Louisburgh Sportswear Co.

678 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Louisburg Sportswear Co. and Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America , AFL-CIO. Cases 11-CA-3423, 11-CA-3463, and 11-RC-2596 November 8, 1968 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN MCCULLOCH AND MEMBERS BROWN AND JENKINS On June 24, 1968, Trial Examiner Harry R. Hinkes issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent has engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices, and recom- mending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. He also found that the Respondent had not engaged in other unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint, and recommended that such allegations be dismissed. The Trial Examiner found, in addition, that the Respondent's unlawful conduct had interfered with a Board election held on October 12, 1967, and recommended that the election be vacated and set aside. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision and a supporting brief, and the Charging Party filed cross-exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision and a supporting brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with these cases to a three- member panel. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial lExaminer's Decision, the exceptions, cross-excep- tions, and briefs, and the entire record in these cases, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions,' and recommendations of the Trial Examiner with the modification noted below.' ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the Recom- mended Order of the Trial Examiner, and hereby orders that the Respondent, Louisburg Sportswear Co., Louisburg, North Carolina, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the petition in Case 11-RC-2596 be, and it hereby is , dismissed, and all proceedings held in connection therewith be, and they hereby are, vacated. I In view of the numerous other violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, we find it unnecessary to consider whether under the circum- stances existing in these cases the showing of the film "Women Must Weep" constituted and independent violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, and therefore do not adopt the Trial Examiner 's finding in that respect. 2 We agree with the Trial Examiner 's finding that the Respondent's refusal to bargain with the Union violated Section 8(a)(5) and ( 1) of the Act However , an order directing the Respondent to bargain with the Union, upon request, is also necessary to remedy the effects of its other unfair labor practices , since the record clearly shows that the Union represented a majority of the employees in the appropriate unit when the Respondent initiated its course of unfair labor practices aimed at destroying this support Therefore , we shall order the Respondent to bargain, upon request, with the Union to remedy both its violation of Section 8(a)(5) and its violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act See Bryant Chucking Grinder Company, 160 NLRB 1526, 1530, enfd 389 F 2d 565 (C A. 2), Fabricators, Incorporated, 168 NLRB No. 21. In finding that the Union represented a majority of the employees, we need not rely on those union cards introduced into evidence which were neither signed nor authenticated by the employees whose designation of the Union they purport to bear. We find that even without these designations, the Union at times material herein was the duly designated representative of a majority of the employees in the appropriate unit. TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE HARRY R. HINKES, Trial Examiner: The complaint in Case 11-CA-3423 was issued on October 23, 1967, and the complaint in Case 11-CA-3463 was issued on January 18, 1968, pursuant to charges filed by Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, AFL-CIO, herein called the Union, on September 5 and October 23, 1967, respectively. These cases were consolidated with Case 11-RC-2596 by order of the Regional Director for Region 11 on January 18, 1968. Louisburg Sportswear Co., Respondent herein, is alleged to have engaged in unfair labor practices affecting commerce by the discharges of two of its employees in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, by the commission of acts interfering with, re- straining and coercing its employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed them in Section 7 of the Act in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act and by its refusal to bargain collectively with the representative of its employees in violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. Case 11-RC-2596 involves objections to an election held under the supervision of the Regional Director among the production and maintenance employees of the Respondent which objections also relate to allegations in the foregoing complaints. By answer duly filed Respondent denied the commission of any unfair labor practices as alleged. A hearing was held before me at Louisburg, North Carolina, on February 26, 27, 28, 29 and March 1, 11, 12, 13, and 14, 173 NLRB No 101 LOUISBURG SPORTSWEAR CO. 679 1968, at which all parties were represented and were afforded full opportunity to participate, examine witnesses and adduce relevant evidence. During the hearing, upon motion of counsel for the General Counsel, amendments to the complaint were allowed adding additional instances of interference with the organizational rights of employees and a refusal to hire an applicant for employment because of her union activities. At the conclusion of the hearing counsel for each of the parties waived oral argument. Instead, each has subrrutted a compre- hensive brief which has been given careful consideration. Upon the entire record in this proceeding, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT I JURISDICTION The Respondent is and has been at all times material herein a corporation duly organized under and existing by virtue of the laws of the State of North Carolina with a plant at Louisburg, North Carolina , where it is engaged in the production and distribution of sportswear During the 12 months preceding the issuance of the complaints in this proceeding , which period of time is representative of all times material herein, Respondent produced , sold and shipped goods valued in excess of $50,000 from its North Carolina plant to points outside the State of North Carolina and during the same period of time received goods valued in excess of $50,000 at its North Carolina plant from points outside the State of North Carolina. The complaint alleges, Respondent's answer admits and I find that the Respondent is now and has been at all times material herein an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED The complaint alleges, Respondent's answer admits, and I find that the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act III THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The Discharge of Elleanor Rice and Linda Rich Linda Rich started working for the Respondent in 1962. Elleanor Rice started working for the Company in 1964. Jerry Costa, the manufacturing manager for the Respondent's Louisburg plant and three other plants, was put in charge of the Louisburg plant in 1966. Finding operational defects, he instituted a re-engineering program which was completed in the pressing and folding department where Rich and Rice worked about a week before Christmas, 1966 Among other things, the jobs of pressing and folding were combined into one job and new rates were set for the new job. The operators did not like the change and many of them deviated from the newly prescribed methods. Foreman Meeks testified that Rice and Rich were the ones who persistently deviated from these methods but Supervisor Winstead contradicted Meeks' testi- mony and I credit her testimony inasmuch as she was in a better position to know about the performance of Rich and Rice and other workers under her immediate supervision. In March 1967, employee Murphy was discharged and Rice asked Meeks for the reason. Although Meeks denied the conversation I credit the testimony of Rice and Rich to the effect that Meeks professed ignorance of the reason for Murphy's discharge to which Rice replied, "I think that's why we need a union in here because if things like this happen maybe we would hear both sides of it." In May 1967, Rice received an International Ladies Gar- ment Workers Union card (not the Union involved in this proceeding) which she signed and mailed in. She asked Meeks if he had received one and he said he had Later, she told Meeks she would put her union card on her machine. Although Meeks denied these conversations while admitting that he did receive that union's leaflet from someone else, I credit the testimony of Rice and conclude that by May 1967, Meeks was well aware of Rice and Rich's union sympathies. At about the same time a rumor was circulated to the effect that Supervisor Winstead was going to be relieved of her duties. Rice and Rich asked Meeks about it and when he refused to tell them Rice answered "that's the reason we need a union in this plant. If we had a union in here, things like this wouldn't happen." Rich agreed with her but Meeks replied "the Union is not going to give you any more than this company already has " Here, too, although Meeks denied any talk about the Union on this occasion, I credit the testimony of these two employees after careful consideration of their testimony and their demeanor on the stand vis-a-vis that of Foreman Meeks. Finally, Rice asked Meeks to call a meeting to discuss the problems of the department. Meeks refused to call a meeting but was unable to recall the reason for the refusal. Rice testified, however, that Meeks refused to have a "mob meeting" and Rich testified that Meeks replied "he wasn't going to have any mass mob meeting." I credit the testimony of Rich and Rice. On June 14, Sam Vick, Respondent's plant manager, called a meeting of all the pressers, folders and turners to announce the termination of Supervisor Winstead. This meeting was short and the employees went back to their work stations. They returned to see Vick and to ask why Winstead was being replaced. Rice asked if Winstead was being given a promotion or a demotion Vick replied that Winstead had been out sick a lot and that somebody else could do the job better. The employees asked Vick to reconsider his decision but Vick refused. Rich then brought up the subject of wage rates and their readjustment but Vick replied only that the rates were fair, making no mention of any wage increase plan. The meeting lasted about an hour and a half after which work was resumed. Later that afternoon Meeks called Rich and Rice to see Plant Manager Vick. Vick told Rich and Rice that they had complained constantly and that he thought they would be happier working elsewhere. Rice asked if that meant they were fired to which Vick replied by handing each of them a check. Vick's testimony was substantially the same adding that he told them there are some people who worked at the plant who go out at night when they go home and run the place down. When Rice started to deny such activity Vick testified that he did not accuse her of doing that. On the discharge slips given Rich and Rice the next day Vick had simply noted "difference of opinion and disagree- ment." Meeks testified, however, that Rich and Rice were guilty of deviating from prescribed methods of operation, itemizing four specific instances in his testimony plus one 680 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD instance observing Rice pressing from a stack. Vick, however, itemized a different list of methods deviation reported to him by Meeks. Meeks testified that Rich and Rice would follow methods for only a few minutes after being shown and then revert to their own procedures. Vick, however, testified that their work looked pretty good for 3 or 4 days after which Rich and Rice would go back to the same old way. Vick admitted, however, that he never warned these two employees about their methods deviation before their discharges. Meeks testified that he did reprimand them "for not pressing tape, not bosom pressing, not pressing the fold properly or pressing properly " No mention was made of reprimands for stack pressing. Plant Manager Vick testified that he saw Rice pressing from a stack on three different occasions and on the first two occasions called it to the attention of Supervisor Winstead. Rice admitted that there was one occasion when she pressed from a stack because the shirts needed merely a touching up due to a label change. This was corroborated by Supervisor Winstead who also denied that Vick commented about it on two occasions. About a week before the discharge of Rich and Rice which took place on June 14, Meeks informed Costa that Rich wanted to see him. When Costa came over, both Rich and Rice talked to him about the rates. Rich showed Costa a different way of pressing the shirts which she thought was better. Costa testified that it was this questioning of the methods that prompted the discharge of these two employees. He admitted, however, that he told them that his methods were always under review and that he would check the methods and let them know in a couple of days. Upon questioning the consistency of keeping methods under review while discharging employees for questioning methods, Costa then stated that the discharge was reinforced by Vick's report of methods deviation by these employees He finally testified that their questioning of his methods was the primary motivating cause of the discharge. There are other inconsistencies in the testimony of the Respondent's witnesses. Vick testified that during a conver- sation with Costa, Costa brought up the question of pressing from a bundle. He further testified that Costa was upset about this and referred to both Rice and Rich. This conversation allegedly took place on Thursday or Friday preceding the Wednesday, June 14 discharge of the two employees. There is, however, no record evidence to support Costa's accusation as far as employee Rich is concerned. Although Vick testified that Costa suggested the termination of these two employees on that Thursday or Friday preceding the actual discharge of Rich and Rice on June 14, Vick testified that he thought about it over the weekend but did not act on the suggestion on the following Monday because Supervisor Winstead was out sick. Nevertheless, Vick made his decision to discharge these employees