The Coca- Cola Bottling Co. of San Matco

590 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD The Coca-Cola Bottling Company of San Mateo and Music, Amusement & Vending Machine Operators Division, Local No. 856, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Help- ers of America. Case 20-CA-5827 February 19, 1971 DECISION AND ORDER BY MEMBERS FANNING, BROWN, AND JENKINS On October 19, 1970, Trial Examiner Stanley Gil- bert issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceed- ing, finding that the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision and a supporting brief. The General Counsel filed limited exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision and an answering brief support- ing the Trial Examiner's Decision. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na- tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no preju- dicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the findings,' conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner.2 ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Rela- tions Board adopts as its Order the Recommended Order of the Trial Examirier as modified below and hereby orders that the Respondent, the Coca-Cola Bottling Company of San Mateo, Burlingame, Cali- fornia, its officers, agents successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order, as so modified. 1. Delete paragraph 1(g) of the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order and substitute, therefore, the following new paragraph: "(g) In any other manner interfering with, re- straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their rights of self-organization, to form, join, or assist the Union, or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, to engage in concerted activities for the pur- pose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from engaging in any or all such activities." 2. In footnote 21 of the Trial Examiner's Decision, substitute "20" for "10" days. 3. Delete the seventh paragraph of the notice and substitute the following: WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of their rights of self-organization, or to form, join, or assist the Union, or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively through rep- resentatives of their own choosing, to engage in concerted activities for the purpose collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from engaging in any or all such activi- ties. 1 Respondent has excepted to certain credibility resolutions made by the Trial Examiner. It is the Board's established policy not to overrule a Trial Examiner's resolutions as to credibility unless the clear preponderance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect . Such a conclusion is not warranted here. Standard Dry Wall Products, Inc., 91 NLRB 544, enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (C.A. 3). 2 As we find that the unfair labor practices committed by the Respondent are of such a character and intensity as to reflect a predisposition by the Respondent to thwart by any means the employees' efforts to engage in legitimate concerted activities for the purpose of self-organization or other mutual aid or protection , we shall issue a broad cease -and-desist order. John P. Krystyniak d/b/a/ Red & White Super Markets, 172 NLRB No. 210, enfd, 415 F.2d 125 (C.A. 3). TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE STANLEY GILBERT, Trial Examiner: Based upon a charge filed November 6, 1969, by Music, Amusement & Vending Machine Operators Division, Local No. 856, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of America, hereinafter referred to as the Union, the complaint herein was issued on January 8, 1970. Said charge was subsequently amended on March 9, May 20, and June 25, 1970, by the Union, and an amendment to the complaint was received in the record at the commencement of the hearing. The complaint, as amended, alleges that The Coca-Cola Bottling Company of San Mateo, hereinafter referred to as the Company or the Respondent, engaged in conduct viola- tive of Section 8(a)(1), (3) and (5) of the Act. Respondent, by its answer, denies that it committed the unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint. Pursuant to notice a hearing was held in San Francisco, California, on Juty 7 and 8, 1970, before me. Appearances were entered on behalf of the General Counsel and Res on- dent, but no appearance was entered on behalf ofp the Charging Party. Briefs were received from the General Counsel and the Respondent within the time designated therefor. Upon the entire record in this procegding and my obser- vation of the witnesses as they testified, I make the follow- ing: 188 NLRB No. 91 THE COCA-COLA BOTTLING COMPANY 591 FINDINGS OF FACT 1. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT Respondent, a Delaware corporation with a place of bus- iness in Burlingame, California, is engaged in the manufac- ture and wholesale distribution of soft drink beverages. During the year preceding the issuance of the complaint, Respondent, in the course and conduct of its business o er- ations, purchased and received at its Burlingame plant, goods and services valued in excess of $50,006 from firms located outside the State of California. As is admitted by the Respondent, it is, and at all times material herein has been, an employer engaged in com- merce and in operations affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 11 THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED As is admitted by the Respondent, the Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The Bargaining Unit Involved Herein and the Request to Bargain As is admitted by Respondent, all of its office clerical empployyees employed at its Burlingame, California, location, excluding the confidential secretary, salesmen, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act, constitute a unit appropri- ate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act. It is stipulated by the parties-that there were four employ- ees in the above-described bargaining unit during the time material herein and that they were as follows: Betty Intersi- mone, Florence Calise, Pamela Marquard, and Cheryl Prine. It is alleged that at all times since October 14, 1969, the Union has represented a majority of the employees in the above-described unit. The record discloses that on October 13, Prine signed a union authorization card and handed it to William Dykstra, ' business agent of the Union. Also on October 13, Marquard signed a union authorization card and mailed it to Dykstra. On October 14, Calise signed a union authorization card and handed it to Dykstra. There is no dispute that the cards were signed by said employees for the purpose of having the Union represent them as their collective-bargaining representative. Therefore, it is con- cluded that as of October 14, 1969, the Union did represent a majority of the employees in the above-described bargain- ing unit. The circumstances in which the cards were signed and the request for recognition and bargaining was made are set forth hereinbelow. Said findings of fact are based upon uncontradicted and credited testimony. On October 13, Dykstra visited the office of Respondent and asked to speak to Harry Sheldon, vice president of the Company, apparently with regard to Respondent's drivers crossing a picket line maintained by the Union at a motel.2 Dykstra was advised that Sheldon was not in and he then inquired of the girls in the office whether they were i Although throughout the transcript his name appears as Dystra, it ap- pears that the correct spelling is as indicated 2It appears that the Union did not at that time represent any of the employees of Respondent, but that the picket line was with respect to a labor dispute with another employer. "interested in joining the union." Rene Muselman, secre- tary to Paul