement may properly be characterized as reasonably calculated to promote NVEU's campaign, thereby necessarily countering UAW's thrust. I so find. Respondent's November 14 published bulletin wherein various substantive terms, set forth within NVEU's newly- negotiated contract, covering technical and clerical person- nel, were detailed has been noted. Respondent's Newbury Park employees generally, but production and maintenance workers particularly, were told, therein, that contractually covered workers would receive a wage increase retroactive to August 19, directly following ONE's contract termina- tion date. Within a short time thereafter, so the record shows, the division's production and maintenance workers were being told, however, that Northrop-Ventura could not then grant them a comparable retroactive wage increase, because statutory provisions governing the conduct of concerned parties during the period directly preceding a representation vote would bar such a managerial decision. Setting aside, for the moment, those questions which have NORTHROP CORPORATION 201 been raised regarding the latter statement's propriety, determination seems clearly warranted , consistently with General. Counsel's contention, that Respondent's signifi- cantly contrasted pronouncements, per se, provided powerful support for NVEU's representation election campaign ; they suggested, clearly, that Newbury Park's production and maintenance workers, could blame man- agement's deferral policy, with regard to their possible retroactive raises, upon UAW's meddlesome presence. In reaching this conclusion , the present Trial Examiner does not, consistently with Respondent counsel's colorful phraseology, consider the collective-bargaining relationship with which we are concerned herein as constituting "some ghastly conspiracy being hatched by shriveled little men wearing green eye shades in the depths of bat caves ." True, NVEU was throughout this period the beneficiary of statutorily proscribed assistance and support . My determi- nation with regard to the present matter, however, does not derive from that factual conclusion. It derives, rather, from my determination that Respondent's purportedly straight- forward publicity program with regard to retroactive wage increase grants possessed a reasonably foreseeable tenden- cy to interfere with, restrain, and coerce Newbury Park's workers, with respect to their choice of collective-bargain- ing representation. Respondent's counsel would have this Board note that UAW first broached the question of retroactive wage and fringe benefit adjustments for production and maintenance workers ; he suggests, with due regard for Respondent's successive rejoiners, that "the whole affair" should be considered nothing more than a series of "propaganda parries and thrusts" with both sides striving to shift blame for a distressing situation. This contention, within my view, lacks meet. Respondent's repeatedly declared position , regardless of the purpose which may have motivated its declarations , was, clearly, calculated to promote NVEU's stature while concurrently denigrating UAW's purported "dog-in-the-manager" pos- ture. Further, Respondent's publicized claim that UAW's representation petition created a legal "stymie " for "P & M" raises derived from a misconception ; further discussion with respect thereto will be found, subsequently, within this Decision. Respondent's position was reiterated, subsequently, with varying phraseology and within varying contexts, through- out bulletins and correspondence directed to Newbury Park workers generally on November 21 and December 10 before the representation vote, and, further, on December 24, January 2, 1969, and January 24 thereafter. I find, consistent with General Counsel's contention, that Respon- dent management, thereby, breached its professed posture of strict neutrality, provided NVEU with potent forbidden support, and, contrary to law, has interfered with its workers' freedom of choice. I find merit, further, with respect to General Counsel's contention that Respondent's general manager, for the purpose of counteracting UAW's organizational campaign and securing NVEU's entrenchment, conveyed a message to Newbury Park's production and maintenance workers that, should they designate UAW their representative, Respondent would not strike a bargain with that organiza- tion different from NVEU's contractual settlement. My determination derives from Gasich's version of his December 16 cafeteria remarks. His speech, despite its seeming "rhetorical question" phraseology, was reasonably calculated to convey the thought that Respondent's workers would derive no measurable benefit should they designate UAW their collective-bargaining representative. More particularly, General Manager Gasich was, essential- ly, pointing out that Respondent's production and maintenance workers would find their UAW support productive of futility, since, should that organization win certification, the division's management contemplated granting nothing more than wage and fringe benefit changes matching those which NVEU's contract contained. Standing alone, such comments might well be considered statutorily privileged "argument" merely. However, within their context, which included several references to UAW's strike record, together with that organization's purportedly militant, potentially "bullying" posture, which Gasich contrasted with NVEU's so-called "constructive" negotia- tions, there can be no doubt that Respondent general manager's proclaimed stance was reasonably calculated to derogate UAW's goals while proclaiming that organiza- tion's prospective powerlessness with respect to winning further benefits ; thereby Gasich was necessarily conveying the thought that Newbury Park's workers would find it futile to designate UAW, rather than NVEU, their collective-bargaining representative . I so find. Previously, within this Decision, reference had been made to Respondent's December 17 distribution of retroactive paychecks for "Group B" workers, some 140 in number. The record, within my view, will support a conclusion, consistent with General Counsel's contention, that this felicitously timed distribution was not fortuitous, but that Respondent's personnel, responsible for payroll check preparation, made a special effort to prepare these retroactive paychecks for distribution before the scheduled December 18 representation vote. The record shows that following the November 13 signing of NVEU's first contract the work required to prepare and process retroactive paychecks for "Group A" workers did not really begin until November 22. Thereafter, through coordinated efforts which involved both Respon- dent's payroll accounting department and Northrop Corporation's data processing section, retroactive pay- checks for these workers were prepared and distributed within 21 days, on December 12 and 13 respectively. These were Respondent's regular weekly paydays. By contrast, the procedure required to process Respondent 's second batch of retroactive paychecks was initiated promptly, following the December 10 bargaining session during which contractual