Artcraft Mantel and Fireplace Co.

JOSEPH H. BLISS Joseph H. Bliss, d/b/a Artcraft Mantel and Fireplace Co. and United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America , Carpenters District Council of Western Pennsylvania, AFL-CIO. Case 6-CA-4036 February 25, 1969 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN MCCULLOCH AND MEMBERS FANNING AND JENKINS On May 2, 1968, Trial Examiner Herman Tocker issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. The Trial Examiner also found that Respondent had not engaged in certain other unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint and recommended that the complaint be dismissed with respect to these allegations. Thereafter, Respondent and the General Counsel filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision, together with supporting briefs. Respondent also filed an answering brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel. The Board has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in this case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner and hereby orders that Respondent, Joseph H. Bliss, d/b/a Artcraft Mantel and Fireplace Co., Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order. TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE HERMAN TOCKER, Trial Examiner: This proceeding, with all parties represented, came on to be heard before me at a hearing in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, January 18 and 19 and February 5, 1968, upon a complaint issued 737 December 12, 1967, following a charge filed September 5, 1967, and amended December 12. It was alleged in the complaint that Joseph H. Bliss, the employer, had engaged in- (a) violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, as amended, involving an alleged promise of benefits to an employee in order to induce him to abandon a strike and an alleged threat that he would not be reemployed if he did not abandon it; and (b) violations of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) involving the alleged failure and refusal of the employer to recognize United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, Carpenters District Council of Western Pennsylvania, AFL-CIO, as the duly designated and authorized representative of his employees' for purposes of collective bargaining, thereby causing to be prolonged a strike commenced to procure such recognition, and thus causing it to become an unfair labor practice strike. The Respondent, Joseph H. Bliss, appeared by counsel. In his answer, received by the General Counsel December 29, while reserving his contention that the Board had no jurisdiction to entertain this proceeding, he denied all allegations on the basis of which it might be concluded that he had violated the law. PRELIMINARY Together with his answer Respondent filed a motion contesting the Board's jurisdiction and, at the same time, a motion to dismiss. The motions were referred to Trial Examiner Charles W Schneider for preliminary disposition. By order dated January 10, 1968, he denied them. These motions were renewed at the hearing and since. After careful consideration, I have concluded that they should have been and properly were denied. For that reason, to the extent that they are now renewed, they are denied. By petition dated April 12, 1967, amended May 8, the Union requested the National Labor Relations Board to hold an election for the certification of representatives on behalf of Respondent's production and maintenance employees. After a hearing held May 26, 1967, in which Bliss participated and was represented by counsel, the Regional Director of Region 6, National Labor Relations Board, on August 25, 1967, issued his decision and direction of election. In the decision he defined as the unit appropriate for the purpose of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act: All full time and regular part-time production and maintenance employees, including installers, helpers, janitors and truckdrivers, at the Employer's Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, plant, excluding salesmen, automotive mechanics, office clerical employees and guards, professional employees and supervisors as defined in the Act. He held further that Respondent's activities ".. afford a basis for the assertion of jurisdiction under the Board's nonretail standards." He decided as well whether certain disputed persons should be included in or excluded from the unit. Excluded were Lester Cauffiel, Carol Settlemaier, Mary Ann Petrowski, Grace Bliss, Philomena Vichie (not to be confused with Lawrence Vichie included as noted below), Ann Muscarella, Clyde Creen, William Worshawski, and finally Jerome DeWalt and William Kush. He included Gerald Klodowski, Gus Kalaras, William Gardner, Frank Sergi, Pardo Nairo, Joseph Walker, Jeffrey Lynn, and finally (mentioned last and singled out particularly 174 NLRB No. 110 738 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD because of a suggestion during the hearing of the complaint case that there might be a question as to his supervisory capacity) Lawrence Vichie, whom he characterized in his decision as being, " .. at most . . . a `straw boss' or group leader." An observation was made in the decision that, "A strike called by Petitioner began on April 12, 1967, and was still in progress at the time of the hearing." Bliss, the employer, petitioned the National Labor Relations Board for review of the Regional Director's decision. He brought up as issues the Board's jurisdiction, the finding defining the "appropriate unit," and the determinations that the particular employees above mentioned were to be included within the unit By telegraph decision, issued September 14, 1967, the Board denied the Petition for Review saying, ". . . [I]t raises no substantial issues warranting review, except as to the exclusion of automotive mechanics, De Walt and Kush, ... [which] issue can best be resolved through the challenge procedure, . " The Regional Director's decision was amended accordingly to permit these two employees to vote subject to challenge. The decision as to the unit, as to employees to be included or excluded, and the status of Lawrence Vichie is binding upon and not subject to reopening by me. It likewise determines the issue as to jurisdiction with respect to which Respondent's motion has been denied, as noted above. Subject to preservation of the right to challenge DeWalt and Kush, it was agreed that, as of April 12, 1967, the employees in the unit were Delbert Brain, Elmer Caton, Guy Chickinelli, Paul Creen, Leon Cristofano, James Elder, Dan Floss, Anello Giugliano, Bradford Hart, Gus Kalaras, Gerald Klodowski, Jeffrey Lynn, Rod McConaha, Pardo Nairo, John Pitchok, Frank Sergi, Lawrence Vichie, Joseph Walker, James Ward, Glenn Yauch, and Robert Zrimsek. Upon the filing of the charges in the complaint case, the Union requested permission to withdraw its petition for certification of representatives and, the complaint in this proceeding having been issued on December 19, 1967, the Regional Director on that day entered an order permitting such withdrawal. THE ISSUES The issues are (a) whether the Employer violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by a promise of benefits to induce an employee to abandon the strike and a threat of loss of employment if he continued to strike, (b) whether, on April 12, 1967, the Union had been designated by a majority of the employees in the unit for purposes of collective bargaining; (c) whether the Employer, by refusing to recognize the Union upon demand made at that time, violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act; (d) whether the strike which already had been in progress at the time of the refusal thereby became an unfair labor practice strike, (e) whether, if it did become an unfair labor practice strike, the remedial order to be entered herein should require an offer of reemployment, reinstatement, and backpay to all employees who have not been reemployed and further require backpay to the employees who participated in the strike