Steele Apparel Co., Inc.

STEELE APPAREL CO., INC. 903 Steele Apparel Company, Inc. and Southern Missou- ri-Arkansas District Council International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, AFL-CIO. Case 14-CA-4086 July 1, 1968 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN MCCULLOCH AND MEMBERS BROWN AND JENKINS On September 26, 1967, Trial Examiner Jerry B. Stone issued his Decision in the above-entitled case, finding that the Respondent had engaged and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, and recommending that it cease ,and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. He further found that Respondent had not engaged in certain other unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint and recommended that such allegations be dismissed. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision and a brief in support thereof and the Charging Party filed exceptions to the Trial Ex- aminer's Decision, an argument in support thereof, and an answering brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the Act, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommenda- tions of the Trial Examiner,' except for the follow- ing modification. The Trial Examiner found that the Union represented an uncoerced majority of the em- ployees in the appropriate unit when the Respon- dent refused its demand for recognition, and that the Respondent thereby violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. The Respondent contends, inter alia, that the card of employee Barbara Rose was invalid because of threats and inducements of a su- pervisor. We find merit in this contention. Prior to August 8 . 1966, the date Rose signed a union card, there had been rumors that she , among others, had been informing on the Union to the Respondent. In a discussion about the rumors, Supervisor Beatrice Peters told Rose that if she ( Rose ) signed a union card it would indicate to the other employees that she had not been "carrying tales" to the Respon- dent . Rose accordingly signed. We have in the past refused to rely on an authorization card where a supervisor takes an ac- tive part in the solicitation thereof . We find nothing in the record of this case to convince us to rely on the authorization card signed by employee Rose in determining whether or not an uncoerced majority of employees designated the Union ; Insular Chenu- cal Corporation and Rubber Corporation of America, 128 NLRB 93, 98. The Respondent contends that the Union ob- tained other authorization cards by misrepresenta- tion and coercion , thus invalidating the card majority . The Trial Examiner, on the basis of credited testimony , found the Respondent 's conten- tions to be without merit. With the exception of Barbara Rose's card, we find nothing in the record to indicate that the Trial Examiner 's findings are in error, nor do we find any other evidence in the record to substantiate the Respondent 's conten- tions. Rather , we agree with the Trial Examiner, in the face of the Respondent 's concerted antiunion campaign , marked by flagrant unfair labor prac- tices, including threats and discriminatory discharges and layoffs, that the other signatures of a majority of the employees were obtained without resort to any improper solicitations . We agree with the Trial Examiner that the Union represented an uncoerced majority of the 105 or less employees in the appropriate unit when the Union demanded and the Respondent refused recognition , and we shall therefore issue an appropriate order. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the Recom- mended Order of the Trial Examiner and hereby orders that the Respondent, Steele Apparel Com- pany, Inc., Steele, Missouri, its officers, agents, suc- cessors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order. ' The Charging Party has filed exceptions only to the Trial Examiner's failure to order the Respondent to make the employees whole for losses "they would have obtained through collective bargaining had the company not refused to bargain " We deem it inappropriate in this case to depart from our existing policy with respect to remedial orders in cases involving violation of Section 8(a)(5), and therefore find no merit in the Charging Party's exceptions 72 NLRB No. 95 904 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE JERRY B. STONE, Trial Examiner: Upon a charge and amended charges filed on August 17 and 22, 1966, and on September 8, 1966, by Southern Mis- souri-Arkansas District Council, International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, AFL-CIO (herein sometimes called the Charging Party or Union), the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board, by the Regional Director of Re- gion 14 (St. Louis, Missouri), issued his complaint, dated November 4, 1966, and his amended com- plaint, dated January 19, 1967, against Steele Ap- parel Company, Inc. (herein sometimes called the Respondent or the Company), alleging violations of Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (5) of the Act. Respon- dent's duly filed answer and amended answer admit some of the facts alleged but deny other facts and deny the commission of unfair labor practices. The main issues in this case are: (1) whether the Respondent by its agents interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, (2) whether the Respondent discrimatorily fired or laid off certain employees in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act; and (3) whether the Respondent has refused to bargain collectively with the Union in violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. There are other cer- tain issues involved in the foregoing, including the question of Respondent's responsibility for the con- duct of certain "town merchants," the question of what conduct occurred, the inclusion or exclusion of certain persons from the appropriate bargaining unit of employees, and the authenticity of authorization of union representations. Pursuant to appropriate notice, a hearing in this matter was held on February 28, 1967, and March 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, and 9, 1967, before Trial Examiner Jerry B. Stone. All parties were represented at and participated in the hearing, and were afforded the right to present evidence, to examine and cross-ex- amine witnesses, to offer oral arguments, and to file briefs. Briefs have been filed by the General Coun- sel, by counsel for the Charging Party, and by coun- sel for the Respondent and have been carefully considered. Upon the entire record in this case and from my observation of the witnesses, the following findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendations are made.' 1. THE BUSINESS OF THE EMPLOYER INVOLVED The facts pertaining to the business of the Em- ployer are based upon the pleadings and the admis- sions therein. Steele Apparel Company, Inc., the Respondent, is, and has been at all times material herein, a cor- poration duly organized under, and existing by vir- tue of, the laws of the State of Missouri. At all times material herein, Respondent has maintained its principal office and place of business in the city of Steele, and State of Missouri, herein called the Respondent's place of business. During the year ending August 1, 1966, which period is representa- tive of its operations during all times material herein, Respondent, in the course and conduct of its business operations, manufactured, sold, and dis- tributed at its Missouri place of business, products valued in excess of $50,000, of which products valued in excess of $50,000 were shipped from said place of business directly to points located outside of the State of Missouri. During the year ending August 1, 1966, which period is representative of its operations during all times material hereto, Respondent, in the course and conduct of its busi- ness operations, purchased and caused to be trans- ported and delivered to its Missouri place of busi- ness cloth, thread, buttons, snaps, and other goods and materials valued in excess of $50,000, of which goods and materials valued in excess of $50,000 were transported and delivered to its place of busi- ness in Missouri directly from points located out- side the State of Missouri. As conceded by the Respondent, and based upon the foregoing facts, it is concluded and found that the Respondent is now and has been at all times material herein an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED Based upon the pleadings and admissions therein, it is found and concluded that Southern Missou- ri-Arkansas District Council International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, AFL-CIO, the Union involved in this proceeding, is now, and has been at all times material herein, a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES This case involves the issues as indicated previ- ously. In support of their various contentions the parties presented many witnesses and many ex- hibits. The parties also extensively availed them- selves of their opportunities of examination and cross-examination of witnesses. In many respects as to many of the issues it may be simply stated that the testimony of the witnesses and the evidence otherwise simply did not establish or support the contentions. In many respects the totality of the evidence reveals that there really is no dispute as to ' All credibility resolutions made herein are baseu upon a composite evaluation of the demeanor of the witnesses and the probabilities of the evidence as a whole STEELE APPAREL CO., INC. the relevant facts but merely dispute as to what the facts amount to in legal conclusion. As indicated as to a substantial portion of the relevant facts there is no real dispute and the facts are based upon a composite of the credited testimony of the witnesses who testified as to such facts. A. Preliminary Issues. Supervisory and Agency Status 1. Based upon the pleadings and admissions therein, it is found and concluded that Respon- dent's Vice President Morton Smoller and Superin- tendent Leon Hellman, at all times material herein, are and have been supervisors of the Respondent within the meaning of Section 2(11 ) of the Act, and have been agents of the Respondent. 2. Based upon the pleadings and admissions therein and statements of counsel narrowing the is- sues, it is found and concluded that Beatrice Peters and Frank Peters, at all times material herein, were supervisors of the Respondent within the meaning of Section 2(1 1) of the Act. The Respondent de- nies, however, that Beatrice Peters and Frank Peters, under the circumstances of this case, acted as agents of the Respondent. This contention is disposed of elsewhere in this Decision wherein the specific conduct complained of is discussed. 3. The General Counsel alleges and contends that certain merchants of the town of Steele, Mis- souri, engaged in certain conduct as agents of the Respondent within the meaning of Section 2(1 1) of the Act. The merchants alleged to be agents of the Respondent are Tommy German, Larry Gammiter, Hobert Poteet, and Phillip Carey.' Briefly, the undisputed facts reveal that the aforenamed merchants and others were members of an industrial committee of merchants and citizens of the town of Steele, that said committee was in- strumental in the building of the plant facilities oc- cupied by the Respondent, and that said committee was instrumental in getting the Respondent to locate in Steele, Missouri, and to utilize the aforesaid facilities. The undisputed facts further reveal that the Respondent in the past substantially utilized said committee as an instrument for the ad- There were various spellings and pronunciations with reference to one of the merchants For convenience in this decision this merchant will be referred to as Carey Henri / Siegel, inc , 165 NLRB 493 The facts are undisputed and are based upon a composite of the credited aspects of the testimony of all of the witnesses who testified thereto and the various exhibits in the record s The facts are based upon the credited testimony of Jernigan Consider- ing a composite of the demeanor appearance of Jernigan and Hellman as witnesses and the logical consistency of all the evidence, I find Jernigan to appear a more frank, forthright, and truthful witness than Hellman and credit her version of the event and discredit Hellman'' denial thereof In the foregoing evaluation I have considered Jernigan's inconsistent pretrial 905 justment of grievances with Respondent's em- ployees. During the instant labor problems members of the aforesaid committee were present at two meetings (August 5 and 15, 1966) at the Company wherein Respondent's officials presented their op- position to unionism. At these said meetings the employees were paid for their time while attending. At these meetings, also, the Respondent allowed the committee members to express viewpoints con- cerning the question of unionization and what would occur as a result of unionization. Several of the aforenamed agents also visited employees at home about the same time and talked against unionization. At the August 15, 1966, meeting, Su-. perintendent Hellman told employees that they could secure from the town merchants forms to be used in withdrawing from the Union. The facts as summarized by the foregoing pre- ponderate for a finding that members of the referred-to committee, including the named per- sons (Tommy German, Larry Gammiter, Hobert Poteet, and Phillip Carey), during the time material herein, acted as agents for the Respondent within the meaning of Section 2(11) of the Act. I so con- clude and find.' B. The Setting4 The Union commenced its organizing campaign of Steele Apparel Company, Inc., in Steele, Missou- ri, around the middle of July 1966. Between this time and August 1, 1966, and thereafter, the Union solicited and secured union authorization cards from various employees. On August 1, 1966, the Union held its first organizational type meeting at the Oasis Restaurant in Steele, Missouri. C. Interference, Restraint , and Coercion and Discriminatory Discharge and Layoffs 1. Event of August 2, 1966: interrogation of Geneva Jernigan' On August 2, 1966, Superintendent Hellman ap- proached Geneva Jernigan at her machine and asked her if the Union had had a meeting at the Oa- affidavit statement as to the occurrence being one of a statement being made over the telephone and her explanation at the hearing that she had, at the time of reading and signing the affidavit, not considered the erroneous recitation to be important I have also considered and weighed the conflict of Dodd 's and Hellman 's testimony relating to an event in which I find Dodd's testimony more reliable than Hellman's and in which I credit that Hellman related to Dodd that he had already talked to Jernigan The later resolution required a weighing of the interests of Dodd and Hellman in the outcome of this case as well as a consideration of Hellman 's and other wit- nesses' conflicting testimony The total consideration of comparative demeanor of all witnesses and logical consistency of the evidence con- vinces me that Jernigan 's version of facts is more reliable than Hellman's denial 906 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD sis.6 Jernigan told Hellman that there had been such a meeting. Hellman asked Jernigan to tell him how many were at the meeting. Jernigan told Hellman that she didn't know exactly but thought there were about 25 employees, that there were 25 or 30 em- ployees at the meeting. Hellman asked Jernigan to tell him the names of the employees at the meeting Jernigan told Hellman that she would not tell him the names of the employees. Hellman told Jernigan that he would find out the names of the employees. Considering the foregoing, it is concluded and found that the Respondent, by Hellman, engaged in interrogation of Jernigan about employees' union activities, and that such conduct constituted con- duct violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 2. Events of August 3, 1966: interrogation of Betty Hager' On August 3, 1966, Hellman stopped by Polly Fleeman's work station. Hager saw Hellman speak- ing to Fleeman and overheard part of a conversa- tion between Fleeman and Hellman. Hager over- heard Fleeman say to Hellman, "The Oasis, I didn't go. Hellman left Fleeman's place of work and ap- proached Hager at Hager's place of work. Hellman told Hager that he would like to know who was at the union meeting. Hager told Hellman, in effect, that she had not been invited to the August 1, 1966, union meeting at the Oasis, and that she had only been at the Oasis because her car was being serviced. Hellman told Hager that this was not what he had asked, that he wanted to know who was there. Hager told Hellman that she did not know any of the people. Hellman told Hager that he didn't mean the union organizers, that he wanted to know who of the girls in the plant were there. Hager told Hellman that she could not tell him what he wanted to know. Considering the foregoing, it is concluded and found that the Respondent, by Hellman, engaged in interrogation of Hager about employee's union ac- tivities, and that such conduct constitutes conduct violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 3. Events circa August 3, 1966: activities of businessmen On August 3, 1966, Larry Gammiter and Phillip Carey visited the home of Velma Farris, one of " Jernigan had returned to work on August 2, 1966, after