coverage for so-called "Group B" workers was negotiated. Their checks were ready for distribution within 6 days; distribution was effectuated on the seventh. Prima facie, this temporal discrepancy suggests that the processing of "Group B" workers' checks must have been expedited. Respondent's director of general accounting and policy, Charles Hass, proffered detailed testimony regarding this time differential . He declared that the first group of retroactive checks constituted the division 's "first proof" with respect to the computer program, previously estab- lished, whereby the requisite data for retroactive pay 202 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD computations had been accumulated. Therefore, so Hass testified, the computer data printout and consequent checks were reviewed carefully. The second group of checks, so Hass claimed, were derived from less detailed data, requiring a shorter computer printout and, conse- quently, less detailed checking and verification. Hass' testimony, nevertheless, warrants a determination, within my view, that work on Respondent's second batch of retroactive paychecks was hastened. The requisite payroll department calculations, thought initiated promptly, could not be completed for transmittal to Respondent's data processing section before Respondent's normal daytime Friday, December 13, shift terminated. These calculations were thereafter carried to conclusion before midafternoon on Saturday, December 14, specifically, with several volunteers working overtime. Respondent's data processing section, which received these check calculations Saturday afternoon, completed its task of check preparation by Monday, December 16; the checks were, therefore, necessarily processed sometime during the weekend period. Though Respondent's data processing section normally works 7 days per week, Hass concededly had requested that department to realign its work schedule, so that these retroactive paychecks could be processed promptly follow- ing their Saturday transmittal. Though Hass subsequently stated, while a witness, that he had been primarily concerned with facilitating the distribution of Respondent's second batch of retroactive paychecks before the Christmas holidays, he conceded that this concern could have been satisfied through their distribution on December 20, Respondent's next regular payday. Respondent's director of general accounting and policy then testified, when questioned by Respondent's counsel, that his determination to facilitate a check distribution before the forthcoming representation vote, promptly following their preparation, derived from his "feeling" that such promptness was required, since the money "belonged" to the workers concerned; Hass contended that he was, therefore, obligated to get it to them as quickly as possible. The contention, within my view, lacks persuasive thrust; the record shows that Respondent's payroll department normally holds regular paychecks for 2 days following their preparation, regardless of some supposed duty dictating their prompt distribution. Respon- dent's proffered rationale for its preelection distribution of retroactive paychecks on December 17, within my view, must be rejected. Though Respondent maintains that no special effort was made to distribute the second group of retroactive checks before the scheduled vote; that NVEU's representatives received no committment, during their December 10 bargaining session, with respect thereto; and that no one knew, before December 16, that the distribution could be made before the representation vote, these defensive contentions lack record support. Clearly, the procedure followed in connection with check data preparation was hasty. The checks were distributed immediately following their preparation; they were not held until Respondent's next regular payday. And, finally, this trier of fact notes that NVEU's preparatory work for a final campaign handbill, drafted particularly to feature the "second distribution of retroactive paychecks , had begun several days before the checks were distributed. The handbill, which proved to be NVEU's most costly for the campaign, featured pictures of numerous "Group B" workers purportedly holding their retroactive paychecks; these checks, however, had been borrowed from various "Group A" workers. The pictures were, so the record shows, made before Respondent's December 17 retroactive paycheck distribution. The contention, suggested herein, that NVEU's leader- ship would have prepared this costly propaganda coup solely on the basis of some speculative hope that a preelection retroactive check distribution would take place, strains credulity. Within his brief, General Counsel suggests, contrariwise, that Respondent's management timed the second retroactive paycheck distribution , deliber- ately, to permit NVEU's reference thereto within its so- called last hour campaign leaflet. The contention, however, seems somewhat strained ; upon the present record, determination can hardly be considered warranted that Respondent's management was privy to NVEU's campaign plan, or that Respondent's personnel, with knowledge, proceeded to rush a check distribution specifically to validate that organization's planned propaganda appeal. This trier of fact is satisfied, nevertheless, that Respon- dent's management did make a special effort to get the second batch of retroactive paychecks distributed before the scheduled election and that Respondent's hurried program in this respect derived , not from business considerations, but from its previously noted purpose to provide NVEU with prestige, countering UAW's represent- ation campaign thereby . I so find. Well settled decisional doctrine teaches that employer- respondents violate Section 8(a)(3) and ( I) of the statute when, for the purpose of influencing a Board election, they withhold, from workers within the prospective voting group, pay raises granted other employees . N.L.R.B. v. Great A & P Company, 166 NLRB 27, 29, enfd . 409 F.2d 296, 298 (C.A. 5). Accord: Russell-Newman Manufacturing Co. v. N. LR.B., 406 F.2d 1280 (C.A. 5). The withholding of a pay raise, granted to other workers, from those within the prospective voting unit, constitutes statutorily proscribed discrimination against those workers who are distinguisha- ble only by their participation in protected activity, since such discrimination may "to some extent" discourage membership in a labor organization by inducing deprived employees to vote against the union . N.LR.B. v. GreatA & P Company, supra. Though it may be necessary to prove the particular employer's purpose to discriminate so as to discourage union membership, specific evidence of such motivation is not required . See Russell-Newman Manufac- turing Co. v. N.L.R.B., supra, in this connection. General Counsel's burden, with respect to this aspect of the matter, will be considered satisfied by proof that the particular employer-respondent had specifically directed his workers' attention to the so-called union aspect of their situation. Stating the matter shortly : When employers declare their desire to grant immediate wage or fringe benefits