173 NLRB 118
Public Pontiac, Inc.
118
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Public Pontiac, Inc. and I. J. Wilson , an Individual.
Case 13-CA-8151
October 8, 1968
DECISION AND ORDER
By MEMBERS FANNING, JENKINS , AND ZAGORIA
practices, I heard this case at Chicago, Illinois, on March 6,
1968
The only substantive allegation of the complaint was that
the respondent had discharged 1. J
Wilson, one of its
employees, in violation of Section 8(a)(1) or (3) of the Act.
Subsequent to the hearing, counsel for the General Counsel
and for the respondent filed briefs with the Trial Examiner.
Upon the record so made, and in view of my observation of
the demeanor of the witnesses, I hereby make the following
findings of fact-
On June 11, 1968, Trial Examiner William Seagle
issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding,
finding that the Respondent had not engaged in the
unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint, and
recommending that the complaint be dismissed in its
entirety, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's
Decision. Thereafter, the Charging Party filed excep-
tions to the Trial Examiner's Decision.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National
Labor
Relations
Act,
as amended, the
National
Labor Relations Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this case to a three-
member panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no
prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are
hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner's Decision, the exceptions, and the entire
record in this case, and hereby adopts the findings,
conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Exam-
iner
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations
Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the Recom-
mended Order of the Trial Examiner, and hereby
orders that the complaint herein be, and it hereby is,
dismissed in its entirety.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
WILLIAM SEAGLE, Trial Examiner Upon a charge filed on
December 4, 1967; a complaint issued on January 12, 1968 by
the Regional Director of Region 13, and the answer of the
respondent denying the commission of any unfair labor
I These terms are defined in Article II, Sections 1, 2, and 3 of the
agreement
Section I provides
"The term 'utility employees' shall
apply to employees who wax, shine, buff, or otherwise polish vehicles or
who spray , or otherwise apply undercoating to vehicles , occasionally
drive vehicles for purpose of receipt on delivery , assist toward building
maintenance or perform other semiskilled tasks necessary to the
Dealer's operation ." Section 2 provides "The term 'washers ' shall apply
to employees who wash or otherwise clean vehicles." Section 3
provides
"The term, 'garage attendants ' shall apply to employees who
do clean-up work, to night men , to vehicle movers within or upon the
I
THE RESPONDENT
The respondent, Public Pontiac, Inc. (hereinafter referred to
as Public Pontiac), is an Illinois corporation, which, at all
material times, has maintained its principal office and place of
business at 3150 West Ogden Avenue, Chicago, Illinois, where
it has been engaged in the sale and servicing of new and used
automobiles.
Duruig the past calendar year, the respondent, in the course
and conduct of its business operations, sold and distributed
automobiles, the gross value of which exceeded $500,000.
During the same period of time, the respondent received
automobiles valued in excess of $100,000, and these auto-
mobiles were transported to its place of business in interstate
commerce directly from places outside the State of Illinois.
The respondent admits that all material times it has been an
employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section
2(6) and (7) of the Act, and I so find
II
THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
Excavating, Grading, Asphalt, Private Scavengers and Auto-
mobile Salesroom Garage Attendants Local Union No 731,
affiliated with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters
(hereinafter referred to as Local 731), is a labor organization
within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act The respondent
has at present a collective-bargaining agreement with Local
731, covering its utility employees, washers, garage attendants
and parts department employees 1 The term of this agreement
is from July 1, 1967, to June 30, 1969
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE
A. The Discharge of Wilson
I
J. Wilson, the charging party in the present case, the
legality of whose discharge is in issue, was employed as one of
about 12 garage attendants or porters, whose duties included
getting new cars ready for delivery by washing them, putting
on their hub caps and antennae, and removing the plastic
coverings from their upholstery
Dealer's premises , and to others who may be assigned to miscellaneous
work of an unskilled nature " Article II , Section 8 of the agreement
further provides
"Any person who performs work described in the
above classifications fifty percent (50%) or more of his working time
shall be eligible for membership in the Union " Under Article III of the
agreement , wages in these classifications for the year commencing July
1, 1967, were fixed as follows $2. 52 an hour for utility employees,
$2 42 an hour for washers , and $2 .32 an hour for garage attendants, and
a 10-cent-an-hour raise on July 1, 1968, was also provided
However,
Public Pontiac did not actually employ any "washers."
