Electronic Research Co.

ELECTRONIC RESEARCH CO. Electronic Research Co. and International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW). Case 17-CA-4145 January 7, 1971 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS BROWN AND JENKINS On September 15, 1970, Trial Examiner Herzel H. E. Plaine issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. Thereafter, the Respondent and the Charging Party filed exceptions to the Decision and supporting briefs. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner with the following modifications: We agree with the Trial Examiner that the Respon- dent violated Section 8(a)(4) and (1) of the Act by denying a perfect attendance incentive award to Luther Brandenburg, who was absent from work in obedience to a Board subpena, while granting the same award to employees who appeared at the same Board hearing at the Respondent's request. In so concluding, we do not rely on the Trial Examiner's findings regarding Respondent's prior practices con- cerning employee absences for court appearances. The Trial Examiner found a similar violation with respect to the denial of attendance awards to employees Freida Robinson, Karen Skaggs and Marie Bey.' None of these employees was alleged as a discriminatee in the complaint, and the Respondent was never subsequently made aware that the failure to give awards to these employees was an issue in the case. Moreover, the only testimony in the record concerning these employees is that of Robinson who did not believe she would have been entitled to an award irrespective of her absence pursuant to the subpena.2 Therefore, we shall find no violation respecting Robinson, Skaggs, or Bey. 733 The Trial Examiner found an independent violation of Section 8(a)(1) based on evidence that representa- tives of the Respondent told employees that Board subpenas are not "regular" or "legitimate" subpenas. This conduct was not alleged as a violation in the complaint and was not thereafter urged as the basis for any additional remedial action. As the record stands, the bare statements are insufficient, in our judgment, to warrant finding an unalleged violation. Accordingly, we do not adopt this finding. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the Recommend- ed Order of the Trial Examiner, as modified herein, and hereby orders that the Respondent, Electronic Research Co., Overland Park, Kansas, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order as so modified: 1. Delete paragraph 1(c) and renumber paragraph 1(d) accordingly. 2. Delete paragraph 2(a) and substitute the follow- ing: "(a) Correct the attendance record of former employee Luther Brandenburg to reflect an excused absence under the perfect attendance award program for November 18, 1969, when he was in attandance under subpena at a Board hearing, and make him whole by the appropriate award or awards or cash equivalent (as he prefers) to which he is entitled by virtue of the correction." 3. In footnote 9 of the Trial Examiner's Decision, substitute "20" for "10" days. 4. Substitute the Notice to Employees attached hereto for that recommended by the Trial Examiner. I The Charging Party's motion to correct the transcript and the Trial Examiner's Decision , to reflect the correct spelling of the first names of Freida Robinson and Mane Bey , is hereby granted. 2 The source of the Trial Examiner's finding that these employees lost awards through their attendance at Board hearings was the oral statement of Respondent's attorney, to which neither the General Counsel nor Charging Party would stipulate APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government After a trial in which all sides had the opportunity to present their evidence, the National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the law and has ordered us to post this notice: WE WILL NOT deny perfect attendance credit to otherwise eligible employees who are absent from 187 NLRB No. 100 734 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD work as a result of compliance with National Labor Relations Board subpenas or other process for giving testimony under the National Labor Relations Act, while allowing such credit to employees who provide testimony under the Act at our request. WE WILL NOT discriminate, in making perfect attendance awards, against otherwise eligible employees who are absent from work as a result of complying with National Labor Relations Board subpenas or other process for giving testimony under the National Labor Relations Act at the call of the Union or of the Board's General Counsel. WE WILL NOT in any like manner interfere with your rights of self-organization and mutual aid guaranteed by Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act or the vindication of those rights through National Labor Relations Board process. WE WILL correct the attendance records of former employee Luther Brandenburg to reflect an excused absence, under the perfect attendance award program, for November 18, 1969, when he, as one of our employees, was in attendance under subpena at the National Labor Relations Board hearing. WE WILL give Brandenburg the appropriate award or awards or cash equivalent (as he prefers) to which he is entitled by virtue of the correction of the attendance records. ELECTRONIC RESEARCH Co. (Employer) Dated By (Representative) (Title) This is an official notice and must not be defaced by anyone. This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material Any questions concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions may be directed to the Board's office, 610 Federal