Bacon, indicated that she was not interested,3 but Prine indicated that she was and walked over to talk to Dykstra. Marquard also indicated that she was interested and joined Prine and Dykstra in a discussion of the wages set forth in the Union's collective-bargaining agreement. At that time, Prine filled out and signed her union authoriza- tion card and gave it to Dykstra. Marquard accepted an authorization card but did not fill it out at the time. After Dykstra left, Prine and Marquard discussed advan- tages of union membership and then Marquard filled out her card, signed it, and mailed it to Dykstra. After doing so, Marquard called Dykstra and arranged a meeting the next day at a coffeeshop in Burlingame. Marquard then talked to Calise and told her about the meeting arranged with Dykstra. At noon, on October 14, Prine, Marquard, and Calise met with Dykstra and talked about the benefits that could be obtained under the union contract, and made comparisons as to what Respondent was giving them at that time. At that meeting, Calise filled out an authorization card, signed it, and delivered it to Dykstra. Dykstra then told them that since the Union represented a majority of the office employ- ees, the Union would send Respondent a letter requesting that the Compan bargain with it. On that same date, October 14, the Union sent a letter to the Company, stating that it represented the office employ- ees of the Company, and asked for a meeting "for the pur- pose of recognition and collective bargaining." Bacon, who was out of town at the time the letter was received, testified that he talked to his office on October 18 and was informed of the receipt of the Union's letter. He gave instructions that his secretary write a letter stating that he was out of the city and would respond when he returned. A letter accomplish- ing the purpose of his instructions was sent to the Union dated October 20, 1969.4 The conduct of the Respondent which the General Counsel contends constituted the various unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint commenced on October 22, with the interrogation by Bacon of several employees. Although there is some conflict in the record as to whether this interrogation took place on October 21 or 22,5 the disparity in the dates is of no material significance, and, since in Respondent's brief the date of October 22 is accepted, it is found that the interrogation did occur on said date. B. The Interrogation on October 22 There is no dispute that Paul Bacon, president and "own- er" of the Respondent, interrogated several of the employ- ees in the bargaining unit on or about October 22, 1969. Marquard and Bacon testified to the incident and, while there are some variances in their testimony, it is clear there- from that Bacon did question the said employees as to their adherence to the Union. Respondent contends, however, that Bacon's questioning them was not unlawful because "there were no threats of reprisal or promises of benefit made to the employees, merely an inquiry to determine if the employees in fact wanted a union." Bacon (carrying the letter from the Union requesting rec- ognition) came into the office where the employees worked 3 It appears to be conceded by the parties that it would not be appropriate to include her in the above-described bargaining unit The Union's letter was addressed to Sheldon, and the Company's re- sponse was that Sheldon was out of town and would contact the Union upon his return. The letter was signed by Muselman as secretary to Sheldon. 3 Bacon testified that it occurred on October 21, and Marquard that it occurred on October 22 592 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD and spoke to the four girls who were present at the time , I said we had. Muselman, Calise, Marquard, and Prine. Bacon's testimony as to what occurred is as follows: A. I told them that I had received this notice request- ing that I bargain with the union and I wanted to know whether or not the union represented the majority of our employees, and I asked Mrs. Cause if she had signed a card, and she said yes; and I say "Why?" And she gave a hesitating answer, and then indicated that she was uncertain as to whether or not she wanted to be a member of the union. And then I asked Mrs. Marquard if she had signed the card, and she said yes; and then I asked Miss Prine and she said yes. * A. I asked why and I believe Mrs. Marquard stated that she felt that they would get more benefits in the way of wages and later, after-which I believe she stat- ed-she brought up the question of insurance. I believe Miss Prme confirmed the same thing, that she would benefit by joining the union because of the wages and insurance. THE WITNESS I believe that I said to Mrs. Calise when I received her answer, "Well, where is your loyalty or don't you have loyalty to the company?" Marquard testified as follows: A. Mr. Bacon came out of his office, he was holding a letter. He began to read the beginning of the letter stating that the union had been given authorization by us to represent us and he asked if it was true. Q. Did anyone answer? A. He looked toward Rene, and Rene said something like "I don't know," or "it doesn't apply to me." And then he turned to- Q. Is that Rene Muselman? A. Rene Muselman, yes. And then he turned to Flo, and I don't believe she answered, and toward me, and I said, "yes," and Che- ryl said "yes," and then he asked why. And I believe Flo said it was because of the union, the benefits, the insurance policy and that our policy that we had then was not adequate, or that we didn't feel it was adequate. That there was a page in the union booklet that said we only got $14 a da in the hospital, or in our booklet, our insurance booklet. And he asked then if we signed anything and he asked Flo, and she said, "I don't know." And then he asked me if I signed anything, and I said "yes," and I said, "Don't you remember, Flo, the cards we filled out?" And then he asked Cheryl, and she said, yes. * THE WITNESS Mr. Bacon asked us if we didn't feel any loyalty to our company. There was no response to that. And then-he asked if we had signed anything first. Well, I already said that, didn't I?-He asked Flo and then myself, and then Cheryl. We all said we had, or * * * THE WITNESS He asked if this is what we wanted, to be represented by the union, and Flo said, "I'm with the girls." Q. (By Mr. Smullin) Did he ask her before he asked you? A. Yes. Q. And did he ask anyone else besides the two of you? A. He asked the three of us, myself ; and Cheryl and Flo. Q. And what was your answer? Did you answer? A. Yes. I said yes. And so did Cheryl. The only material difference in their testimony is whether or not, as Bacon testified, Calise "indicated that she was uncertain as to whether or not she wanted to be a member of the union." In view of Bacon's own testimony that he accused her of a lack of loyalty to the Company, it is con- cluded that rather than indicating uncertainty with respect to her adherence to the Union, she stated , as Marquard testified, that she was "with the girls [Prine and Marquard]" in their desire to be represented by the Union. While Bacon's questioning of the girls did constitute an attempt to poll them as to their desire for union representa- tion and was not accompanied by threats of reprisals or promises of benefits, nevertheless certain of the safeguards required in polling as set forth in Struksnes Construction Co., 165 NLRB 1062, 1063, were not observed.b Not only were at least two of the safeguards (assurances against reprisal and secret ballot) not observed but also Bacon demon- strated his antiunion animus 7 by accusing Calise of a lack of loyalty to the Company . Consequently, it is concluded that, in the circumstances, Bacon s interro ation of the three employees was violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. It is noted that