Combined Paper Mills, Inc.

COMBINED PAPER MILLS Combined Paper Mills, Inc. and United Paper Makers and Paper Workers, AFL-CIO, and its Local, United Paper Makers and Paper Workers Combined Locks Local 264, AFL-CIO and International Brotherhood of Pulp, Sulphite and Paper Mill Workers, AFL-CIO, and its Local, International Brotherhood of Pulp, Sulphite and Paper Mill Workers Combined Locks Local 144, AFL-CIO. Case 30-CA-668 February 13, 1969 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN MCCULLOCH AND MEMBERS FANNING AND BROWN On July 9, 1968, Trial Examiner Frederick U. Reel issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. Thereafter, the Respondent, the Charging Parties, and the General Counsel filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision and briefs in support thereof. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing andy finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in this case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner, and hereby orders that the Respondent, Combined Paper Mills, Inc., Combined Locks, Wisconsin, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order. TRIAL EXAMINER' S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE FREDERICK U. REEL, Trial Examiner: This case, heard at Appleton, Wisconsin, on May 8, 1968, pursuant to a charge filed the preceding October 10, and a complaint issued March 28, presents the novel question whether 483 Respondent, herein called the Company, engaged in unilateral action violative of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, when it agreed with the representative of one unit of its employees to a change in an insurance arrangement, and thereby raised the insurance premium for another unit without bargaining with the latter's representative. Upon the entire record, including my observation of the witnesses, and after due consideration of the briefs filed by counsel for each of the parties, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT I. THE BUSINESS OF THE COMPANY AND THE LABOR ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED The Company, a Delaware corporation engaged at Combined Locks, Wisconsin, in the production of paper products, annually ships over $50,000 worth of products to points outside the State, and is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. The Company wholly owns another corporation which 'operates a paper producing plant in Pennsylvania. The latter plant is known as the "Bare Mill"; the Wisconsin plant is called the "Locks Mill." The employees at the Bare Mill are represented by United Papermakers and Paperworkers, AFL-CIO, and by its Local No. 422. At the Locks Mill the employees are represented by the same International and its Local 264, and by the International Brotherhood of Pulp, Sulphite and Paper Mill Workers, AFL-CIO, and its Local 144' The two Internationals and the three locals just referred to are labor organizations within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. II. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE A. Background - the Insurance Plans at the Two Plants As noted above, the two plants comprise separate bargaining units, and they have been operating under different collective-bargaining contracts. Such a contract at the Bare Mill was in effect from August 1, 1965, to July 31, 1967. After about 2 months of negotiations at that plant a new contract was agreed to on July 28, 1967, and ratified July 30, 1967, to be effective from August 1, 1967, to July 31, 1968. Meanwhile, the collective agreement at the Locks Mill which had become effective August 1, 1965, was in effect until June 1, 1968. The contracts at both mills provided for life insurance, sickness and accident insurance, and hospitalization insurance. At the Bare Mill the employer paid the entire cost of the insurance (although this cost was, of course, considered as one of the fringe benefits to the employees and hence was included in determining the cost of the "wage package" in bargaining ), and at the Locks Mill the Company paid 60 percent of the premium, and deducted the remaining 40 percent from each employee' s wages. From time to time the premiums would fluctuate up or down as various factors (such as insurance experience or age of employees) would fluctuate. On these occasions the Company would change the amount it deducted from wages, raising or lowering it by 40 percent of the change 'For convenience the two Internationals and their locals are sometimes referred to herein as the Papermakers and the Pulp and Sulphite Workers, respectively. 