and since have been rehired; and finally (f) whether an order should be entered herein requiring the Employer to recognize, and engage in collective bargaining with, the Union. In connection with the foregoing issues consideration also will have to be given to whether, as alleged, following the initial demand, there had been recognition which subsequently was withdrawn and to the conduct of the union representatives and employees during the strike. In the resolution of all issues with respect to which credibility of oral testimony became a factor, I have weighed all the probabilities, considered the demeanor and conduct of the witnesses, their candor or lack of it, their objectivity, bias, or prejudice, their understanding of the matters concerning which they testified, whether their testimony has been contradicted or sufficiently impeached, whether parts of testimony should be accepted when other parts are rejected, consistency, plausibility and probability, and the effect which leading questions might have had on the answers elicited thereby. Now, upon the entire record, after my observation of the witnesses and having in mind the foregoing considerations, the following are my FINDINGS OF FACT I. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT At all times hereinafter mentioned Joseph H. Bliss, an individual, has been doing business under the firm name and style of Artcraft Mantel and Fireplace Co. He is engaged in the manufacture and retail sale of fireplaces, mantels, and related accessories in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. During the calendar year 1966, in connection with and for the operation of said business he received directly from outside the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, for use in his business in Pittsburgh, goods and materials valued in excess of $50,000. He is now, and at all times hereinafter mentioned was, an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, Carpenters District Council of Western Pennsylvania, AFL-CIO, is, and at all times material herein has been, a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. JURISDICTION The National Labor Relations Board has jurisdiction of the Respondent and of this proceeding. IV. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The Promise of Benefit to Induce an Employee to Abandon the Strike and the Threat Save for the alleged refusal to recognize and bargain with the Union, the only incident involving an alleged violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act alleged to have occurred from the 12th day of April 1967, until and including the day of the hearing herein, approximately nine months, is to be found if at all in an alleged telephone conversation between Bliss and an employee, Anello Giugliano. There is some disagreement about his testimony as it is set forth in the transcript As it appears there, following his testimony to the effect that he received a telephone call from Bliss while he was on strike in the month of June 1967, it is. A. Mr. Bliss said, "you want to come back to work I pay you how much you want." I said, "no, if you JOSEPH H. BLISS recognize the Union I will be back." Q. What did he say9 A. He said, "you know if I recognize the Union I want you back." Q. Did you say anything after that to Mr. Bliss? A No, that is all. Q. Was that the end of the conversation9 A. That is it. Oh, I said, "that is all right" after he said, "I want you back." Counsel for the General Counsel, in his motion for corrections of the transcript, requests that it be corrected so that the word "How" would be inserted in the answer following the question, "What did he say?" so that it may read, "He said, `How you know if I recognize the Union I want you back?' " I have denied that application to amend because it is not consistent with what I recalled immediately after the witness had completed his testimony and the case had been rested At that time I inquired of counsel, "Am I right that there is no proof of paragraph 6(b) of the complaint and that it should be dismissed?" Counsel promptly disputed this and contended that the testimony had been substantially the same as he now contends. If Giugliano had testified in the same words as were contained in his pretrial affidavit, that is the way he would have testified at the hearing. However, according to my recollection, he did not, and I say this even though the transcript is rife with errors as must be apparent from an order which I have entered directing numerous other corrections. Nevertheless, even if the testimony had been in the form requested, I would give it no credit because I am convinced that Bliss had been so conditioned by his attorney, as he testified and as appears in documentary evidence in the record, not to engage in any conversations with employees lest such conversations be considered violations of the law, that it is highly unlikely that he would have offered this particular and lone employee, as an inducement to abandon the strike, whatever amount of compensation that employee might request and that he would have said anything to this employee impliedly threatening not to reemploy him if he did not abandon the strike or if he did support the Union. Bliss religiously and blindly followed the instructions given him by his attorney. While Bliss admitts having had a conversation with Giugliano in or about June and thereby appears to have violated his attorney's instruction not to talk to the strikers, the conversation which he admits having had had nothing to do with the strike. Bliss' version of the conversation with Giugliano, and how it came about, immediately following his testimony that his attorney had instructed him to stay in the office, not to talk to the strikers, not to question them, not even to say, "Hello," to them, was. On an occasion when Giugliano came in to get his pay, his May hospitalization charges had been paid but the time for paying the June charges was soon to arrive and Giugliano had no money in escrow for that payment. He was informed that unless he was back at work he would have to make the payment to Respondent or his hospitalization would be dropped. Having been so informed, he agreed to make a weekly deposit so that, by June 20, when the June payment was due, the money would be available to make it Apparently he failed to make the deposits. This resulted in a telephone call by Bliss to him to ask "him if he wanted to keep up the hospitalization, . " Bliss testified that the hospitalization "was the extent of the conversation" and that he "did not ask him to come back. . Bliss' testimony is supported in an important aspect by testimony given by Mary Ann Petrowski, an absolutely 739 credible witness According to her, during the strike, Giugliano came to the office and "inquired about keeping up his hospitalization." An arrangement had been made for him to send in a weekly check so that it might be maintained. I accept as credible Bliss' version of the conversation that it was concerned only with the hospitalization and as a denial of the claim that he had asked Giugliano "to come back." It is notable that neither Bliss nor his attorney adverted to any alleged or implied threat not to rehire Giugliano if the Union were recognized. This was consistent with my own recollection that there had been no such testimony. On the other hand, even if Giugliano had testified to the same words used in his pretrial affidavit, I would accept as credible Bliss' testimony and rule that no such threat had been made. Paragraphs 6(a) and (b) should be dismissed. B. The Refusal to Recognize and Bargain With the Union On the morning of April 12, following a meeting of employees on the night before at which it had been decided that if the Employer did not recognize the Union as their bargaining agent they would go on strike, Respondent's employees came to his establishment. Instead of going to work as they usually did, they stood outside, milled around, and gave every appearance that they were on strike. According' to Bliss, as was his practice after awakening