without consulting Winstead, testifying that he spoke only to Foreman Meeks about it. In sum, the inconsistencies of the testimony of Meeks, Vick, and Costa compel me to discredit their testimony with respect to the discharge of Rich and Rice. Even absent such inconsistencies I found the testimony of Rich, Rice and Winstead more plausible and creditable. This conclusion is fortified by the credited testimony of Lois King, Rich's sister, who spoke to Meeks about the discharge on the next day. Meeks told her that it was because Rich complained. He added that it was not Rich's fault but the "other one's." He added further that Rich was an excellent worker and had a very high production but that "fussing and complaining had to be stopped one way or the other." Respondent argues correctly that an employer may termi- nate the services of an employee for any reason or no reason so long as the discharge is not motivated by the employee's union or other concerted activity. It cites the fact that these discharges took place even before the arrival of the Union's organizer at Louisburg on July 10, 1967, and could not, therefore, have been motivated by antiunion animus. The argument, however, does not withstand close scrutiny I have found that Foreman Meeks was well aware of the activities of these two employees with respect to union organizational matters as early as March 1967, when they told Meeks of the need for a union at Louisburg. This was confirmed in May when Meeks learned they had received the International Ladies Garment Workers Union card and also by their conversation with him concerning the rumor of Winstead's discharge which they told him would not happen if they had a union. In all of these instances Rich and Rice were acting in concert with respect to matters affecting the terms and conditions of employment at the plant. Respondent argues, however, that the Union interest of Rich and Rice was known only by Meeks and not by Vick who made the decision to discharge Rich and Rice This overlooks the significant fact that before Vick made his discharge decision he consulted Meeks Nor can I credit the testimony of the Respondent's witnesses that the discharge was motivated by these employees' deviation from prescribed methods. The testimony of Supervisor Winstead establishes that their deviations were not greater or more persistent than other employees. Costa himself testified that their discharge was motivated by their questioning of his methods and that their deviation only reinforced the discharge decision. I also note that the termination slip spoke, not of methods deviation but "difference of opinion and disagreement." Finally, I note the appreciable interval of time which elapsed between the alleged deviation from prescribed methods and their terrru- nation, that delay never having been convincingly explained. Nor do I believe the discharge of Rich and Rice was actually caused by their questioning the methods, as claimed by Costa. I note that Costa testified he told these employees that the methods were "always under review" and that he would check the methods and rates and let them know. He did not suggest that their questioning of methods was improper. Indeed, even after Costa had allegedly told Vick to fire these employees, he again spoke to Rich about the methods and said nothing to her about the imminent discharge. Instead, I deem it significant that the discharge took place immediately following the appearance of Rich and Rice, together with other employees, in the office of Plant Manager Vick at which Rich and Rice brought up the subject of wage rates. The fact that before discharging Rich and Rice, Vick consulted with Meeks who was well aware of the union sympathies of these two employees may explain why only Rich and Rice were singled out of the group that met with Vick for discharge that day. I therefore, conclude and find that the discharge of Rich and Rice was motivated by their known prounion sympathies and their participation in the group meeting of June 14, at which Plant Manager Vick was asked about wage rates and at which these two employees were quite vocal. Such a meeting was protected concerted activity and their discharge for engaging in it constituted a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, even though all of the incidents occurred prior to the advent of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America at Louisburg. Waldensian Bakeries, Inc., 132 NLRB 1137. LOUISBURG SPORTSWEAR CO. 681 B. Surveillance On July 20, Plant Manager Vick left the plant premises to go into town. In so doing he had to head west to Bickett Boulevard, turn left on Bickett Boulevard to Washington Street, then continue west on Washington to get to Main Street He testified, however, that a left turn on Bickett Boulevard was difficult to negotiate. So, instead, he chose to make a right turn on Bickett Boulevard and then turn left on another street which ran into Main Street. On this day he turned right on Bickett Boulevard but did not turn left onto Justice Street which would take him to Main Street. Instead, he went past Justice Street and turned left on Waddel Street intending to continue on Waddell to where it joined Justice Street and then continue on to Main Street. He testified that he could not use Justice Street in its entirety because it was torn up. The Lanford Motel, the only motel in Louisburg, North Carolina, is located at the corner of Bickett Boulevard and Waddell Street. Rachel Barnes, the union representative engaged in organizing the Louisburg plant, was staying at the Lanford Motel and occupied a room on the Waddell Street side of the motel. For several years employee Boone and employee Overton operated a carpool between themselves , alternating the cars in which they drove to work every day. The existence of this carpool was known generally in the plant. On July 20, Overton drove Boone to the motel and waited in the car while Boone visited with Barnes. Vick drove slowly past the motel on Waddell Street. As he did so, employee Overton, sitting in her car which was parked along the motel near Barnes' room, covered her face with a newspaper. Vick rode on for a short distance, then turned around and again rode past the motel and Overton's car. This time he wrote down the license number of the car. He then returned to the plant instead of going on into town which was his original intention. Vick testified that he turned around and came back past Overton's parked car because the occupant was hiding from him and he wanted to talk to her. He did not explain the reason for taking down the license number of the car, however, and when asked why he did not complete his trip to town but returned to the plant instead, he testified that he wanted to "think about somebody hiding." He also denied knowing that Rachel Barnes was at the motel. He admitted however, that with respect to the union organizing campaign, "there was something going on some place." The next day employee Duke saw Vick walking around the parking lot of the plant looking at the license plates. Vick admitted that he visits the parking lot to check its condition but denied that he was there looking for license numbers when Duke testified that he saw him. On the same day Costa addressed the employees and told them that some of them might be approached by a union organizer to sign a union card and that some of them have already been so approached. I find such language created the impression of surveillance in violation of Section 8(a)(1). Respondent argues that Vick's behavior was merely acci- dental and inadvertent but I find Vick's explanation quite incredible . With the Overton-Boone carpool in operation for many years and its existence common knowledge at the plant, it is hardly likely that Vick would fail to recognize Overton's car parked at the motel even if he failed to recognize Overton sitting in the car. Moreover, with the Lanford Motel the only motel in the area, coupled with Vick's knowledge that "something was going on some place," it took little for him to conclude that the union organizer was at the motel, nor is it likely that Vick would go considerably out of his way to get to Main Street unless he really wanted to go by the Lanford Motel. Having gone by, it is noteworthy that Vick did not continue on his trip to Main Street but returned to the plant for the odd reason of "wanting to think about somebody hiding." It seems more likely that his return to the plant made it possible for Costa to tell the employees on the following day that he knew some of them had been approached by the union organizer. Vick's final act of checking license numbers in the parking lot of the plant caps this surveillance behavior and I do not credit his testimony to the effect that he did not go out to the parking lot to look for license numbers As I have found that Vick recognized Overton's car parked at the motel either when he observed it driving by or the next day when he checked the license number and since by his own admission he noticed the occupant of the car sitting at the driver's seat, he must have realized that the other member of that carpool , Boone, who would be the passenger, was probably visiting at the motel where Vick must have realized the union organizer was stationed. It is therefore apparent that on July 20, Vick became aware of Boone's union interest. Vick's surveillance, therefore, was not only a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act but furnished the basis for his subsequent behavior to Boone, which will be discussed below C. The Refusal to Hire Boone Louise Boone started to work for the Company in 1962. In 1964 or 1965, she quit for a short time in order to work with her husband in tobacco harvesting. Upon completion, she returned to work. I have found above that Vick learned of her union interests through his surveillance of the Lanford Motel in July 1967. Shortly thereafter Boone asked Vick for a leave of absence to permit her to work for 6 to 8 weeks in the tobacco fields. When Vick refused to grant her leave she then quit. According to Boone, Vick told her that the Company would need some hemmers by the time she expected to return and asked her to get in touch with him at that time. On October 11, Boone called Vick and asked if there was any work for hemmers. He replied that he had no such work at that time and advised her to apply for unemployment compensation. Despite Vick's statement, Boone knew that another employee, Lois King, was about to quit because of pregnancy and moreover had seen a company advertisement in the local newspaper seeking "sewing machine operators" with "no experience necessary ." Boone was an experienced hemmer and the Company officials considered hemmers capable of being sewing machine operators as well, although sewing machine operators had to be trained in order to do hemming work. On November 1, Boone asked Vick why she had not been recalled to work, to which Vick replied that he was not obliged to rehire her. Boone then asked him if this was because of her union activities to which Vick replied that "only she knew the extent of her union activities." Vick then directed Boone to the personnel clerk to take the three usual tests required of applicants for employment. Boone took two of these three tests and was told she had done well on those two. She was unable to stay to do the third test which was a sewing test but told Supervisor Griffin that she would return to take that test 682 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD any time Vick wanted her to come back. Griffin promised to tell Vick. Boone was never called back. Although the Company had every right to insist upon applicants taking all of the tests that the Company felt necessary, it does not appear that Boone's failure to take the sewing test was the reason for the refusal to rehire her. Vick himself testified that he had no reservation about her ability, thus disposing of the necessity for any sewing test. Indeed, a number of inexperienced applicants were hired by the Com- pany at about the same time as will be discussed below. The only reason Vick gave for not rehiring Boone was that she had quit twice and he was not interested in a "part-time worker." This reasoning, however, does not square with his testimony that the Company has never had any problem with employees taking leaves of absence. Moreover, Vick failed to state that as his reason when he refused to rehire Boone. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the Company's record of hires and quits during this period of time suggests strongly that part-time workers were not as unacceptable as Vick's testimony would lead one to believe. Thus, in the hemming department, company records shown in General Counsel's Exhibit 35, received in evidence, indicate that one employee was added to that department in August 1967, without any hemming experience; two were added in September, only one of which was experienced, four were added in October, only three of which were experienced, six were added in November, none of which was experienced in hemming, and three were added in December without experience. During the same months, four hemmers quit and one was transferred to press and fold. Other quits and transfers occurred in January, February and March 1968. Surely Boone, even as a "part-time worker," would have been preferable to those hired without any previous experience and who quit or had to be transferred out even before they were trained to do the job. Having found that Vick's refusal to rehire Boone was based upon a pretext of part-time work, it is reasonable to assume that the real motive for his refusal to did represent a majority of its employees. On October 12, an election was conducted at Respondent's plant by the Board. One hundred and twenty one employees voted against the Union and 39 employees voted for the Union. By timely objections to conduct affecting the results of the election, the Union seeks to set aside the election. In addition the Union claims that the Respondent unlawfully refused recognition despite its majority status on July 27, in that the Respondent committed acts of coercion, intimidation, and interference to destroy the majority support the Union had created. Of the 104 union cards solicited and obtained through the efforts of Barnes and employees of the Respondent, 102 were offered and received in evidence. These cards state Date of Signing I, (Print your full name here) now employed by (Name of Company) (Location) have voluntarily accepted membership in the A- MALGAMATED CLOTHING WORKERS OF AMER- ICA (AFL-CIO) and designate said Union as my collective bargaining agent in all matters pertaining to wages, hours and other conditions of employment. I hereby further subscribe to the dues deduction provisions printed on the reverse side of this card. Signed rehire her was one that the Respondent desired to conceal and (Operation and Department) that such a motive might be an illegal one. Shattuck Denn Mining Corporation v N.L.R.B., 362 F.2d 466 (C.A. 9). In this instance, having regard for the fact that Vick was well aware of Boone's interest in the Union and considering the contempo- raneous conduct of the Respondent aimed to discourage union activities as will be discussed below, I conclude that Boone was not hired because of her union activities in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. D. The Refusal to Bargain 1. The Union's majority The Union's organizational campaign at the Louisburg plant of the Respondent commenced on July 10, 1967, when Rachel Barnes, a union representative, moved into the Lanford Motel in Louisburg. By July 26, Miss Barnes had accumulated, with the help of employees, at least 104 signed applications for membership in the Union. On that day she sent a letter to the Respondent requesting recognition and, on the same day, the Union filed a petition with the Board asking for an election among the production and maintenance employees of Respon- dent. Respondent received the request for recognition on July 27. On that date there were 180 employees in the unit for which recognition was sought. On August 3, Respondent refused the request for recognition doubting that the Union (Phone No.) (Signer's Home Address) On the reverse side of the card is additional language authorizing the employer to deduct union dues. Fifty seven of the 102 union cards received in evidence were authenticated by persons other than the signers thereof. Counsel for the Respondent objected to the reception of evidence of such cards "especially where there is no showing of unavailability of the purported signers." This objection was overruled. Sandy's Stores, Inc., 163 NLRB No. 95; Don the Beachcomber, 163 NLRB No 36. In addition Respondent questions the authenticity of a number of cards which were signed by persons other than the purported signatory. Thus, the card of Ethel Gupton was signed by employee Rochelle Southall who testified she did so at Gupton's request. Gupton did not testify and I credit the testimony of Southall.' Counsel for the Respondent however, argues that: "letting proof of agency come in by the testimony of the agent is violative of the rules of evidence." Counsel fails to cite any authority for this statement. Indeed, all citations are to the contrary. See 3 C.J.S. Agency § 322 and 3 Am. Jur. 2d Agency § 353. See also Shapiro Packing Company, Inc, 155 NLRB 777, 785, and Peterson Brothers, Inc., 144 NLRB 679. Similarly, the card of Malcolm Finch was signed by his wife Adal Finch, who testified that her husband authorized her LOUISBURG SPORTSWEAR CO. 683 to sign his name. I credit her testimony Mr. Finch not having testified. Employee Hodge testified that she signed the names of employees Harris and Collins to union cards at their request Neither Harris nor Collins testified and I credit the testimony of employee Hodge to that effect. Employee Baker testified that, at the request of Betty Strickland, she signed a union card for Betty and at the request of employee Coppage signed a card for her as well. Coppage did not testify to contradict employee Baker and I credit Baker's testimony. Strickland, however, did testify that she did not authorize employee Baker to sign a card for her, contradicting the testimony of Baker. Strickland admitted, however, that employee Coppage told her Baker had signed for her Nevertheless, Strickland never talked to Baker about it or did anything about it, behavior which is hardly consistent with her alleged failure to authorize Baker signing her name I note, moreover, that Baker is no longer employed by the Respon- dent. Strickland, however, was still in the employ of the Respondent when she testified and testified in the presence of her employer's counsel as well as its District Manager Costa, a situation that could have affected the reliability of her testimony, particularly after the Respondent's antiunion cam- paign which will be discussed below. I credit the testimony of Baker and conclude that Strickland authorized Baker signing her name to the union card. Respondent contends that representations made to the signers of a number of cards and irregularities in the obtaining of such signatures invalidate them with the result that the General Counsel has failed to sustain his burden of proof that the Union had a valid majority as of July 27, 1967. Cards signed by employees to whom representations were timely made by union solicitors before they signed the cards that the cards would be used only for the purpose of an election and not for any other purpose would be invalid under the Board's holding in Cumberland Shoe Corporation, 144 NLRB 1268, enfd. 351 F.2d 917 (C.A. 6), and Gotham Shoe Manufacturing Co., 149 NLRB 862, 873-874, enfd. 359 F.2d 684 (C.A. 2). However, cards which unequivocally authorized a labor organi- zation to act as a collective-bargaining agent of the signers must be treated as valid bargaining authorizations in the absence of showing of coercion in their procurement or representations that despite the purpose clearly and expressly stated on the cards themselves, the cards would be used only for a different more limited purpose. Aero Corporation, 149 NLRB 1283, 1290. Absent any misrepresentations by the Union's solicitors, it is well settled that an employee's subjective reasons for signing a card or his conception of the meaning of the card have no bearing on the validity of the card. Joy Silk Mills, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 185 F.2d 732, 743 (C.A.D C.), N.L.R.B. v. Greenfield Components Corporation, 317 F.2d 85, 89 (C.A. 1). In this case there can be no argument on the clarity of the card which the employees signed and which contained no mention of an election. Moreover, I have satisfied myself that the employees who testified in this proceeding had no difficulty in reading the card or in understanding it. Under those circumstances I find that the signers of these cards understood that they were designating the Union as bargaining agent. "Where an em- ployee has signed a card which plainly designates the union as bargaining agent, the employer can prevail only with clear evidence of misrepresentation." N.L.R.B. v. Hamburg Shirt Corporation, 371 F.2d 740, 745 (C.A.D.C.). A card, making no mention of an election, but only authorizing the Union to act as bargaining representative, is a clear and explicit affirmation of the fact that the card can be used to secure recognition without an election .... To invalidate authorization cards relating solely to union representation, it is necessary that there be affirmative representation that the sole and only purpose of the card is to secure an election. Dayco Corporation v. N.L.R.B., 382 F.2d 577, 582 (C.A 6). With these principles in mind we turn next to an exam- mation of the alleged misrepresentations which Respondent argues were made to certain employees. a. Misrepresentations as to purpose of card Employee Leonard testified that she solicited and obtained the signature of employee Murphy on a union card, telling her that "if she wanted to join the Union to sign the card," and , denied any mention of an election. She also testified that shc. procured the signature of employee Lewis in the same manner. Lewis testified that she had no discussion with Leonard before signing the card and exhibited no inability to understand its language. Employee Murphy testified that Leonard told her that the card was for an election. She was unable, however, to recall any more of that conversation nor of the remarks made by others in connection with signing union cards. I was not impressed with her recall ability and do not credit her testimony regarding the language used by Leonard in procuring her signature. Instead, I credit the testimony of Leonard and find no misrepresentation in procuring Murphy's signature. Employee Southall, whom Ethel Gupton authorized to sign a union card for her, as noted above, also procured the signatures of employees Ernestine Wilkins and Pauline Townes. She testified that she gave them cards, asked them to read them on both sides and, if they were interested, to sign them. She also testified that Union Representative Barnes had solicited her signature to a union card telling her that by signing she would be accepting membership in the Union but nothing was mentioned about an election either by Barnes to Southall or Southall to Wilkins and Townes. In a statement given earlier to a Board representative she quoted Barnes as saying that if the Company did not recognize the Union there would be an election. At no point, however, does it appear that Barnes suggested or intimated that the signing of the card was for the purpose, sole or otherwise, of having an election. Indeed, the purpose was stated specifically to be that of accepting membership in the Union. Employee Wilkins tes- tified that when Southall solicited her signature to a union card she was told it was only to have an election. She later amended her testimony stating that Southall told her "they wanted to see if they could get an election." She further testified that she did not read the card although she exhibited no difficulty in so doing at the hearing. She also testified that she first printed her name at the top of the card and then, at Southall's request, signed her name at the bottom of the card, that she asked Southall no questions about it because she was busy and had no time to read the card. Nevertheless, she made no attempt to retain the card so that she could read it later. On balance I found the testimony of Southall more plausible and convincing than that of Wilkins and credit it. Respondent questions the validity of the card signed by employee Moody, arguing that the employee "apparently did not read the card and signed it because she thought it was to obtain an election and there would be a vote on the Union 684 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD question." Her testimony , however, is not that unequivocal. She testified "I thought I [read the card] but evidently not." She further testified that she had no idea at all as to where she could have gotten the notion that she was signing only for an election. This furnishes no basis for invalidating her card for misrepresentation. The Respondent also attacks the card of employee Melba Fuller. Employee Fuller did testify that her understanding was that the card was for a union and that there would be an election in order to get the Union. Later in response to a leading question from counsel for the Respondent , "did they tell you that you needed so many cards to get an election?" she answered "yes, sir." Still later she refined her answer saying, "after a certain number of cards were signed they were to be turned over to the Union , and there would probably be an election later." (Emphasis supplied) Although Fuller was not sure whether she had read the card before she signed it, she testified that she read the card after she had signed it and before handing it to the solicitor . She further testified that she was told by the solicitor that the card was "in order to get a union." I find insufficient evidence of any substantial or meaningful misrepresentations - by the solicitor , particularly where, if those representations differed materially from the language on the card which she read, she could have refused to deliver the card to the solicitor but failed to do so. Employee Nancy Harris testified that the person who solicited her signature to the union card told her "an election could be necessary ." Such language does not suggest that the signing of the card has an election as its objective. Employee Lucille Finch testified that after she signed the card she regretted having signed it and that she did not know what she was doing when she signed the card . She admitted, however, reading the card before she signed it and knowing that she was signing her name for an application for member- ship in the Union . There is no basis for invalidating this card. Ruth Kearney testified to signing a union card after reading it. She further testified that she was told the card was to help get a vote and that she understood there would be a vote. Upon further questioning, however, she stated that she did not know anything about an election when she signed the card. She remembered , however, that the card was an application for membership in the Union . Later when called to testify on behalf of the Respondent , Kearney stated that the solicitor told her "if they wanted the Union out there the people could vote on it." She also stated that the solicitor said nothing to her about an election when she signed the card. As opposed to this sometimes inconsistent and contradictory testimony re- garding what the solicitor told her , we have her positive testimony of having read the card and having understood that she was accepting membership . Under those circumstances it seems clear to me that her card must be treated as a valid designation of the Union as her bargaining agent. Respondent argues that the union card of Adal Finch should not be deemed a valid designation because she "guessed" she was told that the Union needed a certain ,percentage to get an election . The record shows the following colloquy between counsel for the Respondent and Mrs. Finch Q. However , is it not true that when you signed your card you were told the Union needed a certain percentage of the cards in order to get a vote, needed a certain percentage of signatures in order to get a vote? A. At the time I didn't know enough about it. Q. I know you didn't know, but weren't you told? Think carefully ; that the Union needed a certain percentage of the cards of the employees in the plant, signed cards, in order to get an election? A. I guess so , I don't remember. Q. Don't you really remember that now? A. No, Sir I don't. This testimony is certainly insufficient to establish any misrepresentation of the purpose of the card by anyone or for that matter credible evidence of any misunderstanding on the part of the signatory. Mahlon Horton's card is challenged by the