having been off for an undisclosed time The record reveals that Jernigan had, at some un- disclosed time and apparently just prior to August 2, 1966, worked at the Oasis The record also reveals that Leila Edwards, Jernigan', sister, worked at the Oasis The fact, are based upon the credited testimony of Hager Essentially the issue is one of credibility and I find that Hager's testimony was that presented by a reliable, frank, forthright, and truthful witness Hager's testimony touched upon the incidents of August 3, 1966, and August 10, 1966 Hellman's testimony pnmanly touched upon the incident of August 10, 1966 1 credit Hager's testimony as to these events over Hellman's In Respondent's employees. Gammiter and Carey told Farris that she probably knew why they were there, that they were visiting the girls, that they had heard the girls were trying to organize a union, and that they wanted to know what she thought about the Union. Carey and Gammiter told Farris about the lease between Steele Industrial Development Com- mittee and the Respondent and that if the Union came in the plant the Company would leave. The close relationship of the businessmen of Steele, Missouri, in their collective action as mem- bers of the Steele Industrial Development Commit- tee with the Respondent in the handling of em- ployee grievances, in participation in the August 5 and 15, 1966, company meetings with employees, in having preprinted forms for withdrawal of union authorization cards, and in such activities as this type of employee visitation, clearly constituted the businessmen as agents for the Respondent in such activities." Considering all of the foregoing, I conclude and find that the Respondent by the conduct of Gammiter and Carey, described above, interfered with, restrained, and coerced employees within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. The General Counsel also alleges and contends that Gam miter and Hobert Poteet went to the home of an employee (Bolton) and told Bolton's husband that they wanted to solve the problems of the Respondent without bringing the Union in so the Respondent would not cease business or move. The General Counsel's evidence varied substan- tially from his allegation with respect to this in- cident. Gus Bolton, the husband of Dorothy Bolton, credibly testified that on an unspecified date Gammiter and Poteet came to his home and told him "they were out trying to see some of the girls who worked at the factory to see if they had any grievances and maybe they could straighten them out without bringing the union into the factory, if they could help them any." Gus Bolton credibly testified that Gammiter and Poteet did not say that he should communicate their remarks to his wife. I find it obvious, however, that all knew that this was intended. Gus Bolton credibly testified that he told his wife of the visit and what was said. The examination of Dorothy Bolton with respect to this incident was limited to establishing that Gus Bolton was her husband, and that Bolton had re- lated to her that he had had visitors and what had occurred at her home in July or early August 1966. many respects I found Hellman to vacillate as to details and I did not be- lieve him as he testified A composite evaluation of witness demeanor and logical consistency of the evidence convinces me that Hager was a more re- liable witness than Hellman and I so credit her testimony and discredit his denial of the interrogation The Respondent contends that Hager', pretrial affidavit reveals an inconsistency in that Hager related that ,he did not hear what was said between Fleeman and Hellman Suffice it to say, the affidavit related to an event on August 10, 1966, and not to the incident herein set out " See Henri I Sic qel, hit , 165 NLRB 493 STEELE APPAREL CO., INC. 907 Considering the foregoing and the pleadings, I conclude and find that the General Counsel has not ,established the violation alleged with respect to the visitation of Gammit.er and Poteet to the Bolton home.9 4. Events of August 5, 1966: interrogation of Dorothy Dodd10 Dorothy Dodd was an employee of the Respon- dent in May 1966 and worked until May 16, 1966. As a result of an injury on the job Dodd did not work after May 16, 1966, and was not working at the time of the hearing in this matter. Around August 5, 1966, Dodd went to the Oasis, a restaurant operated by her sister-in-law. Dodd was told that Superintendent Hellman had called on the telephone and asked for her. Dodd thereupon telephoned Hellman and asked what it was that he had telephoned about. Hellman told Dodd that he had called to see how she was doing. Dodd told Hellman that she was doing fairly good, that there were days that she felt all right, and that there were days that she didn't feel all right. Dodd asked Hell- man if he hadn't received a report on her (about her physical condition). It is clear that Hellman must have replied to this but the evidence does not reveal his answer. Dodd told Hellman that any time he wanted to find out about her condition he could call her doctor. Hellman told Dodd that what he really wanted to talk to her about was the union meeting the employees had. Dodd told Hellman that she didn't know anything about a union meet- ing, that he might find out something about the meeting by talking to Geneva Jernigan. Hellman told Dodd that he had already talked to Jernigan ,and had received some information but that Jer- nigan had not wanted to go into details. Hellman asked Dodd if her sister-in-law (who operated the Oasis) knew anything about the union meeting. Dodd told Hellman that he might talk to her. Hell- man asked Dodd if she thought that her sister-in- 1law would tell him the truth. One of the issues raised by the parties in this proceeding is whether Dodd was an employee within the meaning of the Act. I do not find it necessary for this proceeding to resolve such issue. As to the questions of Dodd's inclusion or exclusion from the appropriate bargaining unit, or as to the inclusion or exclusion of her authorization card with reference to the Union's bargaining status, determination of such issues either way does not af- fect the ultimate results as revealed by the totality of the evidence. Nor do I find it necessary to determine Dodd's status for the purpose of evaluating Respondent's conduct with regard to the interrogation herein. The interrogation herein went beyond what is nor- mally considered to be interrogation. The facts clearly reveal that Respondent was undertaking acts to determine with specificity the number of employees who attended the August 1, 1966, union meeting and to also determine the identity of such employees. Such type of interrogation assumes the significance of surveillance, the impression of sur- veillance, and other types of illegal invasion of the private union interests of employees. Under such circumstances it is immaterial as to whether Dodd was an employee with reasonable ex- pectancy of future employment by the Respondent, or an employee within the broad meaning of the Act. Nor is it necessary to draw the reasonable in- ference that Dodd communicated the facts of the interrogation to other employees. It is clear that some of the employees learned of the incident at least at the time of the hearing herein. The Board in Wallace Press, Inc., 146 NLRB 1236, 1238, states as follows:" Few propositions are more firmly embedded in the law of labor relations than that an em- ployer who spies upon the union activities of his employees engages in a flagrant violation of the rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act. Such conduct has been condemned by the Board and the courts since the early days of the Act, for experience has shown that em- ployers resort to labor espionage or surveil- lance for the purpose of obstructing and destroying employees' self-organizational rights and activities. If such first steps leading to dis- criminatory practices are outlawed, the com- mission of other unfair labor practices may be thwarted. The Wallace Press case did not involve a question of interrogation and the Board declined to consider the General Counsel's contention that the conduct therein was tantamount to a form of unlawful inter- rogation. The facts and logic of the case, however, reveal the underlying principle that the protected rights of the employees warrant prohibition of sur- veillance or related interference with such rights. Considering all of the foregoing, it is concluded and found that the Respondent, by Hellman, en- gaged in conduct of interrogation of Dodd and thereby interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of Section 7 rights. Such conduct is violative of Section 8(a)(I) of the Act. " I limit my consideration of the legality or illegality of the conduct in- volved herein to the issue alleged and litigated '° Based upon the credited testimony of Dorothy Dodd I found Dodd's demeanor as a witness to appear more frank, forthright, and truthful as to this incident than Hellman's I discredit Hellman's testimony in denial of the incident described " The footnotes in the Board case are deleted herein 908 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 5. Events of August 5, 1966: company meeting with employees" On August 5, 1966, Hellman notified employees of a meeting to be held in the cafeteria in the after- noon. The employees attended such meeting and were paid for their time in attendance Present with Hellman were Morton Smoller (one of the Respon- dent's owners) and four businessmen from Steele, Missouri. Hellman had invited the four businessmen (Ger- man, Waffler, Gammiter, and Cooperman) for several reasons. The first reason was that Hellman wanted the businessmen to be witnesses to what was said and done The second reason was that Hellman wanted to show the employees that the community had an interest in what was going on. Superintendent Heilman started the meeting by announcing that he had received a telegram con- cerning the Union. Hellman told the employees that there had been rumors that they were trying to get a union, that he was shocked at getting the tele- gram, that he frankly was surprised at the names of the people on the telegram, and that he thought those people had better sense than to do that. Hellman told the employees that he had the busi- nessmen from Steele there to be his witnesses Hell- man also read the August 5, 1966, telegram to the assembled employees. The telegram was as follows: Leon Hellman Steele Apparel Co North First St Steele Mo Please be informed the following employees of your firm are members of the Steele Apparel Employees organizational committee I.L.G.W.U. they should be accorded all rights and privileges guaranteed by the National Labor Relations Act Dorothy Bolton Letha Brooks, Madie Darnell , Velma Farris, Delia Akins, Doris Smith , Betty Hager , Mary Ash, Margie Vent, Louise Gray, Stella Driscoll, Josephine Barger, Jerry PerlStein Manager Southern Mo-Ark Dist Council I.L.G.W.U. 512 Mid Land, Poplar Bluff Mo 11 The facts are based upon a composite of the credited aspects of the testimony of all the witnesses who testified with respect to the speech Es- sentially these witnesses were Hellman , Rose , Letha Brooks, Overturf, Evans, Farris , Bolton, Hager, Miller, and German In most respects the ver- sions of the various witnesses are in substance consistent Hellman's testimony was generalized and varied between statements of fact, reasons, and conclusions German's testimony was to some extent generalived In general, Rose, Letha Brooks, Overturf , Evans , Farris , Bolton, Hager, and Miller were more specific in detail in their testimony Hellman as a witness appeared prone to give the version he thought in the best interest of the Respondent As an examole . he vacillated between testifying that he told employees that he could not answer these questions about whether the plant would close if the Union came in pursuant to advice of his attorney After the telegram was read Superintendent Hell- man and Vice President Smoller made talks to the employees. There was also a question and answer period for the employees and some questions were asked in the midst of the talks. Hellman told the employees that the Respondent could not afford the Union, that the Respondent could not afford the union scale, and that Respon- dent as compared to others made a cheaper gar- ment and could not compete with higher priced garments. Hellman asked Louise Gray, one of the employees, if she would pay $10 for the dress she had on (which was a dress purchased from the Respondent). Gray said that she would not. Hell- man said "well see." Hellman told the employees that the Respondent could not compete with bigger name-brand compa- nies, that unionism would force the Respondent into bankruptcy Hellman, during his talk, ex- plained the various benefits that the Respondent had for employees. He stated that one of the Union's first demands would be a health and wel- fare plan that the Respondent would have to pay out of its pocket, and that the Respondent was pay- ing the benefits that it could, and that this addi- tional cost could bankrupt the Respondent. Hellman stated that the health and welfare plan would cost a fortune, that the Respondent could not afford the Union, that the Respondent could not compete with union prices, that the Respondent had to undersell to make what it did, and that the Respondent only made a few pennies on a dress. Hellman stated that if the employees wanted to work in a union factory that they should go and work in the Hayti factory (a nearby unionized fac- tory), that the Hayti factory was on strike half the time and that the employees at the Hayti factory did not work as steadily as the employees at Steele. Some of the employees asked Hellman how a union shop operated. Hellman told the employees that he had worked in a union shop in the past and told the employees that according to his recollec- tion a union-operated shop operated in certain ways and under certain conditions. Hellman talked about union contracts and how they affected union girls, seniority, layoffs, and "bumps," etc. One of the girls asked Hellman what would hap- pen if the Union got in. Hellman replied by asking what good was a union in an empty factory. Janie Thornton stated at that point that she had formerly and to the effect that he did not tell the employees that he could not answer pursuant to advice of his attorney, and that he and Smoller answered the question as to whether the plant would close if the Union came in a number of times and said that no, they would not close and that it was against the law to say that the factory would close I do not credit Hellman's testimony to this effect All other witnesses , including German, testified to the effect that neither Smoller nor Heilman would answer the question directly I find the evidence to be overwhelming that Smoller and Hellman did not answer the question directly As to whether Hellman told the employees that his answer was pursuant to advice of his attorney , I find the facts to prepon- derate for a finding that he did not Except for Hellman's vacillating testimony there is no evidence that he so advised the employees STEELE APPAREL CO., INC. 909 worked for 50 cents an hour and that she thought her $1.25-per-hour wage rate was wonderful, that she would rather have a plant without a union than to have an empty factory. Hellman stated that this was right. On one or two occasions a girl asked Hellman if the Union came in would the plant move. Hellman replied each time to the effect that he was not at liberty to answer, that it was against the law for him to say that. Farris, one of the girls, asked Hellman if he could get a raise would he accept it. Hellman told Farris that he would. Farris told Hellman that this was what the girls were working for and that they would keep fighting. Hellman asked Dorothy Bolton, one of the em- ployees, if she had anything to say. Bolton asked Hellman why the Company was fighting so hard to keep the Union out if the Union couldn't help the girls. Hellman told Bolton that the Company was not fighting. Bolton asked Hellman if it was in the lease agreement for the buildings that the em- ployees could not vote a union in for 7 years in order for the factory to remain in Steele, Missouri. Hellman told Bolton that this was not in the con- tract. After Hellman had initially talked to the em- ployees, Smoller talked to the employees. As in- dicated, the talks were interrupted by questions and answers at several points. After Smoller had finished talking, Hellman again talked to the girls. Hellman told the girls that there had been rumors about violence against nonunion girls, against girls who would not sign union cards. Heilman told the girls that there was talk about sugar being put into automobile gas tanks in the parking lot. Hellman stated that anyone threatening an act of violence or trying to do damage to a car would automatically be fired. One of the girls asked Hellman why the Company could not afford a union. Hellman told the girls that the Company could not afford the Union because of the union health and welfare fund which varied from contract to contract between "6 and 8 per- cent." Vice President Smoller told the employees that the Union was not anything but a racket and a "damn" good racket, that if the Union would pay him one-third of the dues it collected from the em- ployees that he would let the