Granite State Joint Board

636 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Granite State Joint Board, Textile Workers Union of America, Local 1029, AFL-CIO i (International Paper Box Machine Company) and Felix Radziew- icz, Maurice K. Kimball, II and Paul R. Marquis, Eugene Collard , Hazen R. Johnson , Peter Makris, Sr. and Joseph M. Kerrigan, Esq. Cases 1-CB-1460 (1-2), 1-CB-1504 (1-4), and 1-CB-1534 December 31, 1970 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS BROWN AND JENKINS On June 4, 1969, Trial Examiner Milton Janus issued his Decision in the above-entitled Case 1-CB-1460(1-2), finding that the Respondent had not engaged in certain unfair labor practices within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, and recommending that the complaint be dismissed in its entirety, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. Thereafter, the General Counsel filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision and a brief in support thereof. The Respon- dent filed an answering brief. On July 3, 1969, the General Counsel filed a motion with the Board to reopen the record in Case 1-CB-1460(1-2), alleging that the Union had under- taken to implement its threat to fine the Charging Parties, which the Trial Examiner found was not violative of the Act, by filing formal charges against Radziewicz and Kimball for crossing its picket line at their place of employment at International Paper Box Machine Company (herein called the Company). The Respondent filed a brief in opposition to the General Counsel's motion. On October 22, 1969, the Board issued an Order granting the General Counsel's motion to reopen the record and remanded the proceeding to the Trial Examiner "... for the purpose of permitting the parties to present evidence of conduct occurring after the close of the hearing and bearing directly upon the conduct alleged in the complaint." In the interim, on June 24 and September 3, 1969, charges were filed against the Union in Case 1-CB-1504(1-4) and Case 1-CB-1534, on the basis of which a consolidated complaint, with notice of hearing, was issued against the Union on October 20, 1969. The complaint alleged that the Union violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by threatening to fine, i Herein called the Union or the Respondent 2 The Respondent's request for oral argument is hereby denied as, in our opinion, the record, exceptions, and briefs adequately present the positions of the parties 3 Booster Lodge No. 405, International Association of Machinists and imposing fines, and seeking judicial enforcement of such fines against certain named employees of the Company who had resigned from the Union and had returned to work during the Union's strike against the Company. On November 10, 1969, pursuant to motion made by the General Counsel, the Trial Examiner consolidated all these cases and, on November 20, 1969, conducted a hearing in the entire consolidated proceeding. On April 8, 1970, Trial Examiner Milton Janus issued his Supplemental Decision in the above-enti- tled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Supplemental Decision. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions to the Trial Examin- er's Supplemental Decision and a brief in support thereof. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this proceeding to a three- member panel. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearings and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in this proceeding, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommenda- tions with the following modifications.2 The Trial Examiner found, and we agree, that the Charging Parties, having effectively resigned from the Union before they crossed its picket line at their place of employment, were not subject to the Union's discipline for their postresignation conduct. The Trial Examiner therefore correctly concluded that the Union, by fining its former members, the Charging Parties herein, for conduct engaged in by them after their resignations from the Union and by seeking judicial enforcement of such fines, violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. In so finding, however, we rely upon the rationale more fully explicated in The Boeing Company,3 which issued after the Trial Examiner's Supplemental Decision herein.4 ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO (The Boeing Company), 185 NLRB No 23 i We agree with the Trial Examiner that the matter of the reasonableness of the Union's fines is an immaterial consideration herein, International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, Local Lodge No 504 (Arrow Development Co), 185 NLRB No. 22 187 NLRB No. 90 GRANITE STATE JOINT BOARD Relations Board adopts as its Order the Recommend- ed Order of the Trial Examiner's Supplemental Decision and hereby orders that the Respondent, Granite State Joint Board , Textile Workers Union of America, Local 1029, AFL-CIO, its officers , agents, and representatives, shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order, as so modified: 1. Delete paragraph 1(a) of the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order and substitute the following: "(a) Imposing fines, or seekingjudicial enforcement of such fines , against former members for crossing its picket line at International Paper Box Machine Company after they had resigned from the Union." 2. Add the following new paragraph 2(b), and reletter present paragraphs 2(b), (c), (d), (e), (f), and (g) as paragraphs 2(c), (d), (e), (f), (g), and (h), respectively: "(b) Reimburse or refund to any employees named in Appendix A who may have paid fines under the circumstances described in paragraph 1(a) of the Order the amount, if any, of said fines plus interest thereon at the rate of 6 percent per annum." 5 3. In footnote 8 of the Trial Examiner 's Supple- mental Decision , substitute "20" for "10" days. 4. Substitute the attached Appendix B for the Trial Examiner's Appendix B. MEMBER BROWN, dissenting: For reasons stated in my separate opinion in Booster Lodge No. 405, International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO (The Boeing Company), 185 NLRB No . 23, I would find no violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act in these cases and would dismiss the complaint in its entirety. 