187 NLRB 670
Welsman's Furniture and Appliances, Inc
670
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Weisman's
Furniture and Appliances,
Inc.
Myles
Furniture and Appliances, Inc. Heidi Furniture and
Appliances, Inc. Fair Furniture and Appliances, Inc.
Buena Furniture and Appliances, Inc., and Local
888,
Retail
Clerks
International
Association,
AFL-CIO. Case 2-CA-11939
January 4, 1971
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS
FANNING AND JENKINS
On August 20, 1970, Trial Examiner Paul E. Weil
issued his Decision in the above-entitled case, finding
that Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in
certain unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint
and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom
and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the
attached Trial Examiner's Decision. He further found
that Respondent had not engaged in certain other
unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint.
Thereafter Respondent filed exceptions to the Deci-
sion, and the General Counsel filed an answering
brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, the National Labor
Relations Board has delegated its powers in connec-
tion with this case to a three-member panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no
prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are
hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner's Decision, the exceptions, the briefs, and
the entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the
findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the
Trial Examiner.'
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the Recommend-
ed Order of the Trial Examiner as modified herein
and hereby orders that Respondent,
Weisman's
Furniture and Appliances, Inc., Myles Furniture and
Appliances, Inc., Heidi Furniture and Appliances,
Inc., Fair Furniture and Appliances, Inc., and Buena
Furniture and Appliances, Inc., New York, New
York, their officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's
Recommended Order, as modified below.
1.
Add the following as paragraph 2(b) to the Trial
Examiner's
Decision and reletter the subsequent
paragraphs accordingly:
"Notify immediately the above-named individuals
if presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United
States,
of the right to full reinstatement, upon
application after discharge from the Armed Forces, in
accordance with the Selective Service Act and the
Universal Military Training and Service Act.
2.
In footnote 14 to the Trial Examiner's Decision,
substitute "20" for "10" days.
3.
Substitute the attached Appendix for that
attached to the Trial Examiner's Decision.
IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint
be dismissed insofar as it alleges violations of Section
8(a)(1) and (3) as to which the Trial Examiner
recommended dismissal.
I We correct these madvertencies in the Trial Examiner's Decision
which do not affect the result herein.
Henrietta Finkelstein's office at the time of the layoff was at the Myles
(Peoples) store and not at the Weisman store.
The account of Marvin Weisman's conversation with employee Luis
Vargas should not be reported as a quotation from the record. It is a
paraphrase of Weisman's threat to the employee
There is no issue as to whether the Charging Union is a labor
organization, as mentioned by the Trial Examiner in In. I In the related
representation
case,
the
Regional
Director so found. Decision and
Direction of Election, dated October 22, l%9, Case 2-RC-15212 (not
published in bound volumes of Board decisions). And Respondent does
not challenge the Union's status.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO
EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
After a trial in which all sides had a chance to give
evidence the National Labor Relations Board has
found that we violated the National Labor Relations
Act and has ordered us to post this notice . The Act
gives all employees these rights:
1.
To engage in self-organization
2.
To form, join, or help unions
3.
To bargain collectively through repre-
sentatives of their own choosing
4.
To act together for collective bargaining
or other mutual aid or protection
5.
To refrain from any or all of these things.
WE WILL NOT do anything that interferes with,
restrains, or coerces employees with respect to
these rights.
WE WILL NOT coercively interrogate our em-
ployees about their union activities , threaten them
with discharge or threaten to close the stores
because of their union activities , or offer them
benefits to induce them to refrain from union
activities.
WE WILL NOT discourage membership in Local
888,
Retail
Clerks International
Association,
AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization, by
discriminatorily discharging and refusing to reins-
187 NLRB No. 86
WEISMAN'S FURNITURE AND APPLIANCES
671
tate any of our employees , or by discriminating in
any other manner in regard to their hire and tenure
of employment or any term or condition of
employment.
WE WILL offer Juan Matta ,
Jr.,
Francisco
Oliveras, Henrietta Finkelstein , and Linda Jack-
son reinstatement to their former positions or, if
those positions no longer exist , to substantially
equivalent positions, without prejudice to their
seniority or other rights and privileges, and we will
make them whole for any loss of earnings suffered
as a result of their discharges.
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with
Local 888, Retail Clerks International Associa-
tion, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive collective-bar-
gaining representative of all the following employ-
ees:
All full-time and regular part-time office
assistants, truckdrivers, helpers, store manag-
ers, store salesmen and payroll department
employees employed at our stores, excluding
all
professional
employees,
watchmen,
guards and supervisors as defined in the Act.
WEISMAN FURNITURE
AND APPLIANCES, INC.,
MYLES FURNITURE AND
APPLIANCES, INC., HEIDI
FURNITURE AND
APPLIANCES, INC., FAIR
FURNITURE AND
APPLIANCES, INC., AND
BUENA FURNITURE AND
APPLIANCES, INC.
(Employer)
Dated
By
(Representative)
(Title)
We will notify immediately the above-named individ-
uals, if presently serving in the Armed Forces of the
United States, of the right to full reinstatement, upon
application after discharge from the Armed Forces, in
accordance with the Selective Service Act and the
Universal Military Training and Service Act.