about 7 o'clock in the morning, he went to the window and, seeing all the men at the corner of the building, he became very excited. "They were standing in bunches, and at that time they had supposedly been working. They were supposed to be working." He dressed, went downstairs, and spoke to his leadman, Vichie, asking him what was going on. When he looked through the window at or about 8 or 8:15 o'clock the men "were walking up and down in front of the building with signs . They had signs; they were walking up and down in front of the place. When the girls came to work at 9 o'clock they had signs." He observed that Maher, the Union Organizer,' apparently was one of the leaders and was instructing the men as to the manner in which they were "to walk up and down and pointing out the different ones to keep going back and forth." Sometime after that, possibly iwthe area of 10 or 10:30 o'clock, Maher came in, informed, him that the men were on strike, and said that he wanted to talk to him about it. Bliss testified that he answered, "you have got them out there; they are yours. As far as I am concerned they are fired." He told Maher that if there was anything to be discussed the discussions were to be with his attorney, "that the men were out picketing and as far as I was concerned they were fired. And I walked away from him " There is evidence that at a later time he changed his mind about the discharges. Maher's version of the conversation is that he informed Bliss that the Carpenter's Union represented a majority of the employees, that he wanted to know whether Bliss would recognize them, and that he was willing to have the authorization cards viewed by an impartial person. The answer, after an imprecation by Bliss, was, "Those people don't work for me any longer. You have them; you can keep them. If you want to talk to anyone talk to my attorney." The initial petition for an election was filed that morning shortly after 11 a.m On the same day a letter claiming majority representation, offering to submit authorization cards to prove it, and requesting a meeting to proceed with collective bargaining, was sent to Respondent. Respondent at no time thereafter recognized 740 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD the Union as the bargaining representative of its employees, has consistently refused to do so, and has refused to bargain with it. It is alleged in the complaint that for a short period of time beginning on or about June 7 and ending on or about July 21 Respondent purported to recognize the Union and purported to bargain with it but that on about September 15 it "did withdraw recognition from the Union, ." I am satisfied from all the evidence that this did not transpire and that, to the extent that Respondent's attorney dealt with the Union during this period, he did so because Respondent was distraught with the manner in which the strike was being conducted and, for the purpose of settlement (albeit it risked a violation of Section 8(a)(2) of the Act) he entered into negotiations with the Union's representatives to ascertain what, if any, benefits and conditions might result from recognition. During the course of this claimed recognition, the res gestae, Respondent's attorney wrote the letter of June 12, 1967, a portion of the correspondence received in support of the charge. In this letter he stated, If you will recollect, from almost the very beginning, I have asked that you submit to my office a letter setting forth the benefits of recognizing the Union plus what you want from Artcraft Mantel Company, so that I can have a preliminary meeting with Mr. Bliss and go over everything with him without numerous preliminary meetings with you and him and others which will only terminate in obtaining the facts then which I request now. Trusting you will comply with my request so that we may explore the advisability of recognizing the Union and accept your terms, I remain . . . [Emphasis supplied.] When Bliss looked into the street immediately upon awakening on the morning of April 12 and again after going downstairs into the shop he had ample visual evidence that his employees were on strike. Not long after that he was confronted by a union representative who endeavored to obtain recognition and start collective bargaining. He rejected that offer giving as his reason not that he doubted the Union's majority authorization but that the men had gone on strike and had been discharged. (The fact that, at a later time, Bliss seems to have reconsidered and cancelled the discharges does not alter the effect of what he did on April 12.) At the time the demand was made the Union had obtained from sixteen employees signed authorizations to act as their exclusive bargaining agent "in regards to wages, hours, and working conditions ..." The employees in the unit at that time aggregated 21 and, if Respondent's contention that two additional persons should be included is allowed, the aggregate would have been twenty-three. Even if the two card signers excluded by the Regional Director' s decision are added to these twenty-three the Union's majority continues. Bliss' peremptory refusal to recognize the Union on the first day of the strike was explained or changed later by a claim that his business was not subject to the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board and a claimed doubt that the Union actually did represent a majority of his employees. However sincere Respondent's belief that the Board did not have jurisdiction might have been, this mistake of law is not a defense to a wrongful refusal to recognize and bargain. H & W Construction Company, Inc., 161 NLRB 852; Old King Cole, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 260 F 2d 530, 532 (C.A. 6) and cases there cited. The continuation of the strike, the number of men participating in it, and the visual evidence Bliss had that there was a majority participating on the morning of April 12 negate the contention that when on that day and in the weeks or months following there had been a refusal to recognize based upon a genuine or sincere doubt that the Union did have majority authorization. Seven Up Bottling Company of Miami, Inc., 92 NLRB 1622. Thus it must be held that there was an unlawful refusal to recognize and to bargain with the Union in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act. C. The Unfair Labor Practices Strike Aspect Bliss testified that when he rejected the Union's demand for recognition he told its representatives that the employees had been discharged. The action of the employees in continuing the strike at that time is different from a walkout following a discharge, as was the situation in Brooks Foundry, Inc., 166 NLRB No. 57 and N.L.R.B. v. Mastro Plastic Corp., 214 F.2d 462 (C.A. 2). The evidence here does not present either an implied or explicit picture of a strike induced by or continued because of a discharge or discharges. Nevertheless the strike was continued and the employees persisted in it by reason of and because of Bliss' refusal to recognize the Union as their authorized bargaining agent. Consequently, although I do not find that they continued their strike in protest against their discharge, allegedly unlawful, I do find that it was continued and was clearly a strike for recognition after a wrongful refusal to recognize. It was therefore an unfair labor practice strike. Now, upon the foregoing facts and the entire record, the following are my CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Respondent, Joseph H. Bliss, doing business under the firm name and style of Artcraft Mantel and Fireplace Company, is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act and the National Labor Relations Board has jurisdiction over him and of this proceeding. 