173 NLRB No. 24
PUBLIC PONTIAC
119
Wilson had been employed by Public Pontiac in December
1965, and he was classified as a garage attendant, being paid at
the rate of $2 32 an hour. He worked under the general
supervision of Stanley Unhock, the service manager, but he
washed and prepared new cars for delivery when directed to do
so by Arthur Markman, the new car sales manager. New cars
were stored in two warehouses in the vicinity of Public
Pontiac, and when Markman was ready to deliver a particular
car, he would hand a slip indicating its stock number and color
to one of the porters
When Wilson first started to work for Public Pontiac-he
worked on the late shift from noon to 9 p.m.-Markman
thought that the firm had found what he described as "a
diamond in the rough." But after several months Markman
found that he had to be on Wilson's back all the time to get
something done. "He was looking," testified Markman, "for
ways to not have to do things as opposed to getting them done
when you asked him to do it " Markman related one incident
in particular to illustrate the trouble that he had with Wilson.
Markman asked Wilson to polish a car but Wilson objected.
"You can't polish the car The car has to be buffed out "
Markman insisted that the car be polished but Wilson refused
to do so, and Markman had to call the general manager to get
Wilson to follow his instructions It turned out that polishing
was all that the car required Markman also complained about
Wilson a number of times to Unhock, the service manager, and
Newell, the fleet manager also complained to Unhock that
Wilson was not getting his cars ready for delivery when he gave
them to him.
About a month and a half before his discharge, which
would be about the middle of October 1967, Wilson was
transferred by Unhock to the early morning shift, which began
early in the morning (probably at 9 a.m.) and ran to 6 p.m.
Wilson did not accept the transfer, however, with good grace
He wanted to know why he was being transferred, although it
made no difference to him whether he worked on the early
morning shift or the late shift As Wilson testified:
Q. Did you want to stay on at night?
A Well, it didn't make me no difference, but I just
didn't understand why that was being did
Wilson testified also that when he asked Unhock why he was
being transferred the latter shouted at him.
Along about this same time Wilson filed a complaint with
the Fair Employment Practices Commission that the porters
were not being paid in accordance with the requirements of
the contract between Public Pontiac and Local 731. It was
Wilson's contention that the porters should be paid $2.52 an
hour because they were in fact washing and polishing cars.
When Maurice Kay, who is one of the owners of Public
Pontiac, and also the secretary -treasurer of the corporation,
received the complaint from the FEPC, he called Wilson into
his
office
to
discuss it.
Waldorf, the president of the
corporation, was also present at this interview, which, Wilson
testified, occurred on October 16 Kay told Wilson that the
porters were being paid in accordance with contract require-
ments and that they would get a 10-cent-an-hour raise on July
1, 1968, as provided in the contract, but that if he had any
complaint, he was free to take it up with the union. Wilson
objected to the further discussion of his complaint because
two of the porters were off that day. Kay then contacted Kent
Guido, the union's representative, to inform him of the
complaint, and the latter came out to Public Pontiac to talk to
Wilson, who again refused to do so unless the other porters
were present. About a week later, a meeting was held to
discuss the complaint at which there were present not only
Wilson, two of the porters, and Guido but also Unhock and
Lester Barnett, one of the managers of Public Pontiac Guido
took the position in discussing the complaint that the porters
could not be paid as washers or polishers because they did
not perform such work during at least 50 percent of their time,
and the porters, except Wilson, agreed with Guido. When
Wilson persisted in maintaining that the porters did do washing
and polishing more than 50 percent of their time, Guido told
him that he could take the complaint up with the National
Labor Relations Board Under date of November 21, 1967,
Wilson filed a charge with the Regional Office of the Board in
Chicago, alleging that Local 731 had refused to process his
grievance protesting inadequate pay 2
At about 10 a in., on November 30, 1967, the day of
Wilson's discharge, he was engaged in wiping down some new
cars in the new car department of Public Pontiac When Wilson
saw Unhock, he complained to the latter that he had only been
paid for working 34'% hours during the previous week, which
would be the week ending November 24, although he had
worked 36 hours that week Unhock told Wilson to pull his
timecard, so that they could find out how many hours he had
worked
Wilson then decided to make a telephone call to the
National Labor Relations Board but, while he was doing so,
Markman approached him and gave him a slip to pick up a car
from one of the Public Pontiac warehouses Since Wilson was
attempting to get through to the Board, he asked Willie Lacey,
one of the other porters to pick up the car wanted by
Markman, the car being, apparently, a black and yellow