Building, 601 East 12th Street, Kansas City, Missouri 64106, Telephone 816-374-5181. TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION HERZEL H. E. PLAINE, Trial Examiner: The Respondent maintains a perfect attendence award program to encour- age better employee attendance at work and, thereby, to reduce employee absences and tardiness . It uses the incentive of merchandise awards of increasing value to each employee who progresses through uninterrupted attendance at regular hours over consecutive periods of I month, 6 months, and 12 months. I Under Section 8(a) of the Act, "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-( 1) to interfere with, restrain , or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7; (4) to . discriminate In this proceeding, the complaint, issued April 17, 1970 (on a charge by the Union filed November 28, 1969), charges the Respondent with administering the perfect attendance award program in violation of employee rights under Section 8(a)(1) and (4) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act). It is alleged that Respondent has denied attendance credit and the awards to otherwise eligible employees who were away from their work at the plant because they complied with subpoenas, issued at the request of the Union or of the General Counsel, to attend Board hearings (including, as it developed, this trial), but that Respondent gave attendance credit and made the awards to eligible employees who were also away from their work at the plant to attend the Board hearings at Respondent's request.' Respondent has sought to justify the different treatment of the two sets of employees who attended the Board hearings on the ground that those who attended the hearings under government subpoena were not at work, while those who attended the hearings at its request were "at work" and hence their work attendance suffered no interruption. The case was tried May 25, 1970, at Kansas City, Missouri. Counsel for the General Counsel, for the Respondent, and for the Union have filed briefs. Upon the entire record of the case, including my observation of the witnesses , and on due consideration of the briefs, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. JURISDICTION Respondent is a corporation with its principal place of business at Overland Park, Johnson County, Kansas, engaged in the manufacture and wholesale distribution of components for electronic devices and temperature con- trols. Annually, Respondent ships goods valued in excess of $50,000 directly to points outside Kansas. Respondent is, as it admits, an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. The Union is, as Respondent admits, a labor organiza- tion within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. II. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Respondent's Perfect Attendance Award Program For several years Respondent has had a program providing merchandise awards to employees as an incentive to achieve perfect attendance at work. According to Respondent's comptroller, Charles Roberson, and the bulletin on the subject for 1969, exhibit GC-2, perfect attendance meant uninterrupted attendance during an employee's regular hours, for a 40-hour week in a normal 8- hour day, Monday through Friday. The only excuses or exceptions recognized, according to the 1969 bulletin, were earned vacation time , death in the immediate family of the employee, tardiness of not more than one hour due to transportation, and a temporary layoff. Actually, other exceptions were recognized or allowed , as noted under against an employee because he has . . given testimony under this Act. ELECTRONIC RESEARCH CO. heading B, below. Exceptions claimed had to be noted on the employee's time card on the day of the occurrence and approved by his supervisor. The awards to employees who qualified were on a monthly basis, for perfect attendance during the month, and special prizes of greater value were awarded for consecutive 6-month and 12-month perfect attendance. In dollar value, the prizes ranged from $2.45 for the monthly award to $35 for the 12-month award. B. Application of Program to Employees Attending Hearings On November 18, 1969, employee Luther Brandenburg and several other employees attended the Board heanng of November 18-19, 1969, held in Kansas City in Case 17-RC-6226, a case affecting the representation of Respondent's employees in collective bargaining. Employee Brandenburg, and employees Freda Robinson, Karen Skaggs, and Mary Bey were four employees who attended under subpoena, issued at the instance of the Union. All four had an otherwise perfect work attendance record in November if the time spent in the courtroom had not been counted against their receiving the awards? Employee Brandenburg and the three women employees were served with the subpenas on the night before the hearing, and came to the plant on the morning of the hearing to so advise their supervisor. Both employees Brandenburg and Robinson testified that each of them came in (separately) about 8 a.m. of November 18 and showed the subpena each had received to Supervisor Frank Wilson. Wilson, who enjoyed the authority of a supervisor to excuse absences, told employee Brandenburg that it was alright for him to go but did not say whether Brandenburg was excused or not excused for purposes of the perfect attendance award. Supervisor Wilson explained, at trial, that he felt he had no choice, in the face of the subpena, but to tell Brandenburg it was all right to go. In employee Robinson's case, Wilson read the subpena without comment. None of the subpenaed employees