in its brief Respondent contends "that Mrs. Muselman was apparently opposed to union organiza- tion so it appears that on October 22 there was no majority status." On the contrary, not only is Mrs. Muselman's oppo- sition to the Union irrelevant, since she is admittedly out- side the bargaining unit, but also it appears that as the result of his polling of the employees on October 22, Bacon was made aware of the fact that Prine, Marquard, and Cause wanted union representation . Thus, as of that date Respon- dent had evidence of the fact that the Union represented a mojority of the employees in the unit , even if it believed Muselman to be within the unit sought by the Union. C. Respondent's Conduct on October 24 It is alleged in the complaint that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by the following conduct: 1. On or about October 24, 1969, Respondent, by Bacon, 6 In said case , the Board stated: Absent unusual circumstances, the polling of employees by an em- ployer will be violative of Section 8(axl) of the Act unless the following safeguards are observed : (a) the purpose of the poll is to determine the truth of a union's claim of majority, (2) this purpose is communicated to the employees, (3) assurances against reprisal are given, (4) the em- ployees are polled by secret ballot, and (5) the employer has not engaged in unfair labor practices or otherwise created a coercive atmosphere. 7 Respondent's antiunion animus was clearly demonstrated 2 days later (October 24) in meetings Respondent held with the employees , as set forth hereinbelow. Also on October 24, as found hereinbelow, Respondent did engage in conduct constituting unfair labor practices THE COCA-COLA BOTTLING COMPANY at Respondent's premises, promised employees increased fringe benefits to induce them to abandon their support of the Union. 2. On or about October 24, 1969, Respondent, by Bacon, at Respondent's premises, promised employees increased wages to induce them to abandon their support of the Un- ion. 3. On or about October 24, 1969, Respondent, by Bacon, at Respondent's premises, told employees they would not be able to find other employment if they selected the Union as their collective-bargaining representative. 4. On or about October 24, 1969, Respondent, by Bacon, at Respondent's premises, conducted a poll of employees, to induce them to abandon their support of the Union. The testimony with respect to the events on October 24 is set forth hereinbelow prior to a consideration of any of the aforesaid allegations, since said allegations must be con- sidered in the context of all that occurred on that day, as well as in the light of prior and subsequent events. On Friday, October 24, the office employees were called into a meeting with Bacon and two other officers of Respon- dent. On that occasion all of the office employees were present (Muselman and the four above-mentioned members of the bargaining unit).8 The meeting started at approxi- mately 3 p.m., and for a half hour or 45 minutes there was a discussion of office procedures. At the conclusion of the discussion of such matters, Bacon stated that he would like to discuss with them the matter of their oining the Union and the reasons that he "felt" that they did not need a union. Marquard and Bacon were the two principal witnesses 9 who testified as to what occurred at the meetings 10 on Octo- ber 24. Although he did not testify to all of the matters contained in Marquard's testimony, Bacon's testimony does not materially contradict that of Marquard except with re- spect to what he said about raises and his appraisal of Calise's adherence to the Union. Bacon spoke to the employees about a new insurance policy. Marquard's testimony with respect thereto is as fol- lows: He had an insurance policy, he said it was from Coca-Cola, Atlanta, that they had been reviewing, and considering putting into effect. He talked about part of the insurance benefits that this new policy would provide. He mentioned a 100 percent major medical and prescriptions; it was $1 de- ductible on prescriptions. There was a dental program, and there was also a retirement program. Bacon's testimony as to what he said to them regarding insurance is as follows: I recalled that at a prior staff meeting we had dis- cussed upgrading our insurance policy, which it has been, and explained that the reason for this was be- cause it had been our practice to increase the insurance benefits of nonunion employees every time that there was an increase in the benefits to union employees, and that the matter was being looked into at the time.) ) $ Intersimone who had not been present on October 22 was present on October 24 9 Prine was called as a witness on rebuttal and she testified only with resgect to a segment of the events on October 24 The plural is used inasmuch as the meeting was interrupted to permit the employees to engage in a discussion among themselves and were then recalled to meet again with Bacon after said interlude 11 There was a further reference to insurance at the second meeting on October 24 and considerable testimony with respect to Respondent's efforts to upgrade insurance and the subsequent conduct of Respondent which led to the granting of insurance benefits to the employees These matters are 593 Marquard further testified as follows: THE WITNESS After we talked about the insurance program Mr. Bacon gave us some reasons that he felt we might not want a union. He said that he didn't know how much our initiation fee was, but the men at Auto- matic Catering had to pay $100. He said-at that time Cheryl Prine and myself told him we only had to pay $10-then he said that we would have to go to union meetings, and if we didn't go we would be fined, and also that they were in San Francisco and not a very nice place for young ladies to go. He said that he wasn't familiar with any business in the area that were union and that if we ever left there and went to work someplace else after we went union, we might find it difficult to find employment, because no nonunion house would want to hire us because wherever we went the union would find us and follow us. I remember Betty Intersimone said that she wasn't interested in joining the union, her husband has his own business and it was very difficult and that they were against unions, and Flo Calise said that if they had an insurance policy like that she wouldn't have joined the union-with the good benefits that this policy had. A.... Rene suggested that we discuss something about wages, because she felt that we might have been misled by our union representative, that we seemed to think we would be making a great deal more money with the union. At this time, Mr. Bacon said that he had gone back into the records and had looked up to see how frequent raises had been for, and that-that there had been auto- matic raises every six months for all of the office em- ployees he'd had before and that he felt that this was very fair, and Mr. Belway said that he had talked to the California Employment Bureau, and they led him to believe that he was paying a very fair wage for what we were doing in the office. Bacon's testimony substantially corroborates much of the above-quoted testimony of Marquard. He testified as fol- lows: I told them that I felt that the initiation fee would be a financial burden, citing that the fee charged the mem- bers of our Automatic Catering Company's driving team was $100.1 also stated that f didn't-know what the initiation fee would be for you, I stated that there would be monthly dues to pay. I stated that there would be union meetings to attend and that it has been the practice of the unions to fine members for not attending certain meetings. I told them that since offices in the Peninsula area were not generally unionized, I felt that it would be, in my opinion, a handicap to them if they sought a job elsewhere in a