174 NLRB 104
Local 98, Sheet Metal Workers
104
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Local Union No. 98, of the Sheet Metal Workers'
International Association and its Agents Malcolm
Hamilton, Jr. and Lincoln Baird
and Cincinnati
Sheet Metal & Roofing Company A/K/A Ajax
Company. Cases 9-CC-435 and 9-CE-16
January 14, 1969
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MCCULLOCH AND MEMBERS
BROWN AND JENKINS
On August 1, 1968, Trial Examiner Phil Saunders
issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding,
finding that Respondents had engaged in and were
engaging in certain unfair labor practices, and
recommending that they cease and desist therefrom
and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in
the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. Thereafter,
Respondents filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's
Decision and a supporting brief.' The Charging
Party filed an answering brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National
Labor Relations Act as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
powers
in
connection
with
this
case
to
a
three-member panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no
prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are
hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner's Decision, the exceptions, the briefs, and
the entire record in these cases, and hereby adopts
the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of
the Trial Examiner, as modified below.
1. We agree with the Trial Examiner that Article
II, Section 2 and Article VIII, Section 3, in the
collective-bargaining contract between
Respondent
Local Union No. 98 and Sheet Metal Contractors
of Southern Ohio, were not intended to preserve the
work or work standards of employees in the
bargaining unit but rather had an impermissible
secondary object and therefore were violative of
Section 8(e) of the Act.'
2. We also agree with the Trial Examiner that
Respondents induced and encouraged employees,
'Respondents have also requested oral argument The record, including
the exceptions and briefs, adequately presents the issues and the positions
of the parties We, therefore, deny the request.
'The Trial Examiner found, apparently inadvertently, that Section 2 of
Article VIII was also unlawful. However, the complaint did not allege that
this section of Article VIII was unlawful. Accordingly, we do not adopt
this finding
In adopting the Trial Examiner's findings as to the unlawful object of
the collective-bargaining contract provisions considered above, we do not
adopt the Trial Examiner's statement that "testimony that employees of
Veach and Standard started making elbows and pipe as a result of their
difficulties" is also evidence of a violation. Nor, in finding an unlawful
object, do we rely on testimony, as recounted in the Trial Examiner's
Decision, that Union agents Baird and Hamilton said "they had no
objections where the pipe or elbows came from as long as it was made by
employers paying prevailing wages
"
and threatened and coerced employers, in both cases
for an object of inducing sheet metal contractors to
cease doing business with the Charging Party, in
violation of Section 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii)(B) of the Act.
We rely on the following incidents as establishing
inducement of employees:
(a) On April 7, 1967, sheet metal worker James
Allen, a member of Respondent Local Union No.
98 and an employee of Standard Sheet Metal, Inc.,
was installing round pipe ,
with some adjustable
elbows,
in
a
building
under
construction
in
Portsmouth,
Ohio,
when
Union Agent
Malcolm
Hamilton appeared at the jobsite and asked Allen
why he
was "using nonunion pipe on the job."
Hamilton told Allen he would either have to get the
"right
material"
or he would remove employees
from the job . Allen quit working on the job.
(b) On August 7, 1967, Hamilton appeared at a
car wash job of Standard in Portsmouth , Ohio, and
pulled Union apprentice John McCoy from the job
because he was installing "non-union ells."
We rely on the following incidents as proving
threats or coercion of employers:
(a)
As
previously
stated ,
in
April
1967,
Respondent Hamilton caused Standard's employee,
Allen,
and
Allen' s helper to quit work on the
Welfare Building project.
Thereafter,
and in connection with the same
construction project , Hamilton told Carl Newman,
Standard's secretary-treasurer, that Standard would
have to "obtain the right materials for the job," that
the
material
was improper because it was
manufactured by a production union instead of a
construction union, that if Standard installed the
improper materials they would have to be removed,
that the men would not be permitted to put up the
improper materials and that they would be fined by
the Union if they did.
(b) In June 1967 at C. S. Veach Inc.' s Ralston
Purina plant project at
Wellston ,
Ohio,
Union
Steward Dick Neely and Union Agents Hamilton
and Lincoln Baird told L. K. Scruggs ,
Veach's
mechanical
superintendent,
that
the
Charging
Party's round pipe and adjustable elbows could not
be used because they were not made by the Sheet
Metal Workers in the area under their wage scale,
and that the Union's members could not install
them.
(c) In August 1967, on the Portsmouth , Ohio, car
wash
installation ,
Hamilton
told
Standard's
secretary-treasurer,
Newman,
that
he could not
install
10-inch elbows which did not have union
labels, and pulled apprentice John McCoy from the
job.
In a letter
of August 10, 1967,
to
Standard,
Hamilton wrote that he had "stopped the apprentice
from installing nonunion ells on the car wash job,"
stated that he had asked Standard before for
compliance with the collective-bargaining agreement,
and laid down this ultimatum : "This is the last time
I will call this to your attention . Failure to comply
next time will result in charges being filed."
174 NLRB No. 22
LOCAL 98, SHEET METAL WORKERS
105
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Delete Conclusions of Law No. 3 and 4 in the
Trial Examiner's Decision, substitute therefor the
following
paragraphs, and renumber the present
Conclusion of Law No. 5 to read No. 6.
3. By maintaining, enforcing, or giving effect to
Article II, Section 2, and Article VIII, Section 3, of
the Standard Form of Union Agreement entered
into
by
Respondent
Union and Sheet Metal
Contractors of Southern Ohio on or about June 1,
1967, Respondent Union entered into an agreement
in violation of Section 8(e) of the Act.
4.
By inducing and encouraging employees of
Standard and Veach to refuse to perform services or
handle the Charging Party's products with an object
of forcing or requiring the above-named employers
to cease doing business with the Charging Party,
Respondents have violated Section 8(b)(4)(i)(B) of
the Act.
-
5.