Union have the facto- ry, that costs were going up and that the Company was in difficulty because of the new minimum wage law, that the wage increases would cause the Respondent to have a tough time meeting competi- tion, and, however, that if his competitors had to raise their prices as a result of the new minimum wage law, that the Respondent would still be com- petitive. Smoller stated, however, that some of the competitors might not have to raise prices because of lower overhead and more efficiency. Smoller told the employees that costs were going up, that the Respondent only made a few pennies on a dress, that the Respondent had to undersell its com- petitors, that the Respondent was a cheap garment outfit and could not raise prices, that other compa- nies advertised more and had a reputation for higher priced dresses, that the Respondent would go bankrupt if the Union came in, that the Respon- dent could not work with the Union, that the Respondent could not afford a union, that he was going to stay in business as long as he could, and that because of the increase in minimum wages, that unless the Respondent could meet its competi- tors' prices it could be forced out of business. One of the girls asked Smoller about the lease on the building. Smoller told the employee that the lease had 2-1/2 years to run and that he intended to fulfill the obligation as far as the lease went. 13 Smoller was asked by an employee whether the plant would close if the Union came in. Smoller stated in effect that he did not say that the plant would close, that he could not say that the plant would close, and that it was against the law for him to say that the plant would close. One of the girls asked Smoller if Steele was the only factory the Company owned. Smoller told the girls that the Steele and the Caraway plants were the only interests they had, that what had been made from the Steele factory had been put back in the factory, and that the Respondent could not af- ford a union. Hellman concluded the meeting by telling the employees to "be free from outside influences and let your conscience be your guide." Considering the totality of the remarks made by Hellman and Smoller to the employees on August 5, 1966, it is clear that the message presented was that if the employees selected the Union as their bargaining representative, it was inevitable that the Respondent's plant would be closed. By such con- duct the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act." I so conclude and find. " Hellman testified to the effect that the obligation of the lease was one of paying rent " The legal principles involved herein have been decided and are rela- tively simple The essential problem is one of interpretation and the appli- cation of expertise as regards factual meaning As indicated, I am con- vinced and conclude and find the facts as set forth I note that prior to the Board 's decisions in Dal-Te.x Optical Companv, /tic , 137 NLRB 1782 and Texas Industries, hit , 139 NLRB 365, there were some cases involving somewhat similar factual situations ( to the present case) where the Board decided as a matter of expertise that the facts did not sum up to ultimate facts of threats or promise of benefits but were in fact expressions of opinions within the meaning of Section 8(c) of the Act The Board in Dal- Let Optical Conipanv, Inc , supra, discussed such cases and overruled such cases with respect to the findings therein with connection to Section 8(c) of the Act A consideration of the Board's decisions in I)al-7e% Optical Cumpanv, hic , supra, and Texas Industries, Inc . supra, and cases thereafter, reveal that the Board has found statements similar to the ones herein in total context to constitute threats and to he violative of Section 8(a)( I) of the Act See also Herman Wilson Lumber Company, 149 NLRB 573, and Jones Packing Compa,i, 159 NLRB 988 910 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 6. Events of August 6, 1966: Hellman's Bea came by and told me not to come in the interrogation of Gray15 next day. I asked her why, and she said that On August 6, 1966, Hellman, in the presence of Smoller and Beatrice and Frank Peters, asked Gray if she had signed a union card and whether she had been to any union meetings. Gray told Hellman that she had signed a union card and that she had not been to a union meeting. Considering the foregoing, it is concluded and found that the Respondent, by Hellman, inter- rogated Gray about her union activities in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 7. Events of August 8, 1966: the layoff of Vent's Margie Vent was hired by the Respondent in March 1966. At the time of her hiring she was asked by Superintendent Hellman if she knew that the Respondent was not a union shop. Vent told Hellman that she was aware the Respondent was not a union shop. Vent was employed as a hemmer but on occasion was used in the belting department. Vent received a union authorization card from union solicitors in front of the plant gate on July 14, 1966. That night Vent signed a union authoriza- tion card and transmitted the same to the Union. Thereafter Vent authorized the Union to include her name on a telegraphic list of "Steele Apparel Organizational Committee" of the ILGWU which was sent to the Respondent on August 5, 1966. As indicated previously, Hellman , for the Respondent, held a meeting for employees on Friday, August 5, 1966, read the aforementioned telegram and indicated that he thought the named employees had better sense than to be doing what they had done. Hellman and Smoller also revealed to the employees that it would be inevitable that the Respondent would close if the Union came in the plant. On August 8, 1966, Vent was working at her regular job of hemmer. Another regular hemmer, Wanda Goodwin, was absent because she was sick, being pregnant at the time. On August 8, 1966, there was enough work piled up at or near Vent's work station to reveal that there was work for "quite a few" days if additional work was not brought in. Supervisor Beatrice Peters came by Vent's work station and told her that she was laid off. What transpired is revealed by the following excerpt from Vent's credited testimony. " The facts are based upon the credited testimony oPGray Considering Gray's testimony and her pretrial affidavit, I am convinced however that Gray has confused some remarks about " 10 years" and although I believe that the term "10 years" was used by Hellman, I am not convinced that Hellman told Gray that her signing of a card would be held against her for 10 years It suffices to say that the demeanor of Gray was more convincing of truthfulness than the demeanor of Hellman I discredit Hellman's denial that he had such a conversation I discredit Gray's testimony of facts not found on the basis of unreliability was orders from Mr. Hellman for me to stay home. I asked her if that was permanent or just for me to stay home for good since I had quite a bit of work piled up and she said, "Well, not if I can help it," because Wanda, the other hemmer, was pregnant and she was going to be sick quite a bit and she thought she would need me. She went on to tell me that it was not her doing, it was strictly Mr. Hellman's. On the same day that Vent was laid off, Vent overheard another girl speak to Hellman about Vent's layoff. What occurred is revealed by the fol- lowing credited excerpt of Vent's testimony." He said-this girl asked him why he was lay- ing me off since we had work piled up and he said, well, he thought Wanda would be in the next day and if she wasn't, he would try and work something out. Q. And that is what you heard Mr. Hellman say? A. I heard Mr. Hellman say that, yes. On August 15, 1966, as indicated later herein, Hellman in his talk with Mandie Evans stated that he wasn't going to fire anyone for their union ac- tivity, but that he might have to let a couple go and Hellman named Vent as one of those he might have to let go. On August 18, 1966, Vent returned to work. On the day Vent returned to work there was more work at her work station than had been on August 8, 1966, when she was laid off. As indicated later herein, on August 18, 1966, Supervisor Beatrice Peters followed Vent into the restroom and told Vent that the reason Vent was laid off was because Vent's name was on the tele- gram and because Hellman thought that Vent had something to do with the Union. Several days later Supervisor Beatrice Peters repeated in effect to Vent that Vent was laid off because of her union activities. The General Counsel contends that the Respon- dent laid Vent off in order to discourage union ac- tivity and on a pretextual basis of lack of work. The Respondent contends that Vent was laid off because there was a lack of work, that Vent was a junior employee, and that the "layoff" was not dis- criminatorily motivated. The General Counsel, the Respondent, and the Charging Party adduced evidence relating to production figures and layoffs. Suffice it to say that " The facts relating to Vent's layoff are principally based upon a com- posite of the credited testimony of Vent, Hellman, and other witnesses relating to production status Considering the logical consistency of all the evidence and Hellman's unreliability upon the crucial aspects of his testimony in general, I discredit Hellman's testimony to the extent it is in- consistent with the facts found '' The testimony reveals that the Wanda referred to was Wanda Good- win who worked as a hemmer The testimony reveals that Goodwin was pregnant and sick on August 8, 1966 STEELE APPAREL CO., INC 911 the evidence adduced was not sufficiently tied up to reveal precisely the production needs for hemmers (Vent's job) or the comparative basis or need for sewing department employees being transferred, into the "belting" jobs. Thus production figures showing total amount of dresses in progress for the month of August as being substantially on the same level are not sufficient to reveal one way or the other the need with respect to individual operations on the dresses . Letha Brooks' testimony relating to work and transfer of girls from "sewing" to "belt- ing" also revealed "layoffs" of such girls during the time of Vent's layoff. The parties' stipulation as to "layoffs" however reveals an inconsistency with Letha Brooks ' testimony as to "layoffs." Hellman's testimony revealed a propensity to give facts in- terpreted in favor of his position and , as indicated, was unreliable. Hellman testified to cancellation of orders as having an effect , but his testimony was general in nature as to effect on production and, absent support by specific facts, appears to be in- consistent with the general production figures. In summary I do not find that the evidence relat- ing to transfers from " sewing" to "belting" or por- duction to be sufficiently tied up to have persuasive, value in determining the question of Vent's layoff other than the facts relating to the production as testified to by Vent. Hellman, in effect, conceded that there was work available on Monday, August 8, 1966, for the hem- mers. Hellman 's testimony, ultimately, was to the effect that on Monday, August 8, 1966, there was work available for three hemmers for the week, and that he let Vent (one of the four hemmers) go because he did not want to have to layoff two hem- mers in the middle of the week. Hellman also ad- mitted, however, that company records revealed that frequently employees were laid off in the mid- dle of the week. It should be noted that, at the time of Hellman's layoff of Vent, Hellman was knowledgeable that another hemmer, Goodwin, was absent and might not be back during the week. Assuming Hellman's testimony as to the produc- tion needs as related to hemmers to be correct, it does not appear logical, knowing that Goodwin might be out for the rest of the week, that Hellman would have laid off Vent on August 8, 1966. Considering all of the foregoing, I am convinced and I conclude and find that the facts preponderate for a finding that the Respondent discriminatorily laid off Vent on August 8, 1966, in violation of Sec- tion 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. I so conclude and find. 8. Events of August 9, 1966: the layoff of Overturf" Carolyn Overturf was initially hired by the Respondent in March 1965 and worked thereafter until around September 1965. Overturf's principal work at the time of her leaving Respondent's em- ployment in September 1965 was that of "belting." At this later date Overturf moved to St. Louis, Mis- souri. In March 1966 the Respondent employed Linda Sue Scott. Scott worked thereafter until July 25, 1966, when she quit. At the time that Scott quit she was working in "belting." Sometime shortly before July 29, 1966, Overturf, returned to the Steele, Missouri, area. On July 29, 1966, Overturf saw Hellman and was reemployed in "belting. "19 On August 5, 1966 , Overturf signed a union authorization card and transmitted the card to Mandie Evans who transmitted it to the Union. On August 8, 1966, Linda Scott telephoned Hell- man, asked if there was a job opening, and told Hellman that she would like her job back . Hellman told Scott that there was not a job opening but that he would keep her in mind if something came up. Sometime between August 5, 1966 , and prior to August 9, 1966, Overturf authorized the Union to notify the Respondent that she was a member of the Union 's organizational committee . On August 9, 1966, the Union notified the Respondent by tele- gram that Overturf and several others were on the Union 's organizing committee. On August 9, 1966 , Hellman 's secretary, Donna Wimberly , telephoned Scott and told Scott to re- port to work the next morning . Scott reported to work on August 10, 1966 , and worked for 3 days and then quit again. On August 9, 1966 , Jo Pugh notified Overturf that Hellman had said that she (Overturf) would not have to come in the next day. The next day, August 10, 1966 , Overturf telephoned Hellman and asked if Hellman wanted her to come back to work the next day . Hellman told Overturf that Linda Scott had come back to work and that he would not need her (Overturf) for a while . Overturf asked Hellman what difference this made and told Hell- man that he had hired her to take Scott 's place. Hellman told Overturf, "Well, she 's back now and we can't use you for a while." As indicated later in this decision , on August 10, 1966, Overturf was with the group of union or- ganizers and employees handing out literature at quitting time to employees when Hellman stated '" The facts are based upon a composite of the credited aspects of the testimony of Overturf, Scott, and Hellman and a fair inference therefrom For reasons previously indicated as to the unreliability of Hellman's testimony, I discredit Hellman's testimonial version of facts inconsistent with the facts found and to the effect that Overturf was laid off because Scott returned to work "' Smre I find the overall facts to reveal clearly that Overturf had been hired to replace Scott, I find it unnecessary to consider the effect or value of Overturf's testimony on cross-examination that Pugh, at an undisclosed time , told her that Scott had quit and Hellman would be hiring her to take her place 912 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD that there were two people who would not be com- ing back. Considering the totality of the incident, it is clear that the only ones that this statement had relevant meaning to were Hager and Overturf. Con- sidering the totality of Hellman's statement and his exhibited agitation, it is clear that the statement was made in a hostile manner and constitutes evidence of union animus. As also indicated later in this Decision, on Au- gust 15, 1966, Mandie Evans told Hellman in effect that it was not the girl's fault that the desire for unionism existed, that it was the manner and con- duct of Beatrice Peters that created such desire for unionism, that she (Evans) had persuaded Overturf to sign the union card and that she felt responsible for Overturf's plight. On August 15, 1966, Hellman told Evans to try to get Overturf to revoke her union card and that if she did, Overturf would be put back to work. Considering all of the foregoing, it is clear that Hellman on August 8, 1966, considered that there was no job vacancy for which Scott could be re- called to work and that Overturf was not temporari- ly replacing Scott at work. It is also clear that on August 9, 1966, Hellman changed his mind and de- cided to lay off Overturf and to rehire Scott for work. The only credible evidence in the record which reveals a basis for such a change in mind by Hellman is the receipt of the telegram from the Union notifying him that Overturf was on the union organizing committee. Considering all of the foregoing, I conclude and find that the facts reveal that on August 9, 1966, Hellman received the Union's telegram notifying him that Overturf was on the Union's organizing committee and thereu- pon decided to and did lay off Overturf from work. That Hellman was discriminatorilv motivated in the layoff of Overturf is revealed not only by the very precipitating nature of the layoff but by his motivation shown in his remarks on August 10, 1966, to those distributing the union leaflets, and in his remarks to Evans on August 15, 1966. The layoff of Overturf because of her union activity clearly constitutes conduct violative