clocked in on the morning of November 18 and no one for Respondent suggested that they should. Employee Brandenburg testified that his usual starting time was 6 a.m., but because there was no one at the plant to whom he could report the subpena that early, and the need for him to be dressed to go to court, he reported to Supervisor Wilson at 8 a.m., without clocking in. Brandenburg was at the hearing all day until 6 p.m., but was not called upon to testify, and, along with some of the others, was excused from attendance on the following day, November 19. Employee Robinson was required to be present both days of the hearing, November 18 and 19. On November 19, employee Brandenburg reported back to work, clocked in at his usual starting time, 6 a.m., and thereafter completed regular and punctual attendance at 2 The complaint named Brandenburg as the only employee so affected, but the evidence provided by Respondent indicated that employees Robinson , Skaggs, and Bey were similarly treated and denied awards While the General Counsel failed to seek amendment of the complaint in this respect, the matter having been litigated , fairness and completeness require that, sua sponte, I direct amendment of the complaint to include 735 work for the balance of the month of November. He had had perfect attendance in the 5 previous months and five monthly awards. An award for November would have given him a sixth consecutive monthly award and the special and more valuable prize for 6 consecutive months of perfect attendance. Employee Brandenburg inquired of Supervisor Wilson on November 24 as to whether his, Brandenburg's, absence of November 18 had been an excused absence. Wilson said he would check the matter with Comptroller Roberson. Supervisor Wilson testified that he had on previous occasions excused, without checking with management, employee attendance at court under subpena, because he understood it was company policy to do so since neither the employee nor employer had control of the matter of the subpena. Such was the case, he said, when he excused employee Betty Colton, who was summoned for jury duty in June 1969, and she received her perfect attendance award for that month. This time he felt obliged to check, said Supervisor Wilson, because a union was involved. Comptroller Roberson told him, said Wilson, that Branden- burg's absence could not be excused because it involved the Union, the UAW, and was a matter with the National Labor Relations Board. Wilson then reported to employee Brandenburg that Comptroller Roberson refused to recognize the subpena as a valid excuse for the absence, because it was not a "regular subpena." Brandenburg and the three eligible employees who had been subpenaed were denied the monthly award for November and, in Branden- burg's case, the 6-month award. Comptroller Roberson gave an explanation somewhat similar to Wilson's in a meeting of the plant employees Roberson called on March 25, 1970. Roberson called them together, he said, to inform them of the date of the representation election, and that the Board was instituting a complaint (this case) on behalf of Brandenburg (who had left Respondent's employment in January). According to employee Freda Robinson, Comptroller Roberson told the employees that Brandenburg did not get the attendance award because "the subpoena was not legitimate." Roberson's notes (exhibit R-4) also indicate that he told the employees that Brandenburg did not receive the attendance award because he went to the Board hearing, which was an absence not excused by the attendance award rules, and it would be unfair to all employees if the company didn't apply the rules. Employee Shirley Waterman stood up in the meeting and asked Comptroller Roberson, how come employees Deanna Summerskill and Helen McCorkle who, like Brandenburg, attended the same Board hearing, but as company witnesses, received their perfect attendance awards. Roberson replied they did not receive awards and were not on the list of recipients. It turned out, however, that employees Summerskill and McCorkle were on the November 1969 list for perfect attendance awards (exhibit GC-3), and did receive their within its gravamen , in particular paragraphs 5, 6, and 7, employees Freda Robinson , Karen Skaggs, and Mary Bey. Dennison Manufacturing Co v N L R B, 419 F.2d 1080, 1083-84 (C.A. 1, 1969), cert denied 397 U.S. 1023, A N Belo Corp v. N.LR B,411 F.2d 959, %5-966 (CA. 5, 1%9), cert. denied 369 U S 1007; Montgomery Ward and Co. v N LR. B., 385 F 2d 760, 763-764 (C.A 8, 1%7) 736 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD prizes. Comptroller Roberson admitted, at trial, that he had been wrong when he denied the fact at the March 1970 meeting and further admitted that he never bothered to explain this to the employees as a whole, or to explain to them the basis for the awards to the two employees Summerskill and McCorkle. Comptroller Roberson's explanation, at trial, for giving credit toward the awards for regular attendance at work to those employees who appeared on its behalf at the Board hearing of November 1969 (and at the Board trial in this case on May 25, 1970), and for denying similar credit to those employees who appeared under subpena at the instance of the Union (or at the instance of the General Counsel in this trial) was as follows: The purpose of the perfect attendance award program is to encourage employee attendance at work and to discourage absence and tardiness. The awards are an added incentive, above regular pay, and the company limits the exceptions or excused absences to those few reasons