nonunion office. s s s s A. Mrs. Muselman brought up the question of wages, I believe, and I recited the policy of the company, or rather I might call it the practice of the company. discussed herembelow in resolving the issue of whether or not Respondent did, on October 24, violate 8(a)(1) of the Act by a promise of insurance benefits 594 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Q. What did you say? A. I said that the practice of the company is to review about each six months, at the end of each six months period, the work of the employees in the office, and if they merit increase in pay wed give them an increase m I said that because of the union request that we bar ain that I could not give a pay increase at this time for tear that I would be accused of bribing employees. Q. Did you say that raises were automatic every six months? A. No. Q. Are they automatic every six months? A. No, sir. I did say this, I recall, to support the statement of practice , that we had looked in the records and here was a frequency of raises for former employ- ees and there were three or four employees records mentioned at that time. Bacon then requested that they vote as to whether or not they wanted the Union . Marquard's testimony with respect thereto is as follows: Then Mr. Bacon told us that we could still vote whether to join the union or not, and that he had a gentleman, a Mr. Weinstein, to supervise the voting of the balloting, and that he was an unbiased vote-counter and asked us if we would like to vote again. At that point, Cheryl and I protested. We felt that we should have an opportunity to discuss it with out [our] union representatives. We also felt that we had-I have not had an opportu- nity to discuss it with the union representatives and what they had to offer and really couldn't give a fair vote. Mr. Bacon insisted, or asked us again if we would please vote, and he said that he had to respond to a letter from the union within 10 days, and this was the 10th day. I believe Cheryl said that she didn't think it was fair that we would have to vote then and Mr . Bacon said, "Do you think it was fair for you to join the union while we were out of town?" And I said that-I asked him if he felt that because he felt we were unfair with him that it entitled him to be unfair with us. Then they decided that they would let us talk for a few minutes and discuss it between the four of us. Q. Who do you mean by that? A. Mr. Bacon, and Mr. Sheldon and Mr. Belway. Mr. Bacon mostly , said we could talk about it, and they left us alone in the office, in Mr. Bacon's office. Bacon's testimony with regard to the request that they take a vote is as follows: A. I stated that I would like to conduct a poll, have Mr. Weinstein do it on that day, and in answer to "couldn't it be put over until Monday," I stated that the union expected an answer from us and indicated in their letter dated the 14th of the month that our demur- rage would be significant that we were not willing to bargain, to them they would feel this would be signifi- cant that we will not be willing to bargain with them, and I didn't feel that I should place our company in jeopardy to such a charge, and that we would go ahead and have the poll, and they could vote either way they wanted to, and then again, at least a half dozen times during the meeting, and on the subject of the voting and it was their right to vote, that there would be no reprisals regardless of how they voted , and that the voting would be by secret ballot and they could answer in any, way they wanted to. If they chose the union, fine; if they didn't that was fine. Q. And was there any conversation the subject of which what the poll was for? A. The poll, yes. Every time we discussed-I mean frequently-I said I don't believe that the union represents a majority, and at the meeting Mrs. Calise stated that she was not in favor of the union and this was before the voting, and she had stated it several times. Mrs. Intersimone did the same thing , and only Che- ryl and Pam indicated through their statements and remarks that they were in favor of joining the union. And I told them that they could vote any way they wanted to, and they needn t be afraid of any reprisals. In his testimony Bacon made no mention of the interlude in which the employees were given an opportunity to talk among themselves. According to Marquard's testimony which is credited the employees were given an opportunity to hold a private discussion . Marquard's testimony which is credited as to what occurred during this interlude and there- after is as follows: THE WITNESS Cheryl tried to call the union and talked to Mr. Dystra [Dykstra] to tell him what was happen- mg, and there was no answer at the union. Then we talked among the four of us . I told Betty [Intersimone] that I felt that even if she didn't want to go to the union, she should at least hear the other side before we made a valid-a vote. Flo [Calise] said that we didn't need the union if we had a policy like we were going to get . That was the major-we talked about in general this sort of thing, but we decided that we wouldn't take a vote . We would wait until Monday . It was already 5:00 o'clock, or close to it, and we felt that they couldn't even contact the union with an answer to the letter, so we started to leave the office and-and I was at my desk and Mr. Bacon asked us if we wouldn 't please come back into his office. So we went back into his office and he told us that- oh, excuse me. I remember during that-I don't remem- ber if it was the first part when Mr. Bacon was in or the latter part when they came back in after they left us alone, that Flo asked him when this insurance policy they had discussed would go into effect, and Mr. Bacon said that it would probably go into effect after it had been approved. Later on Betty asked again when it would go into effect, and Mr. Bacon said in about 6 to 8 weeks, and then he turned to Mr. Belway and asked him what he thought, and Mr. Belway said yes, he felt 6 to 8 weeks. Q. (By Mr . Smullin) Now, was this before or after Mr. Sheldon and Mr . Bacon and Mr. Belway and Rene Muselman left the room? A. I don't remember whether it was before or after they were in the room when this was talked about, but-I don't remember whether it was before they left us alone or not. Q. Was this in connection with Mr. Bacon's discus- sion of the insurance policy? A. Yes, it was. I believe it took place, now that I think about it, one of the questions-Flo's question may have been asked before we went to be alone, or they left the office, but I'm quite sure that Betty's question came afterwards because I told Betty that we didn't even know if this new insurance policy that he talked about would go into effect, that he had said it still had to be approved. THE COCA-COLA BOTTLING COMPANY So I think that's when she asked again, when they came back into the office. Anyway, then Mr. Bacon asked us again, he said he had to have us make this decision, or make this vote now, that he had to answer the union. I pointed out that-that I didn't think it was fair, that it was already too late to do anythin, but he insisted. Bacon then called in "Mr. Weinstein" who had been waiting in the office to be called and introduced him to the employees. Marquard testified as to what occurred at the balloting as follows: So they brought in Mr. Weinstein and then ev- erybody left but the four of us and Mr. Weinstein, and he came in with a ballot box, and some mimeographed ballots and asked us if we understood them, when he gave them to us. I asked him if he was a lawyer, and he said no. And then I asked-I said, "If we vote, two of us vote for the union, and two of us vote against the union, would we still be able to go union, or would it have to be a majority," and I believe he said he couldn't give us any information like that, that all he was there to do was to supervise the voting. 