2 On or about April 12, 1967, and for an undetermined period thereafter, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, Carpenters District Council of Western Pennsylvania, AFL-CIO, a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act, was the duly authorized representative for purposes of collective bargaining of Bliss' employees in the unit comprising: All full time and regular part-time production and maintenance employees, including installers, helpers, janitors and truckdrivers, at the Employer's Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, plant, excluding salesmen, automotive mechanics, office clerical employees and guards, professional employees and supervisors as defined in the Act. 3. Bliss, the Respondent, on .that day and for a long time thereafter, did wrongfully refuse to bargain collectively with that Union and, by so refusing to bargain with it and to recognize it, he thereby violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act. 4. Such refusal by him caused what might have been commenced as an economic strike to become an-unfair labor practice strike. 5 Respondent's activities and operations as heretofore set forth had and have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several JOSEPH H. BLISS 741 States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. 6. Respondent' s refusal to recognize the Union, his refusal to bargain with it, and his conduct in connection with his initial rejection of the Union' s request for recognition are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 7. Respondent has not engaged in a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by promising an employee economic benefits in order to induce him to abandon the strike or by threatening him with loss of employment if he, did not abandon the strike, as alleged in paragraphs 6(a) and (b) of the complaint and those paragraphs accordingly should be dismissed. 8. Respondent at no time extended recognition to the Union and for that reason cannot be said to have withdrawn recognition once extended . To the extent that there are allegations to this effect in the complaint, those allegations should be dismissed. THE REMEDY If this were an ordinary refusal to recognize and bargain case the remedy would be the routine order to recognize the Union, to bargain with it concerning working conditions in Respondent' s establishment, and to offer reemployment to all strikers excepting only those found guilty of misconduct on and off the picket line. This, however, is not an ordinary and conventional refusal to recognize and bargain case. In the first place, except for the refusal to recognize and bargain , the Respondent here engaged in no violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act except to the extent that it could be argued, although eschewed by the General Counsel, that his impetuous and subsequently cancelled discharge of the striking employees was a violation of that Section . All that can be said of his conduct is that he scrupulously avoided contact with the striking employees ' and gave blind obedience to his attorney' s advice, much of which was based on an erroneous ` interpretation or understanding of the Labor Management Relations Act and Board decisions thereunder . On the other hand, the evidence of events which must be laid at the door of the Union and the striking employees presents a sordid picture of disregard of the law, violence , and misconduct, and their failure to compel or seek recognition by following through on the normal procedures of Board action available to them under the law. This requires some ADDITIONAL FINDINGS OF FACT At the very beginning of the strike the pattern or die was cast by an early morning intrusion on April 13, 1967, by two strikers at the home of Mary Ann Petrowski as she was getting -ready to go to work. Here I must observe quite emphatically that I regard Miss Petrowski as an absolutely credible witness and believe every word of her testimony. Bradford Hart, a striker whom she had previously "dated," came to her door and informed her that Leon Cristofano, another striker, wanted to talk to her in his car. It was parked slightly up the street and was not visible from her front door. She acceded to the request, walked up the street, got into the car, and was told by Cristofano "that if Joe [Bliss, the Employer] didn't recognize the union he would have 500 men down at Artcraft to damage the building. He said, `Can you imagine what 500 men can do to that building?' He also said that, `Joe Bliss's skull wouldn't be the first that the union had crushed .' " She was told that all the men were on the union side, that no - one was working and that "they would win because [Bliss'] attorney had no knowledge of the labor laws." She testified in addition, "They wanted someone on the inside working every day to give them information as far as what Joe's strategy would be." Additional remarks made to her were that they would picket every outside job Respondent had, that they were sorry for her and two other employees because they "would lose [their] jobs if [they] didn't go in with the union, didn't give in to the union." There was also a suggestion of blackmail related to Bliss' income tax return. She refused to agree to their demands because she had made her decision not to participate in the work stoppage. This was an omen and warning of things that were to come and did come. Any claim made that the events which followed have not been legally connected with the Union may not be upheld because, as was testified by a union representative, at all times it hacl one or more representatives present at the scene . Being present, it had knowledge of what was happening and should have but did not take steps to stop it. In fact, it was admitted that the union representatives encouraged some of the acts and that they engaged in a consistent pattern of following Respondent' s movements , whether by truck or automobile. Events such as happened here, to which reference will be made below , particularly when they are events which had not happened before, and which followed a warning such as had been given to Miss Petrowski, may not be disregarded and dismissed for lack of meticulous and technical common law proof or direct eye -witness connection. We are permitted to make reasonable inferences based on all of the facts and, when these inferences can be made, we may not disregard them if they are relevant to the proceeding. I am satisfied both by photographs in evidence and by the testimony of Bliss, which I credit notwithstanding the fact that there was some inconsistency between his testimony at the hearing and in the representation case on an unrelated matter, that numerous acts of violence and misconduct for which the Union and the strikers are responsible did occur . Before referring to these facts it may be well to note that Bliss had had a heart attack, was under the care of a physician, and his physical condition was known to all the employees because, only about two weeks before the beginning of the strike, he had left the hospital where he had been confined. On the very first day of the strike the strikers, in the presence of Maher, one of the union representatives, sought to prevent female employees from going to work. On that day the chain which controlled the raising and lowering of the garage door was cut and the door could not be operated . Respondent was thereby prevented from driving his truck in or out of the garage. During the strike soda pop bottles , cans, and other litter were strewn in front of Respondent's premises at places of egress, When the garage door was repaired and an effort was made to drive the truck out of the garage, the strikers, under Maher' s direction , made it a practice to stand or walk in groups in front of the garage so that the truck was prevented from being driven out by this human barrier. During the strike nails were placed under tires of various cars in front of Respondent's premises . Some of these nails caused at least one tire to be punctured. Another tire had been pierced by an instrument which could have been an ice pick . On one occasion , when Respondent's wife sought to take her car out of the garage after the door 742 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD chain had been repaired, the falling door almost