172 NLRB 721
Technical Maintenance, Inc.
TECHNICAL MAINTENANCE, INC.
721
Technical
Maintenance,
Inc.
and
International
Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers, AFL-CIO,
Local 390. Cases 23-CA-2716 and 23-RC-2968
June 28, 1968
DECISION, ORDER, AND CERTIFICATION OF
REPRESENTATIVE
By CHAIRMAN MCCULLOCH AND MEMBERS FANNING
AND BROWN
On February 19, 1968, Trial Examiner Alba B.
Martin issued his Decision in the above-entitled
proceeding, finding that the Respondent had en-
gaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor
practices and recommending that it cease and de-
sist therefrom and take certain affirmative action,
as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Deci-
sion.
The Trial Examiner further found that
Respondent had not engaged in certain other unfair
labor practices alleged in the complaint and recom-
mended that such allegations be dismissed. The
Trial Examiner also recommended that the chal-
lenges to the ballots of Ernest Dean, Marvin Hogan,
K. C. Underwood, and James Sims be sustained and
'their ballots not be opened or counted and that the
challenge to the ballot of James L. Johnson be
overruled and his ballot be opened and counted. He
recommended that Respondent's objections to the
election in Case 23-RC-2968 be overruled and that
the election be held valid. Thereafter, the Respon-
dent filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Deci-
sion with a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this case to a three-
member panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no
prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are
hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Em-
ployer's objections, the Trial Examiner's Decision,
the exceptions and brief, and the entire record in
these cases and hereby adopts the findings,' conclu-
sions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner,
with the modifications hereinafter set forth.
1. We find merit in Respondent's exceptions to
the Trial Examiner's findings that James L. Johnson
was discriminatorily discharged in violation of Sec-
tion 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
Johnson was a Class B journeyman electrician on
Respondent's electrical construction crew under
Supervisor Hogan when laid off on June 2, 1967,
allegedly to meet a reduction on the work force
requested by Houston Chemical. During the week
before June 2, Hamill told Hogan that one of the
men in his crew would have to be terminated. On
about June 1, Hogan asked Hamil if he still wanted
a man taken off the job and Hamil replied, "yes."
Hamil inquired of Hogan whom he intended to
select, whereupon Hogan named Johnson, "as he
was the last man to come on the job." The follow-
ing day Hogan told Johnson that there was to be a
eduction in the work force, and, as Johnson was
the man with the least seniority, he would be
discharged.
Thereafter, during the evening of June 9, Tom
Robinson, administrative assistant to Respondent's
president, contacted Supervisor Dean and told him
that he was informed by Houston Chemical that
Respondent would be able to add another man to
the electrical maintenance crew. Robinson sug-
gested that Dean offer the job to Johnson as "we
had reduced him from the force, and the fact that
Houston Chemical wanted us to and so he knew the
plant, and I thought, well he would make a good
man to call back." Later that same evening, pur-
suant to Robinson's instruction, Dean telephoned
Johnson and offered him the job on his crew. John-
son wanted time to think about the offer and to
give some sort of notice to his new employer, and
responded that he would let Dean know his deci-
sion on Monday, June 12. At or about 10:30 Mon-
day evening Johnson called Dean to accept the job,
but Dean told him that the job had been filled as
Johnson was to have called him earlier that day.
Johnson replied that he had promised to call Dean
on Monday, that no specific time had been set, and
that Dean had promised to keep the job open until
Tuesday morning. Dean disputed all of this during
their telephone conversation and at the hearing.
Although the timing of Johnson's termination in
relation to his union activities and the demon-
strated union hostility of Respondent create a suspi-
cion of unlawful motivation, we are here con-
fronted with a record which plainly establishes that:
(1) Houston Chemical requested a reduction in the
work force in accordance with the terms of its con-
tract with Respondent; (2) Respondent, following
orders from Houston Chemical, discharged the
least senior member of the construction crew; and
(3) as of the close of the hearing, September 22, no
' In further support of the Trial Examiner 's finding that Dean , Hogan,
ployees
Cf
The Bama Company, 145 NLRB 1141 , 1143, Swan Super
and Underwood were supervisors within the meaning of the Act, we note
Cleaners, Inc , 152 NLRB 163, 168 , cnfd in pertinent part 384 F 2d 609
that the record establishes a disproportionate ratio of supervisors to super-
'C A 6).
visees if Howard Hamil , Houston Chemical 's liaison man with Respondent ,
2 See in . I, supra
be accepted as the sole person exercising supervision over the 24 cm-
172 NLRB No. 60
354-126 O-LT - 73 - pt. 1 - 47
722
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
person was hired to replace Johnson . Unlike the
Trial Examiner , we are not willing to say in these
circumstances that the Respondent 's lack of proof
of the necessity for a layoff at this particular time,
especially from Hogan 's crew , or as to why Johnson
was not immediately transferred to the electrical
maintenance crew , evidences a discriminatory mo-
tive in Johnson 's discharge . On the contrary, it is
clear on the record that Houston Chemical had ex-
press authority to require cutbacks of personnel,
and that , contractually , Respondent 's compensation
was based upon a percentage of direct labor costs.
Thus, Hamil 's instruction to Hogan to eliminate a
man on his crew was in accord with the expressed
authority granted to Houston Chemical and had the
economic effect of reducing Houston Chemical's
direct labor cost . Johnson was severed pursuant to
Respondent's policy of laying off the least senior
member of the crew , and the Respondent did not
hire a replacement for him on that crew . The fact
that Houston Chemical permitted Respondent to
add another employee to the electrical main-
tenance crew a week later does not establish that
such an opening was available on June 2, when
Johnson was terminated.