5o he asked us to mark our ballots, and I refused to mark my ballot. I said that I still didn't think it was right that we should be made to do this, and I folded my ballot unmarked and put it in the ballot box, so did Cheryl Prine, and we left the office. Q. And what happened after that? A. Flo and Betty came out of the office, and I believe Betty came up to me and told me that she had voted for it-oh, no. She had voted against it and Flo had voted for it, so that we could vote again on Monday, and we left. Bacon confirmed her testimony as to the results of the vot- ing, that of the four ballots two were blank ballots, one was for the Union and one against. 1. Promise of improved fringe benefits It appears from Marquard 's credited testimony that Ba- con stated during the meetings of October 24 that Respon- dent had an insurance policy which it was considering putting into effect and outlined some of the provisions. Tt is noted that on October 22, when Bacon asked employees why they were interested in union representation , one of the reasons they gave him was the better insurance provisions afforded under the Union's contract. Repondent's position with respect to the allegation that it promised such improved fringe benefits to induce the employees to abandon the support of the Union may be summarized as follows : That the improved health and wel- fare plan was a subject considered prior to the advent of the Union and that it was the intent of Respondent to upgrade the coverage of nonunion employees to a point comparable to that afforded its union employees . Respondent argues in its brief that Bacon made no promises to the employees that were not, in fact, under discussion prior to the Union's request for recognition, that an insurance plan was being "negotiated" prior thereto, and that no promise was made other than an explanation of an existing company policy. In its brief Respondent also noted that of the 12 nonunion employees who were to benefit from upgrading the insur- ance only 4 were members of the bargaining unit. I note that it appears from the record that the other ei t employ- ees were either officers of the Company (inclu ing Bacon) or supervisors (with the possible exception of Muselman). 595 In support of Respondent's contention that improvement of the insurance plan was under consideration or negotia- tion, Respondent called as a witness Robert Steacy , manag- er of the San Jose branch of the Coca-Cola Bottling Company of California, a corporation unrelated to Respon- dent. Steacy testified that sometime in August 1969 he had several conversations with Bacon "as to Bacon's upgrading of his insurance plan in his plant" (presumably for his non- union employees, since Respondent s union employees were apparently covered by contracts with Teamsters Locals #278 and 896, neither being the local involved in this pro- ceeding). Bacon also testified to having had such conversa- tions. Other than this testimony Respondent offered no evidence to show that it was considering an insurance plan or negotiating with respect thereto. Bacon testiied that it is Respondent's policy to furnish to nonunion employees an insurance plan comparable to that enjoyed by its "union employees." 1t appears that the con- tract with Local 278 (which represented Respondent's driv- ers) was executed in September or October 1968. Counsel for Respondent, in an attempt to explain the delay in ar- ranging for a comparable plan for the nonunion employees, testified that the ultimate benefits under said contract were not established until late September 1969. However, it ap- pears that the problem which was not settled until Se pptem- ber 1969 was with respect to the allocation of certain funds held by the trustees, the amount of contributions having been established in the contract . The Trial Examiner is not convinced that the Respondent did have an established comparability policy, not only by reason of the delay in upgrading the nonunion employees' benefits for over a year after the Local 278 contract was signed and the amount of contributions was thus fixed , but also because of the testi- mony of Frank Belway, Respondent's treasurer and office manager, that Respondent did not institute an insurance program for nonunion employees until March 1, 1970, and that as late as January 1970 he was discussing plans with an insurance agent and was seeking a plan that was competi- tive with that of Local 856, the Charing Party herein.12 In addition, Marquard testified without contradiction, and her testimony is credited, that on October 24 both Bacon and Belway assured the employees that the insurance olicy they were considering would probably go into effect 'in about 6 to 8 weeks ." Also, Marquard testified without contradiction, and her testimony is credited, that shortly after October 24 she asked Bacon if she could see the policy he referred to on October 24. Bacon and Belway testified that at a meeting with the employees sometime in late summer of 1969 Bacon stated to them that the Company was considering upgrading the insurance for the office employees . Marquard testified that she had no recollection of such a statement being made to the employees. I am of the opinion that if such a statement were made, it could not have been more than a casual statement, for, in view of Marquard's interest in the insur- ance plan, it does not appear likely she would fail to recall a statement that the Company was considering improving the insurance. In any event, I am convinced that Respondent did not have an insurance plan under active consideration 13 on October 24, as he indicated to his employees , and that Ba- con and Belway led them to believe that a definite plan was 12 It appears from the record that Respondent's bottlers were represented by, Local 896 and its drivers by Local 278 31 am of the opinion that, at the most, Respondent had some vague intentions of upgrading the insurance for its officers, supervisors, and office employees sometime in the future 596 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD being considered and would take effect in 6 to 8 weeks. It is inferred that this conduct was intended to induce the employees to abandon their desire to have the Union repre- sent them. (As noted hereinabove, Respondent was aware of the fact that one of the chief reasons the employees were interested in having the Union represent them was the Union's insurance plan.) Thus, it is concluded that Bacon's and Belway's statements on October 24 with respect to an improved insurance plan constituted a promise of benefit designed to destroy the Union's majority in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 2. The promise of wage increases Marquard, Bacon and Prine testified as to what Bacon said on October 24 with respect to wage increases. There is no contradiction in their testimony that Muselman brought up the matter of wage increases . However, it is apparent that Bacon had planned to make the statements he did, inas- much as he spoke of having reviewed the records of past wage increses as a basis for his statements. Marquard and Prine testified that Bacon stated that there had been "auto- matic" raises every 6 months. Bacon testified that he stated it is the practice of the Company to "review" employees' records at 6-month intervals. Both Marquard and Pnne denied that he said anything about not being able to give any raises because of the advent of the Union or for fear of "bribing the employees." It is apparent that Respondent did not have a policy of granting automatic pay raises every 6 months since, if that were its policy, both Marquard and Prine would have re- ceived pay raises sometime in September. Marquard and Prine would have received pay raises sometime in Septem- ber. I am of the opinion that Bacon's testimony should be credited that he stated that it has been the