174 NLRB No. 71 484 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD in the premium.' When such changes occurred, the Company would post a notice at the Locks Mill informing the employees of the change in deduction and of the reason for the change. Although the two collective-bargaining agreements were entirely separate and distinct, the Company for some time prior to the summer of 1967 (the period immediately involved in this case) had made a single contract with the Aetna Insurance Company covering the employees at both plants, including` also the clerical employees who were not in either bargaining unit. The employees at the Locks Mill were aware of this fact. In the negotiations which culminated in the 1965-1968 contract at the Locks Mill, one of the Unions jointly representing the employees at that plant had made some effort to have the Company change from Aetna to another insurance carrier. The Union's insistence on this was at least one of the causes of a brief strike in 1965, but the Company told the Union that the Company preferred to put "all their insurance eggs in one basket, a bigger group, it was cheaper . . . the impact wasn't so great." Eventually the strike ended with the Union's agreeing to continue the insurance program with Aetna, with certain increased insurance benefits to be added" during the life of the contract on August 1, 1966, and August 1, 1967. These benefits necessitated increased premiums, of which the Company paid 60 percent, and deducted the remainder from the employees' paychecks, pursuant to notices posted as described above. B. The Bare Mill Change in Insurance and its Impact on the Locks Mill In the 'course of negotiations for a new contract at the Bare Mill in the summer of 1967,2 the union representatives at that plant, led by Robert Neff, international representative of the United Papermakers and Paperworkers, pointed out that the nonclerical employees at that plant could get substantially greater hospitalization insurance at no increase in premium if their unit was separated from the rest of the plant for purposes of hospitalization insurance. The primary motivation for the demand for separate hospitalization coverage appears to have been the Union's realization at the Bare Mill that the inclusion of the Bare Mill clerical employees (many of whom were elderly) in the same insurance unit caused the production workers to "carry" part of the cost of the clericals. However, the Locks Mill production employees had also been benefiting from being included in the same hospitalization policy with the Bare Mill production employees, in that the insurance claims of the Locks Mill group were in excess, relative to their share of the premium, of the claims of the Bare Mill production employees. The Company agreed with the Union representing the Bare Mill production employees to place their hospitalization insurance in a separate group from the remainder of the Company's employees, which remainder consisted of the clerical employees at the Bare Mill and all the employees at the Locks Mill. As the company and union negotiators in Pennsylvania must have been aware, the necessary result of this change, which was effective with the new contract at the Bare Mill on August 1, 1967, was to raise the premium for the hospitalization insurance at the Locks Mill. At, the same time, as noted above, T All dates subsequently referred to are to the year 1967 unless otherwise indicated. certain improved benefits, necessitating a higher premium, went into effect at the Locks Mill. On July 31 the Company posted a notice at the Locks Mill reading in part as follows: Effective August 1, 1967, the following rates will be applicable to the mill hourly employees for their share of premium for Aetna group insurance coverage. This change is due to increase in daily hospitalization and other benefits. There followed a list of rates showing the past and future deductions for various classes of employees 3 Although the notice recited that the increase was caused by changes in benefits, approximately half of the increase was caused by the elimination of the Bare Mill production employees from the hospitalization coverage. The average amount of the increased deduction attributable to that cause $1 29 per month per employee. Asked to explain why the notice posted on the bulletin board reflected only one, rather than both, of the reasons for the increased deductions, Company Personnel Manager Charles Ehlke testified that at the time he posted the notice he had not received written confirmation from the Bare Mill. I regard the "explanation" as lame and unconvincing because if Ehlke was sufficiently certain to include the rate based on the Bare Mill changes, he must have been equally certain of the reason, or, to put it in other terms, if he needed confirmation before stating the reason, he needed the same confirmation for inclusion of the new rate. In the light of what I regard as Ehlke's equivocation in the matter. I credit the testimony of Michael Courtney, president of Local 144 of the International Brotherhood of Pulp, Sulphite and Paper Mill Workers, that when Ehlke gave him a copy of the notice on July 31, Ehlke did not tell him that the withdrawal of the Bare Mill group was one of the reasons for the increase. In thus declining to credit Ehlke's testimony as to his alleged statement to Courtney, I also do not credit Ehlke's testimony that on July 31 he apprised Ervin