By threatening, coercing, and restraining
Standard and Veach with an object of forcing or
requiring them to cease doing business with the
Charging Party, Respondents have violated Section
8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations
Act,
as
amended, the National Labor
Relations
Board hereby orders that Respondent
Local
No. 98, of the Sheet Metal Workers'
International Association, its officers, agents, and
representatives, including Malcolm Hamilton, Jr.,
and Lincoln Baird, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Engaging in, or inducing or encouraging any
individual employed by Standard Sheet Metal, Inc.,
C. S. Veach, Inc., or any other person engaged in
commerce or in an industry affecting commerce to
engage in, a strike or a refusal in the course of his
employment to use, manufacture, process, transport,
or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles,
materials,
or
commodities, or to perform any
services;
or threatening, coercing, or restraining
Standard Sheet Metal Inc., C. S. Veach, Inc., or
any other person engaged in commerce, or in an
industry affecting commerce, where, in either case,
an
objiect
thereof is to force or require the
aforementioned employers or any other person to
cease
using,
selling,
handling,
transporting,
or
otherwise dealing in the products of, or to cease
doing business with, Cincinnati Sheet
Metal and
Roofing Company or any other person.
(b) Maintaining, enforcing, or giving effect to
Article II, Section 2, and Article VIII, Section 3, of
the collective-bargaining contract entered into by
Respondent Union with Sheet Metal Contractors of
Southern Ohio on behalf of its employer-members,
about June 1, 1967, entitled "Standard Form of
Union Agreement."
-(c) Executing, maintaining, enforcing, or giving
effect to any other contract or agreement, express or
implied, with Sheet Metal Contractors of Southern
Ohio
or
its
employer-members,
whereby such
employers cease or refrain or agree to cease or
refrain from handling, using, selling, transporting, or
otherwise dealing in any of, the products of, or to
cease doing business with, Cincinnati Sheet Metal
and Roofing Company, or any other person.
2. Take the following affirmative action which the
Board finds will effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Notify contractors, or their Association acting
for its employer-members, that Respondent Union
will not maintain nor insist upon the inclusion of the
above
enumerated
articles
and sections found
violative of the Act, or any clauses and provisions of
a similar or like nature, in any collective-bargaining
contract.
(b)
Post in conspicuous places in all the
Respondent Union's business offices, meeting halls,
and all places where notices to members are
customarily posted, copies of the attached notice
marked "Appendix."' Copies of said notice, on
forms to be provided by the Regional Director,
Region 9, shall, after having been duly signed by
Respondent
Union's
authorized
representatives,
including Malcolm Hamilton, Jr. and Lincoln Baird,
be posted by Respondent Union immediately upon
receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60
consecutive days. Reasonable steps shall be taken by
Respondents to insure that said notices are not
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(c) Sign and mail sufficient copies of said notice
to the aforesaid Regional Director for forwarding to
the
Association
and its employer-members for
information, and, if they are willing, for posting by
them in all locations where notices to employees are
customarily posted.
(d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 9, in
writing, within 10 days of this Decision, what steps
have been taken to comply herewith.
In the event that this Order is enforced by a decree of a United States
Court of Appeals, there shall be substituted for the words "a Decision and
Order" the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals
Enforcing an Order "
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL MEMBERS OF LOCAL UNION No. 98,
SHEET
METAL
WORKERS'
INTERNATIONAL
ASSOCIATION, AFL-CIO
Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National
Labor Relations Board and in order to effectuate the
policies of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended,
we hereby notify you that:
WE WILL NOT maintain, enforce, or give effect to
Article II, Section 2 and Article VIII, Section 3 of the
collective-bargaining
contract
entered into by this
Union with Sheet Metal Contractors of Southern Ohio
about June 1, 1967, entitled "Standard Form of Union
106
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Agreement."
WE WILL NOT execute, maintain , enforce, or give
effect to any contract , express or implied, with Sheet
Metal
Contractors
of
Southern
Ohio
or
its
employer-members , whereby such employers cease or
refrain or agree to cease or refrain from doing business
with Cincinnati Sheet Metal and Roofing Company, or
any other person , in violation of Section 8(e) of the
Act.
WE WILL NOT engage in , induce, or encourage any
individual employed by Standard Sheet Metal , Inc., C.
S.
Veach ,
Inc.,
or
any other person engaged in
commerce or in an industry affecting commerce to
engage in, a strike or a refusal in the course of his
employment to use, manufacture , process, transport, or
otherwise handle or work on any goods ,
articles,
materials, or commodities, or to perform any services;
and
WE WILL NOT threaten ,
coerce,
or
restrain
Standard Sheet Metal, Inc., C. S. Veach, Inc., or any
other person engaged in commerce or in an industry
affecting commerce where in either case - an object
thereof is to force or require, the aforementioned
employers or any other person to cease using , selling,
handling, transporting ,
or otherwise dealing in the
products of, or to cease doing business with, Cincinnati
Sheet
Metal and Roofing Company or any other
person.
LOCAL UNION No. 98, OF
THE SHEET METAL
WORKERS'
INTERNATIONAL
ASSOCIATION
(Labor Organization)
Dated
By
(Representative)
(Title)
(Agent)
(Agent)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting, and must not be altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
If members have any question concerning this notice or
compliance with its provisions,
they may communicate
directly with the Board's Regional Office , Room 2407,
Federal
Office
Building,
550
Main Street,
Cincinnati,
Ohio 45202, Telephone 513-684-3686.
TRIAL EXAMINER 'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
PHIL SAUNDERS, Trial Examiner: Upon charges filed on
August 7, 1967 , by Cincinnati Sheet Metal & Roofing
Company, herein called Cincinnati or the Charging Party,
against Local Union No. 98 of the Sheet Metal Workers'
International
Association
and its Agents Malcolm
Hamilton and Lincoln Baird , herein called the Respondent
Union, Local 98, or Respondents, the General Counsel
issued
a consolidated complaint on
March 27, 1968,
alleging
the
Respondents
had
violated
Section
8(b)(4)(i)(u)(B) and 8(e) of the National Labor Relations
Act,
as
amended .
A hearing was held before me in
Columbus, Ohio, on May 6 and 7 ,
1968, and all the
parties filed briefs in this matter.
Upon the entire record and from my observation and
demeanor of the witnesses , I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
L THE BUSINESS OPERATIONS OF THE EMPLOYERS
The Charging Party, an Ohio corporation with its plant
and principal offices located in Cincinnati ,
Ohio, is
engaged in the manufacture and fabrication of roofing,
rain carrying goods, piping, siding and other sheet metal
products for distribution and sale to the building and
construction industry . During the past 12 months, which is
a representative period, the Charging Party had a direct
inflow of goods and materials , in interstate commerce,
valued in excess of $50,000, which it purchased and caused
to be shipped directly from points outside the State of
Ohio to its said Cincinnati, Ohio, location.