In addition to the above , we are not persuaded
that Respondent was aware of Johnson's activities
on behalf of the Union . Unlike the Trial Examiner,
we are unable to conclude that testimony to the ef-
fect that Dean told certain employees that he knew
who
had
signed
union
authorization
cards
establishes that Respondent was actually aware that
Johnson had even signed an authorization card, let
alone that he initiated the union movement and was
its principal proponent . Indeed , Dean 's statement
that he knew who had signed authorization cards
appears to have been erroneous , and he may not, in
fact, have known the identity of those employees
who actually signed cards . Thus, according to the
credited testimony of employee Villemez, Dean
stated to him "that he knew that there wasn't but
eight men that filled out these cards ," but the
record shows that more than eight cards had been
executed by the employees.
Against this background , we are also unwilling to
rely upon Dean 's treatment of Johnson on June 9
and 12 as determinative of an unlawful motive in
Respondent 's failure to reinstate Johnson. On the
contrary , the series of events , including the timing
of the offer of reemployment on Friday, June 9,
when Respondent first received instructions to hire
an employee ; the fact that the offer remained open
until the evening of Monday, June 12, and the
further fact that Johnson could have accepted the
offer at any time during that period , are consistent
with a lawful motive of attempting to reinstate an
employee who had been recently servered due to a
cutback . The dispute between Dean and Johnson
over the deadline for Johnson 's decision can best
be explained as a simple misunderstanding rather
than an unlawful tactic devised by Respondent to
avoid rehiring an active union adherent who was
lawfully discharged only a short time earlier. In
view of the above , and as it is clear that Respon-
dent followed Houston Chemical 's instructions and
also terminated Johnson according to Respondent's
policy of seniority , we find that General Counsel
has failed to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that Respondent 's
discharge
of,
and
failure to reinstate , Johnson was motiviated in
whole or in substantial part by union animus.
2. The parties stipulated , and we find , that the
following employees constitute a unit appropriate
for the purposes of collective bargaining within the
meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act:
All instrument and maintenance mechanics,
employed by Technical Maintenance , Inc., at
the
Houston
Chemical
Corporation
plant
located on Gulf States Road , Beaumont, Texas,
specifically including all first class electricians,
electrician leadmen ,3 electricians , electrician
helpers, apprentice electricians , first class in-
strument technicians , instrument leadmen, in-
strument fitters, instrument trainees , and in-
strument fitter helpers , but excluding all office
clerical employees, guards, watchmen , and su-
pervisors as defined in the Act.
Inasmuch as Johnson was lawfully discharged prior
to the election, the challenge to his ballot must be
sustained and it may not be opened and counted.
We note that , in any event , it could not affect the
results of the election . As we adopt the Trial Ex-
aminer 's recommendation to overrule the objec-
tions, and as the tally of the ballots shows that Peti-
tioner has received a majority of the valid votes
cast, we shall certify it as the exclusive bargaining
representative of the employees in the appropriate
unit
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the Recom-
mended Order of the Trial Examiner, as modified
below, and hereby orders that the Respondent,
3 Dean, Hogan, and Underwood are excluded from the unit, as they have
been found to be supervisors within the meaning of the Act
TECHNICAL MAINTENANCE, INC.
Technical Maintenance, Inc., Pasadena and Beau-
mont, Texas, its officers, agents, successors, and as-
signs, shall take the action set forth in the Trial Ex-
aminer's Recommended Order, as herein modified:
1. Delete paragraph l (a) of the Recommended
Order and renumber the subsequent paragraphs ac-
cordingly.
2. Delete paragraph 2(a) of the Recommended
Order and renumber the subsequent paragraphs ac-
cordingly.
3. Delete the words "in any other manner" from
the present paragraph 1(g) of the Recommended
Order and from the sixth indented paragraph of the
notice, and substitute therefor the words "in any
like or related manner."
4.
Delete the seventh and eighth indented para-
graphs of the notice.
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE
It is hereby certified that International Brother-
hood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO, Local 390,
has been designated and selected by a majority of
the employees in the appropriate unit as their
representative for the purposes of collective bar-
gaining, and that pursuant to Section 9(a) of the
Act, the said labor organization is the exclusive
representative of all such employees for the pur-
poses of collective bargaining with respect to rates
of pay, wages , hours of employment , and other con-
ditions of employment.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
ALBA B. MARTIN, Trial Examiner: This con-
solidated proceeding, with all parties represented,
was heard before this Trial Examiner in Beaumont,
Texas, on September 21 and 22, 1967, on com-
plaint
of the General Counsel and answer of
Technical Maintenance Inc., Respondent herein.'
The issues litigated were whether during an or-
ganizational campaign Respondent violated Section
8(a)(3) and (1) of the National Labor Relations
Act, as amended, 29 U.S.C. sec. 151, et seq., herein
called the Act, by interrogating and threatening
employees because of their union activities and by
other acts; and whether Respondent unlawfully
discharged and refused to reinstate, or lawfully laid
off, James Johnson. Also involved is whether an
election should be set aside on the grounds that the
Union offered economic inducements in return for
votes, and how some five determinative, challenged
ballots should be disposed of.
'The Union filed the original charge on May 18, 1967 It filed the
amended charge on June 6, 1967
It filed the second amended charge on
June 14, 1967
1 The following errors in the numbering of the pages of the transcript are
723
After the hearing the General Counsel and
Respondent filed helpful briefs, which have been
carefully considered.'
Upon the entire record and my observation of
the witnesses, I hereby make the following:
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
1.
THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
Technical Maintenance, Inc., Respondent herein,
is a Texas corporation having its principal office
and place of business in Pasadena, Texas, with
facilities located in the Beaumont, Texas, area
where it is engaged in the instrument service main-
tenance business. During the 12-month period prior
to the issuance of the complaint on August 1, 1967,
a representative period, Respondent purchased
goods and materials valued in excess of $50,000
from sources outside of Texas, which goods and
materials were shipped directly to Respondent in
Texas.
During the same period Respondent
received in excess of $50,000 for services per-
formed for customers located outside of Texas.