to employees, but then shift, to the labor organization concerned , the blame for their failure to grant such benefits promptly, determination is considered NORTHROP CORPORATION 203 warranted that they have been seeking to discredit that labor organization, and to discourage membership therein. McCormick Longmeadow Stone Company, 158 NLRB 1237, 1242. Accord: Big Three Industrial Gas & Equipment Co., 181 NLRB No. 180 (TXD); The Deutsch Company, Metal Components Division, 178 NLRB No. 95. Within the Deutsch Company case last cited, this Board recently stated the relevant decisional principle positively: When confront- ed with a labor organization's representation campaign, concerned employers must determine whether to grant or withhold benefits just as they would normally, absent the labor organization's presence. These principles, clearly, must be considered determina- tive herein. Respondent, when confronted with UAW's November suggestion that a wage increase was warranted, which the labor organization coupled with a promise that no unfair labor practice charge would be filed should such wage increase be granted promptly, declared its desire to find some "legal way" to grant retroactive raises, matching those negotiated within NVEU's contract, to workers who were purportedly being denied such benefits through no fault of their own. This last reference, within my view, was clearly calculated to convey the thought that, but for UAW's presence and their support for that organization, Newbury Park's production and maintenance workers would have been scheduled to receive their wage raise. And Respondent's further comments, both its November 15 letter and November 21 bulletin previously noted, defined three conditions which under current circumstances would have to be satisfied before retroactive raises could be granted ; UAW, NVEU President Means, and the Board's Regional Director, respectively, would have to provide Respondent with written statements that no unfair labor practice charges or prospective election objections would be filed, entertained, or sustained, consequent upon such grants. Despite this conditional proffer, Respondent's workers were concurrently told that UAW's waiver promise constituted merely a "crude attempt to trick and mislead" since the Board's Regional Director could not give assurances that relevant unfair labor practice charges would not be filed or entertained. With matters in this posture, Respondent's management, through its several "propaganda parries and thrusts" respectively, had first created the requirement of written consent or reassurance for this Board's Regional Director, knowing full well that Board officials do not normally give such consent or reassurance ; then Respondent had blamed UAW for supposedly proffering something (the proposed waiver of unfair labor practice charges) which UAW knew it could not deliver. Thereby, Respondent's management had "made it appear" that Northrop-Ventura stood ready, willing, and able to grant the retroactive raises in question, but that UAW could not fulfill its promise Respondent would be saved harm. On December 10, before the scheduled representation vote, Respondent reaffirmed its position that the "current NLRB proceeding" had held up the wage and benefit adjustments which Newbury Park workers "would have received" previously. Thereafter, following the election, in Respondent's December 24, January 2, 1969, and January 24 bulletins, this theme was repeated, with particular reference to UAW's election objections and pending unfair labor practice charges. Complainant Union-Petitioner, particularly, was clearly blamed for purportedly "punishing" the Division's workers, by depriving them of pay increases through its resort to Board processes. In a recent Board decision, which dealt with a situation closely paralleling that presented herein, the determinative legal principle previously noted, stands reaffirmed, The Gates Rubber Company, 182 NLRB No. 15. Therein, the Board has noted that: It is uncontradicted that unit employees expressed a keen interest in the timing of the wage increase , and it is undisputed that, were it not for the union election, the print-shop employees would have received the wage increase comparable to and at the same time as that negotiated by the Respondent and the Rubber Workers. In these circumstances, neutrality is not maintained by an announced withholding of a wage increase because of a pending Board-conducted election. It is well-settled that the employer's legal duty is to proceed as he would have done had the union not been on the scene. Here the Respondent withheld increases which would normally have been granted but for the presence of the Union and pendency of the election and advised employees that their wage increases were being withheld for this reason. Consistent with this rationale, determination is found warranted that Respondent herein , when it withheld retroactive wage increases from Newbury Park's prod- uction and maintenance employees , which their fellow technical and clerical workers were contractually scheduled to receive, provided NVEU with statutorily proscribed support, and interfered with employee free choice. I so find. C. Respondent's Conduct Affecting Kniffen's Working Conditions The Consolidated Complaint herein charges Respondent with statutorily proscribed discrimination plus derivative interference, restraint, and coercion because Director of Industrial Relations Fairless rescinded the privilege previously given ONE President Kniffen to spend his full working time policing ONE's contract. General Counsel contends that Respondent's July 9 decision, in this connection, constituted a calculated reprisal for Kniffen's failure and refusal to provide support for Respondent's effort to keep UAW from organizing Newbury Park's production and maintenance workers. Traditionally, ONE's president, so the record shows, had been permitted to devote his full working time to ONE business. Johnny Via, President Kniffen's predecessor, had been permitted to do so; Kniffen had, likewise, been granted this privilege, save for a 2-month span, approxi- mately 1 year before the period with which we are now concerned. At that time, ONE's president had been told that Respondent's reason for directing his resumption of milling machine machinist work derived from Fairless' concern that paying a labor organization's president, for full-time service in that capacity, would violate the Landrum-Griffin Act. When Fairless renewed his directive that Kniffen 204 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD should resume shop work, during their July 9 conference, he proffered the same reason for his decision. Substantially, General Counsel contends, therefore, that Respondent's directive significantly changed Kniffen's working conditions; that Respondent's contemporaneously proffered rationale for directing the change was pretextual; and that Fairless' restrictive direction had really been motivated by President Kniffen's refusal to marshall his organization's manpower, prestige, and resources for resistence to UAW's representation campaign. With due regard for the