Standard Sheet Metal , Inc , herein called Standard, an
Ohio corporation with its principal offices located at
Portsmouth , Ohio, and C . S. Veach, Inc., herein called
Veach, a Kentucky corporation with its principal offices
located at Lexington , Kentucky are each engaged in the
States of Ohio and Kentucky as sheet metal contractors in
the building and construction industry.
At all times material herein, the Charging Party,
Standard and Veach each is and has been, an "employer"
as
defined in Section 2(2) of the Act ,
engaged in
"commerce" and/or in operations "affecting commerce"
as defined in Section 2(6) and (7 ) of the Act, respectively.
H. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
Respondent
Local 98 is, and has been ,
a labor
organization as defined in Section 2(5) of the Act, and at
all
times
material
herein,
Respondent
Hamilton and
Respondent Baird are and have been business agent and
business manager of Local 98, respectively, and are and
have been agents of Local 98, acting in its behalf, within
the meaning of Section 2(13) of the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
The complaint alleges that Standard and Veach have
purchased certain fittings including adjustable elbows,
round pipe and ducts, fabricated and assembled by the
Charging
Party
and
Buckeye
Furnace
and
Fittings
Company, herein called Buckeye, for installation at
jobsites in connection with construction work performed
by these sheet metal contractors . It is also alleged that on
certain
dates in
April, July, and August ,
1967,'
the
Respondents ordered individuals employed by Standard
and Veach not to handle round pipe and adjustable elbows
made by the Charging Party for installation by Standard
and Veach at certain construction sites, and that by the
conduct of Respondent's agents, Hamilton and Baird,
Local 98 threatened, coerced, and restrained Standard,
Veach, and others. It is further alleged that on June 1,
Local 98 entered into a collective-bargaining agreement
with Standard and Veach covering their said employees
and members of Respondent Local 98, containing the
following provisions:
ARTICLE II
Section 2 . Subject to other applicable provisions of
this
Agreement ,
the
Employer agrees that when
subcontracting for prefabrication of materials covered
herein, such prefabrication shall be subcontracted to
'All dates are 1967 unless specifically stated otherwise
LOCAL 98, SHEET METAL WORKERS
fabricators who pay their employees engaged in such
fabrication
not less than the prevailing wage for
comparable sheet
metal fabrications, as established
under provisions of this Agreement.
ARTICLE VIII
Section 3. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section
2 of this Article and Section 2 of Article II, the
following items may be manufactured for sale to the
trade or purchased at the rates specified below:
1. High pressure pipe and fittings (local building and
constiruction wage rates)
2. Ventilators (production wage rates)
3. Louvers (production wage rates)
4. Automatic dampers (production wage rates)
5.
Radiator
and
air
conditioning
unit
enclosures
(production wage rates)
6.
Fabricated
pipe
and
fittings
for
residential
installations only (production wage rates)
7. Mixing (attenuation) boxes (production wage rates)
8. Plastic skylights (production wage rates)
9. Kitchen equipment (industrial rates)
10.
Air diffusers, grilles, registers (production wage
rates)
11. Sound attenuators (traps) (production wage rates)
The complaint alleges that Local 98 and Standard and
Veach have, and are continuing, to give effect to the
above-contract provisions, and in so doing Standard and
Veach have ceased and refrained from buying, handling,
using,
installing
or
otherwise
dealing in
products,
including
adjustable
elbows,
round
pipe
and
ducts,
fabricated and assembled by the Charging Party and
Buckeye,
and have ceased doing business with the
Charging Party, Buckeye and other persons
This record shows that the Respondent Union has
about 1,700
members, and territorial jurisdiction in
Southeastern Ohio and Kentucky comprising 65 counties.
It customarily negotiates collective-bargaining agreements
with multiemployer associations of contractors engaged in
the sheet metal and air-conditioning business . On June 1,
1967, the Respondent Union entered into an agreement
with the Sheet Metal Contractors of Southern Ohio
General
Counsel
Exhibit
No. 2 - containing the
aforementioned Articles and Sections in question here.'
Standard and Veach are signatory contractors with the
Respondent Union.
Local 98 did negotiate separate contracts with different
groups. It had a contract with the Mechanical Association
of
Central
Ohio;
one
with
the
Lima
Contractors
Association,
another
with
the
Portsmouth
Area
Association, another with the Ashland, Kentucky, area;
and another one with the Zanesville, Cambridge, and
'Article VIII Section 2 of this agreement provides that
On all work specified in Article I of this Agreement , fabricated and/or
assembled
within the jurisdiction of this Union, or elsewhere, for
erection and/or installation within the jurisdiction of any other Local
Union affiliated with Sheet Metal Workers' International Association,
whose established wage scale is higher than the wage scale specified in
this Agreement, the higher wage scale of the job site Union shall be paid
to the journeymen employed on such work at the home shop or sent to
the job site
107
Logan, Ohio, area, and therefore, about 80 different sheet
metal contractors were split up into at least 5 different
groups. It appears the Central Ohio contract has a
different wage scale from the Portsmouth contract in that
the Portsmouth Local 98 members are paid 27,cents more
an hour than the Central Ohio members. The Portsmouth
Area
Association is the group that negotiated the
agreement identified as General Counsel Exhibit No. 2.
This contract, and the others like it, are generally referred
to as the Standard Form of Union Agreement and are
negotiated along with an addendum to meet the local
conditions of the particular area involved. The Standard
Form of Union Agreement would be the same throughout
the entire United States, whether negotiated in Columbus,
Chicago,
or
California,
but
the
addendum
makes
provisions for local or area conditions, and the Standard
Form of Union Agreement is also the basic contract
which is consummated between the Sheet Metal Workers'
International Association and the National Association of
Sheet
Metal
Contractors.
The articles and sections
involved in this proceeding, as aforestated, are provisions
within the basic Standard Form of Union Agreement, and
therefore,
effective
and
used
throughout the entire
country. The Respondent Union also has a blue book put
out by the International and which contains a partial list
of sheet metal contractors who are organized by the
various locals of the Sheet Metal Workers' International.
The
Charging
Party
has
a
collective-bargaining
agreement with Local Union 183, Sheet Metal Workers'
International Association, and this agreement, expiring on
October 31, 1968, sets forth the wages, and working
conditions
of
the
Charging
Party
production
and
maintenance employees at its plant in Cincinnati, and the
wage rates for their production employees are less then
those contained in the construction agreement of the
Respondent Union. It appears that Local 183 is not a
construction local but rather a shop or production local
although it is a part of the same International as Local
98.
James Allen was employed as a sheet metal worker by
Standard on a construction site in Portsmouth, Ohio.
Allen testified that on April 7, he was installing round
pipe, with some adjustable elbows, in the basement of the
Welfare Building under construction in Portsmouth, when
Respondent Malcolm Hamilton appeared on the job and
wanted to know what Allen was doing "using nonunion
pipe on the job." Hamilton then informed Allen that he
would either have to get the "right material" on the job or
he would take employees off the job. Allen stated that
Hamilton told him he would confer with Carl Newman to
get the matter straightened out, but that he and his helper
then quit on this particular job and went to another part
of the building to work Allen testified that 2 or 3 weeks
later they received a shipment of round pipe and elbows
made in a union shop and the initial material and pipe
was sent back. Carl Newman, secretary-treasurer of
Standard, testified that on April 7, Respondent Hamilton
advised him that Standard would have to "obtain the right
materials for the job." Hamilton told him the material he
had on the job was improper because it was manufactured
by a production union instead of a building trades union
or construction union. Hamilton also told Newman that if
Standard installed the improper materials, such would
have to be removed and further that the men would not be
permitted to put up the improper materials and would be
fined by the Respondent Union if they did.
Herman Raynard, general manager and vice president
of Standard, testified that he was aware of the difficulties
108
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
on the Portsmouth job and went to see Allen and Allen
told him that Hamilton had instructed him not to use the
pipe and elbows that were on the jobsite and Hamilton
had told him they would have to either make it or "use
construction paid elbows." The material in question had
come from Lennox Heating Co. or Buckeye and which
was an unacceptable source of supply to Local 98.
Raynard then wrote a letter to the Respondent Union
on April 7, requesting that Local 98 place their order of
round pipe and elbows with an approved wholesale
manufacture, and the purchase order by Standard for
quantities of the above material was attached to the letter.'
Standard received no reply to their letter, and as a result
Raynard then called Respondent Baird in Columbus and
inquired about this matter. Raynard testified that Baird
informed him he was not in the business of buying
materials for contractors and that Standard would have to
secure it themselves. Upon being asked for source of
supply,
Raynard was advised to look in the "Green
Book." Raynard said he did not have such a book and
asked for the closest supplier. Baird then suggested United
Sheet Metal, and Standard then placed the order with
United Sheet Metal
Respondent
Hamilton admitted visiting the
Welfare
Building construction job in Portsmouth and talking to
Allen. Hamilton stated that he inquired where the round
pipe
came from and whether Standard made it or
purchased it. Hamilton could not recall any conversation
with Newman, but admitted talking with Raynard and
asking him "about the contract insofar as pipe and such."
Hamilton testified that prior to the events involving the
Welfare Building, he had talked to Newman about the
installation of prefabricated material, and they had gone
over the contract and the clause pertaining to pipe for
commercial jobs. Hamilton stated Newman then told him
that Standard had purchased some pipe from United
Sheet Metal and from Kirk and Blum for use on their
commercial jobs. Respondent Baird testified that when he
received the call from Raynard, as aforestated, he told
Raynard he was not his purchasing agent. Baird stated
they then discussed several different suppliers
who
manufacture the materials m question, and he then gave
Raynard the names of Myers Brothers and United Sheet
Metal, and told Raynard that the closest place he could
purchase adjustable elbows was at United Sheet Metal at
Columbus, Ohio.
L. K. Scruggs was the mechanical superintendent for
Veach on the Ralston Purina Plant construction project in
Wellston,
Ohio,
and
had signed the "Portsmouth
Agreement" with Local 98 in June, 1967. This agreement
had a higher wage scale than the Columbus Agreement
which Local 98 had with Sheet Metal Workers in the
Columbus area. It appears from this record that in early
June, Scruggs ordered round pipe and adjustable elbows
from Vorys Bros., a distributor for the Charging Party,
for use on the Ralston Purina Project, and as indicated,
these were the products of the Charging Party with "ajax"
stamped on them.4 When the pipe and elbows arrived
Steward Dick Neely informed Scruggs that these products
could not be used because they were not made by the
Sheet Metal Workers in the area under their wage scale.
Respondent Hamilton then appeared at the jobsite, and
Scruggs showed him a letter from Vorys Bros. stating that
the products in question were made by a company (the
Charging Party) who had a contract with the Sheet Metal
Workers' International. Scruggs testified that Hamilton
'G.C. Exhs 4A, 4B, and 5.
told him the letter "was not any good" and that Veach
could not use the material, and after making a telephone
call Hamilton came back and informed him the members
of the Respondent Union could not install these products
made by the Charging Party. Scruggs then acquired pipe
and elbows that had "United" stamped on them, and
called Vorys Bros. to pickup the Ajax products. Scruggs
stated there was no difference between the Ajax products
and those he received from Union. Scruggs related that he
also had a conversation with Respondent Baird on the
above difficulties, and Baird told him that the material in
question
was
made by a production local and the
Respondent Union was not installing this type of material.
Scruggs testified that as a result of this problem he had to
postpone the installation of that particular pipe on the
Ralston building for about a month while waiting for the
replacement products, as aforementioned.
Respondent Hamilton testified that the steward on the
Ralston project had noticed some pipe and a box marked
with Ajax, and wanted to know about it. Hamilton then
checked his "blue book," but could not find it listed and
after talking with Baird learned that Ajax products were
made by the Charging Party. Hamilton admitted that
Scruggs asked him if he could use the material in question
at the Ralston job, and also inquired where he could
purchase such products. Respondent Baird testified that in
a telephone conversation concerning the problem on the
Ralston project, he informed Scruggs that the closest
place to purchase the materials in question was from
United Sheet Metal.
The third construction site directly involved in this case
was a car wash installation in Portsmouth, Ohio, and on
or about August 7 Standard was working on this project.
Carl
Newman testified that
Respondent
Hamilton
appeared on this job and "pulled" Standard's employee
apprentice, John
McCoy, off the job. Hamilton then
informed Newman that Standard could not install the
10-inch elbows which did not have union labels on them.
Newman advised Hamilton that he did not have any
10-inch United Sheet elbows in stock. Hamilton then gave
him
permission
to
put
the
nonunion
elbows
on
temporarily, but when he got United elbows, he would
have to replace the nonunion ones
On August 10,
Hamilton wrote a letter to Standard, and the pertinent
paragraphs state as follows:
I stopped in your office yesterday and since you were
out I talked with Carl (Newman), I stopped the
apprentice from installing non-union ells on the car
wash job.