This is an official notice and must not be defaced by
anyone.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive
days from the date of posting and must not be altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
Any questions concerning this notice or compliance
with its provisions may be directed to the Board's
Office, 36th Floor Federal Building, 26 Federal Plaza,
New
York,
New
York
10007,
Telephone
212-264-0300.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
PAUL E. WEIL, Trial Examiner : On November 24, 1969,
Local
888,
Retail
Clerks
International
Association,
AFL-CIO, hereinafter called the Charging Party , filed the
charge alleging that Weisman Furniture and Appliances,
Inc.; Heidi Furniture and Appliances , Inc.; Myles Furni-
ture and Appliances, Inc.; Fair Furniture and Appliances,
Inc.; and Buena Furniture and Appliances, Inc., hereinaft-
er collectively called Respondent, engaged in certain unfair
labor practices. On March 27, 1970, the General Counsel,
by the Regional Director for Region 2, issued a complaint
alleging that Respondent by various acts interfered with,
restrained and coerced employees , discharged employees
because of their union or concerted activities and failed and
refused to bargain in good faith with the Charging Party as
the representative of its employees within the meaning of
Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. Respondent, by an answer duly
filed, admitted the filing of the charge, the fact that each of
the Respondents was a corporation and that the Charging
Party was a labor organization and denied all other
allegations in the complaint , except insofar as it is alleged
that Marvin Weisman is and has been the president of
Respondents Myles, Heidi, Fair and Buena and Isidore
Weisman is and has been the president of Respondent
Weisman Furniture and Appliances , Inc. In addition
Respondent alleged in its answer that in a Decision and
Direction of Election in Case 2-RC-15212 , dated October
22, 1969, the Board made certain findings of fact as to
matters alleged in the complaint in which Respondents
acquiesced and failed to appeal wherefor said findings may
not now be questioned by either Charging Party or the
Board and must be deemed exclusive findings "possible on
all issues that were raised or could have been raised as to all
that happened up to the date of the election."
On the issues thus joined the matter came on for hearing
before me on June 22, 1970, in New York City. All parties
had an opportunity to appear, to adduce evidence , to call
witnesses and examine and cross -examine them, to argue
on the record and to submit briefs . Briefs were received
from the General Counsel and Respondent.
In consideration of the record herein and of the briefs, I
make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT
Respondent consists of five New York corporations each
of which at the time material herein maintained a place of
business at a separate address all located in the borough of
Bronx, city and State of New York within an area the
diameter of which is 1 mile. In accordance with the
allegation in the complaint and the admission of Respon-
dent contained in its answer, relying on the findings of fact
in the representation decision, I find that Respondent is
and at all times material herein has been an affiliated
business with common officers, ownership, directors and
operators and constitutes a single-integrated business
enterprise engaged in the retail sale of furniture, household
672
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
appliances and related products. I find that annually
Respondent in the course and conduct of its operations
derives gross revenues in excess of $500,000 and causes
merchandise valued in excess of $50,000 to be transported
directly to its places of business from States of the United
States other than the State of New York. Accordingly, I
find that Respondent is and has been at all times an
employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(2), (6) and (7) of the Act.'
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The Charging Party is and at all times relevant hereto has
been a labor organization within the meaning of Section
2(5) of the Act.
III.
THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A.
The Unit
All full-time and regular part-time office assistants,
truckdrivers, helpers, store managers, store salesmen and
payroll department employees employed by Respondent at
its
five
stores,
excluding all professional employees,
watchmen, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act,
constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective
bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act.
B.
The Facts
Union organization on behalf of the Charging Party
commenced on July 13.2 Francisco Oliveras, the manager
of the Myles store, which is also known as Peoples and
usually referred to by that. name through the transcript,
together with the Union Business Agent Ivan Ruts, took
cards to various of the employees of Respondent who
signed them on July 13, 14 and 15. On July 16 or 17 Ruts,
together
with
another
union agent, Lucus, went to
Weisman's furniture store where they approached Isaac
Mizrahi, the manager of the store and asked to see Mr.
Weisman. Mizrahi informed them that he was not in the
store. They walked out of the store and called Oliveras at
the store in which he was employed. Oliveras told them that
Weisman was in fact in the store and described him
whereupon Ruts and Lucus returned to the store and
addressed themselves to Mr. Marvin Weisman, identified
themselves and attempted to hand him 15 signed authoriza-
tion cards. There is a conflict in testimony at this point.
Ruis and Lucus testified that Weisman took the cards and
examined each of them and laid them down on his desk.
Weisman,
Mizrahi and a clerical employee, Brenda
Narvaez, all testified that Weisman refused to take and
examine the cards. I see no need to determine the issue, it is
clear at any rate that Weisman had an opportunity to
examine the cards on that occasion. In response to the
request for recognition, Weisman stated that only his father
i At the hearing when counsel for Respondent attempted to introduce
evidence relating to the integration of the business enterprise, the alleged
supervisory status of a general manager, and of the store managers, and
moved at the close of the General Counsel's case that the complaint be
dismissed because inter atia the General Counsel did not adduce evidence
that the Charging Party is a labor organization I reminded him that under
the terms of the answer as I read it the findings set forth in the decision in
the representation matter were alleged by Respondent to be binding on all
could grant recognition and his father was not at the store;
he suggested that the union agents return the following
week. Ruts and Lucus returned about a week later and
again asked Marvin Weisman if he was willing to recognize
the Union. Marvin Weisman said that his father had not
returned and that he could not recognize the Union and
informed Ruis that his lawyer would get in touch with the
Union. According to Weisman, Ruts returned a day or two
later and excitedly asked him if he had posted something
sent him by the Labor Board. Weisman testified that a day
or two later he received a packet of material from the
National Labor Relations Board but apparently had no
clear recollection of what was in it. It would appear that his
reference was to a copy of the petition filed by the Union
on July 17 which resulted in the decision mentioned above.
Weisman does not deny that the Union requested
recognition on this occasion.
