Barnett Pontiac, Inc.

A2 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Barnett Pontiac, Inc. and Automotive Salesmen's Association (A.S.A.), affiliated with Seafarers' International Union of North America, AFL-CIO. Case 7-CA-6741 February 4, 1969 DECISION AND ORDER By CHAIRMAN MCCULLOCH AND MEMBERS FANNING AND ZAGORIA On October 24, 1968, Trial Examiner Thomas A. Ricci issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that Respondent had engaged in certain unfair labor practices within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. Thereafter, Respondent and the General Counsel filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision and supporting briefs. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner with the following modifications. The Trial Examiner found that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) on and after April 23, 1968. The General Counsel in his exceptions contends that the violation occurred on and after November 29, 1967. We find merit in this exception. On February 7, 1967, as the Trial Examiner found, the Union was certified as the exclusive bargaining agent for Respondent's employees in an appropriate unit. On February 23, the Union made the first of several written requests to bargain, but Respondent declined to meet. Thereafter, Respondent met for the first time on November 29. The Trial Examiner found that at this meeting the Union presented contract proposals. In reply, Respondent's vice president, Robert Barnett, Jr., asserted that "he could not negotiate anything without his father (Respondent's President) being there" and "couldn't agree to anything at that time." In addition, Respondent's counsel stated that he would accept the written proposals and later discuss them with Barnett, Sr., and said "let's not get into the economics." Thereafter, on December 6, before any second meeting was held, Respondent withdrew recognition because the Union, prior to the November 29 meeting, had filed with the Board a petition, subsequently granted, to amend its certification to reflect its affiliation with Seafarers' International Union; and it cancelled a meeting which had been scheduled for January 13, 1968. Thus, as the Trial Examiner stated, since the Board's certification, "all the Union achieved was a very short meeting on November 29, when Colombo [Respondent's counsel] said only he would discuss the Union's demands with his client. Then came a complete closed door in the December 6 letter." Moreover, the facts, as found by the Trial Examiner and fully set forth in his Decision, show that thereafter, Respondent's new counsel "literally refused to negotiate," and merely went through the motions of meeting with the Union's representatives, with a deliberate intent to frustrate the Union's desire for real negotiations. Accordingly, on the basis of the facts as found by the Trial Examiner, and the record as a whole, we find that Respondent refused to bargain in good faith with the certified Union on November 29, 1967, within the certification year, and at all times thereafter, in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. The General Counsel also requests, in ' his exceptions, that, in view of Respondent's unlawful refusal to bargain, the period during which the certification is immune from attack should be extended for a period of 1 year. As the facts show that Respondent has refused to bargain in good faith from the inception of negotiations, we shall grant the General Counsel's request, and extend the normal certification year to 1 year from the date when Respondent begins to bargain in good faith with the Union as the recognized representative of the employees in the appropriate unit.' ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner, as modified below, and hereby orders that Respondent, Barnett Pontiac, Inc., Dearborn, Michigan, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order, as modified herein: Add the following as paragraph 3 to the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order. "3. For the purpose of determining the duration of the certification, the initial year of certification shall be deemed to begin on the date the Respondent commenced or commences to bargain in The purpose of this remedy is to insure that the employees in the appropriate unit will be accorded the services of their selected bargaining agent for the period provided by law. See Mar-Jac Poultry Company, Inc., 136 NLRB 785; Commerce Company, d/b/a Lamar Hotel, 140 NLRB 226, 229, enfd 328 F 2d 600 (C A 5), cert denied 379 U.S 817 , Burnett Construction Company, 149 NLRB 1419, 1421, enfd 350 F.2d 57 (C A 10), Waycross Sportswear, Inc, 166 NLRB 101, enfd. 403 F 2d 832 (C.A 5). 174 NLRB No. 57 BARNETT PONTIAC good faith with the Union as the recognized bargaining representative in the appropriate unit." TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE THOMAS i . Ricci, Trial Examiner: A hearing in the above-entitled proceeding was held before the duly designated Trial Examiner at Detroit, Michigan, on September 12, 1968, on complaint of the General Counsel against Barnett Pontiac, Inc., herein called the Respondent, or the Company. The sole issue presented is whether the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. The charge was filed on May 9, 1968, and the complaint on July 29, 1968. A brief was filed after the close of the hearing by the Respondent. Upon the entire record, and from my observation of the witnesses, I make the following- FINDINGS OF FACT 1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT Barnett Pontiac, Inc., a Michigan corporation, is engaged in the retail sale and servicing of automobiles and related automotive products , with its place of business in the City of Dearborn , Michigan. During the calendar year 1967, a representative period, it received gross revenues in excess of $500,000 from the sale of new and used automobiles and trucks . During the same period it received goods and materials valued in excess of $8,000, which were transported to its Dearborn location directly from places outside the State of Michigan . I find that the Respondent is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act, and that it will effectuate the policies of the Act to exercise jurisdiction herein. It. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED I also find that Automotive Salesmen's Association (ASA), affiliated with Seafarers' International Union of North America , AFL-CIO, herein called the Union, is a labor organization within the meaning of the Act. III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES This is a refusal to bargain case. Certain fundamental facts are either not disputed or beyond the area of permissible litigation in this proceeding. The Charging Union's exclusive majority representative status in an appropriate unit was established in a prior Board representation proceeding (Case 7-RC-7452). It was there determined, and I now again find that all new and used car and truck salesmen at the Company's Dearborn, Michigan, place of business, excluding office clerical employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act. The election took place on December 7, 1966. At the time this Company was represented by Attorney Frederick Colombo. That representation case was processed by the Regional Director together with approximately 200 other separate representation petitions, all filed by this same union, all for automobile salesmen, each involving a separate bargaining unit, with the total number of independent employers about 175. Colombo acted on behalf of somewhere between 22 and 38 of the employers 303 in these many petitions. On their behalf, including the Respondent here, Colombo filed objections to the elections. These were overruled by the Regional Director and the Union was certified here on February 7, 1967. The same lawyer then filed with the Board in Washington a request for review of the Regional Director's ruling on objections and certifications, a supplementary proceeding he brought on behalf of 17 named-employers, again including Barnett. The Board denied review on April 27, 1967. The Union, which had appeared on the election ballot only as Automotive Salesmen's Association, in fact affiliated with Seafarers' International Union of North America, AFL-CIO, later in the year, and on November 20, 1967, it filed a series of separate petitions with the Regional Director - one for each auto dealer where it had been certified as bargaining agent, - for amendment of its certificates to reflect the affiliation. There was a hearing on these petitions, and again Colombo appeared to protest the certificate amendments as attorney for 22 separate companies, including this Respondent. He also advised the Union, by letter dated December 6, 1967, that during the pendency, and until final resolution of Case 7-CA-20, as spokesman for the Barnett Pontiac Company he would refuse to continue recognition of the Union. The Regional Director ruled in favor of the ASA and amended the certificates accordingly. Still , acting as Barnett's attorney, Colombo, on February 13, 1968, filed a motion to stay the Regional Director's decision in all the AC proceedings, requesting such delay simultaneously on behalf of 21 other dealers. He also filed a request for review in this matter with the Board on March 1; this appeal spoke for 22 companies, including Barnett. The Board denied the appeal on April 26, 1968. The answer to the complaint was filed on August 6, 1968, by new lawyers, Stringari, Fritz, Fiott and Burwell; this firm had represented 34 independent auto dealer employers in the AC proceedings in the fall of 1967 through 1968. The answer denies the allegation that this Union has since its certification in February of 1967 been the exclusive bargaining agent of the salesmen, and that it still maintains that status now. But no evidence was offered intended to cloud the continued validity of the certification or the Union's majority standing today. Accordingly, I find that the Union has at all times material hereto been, and now still is, the exclusive majority representative of the employees in the appropriate unit. Communications and Meetings Between Union Representatives and Agents of the Respondent Although the complaint specifies that lawyer Colombo's letter of December 6, 1967 (where the Respondent withdrew all recognition pending the AC proceeding), and certain dilatory tactics of the Respondent's agents, evidence the unfair labor practice alleged, clearly the substantive burden of the complaint is that the Company failed to accord to the Union the true recognition which the statute commands. On February 23, 1967, a few weeks after the certification issued, Mr. Duane Ashley, attorney for the Union, wrote to the Respondent inviting it to a bargaining session for February 27 in a certain conference room. He sent like invitations to other auto dealers, and explained to all that while it would be a joint meeting, each employer could preserve his separate bargaining unit. Lawyer Colombo answered for the Respondent, that he would not meet because he was filing objections to the 304 