5 Booster Lodge No 405, International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO (The Boeing Company), supra, in 3 APPENDIX B NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES AND MEMBERS POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government WE WILL NOT fine former members of this Union for crossing our picket lines at International Paper Box Machine Company after they have resigned from the Union, nor will we try to collect such fines by suing them in the courts. WE WILL NOT restrain or coerce our former members in the exercise of rights guaranteed to them by Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended. WE WILL rescind the fines we have imposed against the persons named below, change our records to show that we have rescinded these fines, 637 and take all necessary action in the courts of New Hampshire to withdraw and give up all claims for collection of such fines. Alonzo Bealand Roger Bernier Marcel Berube Jean Boutin Eugene Collard Robert Depontbriand Leonard Desjardins Leo Dubois Aurel Duval Bernard Francis Roger Gagne Adrian Gagnon Clovis Gamache Robert Guerrette Hazen Johnson Maurice Kimball Armand Levesque Peter Makris Paul Marquis Ronald Maynard William Mayo Franklyn McAlister Roland Michaud John Nadeau Felix Radziewicz Emilien Riendeau Robert Roy Zennie Runowicz Alfred Theriault Henry Tremblay Gerald Tyler WE WILL reimburse the above nonmembers for any fines they may have paid to us for working behind our picket line at International Paper Box Machine Company plus interest at the rate of 6 percent per annum. GRANITE STATE JOINT BOARD, TEXTILE WORKERS UNION OF AMERICA, LOCAL 1029, AFL-CIO (Labor Organization) Dated By (Representative) (Title) This is an official notice and must not be defaced by anyone. This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. Any questions concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions may be directed to the Board's Office, 20th Floor John F. Kennedy Federal Building, Cambridge & New Sudbury Streets, Boston, Massa- chusetts 02203, Telephone 617-223-3330. TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE MILTON JANUS, Trial Examiner : Charges were filed by Felix Radziewicz and Maurice K. Kimball, II, on December 9, 1968, against Granite State Joint Board, Textile Workers Union of America , Local 1029, AFL-CIO, 638 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD referred to hereafter as the Respondent or the Union. A complaint based thereon was issued by the Regional Director for Region 1 on January 29, 1969, and an amendment thereto on February 12. The complaint, as amended, alleges that the Union violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by threatening employees of International Paper Box Machine Company, who were claiming to no longer be members of the Union with excessive fines if they failed to support its strike against the Company and/or attempted to resign from the Union, and by threatening employees with bodily harm and property damage if they failed to support its strike.' Respondent's answer denies the material allegations of the complaint. I conducted a hearing in this matter at Nashua, New Hampshire, on March 25, 1969. Briefs have been received from the General Counsel and the Union, and have been fully considered. Upon the entire record in the case, and from my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACTS 1. JURISDICTIONAL FACTS International Paper Box Machine Company is a New Hampshire corporation with its principal place of business at Nashua, N.H., where it is engaged in the manufacture and sale of automatic paper box making and gluing machines. During a representative 12-month period preceding the issuance of this complaint, the Company received material valued in excess of $50,000 from points directly outside New Hampshire, and shipped products directly to points outside that State valued in excess of $50,000. I find that the Company is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED Granite State Joint Board, Textile Workers Union of America, Local 1029, AFL-CIO, admits, and I find, that it is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES The Factual Background The Union has represented the production and mainte- nance employees of the Company for more than 20 years. Pursuant to a strike vote, the employees went on strike September 20, 1968, over economic issues upon the expiration of the latest agreement. The strike was still i The pertinent language of the statute reads as follows Sec 8(b) it shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents- (1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7 Provided, that this paragraph shall not impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership therein, 2 Two witnesses for the Respondent, Pitarys, a vice president of the International Union and manager of the Granite State Joint Board, and Arel, who was recording secretary of Local 1029 in September 1968, testified that the motion as offered and adopted was to the effect that the fine be $2000 or any amount determined by the Union The official minutes of the meeting, kept by Arel, were not offered by Respondent I current in late March 1969 when this hearing was held. Although the plant remained open, the only employees at work were supervisors, clerical, office, and technical employees, and three or four employees in the bargaining unit who were not union members. About 160 employees remained on strike, honoring a token picket line which kept the main gate of the plant under surveillance. The motion to strike the Company was voted on at a duly called meeting of union members the Saturday before expiration of the contract. Practically all the members were in attendance, and they assented to the strike by a standing vote, with only one member dissenting. The following Saturday, a day or two after the inception of the strike, another union meeting was held to discuss organization and tactics. A rank-and-file member proposed a motion that anyone aiding or abetting the Company or its officials during the strike be subject to a $2,000 fine.2 The motion was adopted unanimously without debate. Radziewicz and Kimball decided independently in November that they would abandon the strike and return to work for the Company. Knowing of the Union's vote that members who aided the Company during the strike could be fined $2,000, each believed that he could avoid the possible effects of the fine motion by resigning from the Union. Radziewicz sent a letter of resignation to the Union on November 5, and Kimball on November 25. Within a day or so of the receipt of each resignation, Pitarys, manager of the Granite State Joint Board, sent each of them a letter, substantially identical, saying that he was surprised at the attempt to resign, that they were not familiar with the provisions and procedures they were required to adhere to when they chose to become members, and that they were still considered to be members in good standing, required to abide by the Union's rules and regulations. Further, Pitarys' letters went on to say, "In the event you have any thought that your action removes you from your obligation as a union member, or that you have the right to cross the picket lines, let me caution you that you will be subject to a fine of $2,000 as per the unanimous action taken by the local union." After getting the letter from Pitarys, Kimball spoke to a supervisor of the Company, and asked him if it was true that the Union could fine him. The supervisor said he could not tell him what the Union could do, and Kimball then made no attempt to return to work for the Company. Radziewicz did go back to work secretly for the Company for 3 days around Thanksgiving, but after Pitarys called him by phone a number of times, and referred to his letter cautioning him about a $2,000 fine, Radziewicz decided not to work behind the picket line .3 The Union has taken no action against Radziewicz or Kimball by way of charges or note, moreover, that the letters of Pitarys to Radziewicz and Kimball mention only a $2,000 fine, referring neither to the possibility of a larger or a smaller fine I shall consider, in my later discussion, that the amount of the fine which Radziewicz and Kimball thought the Union could impose on them was a flat $2,000 ' Radziewicz