Respondent admitted, and I find, that at all times
material herein Respondent has been and is an em-
ployer engaged in commerce within the meaning "r
Section 2(6)and (7) of the Act.
II.
THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers,
AFL-CIO, Local 390, herein called the Union, is
and has been at all times material herein a labor or-
ganization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of
the Act.
III.
THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Setting
Involved herein is the group of approximately 24
employees who work for Respondent and perform
maintenance work on the electrical equipment at
Houston Chemical Corporation's plant in Beau-
mont They were unorganized prior to the events
herein. The employees' first contact with the Union
was in March 1967.3 A number of employees
signed union authorization cards in April and May,
which were received in the Board's Regional Office
on May 11, 1967.
Pursuant to the Union's petition the Union and
Respondent entered into a Stipulation for Certifica-
tion Upon Consent Election, Respondent signing
the stipulation on May 3 1, the Union on June 1,
and the Regional Director approving it on June 2.
At the election, held June 19, of 24 eligibles, 9
voted for the Union, 7 voted against the Union, and
hereby corrected Change p 222 to 221, change p 221 to 222 The trans-
cript is hereby further corrected as follows- p. 346,
1
20, change "set
aside" to "complied with", p 346,1 23, change "endorse" to "enforce
3 All events herein occurred in 1967
724
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
5
ballots were challenged. These included the
Union's challenge of the ballots of Ernest Dean,
Marvin
Hogan, and K. C. Underwood on the
ground that they were supervisors.
B. The Supervisory Status of Dean, Hogan, and
Underwood
At the time of the events herein Ernest Dean,
Marvin Hogan, and K. C. Underwood were the only
ones having any supervisory authority over, and
were Respondent's highest paid men in ,' Respon-
dent's crew at the Beaumont plant of Houston
Chemical Corporation. The approximately 24 em-
ployees worked in three groups. Some six worked in
electrical maintenance under Dean. Some three
worked in electrical construction under Hogan.
Some 15 worked in instrument maintenance under
Underwood. Respondent contended that Dean,
Hogan, and Underwood were leadmen. The
General Counsel contended they were supervisors
within the meaning of the Act.
Decision as to their status is complicated by the
close
relationship
between
Respondent
and
Houston Chemical Corporation, a separate cor-
poration, and by the anomalous authority of one
Howard Hamil with the two corporations.
Respondent and Houston Chemical were parties
to a written contract which provided that Respon-
dent was an independent contractor. Respondent's
compensation, subject to additions and deductions
provided in the contract, was to be 29 percent of
direct labor costs under $100,000 plus 27 percent
of any portion over that amount. Thus, Houston
Chemical as well as Respondent had a vital interest
in the labor costs of the job. The contract and its
amendments set forth the job classifications and
hourly wage rates of employees, and provided that
Respondent "shall keep on the work, during its pro-
grams, such competent superintendent and such
necessary assistants ... as may be requested or ap-
proved by the Owner (Houston Chemical) all of
whom shall be acceptable to the Owner."This con-
tract and its amendments are herein referred to as
the contract.
Prior to March 1967, Howard Hamil was on
Respondent's payroll and was without question on
the record Respondent's top man on the job. In
March Hamil went over to the payroll of Houston
Chemical, and thereafter Respondent's top men on
the job were Dean, Hogan, and Underwood. Some
testimony
described
Hamil
as
thereafter
Houston Chemical's liaison man with Respond-
ent. Other testimony suggested that the change of
payroll made no change in Hamil's functions. One
witness testified a group of employees were told of-
ficially that Dean's authority would increase and
would cover all Respondent's employees.
Dean, Hogan, and Underwood used an office in a
corner of the maintenance shop where each had a
mailbox with his name on it. Before and after his
change
of payrolls each morning Hamil put
Houston Chemical's written work orders for the
three crews in the respective boxes. Dean and
Hogan determined which of the men under them
performed which
assignment .
Underwood's men
were more or less permanently assigned to certain
areas of the plant and the assignments to each area
were given to the respective man by Underwood.
Dean, Hogan, and Underwood see that the work is
performed in accordance with the orders and on
schedule. They make out necessary work reports.
They do the paperwork involved in the termination-
of employees. They give safety talks to their crews.
Dean initials the timecards every day. Employees
ask them for time off and for raises, and for help on
the job when needed. They were sometimes
referred to in the evidence as foremen. According
to the credited testimony of employee J. F. Wise,
Jr., who impressed me as a very credible witness,
Underwood told him shortly before the hearing that
Underwood made $4.25 an hour and that his addi-
tional 35 cents an hour over Wise's $3.90 hourly
rate was because Underwood was a foreman. Dean,
Hogan, and Underwood wear gray khaki pants and
shirts which they have laundered themselves. The
employees are issued blue coveralls and other work
clothes and a $2-per-week laundry fee is deducted
from their wages. The record established that when
employees were issued uniforms and other working
equipment for the first time and/or in replacement
of lost items, they had to have the list of needed
items signed or initialed by Dean, Hogan, or Un-
derwood before Houston Chemical would issue
them.
In addition to the above, the record demon-
strated the exercise of supervisory authority by
Dean, Hogan, and Underwood.
According to the credited testimony of employee
Mercer, who impressed me as a credible witness,
twice, in March or April and in August,
Dean
warned him about his absenteeism. Dean told him
that if Mercer could not be depended upon he
would have to let him go. The second time, in Au-
gust, Mercer was about 2 minutes late at 7 a.m.
Dean told him that if he was late again Dean would
give him 3 days off, and that if it occurred again
after that, Mercer would be fired. Mercer's version
included no mention of Hamil. Dean admitted giv-
ing Mercer these warnings, but testified that he al-
ways told the employee he was warning that Hamil
had told Dean to warn him. As on the entire record
this seems highly unlikely to me, and as Mercer was
a credible witness, I credit Mercer's testimony and
find that Dean did not, in warning Mercer these
two times, make any mention of Hamil. This warn-
' These three men testified they were leadmen, and the contract's hourly
rate for leadmen was $4 55 The next highest classification was paid $3 90
per hour
TECHNICAL MAINTENANCE, INC.