of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. I so conclude and find. 9. Events of August 10, 1966 : Hellman 's demand for Hager's list20 After Superintendent Hellman spoke to Hager on August 3, 1966, Hager made a list of employees who had been at the August 1, 1966, union meet- ing. On August 10, 1966, when Hager arrived at work she had this list in her purse. On August 10, 1966. Hager arrived at the plant t" The facts are based upon the credited testimony of Hager and Burgess The testimonial demeanor of Hager and Burgess was more persuasive than the testimonial demeanor of Hellman in that Hager and Burgess appeared more frank, forthright, and truthful than Hellman I discredit Hellman's version of the incident which can briefly be summarized as being to the ef- fect that on two occasions he found Hager not working but writing at her early and before worktime and commenced making a list of names from the timecards of the em- ployees. At 7:45 a.m. Hager went to her work sta- tion and commenced work. Between 8 and 8:30 a.m., Hellman approached Polly Fleeman's work station, spoke to Fleeman, and then came to Hager's work station. Hellman asked Hager why she was making a list of names. Hager told Hellman that she was going to give a party and was going to invite some of these people . Hellman told Hager, "No, you're not. I want that list of names." Hager at this time gave Hellman the list of names she had made on August 3 or 4, 1966 . Hellman left Hager's work station and went over to Floria Atkins' machine. Hellman showed Atkins the list of names. Atkins told Hellman, "That's not all of them." In the meantime Hager had gone to the washroom after her talk with Hellman. Hager was gone for 4 or 5 minutes. After Hellman talked to Atkins, he waited until Hager returned to her machine. Hell- man then went to Hager's machine again. Hellman told Hager that he wanted "that" list of names. Hager told Hellman that she had given him the list of names. Hellman told Hager that it was against the law for her to take the names of the employees, that he wanted the list of names and wanted the list "right now." Hager told Hellman that she had given him the list of names. Hellman told Hager to clock out. Thereafter Hager turned the list of names she had made on August 10, 1966, over to Union Or- ganizer Helen Phipps. Hellman testified to the incident as follows:21 Betty Hager was sitting in a corner of the factory that is not easy to see, that particular corner, and in the morning as you make a stroll, I usually make a stroll through the facto- ry to see what sort of work is available for the girls, more or less checking up on what is going on. I was taking a walk through Betty's area there and she was sitting at her table, her work table, scribbling on a piece of paper and not sewing. I walked over to her and I said, "Betty, what are you doing? You are supposed to be working, you are supposed to be sewing. Give me that piece of paper and go back to work." I took the slip of paper from Betty and walked away. The facts in this case clearly reveal that Hellman was knowledgeable of union activity and of Hager's union interests on August 10, 1966. The facts also clearly reveal that the Respondent and Hellman were strongly opposed to the union and that Hell- man had engaged in various attempts to keep abreast of the union activity of the employees. If the facts were as Hellman testified, it would appear work station, asked for the paper she was writing on, and told Hager that she was supposed to be at work and to go to work, that she argued.with him and he initially fired her but later changed it to a layoff for insubordination '' As indicated previously, I do not credit Hellman's version of this in- cident STEELE APPAREL CO., INC. 913 that, absent improper interest in knowing what was on the paper that Hager had, Hellman would simply have told Hager to go to work and to cease writing while at work. Considering all of the foregoing facts as credited and a fair inference therefrom, I am convinced, conclude, and find that it had been reported to Hellman that Hager was copying names off the timecards before work, that Hellman believed that the names would be used by Hager and other union adherents in the organizational effort, and that Hellman demanded the lists from Hager and reproached and discharged her in order to interfere with the employees' union organizational efforts and to discourage union activity among the em- ployees. Such conduct is clearly violative of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. I so conclude and find.22 Hellman if all of the employees had left the shop. Hellman told Perlstein and the group that everyone had left the shop and that there were two there who would not be returning to the shop. In connection with the foregoing it is necessary to consider certain other events. The facts reveal that on August 9, 1966, Overturf was discrimina- torily discharged because of her union activities and that on August 10, 1966, Hager was dis- criminatorily discharged because of her union ac- tivities. Considering all of the foregoing, I conclude and find that Hellman in effect told the employees that those who engaged in union activities would be sub- jected to reprisals. Such conduct is violative of Sec- tion 8(a)(1) of the Act. I so conclude and find. 11. Events circa August 15, 196625 10. Events of August 10, 1966: the handbilling incident23 On August 10, 1966, in the afternoon around quitting time for the Steele employees, Union Representatives Perlstein, Phipps, and Clay, and Hager, Overturf, and several other employees were in front of the gate at the Steele plant distributing leaflets. Hellman came out to the union representa- tives and the others and told Perlstein to get off the plant's property. Hellman and Perlstein then argued about whether Perlstein and the others were on plant property. Hellman told Perlstein that he was going to call the police. Perlstein told him to do so. About this time most of the Steele employees left from work apparently to go home. Perlstein offered Hellman a copy of a union leaflet and told Hellman in effect that he knew that the Union would get in at Steele.24 Hellman told Perlstein that he liked his boss the way he was then. Hellman also told Perl- stein that he didn't want any of his union toilet paper (the leaflet). About this time it was obvious that most of the Steele employees had left work. Perlstein asked '= Although not necessary for the above findings, Hellman's remark later on August 10, 1966, to the effect that "two girls" would not be back in because of their union activity constitutes additional evidence of Respon- dent 's union animus as regards Hager and others The Respondent's per- sonnel records reveal various notations relating to its actions pertaining to Hager on this date It is clear that the notations of "discharge"-and "suspended" were made at different times I am convinced from all the evidence that Hager was initially "discharged" and that later the action was changed to that of being suspended for one month " The facts are based upon the credited aspects of the testimony of Perl- stein, Hager, Overturf, and Hellman Hellman 's testimony denying that he stated in effect that there were two girls there ( in the group with the union representatives ) who were not coming back is discredited " Respondent 's counsel cross-examined various General Counsel wit- nesses as to whether Perlstein told Hellman that he would find out "who is boss," or that Perlstein said " it won't be long now before we 'll he your Barbara Burgess returned from pregnancy leave during the week of August 8-12, 1966. Thereafter at some point of time prior to August 15, 1966, Burgess asked Hellman to speak to her at her work position. Burgess asked Hellman if the factory was going to move. Hellman told Burgess that it was against the law for him to say. Hellman said that some of the girls thought he was bluffing but that he wasn't, and that some of the girls did not need to work and for that reason they didn't really care what happened. Burgess told Hellman that she needed to work, that she wasn't one of the girls who didn't care. Later that day Grace Pitts told several of the em- ployees, including Burgess , that the factory was going to move. The employees asked Pitts how she knew this. Pitts told the employees that Hellman had said that, that she had just come out of Hell- man's office, and that Hellman had said that the Respondent was going to move two machines a day until the Respondent could get a -larger truck, and that then the Respondent was going to move them al 1.26 boss " Perlstein and Hager credibly denied such statements Hellman's testimony was to the effect that Perlstein said , " You know we are going to take over in there" and that he (Hellman) said that he liked his boss the way he is now I am convinced from the overall facts that Perlstein could have told Hellman words to the effect that he knew the Union would get in at Steele and that Hellman construed this to mean that the rights of control of employees would he affected and that he construed this in effect .is a partial new "boss " es The facts are based upon the credited testimony of Burgess A careful consideration of the pleadings, the hearing , and the briefs in this matter reinforces my conviction and understanding that this incident was not al- leged or litigated as an 8(a )( I) violation but rather was litigated on the basis of corroborative evidence relating to other alleged conduct M Burgess credibly testified on cross-examination that there were two machines moved around this time 354-126 O-LT - 73 - pt. 1 - 59 914 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD a. Company meeting, August 15, 196627 On August 15, 1966, the Respondent held a meeting at its plant where Hellman and some of the merchants (15 to 30) from Steele, Missouri, spoke to the employees.2" Hellman told the employees that Tommy Ger- man, the mayor of Steele, Missouri, was there to speak to them, that the merchants had requested a meeting with the employees and that the merchants had elected German to be their spokesman to ex- press their feelings about Steele Apparel. German told the employees that he was not speaking to them as the mayor but as a business- man representing the other businessmen there. German told the employees that the townspeople (merchants) had worked hard to get Steele Apparel in Steele, that they had worked hard to raise $100,000 for the building of the plant, that the plant had been vacant for 5 years before Steele Ap- parel came in, that many of the merchants had per- formed physical labor in finishing the building, that the building still had a $70,000 mortgage on it and that the merchants were cosigners on the notes. German told the employees that the Industrial Development Commission of Steele was trying to bring industry into Steele, Missouri, that they had done a lot of traveling trying to get new industry and without much success, that because of this Steele Apparel was becoming more and more im- portant to the community. German told the em- ployees that the merchants were very interested in what was going on because of this. German asked the employees to stop and think of what they did for an occupation before Steele Ap- parel came to Steele. German told them that before Steele Apparel the work opportunities had been that of being a waitress in a cafe at 50 cents an hour or chopping cotton on a farm at $5 to $7 a day. German told the employees that they, at least, now worked in an air-conditioned building and were getting a decent salary, not the best in the world, but at least a livable salary. German told the employees that the merchants were particularly in- terested in the building being occupied with work- ing personnel because it meant cash being spent in their trade area . German asked the employees to consider what they had accumulated since they had started work at Steele Apparel. German told the employees that they should feel free, if they had any problems or grievances, to call on him or any merchant there, that any of them (German and the merchants) would be glad to talk to them. During German's talk to the employees, one of the girls asked if Steele Apparel left would another factory come to Steele. German replied that he and others had made numerous trips to various towns trying to get industry and had had no success at all. German told the employees in effect that he wished that they or someone else knew where the commit- tee could get another company to come to Steele, Missouri. After German had turned the meeting back over to Hellman, several of the employees asked Hell- man questions. One employee stated that with all the confusion she had one question that she still wanted an answer to. The employee asked Hellman whether if the union came in if the factory would leave. Hellman reiterated that he could not answer this, that it would be against the law to so say. The employee asked if they were to ask the business people there, would they answer the question. Hell- man told her that it was possible that the business people would give her their opinion. Barbara Burgess told Hellman that a girl had told her that he (Hellman) had said that the Company was going to move two machines at a time until the company could get a larger truck and move all the machines. Burgess asked Hellman if this were true and if the factory were leaving. Hellman told Bur- gess that it was not true and that what was said between him and another person could not be proven. One of the girls asked Hellman if the factory closed and he knew that they had not anything to do with signing a union card would he help them get another job Hellman stated that if he could, he would, and if he recommended them they probably would be able to get another job, that if he didn't recommend them that they might not get another job. Mandie Evans, an employee, asked Hellman in 17 The facts are based upon a composite aspect of the credited testimony Pf Letha Brooks, Burgess, Jernigan , German, Hellman , Pride, Cun- ningham, and Miller To the extent that the testimony of Miller, Cun- ningham, German, and Hellman is inconsistent with the facts found and set out, it is discredited The aspects of Miller and Cunningham's testimony not credited are discredited because of unreliability I am convinced that Cunningham and Miller were attempting to truthfully testify but that they have interpreted what was said instead of accurately remembering all details German basically was a truthful witness but impressed me as a wit- ness not quite sure of the facts relating to the "withdrawal" forms and to be trying to tone down the relationship between Respondent and the merchants Hellman, as I have indicated, was not a persuasive witness Hellman first denied facts later clearly established and then later admitted the same but not strongly Thus Hellman initially denied saying anything about withdrawal forms but later admitted talking about such forms A careful consideration of the pleadings, the record, and the briefs reveal that the evidence relating to the August 15, 1966, meeting was primarily of- fered in support of complaint allegations relating to Hellman's statement concerning union authoroation withdrawals The evidence otherwise was offered as corroboration of other events " Although Hellman testified to the effect that wine of the townspeople had come to him and asked if they could present the community interest, and German testified to the effect that some of the merchants asked him and he in turn asked Hellman if "they" could come out and let someone talk to the employees, I am not convinced that Hellman and German credibly testified to the way the meeting was set up Hellman's testimony vacillated as to questions concerning "withdrawal" forms German's testimony was to the effect that he did not know the originating factor of the "withdrawal" forms I do not believe that either has testified fully and frankly about the "withdrawal" forms or the relationship between the Respondent and the merchants In any event it is unnecessary to know ex- actly how this meeting was set up Assuming the facts to be as Hellman or German testified to concerning the setting up of the meeting, the facts clearly reveal Respondent's responsibility for the acts of the merchants committee Henri I Siegel, Inc , 165 NLRB 493 STEELE APPAREL CO.. INC. 915 effect if an employee would get fired because she was for the Union or not or had signed a union card. Hellman told Evans that she should use her own judgment about the matter. One of the girls asked Hellman how they could go about getting their union cards back. Hellman told the employees that they could get their cards back by sending letters to the union office in Poplar Bluff and that they could get printed forms for such use at the plant or from the merchants in town. Hellman told the employees that such forms would either be in his office or on Bea Peters' desk. Hell- man told the employees that if any of them wanted to revoke their union cards to please send him a copy of the letter they sent to the Union. Letha Brooks asked German if the factory would stay empty if the Company left. German stated it probably would. Letha Brooks asked Hellman if the Respondent had a union at its Caraway plant. Hellman told Brooks that there was not a union there and there never would be one there. Hellman closed the meeting by telling the em- ployees to "be