If you will remember I have asked,you to comply
with the Standard Form of Union Agreement before,
This is the last time I will call this to your attention.
Failure to comply the next time will result in charges
being filed.'
Respondent Hamilton testified that on the occasion in
question Newman told him the elbows they were installing
was due to an emergency situation, that they had been
taken out of the residential stock, and would be replaced
with
union
made products.
Hamilton stated in his
testimony that Newman made the suggestion that the
elbows be replaced in accordance with the agreement
between the parties, and there was "no coaching" from
him. Hamilton testified that the last time he checked the
temporary elbows had not been replaced on the car wash
installation. On cross-examination Hamilton admitted he
*'Ajax" is the trade name for the products made by the Charging Party
'G.C. Exh. 3.
LOCAL 98, SHEET METAL WORKERS
stopped McCoy from working because he was installing a
nonunion elbow, and that he then told Newman he was
going to prefer charges if they continued this practice.
In addition to the above testimony involving certain
incidents
at the three construction sites, the General
Counsel also produced related testimony, under these
circumstances and other situations, to show that the
contraclors involved
herein,
and
others,
always
or
normally purchased round pipe, adjustable elbows, and the
additional items listed under Article VIII, Section 3, prior
to their recent difficulties, as aforestated.6
Scruggs had been employed for many years as a sheet
metal worker all the way up to mechanical superintendent
for Veach, and the procedure he has observed is that
adjustable round elbows and round pipe (24 gauge or
lighter) are purchase items unless they have to be specially
made. Scruggs testified that on Ralston Purina job he set
up a field shop and therein fabricated rectangular fittings
and ducts and various other types of fittings, but on this
job they purchased round pipe and adjustable elbows
because such items are not made in the field. Scruggs
stated he has seen adjustable elbows being made in a sheet
metal contractors main shop when such shop is equipped
with the necessary tools and machinery. Veach did make
round pipe up to 3 foot lengths in its field shop from
galvanized sheet metal for special needs on the Ralston
job. Scruggs testified that if you had the equipment or the
machinery a qualified sheet metal worker could make an
adjustable elbow in a time span running from 45 minutes
up to 90 minutes.
This record shows that Standard's practice was also to
purchase round pipe and adjustable elbows. Standard's
employee Allen has been in the sheet metal trade in the
Portsmouth area for 22 years and credibly testified that
the practice was always to purchase such items, 24 gauge
or thinner. Allen stated that the exception was for an odd
or short piece of pipe which they would sometimes make
themselves in their shop. Allen further stated he has never
made - in training or otherwise - any elbows 24 gauge
or thinner, nor had he ever seen an adjustable elbow made
in the shop. Carl Newman has been in the sheet metal
business for 36 years, and testified in his experience
adjustable elbows are purchased, and that he cannot make
such an elbow. He also testified that the practice has
always been to purchase round pipe, 24 gauge or thinner
and although he had equipment to make round pipe, it
was more convenient and less expensive to buy it. In
regard to the 11 items in Paragraph VIII, Section 3, of
the Standard Form of Union Agreement, as previously set
forth herein, Newman and Scruggs stated that generally
Standard and Veach would not make any of these items.
Raynarcl has been in the business for 22 years, and
testified that adjustable elbows were always purchased,
and the round pipe, 24 gauge or thinner, was always a
purchased item except for odd sizes. Raynard stated his
shop has never made adjustable elbows and has never
made rigid elbows (except for 16 gauge or heavier),
because they lack the equipment to do so. He testified up
until 1967, Standard had purchased the Ajax brand of
adjustable elbows and round pipe and Local 98 had never
given him any problems in relation thereto, and the only
reason Standard stopped purchasing was because of the
incident in
April involving
Respondent
Hamilton and
'[t appears that the restriction on round pipe and adjustable elbows in
the contracts negotiated by Local 98, applies to commerical and industrial
jobs, and hat same provisions in question or restrictions do not apply to
residential jobs.
109
Standard, as previously noted herein
As regards the items set out in Article VIII, Section 3,
none of the items have been fabricated in Standard's shop.
Raynard has been in a shop where some odd size louvers
have been made, but all of the items in that Article and
Section are purchase items.
The General Counsel introduced testimony through
Louis Erf of Vorys Brothers, to the effect that Vorys is a
sheet metal distributor within a radius of 100 miles of
Columbus, Ohio, that he has been involved in the sale of
such products for many years, and that Vorys sells the 24
gauge or lighter round pipe and adjustable elbows of the
Charging Party under the brand name of Ajax. Erf
testified that beginning in 1967, Vorys Brothers' sale of
the Ajax brand to the sheet metal contractors organized
by Local 98 has "dried up," and these customers had
advised Vorys they cannot accept the Ajax brand because
Local 98 does not approve of them. Prior to 1967 their
sales to the organized sheet metal contractors of the
furnace pipe and elbows was on the average about $10,000
to $12,000 per year
The Respondent Union produced testimony through
Hamilton relating to practices in the fabrication of elbows
and round pipe Hamilton testified that at one time he
was engaged in Columbus as a sheet metal contractor, and
as a contractor he made round pipe . . . 10 gauge or
lighter . . . and that he also had equipment to fabricate
elbows and on some jobs made adjustable ones. Hamilton
stated that after October, 1967, he returned to the steel
metal trade, and while working for H. K. Ferguson in
Columbus they fabricated round "pipe and 6-inch
adjustable elbows and that he himself made 26-gauge
adjustable elbow. Hamilton testified the cost per elbow
was $2.50 plus his time in making it ... about 25 minutes
after he had laid out the first one, and he was being paid
$5.29 per hour. Hamilton admitted he had purchased 6
inch adjustable elbows for about 90 cents each, and then
went on to state that about 50 percent of the sheet metal
contractors
made adjustable elbows even though they
could purchase them for about one-third of the price.
Denner Monroe testified he had a sheet metal shop
between 1960 and 1965, and with sufficient equipment
which enabled him to make round pipe and adjustable
elbows.
Monroe obtained employment with Veach in
August, and testified that on the Ralston Purina job
Veach fabricated round pipe and rigid elbows but heavier
than 24 gauge.