725
ing of Mercer, which involved the authority to
discipline,
required
the
use
of independent
judgment.
In addition Dean hired one Jerry Tupes as an
electrician. He asked his employees if they knew of
someone who wanted a job. There was no evidence
that prior to this he had discussed the need of
another employee with Hamil. When an employee
suggested the name of Tupes, Dean directed that
Tupes come in. When he did, Dean administered a
mechanical test and a written test to Tupes. Dean
testified he showed the written test to Hamil, who
then talked to Tupes and told Dean to hire him.
Dean did so. All this occurred in May 1967 when
Hamil was working for Houston Chemical Corpora-
tion. Hamil appears not to have examined Tupes'
mechanical test. On this evidence and upon the en-
tire record, I find that Dean took the initiative to
hire a man, found the man, administered the test to
him, got Houston Chemical's approval of the man
in accordance with the contract, and then hired
him. It was Dean who hired Tupes, as contended by
the General Counsel, and Hamil approved the ac-
tion on behalf of Houston Chemical. In addition
Dean was present when Hamil hired two em-
ployees, Johnson and Sims, and, as is seen below,
when Respondent was considering rehiring Johnson
after his layoff, Dean used independent judgment
about giving Johnson a period of time to make up
his mind.
Underwood effectively recommended the hire of
one Newman to the president of Respondent, Mr.
McCrocklin. Underwood and Newman had previ-
ously worked together. Underwood testified that
President McCrocklin said that since Underwood
knew Newman's abilities he should have him take
the test. Underwood then had Newman come in, fill
out an application, and take a test. Underwood
testified that Hamil came over, picked up the test,
took it to his office, and wrote "good" on top of it.
Then, according to Underwood, Hamil told him to
hire Newman and Underwood did so. Underwood
admitted he recommended Newman, but testified
that Newman was hired on his showing of the test
and not because of Underwood's recommendation.
However, Newman would not even have taken the
test if, at Newman's request, Underwood had not
taken the initiative to see if there was a job opening
and if Newman could be considered for it. I find on
all these facts and upon the entire record that Un-
derwood effectively recommended the hire of New-
man and that doing so required the use of indepen-
dent judgment.
Underwood also discharged one Coleman.
Several days before the June 19 election, after a
heated argument, Underwood discharged Coleman
and, according to the credited testimony of Wise,
when Underwood escorted Coleman to the gate
both were "fuming mad." That evening Underwood
told Wise, according to the latter's credible and un-
contradicted testimony, that he had nothing per-
sonal against Coleman but that he was not going to
have a man in his crew who gave him such backtalk
as Coleman had given him, and that that was why
he let him go. Wise's version included no mention
of Hamil. Underwood testified that Hamil had
previously told him that the next time Coleman
became argumentative he wanted him terminated.
By this statement Houston Chemical indicated that
the next time Coleman became argumentative the
latter would be no longer "approved" or "ac-
ceptable" to Houston Chemical under the contract.
Underwood thereafter discharged Coleman and in
doing so used independent judgment in deciding
that Coleman would no longer be acceptable to
Houston Chemical.
As is seen below it was Hogan who selected
Johnson for severance on June 2, an act which
required the use of independent judgment.
Upon the above facts and considerations, and
upon the preponderance of the evidence in the en-
tire record considered as a whole, I hold that Dean,
Hogan, and Underwood have authority in the in-
terest of Respondent to hire and discharge em-
ployees or effectively to recommend such action, to
warn and discipline employees, and responsibly to
direct employees in their work; also that Dean and
Hogan have authority to assign employees; and that
the exercise of such authority requires the use of in-
dependent judgment. Under these circumstances
they were supervisors within the meaning of the
Act and Respondent was responsible for any viola-
tions of the Act committed by them. Even if they
were not supervisors, Respondent was responsible
for their actions because it held them out to em-
ployees as Respondent's top persons on the job and
the only ones having any authority at all over em-
ployees. The employees look upon them as super-
visors; they exercise general authority over the em-
ployees and were in a strategic position to translate
to their subordinates the policies and desires of
Respondent. Cf. I.A.M. v. N.L.R.B., 311 U.S. 72,
79-81.
C. Interference, Restraint, and Coercion
A few days after the filing of ti,. )etition on May
11,5 Supervisor Dean called at lea
hree employees
individually into the supervisor's c ffce, and, after
talking to each about a "call out" problem the
previous weekend, proceeded to interfere into, and
to make economic threats concerning, the em-
ployees' union activities. The latter was clearly one
of the reasons for the interviews.
As credibly testified by James Sims, Dean told
him that he knew about the union movement going
on among the men, and that he knew the names of
those who had signed cards. Dean said one group of
I take official notice that in Case 23-RC-2968 the Union filed the peti-
tion on May I I and that it is the practice of the Board 's Regional Offices to
advise companies immediately when petitions are filed involving them
726
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the Company's employees, such as just this main-
tenance group, could not " go union " but only all
the Company's employees together. He said that no
one would think badly of them if they went down to
the union hall and asked to get their cards back. He
added he would be willing to help anyone who
helped him. Dean also threatened that if the men
"went union" Respondent would probably lose its
contract
with
Houston Chemical and the men
would be out of a jobs
As credibly testified by Claude Villemez, Dean
told him that there had been discussions in the
plant "about passing out these cards" and he knew
that Villemez had signed a card. Dean said he once
had signed a union authorization card and had later
turned it in, and that there was an instrument man
who had a card and he had taken it back. Dean said
there was "no way we could work out here and still
go union," that the Company could not afford to
pay "the high wages that the Union makes" and
that "the insurance rate is very high and they just
couldn't afford to pay it if we went union." Dean
said he knew that not more than eight had signed
cards. Villemez replied that over half the em-
ployees had signed cards, Dean threatened that if
they did not "drop all this union activity that they
were going to have to crack down on things like
coffee
breaks
and taking pretty long coffee
breaks," and they were going to have to start
cracking down on men who had cigarettes in their
pockets-contrary to the rules.