Respondent. Horton testified that Foster solicited his signature to a union card after telling him that the card was for the Union to get enough cards for the Union to call for an election . He further stated that he did not read the card before signing it but had the card for 10 minutes while he listened to Foster before signing it. Horton would not deny, however, that Foster told him the Union could possibly come in there without an election. Horton stated he wanted his card back because he wanted to find out more about it and then finally stated that he might lose his job by having signed the card. Foster, on the other hand, testified that he said nothing to Horton about an election not knowing at that time whether they could have an election. Horton's testimony struck me as being evasive. I cannot credit it and credit the testimony of Foster which furnishes no basis for invalidating Horton's card. Foster also solicited the signature of S.E. Gupton, Jr., whose wife is a supervisor for the Respondent. According to Gupton, Foster told him that the purpose of signing a card was to see if the Union would get a right to have an election. Gupton admitted that he had the card in his possession for several minutes before signing it. He also admitted having another card or two in his apron for 2 or 3 days. Nevertheless, he denied noticing the largest words on the Union card which stated the signer accepts membership in the Union. Finally, Gupton testified that several days after signing the card he wanted it back because he had found out that the Union could come in without an election . Nevertheless, he made no demand for the return of his card . Here too, I credit the testimony of Foster rather than that of Gupton finding the latter's testimony unpersuasive . In the absence of any misrepre- sentation, therefore, the card is valid. Union Representative Barnes solicited and obtained the signatures of 29 employees on union cards . Of these, Respon- dent attacks the validity of 12, which will be discussed below. Barnes testified that she told the solicitees. ... we would have to get a majority of the cards signed, and we would, after we had gotten the majority of the cards signed, that we would notify the Company that we represented a majority of the people , and I did explain to some of them in that time that the Company had a right to say they didn't believe we represented a majority of the people, and could force us into an election , but that was the only time I ever mentioned an election to the workers in soliciting cards. I told them that I wanted them to read the card and to make sure that they knew they were voluntarily accepting membership in the Amalgamated Clothing Workers. Employee Gilliam's card is argued to be invalid by the Respondent. Gilliam testified that Barnes asked her to sign the card to help them to get an election in. She admitted, however, that she read the card before she signed it and realized that she was "signing over my rights to the Union to bargain." LOUISBURG SPORTSWEAR CO. 685 Respondent argues that Gilliam's testimony indicates that "none of this would come about until there had been a vote on the question" but the record does not support that interpre- tation of her testimony. Employee Davis testified that Barnes told her the card was for the purpose of obtaining higher wages and better working conditions and that if a certain percentage would sign that there would be an election. She denied reading the card before signing it, but the inconsistency of some of her answers leaves the rest of her testimony in some doubt. Thus, for example, she testified that she looked at the card for a long time before signing it and, when the question was repeated immediately thereafter, she denied looking at it for a long time. Similarly, she testified that she thought the only purpose of the card was to get an election, yet almost in the same breath, testified that Barnes told her she was there to get Davis to join the Union. Davis impressed me as being intelligent and sufficiently schooled to read the card and understand it easily I find it more likely that Davis had an opportunity to read the card, was able to do so quickly and understood the purpose of the card to be acceptance of membership in the Union, I do not credit her version of Barnes' conversation with respect to an election. Respondent also contests the validity of the card bearing the signature of employee Lena Green. Green had signed a union card before Barnes visited her home, but this card was returned to Green because the signature was printed. There- after Barnes came to Green's home and solicited her to sign another card. Green took the card, left the room and returned with the card signed which she gave to Barnes. Green testified that she did not wish to sign the card and to get rid of Barnes she had her daughter sign the card in her name while both she and her daughter were out of Barnes' sight. Green was not unaware of the purport of the signature to the Union card inasmuch as she admitted reading the front of the card before signing it. Nevertheless, Respondent attacks the validity of this card arguing that Green's behavior disproves any intention by her to designate the Union as the bargaining representative. This, however, is but another example of a subjective reason for an employee's signing or not signing a card and has no bearing on the validity of the card which is not invalidated by such subjective motivations. Marie Horton testified that Barnes solicited her signature to a union card telling her that it was only to have an election and that although she did not want the Union she signed the card to get rid of Barnes. She claimed that she did not read the card although she had no difficulty reading it at the hearing. Despite vigorous questioning by all counsel and the Trial Examiner as well, she persisted in this testimony. We are reduced, therefore, to a bald credibility issue as between employee Horton and Union Representative Barnes, both of whom were equally firm in their testimony. In this instance, however, I am inclined to credit the testimony of Marie Horton and invalidate her card as a result. Jonell Horton signed a card at the request of Barnes who, according to Jonell, said that the card was for an election. Jonell admitted, however, that she read the card before she signed it and saw no inconsistency between what Barnes told her and what was written on the card. If so, Jonell must be deemed to have known that she was signing a card for membership in the Union. This conclusion is fortified by Jonell's testimony to the effect that signing the card consti- tuted the election. I find insufficient basis upon which to invalidate her card. Viola Fuller testified that when Barnes solicited her signature to a union card she was told that her signature was wanted so that they could hold an election, "when they got a certain percentage they would hold an election." She claimed that she did not read the card and did not understand what it was all about. She further denied that she knew what she was signing but "mainly signed the card to get rid of her." She had never known Barnes before that time and had never seen her before. I find this version of her meeting and action vis-a-vis Barnes' request entirely incredible for it would indicate that Fuller readily signed a document which she did not under- stand, which she did not read, and for a person whom she did not know. I do not credit her testimony and find insufficient basis to invalidate her card. The Evans sisters, Betty and Carolyn, were solicited by Barnes simultaneously. Both testified that they did not read the card. According to Betty, Barnes told her that if she signed the card there would be an election. Although she signed the card, she denied being asked to read it as well as noticing any of the wording on the card. Carolyn testified that she did not read the card because she was sleepy. The testimony of neither girl impressed me as being credible particularly in their repeated inability to recall much of their conversation with Barnes and nothing of contemporaneous events at the plant except the statement of Barnes to the effect that there would be an election. I do not credit their testimony. Instead, I find that these girls had the opportunity to read the card placed before them by Barnes, the ability to read and understand it easily, and must be deemed to have comprehended the effect of their signatures to the card. I find no reason to invalidate their cards. Both Nancy Edwards and Ruby Shearin testified that they signed the Union card at Barnes' request after Barnes had told them that an election would be held if enough cards were signed. Both women, however, admitted reading the card. Edwards could remember nothing that Barnes had told her which was inconsistent with the card. Shearin, who is now personnel supervisor for the Respondent, was certainly capable of understanding what she read and must be deemed to have known she was signing for union membership despite anything told her. I do not credit the testimony of either employee that Barnes told them there would be an election if enough cards were signed. If, indeed, Barnes had such a statement, both employees would have questioned her about the inconsistency of such a statement with the language of the card but neither raised any question with her. I conclude that their union cards are valid. Dorothy Pearce signed a union card at Barnes' request and testified that she was told it was for an election. She claimed not to have read the lines on the front of the card stating that she was accepting membership but did read all of the back of the card which contains much more writing than the front. Upon closer questioning she could not remember what lines she had read on the front of the card because she was in a "very highly emotional condition" at that time. She remem- bered, however, that by signing the card she would be a member of the Union if the Union won the election. Moreover, she remembered Barnes saying that Barnes had gotten several other people to join the Union. It seems clear to me that Pearce realized both the purpose of Barnes' visit and the solicitation of the card signing to be for membership in the Union and that regardless of Pearce's alleged emotional condition she must have comprehended the language on the 686 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD front of the card which committed her to membership in the Union. I find no misrepresentation in obtaining her signature to the card and consider it valid. Respondent also objects to the card of Placid Elaine Stallings who testified that Barnes told her she would have the right to vote in the election. On cross-examination, however, Stallings admitted reading the card and remembering the part which acknowledged that she would be a member if she signed it. This furnishes no basis for invalidating her card. Matilda Winn was solicited by employee Patterson to sign a union card. According to Winn, Patterson told her that if enough cards were signed they could get an election to see whether the Union could come in or not. She admitted, however, that she had read the card and understood it and that there was nothing inconsistent between the card and what Patterson had told her. She also admitted that Patterson told her she wanted her to join and that she was attempting to get others to join the Union. It seems clear to me that under all these circumstances employee Winn must be deemed to have known she was accepting membership and joining the Union by signing the card when Patterson solicited her signature, and, it is, therefore, a valid designation. Respondent attacks the validity of the Union card signed by employee Clarence Finch who testified that his signature was solicited by both Conne Thorne and Billy Foster who told him there would be an election. After getting a card from Thorne he asked for another card for his wife and returned them, executed, to Thorne. Foster made no mention of soliciting the signature of Finch and Thorne testified that she solicited Finch's signature telling him only that he should read the card for any information. I do not credit Finch's testimony because of certain irregularities and inconsistencies. Thus, for example, he claimed not to have read the card. An examination of it, however, discloses extraordinary care and particularity in the way Finch filled it out, noting, for example, the location of the plant as not merely Louisburg but North Louisburg and completing every blank on the face of the card. Indeed, he claimed to be "very specific" and "very careful" about everything he fills out. I find it incredible that such a person would sign a paper without looking at it. Finch would not deny that Thorne told him the card was a union membership application, nor would he deny that Thorne had told him to read the card and get all the information from it but only that he did not remember her saying it. I conclude that Finch's card is a valid designation. William Foster solicited William Lovm, Jr., to sign a union card. According to Lovin, Foster told him that signing the card would show that the employees wanted the Union to come in and if the Union had a majority for the election it would be "passed." Foster denied mentioning an election to Lovin. In any event, Lovin admitted reading the card and understanding that if the Union got in he would be a member. It seems clear from all of the testimony that Lovin knew that he was signing not merely for an election but for membership in the Union and his card is a valid designation. Louise Boone solicited the Union cards of eight employees. Two of them, Nadine Redmond and Ruth Dement, testified on behalf of the Respondent who contests the validity of their cards. Redmond testified that she was told by Barnes at a meeting that if more than 50 percent of the workers signed there would be an election held but she could not remember whether that meeting took place before or after she signed the Union card. She admitted reading the card before she signed it and attending meetings of the Union's organizing committee, especially one that went- to Vick's office on August 17. Dement testified that Boone said: . if I sign the card, first, if enough signed it, the Union would come in, I mean, not the Union come in, but we would have an election, and then I could vote whether I wanted to belong to it or not. Despite her admission that she wanted to be very careful about what she was doing, she denied reading the card. Moreover, when