Pontiac, and Lacey agreed to do so. While Wilson was still
waiting to complete his telephone call, Markman came up
behind him with the customer who had purchased the car,
which Wilson had been sent to pick up, and, according to
Wilson, Markman shouted across to him in a loud tone of
voice, "I want that car done"; thereupon he turned around and
said to Markman with a soft voice, "Mr. Markman, you doesn't
have to holler at me. All you have to do so ask me what to do,
and I do it" but Markman shouted again in a loud voice, "I
want that car did", during this interchange, there were present,
in addition to Markman and the customer, James Henry, who
is one of the Public Pontiac's service writers
Markman, Unhock and Henry gave an altogether different
version of this incident. Markman was, of course, involved in
it, and Henry witnessed it but Unhock merely testified to what
Markman had told him about it immediately after its occur-
rence
According to Markman, he gave Wilson the slip to pick up
the car between 9 30 and 10 a.m., after about 10 minutes had
elapsed he saw Wilson in the garage and was very much
surprised to see him, since he knew that it should have taken
Wilson 20 minutes to go for the car and return, he asked
Wilson whether he had brought the car back already and
Wilson explained that he had sent Lacey for it; he reproved
Wilson for sending Lacey to get the car but told him to get to
work on the car as soon as it came in; 10 minutes later he
found the car at the head of the car wash rack but Wilson was
at the other end of the building, still trying to make his
telephone call; he waited until Wilson got off the telephone,
and then told the latter that he must have the car for which
2 The charge was docketed as Case 13 -CB-2335.
120
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
people were waiting, as he walked away some 30 or 40 feet,
Wilson shouted across to him "If you paid me what you are
supposed to be paying me, you wouldn't have to tell me all
these things twice"; when Wilson made this remark there were
present a mechanic and a woman customer, who was waiting
for her car to be serviced, but the people for whom the new
car was intended whom he identified as a husband and wife
whose names he did not know, were waiting in the showroom;
he then went to Unhock and told the latter what Wilson had
said, and commented to him that it was impossible to work
with Wilson.
The testimony of Unhock concerning what Markman told
him about Wilson's conduct is in close agreement with
Markman's Unhock testified that Markman reported to him
about Wilson between 10-30 and 11 30 am., and that after
about 15 minutes he called Wilson who was getting ready to
wash the car and discharged him for his insubordination
toward Markman, after Wilson had admitted that he had made
the remark attributed to him by Markman
Henry, the service writer, corroborated the testimony of
Markman concerning the incident Henry's version of Wilson's
insubordinate remark was: "If you pay me enough money, so I
can get the job done," and he fixed the time of the
conversation between Markman and Wilson as between 9.30
and 10 a.m , and the place as the service area of the new car
department where a woman customer was waiting for service.
Wilson gave quite a different account than Unhock concern-
ing the reason for his discharge by the latter. According to'
Wilson, after he had been summoned to Unhock's office, the
latter closed the door, pulled his timecard out of his pocket
and banged it down on the desk, asking what was wrong with
his timecard. The rest of the interview is best given in Wilson's
own words-
I said, "Well, Stan," I say, "I am short
So he commences to bang it down on the desk with a
shouting voice saying, "You are not short."
I said, "Well, Stan," I say, "I am short "
He say, "I said the timecard doesn't lie You are not short
Now, here is your timecard, and get out of here."
I said, "Well, Stan," I say, "I am short."
He just kept banging on the desk, with a shouting voice,
saying that I am not short, "here is your timecard. Get out
of here. You no longer work for Public Pontiac "
So at this time I says to him, I said, "Well, Stan, I say, "I
haven't did nothing "
I said, "But now, if you dust got to have a fit, you have to
So he replied, "Yes, I will." [emphasis supplied ]
According to Wilson's further testimony he then went back
to the garage and started working on the car he was getting
ready when Unhock came downstairs3 and told him, "I said
leave that car alone You no longer work for Public Pontiac",
he kept working on the car, notwithstanding the fact that
Unhock had fired him, and had repeated what he had said
about not working on the car; a few minutes later Unhock,
who had left, came back with Mitchell Rosenberg, the
brother-in-law of Waldorf, and the general manager of Public
Pontiac, who also told him that he was no longer working for
Public Pontiac; he then asked Rosenberg to give him a letter
stating why he was no longer working for Public Pontiac,
Rosenberg agreed to give him such a letter but the letter
merely read as follows
3 Unhock's office was upstairs.
November 30, 1967
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN
This is to inform you that I. J Wilson has been dis-
charged as of 11.30 a m on Nov 30, 1967
Public Pontiac, Inc.