In his individual interview with Alvin Mercer, Su-
pervisor Dean told Mercer he knew the names of
the men who had signed the cards. He asked
Mercer if he had read the bylaws of the Union.
Supervisor Dean admitted calling Sims, Villemez,
and Mercer into the office, admitted telling the
men he had heard they were in the Union, admitted
that he "just asked them about it"; but denied most
of the specific statements and questions attributed
to him by the three employee witnesses. Dean in-
dicated that he had heard talk about a union in the
lunchroom; but this fact, if true, would not have
justified him in interrogating individual employees
about it.
As the three employee witnesses impressed me as
credible witnesses, and as, by his testimony con-
cerning his and Hamil's duties, Dean appeared to
me not to be telling the whole truth, I credit the
testimony of Sims, Villemez, and Mercer. By inter-
rogating and interfering with employees concerning
their union activities, by impliedly soliciting em-
ployees to withdraw their union authorization
cards, by threatening that if the Union came in
Respondent would probably lose its contract with
Houston Chemical and the employees would lose
their jobs, and by threatening that if the employees
6 Respondent urged that the threat that Respondent would lose its con-
tract with Houston Chemical if the Union came in was improbable because
it was inconsistent with a rumor in the plant that another union then
negotiating with Houston Chemical for its employees was trying to oust
did not stop their union activity Respondent would
stop or curtail coffeebreaks and start cracking
down on employees who have cigarettes in their
pockets, Dean revealed his hostility to the Union
and Respondent interfered with, restrained, and
coerced employees in the exercise of their rights
according to Section 7 of the Act, Respondent
thereby violating Section 8( a)(I).
Sims, Villemez, and Mercer testified that the
Union was discussed rather freely in the lunchroom
and that Dean was sometimes present during the
discussions. Under these circumstances it is unlike-
ly, and I do not find as contended by the General
Counsel, that Dean's telling these employees that
he knew who and how many had signed union cards
reasonably tended to create the impression of sur-
veillance.
The General Counsel contended that it was a
further violation of Section 8(a)(1) when Super-
visor Dean told Villemez that Respondent could
not afford to pay union wages and insurance rates.
Rather it appears to me, and I find, that these state-
ments were views, arguments , or opinions protected
under Section 8(c) of the Act.
On about May 24, according to the credited
testimony of Joel Girolamo, a credible witness, Su-
pervisor Marvin Hogan told Girolamo that Respon-
dent had received a letter from the Union and that
they probably would not get any more
raises.
Hogan added that Houston Chemical would
probably break its contract with Respondent and
that "we could lose our jobs."
Hogan admitted asking his crew of employees
what benefits they expected to get out of being
unionized. When one employee replied, to have a
permanent job, Hogan allegedly replied that there
was no such thing as a permanent job and that
Houston Chemical could terminate the contract at
any time for any reason. Hogan did not remember
but did not deny saying that if the Union came in
the employees would get no more raises. Hogan
testified, improbably as it seems to me, that without
using the word "union" he told Girolamo that if
anything came up that would cause Respondent not
to be able to take care of the work, Houston
Chemical would probably break the contract.
On the preponderance of the evidence in this
record it seems probable to me, and I find, that the
conversation between Hogan and Girolamo oc-
curred substantially as testified by Girolamo, with
Hogan referring to a letter from the Union and fol-
lowing it with the quoted threats. Also, Hogan's ad-
mitted interrogation as to expected benefits from
unionism , followed by his statement that Houston
Chemical could break the contract at any time,
reasonably tended to interfere with, restrain, and
coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
Respondent and to take over its maintenance function for Houston Chemi-
cal employees But Respondent 's contract with Houston Chemical was can-
celable at the will of Houston Chemical and it does not seem improbable to
me on this record that Dean would make such a threat
TECHNICAL MAINTENANCE, INC.
guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. By these threats
and this interrogation Respondent further violated
Section 8 (a)(1) of the Act.
D The Unlawful Discharge and Refusal To
Reinstate James L. Johnson
James L. Johnson worked for Respondent from
November 1966 until Supervisor Hogan told him
on June 2, 1967, that he was laid off in a reduction
in force because he was the lowest man in seniority.
He was the only one severed. Just a week later, on
July 9, Respondent offered him another job in Su-
pervisor Dean's crew and gave him until a certain
time to let it know his answer. When he later called
and accepted, Dean told him he was too late and
that the job had been given to another man.
Johnson was the employee who made the original
contact with the Union in March, who started talk-
ing up the Union among the employees, and who
originally got authorization cards from the Union
and passed them out to employees for signatures
and returned the cards to the Union. Johnson
signed his own authorization card on April 21.
Johnson testified he returned some six signed cards
to the Union. The Union's assistant business
manager put the figure at 13. Although after John-
son's beginning several other employees also got
one or more cards signed, none got as many signed
as Johnson. The cards were signed and turned into
the Union prior to May 11, when the signed cards
were turned over to the Board's Regional Office by
the Union and the Union filed the petition.
Supervisor Dean knew, as has been seen above
and as he stated to Mercer, Sims, and Villemez,
that each of these employees had signed cards for
the Union, and he knew who else had signed up. It
follows that Respondent knew that Johnson also
had signed up. Johnson was responsible for the sig-
ning up of Sims, Villemez, and Mercer, the only
three employees shown by the record to have been
called in by Dean. From this circumstance and the
fact that there were only 24 employees in the
plant,' I conclude also that Dean knew that John-
son started the union movement and was its prin-
cipal proponent.