struck it because bolts in the apparatus had been removed. The strikers engaged also in mass picketing. The police had to be called to contain this. Respondent caused his attorney to bring an action in the Court of Common Pleas of Alleghany County for an injunction restraining alleged unlawful acts. The complaint, answer, and a consent preliminary injunction have been received in evidence. The fact that the preliminary injunction was issued following the filing of the complaint is not res judicata of the facts therein alleged. Montgomery Building & Construction Trades Council v. Ledbedtter Erection Co., Inc., 344 U.S. 178. Nor is the fact that I have received these court papers in evidence proof of the facts therein alleged. They are, nevertheless, evidence of the fact that the court proceedings were brought and that the Union entered into the consent preliminary decree Inasmuch as no final judgment was entered in the court case, we may not base any finding of fact upon the facts as alleged in the papers. The consent decree, however, is acceptable evidence of what it provided It limited picketing to two pickets at each entrance, prohibited picketing at any entrance used only for residential tenants, prohibited blocking of ingress and egress and prohibited both the Union and individual strikers from authorizing, ratifying, permitting, or engaging in any proscribed conduct. The Union's attorney consented to the entry of this decree and the Union and all strikers became bound thereby. After it was entered Bliss affixed it to ^ the window of his premises but Union Representative DeSio scoffed at it and referred to it as only a piece of paper. Unlawful conduct continued even after the issuance of the decree to the extent that the Common Pleas judge found it necessary orally to warn the union representatives against continuing disregard of its provisions. Mass picketing continued Locks were stuffed with chewing gum. When Bliss' child went to school he was followed by union representatives. The strikers continued to walk in front of Bliss' truck and defied the possibility that they might be struck. On an occasion when Bliss sought to take a picture of what was happening Union Representative DeSio warned him that if he took one more picture DeSio would take the camera and strike him on the head. On another occasion, while Bliss' leadman sought to take a commercial vehicle out of his garage, the strikers tried to pull him out of it and almost yanked him into the street. The efforts to prevent trucks from leaving Respondent's premises were continued. Union Representatives DeSio and Maher warned Bliss' wife that they would not permit her to drive the truck out of the garage. Wherever Bliss went, even to the bank, he was followed and on at least one occasion by Union Representative Maher. A nonstriker's automobile, parked in front of Respondent's premises, was locked in by strikers' cars, making it impossible for him to get out. On one occasion, when DeSio and Maher sought to have egress by Bliss' truck blocked by one of the strikers, they instructed him to fall in front of it and make it appear that he was injured. Mysterious and unidentified telephone calls, never before received, started coming in on Respondent's telephone. The callers would hang up when the telephone was answered. Union Representative DeSio and strikers stood in front of Bliss' store window and thumbed their noses at persons in the store. Union representatives and about ten strikers engaged in a childish prank of standing across the street from Respondent's premises pointing in a group at those premises. On the occasion of Bliss' wife's birthday, as the birthday party was leaving to go to Bliss' car, a union representative, Bernard, followed the party across the street, for some unexplained purpose, in a manner that could have been regarded as a menacing gesture. When others of the party approached he stopped following them and returned to his car. One unidentified picket, when seeking to stop Bliss' truck from moving out of the garage on one occasion, stood in front of it in such a way that if Bliss -had continued he would have been struck This person taunted Bliss telling him that if he were knocked down or hurt he would wind up owning the building. On another occasion, a new man employed by Respondent was directed to install a fireplace but Union Representative DeSio called him and, after a conversation between them, the new man returned, took his tools, and went home. On another occasion, Union Representative Maher boarded Bliss' truck and refused to leave it, staying in it while Bliss drove it, going about his business. During this ride Maher told him, "you know there was a paint bomb thrown in your employee's house - in two of your employees' houses, and it did quite a bit of damage. You wouldn't want that to happen-to you." Paint bombs were in fact thrown into the houses of two employees. Damages to one of them amounted to from $800 to $1,000. There was extensive paint damage to furnishings and furniture. A big front plate glass window in the home of Respondent's leadman was broken. A window in Respondent's showroom also was broken when a bottle was thrown through it about 3 or 4 o'clock one morning Union Representative DeSio threw a cup of coffee into Bliss' face on one occasion. Respondent was prevented from getting delivery of merchandise needed for his business and was forced to rent a van and procure it himself On another occasion, when Respondent's truck was being moved out of the garage, Union Representative Maher stood alongside it and beat upon it "like a madman." This caused a big dent in the truck's hood. The foregoing recital is based on credible oral testimony given by Bliss. It is corroborated to a large extent by pictures in evidence which show blocking of trucks, group picketing or loitering, intrusions within the, confines of Respondent's premises, mockery, the broken store window, the punctured tire, the littering and garbage, and the paint bomb destruction, among other things. Leon Cristofano was called in rebuttal but no effort was made to refute Miss Petrowski's testimony and the threats, intimidation, warnings, and blackmail to which she testified must be deemed to be admitted. Union Representatives DeSio and Maher also were called in rebuttal. While they categorically denied some of the conduct, they conceded some of the events concerning which Bliss had testified although their interpretation of them was different. They disclaimed knowledge of or having seen other events. Their testimony has not persuaded me that the events to which Bliss testified did not transpire or that they did not transpire in the manner related by him. In fact, their manner on the witness stand suggests to me that they were of the opinion that whatever did happen was justifiable as the means whereby the recognition which they sought was to be attained. Respondent relies strongly on N.L.R.B. v. Indiana & Michigan Electric Company, 318 U.S. 9 (1943), which affirmed a decision of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals JOSEPH H. BLISS 743 (124 F.2d 50) remanding 20 NLRB 989, to the Board "to hear additional evidence as to a course of depredations, including dynamitings, committed, ii is alleged," by a union on company property during the pendency of the case. That case, however, is authority only for the principle of law that the Board must give consideration to union violence when evidence of it is offered in a Board proceeding. It is a matter of interest however that ten months after the Supreme Court's decision the Board, in an order dated November 20, 1943, vacated its original decision and dismissed the complaint. Indiana & Michigan Electric Company, 53 NLRB 991. Two relatively recent cases are more pertinent to the matters in issue here. In Herbert Bernstein, et al, d/b/a Laura Modes Company, 144 NLRB 1592, the Board refused to enter an order requiring Respondent, absent an election, to recognize and bargain with the union even though it found that respondent had failed to do so in violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. There the Board took note of the fact that a group of union members, not employed by Laura Modes invaded Laura Modes' premises, struck one of the partners in the face when he requested an employee to call the police, and "pushed around" that employee. The Board noted also that the union representative there, who had temporarily left the group, upon returning "ordered his adherents to stop the fracas, stating that the Union `did not want any of that sort of thing.' " Later, during the strike, an employee pointed out one of the partners to four men, "who thereupon proceeded to beat" that partner. A complaint charging the union with violation of Section 8(b)(1)(a) of the Act was filed. This caused the union to agree "to refrain from committing any act of the nature incorporated in the charges." The complaint was withdrawn and the union thereafter complied fully with the terms of the agreement. There was no recurrence of objectionable conduct. The Board said: .. [O]ur finding that the Respondents acted unlawfully prior to the Union's misconduct is not to be taken as condonation of the Union's subsequent resort to or sanction of violent acts in furtherance of its demand that the Respondents immediately recognize and bargain with it: An atmosphere of violence and intimidation can hardly be expected to produce Respondent's participation in reasoned discussion with union agents about the subjects of collective bargaining .... [Emphasis supplied.] We do not, however, deem it appropriate to give the Charging Union the benefit of our normal affirmative bargaining order in the circumstances of this case. For we cannot, in good conscience , disregard the fact that, immediately before and immediately after it filed the instant charges, the Union evidenced a total disinterest in enforcing its representation rights through the peaceful legal process provided by the Act in that it resorted to and /or encouraged the use of violent tactics to compel their grant. Our powers to effectuate the statutory policy need not, we think, be exercised so single-mindedly in aiming for remedial restoration of the status quo ante, that we must disregard or sanction thereby union enforcement of an employer's mandatory bargaining duty by unprovoked and irresponsible physical assaults of the nature involved here. We recognize of course that the employees ' right to choose the Union as their representative survives the Union's misconduct. But we believe it will not prejudice the employees unduly to ask that they demonstrate their desires anew in an atmosphere free of any possible trace of coercion. Taking note of the fact that the Union had agreed to refrain from misconduct and stating its belief that this agreement would afford the employees the desirable conditions necessary to make a free choice it said: We conclude that, in the particular circumstances of this case, the policies of the Act and the legitimate interests of the public and the parties will best be served by denying to the Union the right to invoke our statutory processes in aid of a demand for recognition as bargaining representative of Respondents' employees unless and until it demonstrates its majority among those employees through the Board's election procedures The other pertinent case is United Mineral & Chemical Corporation, 155 NLRB 1390, where the Board concluded that the violence was not of a nature sufficient to justify denial of the routine recognition and bargaining order and it required the employer to recognize and bargain with the Union. (A Trial Examiner of the Board, of course, is bound by the Board decision notwithstanding that the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, N.L R.B. v. United Mineral and Chemical Corp. 67 LRRM 2343 391 F.2d 829 (C.A. 2), denied enforcement of that portion of its order requiring the employer to recognize and bargain with the Union.) The Board in United Mineral & Chemical did not overrule or recede from the policy expressed in Laura Modes. It held merely that "the facts and conclusions set forth in Laura Modes are inapposite" to the circumstances of United Mineral. It pointed out that in Laura Modes the union did not wait to give the employer an opportunity to consult with his lawyer but, on the very next day, "beat up one of the owners . . . and `pushed around' a female office employee" and that this conduct was followed several days later by the beating of another partner. In United Mineral the Board took note of the fact that the Union in Laura Modes had exhibited a total disinterest in resorting to Board procedures and had resorted to or encouraged violence to obtain the same results. After noting its view of the Union's conduct in Laura Modes, the Board observed in United Mineral that the union petitioned for an election on April 22, the day after it made its initial demand for recognition, agreed to United's demand concerning the scope of the appropriate unit, and consistently offered to have its majority status determined by a variety of methods, only to be met from the very beginning with "Respondent's hostility to the Union, including discriminatory discharges and serious violations of Section 8(a)(1), and Respondent's use of dilatory tactics aimed at dissipating the Union's majority strength. The four or five instances of serious misconduct on the picket line during the 65-day strike primarily were attributable to [two employees], for whom reinstatement is not sought. These outbursts, moreover, took place in the heat of picket line tensions, and do not appear to be part of a plan of intimidation as is the case in Laura Modes." Under these circumstances the Board concluded that it would not refuse the usual affirmative bargaining order. Our case is not precisely the same as either Laura Modes or United Mineral but our facts are closer to those in Laura Modes. In some ways our case' would appear to be more serious. For example, in Laura Modes the union agreed and abided by its agreement not to engage in 0 744 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD further violence. In our case, although the Union's attorney had signed a consent preliminary injunction, it has never agreed before this Board and has never offered before this Board to refrain from violence or to endeavor to prevent violence. On the contrary, after the consent preliminary decree was signed, the union representatives flouted and mocked that decree and violence and unlawful conduct continued The Board, in United Mineral, referring to Laura Modes, observed that there had been "a plan of intimidation." What greater evidence of a plan of intimidation can there be than the threats, intimidation, and blackmail by Cristofano to Miss Petrowski conveyed for transmission to the employer and the paint bomb threat by Maher? In United Mineral, the Board took note of the numerous discriminatory discharges and violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act and, no doubt, weighed these as a factor to be considered ' in determining the remedy. As a matter of fact, even m Laura Modes, there were numerous violations of Section 8(a)(1). It hardly can be said that in our case any of the violence, intimidation, and threats were provoked in the slightest by the conduct of the Employer and this despite the uncredited testimony that the coffee-throwing incident mentioned above had been provoked or caused by Bliss and his wife. All that can be said in this case is that the Employer was not well advised. Not being well advised, he nevertheless acted in good faith in seeking to have certain legal questions determined. While this activity on his part and on the part of his attorney is not a defense to a charge of violation of Section 8(a)(5) it does not give license to the Union or the strikers to resort to violence to induce abandonment of such ill-advised efforts. I repeat what I have said above that in this case, save for the single violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) involving the unlawful refusal to recognize and bargain