free from outside influences and let your conscience be your guide." Considering Hellman's statements to the em- ployees at the August 15, 1966, meeting in total context with the questions of employees and state- ments by German, I conclude and find that the Respondent, by Hellman, coercively attempted to get the employees to withdraw and revoke their union authorization cards. As alleged, such conduct is violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. I so con- clude and find. Q. What else was said at that time? A. I just told him how the girls was being treated by Beatrice by going from one to the other carrying tales and stirring up trouble and I said the girls didn't like that at all. He said he had let a union organizer slip by him and he named Mary Ash. Her nephew or something had worked there before and he asked me if I knew him and I said, "Yes, sir." I asked him if he was going to fire anybody, that was before- hand, and he said he was not going to fire any- body, but he said he might have to let a couple go. He named Margie Vent and Mary Ash. He said Mary Ash's nephew was a union organizer. Q. Was6ny other employee mentioned? A. Yes, sir. 0. Who? A. I told him I had gotten Carolyn Overturf, I wanted to know what had happened to Carolyn Overturf, and he wanted to know what I meant by that. I said, well, I told him I got her to sign a card and she just came up from St. Louis and I know she needs to work and I feel responsible for her, if it's because of the union purpose. He told me, he asked me if I thought I could get her card back. I said I didn't know but I would try. * A. He just told me if I could get her card back he would put her back to work. He told me he would like to have "Dot" Bolton's card back, but he thought that probably wouldn't be possible I said I didn't think so either. b. Events after the speech August 15, 16, 196629 After the meeting on August 15, 1966, Hellman spoke to Mandie Evans. What occurred is revealed by the following credited excerpts of Evans' testimony. A. I was working until 5 :30. About 5 minutes till 5 he came out to my machine and asked me if I had something to say to him. Q. What did you say? A. I told him I thought I did. He said if I make up my mind to say it, he'll be in his of- fice. Q. What did you do? A. I got up and walked in there. I told him I was fixing to tell him what I had been wanting to say for a long time, that he was accusing a lot of innocent girls and dismissing a lot of them and laying them off on account of the union. He said they were starting a union and I told him the union wasn't started with the girls, it was inside the factory. -' The facts are based upon Evans' credited testimony Evans testified in a credible, frank, forthright, and truthful manner Hellman, in his testimony to the single effect that Evans simply approached him and asked how to get her union card back, impressed me as a witness lacking in candor As in- dicated with other issues I was not persuaded of the reliability of much of * * * A. He told me I should have come in and told him about all of this before this happened and I told him we figured he knew what was going on out there. He said he didn't. After it was all over with, he said he would make me spokesman for this group if I want to be, after this is all over with. Q. Was anything said about whether the fac- tory would remain or not? A. Yes, sir. Q. Will you tell us what was said and by whom? A. He told me, he said, "I'll swear on my kids, and I love my kids, that this factory will close if the union comes in." Q. What else did he say at that time? Was there anything said at that time about your re- peating his statement? A. He told me, as I said before, Bea told me Hellman's testimony and a composite evaluation of the demeanor of the witnesses and the logical consistency of all of the evidence convinces me that Evans' testimony was more reliable than Hellman's I credit Evans' version and discredit Hellman's version of these events 916 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD if I repeated anything she'd call me a liar and I repeated that to him. He said, "Just like Bea said, if you repeat what I've said, I'll have to call you a liar." A. He asked me if I would get my card back and I told him I would. Q. How did he know you had signed one? A. He asked me if I had and he asked me if I was going to a union meeting that night and I told him I was. He told me there wasn't going to be one. Q. Did he further explain that? A. No sir. Q. When he asked you if you would get your card back, what did you say? A. I told him I would think about it at first and then I told him I would. Q. Was there any reference to any other employees or their cards? A. He just asked me if I would try to get some of their cards back. Q. Did he mention any specific people? A. He said "Dot" and 1 though he meant "Dot" Rose. I said she didn't have anything to do with it. He said he meant "Dot" Bolton and that's all I remember. * Q. Did you see Mr. Hellman the next day? A. Yes, sir. 0. Did you have any conversation with him that day? A. No, not really conversation. He just came out to my machine and asked me if I got my card back and I told him I hadn't. Q. What did he say? A. He had one of those pamphlets in his hand and he said, "Do you want this?" I took it and put it in my drawer. Q. What do you mean pamphlets? A. So we could get our card back. At the time I had intentions of getting my card back. A. I just told him I didn't want the factory to leave but there were a lot of other things that were going on around there that should be straightened out, and he said there wasn't anything he could do about it right then, and he went on to say if the union did come in, the factory would go. c. Conclusions30 Considering all of the foregoing, I conclude and ' It is clear from the complaint and the evidence that complaint allega- tions 6B, 6C, 6J, and 6K are the complaint allegations involved Although complaint allegations 6B and 6C alluded to conduct on August 5, 1966, and complaint allegations 6J and 6K alluded to conduct on August 15, find, as alleged, that the Respondent by Hellman engaged in conduct violative of Section 8(a)( 1) of the Act in: (1) interrogating Evans about her union activities in a manner constituting interference, restraint, and coercion within the meaning of Sec- tion 8(a)(1) of the Act; (2) telling Evans that if she would get Overturf to revoke her union authoriza- tion that he would put Overturf back to work; (3) in coercively urging Evans to revoke her union authorization card; (4) in coercively urging Evans to solicit other employees to revoke their union authorization cards; (5) in soliciting Evans to work against the Union in a mixture of coercion of threat of plant closure and promise of favored status as "spokesman"; (6) in threatening that the plant would close if the Union came in; and (7) in furnishing preprinted forms (for withdrawal of union authorization cards) to Evans in a manner constituting interference, restraint, and coercion within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 12. Events of August 18, 1966" On August 18, 1966, David Pritchett secured preprinted forms (for withdrawal from the Union of his union authorization card) from Hellman. David Pritchett that night completed such forms and mailed them to the Union. Conclusion Considering the foregoing in connection with Hellman's conduct in the company meeting of Au- gust 15 , 1966, I conclude and find , as alleged, that the Respondent , by Hellman , furnished preprinted forms (for withdrawal of union authorization cards) to Pritchett in a manner constituting interference, restraint, and coercion of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 13. Events circa August 18, 1966: Beatrice Peters talks to Vent and others For an understanding of the August 18, 1966, and August 24, 1966, incidents involving Beatrice Peters and Marjorie Vent, I find it proper to set forth initially certain background facts. Marjorie Vent's name was included on the telegram (sent by the Union and received by the Company on August 5, 1966) as one of the Union's organizing commit- tee. On August 8, 1966, Vent was laid off from work. As found earlier in this Decision the August 8, 1966, layoff of Vent was for discriminatory reasons . On August 17, 1966, the Union filed unfair labor practice charges concerning the layoff of Vent on August 8, 1966, and other matters. Copies of these charges were received by the Respondent on August 19, 1966. 1966, it is clear that the incidents occurred on August 15 and 16, 1966, and were litigated on that basis " The facts relating to David Pritchett are based upon David Pritchett's credited testimony STEELE APPAREL CO., INC. 917 On August 18, 1966,32 Vent was recalled to work and returned to work. A day or two later, while at work, Vent left her machine and went into the restroom. A few minutes later Supervisor Beatrice Peters followed Vent into the restroom. Supervisor Beatrice Peters told Vent that if she quit talking she would know that someone had come in. Peters told Vent that she wanted to tell her the reason she (Vent) was laid off. Vent asked Peters what the reason for her layoff was. Peters told Vent that the reason was because Vent's name had been on the August 5, 1966, telegram and because Hellman thought that Vent had something to do with the Union. One morning, shortly after the foregoing in- cident, Vent and Mary Ash were in a restaurant called "The Drumstick." Supervisor Beatrice Peters and her husband Supervisor Frank Peters came into the restaurant. Supervisor Beatrice Peters came over to the table where Vent and Ash were and said that it would not be pleasant if Hellman came in and saw her talking to Vent and Ash. Ash asked if she were laid off because of Jerry Ash. Supervisor Beatrice Peters told Mary Ash that that was the reason, and that Vent was laid off because Vent had been on the union committee. The Respondent admits that Beatrice Peters is a supervisor within the meaning of the Act but denies that Beatrice Peters acted as its agent in the August 18 and 24, 1966, conversations with Vent and Ash. The General Counsel cites and I agree that Orange Premium Stamps, 127 NLRB 1491, 1492, footnote 4, presents the controlling law as to the instant case and that the Respondent is liable for the conduct of its supervisor, Beatrice Peters, in such regard. The facts in the instant case are dissimilar to the facts in Cosmopolitan Studios, Inc., 127 NLRB 788, and similar cases wherein the Board relieves the Respondent from liability of certain types of con- duct if the supervisor is a union member and in- cluded in the bargaining unit Considering all the foregoing, I conclude and find that the Respondent, by Supervisor Beatrice Peters, 'engaged in coercive conduct violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by telling employees in effect that the employees had been laid off because of their union activities. 14. Events of August 18 to September 21, 1966: solicitation of withdrawal of union authorizations: threats: and layoffs of Cunningham, David Pritchett, and Betty Pritchett3'' a. Background John Paul Cunningham was first employed by the Respondent in December 1965 and worked as a spreader in the cutting department. Betty Pritchett was hired by the Respondent on April 11, 1966, and worked as a regular sewing machine operator. David Pritchett was hired by the Respondent in July 1966 and worked as a bundle boy and spreader in the cutting department. Johnny Middleton was hired at some date sub- sequent to David Pritchett's hiring date and worked in the cutting department as a spreader. b. Union activity John Cunningham signed a union authorization card on August 8, 1966, and gave the same to Man- die Evans for the Union. David and Betty Pritchett signed union authorization cards on August 9, 1966, and gave the same to Mandie Evans for the Union. c. The Pritchetts' revocation forms As indicated previously, Hellman and Smoller at the company meeting of August 5, 1966, told the employees in effect that if the Union came in it would be inevitable that the plant would close. Hellman, on August 15, 1966, also told the em- ployees of the availability of forms to use in withdrawing their union authorization cards. On August 18, 1966, David Pritchett secured from Hellman the forms to be used in withdrawing authorization for union representation. That night such forms were completed for David and Betty Pr- tichett and sent to the Union.34 d. The Union's August 19, 1966, telegram to the Respondent On August 19, 1966, the i Jnion sent to the Respondent a telegram adding three names (John Cunningham, David Pritchett, and Betty Pritchett) " The facts relating to Beatrice Peters' statements of August 18 and 24, 1966, are based upon a composite of the credited testimony of Vent and Ash To the extent that Ash's testimony is more explicit as to the reason for her (Ash's) layoff being because of her union activity it is discredited I am convinced that Mary Ash interpreted the meaning of what was said as she 'testified but that Beatrice Peters did not precisely so say " Except as indicated the facts are virtually undisputed and are based on a composite of stipulations , exhibits, and the credited aspects of the testimony of Cunningham, David and Betty Pritchett, and Hellman " Betty Pritchett testified somewhat unsurely on direct examination to the effect that the reason for their sending in the revocation forms was that they had heard that if one had not worked there for a certain length of time that the card would not count and that they would be laid off On cross-ex- amination Betty Pritchett testified more positively and simply to the effect that the Pritchetts executed the withdrawal forms because there were "ru- mors" going around the plant , and that they had not worked there long Considering Betty Pritchett's testimony and Hellman's August 15, 1966, statements, I am convinced that the Pntchetts believed from the rumors that they heard that there were going to he "layoffs," that as relatively new employees they were exposed to such layoffs, and that they felt that their union cards jeopardized their work opportunity 918 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD as members of the Union's organizing committee. The telegram is herein set out.3 Please be advised that the following Steele Ap- parel employees are members of the Steele Or- ganizing Committee and are expected to receive all rights and privileges due them under the National Labor Relations Act namely- John Paul Cunningham, David Pritchett, and Betty Pritchett Jerry Perlstein Mgr South Mo Ark Dist Council ILGWU On August 22, 1966, Johnny Middleton went on layoff status because of illness. Later , at an unk- nown time between August 22, 1966, and Sep- tember 13 , 1966, when Middleton was ready to return to work, he was continued on layoff status until September 13, 1966, when he returned to work. e. The Layoff of David Pritchett At some point of time on or after August 22 and on or before August 31 , 1966, the Respondent laid off David Pritchett . David Pritchett was returned to work at some point of time on or after September 8 and on or before September 13, 1966. Although the General Counsel 's amended com- plaint added allegations of discriminatory layoffs on or about September 20, 1966 , of Cunningham and the two Pritchetts , at the hearing an evaluation of the facts necessitated an amendment by the General Counsel as to Cunningham so as to allege a discriminatory layoff on September 1, 1966. It also appears highly probable that the General Counsel decided to drop his contentions with respect to the allegations concerning David Pritchett . In any event the matter of David Pritchett's layoff did not ap- pear to be litigated as a discriminatory layoff. Nor did the General Counsel's or Charging Party's briefs reveal a continuing contention. Perhaps, because of the multiplicity of issues, the General Counsel by inadvertence neglected to formally withdraw such allegation In any event the issue raised by the pleading and contentions of the Respondent is the basis of David Pritchett's layoff: was it discriminatory or because of lack of work. As to the available production work for cutters and spreaders, (1) Cunningham testified to the ef- fect that he did not know if there was any work available for a spreader on September 1, 1966, and (2) Hellman testified that David Pritchett was laid off because of lack of work and that there was only enough cutter-spreading work for one man as of September 1, 1966. The parties also stipulated to and introduced into evidence data relating to work in progress during certain weeks and the number of garments produced during certain work. From the available data the amount of produc- tion started during certain weeks can be calculated. Thus the following table reveals such data. eeks of No. of dresses in dozens at beginning of week No. of dresses in dozens finished No. of dresses in dozens started No. of dresses in dozens at end of week 8/6 --13/66 1,612 363 (plus 471 (plus 1,720 8 dresses) 8 dresses) 8/13--20/66 1,720 386 267 1,601 8/20--27/66 1,601 432 (plus 465 (plus 1,634 4 dresses) 4 dresses) 8/27--31/66 1,634 250 (plus 4 dresses) 9/10/66 661 (plus 30 (plus 752 10 dresses) 2 dresses) */ 9/10--17/66 752 437 (plus 4 dresses) */Thus 30 dozens of dresses plus 2 dresses were started during period of time 8/27/66 to 