Johnson was severed June 2, some 3 weeks after
the filing of the petition, and just as the parties had
entered into a Stipulation for Certification Upon
Consent Election: Respondent's attorney signed the
stipulation May 3 1, the Union signed it June 1, and
the
Regional Director approved it June 2. The
stipulation set the election for June 19, just 17 days
away. As the Board knows, and as Respondent
could not have failed to know, severing the prin-
cipal union promoter shortly before the election
and at the same time that word of the setting of the
election would be reaching the employees would
' See the recent discussion of the "small plant doctrine " by the Fifth Cir-
cuit, enforcing the Board 's Order in a case involving a plant of 100 em-
ployees
N L R B v Joseph Antell, Inc , 358 F 2d 880, enfg
Malone
727
have had the inevitable effect of discouraging em-
ployees' support for the Union and the likely effect
of defeating the Union at the election.
Although Supervisor Hogan told Johnson on
June 2 that he was being laid off in a reduction in
force, Johnson credibly testified without contradic-
tion that there was no slacking of work during the
few days prior to his severance and that "we were
working."
In its defense Respondent offered no proof of the
necessity for a layoff at this time, or why the al-
leged layoff was from Hogan's crew, rather than
from the larger crews of Underwood and Dean. Its
evidence, through Hogan, was that a week before
June 2 Hamil told Hogan to let one man go from
his crew. No reason was given. Hogan did not do so
for a week, and the record contained no reason for
his delay. Then, according to Hogan, on about June
1, Hogan asked Hamil if he still wanted a man
taken off and Hamil replied ir, the affirmative.
Hamil told Hogan to select the man and Hogan
selected Johnson. Johnson was the last hired in
Hogan's crew but was not shown to have been the
last hired of Respondent's then approximately 24
employees.
Equally
unexplained
was why a week later
Respondent suddenly reversed itself and offered
Johnson another job in a different crew , in Dean's
crew. There was no showing that a job had sud-
denly opened up in Dean 's crew and no explanation
as to why, if in fact work was slacking off for
Hogan's crew a week before, a qualified employee
had not then been transferred from Hogan's crew
to Dean's crew. Respondent's evidence was that on
the evening of Friday, June 9, Tom Robinson, ad-
ministrative assistant to Respondent's president and
a relative of Respondent's president, telephoned
Dean, told him that Respondent was able to put on
another man in his crew (not that it needed a man),
and suggested he offer the job to Johnson. Robin-
son testified that he had been told by "Houston
Chemical that we would be able to add on people,
another man," in the electrical maintenance group.
To be noted is that Robinson did not testify that
Houston Chemical said a man was needed. Asked
why he selected Johnson for the new job Robinson
replied, "because we had reduced him from the
force, and the fact that Houston Chemical wanted us
to and so he knew the plant, and I thought, well, he
would make us a good man to call back." (Emphasis
supplied.)
Thus Respondent's defense seems to contend
that Hamil, then working for Houston Chemical but
continuing to make decisions that vitally affected
Respondent's employees, directed the layoff of a
man but not what man, and then a week later
Houston Chemical gave Respondent permission to
hire a certain man, Johnson. Respondent's defense
Knitting Company, 152 NLRB 643 See also Hesmer Foods, Inc, 161
NLRB 485
728
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
could possibly have been proven by calling Hamil
to the witness stand, but Respondent did not call
him and he was not shown to have been unavaila-
ble. As the record stands there is no direct proof as
to why Hamil and/or Houston Chemical took the
actions they allegedly did.
A plausible explanation for the offer of another
assignment to Johnson so soon after his severance
was that in the meantime, on June 6, the Union
filed the amended charge alleging that Johnson's
severance was an unfair labor practice and Respon-
dent was immediately apprised of that fact;" and
that Houston Chemical and Respondent decided to
take Johnson back rather than contest the matter
and in order to toll backpay in the event the charge
was found to have merit . If this was Respondent's
objective it failed in that objective because of
Dean's treatment of Johnson in connection with
the offer.
According to the credited testimony of Johnson,
who impressed me as a credible witness, when
Dean telephoned him on Friday, June 9, at or about
10:30 p. m. and offered him the job, Dean told him
that he wanted a yes or no answer right then. John-
son replied that he could not give him a yes or no
answer, that he wanted time to think about it, and
also that he would have to give some sort of notice
to his new employer . Dean asked when he could let
him know. Johnson replied, the following Monday.
Dean said he would hold the job open until
Tuesday morning, June 13. About 10:30 Monday
night, June 12, Johnson called Dean and told him
he had decided to take the job. Dean replied that
the job was filled, that Johnson was to have called
him on Monday morning. Dean said he had given
the job to a man from Mississippi and that he had
expected to hear from Johnson Monday morning.
Johnson replied that he had promised to call Dean
on Monday, that a specific time had not been set,
and that Dean had promised to hold the job open
until Tuesday morning . Dean disputed this.
Dean testified in substance that in the Friday
conversation Dean had told Johnson to let him
know by Monday at dinnertime and that Monday
night after dinner Dean called Tom Robinson and
told him that Dean had not called back, and Robin-
son replied that Dean should "go on ahead and tell
Howard ( Hamil ) that he had somebody else." On
credibility grounds I credit Johnson as to when he
was to call Dean back.