Henrietta Finkelstein, who was the bookkeeper for all
five of the stores but whose office was located in the
Weisman store, testified that a few days after she signed the
card Marvin Weisman asked her how she could have signed
a card and accused her of letting the Union look at the
company books, which she credibly testified she had not
done. Mrs. Finkelstein also testified that Marvin Weisman
at a later time told her that if the employees were going to
start trouble with a union he was going to close up the
stores.
Francisco Oliveras testified that a few days after he
turned the cards over to the union agents Weisman accused
him of instigating the Union and asked him why he did not
come to Weisman first. He asked Oliveras why the
employees wanted the Union and Oliveras told him that the
employees were interested in securing benefits that were not
being granted by the employer. Weisman suggested that
perhaps the employer could get Blue Shield insurance for
the employees and they would forget about the Union.
Juan Matta, Jr., testified that a few days after he signed
the card Marvin Weisman asked him if he had signed a
card and when he said that he had done so asked him why.
Matta testified that he heard Marvin Weisman ask the same
questions of Oliveras and stated that Weisman said he
would rather close the shop than deal with the Union.
Luis Vargas testified that Weisman asked him four or five
times if he signed a card. He never answered until the last
time when he answered that he had done so, whereupon
Weisman simply smiled and said, "Your time will come."
Marvin Weisman testified that as soon as the union
agents left his office on the occasion of their first visit he
picked up his telephone and called his attorney who advised
him not to ask questions or say anything about the Union
to any employees. Weisman testified that he followed this
advice and at no time mentioned the Union to any
employee.
I credit Mrs. Finkelstein. I believe that her testimony was
parties in the instant proceeding Respondent at those times had an
opportunity to amend its answer in the event it did not choose to proceed
under the terms thereof and declined to do so It may be noted that
counsel representing Respondent at the hearing was not the attorney who
prepared the answer, on whose behalf the matter was postponed on two
occasions and who never appeared at the hearing
2 All dates herein are in the year 1969 unless otherwise specified.
WEISMAN'S FURNITURE AND APPLIANCES
truthful and that she attempted to respond to questions
both on direct and cross-examination with candor, within
the limitations of her ability to remember precise verbiage
after a period of almost a year, and I was impressed with
her demeanor on the witness stand. On the other hand, with
Marvin
Weisman I was not so impressed. I noted
throughout his testimony a tendency on his behalf to evade
the direct question even under examination by his own
counsel.
I refer to circumstances such as when he was
asked, "Did you at any time threaten any of your
employees in connection with their union activities" and he
answered, "There was no need to threaten any employees. I
was under strict orders from my attorney and I adhered to
those orders." In response to a question whether he
interrogated his employees concerning their activities on
behalf of the Charging Party he answered, "That would
have been physically impossible. First of all it was difficult
for me to get around. I was still on crutches . I was being
driven into the place dust to hold the fort for my father."
Granted that such a reaction to direct questions is by no
means diapositive of the credibility of a witness and in both
instances recited above , after a repetition of the direct
question by his counsel, Mr. Weisman unequivocally stated
his denials, they are recited only as manifestations on the
cold record of the demeanor of Mr. Weisman which from
hearing him and watching him testify failed to convince me
of his candor. Inasmuch as his testimony is categorically
opposed to that of Mrs. Finkelstein set forth above, it
cannot be reconciled. Convinced as I am of her credibility
and unconvinced as I am of his I must discredit him and I
do. I find therefore that he made the statements attributed
to him by Mrs. Finkelstein.
Respondent at the hearing contended that Francisco
Oliveras was unworthy of credit both because of internal
inconsistencies in his testimony and because of various
information adduced with regard to him during his cross-
examination. First , Respondent contends that the fact that
Oliveras occasionally uses an alias, Antonio Conde, is a
disreputable circumstance. Oliveras explained that when he
commenced his most recent employment with Respondent
he had large debts which he was unable to pay At the
suggestion of Marvin Weisman he commenced using the
alias, Antonio Conde. (Antonio is one of his given names;
Conde is his mother's name . His complete name in the
Spanish manner is Francisco Antonio Oliveras-Conde.)
Oliveras
adopted
Marvin
Weisman's suggestion and
purchased goods on credit under the name of Antonio
Conde and Weisman agreed to inform credit investigators
that Antonio Conde was indeed employed by him. There is
no evidence that the alias, Antonio Conde, was used for any
other purpose.
Second, Respondent contends that a document which it
placed in evidence reveals that Oliveras unlawfully took a
number of pieces of furniture from the store for his own
use. The document, signed by Oliveras both as Francisco
Oliveras and Antonio Conde, recites the identification of
the pieces of furniture and the value of each, the total value
and states that Oliveras wants to pay for the furniture and
wants the furniture returned to his house and further
consents and agrees that commission and other moneys due
him may be held up for a reasonable time until an audit was
673
made of the store at which he worked. On the bottom of the
document is a receipt signed by General Manager Steinberg
for payment of the total value of the furniture.
Oliveras testified that it was customary and normal for
employees of Respondent to be permitted to order pieces of
furniture for their own use directly from the wholesale
furniture salesmen. Such furniture was then delivered to the
store and billed to it and the employee was expected to pay
for the material when it was delivered . Prerequisite to such
a transaction
was for the employee to secure the
cooperation of Weisman who had to approve all orders. In
the case of the furniture listed on the document in evidence,
Oliveras testified that he secured Weisman's permission at a
time when Weisman was in the hospital recovering from an
automobile accident early in the year 1969. When the
furniture was delivered to the store Oliveras took it to his
home. When the bills for the furniture arrived at the store,
however, Oliveras was himself in the hospital and had made
no provisions of paying for the furniture although he had
the
money
available . Weisman in the meantime had
apparently returned to work and sent employees to
Oliveras' house where it seems they entered the house
without permission and removed the furniture therefrom.