also testified that Pitarys threatened him in one of these conversations that if he went back to the plant the next working day, the pickets would be watching for him, and that Pitarys would not be responsible for what might be done to him or to his car. Pitarys flatly denied making any threat of physical harm or damage to Radziewicz I credit Pitarys GRANITE STATE JOINT BOARD 639 proceedings for the purpose of fining them or imposing any other type of discipline. It is clear that Kimball, at least, whatever his intentions might have been with respect to working behind the picket line when he attempted to resign, took no overt action about abandoning the strike. The bargaining agreement which expired September 20, 1968, had provided that employees who were union members on its effective date 3 years earlier, or who joined the Union during its term, were to remain members in good standing. The agreement had also provided that the Company would deduct union dues and initiation fees from the wages of any employee who authorized it to do so in writing. Radziewicz had been a member of the Union since 1960, while Kimball had joined it in December 1967, some 7 months after his employment with the Company. Each had signified his intention tojoin by signing an application for membership which included an authorization to the Company to deduct his initiation fees and dues. The combined application for membership and checkoff authorization read as follows: I, the undersigned hereby accept membership in Textile Workers' Union of America, AFL-CIO, and do hereby authorize and direct INTERNATIONAL PAPER BOX MACHINE COMPANY, NASHUA which is my employer, to deduct from my wages the membership dues including initiation fees, in the amount fixed pursuant to the Constitution and the By-Laws of my Local Union and to pay over same to the Union or its designated agent pursuant to the provisions of any current or future collective agreement. This authorization shall remain in effect until revoked by me and shall be irrevocable for a period of one year from the date hereof or until the termination date of any applicable collective agreement, whichever occurs sooner; unless I revoke it by sending written notices to my Employer and the Local Union by registered mail, only during a period of ten days immediately succeeding the termination date of any applicable collective agreement or yearly period, it shall be automatically renewed as an irrevocable checkoff from year to year, until duly revoked as herein provided. The combined application and dues checkoff authoriza- tion card does not set out a procedure by which a union member may resign. It does, of course, permit revocation of the dues checkoff authorization within the time periods specified in Sec . 302(c)(4) of the Labor Management Relations Act, as amended, but the language provides for no more than that-it is completely silent on when or if the Union will recognize a resignation as effective.' The authorization card thereby mirrors what the constitutions and by-laws of the Textile Workers Union of America, the Granite State Joint Board, and Local 1029 already provide for--that a member may not voluntarily withdraw from the Union except by leaving the industry, in which case he may 4 Under the maintenance of membership provision of the last expired agreement, a union member who had revoked his checkoff authorization in a timely fashion, that is within the 10-day period following his anniversary of acquiring membership would still be obligated to remain a member in obtain a withdrawal card. Death, presumably, provides the only other means of exit from the Union. The Union also attempted to show that Kimball had in effect revoked his letter of resignation by accepting a Thanksgiving turkey from it after his letter to the Union. The evidence as to whether Kimball accepted one of the Union's turkeys is unclear, but even if he had, I would not consider it to be a meaningful retraction of his attempt to resign. Analysis and Conclusions The Supreme Court held in N.L. R. B. 'v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Company, 388 U.S. 175, 87 S. Ct 2001, that the Union in that case had not violated Sec. 8 (b)(1)(A) of the Act by seeking judicial enforcement for a fine of $100 imposed on a member who had engaged in strike -breaking activities. In Scofield v. N. L. R. B., 394 U.S. 423, 89 S. Ct. 1154, (April 1 , 1969) the Court held that a union rule imposing a ceiling on payments for incentive work was valid and could be enforced through collection of reasonable fines without violating Sec. 8(b)(1)(A). The Court's opinions in these two cases were obviously intended to illuminate a broader area than that under direct consideration . A brief statement of the general principle involved is given in Allis-Chalmers, at 388 U .S. 195: Thus this history of congressional action does not support a conclusion that the Taft-Hartley prohibitions against restraint or coercion of an employee to refrain from concerted activities included a prohibition against the imposition of fines on members who decline to honor an authorized strike and attempts to collect such fines. Rather, the contrary inference is morejustified in light of the repeated refrain throughout the debates on Sec. 8(b)(1)(A) and other sections that Congress did not propose any limitations with respect to the internal affairs of unions, aside from barring enforcement of a union's internal regulations to affect a member's employment status. There are as yet no decisions of the Board in which it has worked out the implications of Allis-Chalmers and Scofield. Specifically, among the unanswered questions are the two presented here : ( 1) is it critical, in determining whether a union has violated Sec . 8(b)(1)(A) that the amount of the fine is "unreasonable", and under what circumstances does it become unreasonable ; and (2) is it critical, for purposes of the same determination, that membership in the union was in some sense involuntary. 1. Reasonableness of the fine: It is clear from both Alhs- Chalmers and Scofield that the Court considered the amount of the fines for which judicial enforcement was sought in those cases as reasonable . There are scattered references throughout the two opinions that the reasonable- ness of the fine , at least when judicial enforcement was sought, was a factor in deciding whether a violation would be found. But there are other parts of the two opinions where the absence of a reference to reasonable fines might good standing for at least the remaining term of the agreement Failure to retain good standing by payment of his union dues could result in his discharge at the Union's request of the Company, under Sec 8(a) (3) of the Act 640 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD lead one to conclude that the amount of the fine was beyond the scope of the Board's inquiry.5 However, since I assume that the Court did not knowingly refer to the reasonableness of a fine without intending it to have some significance, an attempt must be made to fit the concept into the context of the Court's actual holdings. It must again be noted, in preface, that the Court held the fines as enforced by the state courts in Allis- Chalmers and Scofield as reasonable, and that court enforcement of a fine is the final stage of a