From Dean 's treatment of Johnson on June 9 and
12 I conclude that the offer of a job was tainted and
was no longer a bona fide offer such as would toll
any backpay. Firstly, it was unreasonable for Dean
to demand and expect an immediate yes or no
answer at 10:30 p.m. Secondly, when Dean did not
hear from Johnson Monday by the time Dean al-
leged was set, he hastened to report Johnson's al-
leged failure to Robinson rather than first phoning
Johnson to seek his answer. Thirdly, when later that
Monday night Dean learned that Johnson wanted
the job and disputed when he was to have let Dean
know, Dean made no effort to contact Robinson to
explain the situation and see if Johnson could have
the job. As Dean was hostile to the Union, as found
above, and as Dean knew that Johnson had signed a
union card and was the principal proponent of the
Union, as found above, and as no other reason than
antiunion considerations appears for Dean's treat-
ment of Johnson, I conclude on the preponderance
of the evidence that Supervisor Dean handed the
job offer to Johnson as he did on June 9 and 12,
because of Johnson's union activities, in order to
bar Johnson from returning to Respondent's em-
ploy, in order to discourage further employee sym-
pathy and support for the Union, and to defeat the
Union at the upcoming June 19 election. The tim-
ing of Johnson's orginial severance, just as the date
of the election was being set, 17 days hence, the
fact that he was selected for severance by Super-
visor Hogan, whose union hostility was demon-
strated in the record, the fact that he was never re-
called to the same job or ever reinstated to any job,
the unconvincing nature of Respondent's defense
including the offer of another job tainted by Super-
visor Dean's hostility to the Union, and the prepon-
derance of the evidence in the entire record con-
sidered as a whole proved, and I find, that Respon-
dent discharged Johnson on June 2 and has since
then failed to reinstate him because of his union ac-
tivities, in order to discourage further employee
sympathy and support for the Union, and in order
to
defeat the Union at the June 19 election,
Respondent thereby violating Section 8(a)(3) and
(I) of the Act.
IV. THE CHALLENGED BALLOTS AND
RESPONDENT'S OBJECTIONS TO CONDUCT
AFFECTING THE RESULTS OF THE ELECTION
At the election the Union challenged the ballots
of Dean, Hogan, and Underwood on the ground
that they were supervisors. Supervisors were ex-
cluded from voting in the Stipulation for Cer-
tificarition Upon Consent Election executed by the
parties. As they were in fact supervisors within the
meaning of the Act they were not entitled to vote.
The challenges to these three ballots should be
sustained , and these three ballots should not be
opened and counted.
At the election the Company challenged the bal-
lots of James L. Johnson and James Sims on the
ground that they were no longer working for it.
This was true as to Sims, who was discharged in
early June , and whose ballot should not be opened
' I take official notice that the Board 's Regional Offices send copies of
charges to the charged party as soon as clerically possible after they are
filed
TECHNICAL MAINTENANCE, INC.
729
or counted. As Johnson had been unlawfully
discharged and would otherwise have been still em-
ployed on election day, his ballot should be opened
and counted.
Respondent filed timely objections to the elec-
tion alleging that between the petition and the elec-
tion the Union offered economic inducements to
the employees, such as waiver of initiation fees
and/or reduction of initiation fees and/or member-
ship in the Union conditioned upon said employees
voting for the Union. The record contains not a
scintilla of evidence that the Union offered to waive
initiation fees, offered to reduce initiation fees, or
offered free membership in the Union to the em-
ployees in return for the employees' voting for the
Union.
The record contains no proof of any
economic inducements of any kind made to the em-
ployees by the Union.
In its brief Respondent urged that "the record
shows that the initiation fees of the Union were
reduced from $8 for a `BA' member to $4." The
record showed that initiation fees were set by the
Union's bylaws, and that initiation fees varied with
different classifications of journeymen and depend-
ing upon whether the new member chose to par-
ticipate in the Union's insurance and pension plans.
Concurrent with the organizing period the bylaws
were being changed, affecting the amounts of the
initiation
fees. The changes, not shown in the
record, were approved by the Union' s International
office on April 11 and were put into effect by the
Local on July 1, according to the Union 's assistant
business agent. The latter testified that the initia-
tion fee for a "BA" maintenance journeyman was
$8. Employee Mercer testified he thought he was a
BA member and that his initiation fee, paid after
the election about July 6, when he received his
membership card, was $4. None of the other em-
ployees received their membership cards or paid
their fees, insofar as the record showed, prior to the
election.
Above is all the record evidence on this point. It
does not show any inducement in return for votes,
and does not show any reduction of initiation fees
in return for votes. The Local accepted members
from other companies than Respondent and any
changes in initiation fees presumably related to
them as well as to employees of Respondent. The
record did not show why any changes in initiation
fees were made during this period or what changes
were made. Certainly it did not prove any changes
were made to influence the election herein or that
any inducements were made to that effect. Under
all these circumstances I recommend that the ob-
jections to the election be overruled and that the
election stand.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in
the unfair labor practices set forth above, I recom-
mend that it cease and desist therefrom and that it
take certain affirmative action designed to effectu-
ate the policies of the Act.
Respondent having unlawfully discharged James
L. Johnson because of his actual or suspected union
activities and because of the other reasons stated
above, and not having reinstated him, I recom-
mend that Respondent make a bona fide offer to
Johnson of immediate and full reinstatement to his
former or substantially equivalent position 9 without
prejudice to his seniority and other rights and
privileges and make him whole for any loss of pay
he may have suffered by reason of the discrimina-
tion against him by payment to him of a sum of
money equal to that which he normally would have
earned as wages from the date of his discharge,
June 2, 1967, the date of the discrimination against
him, to the date when, pursuant to the recommen-
dations herein, Respondent shall offer him rein-
statement, less his net earnings during said period
(Crossett Lumber Co., 8 NLRB 440, 497-498), said
backpay to be computed on a quarterly basis in the
manner established by the Board in F.
W.
Wool-
worth
Company,
90 NLRB 289. The backpay
obligation of Respondent shall include the payment
of interest at the rate of 6 percent to be computed
in the manner set forth in Isis Plumbing & Heating
Co., 138 NLRB 716. As provided in the Woolworth
case, I recommend further that Respondent make
available to the Board, on request, payroll and
other records in order to facilitate the checking of
the amount of the backpay due.
In the light of the entire record, I recommend a
broad cease-and-desist order.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact
and the entire record in the case, I make the follow-
ing:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Technical Maintenance, Inc., of Pasadena and
Beaumont , Texas, is engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. International Brotherhood of Electrical Wor-
kers, AFL-CIO, Local 390, is a labor organization
within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By discriminating in regard to the hire and
tenure
of employment
of James L .