she found out that the card was more than a request for an election she took no steps to get her card back. Boone, who testified she said nothing about an election to either of them, also stated that she herself knew nothing of an election when she solicited card signers. On balance, I credit Boone's testimony and find no misrepresentation in the solicitation of these cards. b. Misrepresentation as to number of signers Respondent cites the testimony of some of the card signers that they were told many or all had signed and cites these alleged misrepresentations as a basis for invalidation of the cards. Respondent argues for the rejection of the union card signed by employee Charlie Trader because one solicitor allegedly told Trader that all the men in the cutting depart- ment had signed and another solicitor had told him that everyone in the plant had signed. The argument of counsel, however, is not completely supported by the record Thus, Trader testified with respect to the allegation that everyone in the plant had signed: She told me she had some cards about the Union, she said she thought everybody had signed the cards, she asked would I like to sign one. [Emphasis supplied.] When the Trial Examiner asked "she thought everyone else had'?", Trader answered "Is going to sign." Trader also testified that the various solicitors asked him to sign a union card without mentioning anything about benefits to be derived. The last solicitor, however, who told him that all the men in the cutting department had signed, did ask him to sign for better job opportunities and an increase in pay. The validity of Trader's card turns upon whether substantial misrepresentations were made to him in order to get him to sign the Union card. Respondent cites S.E. Nichols Company, 156 NLRB 1201, 1211, where a card was invalidated because the signer had been told that 75 percent of the employees had signed up, which was untrue. In that case, however, the Trial Examiner makes it clear that the misrepresentation alone was insufficient In view of her reliance in signing her card upon the solicitor's misrepresentation as to the percentage of em- ployees who had signed the cards, I find that it was invalidated .... Here there is considerable doubt that Trader signed relying upon any misrepresentation. The only record evidence indi- cating such reliance is in a statement given by Trader to Respondent's representative wherein Trader is quoted as saying People who approached me told me everyone else had signed a card, so I signed one. In his testimony, however, Trader stated that this was told after he had signed the card. Still later Trader testified that the ones who had told him that everyone in the plant had signed LOUISBURG SPORTSWEAR CO. 687 did so before he signed the card but that he signed the card for the solicitor who told him that all the men in the cutting department had signed cards and that signing the card meant better job opportunities and pay increases With such vacilla- tion on the part of Trader, I am unable to conclude that he signed a union card relying upon any misrepresentation In any event, Such statements are harmless salestalk or puffing which do not operate to overcome the effect of ... [the employees] overt act in signing. G & A Truck Line, Inc., 168 NLRB No. 106. See also I.T.T. Semi-Conductors, Inc., 165 NLRB No. 98, where the Board held a false representation of an existing majority would void a designation if that designation would not have been subscribed but for the representation or the signer was put in fear of majority reprisal, neither of which conditions are shown to exist with respect to Trader's card. c. Conclusions as to union majority In summary, I find that the Union obtained the signatures of 102 employees in the appropriate unit by July 26, 1967, and sent its demand for recognition to the Respondent who received it on July 27. All of these authorizations, with the exception of the one signed by employee Marie Horton, were valid and since the umt consisted of 180 employees at the time, the Union had a clear majority of such employees Respondent mounts a special attack on the credibility of Union Representative Barnes, citing her testimony at one point to the effect that she did not tell the employee the card was just to get an election or would result in election, yet, at another point, admitting that she did discuss an election with one of the employees. I see no inconsistency in this testimony. It is one thing to discuss an election and it's quite another thing to tell a prospective card signer that the purpose of the card is to secure an election. Indeed, Barnes specifically denied telling any employee that the purpose of the card was to secure an election. Finally, Respondent's attack on some of the cards offered to prove the Union's majority status is founded on the testimony of some signers, presently employed by the Respon- dent, who exhibited a singular loss of memory except as respects the solicitor's mention of an election The signing occurred in July 1967, the election in October 1967, and the hearing in March 1968. Between July and October 1967, the Respondent waged an intensive anti-union campaign, con- sisting of a variety of unfair labor practices as will be discussed later. Under such circumstances the language of the court in Preston Products Co., 66 LRRM 2548, is noteworthy: Moreover, we think the Board was justified here in relying upon that rule in accepting the employees' signatures on the unambiguous cards despite the inconclusive testimony of a few as to the events surrounding the union's solicitation of the cards. Neither the Trial Examiner nor the Board found any credited evidence of gross misrepresentation, nor does the record reveal such evidence to us. Rather, we have the classic case of employees testifying under the eye of the company officials about events which occurred almost a year before and prior to the activities which were subse- quently found to constitute unfair labor practices. It is certainly conceivable that those same threats and benefits which shook an employee's original support for the union also altered that employee's memory as to events which occurred before the presentation of such threats and benefits. By the time of the hearing the employees may well have changed their mind with respect to union affiliation, but the crucial question in a refusal to bargain case is whether the union had the support of a majority of the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit at the time the request to bargain was made, and not whether that support remains intact some ten months later. Furthermore, any misunderstanding to the effect that these cards were for an election was dispelled when Manager Costa told all the employees in a speech he gave over the public address system on July 21, that the Union could try to use these cards to establish their right to represent the employees without ever going to a vote. 2. The good-faith doubt Where a union represents a majority of employees in an appropriate unit, an employer violates Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act if it declines to recognize and bargain with it where its refusal is not based on good faith doubt of the Union majority but is motivated by a desire to gain time in which to undermine the Union's support. Joy Silk Mills Inc. v. N.L.R.B., supra. We turn, therefore, to an examination of the events following the Union's attainment of a majority of the employees in the appropriate unit to determine whether the Respondent's refusal to recognize the Union on August 3, 1967, was based upon a good faith doubt or was designed to dissipate the Union's majority by unfair labor practices Reference has already been made to the discharge of employees Rice and Rich which occurred on June 14, and which I have found to be in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. Similarly, I have found that the activities of Vick at the Lanford Motel on July 20, constituted surveillance of the union activities of the employees in contravention of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Both of these events demonstrated, moreover, the antiunion animus of the Respondent as the critical period between the filling of the petition for an election and the election began. In this same connection note must be taken of a speech given by Costa to the employees of the Respondent over the public address system on July 21. In it Costa said: We have asked that you all stop work for a few minutes so that I can talk to you briefly about a matter of serious importance to you. In order that I may be entirely clear in what I say to you and in in order that there may be no doubt or misunder- standing as to what I do say, I am going to refer to some notes which I have here before me. Since efforts to bring the Union into this plant are now going on, a good many questions are arising with respect to the following matters .... 1. This matter is, of course one of concern to the Company. It is also, however, a matter of serious impor- tance to you-important to your whole future here at this plant. 2. It is our sincere belief that if the Union were to get in here it would not work to your benefit, but in the long run, would itself operate to your serious harm. Before long you may be approached by a union organizer, or by someone acting in behalf of the union, for the purpose of getting you to sign a union card. Some of you 688 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD have already been so approached. If and when such a card is put in front of you, think carefullyI Sometimes nowadays unions try to have the labor board certify them as bargaining agents for employees without the employees ever having any opportunity to vote on a matter at all . . . In such a situation, as you can see, the union's promise and assurance that the signed cards would never be made public, turns out to be completely false. Another favorite device that union organizers use is to tell you that you are one of the few who hasn't yet signed and that practically everybody, except you, has signed This is a false-hood which they tell each person in order to deceive him into believing that the others are already on the side of the union. * * * * * Now what your action about all of this will be is, of course, a matter for each of you to decide in your own minds. Our sincere belief is, however, that the union and the union cards are the pathway to trouble- and serious trouble. It is important to note that on July 21, only 1 day after Vick's surveillance at the Lanford Motel, Costa knew that some of the employees had already been approached to sign a union card. It is also important to note that Costa made it clear to the employees that the Union might attempt to be certified without an election, thus destroying any misappre- hensions or misunderstandings on the part of some of the employees as to the purpose of the cards. Finally, the employees were put on notice not to believe any represen- tations that practically everybody had signed a union card. Moreover, note is taken of Costa's remarks concerning his belief that the advent of the Union at the plant would "operate to [the employees'] serious harm." Ordinarily such a statement could be innocent and protected. The same can be said of his reference to the Union and union cards being the "pathway to serious trouble." In the context of other unfair labor practices, however, such statements constitute a violation of the Act. Greensboro Hosiery Mills, Inc., 162 NLRB No 108, Moms & Associates 138 NLRB 1160, White Oak Acres, Inc., 134 NLRB 1145, Whiteville Manufacturing Company and Blue Jeans Corp., 170 NLRB No. 149, Block-Southland Sportswear, Inc., 170 NLRB No. 101. We turn, therefore, to examine the alleged commission of other unfair labor practices on the part of the Respondent. E. Subsequent Unfair Labor Practices Undermining Union Support 1. The wage increase On July 24, Vick made a short speech over the public address system announcing a wage increase . This was the first general wage increase ever given by the Respondent to its employees other than increases required under the minimum wage law. According to Costa, the wage increase was first considered in March and the final decision to grant it was made about July 1. According to him , the final decision to make a raise was "largely based on operating efficiencies, performance in the plant generally." Counsel for the Respondent then asked him: Q. Do you have a budget? A. Yes, when we price our shirts I always submit factors for various catagories, such as overhead directly or indi- rectly, work supplies, and perhaps a contingency. Q. Was there a contingency in your budget dunng 19679 A. Yes, there was. Q. Did it include this wage raise. A. Yes. I cannot credit the testimony of Costa which suggests that the wage increase decision was finalized early in July. I note, for example, that the budget provision testified to by Costa was in response to a leading question from his counsel. Moreover, when Vick called a meeting of the shipping department on or about July 16, and was asked by employee Thorne what the top pay on her job was, he answered that it was "$1.55 until the minumum wages go up." There was no mention of a pending wage increase, which, if it had been finally decided upon, would presumably have been mentioned or suggested by Vick at that time. Again, no mention of the Respondent's consideration of a wage increase was made by Vick when confronted by the employees in the fold and press department and asked by Rice specifically about the unfairness of the wage rates. On the contrary, I note that the wage increase by Vick was made only 4 days after his surveillance of Barnes at the Lanford Motel and only 3 days after Costa had warned the employees of the dangers of unionization. In explanation for delaying the announcement of the wage increase until July 24, after it had been allegedly finally decided upon around July 1, Costa stated that it took that long to work it out, to analyze the statements that they had, and to prepare the statement. No further explanation was made as to why a mere announcement of a wage increase would take 3 weeks to prepare after it had been finally decided upon. I find his attempted explanation insufficient and conclude that the announcement was made on July 24 because of the Respondent's knowledge of the Union organizational campaign which was under way. N.L.R.B. v. Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405. The wage increase was put into effect on September 5, dunng the pendency of the election petition. Costa explained that the increase was delayed until that date because "Septem- 'ber 5 represents the beginning of the new payroll period and the time intervening, I felt, was necessary to announce it properly, run the announcement in the paper properly and communicate 'with our people so that they would understand fully both the amount and the manner in which we were going to implement the increase." He added- We simply added 10 cents an hour to all hourly rated workers' hourly rates and we applied a 6.3 percent factor to all piecework earnings and showed this amount in the adjustment column on their checks. Here, too, the bald assertion of Costa furnishes insufficient basis for explaining the action taken. It does not appear that it should take 6 weeks to do the simple act, particularly when the amount of the increase was going to be shown as a separate item and not to be lumped with the employee's regular pay. Instead, I conclude that both the promise of a wage increase that was made on July 24, and the granting of the wage increase that was effective September 5, were deliberately aimed to discourage unionization in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. The danger inherent in well-timed increases in benefits is the suggestion of a fist inside the velvet glove. Employees are not likely to miss the inference that the source of benefits now conferred is also the source from which future benefits must flow and which may dry up if it is not obliged. N.L.R.B. v. Exchange Parts Co., supra. LOUISBURG SPORTSWEAR CO. 689 2. The Costa meetings of July Costa held a series of meetings on July 26 and 27, at which time he spoke to all employees of the plant in groups of approximately 25. At these meetings he reviewed the fringe benefits of the employees such as the paid holidays, paid vacations and the hospitalization program. He then explained the wage increase that had been announced several days before He also announced a liberalization of the grievance procedure by stating: I outlined an open-door policy for discussions of problems if they arose and told them it would be highly desirable to take them up in this order; first with their immediate supervisor, if they weren't satisfied with that, to take it up with the foreman; if they were still not satisfied with his answer, to take it up with Mr. Vick who was the plant manager and if they were still not satisfied they could see me at any time since I was in and out of the plant regularly Costa also described the Company as "being very dear to us, that we made our living here, and that we should treat it accordingly:" I also stated that loyalty is one of the things that you can give in return for your living. I asked that they support their company and I also stated that a tug of war was fine in a picnic area but not in a factory. I went into the union organizing effects .... I emphasized that the Union couldn't do anything, that all of their pay and benefits came from Louisburg Sportswear, had always come from Louisburg Sportswear, and would always come from Louis- burg Sportswear I reviewed the fact that the Union replaces individual bargaining rights covering wages, hours and conditions, that they had always enjoyed. I urged , before they decided anything, to get all of the facts. I touched on union related violence and union related political activity, as reported in the various papers and suggested that they read about it .... I stated that the normal procedure for a [union] organizer would be to have people within the plant to feed back information to the organizer, and undoubtedly Mrs. Barnes did have. Costa's remarks at these meetings carried the clear sug- gestion to the employees that the wage increase which had been recently announced and the other benefits touched upon was the "loyalty" to the Company that was expected in return and necessitated a rejection of the Union. 3. The increased hospitalization benefits Costa testified that it was the company policy to provide benefits equal in amount to the existing local semiprivate room rate, and to raise the hospitalization amount periodically when they learned about increases in hospital rates. He admitted, however, that this policy of the Company was not widely known and had not been publicized. The previous increase in hospital benefits at Louisburg had been effective in August 1966. Costa further testified that it was a result of his mentioning the hospitalization fringe benefit to the employees at the meetings of July 26 and 27, that it occurred to him that he had not requested a check for a period of about 6 months. He thereupon had local rates checked and, on August 4, 1967, announced that hospital benefits for Louisburg had been increased from $15 per day to $16.50 per day. Considering the fact that this increase in benefits was triggered by the meetings of July 26 and 27, where Costa spoke of the Company's opposition to the Union and the Company's right to the employees' loyalty in return for their living, it is not likely that employees would "miss the inference that the source of benefits now conferred is also the source from which future benefits must flow and which may dry up if it is not obliged." N.L.R.B. v. Exchange Parts Co, supra. As such it was a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 4. The August meetings From the latter part of August until mid-September, Costa held another series of group meetings with his employees, in groups of 10 to 15 at a time. At these meetings, however, some of the employees were excluded. Thus, neither Bernice House nor Bertha Duke, two of the card signers, were asked to attend. Even Lois King, sister of Linda Rich, who asked her supervisor for permission to attend, was told "I don't think he'll let you go, but I will ask Mr. Vick or Bob [Meeks]." Costa's explanation for the exclusions from these meetings was that the exclusions "had to do with people who I felt, on the basis of feed-back, who would not be interested in what I was going to speak about." When asked how he knew these people were not interested, he answered "from the way they carried themselves in the plant," and gave us an example, "soliciting for the Union." He was finally asked categorically TRIAL EXAMINER The only ones excluded from the production and maintenance groups were what type of employees? THE WITNESS People who were openly soliciting for the Union. At these meetings he read from a typewritten text Among other things, he mentioned that the Union's organizaitonal efforts were now before the National Labor Relations Board and an election was expected in September or October. He mentioned the names of some of the officers of the Union and their country of birth, particularly where it was foreign. He also distributed a 1920 report on the Union and some alleged details of its subsequent history. Among other things he told the employees: The Union has no real interest in either you or this plant. It puts its own interest ahead of anything else It has its own goals and its own objectives .... Costa also quoted a newspaper item concerning an em- ployee whom a union fined for failing to attend a union meeting on Sunday, which fine was upheld by the Courts. He also called their attention to another newspaper article describing a law suit filed by employees to whom a union had made promises, as a result of which they had gone out on strike. The article pointed out that the employees had not been given the things promised them and had lost their jobs and were now suing the union. Costa also told the employees that if the Union won the election the Company would be required to meet and bargain with the Union in good faith, but would not have to agree to any union proposal. Even if the Union should be voted in, we would still have the right to say no to any union demand and any union proposal they made on us .... We are not going to agree to any union contract or to any union demand or to any union proposal that is not to the best interest of this plant and all our employees .... What would the Union do about it? .... The only thing they could do is to call you out on 690 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD strike, they only have one weapon. The strike is the Union's only weapon and they would want you to be the ammunition. They want to stand on the sidelines and help you and the Company to fight it out. The Union would want to hold your coats during the fight between you and the Company. That is the only way they could try to make us sign the contract. The Union only has one thing to offer you and that is pressure on the Company and pressure on this company could lead to a strike and all the trouble that could go along with it He then showed the employees clippings of newspaper articles and pictures depicting rioting at a strike-bound shipyard. One picture showing a stricken man is captioned "Nonstriking Worker Pays Price Tuesday After Leaving Job At Shipyard " Another picture is captioned "Trooper Ready With Teargas Gun." Still another picture is captioned "Angry Rioters Were Dispersed By Dogs And Troopers." Costa continued to discuss strikes by saying that if the Union called a strike to try to make the Company sign a contract, the employees would not get paid, either from the Company or from the Union nor could they collect unemploy- ment compensation but "most importantly" the employees could lose their jobs because the Company would have the right to permanently replace strikers with new workers He referred to the group of employees that tried to see Vick as a mob and continued his discussion on strikes telling the employees that the Union calls a strike whether or not the employees want the strike and in a strike there might be a picket line manned by strangers who might threaten those who wanted to work. We would do our best to protect all our people in a strike situation, but strikes very often lead to violence and the kind of trouble that you read about in the newspapers everyday. We don't want that kind of trouble here and I don't believe you want it either Costa then passed around a magazine published for the Combined Textile Industries and in which was an account of a strike at a nearby cotton mill. He called particular attention to some of the pictures in the article including one showing bullet holes in the car of a nonstriker and another showing the bloodied head of another nonstriker hit by a brick. He then discussed the successful operation of the Respondent's plant saying "Your security and your future will come from this plant being a success-nothing else. You cannot buy security by paying dues and fees to the Union. " How much security would you have if the Union won an election and then called you out on strike? How much security would you have if you were out on the picket line doing without your pay? How much security would you have if the Union caused so much trouble here and interfered with our operation to the point that we could not operate this plant successfully and that it caused us to lose more and more money that we were then forced for economic reasons to close the plant down? How much security would you have then? He then discussed a newspaper article describing a plant closing in North Carolina, which had been struck since June 12, and concluded the meeting showing the employees a cartoon depicting a woman telling a man "you are no longer on strike, dear, the Company has gone out of business." 5. The September-October meetings Costa held further meetings with the employees during late September and October, in which the topics discussed were very much like the ones at previous meetings. He pointed out that the Company may exist, explaining that some companies do not necessarily exist for a number of reasons citing a Lynchburg plant closing after losing an election to a union He also dwelt at some length on newspaper clippings which he showed to the employees describing a strike at a plant in Russellville and ending with the closing of the plant. He told the employees that if they voted "no", "they were voting no union, no violence, no union trouble, no dues, no assessments, no fines, no fees, and no contributions " 6. Letters and notices In late July, Costa sent the employees a letter enclosing the notice which had been posted within the plant setting forth the Company's opposition to the Union. This has previously been described as the "serious harm" notice. On September 13, Vick sent the employees a letter telling them among other things, The Union doesn't pay you wages. The Union has never given you anything and they never will. Your pay will always come from the Company-not from the Union What do you think would happen if the Union were voted in and then the Company did not agree to all the Union's demands and proposals during bargaining? What could the Union do about rt7 The only thing the Union could do is to call you out on strike. If you let the Union get into our plant they are going to make the decisions and run the show-not you They are going to call the shots They are going to tell you what to do. If you don't do what they say, they could really put pressure on you. Please think carefully about these things while you still have time to protect yourself from union trouble. Vick sent another letter on September 18, telling them that the reason the Union was trying to get into the plant was because the Union wanted to collect money from the employees. On September 27, Vick wrote the employees again adding "Where would you be if the Union won an election and then called you out on strike?" Enclosed was a cartoon showing a man telling a family "give me your money or your car-the finance company can't wait until the strike is over " On October 4, Vick wrote the employees once again telling them- Unions dominate their members. They tell them what to do, they tell them what not to do and they make them follow all the union rules, regulations and restrictions As the result there is NO FREEDOM FOR UNION MEMBERS' Enclosed with this letter was a reprint of a commentary on the Supreme Court decision in N.L.R.B v. Allis-Chalmers Manu- facturing Co. Finally, Vick wrote to the employees on October 10, telling them: The union issue boils down to a few basic points. 