and the claimed discharges incident thereto (but shunned by the General Counsel), Respondent is guilty of no other violation of the Act. The Employer's questioning of jurisdiction, his position as to unit and his litigation of the persons to be -included therein cannot be the basis for finding antiunion animus. It may be argued that here, as in United Mineral, the Union in addition to its demand for recognition promptly, on the very date it was rejected, filed a petition for an election and that this is evidence that it did not indicate "any lack of interest in enforcing its statutory rights through the Board's processes, [but] zealously sought to do so." I am not so sure, in fact I doubt, that whatever zeal there might have been in filing the petition for recognition, that filing in the light of what happened here was a good-faith resort to the orderly processes afforded to labor unions and employees under the statute When the time finally came that an election could have been held, the Union only then, on September 5, 1967, filed its charge alleging violations of Section 8(a)(3) and (5) of the Act, which charge was amended December 12, 1967, to allege only the violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. In both charges the alleged violation was addressed to the refusal to recognize back on April 12. Simultaneously with the filing of the initial charge, the Union requested permission to withdraw its petition for certification of representatives Ordinarily, withdrawal of a petition for certification, whether it be before an election or after a union has lost an election, may be a perfectly reasonable and proper course of procedure. Under the circumstances of this case, where there has been no pattern of 8(a)(1) conduct and the instances of 8(a)(3) conduct charged were not prosecuted, I find nothing from which I would assume in the light of everything else that happened that the Union in this case had a genuine and continuing interest in having its statutory right to recognition enforced or determined by the Board's processes. Its filing of the petition for an election seems to me to have been merely lip service to Section 8(b)(7)(c) of the Act. In Laura Modes the Board found that there had been a violation of Section 8(a)(5) but made no provision in its Order with respect to it even 'though it restricted its dismissal of the complaint to allegations "as to which no specific finding of violations" had been made. In United Mineral, having found the violation and having distinguished, Laura Modes, it entered an affirmative Order requiring the employer to recognize and bargain with the union and, in addition, directed reinstatement for certain improperly discharged employees, together with other routine relief. As in Laura Modes, here "the legitimate interests of the public and the parties will best be served by denying to the Union the right to invoke [the Board's] processes in aid of a demand for recognition as bargaining representative of [Respondent's] employees unless and until it demonstrates its majority among those employees through the Board's election procedures" (page 1596). The General Counsel requests a reinstatement order here although there has been no proof that any employee either has applied for or been denied reinstatement or, in fact, is not at the present time working for the Respondent. Nevertheless, reinstatement is appropriate remedial action where a strike has been for the purpose of obtaining recognition wrongfully refused. It will be treated at greater length below. The General Counsel suggests further that, in view of Respondent's testimony that all the employees had been discharged on the first day of the strike, they should not only be offered reinstatement but be awarded "backpay from that date until such offer of reinstatement is made." The last of course is not consistent with Board law. "The employees were on strike at the time of their discharge. As they had not abandoned the strike and applied for reinstatement, we can see no justification for awarding them backpay while they were withholding their services irrespective of the fact that they were discharged. Our refusal to award backpay to striking employees is consistent with long-established Board principles and no sufficient reason appears in the particular circumstances of this case for deviating from those principles." Seaway Distributing, Inc, 143 NLRB 460. More recently see LTV Electrosystems, Inc., 169 NLRB No 64, and Hilton Mobile Homes, 155 NLRB 873. This matter of reinstatement requires some further consideration. While, in accordance with established Board principles as stated above, discharged strikers are entitled to backpay only from the time that they cease withholding their services and unqualifiedly request reinstatement, there is a question in this proceeding whether some of the employees should be denied reinstatement because of their misconduct. The proof in this connection has been rather general and only Bradford Hart and Leon Cristofano have been directly connected with serious misconduct. It was they who induced Miss Petrowski to enter Cristofano's car, there to be subjected to the threats, blackmail, and warning of the events to follow. While Hart did not take an active part in the conversation, he arranged it, sat in the car, and indicated by his conduct that he was in complete agreement with what Cristofano was saying. He was equally culpable with Cristofano. Cristofano, however, has been identified as JOSEPH H. BLISS one of the strikers who participated in misconduct. The proof as to other strikers actually named by Bliss is inadequate to establish that they engaged in that degree of misconduct to justify denying them reinstatement. For these reasons, only Hart and Cristofano will be excluded from the reinstatement requirement The others come within the rule of B.V.D. Company, Inc., 110 NLRB 1412, remanded sub nom International Ladies' Garment Workers Union v. N.L.R.B., 237 F.2d 545 (C.A.D.C.) Supplemental Decision, 117 NLRB 1455. It is argued also that there has been either condonation of the misconduct or abandonment of the claim. In this connection my attention has been directed to Respondent's letter of April 21, 1967, to the Pennsylvania Bureau of Employment Security. This letter is far from being evidence of condonation or abandonment. It makes repeated references to the Union's misconduct and to the fact that court action had been brought to restrain such conduct. The Respondent has complained consistently and persistently in every forum afforded to him, the Pennsylvania State Agency, the Pennsylvania State Court, and this Board. There just has been no condonation, acquiescence, or abandonment of the claim. It is suggested also that the misconduct in this case is negligible when compared to that in the Indiana & Michigan case, above cited. Can a quantitative standard be developed for the determination of when misconduct deserves no cognizance? If so, could such a quantitative evaluation be made without regard to proportion of damage and relative size of the person injured? We must not overlook the fact that here the misconduct was not, as was suggested in United Mineral, "in the heat of picket line tensions." Far from being the product of emotional flareups, spontaneous outbursts of temper, or responses to provocation, the misconduct here appears to have been calculated, deliberate, and the fulfillment of the promise made at the very beginning of the strike. In practically every instance, both at the Employer' s premises and at the homes of nonstriking employees, the misconduct was not on or associated with any legal picket line but was of a nature which implied premeditation. But, let us have a moment's look at this proposed quantitative assessment. True, in Indiana & Michigan three of the employer's transmission line poles were sawed off on September 5, 1939, and a transmission line tower was dynamited on September 8. This was followed by the dynamiting, on November 11, of another transmission line tower, on October 28 by the