Johnson,
thereby discouraging membership in the above-
named Union , Respondent has engaged in and is
engaging in unfair labor practices within the mean-
ing of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
4. By interrogating and interfering with em-
ployees concerning their union activities, by solicit-
ing the withdrawal of union authorization cards, by
threatening loss of jobs if the Union came in, by
threatening that if employees did not stop their
union activity Respondent would stop or curtail
coffeebreaks and stop permitting employees to
' The Chase National Bank of the City of New York, San Juan , Puerto Rico
Branch , 65 NLRB 827
730
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
have cigarettes in their pockets, by threatening that
since Respondent had received a letter from the
Union the employees would get no more raises,
Houston Chemical would probably break its con-
tract with Respondent, and the employees could
lose their jobs, and by other acts, Respondent has
engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices
within the meaning of Section 8(a)( I) of the Act.
5. The aforesaid labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact
and conclusions of law, and upon the preponde-
rance of the evidence in the entire record con-
sidered as a whole, I recommend that Technical
Maintenance, Inc., of Pasadena and Beaumont,
Texas, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Discouraging
membership in International
Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers,
AFL-CIO,
Local 390, or any other labor organization of its
employees, by discriminating in regards to their
hire or tenure of employment or any term or condi-
tion of employment.
(b) Interrogating employees concerning their
union activities, sympathies, and expectations.
(c) Soliciting employees to withdraw their union
authorization cards.
(d) Threatening that if the Union came in
Respondent would probably lose its contract with
Houston Chemical and the employees would lose
their jobs.
(e) Threatening that if employees did not stop
their union activity Respondent would stop or cur-
tail coffeebreaks and start cracking down on em-
ployees who have cigarettes in their pockets.
(f) Threatening that since
Respondent had
received a letter from the Union the employees
would get no more raises, Houston Chemical would
probably break its contract with Respondent, and
the employees could lose the jobs.
(g) In any other manner interfering with,
restraining , or coercing its employees in the exer-
cise of their rights to self-organization, to form
labor organizations, to join or assist International
Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers,
AFL-CIO,
Local 390, or any other labor organization, to en-
gage in concerted activities for the purposes of col-
lective bargaining or other mutual aid or protec-
tion, or to refrain from any and all such activities.
2. Take the following affirmative action, which I
find will effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Make a bona fide offer of reinstatement to,
and make whole, James L. Johnson for any loss of
pay he may have suffered by reason of the dis-
crimination practiced against him, in accordance
with the recommendations set forth in "The
Remedy" herein.
(b) Post at its offices in the Houston Chemical
plant in Beaumont, Texas, copies of the attached
notice marked "Appendix." '0 Copies of said notice,
on forms provided by the Regional Director for Re-
gion 23 (Houston, Texas), after being duly signed
by Respondent's representative, shall be posted by
Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and
be
maintained
by it for 60 consecutive days
thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all
places where notices to Respondent's employees
are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be
taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are
not altered, defaced, or covered by any other
material.
(c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 23,
in writing, within 20 days from the receipt of this
Decision, what steps have been taken to comply
herewith. ti
RECOMMENDATIONS IN THE
REPRESENTATION CASE
For the reasons given above, and upon the pre-
ponderence of the evidence in the entire record
considered as a whole, I recommend that:
1. The ballots of Dean, Hogan, and Underwood
not be opened or counted.
2. The ballot of Sims not be opened or counted.
3
The ballot of Johnson be opened and counted.
4. Respondent's objections to the election be
overruled and the election held to be valid and con-
trolling.
10 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board,
the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the
Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the notice In the further
event that the Board 's Order is enforced by a decree of a United States
Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Ap-
peals Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision
and Order "
" In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board,
this provision shall be modified to read "Notify the Regional Director for
Region 23, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps
Respondent has taken to comply herewith "
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board and in order to effec-
tuate the policies of the National Labor Relations
Act, as amended, we hereby notify our employees
that:
WE WILL NOT interrogate employees con-
cerning their union activities , sympathies, and
expectations.
WE WILL NOT solicit employees to withdraw
their union authorization cards.
WE WILL NOT threaten that if International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO,
Local 390, comes in, Technical Maintenance,
Inc.,
will
probably lose its contract with
TECHNICAL MAINTENANCE, INC.
731
Houston Chemical Corporation and our em-
ployees would lose their jobs.
WE WILL NOT threaten that if employees do
not stop their union activity we will stop or
curtail coffeebreaks and start cracking down
on employees who have cigarettes in their
pockets.
WE WILL NOT threaten that because of the
Union employees will get no more raises,
Houston Chemical Corporation will probably
break its contract with us, and our employees
could lose their jobs.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere
with , restrain , or coerce our employees in the
exercise of the rights to self-organization, to
form labor organizations , to join International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers , AFL-CIO,
Local 390, or any other labor organization, to
bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing , and to engage in concerted
activities for the purposes of collective bar-
gaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to
refrain from any or all such activities.
WE WILL make a good -faith offer to James
L. Johnson to give him immediate and full
reinstatement to his former or substantially
equivalent position without prejudice to his
seniority and other rights and privileges previ-
ously enjoyed.
WE WILL make whole James L. Johnson for
any loss of pay suffered by him by reason of
the discrimination practiced against him in ac-
cordance with the recommendations of the
Trial Examiner 's Decision.
All our employees are free to become or refrain
from becoming members of International Brother-
hood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO, Local 390.
TECHNICAL
MAINTENANCE, INC.
(Employer)
Dated
By
(Representative ) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecu-
tive days from the date of posting and must not be
altered , defaced , or covered by any other material.
If employees have any question concerning this
notice or compliance with its provisions , they may
communicate directly with the Board 's Regional
Office, 6617 Federal Office Building , 515 Rusk
Avenue, Houston, Texas 77002, Telephone 228-
0611.