1. A strike would hurt you and the Company. A strike would disrupt our operation and it could cause you to lose your job. Economic strikers can be permanently replaced with new workers .... Enclosed with this letter was a cartoon saying "Don't make a mistake, vote no", and showing an employee saying "I am voting no fees, no strikes, no dues, no violence, and no union." LOUISBURG SPORTSWEAR CO. 691 Costa also identified several notices that were posted in the plant dunng the preelection period. One of them read- Are you playing with dynamite? If the union leaders guess wrong about your job who gets hurt? Not them. You and your family will have to find a way to eat and pay bills when they call a strike. 7 Other 8(a)(1) conduct a. Interrogation Employee Daniels testified that her supervisor came up to her at the factory and asked her how she was going to vote. This testimony was not contradicted and I credit it. In the absence of any legitimate reason for such an inquiry and any assurances against reprisal, and in the context of other contemporaneous unfair labor practices, it was a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, constituting interference with the employees' rights. Fontana Brothers, 169 NLRB No. 56 b. The appreciation night dinner Shortly before the election, handbills were distributed outside the Respondent's plant by local businessmen These handbills announced an "Appreciation Night" dinner to be held at 7 p.m., October 11, 1967, at the local high school with free entertainment and door prizes (the election was held on October 12, 1967). At this "Appreciation Night" dinner, the film "And Women Must Weep" was shown. Although the record in this proceeding contains little detail describing the film, the Board has had occasion to consider this particular film in previous cases. National Labor Relations Board Chairman McCulloch describes it as follows This is the same film shown to employees in the Plochman and Harrison case supra where a majority of the Board set aside the election because of this fact. As the majority opinion in Plochman notes, the film purported to be a true story account of the 1956 Potter-Brumfield strike in Princeton, Indiana, which in- volved a different company, a different industry, a different union, and a different community. The film is not a documentary It is a staged production based on a contrived script, played by professional actors, including an actress who impersonates a minister's wife, the narrator. The film tells the story of property destruction, violence, and the near murder of a child allegedly committed by a union dunng the course of a strike obstensibly called for no justifiable reason. It is organized with sequences skillfully put together so as to achieve the maximum dramatic and emotional impact The professional acting is smooth and extremely lifelike. In fact, the entire production is so well conceived that the ordinary viewer is likely to consider that it represents the literal truth. No attempt has been made, however, to prove that events happened exactly as they are portrayed in the film. In fact, there is ground for believing that the film has distorted the true picture, not only by telling only one side of the story, but by misrepresenting facts. (Carl T. Mason Co., Inc, 142 NLRB 480, 484 ) The showing of this same film has been found to be violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, Southwire Company, 159 NLRB 394, as a restraint upon the employees' rights under Section 7 of the Act. Respondent argues, however, that the showing of the film at the "Appreciation Night" dinner was not the responsibility of the Respondent inasmuch as it was arranged and conducted by third parties. I note, however, the testimony of a number of employees to the effect that their supervisors either asked if they were going to attend this dinner or told them to attend it Thus, employees Dickerson, Wilson, Wood, Patterson, and Daniels were asked by their respective supervisors whether they were going to attend the dinner Daniels also heard her supervisor ask two other employees. Employee Hodge was also asked by her supervisor if she was going to attend the dinner and, when she replied that she would not unless she could go with someone, her supervisor told her she could bring someone but that such person would not be eligible for door prizes Employee House was told by supervisor "I want to see you at the supper." I credit the testimony of these employees, particularly in the absence of any contradiction by the supervisors involved. Moreover, a number of supervisors attended this dinner. This behavior by several supervisors of the Respondent casts an entirely new light upon the third party aspects of the dinner. I find that the supervisors' interrogation of the employees about their attendance at the meeting as well as their presence at the meeting effectively adopted the meeting as the Respondent's, at least in the minds of the employees, and any 8(a)(1) conduct occurring there such as the showing of the film "And Women Must Weep" not only can, but must be, attributed to the Respondent. 8. Conclusions regarding the 8(a)(1) conduct Respondent argues that all of Costa's remarks are privileged and contain no threats nor do they point to any action which Respondent might take in retaliation against employees for selecting the Union. This argument, however, oversimplifies the problem. As in a mosaic, one cannot comprehend the whole of the picture by simply examining each of the fragments separately. Examining the totality of the conduct engaged in by the Respondent, it is clear that the Respondent's portrayal of unionization was not simply unfavorable to the Union, but entirely impossible of any fruitful outcome. Strikes of the employees are pictured as inevitable and violence ensuing therefrom unavoidable. Indeed, Costa's testimony fortified such a conclusion. He could not recall being asked "How can we keep violence out of Sportswear9" He did, however, recall being asked "How do we keep the Union out?" In his mind the two questions were similar and his remarks to the employees, consciously or otherwise, conveyed the same meaning. Moreover, his answer was not merely accidental and unintended. He testified that he arranged with several of his supervisors to have them ask such a question of him at the meeting This intentional linking of unionism with violence was emphasized repeatedly by his repetitive reference to alleged violence occurring in strikes elsewhere. Never did he suggest the possibility of a peaceful strike. Similarly Costa's remarks concerning the loss of jobs could not help but convince the employees of the futility of unionization. Although he linked loss of jobs to an economic strike, it is very doubtful that his listeners, lacking the ability to comprehend legal niceties, would recognize the difference between that and an unfair labor practice strike. Thus, employee Nevils was asked: Q. Was anything said about the continued operation of the plant? 692 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD A. They just referred to it if the Union came in, that the plant might close down, they talked about others that had closed down on account of it. Q. Who said that? A. Mr. Costa On cross-examination counsel for the Respondent asked. Q. Wasn't the only thing Mr. Costa said about the possibility of the plant closing down something like this, if the Union interfered with the operation of the plant, we could not operate econorrucally, we might be forced to close down? Isn't that all he said? A. Yes-But to me it meant the same thing. This constant reiteration of strikes, violence, and job loss linked inextricably with unionization could not but result in the creation of fear in the minds of the employees should the Union win the election. At one of these meetings employee Harris testified that someone asked what could be done to avoid the dire consequences related by Costa According to her, Costa's answer was to vote "no", "that would end the strike because there would be no union and therefore we would have no strike." Employee Nevils testified that Costa said the only way to keep violence out was to keep the Union out. Employee Daniel testified that Costa said to avoid strikes and violence not to get the Union in. Employee Duke testified that Supervisor Gilliam asked Costa how they could keep violence out and Costa's answer was "keep the Union out." The language of the Board in Ideal Baking Co., of Tennessee, Inc., 143 NLRB 546, 552, is apropos- This unremitting effort on the part of Respondent to impress upon the employees the dangers inherent in their selection of the Union as their bargaining agent, particularly the danger of job loss, followed up by the baleful representation of the prospect of violence, physical injuries, and property damage as the ordinary result of voting for the Union in the election, was not an attempt to influence the employees by reason, but was an appeal to fear. Indeed, Respondent's entire preelection campaign was intimidatory in nature and intended to convey the threat of job loss and physical violence should be [sic] the Union win the election. Thus, I conclude as the Board did in Ideal, that the Respondent's entire preelection, antiunion campaign, when considered as a whole, was intended to interfere with, restrain, and coerce its employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed by Section 7 and was accordingly violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. I include in this conclusion Respondent's reference to "serious harm" and the "pathway to . . serious trouble" in connection with unionization, as well as Respondent's interrogation and its involvement in the showing of "And Women Must Weep" of the "Appreciation Night" dinner. I note, also, in addition to the similarity of this case to Ideal, supra, its similarity to Crystal Lake Broom Works, 159 NLRB 429, Yazoo Valley Electric Power Association, 163 NLRB No. 106, and Crown Laundry & Dry Cleaners, Inc., 160 NLRB 746, in all of which the employer involved was represented by the law firm representing Respondent. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. By the discharge of employees Elleanor Rice and Linda Rich on or about June 14, 1967, because of their union and/or concerted activities, Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act. 2. By its refusal to hire former employee Louise Boone on and after October 11, 1967, because of her union activities, Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act. 3. By Plant Manager Vick's surveillance of union activities of the employees, by Manager Costa's impression of surveil- lance which he conveyed in his speech of July 21, where he also spoke of "serious harm" by unionization, by its promise of a wage increase on July 24, 1967, and its effectuation on September 5, 1967, by Manager Costa's liberalization of the grievance procedure announced on or about July 26, by its increased hospitalization benefits announced on August 4, 1967, by its meetings of July, August, September and October 1967, as well as by letters and notices transmitted to its employees dung that same time, in all of which the inevitability of strikes and violence ensuing as result of unionization was emphasized together with probable job losses, by its interrogation of employees regarding union intentions and by its involvement in the showing of the film "And Women Must Weep," Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 4. By its refusal to bargain collectively with representatives of its employees' union on and after August 3, 1967, in the absence of a good faith doubt as to the Union's majority at that time, Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. OBJECTIONS TO THE ELECTION The Union filed timely objections to conduct affecting the results of the election which was held on October 12, 1967, and which the Union lost. Objection 1 was the wage increase in September 1967, pursuant to the promise made around July 24, 1967, Objection 2 was the promise of an increase in hospitalization benefits made on or about August 4, Objection 3 was the grant of an increase in hospitalization benefits on or about August 21, 1967, pursuant to the promise made on or about August 4; Objection 4 was the dinner meeting referred to previously as the Appreciation Night Dinner of October 11, where the film "And Women Must Weep" was shown; Objection 5 was the notice on or about July 26, stating in part that if the Union were to get in it would operate to "your serious harm"; Objection No 6 was the meetings of July and August with small groups of employees where violence and strikes were mentioned as inevitable consequences of unioniza- tion together with threats of plant closing; Objection No. 7 was the Respondent's leaflets indicating that a vote for the Union was a vote for violence and strikes and for closing of the plant. All of these objections have already been discussed in the earlier portion of this decision under unfair labor practices and have found to be violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Such conduct which occurred during the critical period between the date the representation petition was filed and the date the election was held is a fortiori conduct which interferes with free choice in an election. Leas & McVitty Incorporated, 155 NLRB 389, and cases cited therein. Objection 8 by the Union to conduct affecting the results of the election is: The aforesaid employer campaign was intertwined with a local businessmen campaign in which furtive threats of plant closing were made by individual businessmen to individual employees and the public innuendo of plant LOUISBURG SPORTSWEAR CO. 693 closing was made by the local newpaper on September 28 and October 5, 1967. This campaign so polluted the atmosphere that the holding of a free and fair election was rendered impossible Predictions of plant closings were made by various local citizens according to the uncontradicted testimony of a number of employee witnesses. Thus, employee Thorne testified that Sam Woods, an operator of a local store, told her that "if you all vote that union in there, Carolina Fine Woods [a Sylvania plant which was widely known to be considering establishing a plant in Louisburg] is holding back, they will not come to town; we don't want that to happen. They will close that plant because they say so." On October 4, the Union held the meeting at the local courthouse. Clint Fuller and Ashely Johnson, managing editor of the local newspaper "Franklin Times" and manager of the local radio station WYRN, respectively, attended. Employee King testified that Fuller told her and other employees at that meeting that Carolina Fine Woods was waiting to see the results of the pending election at Louisburg to determine