fine proceeding. The preliminary stages recognized by the opinions, through which a union's fine motion may proceed, are as follows: (1) the passage of the motion in an approved manner, or the prior existence of a union rule with or without a prescribed penalty; (2) notification to a member of the union action or existing rule; (3) imposition of a fine in accordance with the procedure prescribed in the Landrum-Grif fin Act; 6 and (4) enforcement, either judicially or through the union's own internal machinery. Notification, meaning a cautionary announcement to strikebreakers that their offense might be punishable by a fine, is found by the Court in Allis-Chalmers, supra at 192, footnote 30, not to be an unfair labor practice at least under the proviso, if not under the body of Sec 8(b)(1), primarily because no inference can be drawn from the notification that court enforcement would be the means of collection. It would thus seem that even a "threat" or "caution" of an unreasonably large fine to employees whom the Union believed to be ready to engage in strikebreaking would not be a violation, unless perhaps, court enforcement was also threatened. Although such a notification may be given before the imposition of a fine, it is only the latter which is, assuming the Union's compliance with Sec. 411(a)(5) of the Landrum-Griffin Act, efficacious. Until the prescribed procedure has been followed, a cautionary announcement to a possible offender that a fine may be imposed is not, it seems to me, any more an unfair labor practice than the fine motion itself. There is no hint in either of the Court's opinions that promulgation of a valid union rule and a prescribed penalty, even though "unreasonable", would constitute a violation of Sec. 8(b)(1)(A). I need not therefore decide in this case whether the imposition of a $2,000 fine would have been unreasonable per se; whether the surrounding circumstances might affect a determination as to the reasonableness of a fine; 7 or whether court enforcement of an imposed fine in such amount would be an unfair labor practice. I find here that the notification to the potential strikebreakers, Kimball and Radziewicz, of the Union's fine motion, of which they were already aware, and the explicit warning that they would be subject to a $2,000 fine was not an unfair labor practice. This does not, however, necessarily dispose of the case. 5 Eg Allis-Chalmers v. N.LR.B, 388 U.S 175 at 191-192 "Cogent support of an interpretation of the body of Sec 8(b)(1)(A) as not reaching the imposition of fines and attempts at court enforcement is the proviso to Sec. 8(b)(I) , At the very least it can be said that the proviso preserves the rights to unions to impose fines, as a lesser penalty than expulsion, and to impose fines which carry the explicit or implicit threat of expulsion for nonpayment" It would seem that if a union may expel a member for violation of a union rule without first fining him, then the amount of a fine for which expulsion may later be sought is immaterial 6 Pub. L 86-257, 73 Stat. 522, 29 U S C Sec 411 et seq Sec 411 (a)(5) reads "Safeguards against improper disciplinary action - No member of 2. The Resignations: The General Counsel contends that a union's right to impose a reasonable fine on a member for failing to support its strike does not extend to a threat to fine an employee who has resigned his membership, without regard to the reasonableness of the fine. The main thrust of the Respondent's argument is that Kimball and Radziewicz could not resign when they attempted to do so, that they are still union members, and that the Board does not have the authority "to passjudgment on the penalties a Union may impose on a member." 8 The Union argues, however, that if Kimball and Radziewicz had in fact resigned, and if the Pitarys letters were a threat, they were nevertheless not coercive within the meaning of Sec. 8(b)(1)(A) because the obligations of membership, no matter how severe, simply do not apply to nonmembers. The Supreme Court's opinions in Allis-Chalmers and Scofield make occasional references to "full membership" but they appear to relate to the problem of an employee obligated under a union-security provision to become a union member who chooses not to assume the responsibili- ties of full membership but to satisfy his financial obligations by paying the equivalent of the initiation fee and the monthly dues. There is, however, a statement in Scofield which speaks more directly on the issue of a union's right to fine a member who seeks to resign. It reads as follows (89 S. Ct 1154 at 1158): Under this dual approach, Sec. 8(b)(1) leaves a union free to enforce a properly adopted rule which reflects a legitimate union interest, impairs no policy Congress has imbedded in the labor laws, and is reasonably enforced against union members who are free to leave the union and escape the rule. [Emphasis supplied. ] The quoted language does not refer to the conditions governing resignations, such as whether a member must comply with internal union regulations as to their time and manner, or whether a resignation need be accepted at all if the union makes no provision for voluntary resignations while still employed in the industry. There are, however, certain statutory and Board princi- ples which are of help in determining the rights and obligations of unions toward employees who seek to resign their union membership. There is first, of course, the proviso to Sec. 8(b)(1)(A) which enjoins impairment of a union's right to prescribe its own rules as to the acquisition or retention of membership. There are also those Board cases which hold that a union violates Sec. 8(b)(2) if it seeks the discharge for nonpayment of dues of an employee who has resigned at a time when a union security, or maintenance of membership, clause was not in effect, or who has resigned at any time from a union which does not any labor organization may be fined, suspended, expelled or otherwise disciplined except for nonpayment of dues by such organization unless such member has been (A) served with written specific charges, (B) given a reasonable time to prepare his defense. (C) afforded a full and fairhearing." r Such surrounding circumstances might be the duration of the strike and what the employee might have earned if he had gone back to work despite the imposition of the fine, as compared with the amount of the fine 8 The quotation is from the Board's decision in the Wisconsin Motors case l45 NLRB 1097, 1104, enforced by the Supreme Court sub nom Scofield v NLRB, supra GRANITE STATE JOINT BOARD 641 provide by its constitution or bylaws for any effective method of resignation.9 These cases certainly hold that a union cannot prevail against an otherwise valid charge of violating Sec. 8(b)(2) by invoking the proviso to Sec. 8(b)(1)(A). Even the Paulding case on which Respondent relies, (N. L. R. B. v. International Union, Automobile Workers etc, 320 F.2d. 12), does not go so far as to hold that a union which provides no effective method of resignation may continue to treat employees who attempt to resign, as members thereafter. See the caveat in this opinion at 320 F.2d 12, 15-16, "Needless to say, as we indicated in a prior opinion between these same parties; `it may be that . . there is a limit of reasonableness