When Oliveras was discharged from the hospital he
returned home and was informed by his wife that Weisman
had ordered the furniture taken from his home . He went to
Weisman and reminded him that the furniture was
purchased with his permission and that it would have been
paid for but for the fact that Oliveras was in the hospital
when the bill was received. The document in evidence was
dictated by Weisman's attorney over the telephone to
Oliveras who signed it. An audit was thereafter made at the
store and no discrepancy appears to have been uncovered.
Although Weisman was present in the hearing room
when Oliveras testified and himself took the witness stand
thereafter, he made no mention of either incident in his
testimony. Accordingly, I infer that the explanations given
by Oliveras were correct. While the first incident appears to
be derogatory to Oliveras, if anyone is discredited thereby it
would be Marvin Weisman , for it was his suggestion that
Oliveras followed and it was Weisman's active participation
in Oliveras' actions that made it possible . The incident
redounds to the credit of neither . The second incident
reveals nothing to the discredit of Oliveras but displays
Marvin Weisman as both impetuous and ruthless toward
his employees.
With this background in mind, I am inclined to credit
Oliveras' testimony that on the Monday after his discharge,
that is to say on August 11, Marvin Weisman accused him
of instigating the Union and asked him why he did not
come first to Weisman. When Oliveras told Weisman that
the employees wanted the Union in order to secure benefits
that they were not receiving from Respondent, I believe it is
wholly consistent of Weisman to have suggested that
Respondent might supply Blue Shield insurance if the
employees would forget about the Union and I find it
equally believable that Isidore Weisman, father of Marvin
and the owner of one of the stores if not all of them, made
the same suggestion as Oliveras testified . In his testimony
before me Oliveras appeared to be truthful and candid both
on direct and cross-examination . I credit his testimony with
674
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
regard to both statements he attributes to the Weismans,
father and son.
Juan Matta, Jr., testified that a few days after he signed
the cards Marvin Weisman came to him and asked if he
signed a card and on his affirmative answer asked why.
Matta also testified that he heard Marvin Weisman ask
Oliveras the same question. He testified that in the
conversation Weisman said he did not want a union in the
store and that he would rather close the shop than have
one.3
Matta testified with apparent candor and sincerity. His
testimony suffered from the fact that he speaks little
English. Most of his testimony on direct examination was
taken through an interpreter. Respondent's counsel was
permitted on cross-examination briefly to examine Matta in
English, but I required counsel to examine him through the
interpreter when it became apparent to me that either I was
misunderstanding his testimony or he was misunderstand-
ing the questions. I credit Matta and I find that Marvin
Weisman interrogated him and in his presence informed
Oliveras that he would rather close the shop than have it go
union.
Luis Vargas testified that Weisman asked him four or five
times whether he had signed a card before he finally
answered in the affirmative at which time Weisman simply
smiled and said, "Your time will come." I credit Vargas'
testimony. The incident is consistent with Weisman's other
interrogations.
The general counsel additionally alleged various acts of
interrogation and one of a threat by General Manager
Steinberg. In view of my disposition of the allegations
concerning
Marvin and Isidore
Weisman, I deem it
unnecessary to resolve the issues raised thereby,4 inasmuch
as the order herein would be in no way changed by the
disposition of those allegations.
The Discharges
The
General
Counsel contends that the following
employees were discharged because of their participation in
the union organization:
1.
Luis Vargas: The General Counsel contends that Luis
Vargas was discharged on August 9, 1969, because he
signed a card for the Union. Vargas testified that Marvin
Weisman on August 9 called to him and simply asked him
for the keys and registration to his truck and told him he
had no more work for him. Nothing further was said. Other
than signing a card Vargas took no part in the union
organization. Marvin Weisman testified that Vargas was
the brother-in-law of Issac Mizrahi and that he also had a
brother employed by Respondent.5 Vargas had been
employed over a period of years by Respondent except for
a period after he quit because of Marvin Weisman's refusal
to pay him for overtime work. He reappeared after 2 weeks
and Weisman put him back to work. Weisman testified that
3 Oliveras did not corroborate the testimony of Matta with regard to the
interrogation of Oliveras by Weisman It was obvious that Oliveras had a
great
deal of trouble recalling the time of the various occurrences
concerning which he testified He testified at one point to an interrogation
by Weisman taking place 2 or 3 days after he signed the card which is
consistent with the timing testified to by Matta
However, later in his
testimony and cross-examination Oliveras testified that the interrogation
took place the day after his discharge on August 11, which was almost a
shortly before August 9 he received a complaint from a
valued customer, a friend of his father to whom some
merchandise had been sold which was delivered by Vargas.
The customer complained that Vargas refused to place the
furniture where he wanted it in his home and became
insolent
and insulted him with ethnic vituperation.
Weisman testified that he was angry because of this
complaint and asked his attorney if he could discharge
Vargas. The attorney told him to do what he had to do
whereupon he discharged Vargas without explanation.