9/10/66. There is no evidence to reveal that the Pritchetts or Cunningham had morn of layoffs, I do not evaluate the telegram as establishing either that authorved the use of their names on this telegram, or if so when Nor is Cunningham or the Pritchetts were on a union organizing committee or there any evidence of union activity on the part of Cunningham or the that any real significance should he placed upon the timing of the telegram Pritchetts other than their execution of union authorv ahon cards Con- and layoffs thereafter It is well known that telegrams of this type are used sidenng the fact that the telegram follows the execution of their cards by 10 as a tactical means of furnishing "company knowledge " of union ad- days, that the use of a telegram implies urgency , that the Pntchetts had ex- herents s ecuted revocations on August 18, 1966 , that there appear to have been ru- STEELE APPAREL CO., INC. 919 Although employees David Pritchett and John Cunningham testified, neither testified to the effect that the available work was of such amount that continuation of their employment was warranted at the time. Essentially the question as to David Pritchett's layoff depends upon whether Hellman's testimony as to the reason for Pritchett's discharge is credited or not. A determination of Hellman's credibility in this respect requires a consideration: (1) that the Respondent has a demonstrated propensity to inter- fere with, restrain, and coerce its employees as revealed by the conduct found to be violative of Section 8(a)(1) in this case; (2) that the Respon- dent has a demonstrated propensity to discriminate with regard to the hire and tenure of employees as revealed by the discriminatory discharge and layoff of employees found to be violative in this case; (3) that David Pritchett, at the time of his layoff, has only been revealed to have engaged in the limited union activity of signing a union card; (4) that little evidentiary value can be attributed to the timing of the August 19, 1966, telegram notifying the Respondent that David Pritchett was on the union organizing committee; (5) that David Pritchett's layoff and recall was on a seniority basis; (6) that the evidence relating to available production tends to corroborate Hellman's testimony; and (7) that Hellman, as to some other events, has testified con- trary to established and believable facts. Consider- ing all of the evidence and the foregoing, including Hellman's demeanor, I am persuaded , and I con- clude, find, and believe that the preponderance of the objective considerations militates for a crediting of Hellman in his testimony to the effect that David Pritchett was laid off because of lack of work and not because of union activity.36 I so credit Hell- man's testimony. Accordingly, I conclude and find that the General Counsel has not established that the Respondent has discriminatorily laid off David Pritchett in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (I) of the Act as alleged. f. Events of August 25 and 29, 1966 : the layoff of Cunningham" After John Cunningham signed a union card on August 8 , 1966, he had a conversation with Super- visor Frank Peters on August 25 , 1966, about his union card . Supervisor Frank Peters told Cun- ningham that Hellman was mad and wanted Cun- ningham to get his union card back , that Cun- ningham should try to get his union card back. A few days later, around August 29, 1966, Supervisor Frank Peters told Cunningham that Hellman wac "mad" because Hellman had found out that Cun- ningham knew that Hellman was the one who wanted Cunningham to get his union card back. Considering the foregoing, I conclude and find that the Respondent, by Supervisor Peters, engaged in coercive conduct designed to interfere with, restrain, and coerce employees in the exercise of their union activities. Such conduct is violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. I so conclude and find. On August 31, 1966, the Respondent notified John Cunningham that he was to be laid off on Sep- tember 1, 1966 Thereafter Cunningham was laid off for the period of time from September 1 through 8, 1966. Cunningham was laid off and re- called in line of seniority. The General Counsel contends that Cunningham was laid off because Hellman was mad because Cunningham had signed a union authorization card and refused to revoke it when Supervisor Peters requested him to do so, and that the layoff was used to attempt to coerce Cunningham to revoke his union card. The Respondent contends that Cunningham was not discriminatorily laid off, that Cunningham was laid off because of lack of work, and that there was only sufficient work for one man-Supervisor Frank Peters. Essentially the issue as to whether the Respon- dent discriminatorily laid off Cunningham requires a determination of whether Hellman's testimony to the effect that Cunningham was laid off because of lack of work is credible or not. In addition to the facts considered with respect to the reason for David Pritchett's layoff one must consider the direct nature of Supervisor Frank Peters' state- ments to Cunningham as to Hellman 's reflected at- titude as well as a contention that the Respondent deviated from normal procedure in not keeping Cunningham to help Supervisor Peters work. As to the latter contention Hellman did testify to the effect that, although he did not remember hav- ing said so, it would have been normal if work got real short that he would have cut back the work and let Peters do the cutting and Cunningham do the spreading. It appears, however, that this would be postulated on an assumption that there was enough cutting and spreading work to keep the two busy for a week. It does not appear that it would follow that if work was so short that only enough work was available for one man for a week that such procedure would be followed. It would appear that if there were enough work available on August 31, 1966, for two men that Cunningham would have testified to such effect. He did not do so. Although the statistical data as to production previously set out is not conclusive as to the question involved herein, it certainly tends to m Although there is a contention that the Respondent tranferred work " The facts are based upon Cunningham 's credited testimony from the Steele plant to its Caraway plant , it suffices to say that the facts are insufficient to so reveal 920 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD corroborate Hellman 's testimony. Considering all of the facts and essentially for the same reasons as in- dicated with respect to the resolution of Hellman's credibility as to the testified reason for David Pritchett's layoff, I am convinced that objective considerations militate for a crediting of Hellman's testimony to the effect that Cunningham was laid off because of lack of work. Accordingly, I conclude and find that the evidence does not establish that the Respondent discriminatorily laid off Cunningham on September 1, 1966. g. Events of August 31, 1966: the Pritchetts sign new union cards Apparently during the time of David Pritchett's layoff, on August 3 1, 1966, the two Pritchetts again signed union cards. Betty Pritchett at some point of time between August 31, 1966, and September 19, 1966, told Letha Brooks that the Union could noti- fy the Respondent that she was a member of the Union's organizing committee .311 On September 19, 1966, the Union sent a tele- gram to the Respondent notifying the Respondent again that Cunningham, David Pritchett, and Betty Pritchett were members of the Union's organizing committee.39 h. Events of September 2, 1966'0 As background it should be noted that Barger signed a union authorization card on August 1, 1966 On or about August 5, 1966, Letha Brooks had the union include Josephine Barger's name on the telegram sent to the Respondent on August 5, 1966. The telegram set forth that Josephine Barger was a member of the Union's Steele Apparel em- ployees' organizational committee. Later Letha Brooks told Josephine Barger what she had done. Letha Brooks told Barger that she (Barger) would kill her (Brooks) but that she had put her name on a telegram. Brooks asked Barger if she (Barger ) had told her to or not. Barger replied that she had not. Barger made no indication at that time or later until September 2, 1966, of dissatisfaction with what Brooks had done. Barger credibly testified that the reason that she took no action on this matter until September 2, 1966, was that she was waiting to see how things turned out. Consider- ing the foregoing, I conclude and find that Barger thus ratified and condoned Brooks' actions with relation to the telegram until September 2, 1966. After the company meeting of August 15, 1966, in which Hellman had related the procedures of getting union authorization cards revoked and the securing of registered mail receipts, Barger, on or about September 2, 1966, secured one of the preprinted withdrawal forms from a newspaper of- fice downtown. On September 2, 1966, Barger completed said form and added in writing on said form, "I want my name removed from the commit- tee immediately. I don't like being used by anyone, and I'm capable of doing my own talking, especially when my name is used without my consent." Later, Barger asked to see Hellman, saw him, and told him that she had sent a "withdrawal" form to the Union and that she would like to tell him why. Hellman told Barger that he could not talk to her directly about the "withdrawal." Hellman, how- ever, asked Barger to send him the registered mail receipt form. Hellman told Barger that this "was the only way we can do anything about it or help." Considering all of the foregoing and in connec- tion with Hellman's coercive attempt on August 15, 1966, at the union meeting to get employees to withdraw from the Union, the foregoing conduct of Hellman constitutes conduct designed to cause em- ployees to believe that it was necessary to prove to the Respondent that they had abandoned the Union in order to remain in the good graces of the Respondent. Such conduct of Hellman constitutes conduct of the Respondent violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. I so conclude and find. i. The layoff of Betty Pritchett On September 21, 1966, Betty Pritchett was laid off for 8 days.4' Thereafter Betty Pritchett had other layoffs. Thus Betty Pritchett was laid off (1) for 6 days during the pay period ending October 15, 1966; (2) for periods of 5 days and 10 days dur- ing the pay period ending October 29, 1966; and (3) for 5 days during the pay period ending December 12, 1966. Betty Pritchett was working as ,of the date of the hearing in this matter (February '28-March 8, 1967) Essentially the General Counsel contends that the timing of Betty Pritchett's layoff following the September 19, 1966, telegram notifying the Respondent that she was on the Union's organizing committee, plus the fact that she was not trans- ferred to some other job for which she was qualified, reveals a discriminatory layoff. As to the latter contention I note that testimony of Letha Brooks and others was to the effect that (about the time of Hager's and Overturf's discharge and layoffs) employees were transferred from sew- ing jobs to belting. The totality of the testimony in this respect, however, was to the effect that em- ' There is no evidence to reveal that Cunningham or David Pritchett made similar authorizations, nor is there evidence of union activity by such employees other than the signing of their cards ' The language of the telegram was identical to the language of the Au- gust 19, 1966, telegram It is noted, however, that the parties stipulated to these telegrams , and there is no issue that there were two telegrams ° The facts are based upon the credited testimony of Barger I found Barger to appear to be a frank , forthright, and truthful witness I discredit Hellman's denial of the incident because, as indicated previously as to much of his testimony, I found him to appear lacking in candor or forthrightness " The record does,not establish when the Respondent notified Betty Pritchett of her layoff STEELE APPAREL CO., INC. ployees were transferred to such belting work because of a need for the belting work. The evidence does not establish that at the time of Betty Pritchett's layoff there was a need for such work. Hellman testified to the effect that Betty Pritchett was laid off because of lack of work. Similar to the credibility resolution pertaining to Hellman's testimony relating to the reasons for the layoffs of David Pritchett and John Cunningham, I find that the totality of the evidence militates for a crediting of Hellman's testimony and so credit it. Accordingly, I conclude and find that the evidence does not establish that the Respondent discriminatorily laid off Betty Pritchett in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act D. The Refusal To Bargain 1. The appropriate bargaining unit The pleadings establish, it is undisputed, and I conclude and find that all production and main- tenance employees of Steele Apparel Company, Inc., employed at the Steele Apparel Company, Inc., Steele, Missouri, place of business, excluding all other employees, office clerical and professional employees, guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for the pur- pose of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act. 2. Employees in the unit The parties stipulated to the effect that there were at least 101 employees in the appropriate bar- gaining unit . The 101 employees that the parties agreed were in the unit were. Connie Hicks Dorothy King Cherre Erwin Jewell Davis Louise Howell Linda Ayers Madie Darnell Ruth Pierce Marie Dennis Ilene Carnell Ruby Miller Clara Fraze Judy Cole Wilma Massey Luvenia Fowler Alice Derrick Dora Smith Grace Pitts Geralden Smith Floye Ellis Ruth Ricketts Pauline Ballard Bobbie Glidewell Sarah Baker Linda Cochran David Pritchett Irene Terry Clara Mullins Ruby Northern Opal Waller Louise Gray Jewel Pugh Billie Dildine Pauline Privett Christine Allard Velma Farris Barbara Rose Katherine Beaird Lois Griggs Alice Welch Marble Bray Mary Hawkins Polly Fleeman Margie Vent Jo Bivins Bernice Fuller Lois Smothers Thelma Bishop Shirley Griggs Doris Wimberley Barbara Burgess Dixie Kackley Betty Whitaker Mary Decker Margie Flood Curtis Perce Mary Wynn Delia Akins Emma Hill Myrtle Sanders Joe Davis Mereda Pride Stella Driskill Brenda Rgins Mary Ash Carolyn Ferguson Ruth Samford Shirley Biggs Patsy Glidewell Ocie Williamson Letha Brooks Geneva Jernigan Wanda Goodwin 921 Johnnie Hawkins Marie Howell Leona Chester Flora Proctor Louise Mitchell Lois Laster Sherry Pritchard Betty Pritchett Norma King Mandie Evans Sarah Robison Josephine Barger Glenda Louise Gray Judy Tremblay Dorothy Bolton Betty Hager Floria Atkins Emma Champman Earlena Welch Joan Cunningham Ruby Hatley Lucille Nenley Eugene Young Janey Walker Lena Brooks Millie Allen Carolyn Overturf Carl Biggs The parties were in disagreement at the hearing as to the status of four persons. These were Floy Smith, Dorothy Dodd, Jo Pugh, and Charles Flanagan. The facts clearly reveal that Floy Smith was an employee properly includable in the bar- gaining unit. The General Counsel's and Respon- dent's briefs agree to the inclusion of Floy Smith in the unit. Language in the Charging Party's brief as to the attempt to eliminate duplication of matters argued in the General Counsel's brief at least in- dicates an implied agreement as to the inclusion of Floy Smith in the unit. Since the facts found with respect to proper authorization cards reveal that the Union had a majority in the appropriate bar- gaining unit on August 17 and 18, 1966, for unit complements of 102, 103, 104, or 105 employees, I find it unnecessary to determine the status of Dorothy Dodd, Jo Pugh, or Charles Flanagan. 