practice of the Company in the past to review employees' records to de- termine whether they should receive a raise and that he indicated that office employees had been receiving raises approximately every 6 months.14 On the other hand, I credit Weir denial that he made any mention of withholding raises because of the Union. It is my opinion that his mention of the past practice in granting raises was an indirect way of implying that those office employees who had not received a pay raise for 6 months could expect one. (The record reveals that at least two of the employees, Marquard and Prine, had not re- ceived a pay raise for a period in excess of 6 months.) It was made quite clear to the Respondent that the employees were interested in the Union because of the possibility of obtain- ing wage increases through union representation. It is con- cluded, in the circumstances, that his statements about a past practice with respect to pay raises constituted a prom- ise of a pay raise calculated to undermine the Union s ma- jority representation in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 3. Bacon's statement regarding employment elsewhere There is no dispute in the testimony that in the course of his meetings with the employees on October 24 Bacon told them that if they became members of the Union and left his employment, they would find it difficult to find other em- 141t is noted, however, that in testifying about past practices Bacon re- ferred to the records of three employees and stated that one of them received a pay raise at the end of her first 3 months of employment and apparently that the other two received pay raises at intervals of approximately 6 months It does not appear that the record will support a finding that a practice existed of review at intervals of 6 months ployment with a "nonunion office." It is Respondent's osi- tion that this statement was privileged under Section 8(c) of the Act 15 as an expression of an opinion. In effect, what Bacon stated to the employees was that other nonunion employers in the area wouldknow that they were members of the Union and would violate the Act by discriminatorily refusing to hire them because of their union membership. While Section 8(c) of the Act does make the expression of an opinion lawful, in my judgment it does not extend to an expression of an irresponsible opinion intended to coerce or restrain employees from engaging in protected activity by the threat that it would impair their job opportunities else- where. Bacon stated no objective basis for his opinion, and it was clearly calculated to coerce his employees and re- strain them from joining the Union. Consequently, it is concluded that Bacon's opinion does not fall within the category of opinions privileged under Section 8(c) and, therefore, was violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Cf. N L R.B. v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, (1969). 4. The poll Respondent contends that the poll of the employees tak- en on October 24 was lawful under the holding in Struksnes Construction Co., 165 NLRB 1062, 1063.16 In that case, the Board set forth certain safeguards with respect to the polling of employees which, if not observed, would make the poll- ing violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. The first of such safeguards is that "the purpose of the poll is to determine the truth of the union's claim of ma onty." The employer had, by reason of his unlawful polling of employees on October 22, as found heremabove, already determined that the Union represented a majority of the employees. It is inferred from the circumstances in this case that the second poll on October 24 was not to determine whether the Union's majority representation existed (which Bacon had already determined), but rather to lay a foundation for mak- ing a claim that the Union did not enjoy ma] ority represent- ation (which apparently he believed he might have succeeded in destroying). More importantly, it is noted that another safeguard with respect to polling the employees is that "the employer has not engaged in unfair labor practices or otherwise created a coercive atmosphere." In this case, immediately preceding the polling of the employees, Bacon committed three unfair labor practices found hereinabove: making a promise of improved fringe benefits, making a promise of wage increas- es, and telling his employees that they would have difficulty as union members in finding employment elsewhere. In addition, the poll was conducted in a "coercive atmos- phere" in that the employees requested that the poll be delayed until the following Monday (instead of at the end of the day on Friday) and contended that it was "unfair" of hire to insist upon taking the poll at that time. According to Marquard's uncontradicted and credited testimony, Ba- con replied, "Do you think it was fair for you to join the union while we were out of town?" The reason that Bacon gave for insisting upon a poll immediately was that he had to make a reply that day to the Union's letter requesting recognition because it was the tenth day after the date of the 15 Sec 8(c) provides as follows The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemina- tion thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of this Act, if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit 16 See fn 6 THE COCA-COLA BOTTLING COMPANY Union's letter. This reason is of little or no merit." It is my opinion that the Respondent believed that as a result of its aforesaid unfair labor practices committed on that day, it had succeeded in undermining the Union's majority representation and that the results of the poll would afford the Respondent a basis for contending that it had evidence that the Union's claim of majority representa- tion was unsubstantiated. In the above-described circumstances, it is concluded that the poll on October 24 did not meet the safeguards set forth in the Struksnes case, supra, and was, therefore, viola- tive of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. D. Withholding of Wage Increases It is alleged in the complaint that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by the following conduct: Since on or about November 6, 1969, Respondent has refused to grant wage increases to employees because of the pending unfair labor practice charge filed by the Union.la The Respondent stipulated "that one of the reasons that wage increases were denied Cheryl Prine and Pam Mar- quard was that the Union's organization drive was in pro-- ress." It is inferred from the record that the Respondent s denial was predicated on the belief that to grant employees wage increases at that time would be a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. An employer who grants a wage increase during the union's organizational campaign or during the pendency of an election may be in a position where he has to justify the wage increase in terms of establishing past practice in order to defend against the contention that the Union's presence prompted the wage increase. It was found hereinabove that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by stating that it was the past practice of Respondent to grant wage increases at intervals of approximately 6 months based on a review of employees' records and thus impliedly promised a wage increase to the employees who had not received one for a period of 6 months. This was predicated on the findingg that the record disclosed that such practice did not exist. It would be anomalous to find that the implied promise of raises at that time violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act for the reason stated and also find that the denial of raises at the same time violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. I am of the opinion that had Respondent, in the circum- stances, granted wage increases to Prine and Marquard at that time, the Respondent would have violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act in that the increases would reasonably have been construed as attempts to dissipate employees' adherence to the Union. Consequently, it would appear inappropriate to find that Respondents denial of the pay raises at that time would have violated 8(a)(3) and (1) of the 17 It appears from the record that the Company made no reply to the Union that day either verbally or by letter. 