written down in the rules governing the awards. Though there may be other good excuses for absence, the company applies a "tough" or strict policy, and absence from work because a subpena requires the employee to attend court is not one of the excuses in the written rules. In the case of those employees attending court, or a Board hearing at the company's request, though the employees are not performing their normal duties we treat them, said Roberson, as if they were at work, because we direct them to come to the courthouse and give testimony. Those employees who appear under subpena are not in court at our direction. Hence for the perfect attendance award, the company excuses those employees who appear in court at its direction, but not others even though they may be compelled to attend court by force of law. This explanation, said Comptroller Roberson, represents Respondent's past and current policy, as it was in 1969 and as it is now. In consequence, he said, those employees who appear and testify, pursuant to subpena, for the Govern- ment or for the Union in National Labor Relations Board proceedings, will not be credited with attendance for the perfect attendance award, on the ground that they are not within the excuses for absence recognized by the program and are not working.3 On the other hand, said Roberson, in the case of employees who appear and testify on behalf of the company at its request, as have employees Richardson and Downen in the trial of this case, their otherwise perfect attendance will not be affected-"we call this work," he said. Notwithstanding the alleged strict application of the written rules (exhibit GC-2) governing the award program, it is obvious from a reading of the rules that the exception, or credit for work attendance, spelled out by Comptroller Roberson for employees attending Board or court hearings at the company's direction or request is not written into the rules. It is also obvious, from Roberson's testimony 3 Roberson made clear that, whether the subpenaed employees clocked in or not, would not excuse the absence incurred to comply with the subpenas, because the employees while absent would not be performing work directed by the company. 4 Respondent provided evidence that it had not excused all court- connected absences in administering the award program , such as in concerning the meeting with the employees in March 1970 that he didn't know or believe, as late as March 25, 1970, that the rules permitted such exception or giving credit, and he publicly said so to the assembled employees that day. Nor did the employees and their supervisor understand that the rules contained this exception even up until the day of this trial in May 1970. Employee Lela Downen, who testified at the request and on behalf of the Respondent, testified that she asked her supervisor, Poindexter, before- hand, whether she would be excused if she came to court or would lose her award, which was then only two months short of a twelve month award. Supervisor Poindexter said he would find out, according to employee Downen, and after inquiring advised her that she would be excused. There was evidence of other kinds of deviations from so- called strict adherence to the written rules. Former employee Evelyn Fuller testified that in September 1968 she attended court (without subpena) as a character witness in a criminal trial. She informed her supervisor, Goble, beforehand that she had been requested to appear by the defendant's counsel and she was excused for the absence and tardiness involving a few hours of one day. Employee Fuller received her perfect attendance award for September 1968, notwithstanding the fact that a question was raised because she had not clocked in for work on the day of her court appearance until 10:32 a.m. She was permitted to make up the full eight hours of work that day by cutting lunch and break times but did not work her regular 8 a.m. - 4:30 p.m. hours, as required under the eligibility rules for the award. Another example, already alluded to, was the absence of employee Betty Colton, whose attendance in a state court for jury duty (that lasted part of a day) in June 1969 was excused beforehand by Supervisor Wilson. Employee Colton received her perfect attendance award for June 1969. In connection with the Colton incident, Supervisor Wilson, who has been a supervisor for nine years, encompassing the five years of the perfect attendance award program, testified that, while there is nothing written down in the program about jury duty, he understood it was an excusable absence as a matter of company policy, because the employee had no control over the subpena or summons. Wilson said that he had, on a later occasion, discussed the Colton incident with Comptroller Roberson and Supervisor Poindexter, and while they noted that the written rules hadn't covered her case they did not reprimand him. The same policy, said Supervisor Wilson, also applied in excusing absences if an employee had to attend court, so long as the National Labor Relations Board or the Union was not involved. The latter exception to excused absences, said Wilson, was invoked for the first time by Comptroller Roberson when employee Brandenburg asked for the excused absence in November 1969.4 employee Richardson's case, when Richardson, as he testified, attended court to protect his property interest in an easement sought by a municipality Respondent supplied the names and dates of a number of such unexcused employee absences , but did not identify the nature of the case or employee connection , other than the foregoing Richardson