Stanley Unhock
Service Manager
After his discharge, Wilson called the union, and Kent Guido
came to Public Pontiac for a meeting, which took place on
December 1 in Barnett's office, and at which Wilson and
Unhock were also present. According to Wilson, when he
complained at the meeting that Unhock had fired him for no
reason at all, the latter shouted "I doesn't have to give you no
reason", Guido then interposed, and told Unhock, "that's
wrong, you have to give a man a reason," whereupon Unhock
stated that Markman had told him that Wilson had insulted a
customer, and that this was the reason for his discharge; he
insisted, however, that he had been discharged because he had
complained about the shortage in his paycheck, then Guido
asked him to step out of the room, and when he returned
Guido told him that Pubhc Pontiac would not take him back,
being "hardheaded and stubborn"; and when Guido asked him
what he was going to do, he replied, "I am going to fight it."
Unhock testified, however, that he had explained at the
meeting that the reason for Wilson's discharge had been
insubordination, and that he had told Guido exactly what had
taken place, and Guido agreed that there had been just cause
for the discharge.
After both counsel for the General Counsel and for the
respondent had rested their cases, the former called as a
rebuttal witness one Alphonso Cook, who testified that he was
the customer who had purchased the black and yellow Pontiac
on the day of Wilson's discharge and proceeded to attempt to
corroborate the latter's testimony that he merely protested
against being hollered at. According to Cook, who worked at
night at a place called Automatic Delivery, he arrived at Public
Pontiac at 8 or 8 30 a m. in order to trade his 1967 Catalina
Pontiac for a 1968 Pontiac, he was in such a state of
sleeplessness that if he had not stayed on his feet and kept
moving he would have fallen asleep, Markman waited on him,
and he expressed an interest in a Grand Prix model but
Markman convinced him, apparently, that this model would be
too expensive for him, and, after haggling for about half an
hour, he settled on a 1968 Bonneville model; Markman then
gave Wilson a slip for the car but Wilson asked an "older
gentleman to pick up the car"; after about 10 or 15 minutes
the car pulled in through the service door but it was put at the
end of a line of cars, and, after waiting about 10 minutes he
reminded Markman that he was waiting for his car, and since
he worked at night, he would like to get home and get some
sleep; so Markman hollered across to Wilson to get the car
cleaned up but Wilson was on the telephone, and Markman
hollered at Wilson again to get the car ready, whereupon the
latter said to Markman, "you don't have to holler at me If you
want me to do something, you just ask me and I will do it";
Wilson then got into the car, backed it out of the service door,
and came `round the garage and pulled the car up to the wash
rack; as Wilson was getting out of the car, he shook Wilson's
PUBLIC PONTIAC
hands, and remarked to the latter, "you work for these people
and they drive you", while all this was happening he did not
see anyone else, whether a customer or Henry; after this he did
not see Wilson again.
As the evidence had shown that there were two compressors
in the service area of Public Pontiac, and that these made
considerable noise, so that it was necessary to talk somewhat
loudly to be heard, this factor was explored during Cook's
cross-examination, as follows:
Q. Was there a lot of noise at the time (during the
interchange between Markman and Wilson)9
A. During what time?
Q. During this mcident9
A No, not at that time. No.
Q. Between Markman and Wilson-during the conversa-
tion between Markman and Wilson?
A What you mean
When they was shouting [emphasis
supplied] ?
Q. Was there any noise, machinery or anything like
that?
A Well, you could hear what each other was saying. I
didn't hear no machines running, no. I know I didn't hear
none. They could have been but I-you, they ain't cross my
mind that I hear them You know what I mean, if
somebody speak, why I was standing right next to him. If
some machine was running I don't know nothing about it
B Concluding Findings
Counsel for the General Counsel correctly submits that the
crucial issue in this case is whether Wilson, when asked by
Markman to wash a customer's car on November 30, merely
protested against being shouted at, or demanded that he be
paid what he was entitled to before he would comply with
Markman's order. If the respondent's witnesses are to be
believed, Wilson was not only insubordinate but impudently
so. But this is not the conclusion of counsel for the General
Counsel who, for some strange reason, argues that "this might
possibly be held to be insulting to the customer who was
waiting for the car and a possible justification for discharge."