Vargas was not recalled in rebuttal and there is no
testimony as to the incident other than that of Weisman,
corroborated by testimony of Brenda Narvaez that she had
originally received a complaint. I conclude from the failure
of the General Counsel to meet the evidence of Weisman
and Narvaez that the incident occurred as testified. Under
the circumstances, I find that the General Counsel has not
sustained his burden of proof that Vargas was discharged
because of his union adherence. It may be noted that as far
as the record shows 15 of the 19 employees were card
signers and, if I credit the testimony of Union Agents Ruis
and Lucus, Weisman was aware throughout what employ-
ees had signed cards. Accordingly, I shall recommend that
the complaint be dismissed insofar as it alleges the
discharge of Luis Vargas to be discriminatory.
2.
Oswaldo
Comacho:
At the hearing the General
Counsel amended the complaint to allege that the discharge
of Comacho was discriminatory. Comacho was not called
as a witness and the General Counsel produced no evidence
in
support of his allegation other than that he was
terminated on August 9 at the same time as Vargas, that he
was Vargas' helper as well as a porter and that he signed a
union card. When Vargas testified about his own discharge
he testified that he was alone, that Comacho was not with
him and that he did not speak to Comacho after his
discharge. Marvin Weisman testified that he at no time
discharged Comacho but that he did not reappear for work
after Vargas' discharge. He surmised that perhaps Vargas
told him that he too was discharged. In the complete
absence of evidence even that a discharge is involved, I
cannot find any discrimination with regard to
Mr.
Comacho.
Accordingly, I shall recommend that the
complaint be dismissed insofar as it is alleged therein that
he was discriminatonly discharged.
3.
Jose Pagan. Jose Pagan was the helper on a second
truck operated by Respondent of which his brother, Carlos,
was the driver. Both Pagans were card signers; there is no
evidence that either engaged in any other form of union or
concerted activity. Jose Pagan testified that a few days after
he signed a card, which is dated July 14, Marvin Weisman
asked him in one of the stores if he signed a card for the
Union. He told Marvin that he had done so. Nothing else
was said. A few days later he arrived at 9:30, his usual time
to come to work, and was cleaning the store. When his
month after he signed the card Under these circumstances I cannot say
that his testimony was unequivocally contradictory to or supportive of that
of Matta
4 While the decision in the representation case is not clear, it is at least
arguable. as Respondent indeed argues, that Bernard Steinberg was found
therein not to be a supervisor
5 The record reveals no other employee named Vargas on the payroll of
Respondent during the critical period
WEISMAN'S FURNITURE AND APPLIANCES
675
brother, Carlos, arrived, Weisman told both the Pagans that
they did not work there any more. On cross-examination
Jose Pagan testified that after he admitted signing the card
he asked for a raise and Marvin Weisman told him "Now
less than ever" and discharged him.
Respondent placed in evidence the affidavit signed by
Jose Pagan during the investigation of this matter. In the
affidavit he stated "only at 10 o'clock when my brother
arrived with the truck, Marvin told my brother and me that
we had no more work because it was slow. My brother and
I left saying nothing. Marvin said nothing about when we
could come back to work, I did not try to go back to work
since." Marvin Weisman testified that Jose Pagan and his
brother, Carlos, came into his office on August 9 and asked
for a raise, Carlos was the speaker and he said in Spanish
that he and his brother wanted a raise, otherwise he would
drive a gypsy cab, he made more money at night than
during the day. Weisman refused the raise whereupon
Carlos said, "All right, here is the keys" and walked out
with his brother. Brenda Narvaez testified that she was
present when the above conversation took place and that
the entire conversation was in Spanish by Carlos Pagan and
in English by Weisman. She testified that she did the
interpreting between them. Her story substantially corrobo-
rated that of Weisman.6 In view of the discrepancy between
Carlos Pagan's affidavit and his testimony and the fact that
his testimony is consistent to a certain extent with that of
Marvin Weisman, I do not credit Pagan's testimonial
version of the conversation. Accordingly, I find that the
General Counsel has failed to present substantial evidence
on the record as a whole contradicting that of Weisman
that in fact the Pagan brothers resigned when he denied
them a raise.
4.
Carlos Pagan.
Carlos Pagan testified that at the
Weisman store on August 9 he asked Marvin Weisman for
a salary raise because he was working all by himself for five
stores. A week or two before that time Weisman had
discharged the other truckdriver (Luis Vargas). He was not
present when Weisman discharged his brother. Weisman
asked him if he had signed a card for the Union. When he
acknowledged that he had done so Weisman told Carlos he
could not give him a raise, asking for the keys and
registration of the truck, and told him to go home. On
cross-examination he testified in response to the question,
"Do you own a taxi cab Mr. Pagan?" "I worked for a
company only on weekends." He stated that Weisman did
not tell him that business was bad and that in fact business
was good. The company records reveal that the Pagans
were discharged on August 23, 2 weeks after the date on
which they testified they were discharged. I note that Carlos
Pagan's testimony is inconsistent with that of his brother
contained in his affidavit as well as with that of Marvin
Weisman. I do not credit Carlos Pagan's testimony and, as I
have found above, General Counsel has not sustained his
burden of proof with regard to this allegation. Accordingly,
I shall recommend that the allegations regarding the two
Pagans be dismissed.
5.
Francisco Oliveras, Henrietta Finkelstein, Juan Matta,
Linda Jackson: These four employees were all discharged
on either Sunday, August 10, or Monday, August 11. Each
of these four employees was called on the telephone by
Marvin Weisman who informed them that they need not
come to work because the store in which they were
employed was being shut down. Each of them went into the
store the following morning and confronted Weisman, he
told each of them they were discharged because the store
was shut down. Mrs. Finkelstein testified that after she got
her things together she went down to Weisman's office and
spoke to him personally. She told him she could not
understand him shutting down the store, especially without
giving any notice. Weisman answered that he did not have
to keep the stores open, they were not doing too much
business and the employees were giving them trouble with
the Union. She testified that she had no further conversa-
tions at anytime with Weisman other than to call him and
ask for payment of $30 for the Fourth of July holiday. He
answered, "What makes you think I have to pay for the
holiday."