3. Authorization for union representation It is undisputed that on dates during the month of July and on August 17, 1966, the employees named below in the bargaining unit signed and completed, or authorized to be signed and completed, cards which on their face authorized the Union to be the collective-bargaining representative of such em- ployees. It is also undisputed that such cards were thereafter delivered to the Union prior to August 17, 1966. The referred to employees are: Delia Akins Mereda Pride 922 Millie Allen Mary Ash Sarah Baker Josephine Barger Katherine Beaird Thelma Bishop Dorothy Bolton Letha Brooks Barbara Burgess Leona Chester Judy Cole Ileen Carnell Patsy Glidewell Madie Darnell Jewell Davis Joe Davis Mary Decker Marie Dennis Alice Derrick Billie Dildine Stella Driskill Mandie Evans Velma Farris Carolyn Ferguson Clara Fraze Bobbie Glidewell DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Wanda Goodwin Glenda Louise Gray Shirley Griggs Betty Hager Ruby Hatley Johnny Hawkins Emma Hill Geneva Jernigan Dorothy King Lois Laster Ruby Miller Carolyn Overturf Ruth Pierce Betty Pritchett David Pritchett Flora Proctor Brenda Ragins Ruth Ricketts Sarah Robinson Barbara Rose Dora Smith Judy Tremblay Margie Vent Betty Whitaker Ocie Williamson Joan Cunningham The Respondent attacks the validity of the authorization cards upon various grounds of con- tended misrepresentation. The Respondent attacks the validity of a number of the cards upon the grounds that the cards either expressly indicated that the cards would remain confidential or that the employee signer was told that the cards would remain confidential . The key question is whether a misrepresentation is of a na- ture that would have bearing upon the intent of the party signing the card . In other words, in the instant case, does the statement of confidentiality have a bearing upon whether the signers of the cards in- tended that the Union be authorized to represent such employees for collective bargaining . It is clear that the question of confidentiality does not relate to the question of intent in such manner. Consistent with Board law on this question the Respondent's contentions as to such misrepresentation are re- jected.42 4' Koeliler's Wholesale Restaurant Supply, 139 NLRB 945, 947 " Freed Oil Compass, /n(, 158 NLRB 391 The Respondent 's counsel extensively cross-examined the General Counsel's witnesses as to what was said with reference to the use of cards for the obtaining of an election The witnesses consistently testified to the effect that nothing was said which would indicate that the cards were limited to use of obtaining an election The tenor of the questions and the answers thereto revealed that the wit- nesses and questioners knew there was a significance to whether statements were made to indicate that the only purpose of the cards was for an elec- tion Some of the Respondent's counsel's questions were phrased so as to elicit a reply that there were or were not statements made to the effect that the cards were not to be used only or solely for an election I am convinced from the overall testimony of the witnesses that such questions were con- fusing to the witnesses and that the witnesses attempted truthfully to answer as to what was actually said I am convinced from the totality of the evidence that nothing was said to indicate either that the cards were solely The Respondent contends that various state- ments relating to an election or other use of the cards for obtaining an election constitute misrepresentations which adversely affected the validity of some or all of the union authorization cards. It suffices to say that the authorization cards clearly revealed that the employees ( signers) were authorizing the Union to be their collective-bar- gaining representative , and there is no testimony to reveal that the employees were ever told that the cards would not be used for such a purpose.' The Respondent contends that certain authoriza- tion cards should not be deemed valid because the General Counsel did not proffer the signers of such cards but authenticated them by other means. The referred-to cards were properly authenticated in ac- cordance with accepted evidentiary rules. I know of no reason why the Respondent is entitled to deter- mine the General Counsel's method of proof as long as the method used is proper. The Respon- dent 's contention in such regard is rejected. The Respondent contends that the card signed by Thelma Bishop on August 3, 1966, should not be counted in determining the majority status of the Union on August 17, 1966 (or August 18, 1966), because union agents allegedly made threatening statements to Bishop prior to the signing of the card on August 3, 1966, and that prior to August 17, 1966, Bishop had revoked such authorization of representation. The relevant facts are as follows: Thelma Bishop signed a union authorization card on August 3, 1966. Prior to signing the card Bishop had a con- versation with Letha Brooks and Helen Phipps of the Union. During the discussion the question arose as to whether Bishop's name would be included on a list of names to be sent to the Respondent as members of the Union 's organizing committee. Bishop informed Letha Brooks and Helen Phipps that she did not want her name publicized as having signed a union card. There was also some discus- sion of the effect of the selection of the Union and the right to work." As has been indicated earlier, the Respondent held its company meeting for employees on August 5, 1966, in which it transmitted a message to the employees that it did not want a union, was op- or only for the purpose of an election The cards that were used clearly in- dicate ( using the language of the question used by Respondent 's counsel) that they were not to be used only or solely for the purpose of an election Furthermore, none of the Respondent 's witnesses adverted to having been told that the cards were to he used only or solely for the purpose of an elec- tion " Exactly what was said is not revealed by reliable testimony Bishop's testimony on this point on direct and cross-examination was revealed to he unreliable I am convinced that Bishop 's testimony on direct examination to the effect that she was told if she didn't sign a card if the Union came in she might not get a job was Bishop 's interpretation of what she thought was said In my opinion this was clearly revealed when Bishop on cross-ex- amination testified that she didn't remember exactly how " it was said" and that it could have been "after the union comes in and gets a contract, everybody will have to be a member of the union to work " STEELE APPAREL CO., INC. 923 posed to the Union, and that the selection of a union meant inevitably that the plant would close. Thereafter, as previously set out in this Decision, the Respondent discriminatorily laid off Margie Vent on August 8, 1966, and Betty Hager on Au- gust 10, 1966. Both Vent and Hager were listed as members of the Union's organizing committee in the telegram sent to the Respondent on August 5, 1966 It is noted also that Hellman read this tele- gram and the names listed to the assembled em- ployees, including Bishop, on August 5, 1966. The Respondent also discriminatorily laid off Carolyn Overturf on August 10, 1966, subsequent to the receipt of a similar telegram from the Union on Au- gust 9, 1966, listing Overturf as a member of the Union's organizing campaign. On August 12, 1966, Thelma Bishop wrote the Union asking for her union card back. Bishop's letter was received at the Union's office on August 15, 1966. About the same time Bishop also spoke to Letha Brooks and told Letha Brooks that she would like to get her union card back, that she had thought it over, and that she was a Christian. Bishop told Brooks that she did not think that persons who were members of the church should take part in anything that had to be kept secret. On the night of August 17, 1966, Union Or- ganizer Phipps and Letha Brooks visited Bishop at her home.45 Phipps and Letha Brooks discussed with Bishop her reason for wanting her card back and told her that the Union wanted her to be satisfied with her card. Brooks and Phipps told Bishop that they wanted her to be satisfied because if she were not and there were an election that she would vote against the Union and the card would not mean anything.46 Bishop indicated that her reason for wanting her card back was a religious belief that it was wrong to be involved in something requiring secrecy such as the Union. Letha Brooks and Phipps gave Bishop some written information which revealed that a preacher in her church denomination had stated that it was not against the principles of her religion to belong to the Union. During the conversation Bishop also told Letha Brooks and Phipps that she could not afford to be laid off. Brooks and Phipps told Bishop that if the Union came in the em- ployees would get more benefits during the layoff periods. Bishop concluded her conversation with Brooks and Phipps by telling them in effect that be- fore making a final decision as to getting her card back she would think about it for 2 or 3 days further, that she might talk to her preacher, and that she then would decide whether she really wanted her union card back. On Friday, August 19, 1966, Bishop saw Letha Brooks and told Brooks that she had made up her mind, that she wanted her union card back, that she wanted Letha Brooks to tear her card up. Letha Brooks told Bishop that there was a union meeting that night and that she would tell Helen Phipps that Bishop wanted her card torn up. Helen Phipps was not present for a union meet- ing that night and no meeting ensued. Phipps was out of town for a few days and apparently Brooks mentioned that matter to Phipps later but no action was taken. Brooks and Bishop did not pursue the question with each other at a later date.41 On Au- gust 25, 1966, Thelma Bishop mailed to the Union a preprinted form of withdrawal of her union authorization card. Considering all of the foregoing, I conclude and find (I) that the evidence does not establish that threatening statements were made to Bishop as in- ducement for the signing of her union authorization card on August 3, 1966, and (2) that there was not a valid revocation of her August 3, 1966, union authorization card as of August 17 or 18, 1966.48 It is clear that the facts do not reveal a changed intent as to the desire for union representation. From the totality of the evidence I am convinced and per- suaded that the reference to "religious" beliefs by Bishop as a basis for revocation was merely a coverup for the real reason. The totality of the evidence reveals that Bishop's real reason for her act of revocation was her fear of layoff and that this fear was caused by Respondent's conduct on Au- gust 5, 1966, at the company meeting in expressing an inevitability of plant slowdown if the Union were selected, in expressing hostility to the Union and its adherents, and in the discrimination in job tenure directed toward Vent on August 8, and toward Overturf and Hager on August 10, 1966. Under such circumstances I conclude and find that the authorization of union representation by Bishop on August 3, 1966, continued in full effect for all material times relevant to the issues in this case. 'z This was on a Wednesday night when Bishop was preparing to go to a church meeting " I credit Phipps' and Letha Brooks' testimony to the effect that they did not tell employees in effect that the cards were only for an election Much of Bishop 's testimony appeared to be of a surprise nature to counsel As a result Bishop 's testimony was presented in a confused and jumbled manner As an example , on cross-examination , when being questioned as to the events of August 3 , 1966, and the card signing , Bishop's testimony rambled into the events of August 17, 1966 On cross-examination by the General Counsel , Bishop's testimony was to the effect that statements were made as if an election were surely planned On cross-examination by the Charging Party's counsel , Bishop's testimony was to the effect " if" an election 'oc- curred Considering all of the testimony and probabilities, I find the facts are as set out 47 1 credit Brooks' testimony to the effect that she did not tell Bishop she would tear up the card or that she told Bishop she had torn the card up I note in this respect that Bishop on August 25, 1966, sent in one of the preprinted withdrawal forms I find it hard to believe and don't believe that Bishop would have sent such a form in if she had been told her union card had been torn up I discredit Bishop's testimony to the effect that Brooks told her that her card had been torn up " It is unnecessary to consider whether the August 25 , 1906, revocation was valid or not However, if necessary, I would find such revocation not to be valid because of the same reasons as indicated for the August 12, 1966, revocation attempt 924 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD The Respondent contends that the union authorization card signed by Johnnie Hawkins on August 4, 1966, should not be counted as part of the designations because it was revoked by Haw- kins by one of the preprinted withdrawal forms dated August 16, 1966, and received by the Union on August 18, 1966. 1 find no merit in this conten- tion. First the evidence does not reveal that such revocation was received by the Union prior to the clearly demonstrated refusal of the Respondent to recognize and bargain with the Union Secondly, assuming the timeliness of a withdrawal of authorization for union representation, for substan- tially the same reasons as set forth with reference to Bishop's withdrawal requests, I conclude and find that the Respondent's coercive conduct was the contributing cause for such revocation and that thereby such revocation is not a valid revocation which destroys the validity of the prior authoriza- tion for representation.41 The Respondent contends that the union authorization cards of Mandie Evans and Barbara Rose should not be counted as designations for the Union because of statements made by Supervisor Beatrice Peters to such employees. Evans signed her union authorization card on August 4, 1966. Thereafter, on the morning of Au- gust 5, 1966, the Respondent was notified that cer- tain named employees were serving on a union or- ganizing committee. Just prior to 3 p.m. on August 5, 1966, Supervisor Beatrice Peters came by Evans' machine and told Evans that the employees might as well sign the union cards if they had them because everyone was going to get fired anyway. As indicated previously, the Respondent had its meet- ing later on August 5, 1966, in which Hellman and Smoller revealed the Respondent's antiunion at- titude. Barbara Rose signed a union card on or about August 8, 1966. Prior to this time there had been rumors that some of the employees had been ob- taining information from the union adherents and passing such information to the Respondent. One of the rumors was to the effect that Rose was engaged in such activity. Rose and Beatrice Peters discussed these rumors.50 Supervisor Beatrice Peters told Rose that if she (Rose) signed a union card this would show the girls for the Union that Rose was not carrying tales to the Employer. Peters also told Rose that she had heard that Rose was telling Hell- man things about her (Peters) which were not true. The facts further reveal that in the past, prior to the union campaign , Supervisor Peters had an- swered employee complaints about work problems by saying she was not to blame, that it was Hell- man's fault, and that the employees needed a union. The facts reveal that Supervisor Peters ex- pressed remarks during the union campaign which were couched in such a manner as to indicate a friendly attitude toward union organization. It is clear that the real authoritative supervision of the Company rested in Hellman's hands. It is also clear that the employees knew Heilman's attitude and that Supervisor Peters' remarks (friendly to the Union) were not official company policy. I am con- vinced that the employees knew they had no need to worry about pleasing Supervisor Peters as to matters which conflicted with Respondent's policy as expressed by Hellman and Smoller. Considering all of the evidence and the forego- ing, I am convinced, and I conclude and find that Supervisor Beatrice Peters' remarks did not have a coercive effect toward inducing the signing of the cards by Mandie Evans and Barbara Rose.51 The Respondent contends that the union authorization card of Ruby Hatley should not be counted because Hatley was told that if she didn't sign she would have to pay an initiation fee. Suffice it to say that Hatley's complete testimony on direct and cross-examination revealed that she was told in effect that after the Union got in and got a contract there would be a period of time that she could join the Union without having to pay an initiation fee The Respondent contends that the Union en- gaged in a campaign of misrepresentation and threats directed toward all employees and that thus the union cards secured are invalidated In support of such contentions the Respondent adduced testimony from various employees who were con- tacted and talked to by union officials and ad- herents. Many of the alleged misrepresentations have already been alluded to, discussed, and found not to constitute misrepresentation or improper in- ducement. It suffices to say that the totality of such proffered testimony does not establish that a widespread practice of misrepresentation existed and consequently does not affect the validity of the signed union cards received in the record in this case. In summary I find that the General Counsel has established that the Union represented a majority of the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit at the time of the Union's demand and the Respon- dent's refusal to bargain on August 17 and 18, 1966.52 I" Although not raised by the Respondent, the General Counsel and Charging Party referred in their briefs to a possible contention by the Respondent as to Johnnie Hawkins' card Thus they refer to Hawkins' testimony that prior to her signing her card Letha Brooks Said "most everybody had signed a card " In any event on the basis of Merrill A% le and Wheel Service, 158 NLRB 1113, such statements do not affect the validity of the card signed "' Rose in her testimony did not recall whether she sought out Peters or Peters sought her out 51 In fact, Evans ' card was signed prior to her conversation with Peters 52 At least 54 employee designations for representation out of a unit of 102 to 105 employees STEELE APPAREL CO., INC. 925 4. The demand for bargaining: the refusal to bargain On August 17, 1966, the Union transmitted to Heilman, for the Respondent, a telegram in which, among other things, the Union made a demand for recognition as the majority representative of em- ployees in the appropriate bargaining unit (produc- tion and maintenance employees) and for the com- mencement of bargaining as to a