beyond which a union may not go' in structuring its internal regulations " In the instant case, when Kimball and Radziewicz resigned, there was no contractual provision in effect which required them to remain members, nor did the union's constitution allow them any free period in which to revoke their membership. But the Union has not sought to affect their job security in any manner. It has, at most, threatened to take steps to impose a fine if they should cross its picket lines. There are, however, intimations in the pertinent cases that resignation from a union is a right protected by Sec. 7 of the Act, embodying a public policy to which the proviso of Sec 8(b)(l)(A) must be subordinated.10 I aim led to conclude from the cases cited in footnote 10 that Kimball and Radziewicz effectively resigned despite their "contract of membership" with the Union which forbade their resignations. To return then to the basic question already posed. If Kimball and Radzrewrcz were no longer members of the Union when Pitarys sent them his warning letters, can the Union be said to have violated Sec. 8(b)(1) thereby? It can be said with a kind of blinkered logic that nonmembers cannot be coerced by a threat to impose a fine based on failure to fulfill the obligations due only of a member. It is true, however, only if the nonmember can divine what the Board and the courts may decide in his particular case years later. Faced with the immediate risk in having to decide what the Union might be able to do, it is not surprising that Kimball and Radzrewrcz decided to forego their Sec. 7 right to work during the strike rather than face the potential risk of a heavy fine. However, the issue of whether the Pitarys letters were intimidating in fact is yet dependent on the primary issue of whether the letters constituted restraint or coercion within the meaning of Sec. 8(b)(1). If it is not restraint or coercion to caution members about a possible fine, it is certainly no more violative to caution nonmembers. I have previously concluded that the Pitarys letters went no further, and accomplished no more than the fine motion did, and since a fine motion or other valid union rule against strikebreaking is not in itself a violation, further notification of its passage or existence either to members or nonmembers is also not a violation. The Union did not impose fines on Kimball or Radziewicz, in compliance with the procedures required by Sec. 411(a)(5) of the Landrum- Griffin Act, nor did it seek either internal or external enforcement of its valid fine motion. It is thus unnecessary for me to decide whether it is the imposition or the enforcement of an excessive fine which violates Sec 8(b)(1). It is also beyond the scope of my inquiry whether $2,000 is a reasonable amount for a fine, or at what stage, either imposition or enforcement, it becomes unreasonable. I shall recommend dismissal of the complaint in its entirety On the basis of the foregoing findings and analysis of the facts, I made the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. International Paper Box Machine Company is engaged in commerce and in activities affecting commerce, within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act. 2. Granite State Joint Board, Textile Workers Union of America, Local 1029, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act 3. The Respondent has not engaged in any unfair labor practices as alleged in the complaint. RECOMMENDED ORDER It is hereby recommended that the complaint be dismissed in its entirety. 9 Aeronautical Industrial District Lodge 751 etc (The Boeing Company) 173 NLRB No 71, Local Union No 621, United Rubber etc Workers, (Atlantic Research Corporation) 167 NLRB 610, In 1, international Union, United Automobile etc Workers, (John i Paulding, Inc) 142 NLRB 296, 137 NLRB 901. set aside in N L R B v international Union, etc 320 F 2d 12 (C A I), 130 NLRB 1035, enfd N L R B v International Union, etc, 297 F 2d 272, (C A 1), Newspaper Guild of Buffalo, Local #26, 118 NLRB 1471, Marlin Rockwell Corporation, 114 NLRB 553, New Jersey Bell Telephone Company, 106 NLRB' 1322, enfd 215 F 2d 835 (C A 2) 10 Marlin Rockwell Corporation, 118 NLRB 553, 559-562, Communica- tions Workers of America v N L R B 215 F 2d 835 at 838, (C A 2) enforcing New Jersey Bell Telephone Company, 106 NLRB 1322 TRIAL EXAMINER'S SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE MILTON JANUS, Trial Examiner: On June 4, 1969, I issued a Decision in Case 1-CB-1460(1-2) recommending dis- missal of the complaint against the Respondent, Granite State Joint Board, Textile Workers Union of America, Local 1029, AFL-CIO, (referred to hereafter as the Union). The reason for my recommendation of dismissal was that, in my opinion, the holdings of the Supreme Courtin Allis- Chalmers v. N.L.R B., 388 U S. 175, and in Scofield v. N.L.R.B., 394 U.S. 423, required a finding that Section 8(b)(I)(A) was not violated by the Union's warning the Charging Parties, Radziewicz and Kimball, that they would be subject to fines if they engaged in strikebreaking. I also held in my Decision that Radziewicz and Kimball could resign from the Union at any time in the absence of provision in the Union's constitution or bylaws for resignation at specified intervals, and that the resignations they had submitted to the Union were effective. The General Counsel filed exceptions to my Decision on June 26, 1969. Two days earlier, on June 24, charges had been filed against the Union in Case I-CB-1504(1-4) by the individuals named in the caption, charging a violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A) by the Union's threats to fine them if they crossed the Union's picket line at the International 642 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Paper Box Machine Company plant where the Union was on strike. On July 3, 1969, the General Counsel filed a motion with the Board to reopen the record in Case 1-CB-1460(1-2), alleging that the Union had filed formal charges against Radziewicz and Kimball for crossing its picket line at the Company's plant, thereby going beyond its previous warnings to them which I had found not to be violative of the Act. On September 3, 1969, Peter Kerrigan , an attorney, filed a charge in Case 1-CB-1534 on behalf of 23 named individuals, employees of the Company , alleging that the Union had fined them for crossing its picket lines and had brought suit in a state court to collect the fines which it had imposed. On October 20, 1969, the General Counsel ordered Cases 1-CB-1504 (1-4) and 1-CB-1534 consolidated for hearing, and issued his complaint in that consolidated proceeding alleging that the Union had violated Section 8 (b)(l)(A) by threatening to impose fines, by fining and by seeking judicial enforcement of such fines against employees of the Company who had resigned from the Union and had returned to work during the Union's strike against the Company. Two days later, on October 22, the Board granted the General Counsel's motion to reopen the record in Case 1-CB-1460( 1-2) and remanded it to me to take evidence as to conduct which occurred after the close of the hearing in that case and which bore directly on the conduct alleged in that complaint. Thereafter, on October 24, the General Counsel filed a motion with me to consolidate the remanded