Weisman testified that while he had been in the hospital
the financial situation at the Peoples or Myles store
deteriorated rapidly and that after he left the hospital and
was convalescing from an operation on his foot he could
not get around as much as he had theretofore to see how to
alleviate the situation. Accordingly, he determined to close
the Myles and the Heidi
stores. He testified that he
immediately telephoned the five employees at the Myles
store.
(Steinberg the general manager was the fifth
employee.) He informed Finkelstein, Jackson, Oliveras and
Matta that he was shutting the store down and their
services would no longer be required and told them that
they could get their personal belongings on Monday,
August 11. As far as the Heidi store was concerned he
testified that the manager at that time was on vacation and
the other employee in the store, Jose Hernandas, was "in
the process of moving to Connecticut and decided to work
in Connecticut and never returned."
Within 2 weeks, before Frank Medina, Heidi' s manager,
returned from his vacation , Weisman reopened the Heidi
store at the suggestion of the finance company who carried
his paper. Bernard Steinberg, the general manager, moved
his office to the Heidi store and Jesus Munoz who had been
employed at the Weisman store was transferred to the
Heidi store . Thereafter Weisman determined that the
Weisman store, which was located in an old building owned
by the Weismans, should be closed because of the fact it
was so constructed that it was difficult to protect it against
thieves and hoodlums and the operations from that store
were moved to the prior situs of the Peoples or Myles store.
It is not clear from the record when this move took place.
On June 23, 1970, Weisman testified, he closed the Fair
e Isaac Mizrahi also testified to the incident He testified that the two
Pagans , Weisman , Miss Narvaez and he were present, that Carlos asked for
a raise and said they would quit if they did not get one When Weisman
refused to give them a raise Carlos handed Weisman the keys and they left
He testified on cross-examination first that Carlos spoke in broken English
and that Weisman understood some Spanish Then , on second thought, he
decided that Carlos might have spoken in Spanish . Brought to the subject
again, he testified that he would say that Carlos spoke in Spanish and that
he,
Mizrahi, acted as the interpreter
His next version was that he
interpreted part of the conversation but heard it all Finally, reminded that
Miss Narvaez was present he decided that she might have done some
translating. I believe that he had no recollection of the conversation, if
indeed he was present
676
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
store. One of the employees was transferred to the Weisman
store (now occupying the Myles-Peoples premises), another
went to the Heidi store and the record is not clear what
happened to the third.?
The General Counsel contends that the closing of the
Myles store was motivated by the incidence of union
organization. Marvin Weisman produced no records of any
kind supportive of his testimony that the store was in
financial trouble. The record reveals that employees were
not necessarily carried on the payrolls of the stores in which
they worked and in fact some of the employees received
paychecks from more than one, store. Whether this was the
occasion for the allegedly high overhead at the Myles store
cannot be ascertained from the transcript. If the overhead
was due to fixed costs such as costs of protection, rent,
utilities and the like it is difficult to see how Respondent
bettered its position by thereafter moving the Weisman
store into the Myles premises. It is notable also that two of
the four employees discharged with the closing of the Myles
store were general corporate employees; Mrs. Finkelstein
and Miss Linda Jackson were the bookkeepers for the
entire five-store complex. No explanation is given for the
brief closing of the Heidi store, and its immediate
reopening at the request of the finance company raises an
inference that it was an economically unsound action on
the part of Weisman
Insofar as Respondent's defense is based on the fact that
it no longer needed as many employees as it had, a further
complication appears on the record. Marvin Weisman was
asked to produce personnel records, especially including
records bearing the signatures of employees. He stated that
he was able to get only a few and pointed out that no
particular payroll period was indicated by the General
Counsel. The few that he brought to the hearing were Isaac
Mizrahi, Edgar Pagano, Jose Rivera, Gabriella Ortez and
Marcellino Rodriguez. With the exception of Isaac Mizrahi,
none of the names recited by Weisman are names that
appeared on the employer's payroll according to his
testimony on July 14, 1969. I believe a fair inference is that
these employees were hired since that time. Nevertheless, it
does not appear that Respondent at any time or now at the
present is prepared to take back the four employees .8
I
find that Respondent's defenses to the discharge
allegation with regard to Finkelstein, Oliveras, Jackson and
Matta are not supported by the facts on the record. Mrs.
Finkelstein testified that she had some knowledge of the
financial conditions of the stores and that certain stores did
more business than Peoples but that business was "routed"
from one store to another and extra expenses, as for
instance payroll expenses, were put on the Peoples store.
She testified that she did not know if Peoples or Heidi was
in any financial difficulty.
In view of the timing of the store closing, 3 weeks after
r The General Counsel moved to amend the complaint to allege that by
closing the Fair store without notifying the Union in advance, Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act I declined to permit the amendment at
that late date (the third and last day of the hearing) inasmuch as an order
to bargain which would ensue in the event the General Counsel prevails on
the allegations already in the complaint would encompass the duty to
bargain about closing a store or any other bargaining duty under the Act
No appeal was taken from my ruling.