present record considered in totality, however, this contention, within my view, cannot be considered sustained. True, General Counsel has proffered evidence calculated to sustain a determination that, when UAW's campaign began, Respondent's manage- ment was preparing to mount a counter campaign calculated to preserve ONE's representative status. True, ONE's June 1968 tentative declaration, that no resistance would be proffered with respect to UAW's representation claim for Respondent's production and maintenance workers, may have disappointed, even angered, Respon- dent's management. And Fairless did learn, sometime before July 9 certainly, that ONE's posture of nonresistence with regard to UAW's campaign had disenchanted, alienated, or worried many ONE members. With matters in this posture, some merit could, arguably, be found with respect to General Counsel's contention, set forth within his brief, that: In short, by July 9, Respondent not only knew that ONE was not going to aid in its campaign against the UAW, but believed that Kmffen, ONE's president, was responsible for ONE's decision. Such a record showing, however, will not, without more, sustain a conclusion that personal hostility toward President Kniffen developed consequentially within Res- pondent's management, or that Respondent's July 9 directive derived from such managerial hostility or resentment. First: Nothing in the present record, within my view, would warrant a determination that Respondent's July 9 directive reflected calculated harrassment. Kniffen was first directed merely to resume productive work within his regular classification; when subsequently requested to provide Kniffen with work within a different classification, however, which would permit him to wear a business suit during working hours, Fairless complied. Kniffen was told, further, that he would, upon request, be given whatever paid "time-off" he might thereafter require to police ONE's contract, process contractual grievance matters , or transact other company-union business. With matters in this posture, General Counsel can hardly contend, persuasively that Respondent's directive significantly restricted Knif- fen's capacity to function, effectively, regarding ONE's business. Second: This trier of fact is not persuaded that Kniffen's reassignment to productive work, per se, consti- tuted discrimination statutorily proscribed. The fact that he may, thereby, have been denied further "unrestricted" freedom with respect to transacting ONE's business on company time and property hardly qualifies as discrimina- tion with regard to his working terms or conditions; the withdrawal of privileges or perquisites bearing no relation- ship to Kniffen's regular "work" assignment, within my view, cannot be considered a statutorily proscribed depravation. Further, General Counsel's present contention that Respondent's motivation, with respect to Kniffen's reas- signment, derived from resentment generated by his refusal to marshall resistance toward UAW's campaign rests, primarily upon mere surmise. The record shows that Respondent's director of industrial relations had previously directed Kniffen to resume productive work approximately I year previously, long before UAW's campaign had begun. Some question might be raised, conceivably, whether Fairless' proffered rationale for this first directive had been legally well-founded. For present purposes, however, the question need not be decided. General Counsel can hardly contend, therefore, that Fairless' motivation for the directive in question , pursuant to which Kniffen did perform machinist work for some 2 months, derived from antiunion considerations . Counsel would have this Board note, however, that Respondent's director of industrial relations, while a witness herein, chose to proffer a different reason for restricting Kniffen's freedom to pursue ONE business on company time. Fairless did testify that his most recent decision had been made in view of the fact that ONE was, within his judgment, moving off the scene. Contrary to General Counsel's contention, however, this trier of fact does not find Fairless' present testimony regarding his July 9 rationale "inconsistent" with the reason Kniffen was given; rather, I find it supplementary. Therefore, even assuming, arguendo, that Fairless' proffered witness chair recollection, regarding his reason for directing Kniffen's return to part-time work, may be credited, nothing therein would, within my view, warrant a determination that ONE's president was being subjected to reprisal. With matters in their present posture, this Trial Examiner concludes and finds General Counsel has not provided reliable, probative, and substantial evidence sufficient to warrant a determination that Respondent 's management changed Walter Kniffen's working terms and conditions for statutorily proscribed reasons. IV. OBJECTIONS TO THE ELECTION Respondent's general course of conduct following the filing of UAW's petition, herein found to compass several unfair labor practices, provides more than sufficient justification for a Board order vacating the challenged election results. Complainant Union-Petitioner has, howev- er, proffered testimony and documentary material suggest- ing numerous bases upon which the representation vote could be set aside. Some of these encompass conduct herein found statutorily forbidden. For example, UAW contends that the challenged election results should be vacated because Respondent's manage- ment provided NVEU with proscribed assistance, violating Section 8(a)(2) thereby: 1. Through NVEU's initial recognition as collective- bargaining representative for a group of workers excluded by stipulation from the prospective prod- uction and maintenance workers unit. NORTHROP CORPORATION 205 2. Through NVEU's subsequent recognition as collec- tive-bargaining representative for a further group of workers excluded by Board determination from the production and maintenance workers unit. Further, UAW contends that Respondent herein unlawful- ly interfered with statutorily guaranteed rights , provided NVEU with proscribed assistance , and discriminated against Newbury Park's production and maintenance workers , violating Section 8(a)(1) and (3) thereby, when it withheld retroactive wage and fringe benefit adjustments from such workers , under the circumstances revealed within the present record. These contentions , herein sustained, do provide a sufficient basis for vacating the challenged election results. This Board will not certify the representative status of labor organizations found to have benefitted from statutorily- forbidden assistance or support . Reliance Steel Products Co., 135 NLRB 730, 731 ; Compare Weather Seal, Incorporated 161 NLRB 1226, 1229 in this connection. This Board has, likewise, held that when a respondent-employer withholds wage increases which would normally have been granted but for some labor organization's presence and the pendency of a representation election , with concerned workers being told that their increases have been withheld for such reasons, such workers have suffered interference with their statutorily guaranteed right