The General Counsel and the Charging Party contend
that the evidence in this record shows that the contractors
involved always purchased round pipe and adjustable
elbows prior to the recent difficulties, and the Respondent
Union, in its interpretation of Article II, Section 2, and
Article
VIII,
Section
3,
as
aforestated,
caused the
employees of Veach and Standard to refuse to install these
items
unless
they
had
been
purchased
from
a
manufacturer who paid the construction rate. It is further
contended that the above activity was calculated to benefit
the
Union generally, that no benefits flowed to the
employees of the boycotted employer, that the benefits
went to the other members of the same local union
working for other employers, and that there was no work
preservation
as
such,
but
an
effort
to
control the
boycotted
employers
as
opposed to the boycotted
employees. The General Counsel points out that if the
objects
of the Respondent Union's activity was to
preserve, or to recapture work for employees of Standard
and Veach - then the activity would be primary, but if it
was calculated to satisfy union objectives elsewhere - to
110
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
get business for United Sheet Metal of Columbus - who
were also members of Local 98 - then the activity is
secondary in nature.
The Respondent Union argues that the prefabrication
clause set out in Article II, Section 2 and further defined
in
Article VIII, Section 3, are valid primary clauses
designed to preserve work for sheet metal workers and
are, therefore, outside the scope of Section 8(e) of the
Act,
and the Supreme Court's decision in
National
Woodwork Manufacturers' Association v. N.L.R.B.
386
U.S. 612 supports this position. It is further contended
that the above Articles and Sections of the Respondent
Union's agreement with Standard and Veach are designed
to preserve work that is traditionally performed by jobsite
sheet metal workers and to maintain union standards, that
round pipe and elbows are customarily fabricated at the
construction site or in a fabrication shop paying the
construction rate, and therefore the Respondent Union
was seeking to preserve work traditionally performed by
sheet metal workers by enforcing its labor agreement with
Standard and Veach, and that the Respondent Union had
no dispute with the Charging Party.
Section 8(e) of the Act reads as follows:
It
shall be an unfair labor practice for any labor
organization
and any employer to enter into any
contract or agreement, express or implied, whereby such
employer ceases or refrains or agrees to cease or refrain
from handling, using, selling, transporting or otherwise
dealing in any of the products of any other employer, or
to cease doing business with any other person, and any
contract
or
agreement entered into heretofore or
hereafter containing such an agreement shall be to such
extent unenforceable and void. Provided, That nothing
in this subsection (e) shall apply to an agreement
between a labor organization and an employer in the
construction industry relating to the contracting or
subcontracting of work to be done at the site of the
construction,
alteration,
painting,
or
repair
of
a
building, structure, or other work:
Provided further,
That for the purposes of this subsection (e) and Section
8(b)(4)(B)
the
terms `any employer,' `any person
engaged in commerce, or in industry affecting
commerce,' and `any person' when used in the relation
to
terms
any
other
producer,
processor,
or
manufacturer,' `any other employer,' or `any other
person' shall not include persons in the relation of a
jobber or manufacturer, contractor, or subcontractor
working on the goods or permises of the jobber or
manufacturer or performing parts of an integrated
process of production in the apparel and clothing
industry: Provided further, That nothing in this Act
shall prohibit the enforcement of any agreement which
is within the foregoing exception.
Whether or not the aforementioned provisions in the
collective-bargaining agreements violate Section 8(e) of
the Act, is to be determined by the object of the restrictive
clauses or provisions in question. In this instance, as is
generally true in cases in which this section of the Act is
involved, "the distinction to be drawn as best one can is
between an object and a consequence."' If the contractual
provisions in question had as their object the preservation
or
protection
of
work traditionally and customarily
performed by employees in the bargaining unit, as the
Respondent Union contends, they may be held harmless;
but if instead they were designed to accomplish other
union objectives, as the General Counsel and the Charging
Parties assert, they are proscribed by the provisions of
Section 8,(e)8
The credited evidence in this record is most conclusive
in showing that the employer members of the Sheet Metal
Contractors
including Veach and Standard - normally
and
regularly
purchase
from
mass
production
manufacturers practically all, if not the entire list of items
listed
under
Article
VIII,
Section 3, except in those
limited situations wherein emergency conditions existed,
or where special small sizes of pipe or other, items are
required and such products were not readily available
from the manufacturer. The General Counsel offered
reliable
testimony
through
numerous
witnesses
in
establishment and in amplification of these facts, as
previously noted herein. The Respondent Union then
attempted to refute this evidence by testimony of its own
witnesses In essence, the testimony by Hamilton shows
that
at
"one time" he made round pipe and had
equipment to make elbows, and while his testimony
relating to recent employment with H. K. Ferguson
directly implies that this firm fabricated round pipe and
adjustable elbows, this practice must be viewed in full
consideration of the overall and general operations of the
contractor - and there is no testimony by Hamilton that
the fabrication of these items were traditionally and
customarily performed in the.normal or regular course of
their work. It is readily admitted that in emergency
situations or where irregular and small size fittings were
required the same were made on the job or in the shop.
However, this in no way reflects on the past traditional
operations and practices of the sheet metal contractors
prior to their difficulties and, furthermore, the "drying
up" in the purchasing of such products by the Respondent
Union
would
necessarily
now result in increased
fabrication of these items. It is also noted that Hamilton
inspected Veach's field shop at the Ralston Purina jobsite,
and even admitted in his testimony that this shop was not
sufficiently equipped to make adjustable elbows. It seems
obvious to me that if such an item was customarily
fabricated, Veach would have had the machinery to do so
and this is especially significant with Hamilton's further
admission that all Veach needed in its shop was a $70
beading machine in order to make adjustable elbows. The
testimony by Denner Monroe, as aforestated, must be
viewed in this same light, and in no way indicates the
usual practices deviated from the normal procedure in
purchasing these items. Monroe also admitted that Veach
fabricated only "rigid elbows" on theRalston Purina job.
The Respondent Union does not contend, nor did it offer
any evidence that the other items listed in Article VIII,
Section 3, were not normally purchased.
In essence, what is directly relevant in this case is
whether
employees
in
the
unit
customarily
and
traditionally fabricated round pipe and adjustable elbows
and the other items listed in Article VIII, Section 3, and
did the contractors assign such tasks to their employees in
the general course of their business. I submit this record
clearly shows that all the items in question were normally
purchased, and the employees only fabricated these items
in situations where unusual or emergency work conditions
existed, and, therefore, I cannot find the fabrication of
these materials to be claimable unit work. I conclude that
the work which was subject to the contractual provisions
here in question was not traditionally and customarily
'
'Houston Insulation
Contractors
v I N L R B., 1 357 F_2d 182, 187
(C.A15), reversed
in part on other grounds 1 386 U S. 664,
Syracuse
Suppty (Company, 139 NLRB 778, 781
'National Woodwork Mfg. Assn , supra
LOCAL 98, SHEET METAL WORKERS
performed by the employees, and the object of the
restrictions so imposed was not the preservation of unit
work.