Marquardt, then president of Local 264 of the United Papermakers and Paperworkers, that the change at the Bare Mill was part of the reason for the increased deductions at the Locks Mill. Marquardt since that-date has been promoted to a salaried position outside the bargaining unit and did not testify, but Vice President Schroeder of the same local testified that he did not know of the Bare Mill withdrawal until a meeting on August 24, when Marquardt asked Ehlke "how come the large increase on our insurance premium . . . and it was stated at that meeting that they at Bare had withdrawn from our plant " Moreover, Schroeder testified that he discussed the increase "quite thoroughly" with Marquardt between July 31 and August 24. Also, the Papermakers International representative testified that Marquardt in mid-August 1967 discussed the increase in premium but did not mention the change in coverage at the Bare Mill. On the entire record, therefore, I credit Courtney and Schroeder, and I find, contrary to Ehlke's testimony, that he did not tell Courtney or Marquardt on July 31, 1967, that the Bare Mill action had occurred or how it affected the Locks Mill premises.' 'These new rates were first reflected in paychecks distributed August 10, but counsel for the Company somewhat overstates the matter when in his brief he uses the latter date as that on which the rate raise "was actually put into effect." '1 appreciate that technically Ehlke's version of his conversation with Marquardt is undented But see N L R.B v Howell Chevrolet Co, 204 F.2d 79, 86 (C.A 9), affd 346 U S. 482 Marquardt , as noted, was not called as a witness COMBINED PAPER MILLS 485 C. The Discussions Between the Locks Mill Unions and the Company Concerning the Insurance Change As just noted, the Company when it announced the increased deductions concealed the fact that the change at the Bare Mill was in part responsible for the increase. According to Ehlke, at a meeting on August 8 with representatives of Local 144 of the Pulp and Sulphite Workers, Courtney asked why the increase was so high, and Ehlke replied that the increased hospitalization and other changes plus "the fact that` the Bare union had negotiated out of its own group" accounted for the increase. According to Ehlke, several other subjects were discussed at this meeting. Courtney did not recall the meeting and testified that he did not know at any time during the month of August of any reason for the increase in premium other than the reason stated in the Company's notice of July 31. Courtney's version derives some support from the testimony of Cluberton, the International representative serving Courtney's local, for Cluberton testified to a conversation with Courtney in mid-August at which time the latter stated that the rate increase seemed excessive but could give no explanation save "bad experience and improved benefits " Cluberton's lack of knowledge at that time is in turn confirmed by the testimony of Windorff, International representative of the Papermakers servicing the Locks Mill, who testified to a conversation with Cluberton between mid-August and August 24, at which time neither he not Cluberton knew that the Bare Mill group had left the insurance plan. Under all the circumstances, I find that Courtney did not learn from Ehlke on August 8 that part of the reason for the rate increase was the change at the Bare Mill. It may be that Ehlke adverted to the matter and that Courtney did not understand the impact of Ehlke's remarks. In any event, even assuming that Ehlke did state the facts on that occasion, this was, of course, after the effectuation of the increased premium, and Ehlke did not purport to be "bargaining" about the matter. On August 24 Ehlke met with representatives of Local 264 of the Papermakers on a grievance unrelated to the insurance situation, but at that meeting the Union raised the insurance matter and Ehlke stated that the withdrawal of the Bare Mill group was a factor in the increase. On September 12 the Company and committees representing the two Unions were guests of the Aetna Insurance Company at a dinner in Little Chute, Wisconsin. At this dinner the Aetna representative, one Chaney, was the principal speaker, and Ehike, who was also present, had little to say. Chaney explained to his assembled guests that the insurance experience at the Locks Mill was very bad compared to that at the Bare Mill, and that for this reason the Bare Mill Union had bargained for withdrawal from the overall group. Cluberton testified that some of the men at the meeting protested loudly and vigorously, "accusing the Company of a sellout" and of acting illegally, although Cluberton himself stated at the meeting that the Company had been under a duty to bargain with the Bare Mill unit over insurance. The meeting broke up in what Cluberton described, with Windorff s concurrence, as a "rowdy" fashion. The following day, but pursuant to arrangements made between the Company and the Locks Mill Unions before the dinner meeting