dynamiting of two transmission poles, on October 30 by the destruction of another transmission tower and, on November 23, by the destruction of two more transmission towers. All the transmission towers carried high voltage Imes and some were located along public highways or railroad tracks. These were high quantity damages indeed. They undoubtedly were greater than the damages sustained by our Respondent and his innocent employees In view, however, of the Board's description of Indiana's vast multistate business and its reference to its 1,000 employees (20 NLRB 991, 993, 994) it is not difficult to conclude here that the conduct and the results of the conduct in our case were as serious or more serious, both qualitatively and proportionally, than those in Indiana. We must not overlook that this one-man retail business with from 20 to 25 employees was operated out of a single store property which was part of Respondent's living quarters in the city of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and his entire gross business might have been about $300,000 a year. 745 With all the foregoing considerations in mind I have concluded that the order in this case- should be patterned after those in Laura Modes Company, 144 NLRB 1592, and LTV Electrosystems, Inc., 169 NLRB No. 64 Moreover, because Respondent, in the heat of the beginning of the strike, either impetuously discharged or made it appear that he discharged his employees because they went out on 'strike there should be a provision requiring him to cease and desist from such conduct. Because there is no convincing or substantial evidence that he has rejected the principles and concept of collective bargaining and because he has not engaged in any pattern of violations of Section 8(a)(l) of the Act, I have concluded that he should not be subjected to a broad form order requiring him to cease and desist from "in' any other manner" interfering with, restraining, or coercing his employees in the exercise of their rights under the Act. The following is my recommended ORDER Respondent, Joseph H. Bliss, doing business under the firm name and style of Artcraft Mantel and Fireplace Co., his agents, representatives, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Discharging any employees or making it appear that any employees have been discharged because they engage in or have engaged in a lawful strike or in other concerted activities for their mutual aid or protection. (b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing his employees in the exercise of their rights to self-organization, to form labor organizations, to join or assist any labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, or to engage in other concerted activities for the purposes of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from engaging in such activities, except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment, as authorized by Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, as modified by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959. 2. Take the following affirmative action: (a) Upon application, offer to all employees who participated in the strike which commenced April 12, 1967, and continued thereafter and who have not yet been reemployed, excepting however only Bradford Hart and Leon Cristofano because of their misconduct during the strike, immediate and full reinstatement to their former or substantially equivalent positions , without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges previously enjoyed, and make all such persons, whether already reemployed or to be reemployed, except Hart and Cristofano, whole for any loss of earnings they suffered or may have suffered from the date they unconditionally requested or the date when they will unconditionally request reinstatement by payment to them of a sum of money equal to that which they normally would have earned following the date of their unqualified request for reinstatement, less their net earnings during said period. Such backpay shall be computed on a quarterly basis in the manner established by the Board in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289, together with interest thereon at the rate of 6 percent per annum. Isis Plumbing and Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716. (b) Notify any and all of the said persons except Hart 746 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD and Cristofano if presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United States of their right to full reinstatement upon application in accordance with the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Training and Service Act, as amended, after discharge from the Armed Forces. (c) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all payroll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other records necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due to any employee. (d) Post at his premises, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix "' Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 6, after being signed by the Respondent, Joseph H. Bliss, shall be posted by him immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by him for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees customarily are posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (e) Notify the Regional Director for Region 6, in writing, within 20 days from the receipt of this Decision, what steps he has taken to comply herewith.' Except to the extent expressly found herein, all other allegations of violations set forth in the complaint shall be, and hereby are, dismissed. In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the notice. In the further event that the Board's Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision and Order." In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, this provision shall be modified to read - "Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order , what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith " APPENDIX NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, I hereby notify my employees that: I WILL NOT discharge or make it appear that any employees have been discharged because they engage in a lawful strike or in other concerted activities for their mutual aid or protection. I WILL NOT, in any like or related manner, interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist any labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, or to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any or all such activities. I WILL, upon application, offer all employees who participated in the strike which commenced April 12, 1967, and who have not yet been reemployed, except Bradford Hart and Leon Cristofano, immediate and full reinstatement to their former or substantially equivalent positions, without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges, and make all employees except Bradford Hart and Leon Cristofano, whole for any loss of earnings they suffered or may have suffered from the date they unconditionally requested or the date when they will unconditionally request reinstatement by payment to each of them of a sum of money in the manner provided in the Decision. All my employees are free to become or remain, or refrain from becoming or remaining, members of any labor organization. Dated JOSEPH H. BLISS, D/B/A ARTCRAFT MANTEL AND FIREPLACE CO. (Employer) (Sole Owner) Note: I will notify the above-designated employees if presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United States of their right to full reinstatement upon application in accordance with the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Training and Service Act, as amended, after discharge from the Armed Forces. This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. If employees have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions, they may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, 1536 Federal Building, 1000 Liberty Avenue, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15222, Telephone 644-2977.