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD election and that in any event in the end the Respondent, as well as all other dealers he represented, would have nothing to do with joint meetings but would each insist upon individual conferences for their own limited bargaining units. Ashley wrote again to the Respondent on July 27, asking for immediate bargaining , and requesting some kind of an answer by August 3. There was no reply, and again on August 30 Ashley repeated the request directly of the Respondent; the next day he advised Colombo by mail of such demands upon 15 of his clients, including Barnett. Colombo did not respond until September 15; he acknowledged the receipt of the demands upon these particular 15 auto dealers, and explained he had been able to do nothing about any of them because during the last 60 days he had been engaged in negotiations between the ASA and Charlie Burke Pontiac, Inc, and George Matick Chevrolet, Inc. "Both of these matters, as you know, have been time consuming to the point that it has been virtually impossible for me to set up any kind of a schedule to commence bargaining with the A.S.A. relative to the above clients." On September 11, 1967, Union agents called personally on Robert Barnett, vice president, and requested a meeting for negotiations. They left a written proposal for a contract; it is a complete agreement except that direct economic matters are omitted. The various sections cover such matters as recognition, transfer of company interest, grievance and arbitration procedures, seniority, layoff and recall, transfers, leave of absence, suspension, a geverability clause, and the term of the agreement. Barnett told these men that the Union would have to communicate with and deal with Lawyer Colombo. There followed some telephoning by William Shekell, -union representative, and then a letter from Ashley again to Colombo, dated October 17. He told Colombo how the Union's field personnel had been in personal touch with nine of his clients, and of the fact each of them - the employers - had taken the position it was Colombo who must agree to set any date for negotiations. Ashley wrote that if this was so, would Colombo at least place these particular companies on a waiting list for eventual bargaining . Colombo answered on October 23, saying he had been in touch with only some of his clients and listed six including Barnett, and that he did intend to act on their behalf. He added that negotiations with two of these - Dexter Chevrolet and Gene Merollis Chevrolet, - were taking more time than had been expected. "I am sure that from your experience you will agree with me that it will take a number of meetings before the parties can agree on a contract. Obviously, this will take some time. Consequently, it does not seem in order that we should schedule meetings for any additional clients until we have concluded bargaining with those who have presently agreed to meet with the Union." The story continues with Shekell's testimony that at a bargaining meeting for other dealers in Colombo's office on October 18, at his request Colombo agreed to meet on November 3 to discuss the Respondent's situation plus that of three others. Colombo later cancelled this meeting, and again, on November 3, Thomas White, William Shekell, and Gene Gough, all for the Union, returned to the Respondent's place of business. Neither Robert Barnett nor his father was there, and the Union representatives left a copy of the proposed noneconomic contract with Earl Christie, the salesman steward, to be given to management. The union agents met with Colombo in his office on November 29; Robert Barnett was there also. Now the union representatives gave Colombo two documents, the original noneconomic contract, and a detailed statement of proposed money matters, such as commission, bonuses, vacation pay and certain fringe benefits. There was some talk, mostly the union men explaining what all these proposals meant. Barnett took the position "he couldn't agree to anything at that time because his father was in Florida, " or, "he could not negotiate anything without his father being there." Colombo said only that he would accept the written proposals and later discuss them with Barnett, Sr.: "He said let's not get into the economics." At the close of the conference, it was agreed the parties would meet again on January 13, but this meeting was cancelled by Colombo's letter of December 6 withdrawing all recognition. In January another lawyer, Lawrence Burns, entered the picture on behalf of the Respondent. At the hearing Burns said he was a labor law specialist and a long-time friend of the senior Barnett. Three witnesses testified about certain meetings held in Burns' office: Thomas White and William Shekell, of the Union, and Burns. During this period the union agents were meeting with many separate auto dealers trying to negotiate a number of contracts; they apparently were going from office to office daily, and making innumerable telephone calls to arrange necessary conferences. Although they made some notes of details of events, inevitably their recollections were faulty on minutiae. The clearest recollection as to these meetings was that of White, who said that together with other union agents he met with Burns four times, January 23, February 9, March 1 and March 13. Shekell was less clear as to dates, for he was present at some of the meetings only a short time, because of other pressing appointments to negotiate elsewhere Burns confessed he could not recall dates at all, and while repeating there had been