8 i suggested to the General Counsel that he not seek enforcement of a
subpena nor delay the hearing to get the signatures when it appeared that
the advent of the Union, and the inconsistency latent in
Respondent's
defense
between the problem, i.e., the
economic motivation, and its alleged solution, including the
layoff of the bookkeeper and her assistant and the later
removal of the Weisman store to the Peoples location, I
conclude and find that Respondent's defense is a pretext
and that in fact the discharge of Jackson, Finkelstein,
Oliveras and Matta was in retaliation for their support of
the Union. Accordingly, I find that the discharge of these
four employees was in order to discourage union member-
ship and violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
The Refusal To Bargain
I have found above that the unit, consisting of all full-
time and regular part-time employees of Respondent's five
stores, is an appropriate unit within the meaning of Section
9(b) of the Act. The testimony of Marvin Weisman, derived
from Respondent's records, reveals that on July 17, the date
upon which Union Representatives Ruis and Lucus called
on Weisman to demand recognition, 19 employees were in
the unit. Ruis testified that he had in his possession and
displayed to
Marvin Weisman 15 authorization cards
signed
by employees. The 15 cards were received in
evidence, all are dated July 14, 1969, except 2, 1 of these
signed by Carlos Carrion, dated July 13, the other bearing
the name Jaime Pons bearing the date July 15. Fourteen of
the fifteen cards were identified by Francisco Oliveras, who
testified without contradiction that he saw the cards signed
by the persons whose names appeared thereon. No attack is
made by Respondent on any of the cards except that of
Brenda Narvaez who, called by Respondent, testified that
although she signed the card she did so only because
Oliveras threatened that he would cause her to lose her job
if she did not .9 Miss Narvaez also testified that within 2
days of signing the card she asked Oliveras to return it to
her because she had changed her mind. She did not indicate
in her testimony what, if anything, had caused her to
change her mind or what, if anything, mitigated the alleged
threat which I do not believe occurred. At any rate even
were I to assume that her card was invalid, 13 of the 15
cards are subject to no challenge cognizable under the
Board's rules.iO The 13 cards, of course, comprise a clear
majority of the 19 employees in the unit found appropriate
by the Board in the representation case.
No issue is raised by Respondent as to the sufficiency of
the Charging Party's demand for recognition. Accordingly,
it
appears that the Charging Party is the majority
representative of the employees in a unit appropriate for
collective bargaining and as such has made an adequate
demand for recognition from the employer. It appears
further and it is admitted that the employer has refused to
bargain with the Union. Under these circumstances the
he proposed to have the Trial Examiner compare signatures for the
purpose of proving the card of Frank Medina There is no indication that
Medina is not available and I declined, under the circumstances, to
undertake to determine from the companson of the signatures that in fact
Medina signed the card which is in evidence
9 1 do not credit Miss Narvaez in her testimony and I do credit Oliveras'
denial that he made any such threat
10 See N L N B v. Gissel Packing Co, Inc. 395 U S 575, accepting and
approving the Board's Cumberland Shoe rule. Cumberland Shoe Corp, 144
NLRB 1268 (1964)
WEISMAN'S FURNITURE AND APPLIANCES
General Counsel contends that a bargaining order should
issue in the instant case. Respondent advances the
argument in its answer and at the hearing that the findings
of the Board in the representation proceeding" must be
deemed "exclusive findings possible on all issues that were
raised or could have been raised as to all that happened up
to the date of the election" and that "Local 888 (the
Charging Party) and the National Labor Relations Board
cannot now for the first time make new inconsistent
allegations after each of the Respondents acquiesced and
failed to appeal from the prior finding." Respondent points
out that the charge in the instant case was not filed until the
day before the election, held pursuant to the Regional
Director's decision, nor served until the day of the election.
Accordingly,
Respondent contends that only by the
election process ordered in the decision of the Regional
Director may the question concerning representation found
to exist in that decision be resolved.
Respondent's argument is fallacious in that it fails to
distinguish between the findings of fact and conclusions of
law reached by the Regional Director (and, thus in the
absence of an appeal, by the Board) and the order of
election predicated thereon in order to resolve the question
concerning representation. As the Supreme Court pointed
out in the Gissel case (supra) a "Board election is not the
only method by which an employer may satisfy itself as to
the union's majority status" quoting its decision in United
Mine Workers v. Arkansas Oak Flooring Co., 351 U.S. 62,
72, fn. 8 (1956). Respondent's insistence herein that the
ballots, which have been impounded since the election was
conducted the day after the filing of the charges, should
now be opened and counted and the question concerning
representation resolved thereby is within its rights unless
Respondent has engaged in "contemporaneous unfair labor
practices likely to destroy - the Union's majority and
seriously impede the election." I have found above that
Respondent has engaged in widespread interrogation of
employees concerning whether and why they designated
the Union as their collective-bargaining representative,
threatened retaliation in the form of closing the stores,
attempted to undermine the employees' determination to
organize by the offer of Blue Shield insurance and actually
closed two stores and discharged four employees in
retaliation for their union activities . Clearly actions of the
nature
which I found to have been committed by
Respondent necessarily have the effect of undermining the
Union's strength and destroying the laboratory conditions
necessary to a fair election. As the Board has found in
many cases, with the specific approval of the Supreme
Court in Gissel (supra), where the intervening unfair labor
practices of an employer are of such a nature that their
coercive
effects
cannot be eliminated by traditional
remedies, a bargaining order may be necessary to effectuate
the purposes of the Act and protect the employees in their
determination of representation. I find that the unfair labor
practices found to have been committed herein are of such
a nature that a fair and reliable election could not be held
now or in the ascertainable future, even after the traditional
remedies of reinstatement with backpay and notice posting
677
were consummated.