How Wilson's conduct could be deemed insulting to the
customer is difficult for me to understand, annoying, it might
be but insulting, it could hardly be. The only reason that this
peculiar semantic argument is made by counsel for the General
Counsel would seem to be that he wishes to denounce as
"preposterous" the "belated" contention of the respondent
that Wilson was discharged for insulting a customer when "the
very customer who (sic) Wilson is alleged to have insulted and
whose car Wilson is alleged to have refused to take care of,
actually shook Wilson's hand and congratulated him on his
behavior in the face of Markman's shouting."
The argument of counsel for the General Counsel that
Wilson was discharged for insulting a customer is based on
Wilson's testimony that this was the false reason finally given
to him by Unhock in the meeting of December 1 that was held
to discuss his discharge. But this is wholly inconsistent with
the testimony of Unhock, and it is difficult to believe that he
would have given a reason that made so little sense, semanti-
cally or otherwise, for it could not possibly have been the real
reason.
121
Counsel for the General Counsel stakes his whole case on
the allegedly corroborative evidence of Alphonso Cook. But
the first difficulty with this approach is that there is evidence,
offered also to corroborate Markman, namely, the evidence of
Henry offered by the respondent. Counsel for the General
Counsel, speaking of Cook, argues. "He is the one witness in
the case who has no possible motive for not telling the truth.
Cook has no connection with Wilson." Henry is, to be sure, an
employee of the respondent and Cook does not appear to have
any discoverable or demonstrable connection with Wilson. But
Cook, like Wilson, is a Negro, and conceivably, Cook's motive
could be found in the sentiment of racial solidarity. On the
other hand, Henry is not necessarily discredited because he,
too, is a Negro, and an employee of the respondent. I am
rendered suspicious of Cook, moreover, by the very circum-
stance on which counsel for the General Counsel places so
much reliance, namely, the alleged fact that Cook shook
Wilson by the hand, and congratulated him on his behavior, for
this conduct of Cook, if it actually occurred, reveals a spirit of
active partisanship rather than disinterestedness. There is,
however, an even more cogent reason for distrusting the
evidence of Cook Serious doubts are raised by his physical
condition on the morning that he bought his new Pontiac. It is
apparent from his own testimony that he was then in such a
state of weariness that he could hardly keep his eyes open, and
that he could stay awake only as long as he kept moving. This
state must have imparied his powers of observation and
recollection.
In addition, there are serious discrepancies between Cook's
testimony and the testimony not only of the respondent's
witnesses but also of Wilson. In his own testimony, Wilson
never mentioned driving the car around to the wash rack, as
Cook did, and since Wilson had induced Lacey to go for the
car, which was immediately needed, it is reasonable to suppose
that Lacey would have driven it to the wash rack as he came in
with it
Wilson also did not mention in his testimony that
Cook shook him by the hand, either before or after the car had
been driven to the wash rack.