case with the two cases which he had previously consolidated and on which he had issued a new complaint. I issued an Order granting the General Counsel 's motion, on November 10, 1969, and reaffirmed it on November 14, after the Union's request for reconsideration. A hearing was thereafter held on the entire consolidated proceeding on November 20, 1969, at Nashua, New Hampshire.' The Union filed a brief after the hearing which I have considered . I have also considered later communications from both the Union and the General Counsel advising me of certain recently issued Trial Examiner's Decisions supporting their respective positions. Upon the entire record in the case and from my observation of the witnesses , I make the following: ADDITIONAL FINDINGS OF FACT The essential facts here are not in dispute, and at the risk of some repetition, I will summarize what is already set out in my original Decision as a prelude to a description of the events which have taken place since then. The last bargaining agreement between the Company and the Union expired September 20, 1968, and on that date the Union began an economic strike which was still in force on the date of the latest hearing, November 20, 1969. Almost the entire working force were members of the union under a maintenance-of-membership provision in the last contract, and all the union members went out on strike. The strike vote had been unanimously adopted, and a motion to fine anyone who aided the employer during the strike in the amount of $2,000 was adopted at a union meeting with only one dissenting vote. Radziewicz and Kimball sent letters of resignation to the Union in November 1968 and the Union quickly replied, advising them that their purported resignations were ineffective, that they were still members subject to the Union's rules, and cautioning them that they were subject to a fine of $2,000 if they insisted on going back to work during the strike. Kimball did not attempt to return to work, while Radziewicz, who had gone back to work for a few days, then decided not to continue working behind the picket lines. On these facts, I held in my original Decision that neither the fine motion, passed by the membership at the inception of the strike, nor the Union 's letters to Radziewicz and Kimball on receipt of their resignations constituted imposition of a fine within the meaning of Sec. 411(a)(5) of the Landrum-Griffin Act, 29 U.S.C. 401 et seq., and that it was therefore unnecessary for me to decide whether a $2,000 fine, if it had been imposed, would have been unreasonable. I went on to find that since the Union's constitution did not provide for voluntary resignations under any circumstances or at any particular time, Radziewicz and Kimball were free to resign whenever they chose. Resignation from a union was, I found, a right protected by Sec. 7 of the Act.2 I recommended dismissal of the complaint since I found no violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A) by the Union warning the two Charging Parties that they might be fined for crossing its picket line at the Company's plant. What follows is a recital of the events occurring after June 4, 1969, the date of my Decision. As soon as the Company was notified of that Decision, it sent letters to all the striking employees (Resp. Exh. 3) advising them that my Decision meant that employees who resigned from the Union could not be fined, and that they were therefore free to cross the picket line and return to work. A few days later, the Union responded to the Company's invitation to the strikers to return to work with a letter (G. C. Exh. 2) to its members, warning them that the Supreme Court had upheld a union's right to fine anyone engaged in strikebreaking, and that charges would be brought against anyone doing so. It urged them not to be misled by the Company. Shortly before my Decision was issued, a third employee, Hazen Johnson, resigned. After the Decision, beginning on June 6, 1969, and for some months following, there were many more resignations, totalling 31 altogether. (Their names are listed in Appendix A.) After resigning, they returned to work for the Company, crossing the picket lines to do so. While they had been out on strike, many of these 31 had obligated themselves in a written statement to the Union, to reimburse it for the premiums which the Union would pay to keep their group insurance policies current. Many of them also accepted cash payments from the Union while they were striking. I By arrangement at the hearing an exhibit number, G.C. Il, was 2 My reason for considering the resignation problem at all was in reserved for later submission by Mr. Kerrigan, the attorney for the connection with the arguments of both parties on whether a nonmember Charging Parties. It is now part of the official record of the case. can be restrained or coerced by a threat to fine him. GRANITE STATE JOINT BOARD 643 After they returned to work , the Union sent each of the 31 a letter charging him with misconduct by crossing its picket line, and requesting him to appear at a hearing at a specified time to answer the charge None of them appeared as requested The Union then notified each of them that a hearing had been held, and that a fine had been imposed on him amounting to a day's pay for each day worked Some time later, the Union sent each of them a letter informing them that it had not yet heard from them about paying their fines, and threatening them with legal action to collect it None of them paid the fine imposed , and the Union then filed a suit and writ of attachment against each in the New Hampshire state courts The suits claim a specific amount due the Union as a result of the defendant 's contract of membership in the Union and, where applicable a second count based on its claim for moneys advanced on their behalf for insurance premiums However, the amount claimed is in all cases greater than the specific sums alleged to be due and owing For example , the action brought against Eugene Collard is for $1,400 in the first count and $195 14 in the second, while the total amount claimed is $2,000 Contentions, Analysis , and Conclusions The General Counsel has already filed exceptions to my Decision in the original proceeding and stands by the contentions raised then, that the Union's letters to Radziewicz and Kimball after their resignations in November 1968 are threats to impose excessive fines and are in themselves violative of Section 8(b)(1)(A) As to the imposition of fines on the 31 Charging Parties now involved in the consolidated proceeding, and the suit for judicial enforcement of these fines , the General Counsel argues, in the alternative ( 1) that the 31 all effectively resigned from the Union and that a threat to fine, or the imposition of a fine in any amount, on nonmembers of a union is restraint or coercion of their Section 7 right not to remain a member, but assuming, however, that their resignations may have been ineffective for some reason, so that they were still members when the Union fined them, then in that event, the fine of a day's pay for each day worked is excessive, since its effect is to force them to quit working for the Company This latter argument is based on the General Counsel's contention, already made in the first proceeding, that the Allis-Chalmers and Scofield cases should be construed to mean that the imposition of an unreasonable or excessive fine is a violation of Section 8(b)(I)(A) The Union's basic arguments, like that of the General Counsel , center on the resignations It argues that some or all of the resignations were ineffective, but that even if the 31 employees did in fact resign , the obligations they assumed when they went out on strike must be fulfilled and if not fulfilled , the Union has a right to require satisfaction from them by the imposition and collection of fines First, as to the ineffectiveness of the resignations The Union relies on the combined membership application and dues checkoff authorization which each of the 31 agreed to (set out in my original Decision), arguing that the 10-day period after the expiration of the collective -bargaining agreement within which dues checkoffs could be revoked was also intended as the allowable period for resignations from the Union It makes the point that it has in fact accepted resignations during that interval despite the silence of its constitution or bylaws on the procedure or period for voluntary resignations It argues from there that it did in fact provide a procedure and an allowable interval within which resignations could be made and accepted as effective I find the argument unpersuasive No employee could be expected to know from the combined membership application and authorization form that the method to be used for revoking his checkoff authorization (sending a registered letter to his employer and to the Union) was also meant to provide a method of resigning from the Union An employee might well intend to remain a union member but choose not to have his union dues checked off by his employer, so that revocation of the authorization does not imply resignation from the Union Also, an employee concerned about his right to resign would certainly expect to be bound by what the Union's basic charter says or does not say on the subject, and should not be required to guess at what the Union's intentions were from an ambiguously expressed form designed for other purposes altogether Other arguments advanced for the ineffectiveness of the resignations are also unpersuasive since they are based on the proposition that the procedures to be followed for resignation are the same as those to be followed for revocation of the dues checkoff authorization They relate to the fact that some of the resignations were not sent by registered mail or were sent by telegram One resignation, that of employee Desjardins, was unsigned In fact, however, his letter gives his name and clearly expresses his intent to resign As for those employees who resigned by ordinary mail or by telegram, I find that their resignations became effective upon receipt of their communications to the Union since no other form of communication was obligatory The Union also points to actions taken by employees after their resignations , which it considers inconsistent with an intent to resign Thus, one employee may have received a strike benefit payment from the Union in the week in which he resigned , while other employees are said to have received insurance benefits after resigning In both cases, it appears that the benefits received accrued before the resignations and are therefore not inconsistent with an effective resignation Finally, the Union argues that it should not be compelled to accept or honor resignations from employees who did so to please the Company which had falsified the meaning of my original Decision in order to induce their resignations I find nothing improper in the Company 's letter of June 5, 1969 (Resp Exh 3), which advised all employees that my Decision meant that they could resign voluntarily at any time in the absence of restrictions on that right imposed by the Union's constitution or bylaws That is the fair import of what I said, and I see nothing coercive or false in the Company's passing on that information If it induced employees to resign , it was because they freely decided to do so For all the foregoing reasons, and for the reasons given in 644 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD my original Decision in more detail, I find that the 31 employees here involved effectively resigned from the Union during the strike 3 Assuming, arguendo, that the resignations were effective, the Union argues that it nevertheless had the right to impose fines on the Charging Parties for working during the strike It points out that they had joined the Union voluntarily, without the compulsion of a union-security provision in the bargaining agreement, and that in accepting membership voluntarily, they bound themselves to adhere to the course of action freely voted on by the Union's membership Thus, the argument goes, although the Charging Parties may choose to withdraw from the Union, they may not thereby avoid their obligation to accept the decision of the membership and to continue supporting the strike Each member was induced to strike by the mutual commitment of all the other members to do the same, and by returning to work during the strike the Charging Parties have breached their agreement with their fellow members Judicial enforcement of a fine imposed for breaking a strike, it is argued, is in harmony with the national labor policy of protecting the right to strike The logic of the Union's argument requires the conclu- sion that a resignation of a union member has only a prospective effect, so that decisions made by the Union before the resignation continue to bind the former member who now seeks to repudiate the collective decision he once accepted It is an argument that cannot be lightly brushed aside, since it is based on the proposition common in the law, that one cannot escape one's freely accepted obligations when the going gets tough However, for more compelling considerations I must reject the Union's argument Section 7 of the Act protects equally the right to engage, and the right not to engage, in concerted activities including strikes The same Section also protects the right to resign from a union 4 just as it does the right to join one When an employee joins a union he assumes both rights and obligations with respect to it To say that his obligation (in this case, to stay out on strike) continues even after he has effectively resigned would postpone to some indefinite date beyond his control his right not to strike Further, since their right to attend union meetings , to vote, and to influence the union's future course of action as to the strike, ended with their resignations I believe that their obligations to the union to support the strike must end then too 5 This is not to say, however, that monetary obligations of a member to his union which are based on an express or implied contract between them, may not survive the member's resignation 6 In the category of possible monetar- y obligations due the Union by the Charging Parties are the premiums for group insurance policies which the Union advanced on their behalf, and the strike benefits which they received while they remained on strike The suits brought by the Union in the state courts clearly seek reimbursement 9 See the cases cited in In 9 of the original Decision a Nex Jersey Bell Telephone Company 106 NLRB 1322 1324 enfd sub nom Communications