Accordingly,
I
shall
order that
Respondent recognize and bargain with the Union, upon
demand, in addition to the specific remedies for the
violations of Section 8(a)(I) and (3) of the Act.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
UPON
COMMERCE
The activities of Respondent set forth in section III,
above, occurring in connection with Respondent's business
operations described in section I, above, have a close,
intimate, and substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and
commerce among the several States and tend to lead to
labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and
the free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent engaged in the unfair
labor practices set forth above , I recommend that it cease
and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action
designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. Such
affirmative action will include recognition and bargaining
on demand with the Union as the representative of its
employees in the unit spelled out above . Having found that
the Respondent unlawfully discharged four of its employ-
ees, I shall recommend that Respondent offer them
immediate and full reinstatement to their formerjobs or, if
their jobs no longer exist , to substantially equivalent jobs,
without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and
privileges, and make them whole for any loss of pay they
may have suffered by reason of the discrimination against
them by payment to them of a sum of money equivalent to
that which they normally would have earned in Respon-
dent's employ. This sum shall be calculated in the manner
established by the Board in F
W. Woolworth Company, 90
NLRB 289, with interest at the rate of 6 percent per annum
as set forth in Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716.
I do not deem it appropriate to recommend an order that
Respondent be required to reopen any store now closed. It
appears that its various stores are operated as a unit, to a
great
extent,
being
opened and closed as business
exigencies dictate . It also appears that a certain amount of
turnover
of
employees takes place in Respondent's
business. Accordingly, it does not appear that an additional
storesite is necessarily required to permit reinstatement of
the employees whose discharge is found herein to have been
discriminatory.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.
Respondent is engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2.
The Union
is
a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3.
Respondent
discharged Juan
Matta,
Francisco
Oliveras, Henrietta Finkelstein and Linda Jackson because
they engaged in union or concerted activities and in order
to discourage membership in the Charging Party and
thereby violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
11 As evidenced in the Decision and Direction of Election of the
Regional Director for Region 2, dated October 22, 1969
678
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
4.
By threatening employees with discharge, by coer-
cively interrogating employees concerning their union
activities, by offering promises of benefit to employees if
they forgot the Union and by threatening to shut the shops
in the event the employees chose the Union as their
collective-bargaining representative,
Respondent inde-
pendently violated Section 8(a)(I) of the Act.
5.
All full-time and regular part-time office assistants,
truckdrivers, helpers, store managers, store salesmen, and
payroll department employees of Respondent, exclusive of
all professional employees, watchmen, guards and all
supervisors as defined in the Act, constitute a unit
appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within
the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act.
6.
By failing and refusing to recognize and bargain with
the Union as the exclusive collective-bargaining representa-
tive of Respondent's employees in the unit described above
with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours and other terms
and conditions of employment of such employees, Respon-
dent has violated Section 8(a)(5) and (I) of the Act.
7.
The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section
2(6) and (7) of the Act.
RECOMMENDED ORDER i2
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and
conclusions of law and upon the entire record in this case, I
shall recommend that Respondent Weisman's Furniture
and Appliances, Inc., Myles Furniture and Appliances,
Inc.; Heidi Furniture and Appliances, Inc.; Fair Furniture
and Appliances, Inc.; and Buena Furniture and Appli-
ances, Inc.; its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall:
1.
Cease and desist from:
(a) Discouraging membership in Local 888, Retail Clerks
International Association, AFL-CIO, or any other labor
organization by discharging any employee or by discrimi-
nating in any other manner with respect to hire or tenure of
employment or any term or condition of employment.
(b) Interrogating employees concerning their union
activities, threatening them with discharge in the event they
engage in union activities, threatening to close the shops in
12 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Section 102 46 of
the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the
findings, conclusions, recommendations, and Recommended Order herein
shall, as provided in Section 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be
adopted by the'Boardi and become its findings , conclusions, and order, and
all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes
is In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a
United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "POSTED
the event the employees choose a collective-bargaining
agent, offering employees benefits to induce them to desist
from engaging in activities on behalf of the above-named
Union or any other labor organization or in any like or
related manner interfering with, restraining or coercing its
employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed in
Section 7 of the Act.
(c)
Refusing to bargain collectively in good faith
concerning rates of pay, hours of employment and other
terms and conditions of employment with Local 888, Retail
Clerks International Association, AFL-CIO, as the exclu-
sive representative of the employees in the appropriate unit
described in the section above entitled "Conclusions of
Law."
2.
Take the following affirmative action which is
necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a)
Offer to Juan Matta, Jr., Francisco Oliveras,
Henrietta Finkelstein and Linda Jackson immediate and
full reinstatement to their former jobs or, if those jobs no
longer exist, to substantially equivalent jobs and make them
whole for any loss of pay suffered by the reason of their
unlawful discharge in the manner set forth in the section
entitled "The Remedy."
(b) Upon request bargain collectively in good faith with
the above-named Union as the exclusive representative of
all employees in the appropriate unit and embody in a
signed agreement any understanding reached.
(c) Post at each of its stores in the city of New York
copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 13 Copies
of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director
for Region 2, after being duly signed by Respondent's
representative, shall be posted by Respondent immediately
upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60
consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, includ-
ing all places at the respective shops where notices to
employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall
be taken by the Respondent to insure that said notices are
not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 2, in writing,
within 20 days from the receipt of this Decision, what steps
have been taken to comply herewith.14
BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD"
shall be changed to read "POSTED PURSUANT TO A JUDGMENT OF
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS ENFORCING AN
ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD."
14 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board,
this provision shall be modified to read: "Notify the Regional Director for
Region 2, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps
Respondent has taken to comply herewith "