of free choice, The Gates Rubber Company, supra; Big Three Industrial Gas & Equipment Co., supra. Compare Dan Howard Mfg. Co., 158 NLRB 805, 813, 818, enfd . as modified in other respects, 390 F.2d 304 (C.A. 7) in this connection. Complainant Union contends, further, that Respondent herein provided NVEU with statutorily proscribed assist- ance, sufficient to warrant vacation of the election results: (a) By providing NVEU with five union bulletin boards throughout the Newbury Park facility 's manufacturing building; (b) by permitting NVEU spokesmen to use company facilities , materials, and time while conducting that organization's representational campaign ; and (c) by allowing NVEU supporters unrestricted time to campaign on company property while enforcing a publicized no- solicitation rule against UAW supporters. Previously in this Decision , Respondent's provision of five glass-enclosed, lock-fitted bulletin boards, for NVEU's use, within Newbury Park's manufacturing building has been noted ; Respondent's favorable reaction, when presented with NVEU's request for bulletin board space, though not specifically designated a proscribed unfair labor practice herein, has been considered relevant and probative with respect to General Counsel's presentation regarding Respondent's disposition to provide NVEU with unlawful support . And the present record, within my view, will support a further determination that management's con- duct, now in question, likewise constituted forbidden interference with the employees' free choice , providing a further warrant for setting aside the challenged election results herein. With respect to UAW's further objections , previously noted, detailed testimony and documentary evidence has been herein proffered: 1. That disciplinary warning notices ("boom sheets") were given three suspected UAW supporters believed to have been involved in campaign related conversations during scheduled overtime working hours ; that, there- after, different UAW supporters were subjected to questioning, harassment, and threats of discharge, reasonably calculated to interfere with or restrain their participation in protected concerted activity on compa- ny premises. 2. That various NVEU supporters, by way of contrast, were permitted to campaign on company premises, while on their own , or other employees', worktime, without significant restraint , through designation card, button, leaflet, and contract copy distributions, posting of publicity materials, plant conversations, and verbal controversy with UAW supporters; that Respondent's supervisors, when cognizant of such conduct , either raised no question regarding its continuance, or merely admonished the workers concerned to desist , or resume work, without giving warning notices or threatening penalties. 3. That John Green, Respondent's departmental supervisor, within a few days following NVEU's formation , distributed designation cards for that organization to workers in his department , requested these workers under his supervision to sign such cards, and suggested their subsequent delivery to Respon- dent's Superintendent W. Lange, his middle manage- ment superior. 4. That, before NVEU's formation, Respondent's supervisors denied UAW supporters permission to post prounion material on their Company's general purpose plant bulletin boards, despite the fact that antiunion materials were being freely posted, and were being permitted to remain. 5. That R. F. Byram, Respondent's departmental supervisor, had knowingly permitted several NVEU leaders to meet, presumably with respect to nonbusiness related matters, during working hours, within a plant area subject to his supervision. 6. That Steve Wrubel, Respondent's departmental supervisor, had, during working hours , provided a draft copy of NVEU's first contract for one worker to review during his "break" time, while permitting other workers to review the self-same document during their working hours. 7. That Delbert Hills, Respondent's departmental supervisor, told a worker whom he supervised, Kenneth Clint, that he (Clint) might lose his "general machinist" classification, should UAW win representative status. 8. That NVEU supporters , concurrently with that organization's formation and the commencement of its campaign for worker support , were knowingly permit- ted to complete arrangements for having some NVEU designation cards printed during working hours on company presses located within Respondent's repro- duction department. 9. That Respondent's management, while negotiations for NVEU's first contract were in progress , provided NVEU's officers and directors , even those not holding job classifications within Respondent's recognized technical and clerical workers' group, regular pay for 206 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD working time spent by them in collective-bargaining sessions. The matters listed, further, have been thoroughly litigated. With due regard for the record herein considered in totality, however, their present disposition hardly seems necessary or warranted. With respect to some matters, for example, UAW's contention that Respondent unlawfully paid certain NVEU negotiators their regular rates of pay for time spent in collective-bargaining sessions during their normal working hours, the legal premise for Complainant Union-Petition- er's complaint seems debatable. With respect to further matters, particularly some UAW testimonial proffers regarding the permissiveness purportedly displayed by Respondent's supervisory personnel when confronted with NVEU campaign activity on company time and property, the presence of company supervisors cognizant relative to the particular NVEU campaign activity has not been convincingly shown. With respect to Foreman Green's purported card distribution, significant testimonial conflicts are presented; their resolution would require both a detailed record review and difficult credibility resolutions, together with some deduction bottomed upon logical probability merely. To illustrate: UAW's several witnesses proffered both coherent and consistent recitals sufficient to warrant a factual determination that Foreman Green did, indeed, distribute NVEU designation cards within his department; that he suggested workers who had received such cards should study and sign them during free time; and that he finally suggested such cards, when signed, should be delivered to Superintendent Lange, Respondent's middle management supervisor with a position two levels higher than the departmental foreman's. This trier of fact might well consider testimony believable that Green, really a rank-and-file worker holding down a foreman's post temporarily, did distribute NVEU designation cards. Since the record shows, however, that NVEU's leadership had from the outset publicized a cafeteria location where signed designation cards could be deposited during nonworking time, testimony that Foreman Green had nevertheless suggested their delivery to some middle management supervisor, specifically, can hardly be considered credible. Such a suggestion would certainly strike most people as senseless, even bizarre; the