Among the serious discrepancies are also the sequence of
the events and the circumstances of the sale of the automobile
involved. According to Cook, he arrived at Public Pontiac
before 8 a in , and he bought the new car after about one-half
hour of bargaining. He also manifested a desire to have the car
immediately, and it should not have taken more than 20
minutes to bring the car over from the warehouse. Yet Wilson
was not discharged until 11.30 a.m. The confusion mounts as
one considers the conflicts in the evidence relating to such
questions as who sold what car to Cook and who was present
when Wilson was ordered to get and prepare the car for the
customer. The testimony of Markman is that it was not he who
sold the car which he was attempting to get Wilson to prepare,
and that the purchasers of this car were a husband and wife
who were waiting for it in the salesroom. According to
Markman also, there was present, during his acrimonious verbal
exchanges with Wilson, Henry, a mechanic and a woman
customer who was waiting for her car to be serviced. All this is
hardly reconcilable with the testimony of Cook that it was
Markman who sold him his 1968 Bonneville and that during
the latter's exchange with Wilson, he did not see any other
customer or Henry, although Cook did not deny that Henry
could have been present. Although the testimony of Wilson
and Cook is in agreement, seemingly, as to the colors of the car
that Cook purchased that morning, their descriptions do not
122
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
seem to be in total agreement.4 It is quite possible that in such
a large agency as Public Pontiac two cars were sold that
morning Another possibility is that if Cook was actually the
customer who purchased the car which Wilson was ordered to
wash that morning he may have been present the first time but
not the second time that Markman ordered Wilson to do so
This, in effect, is really Cook's testimony. Markman testified, on
the other hand, that Wilson's impudent remark was made the
second time that he spoke to him, and after the car was at the
wash rack If this was so, Cook was testifying with respect to
Wilson's first rejoinder to Markman. This would not rule out
Wilson's impudence when Markman spoke to him the second
time when Cook, admittedly, was no longer present
In his attack on the credit of the respondent's witnesses,
counsel for the General Counsel berates them for attempting
deliberately to conceal the identity of the purchaser of the car
which Wilson was to have serviced, although counsel never
himself revealed how he managed to foil this nefarious plot. It
is clear, however, from the testimony of Markman that no
Board investigator ever asked any representative of the
respondent for the name and address of the purchaser of the
car which Wilson was to have serviced The failure to volunteer
this information can hardly be equated to deliberate conceal-
ment.
In any event, assuming that Cook was the customer, it is
apparent that his testimony has elements that damage rather
than help the General Counsel 's case Apart from the fact that
Cook's testimony does not really corroborate Wilson's, whose
testimony is different from the former's in several vital
respects, there is at least one important respect in which it
corroborates Markman's testimony. The clear implication of
Cook's testimony is that Wilson in talking back to Markman
was also shouting rather than speaking with "a soft voice."
I find on the basis of my observation of Wilson, and on the
basis of his record as revealed, for the most part by his own
testimony at the hearing, that when Markman asked him to
wash the car he spoke to the latter neither with a soft voice
nor with soft words. Wilson's own testimony shows him to be
a cantankerous individual who was quite capable of the
impudence and insubordination with which he is charged He
manifested his cantankerousness early in his employment when
he had insisted on buffing a car when he had been ordered to
polish it, and by raising a fuss over his transfer from one shift
to another, although the transfer made no difference to him
The record does not show affirmatively whether he was right
in his interpretation of the contract provisions relating to pay
but neither does it show that the respondent was wrong.5 The
record
does show, however, that Wilson was wrong in
complaining on the day of his discharge that he had not been
paid for hours that he had worked the previous week. Indeed,
his cantankerousness was manifested to the greatest degree on
the very day of his discharge He seemed to be behaving as if
he could do as he pleased. He was making telephone calls to
the Regional Office of the Board not only during his working
time but also at a time when he knew that his services were
urgently required, and, although his laches should have put
him in a defensive posture, he chose to talk back to his
superior Even if he talked back with a soft voice he was guilty
of a piece of effrontery under these circumstances, which
included neglect of his work, and disobedience to orders. Even
more significantly he manifested his impudence during his
interview with Unhock in the course of which he had remarked
to the latter in insisting on the shortage in his pay that Unhock
could have a fit if he had to Finally, Wilson displayed his
cantankerousness in the very moment of his discharge. Sacked
by Unhock, he went right on working, and Unhock had to
summon the general manager to make the discharge stick I
must conclude, therefore, that Wilson was discharged because
of his insubordination and impudence on the day of his
discharge rather than because of any concerted activity in
which he may previously have been engaged.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1
Public Pontiac, Inc , is an employer engaged in com-
merce or in an industry affecting commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. Excavating, Grading, Asphalt, Private Scavengers and
Automobile Salesroom Garage Attendants Local Union No.
731, affiliated with the International Brotherhood of Team-
sters, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section
2(5) of the Act.
3
By discharging I. J. Wilson on November 30, 1967, the
respondent did not discriminate with respect to his hire or
tenure of employment, and did not, therefore, commit any
unfair labor practice affecting commerce within the meaning
of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
In view of my findings of fact and conclusions of law, I
recommend that an order be entered dismissing the complaint.
4 Wilson testified that the car was "a yellow '68 black vinyl top car, "
5 Counsel for the respondent asks that official notice be taken of the
while Cook testified that the color of the car which he purchased was
dismissal of Wilson's charge against the union but the file is not available
"black and yellow."
in Washington, D C