contract to cover such employees. On August 18, 1966, officials of the Union went to the Respondent's plant and orally reiterated such demands. In the telegram and in its oral statements the Union tendered the union authorization cards as proof of its representation status. The Respondent, by statements of its officials on August 18, 1966, and by letter from its attorney on August 19, 1966, refused to recognize the Union as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the employees in the appropriate collective-bar- gaining unit and refused to commence bargaining with the Union. The Respondent, by oral state- ments on August 18, 1966, expressed doubt as to the reliability of authorization cards as a means for establishing a majority status for the Union and in- dicated that the NLRB election procedure was the way to establish such majority status. The Respondent contends that its refusal to recognize and bargain with the Union was based upon a good-faith doubt that the Union represented a majority of the employees in the bargaining unit. Considering all of the facts, I am convinced that the facts reveal that the Respondent did not have a good-faith doubt as to the Union's majority status. Hellman testified in a vacillating manner as to his reason for rejecting the Union's demand. Suffice it to say that in his testimony he stated that his ex- pressed doubt was based upon a "general" feeling that the Union did not represent a majority of the employees. Considering all of the facts in this case, including the foregoing and the Respondent's conduct found to be violative of Section 8(a)( I) and (3) of the Act, I am convinced and I conclude and find that the totality of the evidence reveals that the Respon- dent's refusal to recognize and bargain with the Union was not based upon a good-faith doubt as to the majdrity status of the Union but was done in bad faith in furtherance of a plan to frustrate the desires of its employees as to unionization. Ac- cordingly, I conclude and find that the Respon- dent's refusal to recognize and bargain with the Union upon the Union's demands of August 17 and 18, 1966, constituted conduct violative of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act. IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of the Respondent set forth in sec- tion III, above, occurring in connection with the operations of the Respondent described in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. V. THE REMEDY Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, it will be recom- mended that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. It has been found that the Respondent has refused to bargain collectively in good faith with the Union as the exclusive representative of the em- ployees in the appropriate unit described herein. It will therefore be recommended that the Respon- dent bargain collectively, upon request, with the Union as the exclusive representative of the em- ployees in the appropriate unit, and, if an un- derstanding is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agreement. It has been found that the Respondent dis- criminated with respect to the tenure of employ- ment of Margie Vent, Betty Hager, and Carolyn Overturf, and thereby that the Respondent has vio- lated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. It will therefore be recommended that the Respondent offer Carolyn Overturf immediate and full reinstate- ment53 to her former or substantially equivalent position, without prejudice to her seniority and other rights and privileges, and make whole Margie Vent, Betty Hager, and Carolyn Overturf for any loss of pay each may have suffered by reason of the discrimination against each of them, by payment to each a sum of money equal to the difference, if any, between the wages each would have earned, absent the discrimination against each of them, and the amount of wages actually earned, if less, from the date of commencement of discrimination to the date of reinstatement or offer of reinstatement. 54 Such backpay shall be computed on a quarterly ba- sis, and in the manner established by the Board in -F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289, 291-294, and with interest thereon as prescribed by the Board in Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716. Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and upon the entire record in the case, I make the following: s' There is no issue and the facts reveal that Vent and Hager have been reinstated prior to the hearing in this matter S' In the case of Margie Vent the date of reinstatement is August IS. 1966 In the case of Betty Hager the date of reinstatement is September 12, 1966 In the case of Carolyn Overturf the date of offer of reinstatement will be the date that such offer is made 926 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD CONCLUSIONS OF LAW wise discriminating in regard to the hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employ- ment of any of its employees except to the extent that such may be done pursuant to an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment, as authorized in Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, as modified by the Labor- Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959. (b) Refusing to bargain collectively with Southern Missouri-Arkansas District Council, In- ternational Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive representative of all its employees in the appropriate bargaining unit with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employ- ment, and other terms and conditions of employ- ment. The appropriate unit is: all production and maintenance employees of Steele Apparel Com- pany, Inc., employed at the Company's Steele, Mis- souri, place of business, excluding all other em- ployees, office clerical and professional employees, guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act. (c) Interrogating its employees concerning their or other employees' union affiliation or activities in a manner constituting interference, restraint, or coercion within the Act. (d) Threatening its employees with statements that the plant will leave, that the plant will close, that they will be discharged, that they will be laid off, or that they will suffer other reprisals if they en- gage in union activity (e) Promising employees benefits as an induce- ment to cause employees to refrain from engaging in union activities or support of the Union. (f) In a manner constituting interference, restraint, or coercion, soliciting employees (1) to revoke their authorization of the Union as their col- lective-bargaining representative and (2) to get other employees to revoke their authorization of the Union as their collective-bargaining representa- tive. (g) In any other manner interfering with, restraining , or coercing its employees in the exer- cise of their rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, excepting as may be done as a result of the ef- fect on such rights of an agreement requiring mem- bership in a labor organization as a condition of employment, as authorized in Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, as modified by the Labor-Management Re- porting and Disclosure Act of 1959. 2. Take the following affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Offer Carolyn Overturf immediate and full reinstatement to her former or substantially equivalent position, without prejudice to her seniority or other rights and privileges. (b) Notify Carolyn Overturf if presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United States of her right to full reinstatement upon application in ac- cordance with the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Training and Service Act, as amended, after discharged from the Armed Forces. 1. Southern Missouri-Arkansas District Council International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, AFL-CIO, the Union, is now, and has been at all times material herein, a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act 2. Steele Apparel Company, Inc., the Respon- dent, is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 3. By interfering with, restraining, and coercing employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, the Respondent has en- gaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 4. By discriminating in regard to the hire and tenure of employment of employees, thereby discouraging membership in or activities on behalf of a labor organization, Respondent engaged in un- fair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. 5. All production and maintenance employees of Respondent employed at Respondent's Steele, Mis- souri, place of business, excluding all other em- ployees, office clerical and professional employees, guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act, con- stitute a unit appropriate for the purpose of collec- tive bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act. 6. On August 17, 1966, and at all times material thereafter, Southern Missouri-Arkansas District Council, International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, AFL-CIO, was and now is the representa- tive of a majority of the Respondent's employees in the appropriate unit described above for the pur- pose of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act. 7. By refusing on August 17 and 18, 1966, and at all times thereafter, to bargain collectively with the Union as the exclusive representative of all its employees in the above-described appropriate bar- gaining unit, the Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the mean- ing of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. 8. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. RECOMMENDED ORDER Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law and upon the entire record in this case , it is recommended that the Respon- dent, its officers , agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from. (a) Discouraging membership in or activities on behalf of Southern Missouri-Arkansas District Council , International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union , AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization of its employees by discharging , laying off, or other- STEELE APPAREL CO., INC 927 (c) Make whole Margie Vent , Betty Hager, and Carolyn Overturf for any loss of pay suffered by reason of the discrimination against them in the manner set forth in the section of this Decision en- titled "The Remedy." (d) Preserve and, upon request , make available to the Board and its agents , for examination and copying, all payroll records , social security payment records , timecards , personnel records and reports, and all other records relevant or necessary to the determination of the amounts of backpay due and to the reinstatement and related rights provided under the terms of this Recommended Order. (e) Upon request bargain collectively with Southern Missouri-Arkansas District Council, In- ternational Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive representative of the employees in the appropriate unit and embody any understanding reached in a signed contract. (f) Post at its plant in Steele , Missouri, copies of the attached notice marked " Appendix . "55 Copies of said notice , on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 14, after being duly signed by the official representative of Respondent, shall be posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof and be maintained by it for a period of 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted . Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced , or covered by any other material. (g) Notify the Regional Director for Region 14, in writing, within 20 days from the date of this Recommended Order , what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith.51 IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED as to those allega- tions of the complaint found to be without merit, as indicated in the Decision herein, that such allega- tions be dismissed. ' In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, the words " a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the notice In the further event that the Board's Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Ap- peals Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision and Order - ' In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, this provision shall be modified to read "Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps the Respon- dent has taken to comply herewith " APPENDIX NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board and in order to effectuate the policies of the Na- tional Labor Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our employees that: WE WILL NOT discourage membership in or activities on behalf of Southern Missouri-Ar- kansas District Council International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization of our employees by discharging, laying off, or otherwise dis- criminating in regard to hire and tenure of em- ployment or any term or condition of employ- ment of any of our employees except to the ex- tent that such may be done pursuant to an agreement requiring membership in a labor or- ganization as a condition of employment, as authorized in Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, as modified by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with Southern Missouri-Arkansas District Council International Ladies' Garment Wor- kers' Union, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive representative of all our employees in the ap- propriate bargaining unit with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other terms and conditions of employment. WE WILL NOT interrogate our employees concerning their or other employees' union af- filiation or activities, in a manner constituting interference, restraint, or coercion within the meaning of the Act. WE WILL NOT threaten our employees with statements that our plant will leave, that our plant will close, that they will be discharged, that they will be laid off, or that they will suffer other reprisals if they engage in union activity. WE WILL NOT promise our employees benefits as an inducement to cause employees to refrain from engaging in union activities or support of the Union. WE WILL NOT, in a manner constituting inter- ference, restraint, or coercion, (1) solicit em- ployees to revoke their authorization of the Union as their collective-bargaining represen- tative and (2) solicit employees to get other employees to revoke their authorization of the Union as their collective-bargaining represen- tative. WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, excepting as may be done as a result of the effect on such rights of an agree- ment requiring membership in a labor or- ganization as a condition of employment, as authorized by Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, as modified by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959. WE WILL offer Carolyn Overturf immediate and full reinstatement to her former or sub- stantially equivalent position, without preju- dice to her seniority or other rights and privileges, and if she is presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United States WE WILL notify her of her right to full reinstatement upon application in accordance with the Selec- 928 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD tive Service Act and the Military Training and Service Act, as amended, after discharge from the Armed Forces. WE WILL make whole Margie Vent, Carolyn Overturf, and Betty Hager for any loss of pay suffered by reason of the discrimination against them in the manner set forth in the section (in the Decision in this matter ) entitled "The Remedy." WE WILL bargain collectively, upon request, with the Southern Missouri-Arkansas District Council, International Ladies' Garment Wor- kers' Union, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive bar- gaining representative of all our employees in the appropriate unit described below with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of em- ployment, and other terms and conditions of employment, and, if an agreement is reached, embody such understanding in a signed con- tract. The appropriate unit is: All production and maintenance em- ployees of Steele Apparel Company, Inc., employed at the Company's Steele, Mis- souri, place of business, excluding all other employees, office clerical and professional employees, guards, and super- visiors, as defined in the Act. All our employees are free to become or remain. or to refrain from becoming or remaining , members of Southern Missouri-Arkansas District Council, International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization, except as such rights may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment, as authorized by Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, as modified by the Labor- Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959. STEELE APPAREL COMPANY, INC. (Employer) Dated By (Representative ) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 consecu- tive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. If employees have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions, they may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, 1040 Boatmen's Bank Building, 314 North Broadway, St. Louis, Missouri 63102, Telephone 622-4167.