matter. ELECTRONIC RESEARCH CO. 737 C The Section 8(a)(4) and (1) Findings The evidence is clear that Respondent has administered its perfect attendance award program to penalize Branden- burg and fellow employees who testified or attended to testify before the Board at the call of the Union or the Government and presumably adversely to Respondent, and to reward those employees who appeared on Respondent's request and behalf at the same Board hearing and trial. As Comptroller Roberson said, at one point, if employee Brandenburg had appeared at the request of company he would have received the award for perfect attendance at work (his attendance having been otherwise perfect), because such appearance would have been treated as work. As it was, he appeared under subpena at the call of the Union, and his appearance was treated as an absence from work. The evidence is also clear that the discrimination between employee witnesses who appeared for the Union and those who appear for the employer arose because of union animus on the part of the employer. Although Respondent claimed that its rules governing the attendance awards provided no excuse for absences of employees obliged to attend court proceedings, the evidence indicated that a number of such absences were excused before the question of attendance by employees at Board hearings arose. When that question arose in November 1969, it arose, as Supervisor Wilson said, because the Union was involved in the case. Comptroller Roberson told Supervisor Wilson there would be no excuse because the Union-the UAW-was involved, and the employees were informed by both Wilson and Roberson that a Board subpena was not a "regular" or "legitimate" subpena and could not be the basis for excusing the subpenaed employee's absence. Thereafter, at trial, in May 1970, Respondent proclaimed the additional rule (though not written down as it argued the excusing rules must be), that those employees attending Board hearings and trials at Respondent's request are regarded as at work for the perfect attendance awards.5 It is a violation of Section 8(a)(4) of the Act for an employer, as here, to discriminate against employees who obey subpenas and give testimony6 under the Act, Block- Southland Sportswear, Inc., 170 NLRB No. 101, (Bd D & 0) 67 LRRM 1566, 1570 (1968), aff'd sub nom. Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. N.L.R B., 420 F.2d 1296, 1301 (C.A.D.C., 1969). And, irrespective of any proof of discrimination or union animus, it is a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act for the employer, as here, to engage in conduct that obstructs Board process, Amalgamated Clothing Workers (Block-Southland) v. N.L.R.B, supra, 420 F.2d 1296, 1300-1301. Respondent has not only discrimina- torily administered its perfect attendance award program to favor (by declaring present at work) those employees who appear before the Board on its behalf and to penalize (by 5 Respondent does not appear to push, in its brief, nor would it likely do so, the somewhat overdone claim of Comptroller Roberson (presumably to create an equation between work and testifying) that the company was directing these employees to attend and give testimony on its behalf--which, if true, would be in itself an act of coercion under Section 8(a)(1) of the Act 6 The protection against reprisal applies regardless of the nature of the proceeding and regardless of whether the potential witness actually declaring absent) from work those who appear against it. Respondent has also denigrated and obstructed Board process by telling its employees that Board subpenas are not "regular" or "legitimate," compared with the process of the courts, and by denying Board process the credit, in excusing employee absences for purpose of the award program, previously accorded by Respondent to court process. See Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 128 NLRB 574, 578-579 (1960).7 CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Respondent's denial of perfect attendance awards to otherwise eligible employees who appear at Board hearings and trials in compliance with Board subpenas at the call of the Union or the General Counsel, and allowance of such awards to employees who appear at the same hearings and trials at the request of the Respondent , is a discrimination against employees who obey Board process and an unfair labor practice within the meaning of Section 8 (a)(4) of the Act. 2. Respondent's advice to employees that Board subpenas are not regular or legitimate process of the same validity as court process, and its denial of equal credit with court process towards perfect attendance awards for employees who comply with Board subpenas, is an obstruction of Board process and an unfair labor practice within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 3. The said unfair labor practices affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. THE REMEDY It will be recommended that Respondent, (1) cease and desist from the unfair labor practices; (2) correct the attendance records of, and make whole, the employees who were wrongfully denied the perfect attendance awards; and (3) post the notices provided for herein. The Union has requested two additional remedial measures. First, it is asked that Respondent be directed to pay the regular working pay of all employees who complied and comply with Board subpenas and are absent from their work while giving or awaiting to give testimony, on the ground that Respondent has paid and pays for regular working time of employees who attend Board hearings or trials to testify at