six or seven such meetings, he conceded White may have been correct in his testimony. According to White, whose testimony is the most reliable of all, with a group of union agents on January 23, he gave Burns both written proposals again, the economic and the non-economic union demands. He said many details of the non-economic suggestions were discussed at the four meetings, with Burns agreeing as to some and promising revisions in the language as to many others. Burns said he was not "familiar with the economics of the automobile business with respect to pay plans," and therefore had to consult his client. Neither of the Barnetts ever appeared at any of these meetings in the lawyer's office. On February 9 and again at a later meeting, Burns proposed certain changes in the time schedule for filing grievances, and a detailed proposal concerning work rules and regulations for the salesmen. This last item, according to White, listed about 10 specific rules to govern the work performance of the men. There was much discussions of these rules and the Union agreed to some of them, but not all. At 'one point White suggested a $75 minimum commission, but Burns repeated his "ignorance of the economic conditions in an automobile dealership." Apart from his suggestion concerning precise rules for work performance, Burns never made any counterproposals, economic or otherwise, on behalf of the Respondent, as indeed none was ever -offered by any company representative. White also testified he had been under the impression, towards the last meeting, that Burns agreed to sign the non-economic agreement, with a few changes, and with an BARNETT PONTIAC understanding that whatever economic matters might later be decided, would be inserted later. Shekell's story is that many details of the non-economic contracts were discussed, that Burns agreed with a number of them, that some were clarified at his request, and that Burns agreed to sign it at one point. Shekell also recalled Burns saying "I don't know the automotive business. He said it looks reasonable to me but I will talk to Mr. Barnett, seeing he is the owner, and make a counterproposal." After the last meeting in early March, White and Shekell appeared a number of times at Burns' office but never succeeded in finding him. Finally, in his last telephone call to the office on March 19, Shekell was told by Burns' secretary the lawyer's message to them was that if they had not asked for outside mediation he would have signed the non-economic agreement. In fact, the Union did turn to the Michigan State Labor Mediation Board, which, by letter dated March 4, advised the Respondent directly that a Mr. Leonard D. Bennett, one of its mediators, had been assigned to the case. On April 4, Bennett wrote to both Burns and the Union that he had scheduled a meeting at his office for April 9, "to resolve the dispute." Apparently this meeting was deferred, and on April 23, the union agents and Burns; accompanied by Robert Barnett, appeared at the mediation service office. Bennett was not there, but a state mediator named Gordon Lee was present in his place. Burns refused to participate in any discussion because Bennett was not there, and because, as he stated at the hearing: "I am was not going to be shifted around by different mediators." On April 29, the Union again told the Mediation Service it was ready to meet anytime, anywhere, and again on June 24 Bennett invited Burns to a conference scheduled in his office for June 27. By this time Burns had been talken ill, and the parties never met again. The refusal to bargain charge was filed on May 9, 1968. Analysis and Conclusion I find that the record evidence in its entirety proves the complaint allegation that the Respondent did not adequately comply with the lawful duty to bargain with the statutory majority representative of its salesmen. This is not a charge against Mr. Colombo, who had too many clients, and therefore not enough time to bargain with the Union in place of Barnett Pontiac. He complicated the Union's problems by refusing to participate in joint meetings; he put the Union off again and again because other clients had to be serviced, and he could not do more than one thing at a time; he left no legal recourse unused - exceptions to the election, attack upon the affiliation with the SIU, two appeals to the Board for review of Regional Director's decisions, and even straight withdrawal of recognition from December forward. The December 6 letter of outright refusal to bargain because of the pendency of an AC petition, may or may not have been illegal in itself. Surely, however, all the other procedural steps he took were entirely lawful in themselves. The important thing, so far as this complaint is concerned, is that throughout the long period from February 1967 to an uncertain date in 1968, when clearly the Respondent placed its burden to negotiate upon Colombo's shoulders, this lawyer did not bargain with the Union. Despite repeated attempts to prevail upon someone authorized by the Respondent to deal with it, all the Union achieved was a very short meeting on November 29, when Colombo said only he would discuss the Union's demands with his client. Then came a 305 complete closed door in the December 6 letter. Nor is this a proceeding against Attorney Burns personally. He was under no legal duty to bargain with anyone. He said Barnett, Sr., had given him full authority to negotiate a contract, but to the union agents in his office his expressed position was he knew nothing about the economics of the auto selling business; this was