16 At the conclusion of the General Counsel's case, in response to a motion of Respondent, I ruled that the General Counsel had made out aprima facie case under this allegation only with respect to Marquard since there was nothing at that point in the record to show that there was any other employee besides Marquard who had had more than 6 months of employment without getting a raise . However, in view of the stipulation by Respondent with respect to denying raises, I will consider the allegation as it was originally stated in the complaint There does not appear to be any particular reason why the date of Novem- ber 6, 1969, is alleged. It is noted that there is no specific mention in any of the charges of a refusal to grant wage increases until the charge filed May 20, 1970, in which the date November 10, 1%9, is alleged In view of the findings hereinbelow that the allegation is not sustained, the question of the 10(b) period is not considered 597 Act, when the Respondent had good reason to believe that it would violate the Act by granting such raises. Therefore, it is concluded that the above-quoted allega- tion of the complaint has not been sustained. Cf. Dawson Metal Products, Inc., 183 NLRB No. 25, TXD. E. Respondent's Refusal To Bargain It is alleged in the complaint that commencing on or about October 14, 1969, the Union requested Respondent to bargain collectively with it as the representative of the employees in the above-described appropriate bargaining unit of its office clerical employees . Respondent admits that such request was made on or about October 14, 1969. The record reveals that by letter dated October 14 , which was received by the Respondent, the Union made such request. It is further alleged in the complaint that commencing on or about October 22, 1969 , Respondent has refused, and continues to refuse, to bargain with the Union as requested. Respondent admits its refusal but denies that it was under any duty to bargain with the Union . It is further alleged in the complaint that Respondent's aforesaid refusal consti- tutes an unfair labor practice within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and ( 1) of the Act. In addition General Counsel alleges in his brief that the appropriate remedy herein would be to issue a bargaining order in accordance with the princi- ples enunciated in N.L.R.B. v. Gissel Packing Co., supra, and cites Tower Enterprises, Inc., 182 NLRB N. 56, as further authority for such an order in this proceeding. As found hereinabove , the Union represented a majority of the employees in the above-described appropriate bar- gaining unit as of October 14, 1969. On or about October 21, Respondent's president, Bacon, returned to the city and on October 22 commenced the conduct found hereinabove violative of Section 8(axl) of the Act. As stated in Tower Enterprises, Inc., supra, (TXD): Respondent, however, had a qualified right to refuse to bargain with the Union until the Union could establish its majority in some manner other than its mere asser- tion in a demand letter . This right, however , was not an absolute one, and could be forfeited should it be estab- lished that following the demand Respondent acted in a manner calculated to undermine the Union's claimed majority. Thus, we must next consider whether Respondent's refusal to bargain here took place in a fully lawful context, or whether in conjunction there- with Respondent engaged in unlawful conduct of a nature which resulted in a forfeiture of its right to have the majority determined by the Board or an independ- ent source. Should the latter be the case it may become appropriate to direct a bargaining order. As found hereinabove, on October 22 Respondent violat- ed Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by its unlawful interrogation of employees and through said interrogation ascertained that the Union did represent a majorit y of them. Then on October 24, it further violated Section 8(axl) of the Act by promising employees improved fringe benefits , by impliedly promising wage increases , by telling employees that they would have difficulty in finding employment elsewhere if they selected the Union as their collective -bargaining repre- sentative and by conducting an unlawful poll of employees. On October 27 the Respondent filed pa petition for a Board-conducted election and on the same day a union representative called to ascertain what Respondent 's posi- tion was with respect to the Union's letter of October 14. Respondent indicated that it doubted the Union's majority representation and wished to have an election conducted by 598 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD the Board. The question arises whether or not, in light of the aforesaid unlawful conduct of Respondent and the circum- stances in this case, it would be appropriate to issue an order directing the Respondent to bargain with the Union. It is well established that where an employer's unfair labor practices are relatively inconsequential and do not substantially interfere with the free choice of the bargaining representative a cease-and-desist order may be adequate to remedy the unlawful conduct and permit employees a free choice in a Board-conducted election. Under the doctrine in the Gi;sel case, supra, the bargaining order remedy is appropriate in situations where in fact a union's majority can be established by authorization cards and the nature and extensiveness of the employer's unfair labor practices appears to make subsequent free choice by the employees problematical. In the instant case the Respondent learned on October 22 not only that the Union did represent a majority of the employees but also that they were interested in having the Union represent them because of the better fringe benefits afforded under its contract and wage increases they be- lieved the Union could obtain for them. On October 24, as found hereinabove, the Respondent promised them im- proved fringe benefits and impliedly promised wage in- creases. Although not alleged as violations of the Act, pursuant to Bacon's promises, albeit belatedly, Respondent gave wage increases in January 1970 apparently 19o all but one of the then members of the bargaining unit, and, as of March 1, 1970, instituted the improved fringe benefits which the Union's adherents had sought. Thus, the purposes for which the employees sought union representation were fulfilled by Respondent. The record discloses that the Respondent's unlawful conduct in promising increased fringe benefits on October 24, 1969, destroyed the Union's then ma ority representation, since the testimony is credited that Ca^ise indicated that if the Respondent furnished the employees with the insurance (fringe benefits) Respondent promised, she would have no interest in the Union. In the circumstances, it is concluded that Respondent, by refusing to recognize the Union which represented a majori- ty of its employees in an appropnate bargaining unit, en- gaged in conduct violative of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act, and that in order to remedy such conduct, it is deemed necessary to issue not only a cease-and-desist order but also an order to bargain, since it is unlikely that a fair election could be held. N. L. K B. v. Gissel Packing Co. a; Tower Enterprises, Inc., supra; Dawson Metal Produces, nc., supra; C & G Electric, Inc., 180 NLRB No. 52. IV THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of the Respondent set forth in section III, above, occurring in connection with its operations de- scribed in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and sub- stantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow thereof. V THE REMEDY It having labor practices, it will be recommended that Respondent be ordered to cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. 