of September 12, the Company met jointly with representatives of both Unions to discuss the situation. At this meeting Cluberton asked Ehlke "What do you intend to do about this insurance problem?" Ehlke thought a minute and then replied: "Nothing." The meeting did, however, result in the Unions receiving, for the first time, accurate information as to the amount of the increased premium attributable to the separation of the Bare Mill group. As noted above, the amount averaged $1.29 per month per man. The Unions advised the Company of their intention to file an unfair labor practice charge; the charge was filed October 10. After filing the charge, the Unions also invoked the grievance procedure under the existing contract, which provided for several stages of discussion, culminating in arbitration. On November 10, the parties met for the fourth step in the grievance procedure (the first step to involve International representatives), and Cluberton asked Company President Vogt, "Now, have you changed your mind on this insurance problem." Vogt said, "No," and Cluberton was ready to adjourn, but Windorff prolonged the meeting and (to quote Cluberton) they "proceeded to talk out the problem once again." During the discussion Vogt said the matter was out of his hands, and rested with the board of directors in Chicago. Cluberton a few days later telephoned one Fisher, the chairman of the board, in Chicago, and asked if the union representatives could talk to him about the insurance problem. To quote Cluberton's account of his effort: "Well," he says, "I think you should have thought about this before you filed the charge with the Board." He says, "No, we'll let this thing take its course." He says, "If this thing wasn't laying on the table," he says, "maybe we could talk about it." I didn't pursue what he meant or anything. I says, "All right. Well, thank you, Mr. Fisher," and that closed the conversation. The grievance was not pursued beyond the fourth step and was never taken to arbitration D. Concluding Findings The simple proposition urged in support of the complaint is that the Company without notice to or bargaining with the Locks Mill employees,' 'statutory representative changed the "base" upon" which their insurance premium was computed, thereby increasing the amount deducted from their wages, and thus prima facie is guilty of unilateral action violative of "Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. Cf. N.L.R.B. v. Scam Instrument Corp , 394 F.2d 884 (C.A. 7). To this' contention the Company interposes several defenses too which we now turn. 1. The Company contends that the matter could have been handled by the arbitration machinery set up in the contract, and that the Board should" as a matter of discretion stay its hand and leave the parties to their contractual machinery. The Board, of course, is not required to defer to arbitration but sometimes chooses to do so. The instant case possesses sdme of the features which might lead the Board to defer, in that the issue lies in narrow compass, carries little if any implication to national labor policy, and arises between parties apparently enjoying a reasonably harmonious relationship. On the other hand, the critical facts are not in dispute and the issue is solely whether a legal obligation exists under the statute which the Board administers. The contract between the Company and the Locks Mill Unions recites that the function of the arbitration - board provided for thereunder "shall be to interpret and apply this 486 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Agreement However, this Board shall have no power to add to or subtract from or modify and extend any of the terms of this Agreement...." The right here asserted by General Counsel and the Locks Mill Unions grows out of the statute, not the contract. I see no more reason for the Board to defer to potential arbitration in this case than in any other case in which during the life of a contract an employer engages in allegedly unilateral action. If the employer's action contravenes statutory rights, any arbitration decision exculpating him would be in the teeth of the statute. If the case turned on factual disputes, the Board might be warranted in deferring to arbitration, but on the instant record I see no compelling reason for the Board to do so. See Unit Drop Forge Division Eaton Yale & Towne, Inc., 171 NLRB No. 73; Scam. supra.s 2. The Company contends that it satisfied any obligation it had under the statute by its discussions with union representatives in August, September, and 'thereafter concerning the reasons for the change in premium The unilateral action was taken and announced before the Company apprised the Unions of the basis for its action, and the lack of any bargaining over the matter is :only emphasized by the posting of a deliberately false and misleading notice Subsequent discussions would not cure the taint if the original action violated the duty to bargain. Cf. Stark Ceramics, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 375 F.2d 262^ 205, 206 (C.A. 6), enfg. 155 NLRB 1258, 1265, balling that a Company's "after-the-fact offer to explain its inilateral action does not cure the violation." 