All the parties agree that the main case controlling this
proceeding is that of National Woodwork, supra, recently
decided by the Supreme Court. In that case the carpenters
had a contract with the Frouge Corporation which
provided tha. they would not handle doors which had been
fitted prior to being furnished on the job. Frouge had
purchased, and sought the Union to install, premachined
doors manufactured by National Woodwork. The Union
ordered its carpenter members not to hang the doors.
Frouge withdrew the prefabricated doors and substituted
doors that were satisfactory to the Union. The question
was whether the Union had committed an unfair labor
practice under Section 8(e) of entering into an "agreement
whereby the employer . . . agrees to or refrain from
handling . .
any of the products of any other employer . .
" A majority of the court stated that the Union had not
done so because it was preserving work which had been
traditionally that of the union members. However, -Mr.
Justice Brennan's opinion, speaking for four members of
the court, contained the following:
The determination
whether the `will not handle'
sentence
of Rule 17 and its enforcement violated
Section 8(e) and Section 8(b)(4)(B) cannot be made
without
an inquiry into whether, under all the
surrounding circumstances, the Union's objective was
preservation
of
work for Frouge's employees, or
whether the agreements and boycott were tactically
calculated to satisfy union objectives elsewhere. Were
the latter the case, Frouge, the boycotting employer,
would be a neutral bystander, and the agreement or
boycott would, within the intent of Congress, become
secondary. There need not be an actual dispute with the
boycotted employer, here the door manufacturer, for
the activity to fall within this category, so long as the
tactical object of the agreement and its maintenance is
that employer, or benefits to other than the boycotting
employees or other employees of the primary employer
thus making the agreement or boycott secondary in its
aim. The touchstone is whether the agreement or its
maintenance is addressed to the labor relations of the
contracting employer vis-a-vis his own employees.
The concurring opinion by Mr. Justice Harlan stated.
The facts as found by the Board and the Court of
Appeals show that the contractual restrictive-product
rule in question, and the boycott in support of its
enforcement, had as their sole objective the protection
of union members from a diminution of work flowing
from
changes
in
technology.
Union
members
traditionally had performed the task of fitting doors on
the jobsite, and there is no evidence of any motive for
this contract provision and its companion boycott other
than the preservation of that work. This, then, is not a
case of a union seeking to restrict by contract or
boycott an employer with respect to the products he
uses, for the purpose of acquiring for its members work
that had not previously been theirs.
In applying the guidelines of National Woodwork to
the instant case, it appears to me that Local 98's refusal
to handle the products in question of the Charging Party
and other manufacturers was not addressed to labor
relations of the contracting employer
vis-a-vis his own
employees. Nothing herein required Standard or Veach to
do anything different with their employees. As pointed
111
out, the Respondent Union simply forced a change in the
source of supply. Furthermore, under the guidelines the
objectives of the Respondents must also be preservation of
work for the employees of Standard and Veach -
employees of the Employer on whom pressure is being
applied. Yet, in addition to what I have already found in
this respect, Respondents Hamilton and Baird admitted
they would even have no objection to the use of elbows or
round pipe made by construction locals in California, New
York or elsewhere, if they were paying the prevailing
wage rate, and reference in establishment of such could be
ascertained by using the blue book. As previously noted
herein, there is some testimony that employees of Veach
and Standard started making elbows and pipe as a result
of their difficulties.
However, this too is violative of
National Woodwork as Local 98 is restricting by boycott
or contract an employer, and products he uses, for the
purpose of acquiring for union members work that had
not been previously theirs.
In essence, the Respondent
Union- has been encouraging or pushing the sale of
products made by United Sheet Metal in Columbus, and
certainly this cannot be interpreted to help in any way
work preservation of Standard and Veach employees. The
boycotting employees gained no benefits from their refusal
to install products manufactured by the Charging Party
and others nor did fellow employees of their respective
employers. It is not enough that such benefits were reaped
by employees of another employer, United Sheet Metal
and who happen to be members of the same local, to
avoid liability from Section 8(b)(4)(B).
It is also obvious from this record that ,it has been the
practice of the Respondent Union to use, the Standard
Forms
of
Union
Agreements
supplied
by ^ their
International
Association
as
the
foundation
for its
collective-bargaining contracts. Possibly there were areas
in which deviations were permitted, but the Respondents
in this case did not deem any deviations to be permissible
when it came to applying Article VIII, Section 3, and
particularly item 6. When asked whether or not Local 98
had to have the approval of the International Association
on his interpretation of the contract and provisions in
question, Respondent Baird replied, "It has been in the
Standard Form of Union Agreement of the International
Association and we abide by the Standard Form, for or
from the International." This reply and the testimony of
Baird and Hamilton that they had no objections where-the
pipe or elbows came from as long as it was' made by
employers paying prevailing wages, clearly demonstrates
an object to benefit union members generally, and are
"tactically
calculated
to
satisfy
union
objectives
elsewhere," and are not "addressed to the labor relations
of the contracting employer
vis-a-vis his awn employees"
which the Supreme Court has said is "the touchstone" in
determining the validity.
The language in Article II, Section 2,' and in Article
VIII,
Sections 2 and 3, must be regarded' as strong
'Article Il, Section 2 of the Standard Form of Union
Agreement,
effective from June 1, 1964 until May 31, 1967, read as follows: "Subject
to other applicable provisions of this agreement, the Employer agrees that
when subcontracting for prefabrication of materials covered herein, such
prefabrication
shall
be subcontracted to fabricators
who pay their
employees engaged in such fabrication not less than the prevailing wage for
comparable sheet
metal fabrication as established under agreements
between this union or other local affiliates
o'f_ Sheet Metal Workers'
International Association and sheet metal fabricators." On April 6, 1966,
the Standard Form of Union Agreement was changed to read as indicated
prior herein
112
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
indications that the underlying purpose was to require that
the employers abandon their former practice of purchasing
the items in the open market, and to require that they
must buy such items only from employers paying the wage
standards that the agreement specifically provides. Such a
limitation, when considered in conjunction with all the
circumstances and representations, speaks in terms of
secondary control and not primary unit protection.