19 Prine was not given an increase and voluntarily left Respondent's em- ployment shortly thereafter It having been found that Respondent unlawfully refused to bargain with the Union as the exclusive representative of its employees in an appropriate unit, it will be recommend- ed that Respondent be ordered to bargain collectively with the Union, upon request and, in the event an understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agree- ment. Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and upon the entire record in the case, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Respondent is, and at all times material herein was, engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices with- in the meaning of Section 8(a)(l) of the Act by the following conduct: (a) On October 22, 1969, unlawfully interrogating its em- ployees with respect to their adherence to the Union. (b) On October 24, 1969, promising employees improved fringe benefits in order to dissuade them from adhering to the Union. (c) On October 24, 1969, impliedly promising employees wage increases to induce them to forego their adherence to the Union. (d) On October 24, 1969, unlawfully stating to the em- ployees that they would have difficulty finding employment elsewhere if they became members of the Union. (e) On October 24, 1969, unlawfully polling its employees with respect to their desire to have the Union represent them. 4. All Respondent's office clerical employees employed at its Burlingame, California location, excluding the confiden- tial secretary, salesmen, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act. 5. The Union is, and at all times since October 14, 1969, has been the exclusive representative of the employees in the aforesaid unit for the purposes of collective bargaining with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment and other terms and conditions of employment. 6. By refusing, upon request, to bargain in good faith with the Union as the representative of its employees in the above-described appropriate bargaining unit, Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. 7. The General Counsel has failed to sustain the burden of proof of the allegation in the complaint that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by refusing to grant wage increases to employees "since on or about refusing-to 6, 1969." RECOMMENDED ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Rela- tions Act, as amended, and upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and the entire record in this proceeding, it is ordered that the Coca-Cola Bottling Com- pany of San Mateo, its officers, agents, successors, and as- signs, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Unlawfully interrogating its employees with respect to their adherence to the Union, or any other labor organiza- tion. THE COCA-COLA BOTTLING COMPANY (b) Promising employees improved fringe benefits in or- der to dissuade them from adhering to the Union, or any other labor organization. (c) Promising employees wage increases to induce them to forego their adherence to the Union, or any other labor organization. (d) Unlawfully stating to the employees that they would have difficulty finding employment elsewhere if they be- came members of the Union or any other labor organiza- tion. (e) Unlawfully polling the employees. (f) Refusing to bargain collectively with the Union as the exclusive representative of employees in the appropriate unit described above. In any like or related manner interfering with the rights of employees guaranteed them in Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action which I find will effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Upon request, bargain collectively with the Union as the exclusive representative of the employees in the above- described appropriate unit, and embody in a signed agree- ment any understanding reached. (b) Post at its Burlingame , California, place of business copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."20 Copies of said notice to be furnished by the Regional Director for Region 20, shall, after being duly signed by an authorized representative of Respondent, be posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and maintained by it for a period of at least 60 consecutive days thereafter, in con- spicuous places, including all places where notices to em- ployees are customarily posted Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (c) Notify the Regional Director or Region 20, in writing, within 20 days from the date of receipt of this Recommend- ed Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply here- with 2' The allegation in the complaint that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by refusing to grant its employees wage increases since November 6, 1969, should be, and is hereby, dismissed. 20 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102 46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions, recommendations , and Recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec 102 48 of the Rules and Regulations , be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Rela- tions Board" shall be changed to read "Posted pursuant to a judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board." 21 In the event that this Recommended Order be adopted by the Board, paragraph 2(c) thereof shall be modified to read "Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply therewith " APPENDIX NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government 599 WE WILL NOT unlawfully interrogate our employees with respect to their adherence to Music, Amusement & Vending Machine Operators Division, Local No. 856, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauf- eurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, or any other labor organization. WE WILL NOT promise employees improved fringe benefits in order to dissuade them from adhering to said Union, or any other labor organization. WE WILL NOT promise employees wage increases to induce them to forego their adherence to said Union, or any other labor organization. WE WILL NOT unlawfully state to our employees that they would have difficulty finding employment else- where if they became members of said Union, or any other labor organization. WE WILL NOT unlawfully poll our employees as to their desire to have said Union, or any other labor organiza- tion, represent them. WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with said Union as the exclusive representative of our employees in the appropriate unit described as follows: All office clerical employees employed at our Burlingame, Cali- fornia, location excluding the confidential secretary, salesmen, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with the rights of employees guaranteed them in Sec- tion 7 of the Act. WE WILL, upon request, bargain collectively with said Union as the exclusive representative of our employees in the above-described appropriate unit, and embody in a signed agreement any understanding reached. THE COCA-COLA BOTTLING COMPANY OF SAN MATEO Dated By (Employer) (Representative (Title) This is an official notice and must not be defaced by anyone. This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. Any questions concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions may be directed to the Board's Office, 450 Golden Gate Avenue, Box 36047, San Francisco, California 94102, Telephone 556-0335.