3. The Company relies heavily on the fact that the change at Bare Mill was initiated by an International representative of the Papermakers, that the same Interinational and its Local Union at Locks Mill are chargeable with knowledge of the change and of its necessary impact on the premiums at Locks Mill, and that the failure to request bargaining there constitutes a waiver of the right to bargain. The parties have stipulated and the testimony establishes that in point of fact none of the union rep,(esentatives serving the Locks Mill, including the International representative of the Papermakers, knew of the proposals at the Bare Mill (Ehlke, the company representative, knew of them, for he participated in the Bare Mill negotiations), but the Company argues that constructive notice is sufficient, and that it could reasonably assume that the proposal by one International representative', of the Papermakers was acquiesced in by another in a ,different geographic area So far as the notice to the other Union at Locks Mill is concerned, the Company argues that the two Unions cooperated in administering the contract, and that knowledge imputable to one is equally imputable to the other. (A question from the Trial Examiner elicited the answer that the two Unions in Wisconsin do cooperate and freely exchange data of common'poncern.) The issue appears to be novel, and able counsel have not unearthed authorities controlling on the point. So far as the "joint bargaining" feature is concerned, it would seem to me that notice to one of the joint representatives was legally sufficient notice to all When two unions act as a joint bargaining representative they constitute a single "labor organization" for purposes of the Act. See NL.R.B. v. National Truck Rental Co., 239 F.2d 422, 425 (C.A.D.C ). The realities of industrial life, however, militate against the Company's contention that knowledge of one international representative of the Papermakers in Pennsylvania constitutes notice to another representative or to the entity in Wisconsin. Certainly the Company would not concede that an unlawful threat uttered to such a representative in Pennsylvania warranted remedial relief at the Wisconsin plant on the theory that the employees there would be sure to learn of it. The very fact that the Company in its July 31 notice to the Locks Mill employees concealed the fact that the Bare Mill withdrawal was a major cause of the change in the premium deduction itself suggests that the Company believed the employees to be ignorant of the Bare Mill change and hoped to keep them so. If a duty to bargain existed at all (a matter discussed below), it encompassed the duty to give notice and opportunity for bargaining. Such a statutory obligation should not be administered or applied in a grudging manner, for it arises out of a belief that the exchange of information can help avoid industrial strife. I therefore reject the technical contention that, assuming the Company was under a duty to give notice to the Locks Mill Unions, it complied with that duty or was absolved therefrom because of the knowledge of the Papermakers International in Pennsylvania that the change in insurance carriers it requested would have an adverse affect on the premiums charged in Wisconsin.' 4. Finally, the Company contends that the change in premiums at the Locks Mill was no different from other changes in premiums effected there from time to time as the insurance benefits changed or the insurance "experience" factor resulted in an increase or decrease of rates, and that just as these changes were passed on to the employees, with the Company paying 60 percent and the employees the balance, so the change in rate on August 1, 1967, could be passed on without prior notice or bargaining. General Counsel concedes that the normal changes in premiums, which resulted from factors beyond the Company's control, could be passed on to the employees without further bargaining . He argues for a contrary conclusion here because the change in premium is directly attributable to the Company's action in agreeing with the Bare Mill employees to take them out of the insurance group. The initial reaction to this problem, it seems to me, is to view the matter as simply a rate change which the employer can pass on to the employees as he did other changes in premiums. Further reflection suggests that this easy answer springs in part from the relatively minor impact of this particular change in the premium. If, for example, the defection of the Pennsylvania group had caused an increase in the rate so great as to be prohibitive, the initial reaction might well be that the employer before agreeing to a change which so affected the Wisconsin group should afford their representative actual notice and an opportunity to be heard. The source of the