a virtual admission he could not, bargain, as in truth he did not. Indeed, his own version of what took place when he met with White and Shekell shows clearly he approached the chore with ill will and did not really accept the idea of open and fair consideration of their demands. The following excerpts from his testimony are revealing: A. The first thing I talked to the union about was they had no words in their contract that we could even start with. They had no work rules. They had been operating at Barnett's on an operation that Barnett could not do anything about, arriving late, leaving or anything else, and I suggested to them they start doing something about it. I never had a meeting on economics with this union. Q. Did you come to any agreement with the union on - A Never, never talked to them about it because I said to them they had no language that would start this as a union. They had no rules or regulations as to coming in, having rules and regulations as to violations of the union or the employer, when; they had to come to work, when they could leave work, when they would go to lunch. I understand Barnett let them go ahead. It was his policy - * * * * * Q. Did you ever come to any agreement with the union on non-economic items? A. Never. Q. Did you talk to the union about reducing it to non-economic, reducing the non-economic items to writing? A. I talked to the union about coming out with rules and regulations as to the salesmen when they would report to work, when they would leave work and things like that but it was never reduced to writing, never. * * * * * Q. (By Mr. Fischer) You made no counter proposal? TRIAL EXAMINER: He said that. THE WITNESS: I wouldn't make one - TRIAL EXAMINER: Please, Sir. THE WITNESS: Let me answer. I wouldn't make one because I said the language they had submitted to me and admitted by them did not even contain a labor contract. Burns denied flatly having received or seen any economic demands during these meetings; he denied as directly that he agreed to anything, however trivial, relating to the non-economic documents. His insistence that whatever the Union put in his hands was not even the beginning of a collective-bargaining agreement, is, of course, simply not true, and therefore much more significant than mere exaggeration on his part. His failure, as agent of Barnett, to make any counterproposals, weighs more than otherwise as support of the complaint in the light of Burns' almost boastful declaration that he never intended to make any counter offer. The Union agent 306 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD witnesses were not very reliable with respect to what details of the non-economic agreement Burns may have been willing to accept, but I deem White's testimony more credible than that of Burns, and find that there was some talk about them, with Burns vaguely expressing agreement only with respect to inconsequencial matters. There is no question, as Burns virtually insisted at the hearing, that the only subject he was really willing to talk about with these men was more faithful attention to work performance by the salesmen in the store. In the end Burns, like Colombo before him, literally refused to negotiate with the union representatives. There was no real reason of substance why he should have felt imposed upon when Mediator Bennett was unable to appear and another arrived instead. Had Burns intended in good faith to bargain with the Union, there was no impediment at that moment. And again his fancied injury - "I am not going to be shifted around" bespeaks a deliberate intent to frustrate the Union's desire for real negotiations. It must also be remembered that throughout this entire period - January through April 23 - while Burns was going through the motions of meeting with White and Shekell, the entire matter of honestly recognizing the Union and according it, the status called for by its certification, remained under the cloud of Colombo's December 6 letter, denying any duty to bargain until the AC case ended with finality. Colombo's appeal to the Board on behalf of Barnett was not decided until April 28, 1968. The Respondent - the real party upon which the statute imposes the duty to bargain with a union lawfully chosen by its employees - is the Barnett Pontiac Company. Burns fell ill after the abortive meeting of April 23 at the Mediation Service office. The Union again asked that the Service help, and Mediator Bennett again invited Burns to a meeting on June 27. It will not do for the Company to argue now, through its third lawyer, Mr. Fritz, that because Burns was in the hospital in June and did not personally see the invitation, it, the Respondent, stands innocent of having ignored the last request for bargaining. The Company had made Burns its alter ego, and while it could not place a legal burden upon its lawyer, neither could it divest itself of its own legal obligation. The moral of the case - a rule too well established at this late date to require support citation - is that it is the employer who must meet with the Union and negotiate in good faith, for the conditions of employment which are the substance of all collective bargaining flow from him vis-a-vis his employees. If he choses to have an agent act in his place, he remains always responsible to assure that the agent fulfills the full gamut of the requirement of the statute The agent's failure is his failure.' The Barnett Pontiac Company can negotiate with the Union through its own officers and owners; it can employ a lawyer less in demand than is Mr. Colombo. It can use a lawyer who represents a whole "association" of auto dealers and engage in point meetings, while preserving its own separate bargaining unit. But however the Company does it, it must meet the union agents at reasonable times and fairly consider and discuss proper proposals advanced. The Respondent has not done this, although the request to do so was made again and again. I find that from April 23, 1968 onward the Respondent refused to accord proper recognition to the Union, and refused to engage in proper collective bargaining, and thereby violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. W. THE REMEDY It having been found that the Respondent refused to bargain with the certified representative of its employees, it must be ordered to do so now in order to effectuate the policies of the Act. V. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of the Respondent set forth in section III, above, occurring in connection with its operations as described in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing the free flow of commerce. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The Respondent is an employer within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act, and is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act 3. All new and used car and truck salesmen at the Respondent's Dearborn, Michigan, place of business, excluding office clerical employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act, constitutes a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act. 4. Automotive Salesmen's Association (ASA), affiliated with SIUNA, AFL-CIO, was on February 7, 1967, and at all times thereafter has been the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of Respondent's employees in the appropriate unit, within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act. 5. By refusing on and after April 23, 1968, to meet with the above-named labor organization and to bargain with it for purposes of collective bargaining, the Respondent has, engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. 6. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. RECOMMENDED ORDER Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and upon the entire record in the case, I recommend that Barnett Pontiac, Inc., Dearborn, Michigan, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall- 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Refusing to bargain collectively with Automotive Salesmen's Association (ASA), affiliated with SIUNA, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive representative of all employees in the bargaining unit. (b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of their rights to self-organization, to form, join, or assist any labor organization, to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any and all such activities 2. Take the following affirmative action which I find will effectuate the policies of the Act: 'Cf. Insulating Fabricators, Inc, 86 NLRB 1325, enfd. 388 F 2d 1002 (C.A 4). BARNETT PONTIAC (a) Upon request, bargain collectively with the Union as the exclusive bargaining representative of all employees in the appropriate unit described above, with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other terms and conditions of employment, and if an understanding is reached embody such understanding in a signed agreement. (b) Post at its place of business in Dearborn, Michigan, copies of the notice attached here and marked "Appendix."2 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 7, shall, after being signed by the Respondent's representative, be posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (c) Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 20 days from receipt of this Decision, what steps it has taken to comply herewith.' 'In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the notice. In the further event that the Board's Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision and Order " 'In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, this provision shall be modified to read "Notify said Regional Director, in writing , within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith " APPENDIX NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our 307 employees that: WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with Automotive Salesmen's Association (ASA), affiliated with SIUNA, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive representative of the employees in the bargaining unit described below. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain , or coerce our employees in the exercise of their rights to self-organization , to form , join, or assist any labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any and all such activities. WE WILL bargain collectively, upon request , with this Union as the exclusive representative of all our employees in the bargaining unit described below with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other terms and conditions of employment, and if an understanding is reached embody such understanding in a signed agreement. The bargaining unit is: All new and used car and truck salesmen, excluding office clerical employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act. Dated By BARNETT PONTIAC, INC. (Employer) (Representative ) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. If employees have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions, they may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, 500 Book Building, 1249 Washington Boulevard, Detroit, Michigan 48226, Telephone 226-3200.