whether or not to locate there. Employee Foster at the same meeting testified that he heard Fuller say that if the Union came in the Respondent would close down and the new plant would not come in. Foster also heard Johnson say that the citizens of the county had raised $71,000 and borrowed $171,000 to put the company building here. Employees Rice and Rich corroborated the testimony regarding Fuller's state- ment. On October 10, the "Franklin Times" ran a 2-page ad signed by scores of local citizens urging the employees to vote "no union." This advertisement was put up by the Respondent in the lobby of the plant superimposed upon a red velour cloth and captioned "This is what your friends of Franklin County think of Ed Blair and his union." Employee House testified that when she saw the name of her druggist, Herbert Scoggins, in this double page ad, she called him and asked him what he was doing signing the paper. Scoggins replied that Jack Cooper, an insurance agent, brought him the paper to sign and Scoggins signed thinking he was helping the employees because the plant would close if the Union came in The "Franklin Times" ran a number of articles and editorials on the Union and the election. In the edition of September 24, it mentioned labor troubles at neighboring Henderson several years before where there was violence and "a number of workers left without jobs " In the edition of October 5, the paper again mentioned the Henderson diffi- culties stating that the strike there resulted in the loss of employment at that plant for 1400 workers some of whom were never reemployed after 1959. Finally, in an editorial in the September 28 edition, the Franklin Times concluded by saying. But all citizens, interested in future developments of this area, can readily see the threat to future location of plants here should the unions come in. With tobacco facing its most trying days and the county in need of more, not less, job opportunities, it is hoped that those voting on October 12 will consider, first, the welfare of the county. Respondent argues that the conduct of third parties was not such as to require that the election be set aside. The Board, however, has held to the contrary in situations like this. Dean Industries Inc., 162 NLRB No 106, and cases cited therein. Respondent further argues that the Respondent was not responsible for the conduct of these third parties if it was objectionable. There is reason to conclude that the Respon- dent can and should be held responsible for the conduct of these third parties See, for example, Hamburg Shirt Corp., supra. I find it unnecessary, however, to decide whether the Respondent here should be held accountable for the behavior of these third parties. I have already found that the Respon- dent has committed unfair labor practices like the acts committed by the third parties here. In any event even if these antiunion activities by the local citizenry cannot be attributed to the Company such activities rendered impossible the rational, uncoerced selection of a bargaining representative as contemplated by the Act. Dean Industries Inc, supra; Uni- versal Manufacturing Corporation of Mississippi, 156 NLRB 1459, 1467, and cases cited therein I therefore recommend that the election of October 12, 1967, be set aside. THE REMEDY Having found that the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act I shall recommend that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. Having further found that the Respondent discriminatorily discharged employees Elleanor Rice and Linda Rich on June 14, 1967, I shall recommend that the Respondent offer them immediate and full reinstatement to their former or substan- tially equivalent positions without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges and make them whole for any loss of earnings suffered by reason of the discrimination against them by payment of a sum of money equal to that which they normally would have earned as wages from the date of discharge to the date of Respondent's offer of reinstatement less any net earnings during said period (Crossett Lumber Co., 8 NLRB 440) and in the manner described in F W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289, together with interest thereon at the rate of 6 percent per annum as set forth in Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716. Having further found that the Respondent discriminatorily refused to hire former employee Louise Boone on October 11, 1967, I shall recommend that the Respondent offer Louise Boone employment at her former or substantially equivalent position. Inasmuch as there is no indication that her job or its equivalent is vacant now, I shall order Respondent to offer such employment to her as soon as such position becomes available and, in the meantime, make her whole for any loss of earnings suffered by reason of discrimination against her by payment of a sum of money equal to that which she normally would have earned as wages from the date of Respondent's refusal to hire her to the date of Respondent's offer of employment less any net earnings during said period as set forth in the previous paragraph. Having further found that the Respondent has unlawfully refused to bargain with the Union I shall recommend that the Respondent be required at the request of the Union to bargain collectively with said Union as the exclusive representative of all employees in the appropriate unit and embody in a signed agreement any understanding reached. The unit found appro- priate is All production and maintenance employees at the Em- ployer's Louisburg, North Carolina, plant, but excluding 694 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD office clerical employees, guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act Ordinarily a second election might be indicated where a prior election has been invalidated. Here, however, the nature of the unfair labor practices not only negate Respondent's alleged good faith doubt of the Union's majority, but, together with the community's antiunion behavior, make a fair election impossible. Under such circumstances, an election would be a "less reliable indication of the true desire of employees than authorization cards" Joy Silk Mills, Inc., 85 NLRB 1263, enfd. 185 F.2d 732 (C.A.D.C.), River Togs, Ire, 160 NLRB 58, enfd. in part 388 F.2d 198 (C.A. 2). Counsel for the Charging Party further requests that the remedy provide that Respondent make its employees whole for the monetary value of benefits which they would reason- ably have been expected to receive but for Respondent's unlawful refusal to bargain, such amounts based upon earnings in comparable sportswear plants organized by the Union. He further urges that the "General Counsel and the Amalgamated appear before an assembly of all of Respondent's employees to explain what has happened in this hearing, the nature of the Company's offenses and their ramifications, the nature and dimensions of the bargaining order and related matters." I find insufficient justification for these extraordinary measures urged by counsel for the Charging Party, being of the opinion that the remedy provided in the order should be sufficient to redress the wrongs committed by the Respondent. See Mechanical Specialties Company, Inc., 166 NLRB No. 31. RECOMMENDED ORDER On the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law I recommend that the Respondent, Louis- burg Sportswear Co., its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall 1. Cease and desist from. (a) Refusing to bargain collectively in derogation of the rights of Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, AFL- CIO, any other union selected by the employees as their exclusive bargaining representative. (b) Discouraging membership in and activity on behalf of Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization, by discharging or refusing to reinstate employees or by discriminating against employees in any other manner in regard to their hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment. (c) Surveilling [sic] or creating the impression of surveilling [sic] union meetings and activities. (d) Promising or granting financial and other benefits to employees to discourage unionization. (e) Unlawfully interrogating employees concerning their union activities and attitudes. (f) Changing its grievance procedures to discourage union- ization of the employees. (g) Threatening strikes, job loss, violence, and property damage or serious harm as the inevitable consequence of unionization. (h) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of their rights to self-organization, to form labor organizations, to join or assist Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization, and to engage in any other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or any other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any and all such activities, except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in Section 8(a)(3) of the Act as modified by the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959. 2. Take the following affirmative action which is necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act- (a) Offer Elleanor Rice and Linda Rich immediate and full reinstatement to their former or substantially equivalent positions as of June 14, 1967, without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges previously enjoyed, and make such employees whole for any loss they may have suffered by reason of the discrimination against them in the manner set forth, in the section of the above decision titled "The Remedy." (b) Offer Louise Boone employment at her former or substantially equivalent position as soon as such position becomes available and make her whole for any loss that she may have suffered by reason of the discrimination against her in the manner set forth in the section of the above decision entitled "The Remedy." (c) Notify the above-named employees if presently serving in the Armed Forces of their right to full reinstatement upon application in accordance with the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1948, as amended, after discharge from the Armed Forces (d) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all payroll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other records relevant and necessary to a determination of compliance with (a) and (b) above. (e) Upon request, bargain collectively with the above- named Union as the exclusive representative of all the employees in the following appropriate unit and embody in a signed agreement any understanding reached All production and maintenance employees at the Em- ployer's Louisburg, North Carolina, plant but excluding office clerical employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act. (f) Post in conspicuous places at its place of business including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix"' Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 11, after being duly signed by the Respondent's representative, shall be posted by the Respon- dent immediately upon receipt thereof and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter Steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (g) Notify the Regional Director for Region 11, in writing, within 20 days from the date of this Recommended Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith.2 I In the event that the Recommended Order be adopted by the Board, the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the notice In the further event that the Board's Order is enforced by a decree of the United States Court of Appeals the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision and Order " 2 In the event that this Recommended Order be adopted by the Board, this provision shall be modified to read "Notify the Regional Director, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith." LOUISBURG SPORTSWEAR CO. 695 APPENDIX NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our employees that. After a trial at which all sides had the chance to give evidence, it was found that we, Louisburg Sportswear Co., violated the National Labor Relations Act, and we were ordered to post this notice to inform our employees of their rights. The Act gives all employees these rights To organize themselves To form, join, or help unions To bargain as a group through a representative they choose To act together for collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection To refuse to do any or all of these things We have also been ordered to assure our employees that- WE WI ,L NOT do anything that interferes with these rights. WE WILL NOT spy on your union meetings or union activities. WE WILL NOT make threatening speeches or put out threatening notices saying a union will operate to your serious harm if it gets into the plant. WE WILL NOT promise or grant financial or other ben- efits to discourage you from unionization. WE WILL NOT unlawfully question you about your union activities and attitudes WE WILL NOT change our grievance procedure in order to discourage unionization. WE WILL NOT threaten strikes, job loss, violence or prop. erty damage as the inevitable consequence of unionization. You are free to loin the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, AFL-CIO, or any other union and by majority choice to select any union to represent you in bargaining with us. WE WILL upon request bargain collectively with the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive representative for all our production and maintenance employees at the Louisburg, North Carolina, plant but excluding office clerical employees, guards, and supervisors. It was also found that we violated the Act when we fired Elleanor Rice and Linda Rich because these employees were for the Union. WE WILL give these employees their jobs back and their seniority and we will make up the pay they lost and also pay 6-percent interest. It was also found that we refused to rehire Louise Boone because she was for the Union and we therefore violated the Act WE WILL offer Louise Boone her job as soon as it is available and in the meantime make up the pay she lost and also pay her 6-percent interest. Dated LOUISBURG SPORTSWEAR Co. (Employer) By (Representative) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material If employees have any question concerning the notice or compliance with its provisions, they may communicate di- rectly with the Board's Regional Office, 1625 Wachovia Building, 301 North Main St., Winston-Salem, North Carolina Telephone 723-2911.