difficulty lies in the hybrid character of the contracts and units: what are ostensibly two separate bargaining units were, for the limited purpose of insurance coverage, a single multiplant unit. Moreover, this 'Over half of the Company's able brier is devoted to this issue, and it would be a pity if so admirable a discussion of the conflicting authorities should reach no larger audience. Hopefully, counsel will find time to fashion it into a law review article or a piece for a labor law publication. So far as I am concerned,; however, it is only proper to note that among the most persuasive statements in the brief are quotations from two recently overruled trial examiners and a dissenting Board member 'It should also be noted in support of this conclusion that so far as the Pennsylvania representative of the Papermakers was aware , the Company might have been absorbing the premiums in Wisconsin as it did in Pennsylvania Also the Pennsylvania representative was not chargeable with knowledge that the Company was not advising the Wisconsin representative of the matter COMBINED PAPER MILLS 487 single-unit aspect of the insurance coverage had been insisted on by the employer at the time the Locks Mill contract was renewed in 1965. To be sure the Company was under a duty to bargain with the Bare Mill Union concerning the continued coverage of the Pennsylvania employees under the single insurance carrier. But by the same token namely that the nature of the insurance carrier was a mandatory subject of bargaining - a change in the carrier or in the nature of the unit served by the carrier was equally a mandatory subject of bargaining for the Locks Mill. I conclude, therefore, that the employer before reaching agreement with the Bare Mill Union should have given notice and opportunity for bargaining to the Locks Mill representative This is not to say, of course, that the Company had to secure the consent of the Locks Mill unit before making the change at the other mill. The Company's obligation was to notify the Locks Mill representatives and to hear in good faith whatever views they may have chosen to express. Certainly, the situation was rife with possibilities for adjustment. The Locks Mill representative might have urged the Company to adhere to the existing situation until the following summer when the contracts at both mills would be up for renegotiation. The Locks Mill people could also have taken the position that if the Bare Mill production employees were to be under separate coverage, the Locks Mill production unit should also be severed rather than having to bear the share of the premium attributable to the salaried clerical employees at both the mills without whom (so the record suggests) the premiums would have been lower. This is not intended to exhaust the possibilities of adjustment but only to point out that the duty to notify and afford opportunity for bargaining is far from empty and is more than a pro forma requirement. The Company errs in equating the situation to a premium adjustment imposed by the insurance carrier because of factors beyond the Company's control. The Company although it did not initiate the change in coverage so far as the Bare Mill employees were concerned did initiate it with the insurance carrier. But for the Company's agreeing with the Bare Mill Union, the change would not have occurred at the Locks Mill. The situation is no different from one in which one union at a plant requests a change in working hours, and the company by acceding thereto necessarily affects the hours of other employees represented by another union. Its duty to bargain with the first union in that case does not override or mitigate its duty to bargain with the second. Undoubtedly the result here reached can lead to difficulties in hard cases. If, for example, the Company had shut down the Bare Mill, this would also have led to a premium increase at the Locks Mill. It may seem absurd to say that in such a case bargaining at the Locks Mill is required before the Company acts. Conversely, opening of a new mill and extending insurance coverage to the employees there could affect the premiums at the preexisting mills But these examples serve merely to illustrate that where the employer's motivation in taking certain action is so compelling the probability is that he will adhere to his resolve after notice and opportunity for bargaining The important element is that the bargaining representative of the affected employees must not be ignored or by-passed. No harm is done, and much good may be accomplished, by the collective bargaining, and even if the net result be unchanged, the act of extending the opportunity for good-faith bargaining contributes to stable labor relations and industrial peace. Contrast the situation here, where the ignoring of the representative and the posting of a false and misleading notice led to a "rowdy" meeting, to bitter accusations against the Company, and to this litigation CONCLUSIONS OF LAW By taking action with respect