Workers of America C/O v N L R B 215 F 2d 835 (C A 2) and Marlin Rockwell Corporation 114 NLRB 553 559-562 5 Scofield v N L R B 394 U S 423 at 430 Under this dual approach Sec 8(b)(I) leaves a union free to enforce a properly adopted rule which reflects a legitimate union interest impairs no polic\ Congress has for the insurance premiums and possibly also for the strike benefits The question whether the Charging Parties are liable for these sums, and the determination of the actual amounts due are matters over which a state court would have jurisdiction since they are based on usual contract law principles, not involving interpretation of the National Labor Relations Act However, any part of the sums sued for which are attributable to the fines imposed by the Union on the Charging Parties after their resignations is, in my opinion, not collectible through resort to the state courts, because the Union would thereby be in violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act The remaining contentions which the Union makes can be disposed of briefly First, it argues that the Charging Parties failed to exhaust their internal union remedies even to the extent of failing to appear at the union trials in order to claim that they had effectively resigned But exhaustion of internal remedies would only be required of union members, whereas here all the Charging Parties had resigned before the Union filed charges against them Consequently, they were under no obligation to explain or defend their resignations at a union hearing Finally, the Union argues that the fines imposed, a day's pay for each day worked, were not unreasonable I express no opinion on whether the reasonableness of a union fine determines the legality of its imposition on members, nor on whether the amounts sought here are in fact reasonable, since in my opinion, the Union's imposition of a fine in any amount on nonmembers and its attempt to seek judicial enforcement therefor, are violations of Section 8(b)(1)(A) THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of the Respondent set forth above, occurring in connection with the Respondent's activities described in section I of my original Decision, have a close, intimate and substantial relation to trade, traffic and commerce among the several States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce THE REMEDY As I have found that the Respondent has violated Section 8(b)(I)(A) of the Act, I will recommend that it cease and desist therefrom, and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act Specifically, I will recommend that the Union rescind the fines it has imposed on the 31 persons named in Appendix A, change its records to reflect such rescission , take all necessary action, in the New Hampshire courts where it is seeking judicial enforcement of its suits against these 31 persons, to withdraw and give up its claims for the fines it has imposed, and notify the said 31 persons that it has done all the foregoing imbedded in the labor laws and is reasonably enforced against union members who are free to leave the union and escape the rule This seems to me to mean that a union member must be free to escape the rule totally in its retrospective as well as its prospective effects B Communications Workers of America C/O v N L R B 215 F 2d 835, 838 (C A 2) GRANITE STATE JOINT BOARD 645 On the basis of the foregoing findings and analysis of the facts, I make the following additional: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 4. The Respondent has restrained and coerced the 31 persons named in Appendix A, all of whom had effectively resigned their memberships in the Respondent, in the exercise of their right to resign said memberships and of their right not to strike against their employer, by imposing fines on them through its internal procedures, and by seekingjudicial enforcement of such fines. 5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. thereafter. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (f) Furnish the Regional Director signed copies of such notice marked Appendix B for posting by International Paper Box Machine Company, in places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Copies of said notices, on forms provided by the Regional Director shall, after being duly signed by an authorized representative of the Respondent, be returned forthwith to the Regional Director for disposition by him. (g) Notify the Regional Director for Region 1, in writing, within 20 days from the date of receipt of this Supplemental Decision and Recommended Order what steps it has taken to comply herewith.8 RECOMMENDED ORDER Upon the entire record in this consolidated case, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, I recommend that Granite State Joint Board, Textile Workers Union of America, Local 1029, AFL-CIO, its officers, agents and representatives, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Fining or seekingjudicial enforcement of fines against former members of the Union. (b) In any like or related manner restraining or coercing its former members in the exercise of their rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. (a) Rescind the fines imposed against the 31 persons named in Appendix A. (b) Change all pertinent records to reflect the action taken to rescind such fines. (c) Take all necessary action in the courts of the State of New Hampshire where judicial enforcement for collection of the fines imposed against the persons named in Appendix A has been brought, to withdraw and give up all claims for said fines. (d) Notify the persons named in Appendix A that it has taken the actions which have been ordered above. (e) Post in conspicuous places at its offices and meeting halls, and other places where notices to its members are customarily posted, copies of the attached notice marked Appendix B.7 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 1, shall, after being duly signed by an authorized representative of Granite State Joint Board, Textile Workers Union of America, Local 1029, AFL-CIO, be posted immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days T In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Section 10246 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions, recommendations, and Recommended Order herein shall, as provided by Section 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes . In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR relations board" shall be changed to read "POSTED PURSUANT TO A JUDGMENT OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS ENFORCING AN ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD" " In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, this provision shall be modified to read. "Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith " APPENDIX A Alonzo Bealand Roger Bernier Marcel Berube Jean Boutin Eugene Collard Robert Depontbriand Leonard Desjardins Leo Dubois Aurel Duval Bernard Francis Roger Gagne Adrian Gagnon Clovis Gamache Robert Guerrette Hazen Johnson Maurice Kimball Armand Levesque Peter Makris Paul Marquis Ronald Maynard William Mayo Franklyn McAlister Roland Michaud John Nadeau Felix Radziewicz Emilien Riendeau Robert Roy Zennie Runowicz Alfred Theriault Henry Tremblay Gerald Tyler [Appendix B omitted from publication,]