persistent of UAW's witnesses in charging Green therewith, within my view, significantly weakens their testimony. However, Respondent's counter witnesses, with respect to significant portions of their testimony, likewise lacked credibility. Green, and several departmental workers, did deny the card distribution. The foreman's testimony, however, was vague with respect to various relevant dates; further, he revealed significant failures of recollection. And Respondent's corroborative witnesses, Frances Rush and Doug Main particularly, were, within my view, significantly impeached. Their testimony weakened, rather than strengthened, Respondent's rebuttal presentation. With matters in this posture, disposition of UAW's present contention regarding Foreman Green's purported card distribution would now require more detailed consideration and treatment herein than such subject matter warrants. No disposition with respect thereto will be made. Regarding a further matter, Foreman Hill's conversation with Kenneth Clint regarding his questionable general machinist classification, some disposition consistent with UAW's contention might, conceivably, be considered warranted. The conversation in question, however, seem- ingly dealt with a rather unique situation; since my determination with respect thereto would add nothing of significance herein, the factual and legal questions raised thereby will not be resolved. There remain for disposition, two UAW contentions; these relate to Respondent's so-called "bribe" calculated to dramatize the value of Respondent's various fringe benefit programs and Respondent's prize lottery purportedly conceived merely to stimulate a large December 18 vote. Within two recent Board cases, similar employer conduct standing alone has been found insufficient to warrant a representation election's invalidation. Hollywood Plastics, Inc., 177 NLRB No. 40; Buzza-Cardozo, A Division of Gisbson Greeting Cards, Inc., 177 NLRB No. 38. The present record, however, reveals Respondent's prize lottery and monetary gifts as part of a sustained campaign which I have found reasonably calculated to interfere with employee free choice. With matters in this posture, I consider the cited cases distinguishable, and conclude that Respondent's prize lottery and monetary gift programs, within their relevant context, provide further justification for a Board order setting aside the challenged election results. V. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE Respondent's course of conduct described in section III, above, since it occurred in connection with Respondent's business operations, described in General Counsel's Complaint and concededly described correctly therein, had, and continues to have, a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States; absent correction, such conduct would tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. VI. THE REMEDY Since I have found that Respondent did engage, and continues to engage, in certain unfair labor practices which affect commerce, I shall recommend that it be ordered to cease and desist therefrom, and to take certain affirmative action, including the posting of appropriate notices, designed to effectuate the policies of the Act, as amended. Specifically, I have found that Respondent recognized Northrop Ventura Employees Union and negotiated a contract with it while a real question concerning represent- ation existed with respect to the workers covered thereby. Further, I have found, in the alternative, that this contract was first negotiated and given effect with respect to a particular group of Respondent's workers constituting a purported bargaining unit not appropriate for collective- bargaining purposes. I shall recommend, therefore, that Respondent be ordered to withdraw and withhold all NORTHROP CORPORATION 207 recognition from Northrop Ventura Employees Union, and to cease giving effect to the contract mentioned, or to any renewal, modification, supplement, or extension thereof, unless and until the designated labor organization shall have been certified by the Board as the exclusive representative of Respondent's technical and office work- ers, following a Board-conducted election, within a unit determined to be appropriate for collective-bargaining purposes. Nothing within these recommendations, howev- er, should be construed to require that Respondent vary or abandon any term or condition of employment provided pursuant to the contract mentioned, or currently enjoyed by the workers concerned. I have further found that Respondent's management, for the dual purpose of countering UAW's campaign to win designation as the collective-bargaining representative of Newbury Park's production and maintenance workers, and concurrently securing NVEU's entrenchment as their bargaining representative, provided statutorily proscribed assistance and support for the last designated organization, thereby interfering with, restraining, and coercing the workers concerned, with respect to their exercise of rights statutorily guaranteed. It will be recommended, therefore, that the Board specifically require Respondent to cease and desist therefrom. Within this Decision, it has been found that Respon- dent's maintenance, implementation, and enforcement of its November 13/December 10, 1968, contract, negotiated and signed with Northrop Ventura Employees Union, did not cause discrimination with respect to hire or tenure of employment, or terms and conditions of employment, for Respondent's technical and office workers. It has, however, been found that Respondent's management, when it withheld from Newbury Park's production and mainte- nance workers retroactive wage and fringe benefit adjust- ments equivalent - to those which had been granted Respondent's technical and office workers did engage in statutorily proscribed discrimination. Before this case was heard, Respondent's policy decision with respect to such withholding was reversed, and Newbury Park's production and maintenance workers did receive wage increases and fringe benefits adjustments, retroactive wherever applica- ble, comparable to those previously granted Respondent's technical and office workers. No make whole remedial order, therefore, now seems necessary; Respondent should merely be required to post appropriate notices declaring that no such disparate treatment will be accorded the workers concerned hereafter. In the light of the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record in this case, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Northrop Corporation, Ventura Division, is an employer within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act, engaged in commerce and business activities which affect commerce, within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act, as amended. 2. International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, Nor- throp Ventura Employees Union, and Organization of Northrop Employees, Ventura Division, Incorporated, are labor organizations within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act, as amended, which admit certain employees of Northrop Corporation, Ventura Division, to membership. 3. Respondent herein, by recognizing Northrop Ventu- ra Employees Union as collective-bargaining representative for a group of Newbury Park technical and office workers, and thereafter by signing and giving effect to a collective- bargaining contract with that organization, at a time when ONE, by virtue of its substantial claim to continued recognition, had raised a real question concerning repre- sentation with respect to the group of workers designated, has interfered with, restrained, and coerced these employ- ees with respect to their exercise of rights statutorily guaranteed, and has assisted and contributed support to Northrop Ventura Employees Union herein. Thereby, Respondent has engaged, and continues to engage in unfair labor practices affecting commerce, within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and (2), and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act, as amended. 4. Respondent herein, by recognizing Northrop Ventu- ra Employees Union as collective-bargaining representative for Newbury Park's technical and office workers, under the circumstances herein found; by thereafter signing, main- taining, and giving effect to a collective-bargaining contract with that organization; by making various written and oral announcements reasonably calculated to reveal its prefer- ence for Northrop Ventura Employees Union over Internation Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, in connection with their respective campaigns to win representation rights for Newbury Park's production and maintenance workers; by notifying such workers that, consequent upon NVEU's negotiations with Respondent's management, they would be granted a favorably modified Thanksgiving holiday schedule; by granting retroactive wage and fringe benefit adjustments to Newbury Park's technical and office workers, pursuant to contract, while concurrently notifying their facility's production and maintenance workers that comparable increases and benefit adjustments could not be granted them because of UAW's representation campaign; by notifying the workers concerned that, even should they designate UAW their representative, Respondent would not negotiate wage and benefit changes with that organization other than those provided for in NVEU's current contract; by distributing retroactive, paychecks to technical and office workers, whom NVEU represented, I day before the scheduled production and maintenance workers' representation election; and by declaring, there- after, that retroactive wage increases for production and maintenance workers would be withheld pending a final resolution of the representation question which UAW's petition raised, has interfered with, restrained, and coerced Newbury Park's production and maintenance workers with respect to their exercise of rights statutorily guaranteed, has contributed assistance and support to Northrop Ventura Employees Union in connection with its campaign to win representation rights for such workers, and has discriminat- ed against such workers with regard to their terms and conditions of employment, to encourage their NVEU adherence and discourage their support for UAW's 208 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD representation claims . Thereby, Respondent has engaged, and continues to engage, in unfair labor practices affecting commerce , within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1), (2), and (3), and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act, as amended. 5. General Counsel has not provided reliable, probative and substantial evidence sufficient to warrant a conclusion that Respondent's management changed Walter Kniffen's terms and conditions of work for reasons which would render such changes violative of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act, as amended. RECOMMENDED ORDER Upon these findings of fact and conclusions of law, and upon the entire record in the case, it is recommended that the Board, pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, order that Respondent, Northrop Corporation, Ventura Division, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Assisting or contributing support to Northrop Ventura Employees Union, or any other labor organiza- tion, by recognizing such labor organization as the exclusive representative of technical and office workers within its Newbury Park facility, for collective-bargaining purposes, unless and until said labor organization has been certified by the National Labor Relations Board as the exclusive representative of such workers within an appro- priate bargaining unit; (b) Giving effect to its November 13/December 10, 1968 contract with Northrop Ventura Employees Union, or to any renewal, modification, supplement, or extension thereof, unless and until said labor organization has been certified by the National Labor Relations Board as the exclusive representative of the workers covered thereby; provided, however, that nothing herein shall be construed to require that Respondent withdraw, vary, or abandon any wage, hour, seniority, or other terms and condition of employment which may have been established or con- firmed through collective bargaining with the labor organization designated, or to prejudice the assertion by Newbury Park employees of any rights which they may have derived as a result of membership in or representation by the said labor organization; (c) Assisting or contributing support to Northrop Ventura Employees Union in connection with its campaign to win representation rights covering Respondent's New- bury Park production and maintenance workers, by recognizing the designated labor organization as collective- bargaining representative for any Newbury Park employ- ees, except pursuant to the special procedures which the Act, as amended, provides; by signing, maintaining, or giving effect to any collective-bargaining contract with that organization; by declaring its preference for NVEU over UAW or any other labor organization, within a context of 2 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Section 102 46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions, recommendations, and Recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Section 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings , conclusions, and order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "POSTED BY ORDER OF conduct further calculated to provide assistance and contribute support to NVEU, comparable to the course of conduct herein found statutorily proscribed; by giving NVEU credit for favorable changes in working conditions promulgated for particular groups of concerned workers pursuant to management-determined decisions ; by grant- ing wage or fringe benefit adjustments to workers purportedly represented by NVEU, while concurrently notifying workers not so represented that comparable adjustments cannot be granted them because their choice of a collective-bargaining representative remains unresolved within a pending Board representation proceeding; by notifying such workers that, should they designate a labor organization other than NVEU their collective-bargaining representative, Respondent would not negotiate wage or benefit changes with that organization different from those granted workers pursuant to negotiations with NVEU herein; or by distributing paychecks incorporating wage rate changes for workers purportedly represented by NVEU before a representation election, while concurrently withholding comparable wage rate changes from the workers scheduled to participate in the election; (d) Interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employ- ees, in any like or related manner, with respect to their exercise of rights which Section 7 of the Act, as amended, guarantees. 