Respondent's request. This matter of pay was not an issue in this case under the complaint, and was specifically ruled out from becoming an issue at the request of counsel for the General Counsel, as having no bearing on the discrimination and obstruction practiced in making the perfect attendance awards. Whether or not there is an issue of discrimination in pay that is not satisfied by the payment of subpena fees and other costs due witnesses under subpena has not been examined in the trial of this case or testified, Dal Tex Optical Co, 131 NLRB 715, 730 (1961), enf'd NLRB v Dal Tex Optical Co, 310 F 2d 58, 62 (C A 5, 1962) r That loss of perfect attendance credit has been a concern to the employees in their considering whether to appear at Board hearings was illustrated in the testimony of the employee witness for the Respondent, Downen. who sought and obtained from Respondent an assurance of work attendance credit towards her award before she appeared 738 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD determined by this decision. The Union is not precluded from filing a charge (which would appear to be timely, based upon the occurrences of the May 1970 trial) that would cause the matter to be investigated and a complaint brought if there is merit to the charge. Second, the Union asks that, as the Charging Party, it be made whole by Respondent for all expenses, particularly legal expenses, for, as it says, "enforcing the vital public right" encompassed by this case. The difficulty with the request is that the public right involved has been enforced by the public prosecutor, the General Counsel, at public expense. True, the Union had the initial bother of filing a charge, and an informal appeal to reinstate the charge, but there has been no indication that the cost of this triggering step (an inevitable necessary step in any public prosecution, civil or criminal), has been great or unusual or has inflicted any hardship on any individual or organization. To the extent that the Union chose to be additionally represented at the trial by its own counsel, this, as observed in M.F.A. Milling Co., 170 NLRB No. I11, pp. 43-44, was a voluntary decision on its part, and reimbursement for this expense would not appear to be warranted in effectuating the purposes of the Act. RECOMMENDED ORDER Upon the foregoing findings and conclusions, and upon the entire record, it is recommended that Respondent, its officers, agents, successors, or assigns shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Denying perfect attendance credit to otherwise eligible employees who are absent from work as a result of compliance with Board subpenas or other process for giving testimony under the Act, while allowing such credit to employees who provide testimony under the Act at Respondent's request. (b) Discriminating, in making perfect attendance awards, against otherwise eligible employees who are absent from work as a result of compliance with Board subpenas or 8 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Section 102 46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions, recommendations, and Recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Section 102 48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings , conclusions , and order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the other process for giving testimony under the Act at the call of the Union or of the Board's General Counsel. (c) Advising employees that Board subpenas are any less regular or legitimate than court process, or according less credit for compliance with Board subpenas than may be given compliance with court process, in excusing absences under the perfect attendance award program. (d) In any like manner, interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their rights guaran- teed under Section 7 of the Act or in the vindication of those rights through Board process. 2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Correct the attendance records of former employee Luther Brandenburg and employees Freda Robinson, Karen Skaggs, and Mary Bey, to reflect excused absences, under the perfect attendance award program, for the days in November 1969 and May 1970, when each of them, as an employee of Respondent, was in attendance under subpena at the Board hearing or trial, and make each of them whole by the appropriate award or awards or cash equivalent (as each prefers) for the 1-month, 6-month, or 12-month awards to which each is entitled by virtue of the corrections. (b) Post in Respondent's facilities at Overland Park, Kansas, copies of the attached notice marked Appendix. Immediately upon receipt of copies of said notice, on forms to be provided by the Regional Director for Region 17 (Kansas City, Missouri), the Respondent shall cause the copies to be signed by one of its authorized representatives and posted, the posted copies to be maintained for a period of sixty consecutive days thereafter in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other matenal.s (c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 17, in writing, within twenty days from the date of the receipt of this decision, what steps Respondent has taken to comply therewith.9 National Labor Relations Board" shall be changed to read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board " 9 In the event that the Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, this provision shall be modified to read "Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within ten days from the date of this order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply therewith "