Furthermore,
what has been said regarding adjustable
elbows and round pipe applies with equal force to the
other items listed in Article XIII, Section 3. The
employees of the contractors have seldom, if ever,
fabricated any such articles. Instead, they have always
purchased them from manufacturers with few exceptions.
In the final analysis I have found that the fabrication of
the 11 items to be neither unit work nor fairly claimable
as unit work. Article 2, Section 2, and Article VIII,
Section 3, then are not aimed at unit preservation, and if
their thrust serves no cognizable primary unit purpose
then it is only reasonable to conclude that the aim is a
secondary one
Accordingly I find Article 2, Section 2,
and Article VIII, Sections 2 and 3, to envisage no direct
benefits to unit employees, but are designed to disrupt
established
business
relationships
between
employer
members and their suppliers, and thus to have a secondary
thrust which makes it unlawful within the meaning of
Section
8(e)
of the Act. I further find that the
Respondents violated contractual clauses in question by its
conduct on and after April 1967, in seeking to enforce
those clauses, as detailed hereinafter.'"
The
General
Counsel
maintains the
Respondents
enforced or attempted to enforce the above clauses in their
contracts
by
inducing
and
encouraging individuals
employed by Standard and Veach to refuse, in the course
of their employment, to use, install, or otherwise handle
or work on goods, articles, materials, or commodities
purchased
by their respective employers from the
Charging
Party
or
its
distributor
or
from
other
manufacturers and distributors, and as a consequence of
Respondents' acts and conduct, individuals employed by
Standard and Veach refused to handle or install the items
in question at the various construction and/or jobsites
where they were employed by their respective employers
thereby restraining and coercing Standard and Veach.
Credited evidence in this record shows that Respondent
Hamilton told Standard's employee, James Allen, that his
employer would either have to get the "right material" on
the job or he would take union employees off the job, as
aforestated. On the Welfare Building project Hamilton
also informed Standard's Carl Newman that he would
have to use the correct materials "with the construction
union label," that the employee members of Local 98
working for Standard would not be permitted to install
"In
Local
Union
No 26, Sheet' Metal Workers'
International
Association, 168 NLRB No 118, the Board affirmed a finding that Article
VIII, Section 3, involved in the instant case, was in violation of the
secondary boycott provisions of the Act. It is noted in this case there was
no finding that Article II, Section 2, was violative of the Act, because
there was no proof that it had been used to switch sources of supply that
historically had not been that of the sheet metal workers in the work unit
involved The uncontradicted evidence in the instant case is that as regards
Veach, Standard, and the fabricators in the Portsmouth area, Article II,
Section 2, has so been used See also Sheet Metal Workers' Union Local
216, 172 NLRB No. 6, involving the same contract provisions - Article
II, Section 2, and Article VIll, Section 3 - and wherein the Board also
affirmed a finding that these provisions were violative of the Act. Article
II, Section 2 in the instant case takes on an unlawful connotation when
considered in conjunction with Article VIII, Section 3.
the products on hand, and that the employees "would be
fined"
if
they installed such
materials.
The above
statement to Allen constituted a clear inducement and
threat that discipline or reprisals would be taken for
installing the products in question and must be deemed
violation of 8(b)(4)(i) and (n)(B).r'
The Act does not
require that a union agent refrain from making the law
known to its members, but here Hamilton went beyond
and with explicitness told Allen that he would be laid off
for so doing. Hamilton's statement to Newman is likewise
violative. This remark, following the conversation with
Allen,
must be regarded as threatening or inducing
employees of Standard in refusing to handle or to perform
their work with an object of forcing Standard to cease
doing business with the original supplier or manufacturer
It is noted that Hamilton's statement to Newman not only
informed him that employees could not install the original
items on hand, but was also accompanied with a specific
threat of discipline and reprisal that if members of Local
98 did so they would be fined
As aforestated, this record shows that Hamilton also
appeared at the jobsite wherein Standard was completing
work on a carwash, and pulled employee John McCoy off
the job and then informed Newman that the elbows could
not be installed, and admittedly told Newman that Local
98 would prefer charges if such a practice continued, and
the latter also reduced to writing in a letter sent to
Standard. The above conduct by Hamilton constituted not
only an outright threat of economic reprisal, but also
demonstrated instant discipline in immediately taking
McCoy off this particular job upon Hamiltons' initial
arrival at the jobsite.
Hamilton's subsequent statement
and letter to Newman and Standard that Local 98
members would be fired for continuing installations, is
also regarded as threatening employees, employers, or
persons with an object of forcing this employer to cease
doing business with the original supplier of the elbows in
question.
This record reveals that Respondent Hamilton also told
Veach's Superintendent Scruggs at the Ralston Purina
job, he could not use the materials made by the Charging
Party and the members of Local 98 working for Veach
could not install these products. Under all the particular
circumstances involved in this case, I find this remark
constitutes a violation of 8(b)(4)(ii) as a threat to cease
doing business with the Charging Party 12
IV. THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondents have engaged in
unfair labor practices, it shall be recommended that they
cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative
action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and
upon the entire record in this case, I make the following-
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent Union is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act , and at all times
"The terms induce or encourage, found in Section 8(b)(4)(i), have been
consistently construed as broad enough to include in them every form of
influence and persuasion . International Brotherhood of Electrtcal Workers,
Local 501 v. N.L R B, 341 U S. 694, 701-702. The Board has stated that
inducement or encouragement need not be successful to violate the Act
"Building and Construction Trades Council of Tampa, 132 NLRB 1564,
1566 and 1567
LOCAL 98, SHEET METAL WORKERS
113
material herein Respondent Hamilton and Respondent
Baird have been agents of Respondent Union acting in its
behalf within the meaning of Section 2(13) of the Act.
2.
The Charging Party, Standard, and Veach are
employers within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act
and are engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Sections 2(6) and (7) and 8(b)(4) of the Act.
3.
By maintaining, enforcing, and giving effect to
Article Il', Section 2, and Article VIII, Sections 2 and 3,
of the contracts made by and between the parties on or
about June 1, 1967, the Respondents entered into
agreements in violation of Section 8(e) of the Act.
4.
The Respondents have engaged in unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 8(b)(4)(i)(B) and
8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act.
5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices
affecting
commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
[Recommended Order omitted from publication.]