2. Take the following affirmative action which is necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act, as amended: (a) Withdraw and withhold all recognition from Nor- throp Ventura Employees Union as representative of any of its employees for collective-bargaining purposes, unless and until that labor organization shall have been certified by the National Labor Relations Board as the exclusive represent- ative of such employees within a unit determined to be appropriate for such collective bargaining; (b) Post at its plant facility in Newbury Park, California, copies of the notice attached to this Decision as an appendix.2 Copies of the notice to be furnished by the Regional Director for Region 31, as the Board's agent, shall be posted, immediately upon their receipt, after being duly signed by Respondent's representative. When posted, they shall remain posted for 60 consecutive days thereafter in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that these notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material; (c) File with the Regional Director of Region 31, as the Board's agent, within 20 days from the date of service of this Trial Examiner's Decision, a written statement setting forth the manner and form in which it has complied with these recommendations.3 IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the results of the representation election held December 18, 1968, in Case 31-RC-854 be set aside, and that said case be severed and THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD" shall be changed to read "POSTED PURSUANT TO A JUDGMENT OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS ENFORCING AN ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD " 3 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, this provision shall be modified to read - "Notify the Regional Director, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith." NORTHROP CORPORATION 209 remanded to the Regional Director for Region 31 of the Board, for such further proceedings as may be appropriate; including the holding of a new election at such time as he deems the circumstances will permit the employees to freely express their wishes with respect to a bargaining representa- tive. APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government After a hearing, during which all sides were afforded opportunities to present their evidence, it has been determined that this company violated the National Labor Relations Act. In order to remedy such conduct, we are being required to post this notice. WE WILL NOT assist, or contribute support to, Northrop Ventura Employees Union or any other labor organization by recognizing, negotiating or contracting with such labor organization as the exclusive represent- ative of Newbury Park's technical and office workers, or any other employees, unless and until said labor organization has been certified by the National Labor Relations Board as the exclusive representative of such employees, comprising a group appropriate for collec- tive-bargaining purposes. WE WILL NOT give effect to our November 13/December 10, 1968, contract with Northrop Ventura Employees Union, or to any renewal, modification, supplement, or extension thereof, unless and until the said labor organization has been certified as the exclusive representative of the technical and office workers covered thereby. However, we are not required to withdraw, vary, or abandon any term or condition of employment which, may have been established or confirmed within that contract, as the result of collective bargaining. The workers covered thereby will not be prejudiced with respect to their assertion of rights derived from the contract designated. WE WILL NOT assist or contribute support to Northrop Ventura Employees Union, in connection with its campaign to win representation right covering our Newbury Park production and maintenance workers, by engaging in the conduct described below: 1. Recognizing or contracting with that organi- zation as collective-bargaining representative for any Newbury Park employees , unless and until that organization has been certified following the procedure for such certification which the Nation- al Labor Relations Act provides. 2. Declaring our preference for that organiza- tion over any other labor organization, while engaging in further conduct calculated to provide Northrop Ventura Employees Union with assist- ance or support which the National Labor Relations Act forbids. 3. Giving that organization credit for any favorable modification of working conditions promulgated for particular groups of employees pursuant to management decisions. 4. Granting wage or fringe benefits adjustments to workers purportedly represented by that organization, while concurrently telling workers not so represented that comparable adjustments cannot be granted them because a question of representation pending with respect to them remains unresolved. 5. Declaring that, should our employees desig- nate a labor organization other than Northrop Ventura Employees Union their collective-bar- gaining representative, we will not negotiate wage or fringe benefit changes with that organization different from those previously negotiated with Northrop Ventura Employees Union. 6. Distributing paychecks with wage rate changes to workers purportedly represented by Northrop Ventura Employees Union before any representation election, while withholding compa- rable wage rate changes from workers scheduled to participate in the election. WE WILL NOT interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees, with respect to their exercise of rights which the National Labor Relations Act guarantees, in any like or related manner. WE WILL withdraw and withhold all recognition from Northrop Ventura Employees Union , as the collective- bargaining representative for Newbury Park technical and office workers, or any other employees, unless and until that labor organization has been certified as such, by the National Labor Relations Board, for workers comprising a group appropriate for collective -bargain- ing purposes. NORTHROP CORPORATION, VENTURA DIVISION (Employer) Dated By (Representative ) (Title) This is an official notice and must not be defaced by anyone. This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. Any questions concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions, may be directed to the Board's Office, Federal Building, Room 121000 , 11000 Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California 90024, Telephone 824-7357.