to its Bare Mill employees which directly affected the insurance premiums of its Locks Mill employees without giving the statutory representative of the latter notice or opportunity for bargaining, the Company engaged in an unfair labor practice affecting commerce within the meaning of Sections 8(a)(1) and (5) and 2(6) and (7) of the Act. THE REMEDY I shall recommend an order directing that the Company cease and desist from its unfair labor practice, and I note that at the time of the hearing the two mills were still subject to the same insurance carrier on all insurance except hospitalization, so that such an order may have, some practical significance. I shall not recommend that the Company reimburse the employees for the increase in premium attributable to the defection of the Bare Mill unit As noted, the average cost was $1.29 per man per month commencing August 1, 1967. As the Locks Mill contract expired June 1, 1968, the entire situation as it then stood was subject to collective bargaining. I would therefore not compute the liability at the most as extending for more than 10 months, or an average of $12.90 per employee. The brief filed on behalf of the Charging Parties claims only this limited amount. This may not be de minimis, but it certainly approaches if it does not reach that somewhat elusive mark. Moreover, the reasonable probability is that good-faith bargaining would not have prevented the Company from agreeing to the severance of the Bare Mill group, and it is also probable that at least some of the increased cost would have been carried by the Locks Mill employees. I have previously expressed my criticism of the Company for its posting of a false notice, but I must add that all parties are to be censured for invoking the 1ponderous, time-consuming, machinery of the Board and perhaps of the Federal appellate judiciary to resolve so essentially small a matter as this, particularly at a time when a new contract was being negotiated I do not believe it will effectuate the policies of the Act to require monetary payments here, and I note that the Company itself derived no financial benefit from its transgression. I also believe it would not be in the interest of industrial peace to require a conventional notice posting in this case. Cf. Curtiss-Wright Corp., '145 NLRB 152, 157-158, enfd. 347 F.2d 61 (C.A 3). As noted, the parties have enjoyed contractual relations and the instant problem, in my judgment, should have been resolved in negotiations for the contract to become effective June 1, 1968 If no exceptions are filed to this decision, this will itself indicate that harmonious relations continue. If, on the other hand, exceptions are filed, the instant controversy will be stale long before an order of the Board, to say nothing of a court decree, would eventuate in the posting of a notice. In lieu of"a notice, therefore, I shall recommend that the Company write letters to the Charging Parties reciting that it will not henceforward engage in the conduct here found violative of the Act. The Unions receiving this letter may, if they are so advised, post it on their bulletin boards or otherwise circulate it 488 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD among their members. Accordingly, upon the foregoing finding, and conclusions and upon the entire record , I recommend, pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, issuance of the following: ORDER Respondent Combined Paper Mills, Inc., its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall. 1. Cease and desist from changing the unit of employees covered by its insurance contract with its insurance carrier if such change affects the premium employees pay for the insurance provided for in its contract with the statutory bargaining representative of its production employees at the Locks Mill without giving said statutory bargaining representative notice and an opportunity to bargain over any such comtemplated change. 2 Take the following action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act. (a) Write to each of the labor organizations which jointly represent its Locks Mill production employees the following letter to be signed by a responsible officer or supervisor of the Company: "Pursuant to the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, we hereby advise you that we will not in the future change the unit of employees covered by our contract with our insurance carrier, if such change affects the premiums to be paid for insurance provided under our contract with your labor organization without giving your labor organization notice and an opportunity to bargain over such change." (b) Notify the Regional Director for Region 30, in writing, within 20 days from the date of the receipt of this Decision, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith.' 'In the event that this Order is adopted by the Board , this provision shall be modified to read, "Notify said Regional Director , in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith."