Spotlight Company, Inc.

774 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Spotlight Company, Inc., and International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, AFL-CIO. Case 26-CA- 3535 March 3, 1971 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS FANNING AND JENKINS On June 24, 1970, Trial Examiner Harry R. Hinkes issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that Respondent had engaged in and was en- gaging in certain unfair labor practices and recom- mending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. The Trial Examiner also found that Respondent had not engaged in certain other unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint and recommended dismissal as to those allegations. Thereafter, the Respondent, the Charging Party, and the General Counsel filed exceptions to certain por- tions of the Decision, and supporting briefs. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na- tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no preju- dicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner, as modified herein. 1. Contrary to the Trial Examiner, we find, in agree- ment with the General Counsel's exception, that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by discriminatorily refusing to reinstate employee Wilma Davis after her leave of absence had expired on September 1, 1969. Employee Davis was first hired in February 1964, worked about 6 months, returned to the plant in 1966, again quit after working about 8 months, and again returned and was employed for the third time in Sep- tember 1967. This time she worked until about the middle of May 1969, when she asked for and obtained a leave of absence for medical reasons. Meanwhile, in April 1969, the Union had started its organizational campaign at the plant. Before going on leave, Davis discussed the Union with some of the other employ- ees, attended several union meetings, and signed a union authorization card. While still on leave, she visited the plant in June and inquired about her vaca- tion pay. Plant Manager Leiby refused to give her the vacation pay on the ground that she had not worked or would not work a sufficient length of time to entitle her to it. At this time, she also presented a note to Leiby from her doctor to the effect that she would be off work for medical reasons until September. Employee Davis then took up her claim with the state labor board, which prevailed upon Leiby to re- view the matter and pay Davis her vacation pay. Thereafter, on July 23, 1969, Respondent was served with the Union's charge in Case 26-CA-3396, alleg- ing, among other things, that Respondent denied Wil- ma Davis and seven other employees their vacation benefits because of their union "membership and ac- tivities." Davis had already received her vacation pay when Respondent received the charge, and the charge as to Davis was withdrawn and never made the basis of a formal complaint. On September 1, Davis report- ed to the plant with a doctor's release for work. Leiby called her into his office and asked her to sign the following statement which he had prepared: I, Wilma Davis, hereby agree within two weeks to make as much or more than my fellow-worker on a like operation since I am experienced. If not, I will leave the employment of Spotlight Co., Inc., no questions asked because of my inability to do so. Although the Examiner does not note the testimo- ny, Leiby testified that during this interview he told Davis that he did not like the way she had gone about getting her vacation pay. Davis asked and was permit- ted to take the statement home for her husband's review. The following day, Davis told Leiby at the plant that she did not think it necessary for her to sign the statement. Leiby replied that she would have to sign it or go home because she had not been making production before she left. Davis refused to sign and left the plant. Davis' production quota had been $12.80 per day on a piecework basis, but her average earnings had been $8 and $10 per day. Leiby testified that her production was "below average . . . on that same particular operation." There is no evidence that Davis had ever been reprimanded for low production. Leiby also testified, when asked why he had insisted that Davis sign the statement, that he was "building a record for future use." Leiby had never before asked an employee to sign such a statement, although he testified that he had obtained oral agreements of this nature from other employees. We find, in agreement with the General Counsel and the Charging Party, that the evidence clearly es- tablishes a violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1). In her final period of employment, Davis had worked for 20 months without having been reproved for her failure to meet the production quota. It was only after her complaint about vacation pay to the state labor 188 NLRB No. 114 SPOTLIGHT COMPANY, INC. board, and Respondent's receipt of an unfair labor practice charge concerning and the same matter and referring to Davis' union "membership and activi- ties," that Leiby predicated continuance of her em- ployment on an improvement in her production. While Leiby's expressed concern, in his interview with Davis, about the manner in which she had gone about collecting her vacation pay can, as Respondent as- serts, be construed as a reference to her resort to the state labor board, it is clear that the appearance of Davis' name in an unfair labor practice charge must have compounded Leiby's displeasure. The charge, of course, furnished Respondent with knowledge of Da- vis' association with the Union, and the record else- where-in the case of discriminatee Bryan-supports a conclusion that Leiby kept abreast of the identity of employees named in the charges filed by the Union. Considering together this knowledge; Leiby's testimo- ny that he intended to use the statement for "building a record for future use"; the absence of any previously demonstrated concern about Davis' production; Leiby's stated dissatisfaction with Davis' efforts at collecting vacation pay; and the unprecedented na- ture of the written statement upon which Leiby condi- tioned Davis' return, as well as the Respondent's generally intense hostility to the union campaign as established in this case and in Spotlight Company, Inc., 181 NLRB No. 94, we conclude that the evidence preponderates in favor of a finding that the Respondent's requirement of a written statement from Davis was a discriminatory act based on Davis' union activities, in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.' 2. The Trial Examiner further concluded that Re- spondent discharged Floorgirl Mattie Dodson on Au- gust 19, 1969, in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and 8(a)(1) of the Act. In reaching this conclusion, the Trial Examiner determined that Dodson was not a supervisor within the meaning of Section 2(11) of the Act. We agree with Respondent's contention that Dodson was a statutory supervisor, and for that rea- son we shall dismiss this aspect of the complaint. Dodson was one of seven or eight floorgirls em- ployed by Respondent, each having assigned to them some 20-25 sewing machine operators. A written list of instructions was given to Dodson when Respon- dent first hired her as a floorgirl in March 1968. The list shows that floorgirls are required to perform such functions as keeping work at the machines, being sure that finished work does not accumulate, keeping their sections neat, inspecting their operators' work, ex- 1 Chairman Miller disagrees with the conclusion of his colleagues that the treatment accorded to Davis was violative of the Act For the reasons given by the Trial Examiner, and because the Trial Examiner appears to have believed Respondent'siustification of its actions relating to Davis, Chairman Miller would adopt the Trial Examiner 's recommendation of dismissal 775 plaining timework to the operators, and checking ma- chines at the end of the day. Perhaps the written du- ties most relevant to supervisory status are "See that your operators are put on other machines or other jobs if their machines are down for any length of time," "Keep check on operators that they do not spend excessive time in the Ladies Room or away from machines for other reasons," and "See that all Goal Sheets are filled out properly, all bins are cleaned at least once a week. See that the machines are cleaned, and covered when not in use (Have the operators do this)." Aside from these written instructions, the plant manager and Dodson's immediate supervisor, Floor- lady Sample, testified that although the floorgirls can- not hire, fire, or promote, they have the authority to reprimand employees and to recommend transferring them if they cannot do the work. The record, however, does not show that Dodson personally took either of these actions in the period prior to her discharge in August 1969, and the Trial Examiner concluded from this that the bare assertion that she had such supervi- sory characteristics is insufficient. There was also testimony from the floorlady that Dodson, as well as the other floorgirls, selected em- ployees for layoff when a slowdown in work occurred. However, because of evidence that the Respondent had a policy of rotating the layoff of employees "so that the employees would have an approximately equal amount of work time," the Trial Examiner con- cluded that this power to select for layoff involved no independent exercise of discretion, even though this distribution of work was not formalized and appar- ently depended on the floorgirls' recollection of prior layoffs. Another floorgirl, Hoover, testified that the applicable standard was "to be as fair as possible." Hoover also testified that she was one who picked the employees in her section to perform the overtime work. The record further shows that Dodson, along with the other floorgirls, attended management meet- ings. The floorgirls received $1.75-$1.90 an hour; the operators received piece rates, with an hourly min- imum of $1.60. In deciding that Dodson was not a supervisor, the Examiner stated, "The issue before me, however, is not whether all floorgirls are supervisors, but whether Mattie Dodson was a supervisor. Indeed, it appears that some floorgirls are or were supervisors. I note, for example, that Floorgirl Olive Hoover testified that she transferred operators, chose the layoffs, and assigned the work to the operators? Hoover made it clear, how- ever, that her observations were applicable to her own section and that she did not know how [Floorlady] 2 Except for the first, the record shows that Dodson also performed these functions 776 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Sample handled the other sections" (emphasis sup- plied). We think that the distinction thus drawn by the Trial Examiner between Dodson and the other floor- girls is untenable . The floorgirls generally have the supervisory authority to assign work, to maintain or- der, to recommend discipline, to transfer operators when necessary, and to select operators for overtime and layoff. While the latter powers are supposed to be exercised in accordance with the general company policy of fair distribution of work, the selection ap- pears to be left to the floorgirls' memories and is, consequently, conceivably subject to their personal prejudices. There is nothing in the record to show that the floorgirls do not all possess the same inherent powers and responsibilities. Similarly, there is no evi- dence establishing that Dodson had been denied the authority normally vested in the other floorgirls. Sim- ply because Dodson may not have had the occasion to exercise certain inherent supervisory powers during her tenure as a floorgirl is not, we think, a sound reason for distinguishing between Dodson and the remaining floorgirls, as the Trial Examiner has done. Accordingly, we conclude that Dodson was a supervi- sor at the time of her discharge. Since we do not find any special factors in this case which might support a conclusion that the discharge of Dodson in her capac- ity as a supervisor was nonetheless violative of Section 8(a)(1), cf. Jackson Tile Mfg. Co. v. N.L.R.B., 272 F.2d 181 (C.A. 5); N. L. R.B. v. Talladega Cotton Factory, 213 F.2d 208 (C.A. 5), we shall dismiss the complaint allegation pertaining to Dodson. Upon the basis of the foregoing findings and upon the record as a'whole, we shall substitute the following conclusions for the Trial Examiner' s first, second, and fifth Conclusions of Law: 1. Mattie Dodson was a supervisor for the Respon- dent within the meaning of Section 2(11) of the Act. 2. Respondent's discharge of Mattie Dodson on August 19, 1969, was not violative of the Act. 5. Respondent imposed an improper condition upon the reinstatement of Wilma Davis following her leave of absence which ended on September 1, 1969, because of her union activities, in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. THE REMEDY We have fouund in agreement with the Trial Exam- iner that the Respondent engaged in conduct violative of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act and, accordingly, we adopt his remedial recommendations in that re- gard, except insofar as they provide a remedy for the discharge of Mattie Dodson. We have also found, contrary to the Trial Examiner, that the Respondent additionally volated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) by dis- criminating against employee Wilma Davis. Accord- ingly, we shall order the Respondent to reinstate Wil- ma Davis with backpay for lost earnings together with interest thereon at 6 percent per annum, as more fully set forth in The Remedy section of the Trial Examiner's Decision with respect to employees Sewell and Bryan. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Rela- tions Board adopts as its Order the Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner, as modified below, and hereby orders that the Respondent, Spotlight Compa- ny, Inc., Ashdown, Arkansas, its officers, agents, suc- cessors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order, as so modified: 1. In paragraph 2(a) of the Recommended Order, delete the name "Mattie Dodson" and substitute therefore the name "Wilma Davis." 2. In footnote 4 of the Trial Examiner's Decision, substitute "20" for "10" days. 3. Substitute the attached Appendix for the Trial Examiner's Appendix. APPENDIX NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government WE WILL NOT discourage either membership in the Union or concerted activities for the purpose of mutual aid or protection by discharging or otherwise discriminating against you because you are engaged in union or concerted activities. WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of your rights to self-organization, to form, join, or assist the International Ladies' Garment Work- ers' Union, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organi- zation, to bargain collectively through representatives of your own choosing or to en- gage in other concerted activity for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection or to refrain from any such activity. WE WILL offer Wilma Davis, Lydia Marie Se- well, and Polly Bryan immediate and full reins- tatement to their former jobs or, if those jobs no longer exist, to substantially equivalent positions, without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges, and make them whole for any loss of pay they may have suffered because of the discrimination against them. SPOTLIGHT COMPANY, INC 777 All our employees are free to become or refrain from becoming members of the above-named Union or any labor organization. SPOTLIGHT COMPANY, INC (Employer) Dated By (Representative) (Title) Arkansas with a plant and place of business located in Ashdown, Arkansas, where it is engaged in the business of manufacturing lingerie. During the year preceding the is- suance of the complaint Respondent in the course and con- duct of its business operations purchased and received at its Ashdown, Arkansas, plant goods and materials valued in excess of $50,000 directly from points outside the State of Arkansas and during the same period Respondent sold and shipped from its Ashdown, Arkansas, plant products valued in excess of $50,00 directly to points located outside the State of Arkansas. The complaint alleges, the Respondent's answer admits, and I find that the Respondent is now and has been at all times material herein an employer enga ed in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7f of the Act. This is an official notice and must not be defaced by anyone. This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. Any questions concerning this notice or compli- ance with its provisions may be directed to the Board's Office, 746 Federal Office Building, 167 North Main Street, Memphis, Tennessee 38103, Telephone 901-534-3161. TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE HARRY R. HINKES, Trial Examiner : The original charge in this proceeding was filed by International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, AFL-CIO, hereinafter referred to as the Union, on November 26, 1969 , and served on Spotlight II THE LABOR ORGANIZATION The complaint alleges, Respondent's answer admits, and I find that the Union is now, and has been at all times material herein, a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Background On March 6, 1970, the Acting Regional Director for Re- gion 26 of the National Labor Relations Board directed an election to be held among the production and maintenance employees of this Respondent pursuant to a petition filed by this Union.' This finding of the Director was not appealed to the Board by the Union, but counsel for the Respondent concedes that neither the General Counsel nor the Union are necessarily bound by the Director's findings in this pro- ceeding on the issue of whether employee Dodson, a floor- Company, Inc., hereinafter referred to as the Respondent or Employer, on or about the same date. Pursuant to this i Case 26-RC-3693. In his decision the Acting Regional Director noted charge the complaint was issued on January 2, 1970, alleg- that the parties had disagreed as to the status of eight floorgtrls in the sewing trig that the Respondent had committed unfair labor prac- department The employer contended that they should be excluded from the tice5 within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the unit as supervisors while the petitioner contended that they should be mclud- Act, in refusing to recall employees PollB Bryan and Wilma ed as rank-and-file employees The Director found the eight floorgirls were g y supervisors within the meaning of the Act and excluded them from the unit Davis. A first amended charge was filed by the Union on The sewing department has 152 machine operators who work in sections February 18, 1970. This charge together with an ranging in size from 20 to 24 operators There is one floorgirl assigned amendment to the complaint was served on the Respondent to each section The floorgirls distribute work as evenly as possible on or about February 19 1970, alleging that the Respondent among the operators, check and report the production of the operators, had committed unfair labor practices in violation of Section consult with operators on how to bring up low production and advise 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act in discharging employees Marie the sewing department forelady of any failure on the part of an operator Sewell and Mattie Dodson. By answer duly filed Respon- to keep up production Additionally, they assign operators from their dent denied the alleged discharges as well as the alle ed regular machines to other machines where vacancies occur and act jointly with other floorgtrls to shift operators from one section to another refusals to recall an denied the commission of any unfair as the need arises They also assure that layoffs are conducted by rota- labor practices. non, distribute pay checks to the operators, schedule operators for A hearing was held before me in Ashdown, Arkansas, on overtime and attend management meetings with the plant manager and April 7 and 8, 1970, at which all parties were represented the department forelady where they make appraisals of operators and and afforded full opportunity to participate, examine wit- join in discussing production and repairs They have the authority to nesses , and adduce relevant evidence. Briefs have been filed orally warn operators, about excessive talking and staying away from by counsel for each of the parties and have been given their machines too long The operators are paid on a piecework basis, careful consideration. while the floorgirls are paid an hourly rate ranging from $1.75 to $1.90 Upon the entire record in this I make the per hour Because they work on piecework, some operators who have proceeding, high productivity receive pay in excess of their floorgirl. The operators following: and floorgirls punch a time clock, receive the same vacation, insurance FINDINGS OF FACT I JURISDICTION Spotlit Company, Inc., is now and has been at all times material erein a corporation doing business in the State of and other fringe benefits The floorgtrls do not possess the authority to hire or fire employees and when they recommend the discharge of an operator because of low production, the department forelady makes an independent investigation The above circumstances, including the ab- normally high ratio of employees to supervisors that would exist if the floorgirls were found not to be supervisors, lead to the conclusion that they possess the authority responsibly to direct the work of employees under them 778 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD girl, was a supervisor within the meaning of the Act. On March 17, 1970, the Board issued its Decision in Spotlight Company, Inc., 181 NLRB No. 94, wherein it adopted the findings, conclusions , and recommendations of Tral Examiner Melvin Pollack on a complaint against said Company pursuant to charges filed by said Union. In his decision Trial Examiner Pollack recommended the issuance of a broad cease-and-desist order, having found that the Respondent had violated Section 8 (aXl) of the Act in a variety of ways interfering with, restraining, and coercing its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them in Section 7 of the Act. Respondent's unlawful conduct was found to have started immediately after the Union had handbilled Respondent's plant in April 1969 and to have continued into May 1969. On April 24, 1969, the Union sent the Respondent a telegram listing the names of 32 employees who were mem- bers of the Union's organizing committee and, on May 2, 1969, supplemented the telegram with a letter adding seven additional names of employees as members of the Union's organizing committee. Included in these lists of names were the names of employees Mattie Dodson, Polly Bryan, and Lydia M. Sewell, the last of whom is variously referred to as Lydia Sewell, Marie Sewell, and Lydia Marie Sewell. B. Mattie Dodson 1. The supervisory issue Dodson was hired as a floorgirl in March 1968. Accord- ing to Respondent General Manager Paul Leiby, floorgg^^irls were given a written description of their job duties wl ►en hired. This job description states: Keep work at machines at all times. If the operator is to be changed, have the work, thread, etc., there in advance. Keep them on one job as long as possible. Keep finished work moved as it is done. Do not let it pile up in the operators way. Match all trim, yokes, etc., for your operators. Stack their work in size ranges for them. Keep all empty boxes moved to the Cutting Depart- ment. Keep your section cleared and as neat as possi- ble. Keep all work separated, so you know where every style is. See that your operators are put on other machines or other jobs, if their machines are down for any length of time. Keep check on operators that they do not spend exces- sive time in the Ladies Room or away from machines for other reasons. See that all Goal Sheets are filled out properly, all bins are cleaned at least once week. See that the machines are cleaned, and covered when not in use. (Have the operators do this.) At the end of the day, check all machines and make sure there is work to start on the next morning. Ask the operators to turn machines off at the end of the day. Do not visit with your operators or other floor girls. Do not carry messages for your operators unless it pretains [sic] to getting rides during the overtime peri- ods. If your operators need a part replaced, get it as quickly as possible and put it in the correct bundle. Please see that no operator gets up to get her work or has to wait for it. See that all thread and lace is used off the spools before the operator discards it. Check your operators work, also check to see if the number is on the card and the card on the bundle. All time work given to the operators must be explained. The hour started and stopped on time work should be listed on the daily work sheets. NO TIME WORK is given an operator for repairing her own work. If a ticket is missing from a bundle a VOID ticket from THAT bundle will be accepted if it contains the opera- tion, style number, price and signed by a service or floor lady. Leiby testified that when the floorgirls were hired and from time to time thereafter they were reminded that they were supervisors. They were not, however, authorized to hire, fire, promote, or discharge other employees on their own initiative. Counsel for the Respondent argues that Dodson as a floorgirl could effectively recommend the Kir- ing of an applicant citing the fact that she had recommend- ed the employment of her sister as a floorgirl. Leiby admitted, however, that there was considerable family rela- tionship at the plant among the employees and other em- ployees had recommended their immediate relatives be hired just as Dodson did. Such recommendations do not establish supervisory activities. See Edinburg Mfg. Co., 164 NLRB 121, 123. Leiby also stated that Dodson as a floorgirl had authority to reprimand employees. He admitted, how- ever, that he knew of no instance where Dodson had done so nor could Lucille Sample, Dodson' s immediate supervi- sor, recall any occasion in which Dodson disciplined an employee. Similarly, Sample could not recall Dodson ever recommending that an employee was not capable of work in her section. Sample also testified that floorgirls were "supposed to speak to ... [employees who are derelict in their duties] and see that they don't do it, that they don't spend too much time away from their machines or visiting." However, she could not recall any occasion in which Dod- son had disciplined an employee. Sample's testimony to the effect that floorgirls recommend transfering employees who are not capable of doing the work and discipline offending operators would appear, therefore, to be inapplicable to Dodson. The absence of any evidence that Dodson exer- cised the alleged supervisory authority should negate the bare assertion that she, in fact, possessed this authority. Security Guard Service, 154 NLRB 8, 10. A close examination of the written job description given the floorgirls when they were hired fails to reveal duties that would properly be supervisory in nature by requiring the use of independent judgment. Supervisor Sample testified, how- ever, that this job description just "shows ... the work schedule." Sample went on to testify that Dodson selected employees to be laid off when Sample notified her of a slowdown in work. At first blush this would appear to be SPOTLIGHT COMPANY, INC. 779 supervisory work. It appears, however, that it was company policy to rotate the layoff of employees so that the employy- ees would have an approximately equal amount of work- time. The selection of an employee to be laid off, therefore, instead of requiring independent judgment by the floorgirl, merely required some recollection of the order in which the rotation was carried out. It thus appears that the duties of floorgirls described by the Acting Regional Director at Case 26-RC-3693 are not entirely applicable to Mattie Dodson. Specifically, it appears that Dodson did not advise her floorlady of any failure on the part of an operator to keep up production nor did she act jointly with other floorgirls to shift operators as the need arose. The Acting Regional Director also relied on the ab- normally high ratio of employees to supervisors that would exist if the floorgirls were found not to be supervisors. I do not disagree. If all the floorgirls were found not to be super- visors, Supervisor Sample would be the immediate supervi- sor of some 150 or more operators. The issue before me, however, is not whether all floorgirls are supervisors but whether Mattie Dodson was a supervisor. Indeed, it appears that some floorgirls are or were supervisors. I note, for example, that Floorgirl Olive Hoover testified that she transferred operators, chose the layoffs, and assigned the work to the operators. Hoover made it clear, however, that her observations were applicable to her own section and that she did not know how Sample handled the other sec- tions. It follows, therefore, that the brief of counsel for the Respondent misses the mark in relying heavily on Hoover's testimony regarding her work duties as floorgirl. I conclude that a preponderance of the evidence submit- ted in this proceeding indicates that the duties of Mattie Dodson were routine and perfunctory and did not require the exercise of independent judgment. Moreover, her au- thority did not encompass activities which the Act defines as supervisory nor is there evidence that she could effective- ly recommend such action by others. Nor does Dodson's attendance at management meetings of floorgirls establish her supervisory status. Sample described the meetings as discussions of "production and just the general things that they had to know about." There is no suggestion of manage- ment decisions in such discussions, nor an indication of the extend of their participation. See Edinburg Mfg. Co., supra. 2. The termination Dodson signed a union card and became a member of the Union's organizing committee around April 1969. The Re- spondent was notified of her participation. Dodson attended several meetings of the Union and obtained the signatures of four or five employees to union cards. General Manager Leiby testified that he told his floorgirls not to engage in union activities. In addition he told Dodson separately that she was to stay away from union activities. According to Dodson, Leiby told her that he was going to get rid of the girls that had started the Union, especially Mrs. Altenbaumer. He added that he wanted Dodson to get on the Company's side and request her card back. Although Leiby denied saying that he intended to get nd of the em- ployees who had started the Union and requesting Dodson to et her union card back I credit the testimony of Dodson. fn June Leiby ordered Dodson to tell Altenbaumer she 2 The Act at Section 2(11) defines "supervisor" as "any individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, layoff, recall, promote , discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action had been discharged. Although Dodson protested that her job duties did not include transmission of a discharge deci- sion from management to an employee she nevertheless complied with these instructions. Altenbaumer' s discharge has been found to be in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act in the decision of the Board cited earlier (Case 26-CA- 3396). In August 1969 Supervisor Sample decided to transfer Dodson from her section to another section and to bring in the other section's floorgirl (Madden) to work in Dodson's former section. The planned move was told to Madden but not to Dodson. On August 19 a meeting of the floorgirls was held at which Respondent President Seiff announced a 5- cent-per-hour raise for the floorgirls. Sample announced the transfer of Dodson and Madden. Immediately after the meeting Dodson went into Leib 's office and told him of her dissatisfaction with the transfer. She told him that she did not know if she would keep on working and Leiby admits that she did not tell him she was quitting. As Dodson left Leiby's office she met Sample and complained to her that Sample should have told her of the transfer before announcing it publicly at the meeting. She asked Sample for an apology and, according to Dodson, Sample said, "I am sorry. Dodson retorted, "You are darned right, you are." According to Sample, however, Dod- son added, "You are dirt. You are trash." Sample further testified that Dodson followed her around, talking in a loud voice and disturbing the whole section. According to Dod- son, however, she merely told Sample that she did not know "but that I was going to quit." She then asked Sample how much she would have if she took the new section to which Sample replied, "You won't have any because you have already quit." Sample testified that after Dodson had called her "dirt" and "trash" she reported the incident to Leiby and Presi- dent Seiff. Later Dodson came to her once again and told her that she had changed her mind and was not quitting, whereupon Sample went back to Leiby's office and reported the second conversation. Between these two conversations with Dodson, Sample had a conversation with Floorgirl Betty Hill who told her that she heard Dodson say "the bitch," and "the sorry thing" as she left the meeting. Hill admitted, however, that she did not know to whom Dodson was referring. In further explanation Hill testified that any word that is used with anger is bad and that it was not the language which Hill deemed improper but Dodson' s tone of voice. She admitted further, however, that other operators have used angry tones of voices but that she had never reported such incidents to management. Leiby also testified that President Seiff and Respondent Engineer Levine told him that Dodson had said she was quitting. Neither of these individuals testified. I have considered the different versions of Dodson's be- havior following the meeting and I have observed the de- meanor of the witnesses as they testified on this subject. I conclude that Dodson's version should be credited rather than the versions given by Leiby, Sample and Hill. It fol- lows, therefore, that Dodson did not quit but was dis- charged. Leiby admits that Dodson never told him she was quitting. He rests his belief that she had quit upon the re- ports he received from Supervisors Sample and Levine as well as President Seiff. Both Seiff and Levine allegedly told him that they heard Dodson say she was quitting but neither of these two men testified. Even if we assume arguendo that they heard Dodson say she was quitting, the question still remains whether such an expression indicated only a future intention to quit. Leiby attempted to supply the missing link when he testified that Sample told him Dodson had quit. On 780 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD being shown an affidavit he had made earlier, however, Leiby modified his testimony saying that Sample had told him Dodson was going to quit. Sinularly, Sample in her testimony stated that Dodson had told her she was quitting, which she reported to Leiby. This however, contradicts the version given by Leiby in his earlier affidavit which I as- sume to be the correct version . Moreover, there is no ques- tion but that Dodson continued at her post after the meeting had ended and after she had allegedly told Sample that she "had quit. Her continuation of her work duties clearly nega- tes any resignation and is consistent at most with an inten- tion to quit at a future time . Nevertheless, Respondent seized upon the situation and declared Dodson a voluntary quit, despite her protestations that she had not quit . There- after Respondent took the position that it could not rein- state her to her former job because she had engaged in improper conduct . I find even this position untenable. The improper conduct, if I were to believe the testimony, of Sample, was Dodson's calling Sample "dirt" and "trash." I deem it significant, however, that Leiby made no mention of this abusive language when first testifying about Dodson's termination, nor did he make any mention at that time of Hill's report to Sample about Dodson 's profanity. Indeed, it appears that the profanity was not offensive to Hill who reported it to Sample . It was only the angry tone of voice employed by Dodson that Hill found improper. Even that, however, was not unusual in the plant and Hill admitted having heard such tones of voice previously with- out reporting same to any supervisor . On balance I conclude that versions given by Leiby, Sample, and Hill on the Dod- son termination should not be credited and find that Dod- son was discharged 'pruportedly for having called her supervisor "dirt" and `trash" and for having used profanity. I find further, however, that Dodson was not guilty of that conduct and that therefore the stated motive for her dis- charge (or refusal to reinstate) is false and pretextual. The language of the court in Shattuck Denn Mining Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 362 F.2d 466 (C.A. 9), is appropriate: In his decision, the trial examiner reviewed the evi- dence in detail and found that Olvera was not insubor- dinate, that Kentro had no reasonable ground to believe that Olvera was insubordinate, that the stated grounds for discharge were a pretext, and that the real motivation was to discourage the union 's filing of griev- ances and its aggressive pursuit of bargaining. He con- cluded that the discharge was discriminatory, in violation of Section 8(a)(3), and constituted restraint and coercion, in violation of section 8(a)(1). These findings are vigorously attacked, and heavy reliance is placed on cases indicating that the mere fact that good cause for a discharge does not exist is not a basis for inferring that the discharge was based upon an unlawful motive, that the fact that an employee is engaged in union activity is not, taken alone, proof that the discharge was for that reason , that suspicion is not enough to support a finding , that an employer may discharge for any reason or no reason and so has no burden to justify his action, that inferfences must be based upon evidnce , that it is not thejob of the Board to judge the seventy of punishment imposed by the employer, that lack of anti-union bias is to be consid- ered in the employer's favor, and that the Board may not infer an unlawful motive if the evidence equally supports an inference of lawful motive . [Footnotes omitted.] Actual motive, a state of mind, being the question, it is seldom that direct evidence will be available that is not also self-serving. In such cases, the self-serving declaration is not conclusive; the trier of fact may infer motive from the total circumstances proved. Otherwise no person accused of unlawful motive who took the stand and testified to a lawful motive could be brought to book. Nor is the trier of fact - here the trial examin- er - required to be any more naif than is a judge. If he finds that the stated motive for a discharge is false, he certainly can infer that there is another motive. More than that, he can infer that the motive is one that the employer desires to conceal - an unlawful motive - at least where, as in this case, the surrounding facts tend to reinforce that inference. Here the Respondent knew that Dodson was a member of the Union's organizing committee and had even gone so far as to demand that she cease and desist from such activi- ties. Moreover, the Respondent's union animus is fully set forth in the earlier proceeding against it, reported at 181 NLRB No. 94. Respondent's real motivation for the dis- charge was to get rid of a union adherent, indeed a union leader, whom it found in the midst of its floorgirls, some of whom possessed supervisory attributes. Dodson's discharge was therefore discriminatory in violation of Section 8(aX3), and constituted restraint and coercion in violation of Sec- tion 8(a)(1). C. Lydia Marie Sewell Lydia Mane Sewell was first hired by the Respondent in 1963. For several months in 1966 she worked in binding, and in July 1968 Sewell voluntarily quit, but not until her supervisor, Sample, had promised her a position when she could return. In March 1969 Sewell had her daughter in- quire about returning to work and that evening was recalled by the Respondent. Once again her supervisor was Sample and she was assigned to work in binding . In that department employees were paid by the iece produced but were guar- anteed $1.60 per hour or $12.80 per 8-hour day. Sewell did not make her production quota, averaging only between $7 and $10 per day. She had, however, done better in her previous period of employment with the Respondent. She explained that better production was possible then due to the difference in styles produced as well as the better condi- tion of the machines worked on. Sewell complained to her floorgirl, Hill, about the poor machine she had from March 1969 on, but no significant improvements were made. Al- though Hill was called to testify by counsel for the Respon- dent, she was not asked about this complaint from Sewell. Sewell received no reprimands for her low production al- though Sample did testify that she asked Sewell "if she could produce a little more." On the other hand Sewell heard Sample tell Floorrirl Hoover to give Sewell the more difficult work because `some of the other girls would mess it up." Hoover in her testimony confirmed that Sewell did the harder work and that this slowed her production. She testified further that Sample told her it did- ot matter and that Leiby agreed. Indeed, Hoover testified that Sample told her what work to assign to Sewell because Sewell did better work. Although Sample denied assigning Sewell's work, I credit Hoover s testimony noting that she is no longer em- ployed by the Respondent having left voluntarily and would have no reason apparently to testify falsely or to color her testimony. There is no doubt, however, that Sewell's production was low. Records of the Respondent indicate that Sewell's pro- duction was the worst in the binding department with the exception of two employees, one of whom quit on May 10 and the other quit June 28. Neither of these two employees were discharged for their low production. On May 27, 1969, SPOTLIGHT COMPANY, INC. Sewell was informed by Floorgirl Hoover that there was insufficient work for the employees that afternoon. Later Sample told her that she would not be called back because Leiby "doesn't feel like your work has picked up." Leiby in his testimony stated that Sewell was laid off because of this excessive "makeu ." He admitted, however, that he knew the binding employees were not making production and that it was unusual for an employee to make production in binding. Sewell's name was on the list of organizing committee members for the Union that was sent to the Respondent on April 24. As such she solicited for the Union and obtained signatures to 10 union cards. She also attended committee meetings for the Union, and testified that although she and Sample were freindly at the plant prior to April 25, 1969, Sample became unfriendly and avoided her thereafter. I find it significant that the Union's notification of the organ- izing committee membership as well as the first union meet- ing occurred on April 24, 1969. Counsel for the Respondent argues that Sewell was dis- charged for her low production. He states that "there is no such thing as harder or easier work. If sewing operations or certain garment styles take longer to perform the piece rate is higher." This undoubtedly is the purpose for different rates on different types of work. It does not follow, however, that the differences in rates compensate exactly for the dif- ferences in the time involved. Moreover, I credit the testi- mony of Hoover that Sewell's low production was due to the more difficult work she was required to do. Further, there is no contradiction of Hoover's testimony that Leiby said the production quota made no difference as long as the employees did good work. Counsel for the Respondent also cites record evidence indicating that Sewell's rate of prod- uction on a certain style was substantially lower than the rate of another operator doing the same style the following day. This does not explain, however, Respondent's failure to discharge two operators whose production was even low- er than Sewell's, choosing instead to permit these two opera- tors to continue in the employ of the Respondent despite their lower production until they quit voluntarily. Counsel for the Respondent also notes the "oral admonition" for Sample. This is apparently in reference to Sample's request of Sewell that "she ... produce a little more." I do not regard this language as a admonition. It is a request, of course, but it does not carry with it the necessary implication that Sewell's low production was cirtical. No warning or threat of discipline accompanied this so-called oral admonition. Considering, therefore, that Sewell was discharged without any warnin gg, su esting illegal motivation (Dunclick Inc., 159 NLRB I0, 1 and was not recalled thereafter although it is admitted that many new employees were hired by the Respondent during the months that followed the events involved in this proceeding, coupled with Leiby's admission that it was unusual for production to be made in the bindin department, as well as Respondent's admitted knowledge of Sewell's leadership in union activities, drives me to the con- clusion that her discharge was not based on her production but was discriminatory and designed to discourage mem- bership in the Union in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. D. Polly Bryan Polly Bryan started working for the Respondent in Au- gust 1968 . She was instructed in the binding operations as well as other operations and as a result was told by Supervi- ng sor Sample that she would not be subject to layoff duri the slack season. Consequently she worked steadily through 781 the winter of 1968-69. Although her production quota was $12.80 a day she averaged only about $9 to $12. Neverthe- less she received no reprimand for her work ( nor was she commended). She learned about the Union in April 1969 and became a member of the organizing committee. Her name was submitted on the list of employees on the organiz- ing committee submitted by the Union to the Respondent on April 25, 1969. She attended union meetings, distributed literature in front of the plant, and obtained signatures to 10 to 14 union cards. Manager Leiby admitted knowing that Polly Bryan was on the organizing committee. On June 3 Bryan presented a statement from her doctor and requested a leave of absence. The medical statement spoke of a 6- to 8-week leave of absence but Bryan was not aware of that. Bryan underwent surgery and because of subsequent complications remained off work and under a doctor s care until August 27 when she was given a release to return to work on September 1. Bryan returned to the plant on August 28 and met with Leiby. She gave him the doctor's release and in response Leiby told her that she had been away 12 weeks instead of the expected 6 to 8 weeks. He also told her he had hired a new employee to replace her and could not fire the new employee to put her back to work. He added, however, that he would call her back when he needed someone. In mid-September Bryan telephoned the office of the Respondent and was told again that she would be called when needed. It is undisputed that Respondent has hired many new employees subsequent to the events involved in this proceeding. Polly Bryan, nevertheless, was not recalled. General Manager Leiby was asked, "Why wasn't she re- called?" Leiby replied: Well, I started to take on more duties in the other part of the factory and I just didn't watch over all the firing and hiring and I don't do all the hiring and firing. don't know how many girls she hired in just the binding department alone at at time. Again he was asked, "Why wasn't Polly Bryan recalled?" A. I don't know. At that particular time I just didn't have enough binding work. Q. Since that time other employees have been re- called, hired in the binding department, have they not? A. Yes, but since then the charge was filed. Q. Yes, but other employees have been hired since the last of August for the binding department? A. I am almost sure they have. Q. As a matter of fact you know there have been? A. Yes. Q. Now why didn't you call Mrs. Bryan? A. Because I don't do all the hiring. Q. Is that the reason? A. That is right. Q. Is that the only reason that you didn't recall her? A. That's the only reason. Upon being shown an earlier affidavit given by him to the NLRB, Leiby testified that "the number one reason" for not recalling Bryan was that she could not make a quota. In spite of that, however, he admitted that it was unusual for one to make production in binding. Nevertheless, he insist- ed that that was the reason he did not recall her. I find Leiby's testimony most unimpressive. One would expect that if Bryan was not making the production expect- ed of her something would have been said to her about it. Nothing was. Moreover, even if her production was low there would be little reason to prefer hiring inexperienced and untrained new employees in preference over Bryan. It seems clear to me that the more reasonable explanation for Respondent's failure to recall Bryan is its knowledge of her 782 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD active participation in union activities . I deem it significant that when Leiby was asked if other employees had been hired even though Bryan was not , he answered "yes, but since then the charge was filed." Counsel for the Respondent cites precedent for finding no unfair labor practice where an employer discharges an employee for overstaying a leave of absence . Such preced- ent, however, is based on failure to prove discrimination in the discharge, as where the employee's union activities were unknown to the employer . But here Bryan's union activities were well known to the Respondent . Moreover, Respondent failed to contradict Hoover's testimony that other employ- ees, including herself and employee Lanstrell , were not dis- charged or even reprimanded for overstaying their leaves of absence. There is a clear inference of discrimination in Respondent's treatment of Bryan for overstaying her leave. I conclude that Respondent's failure to recall Bryan fol- lowing her leave of absence was not due to her extended absence nor to her poor production but was motivated by Respondent's union animus and desire to undermine the effectiveness of the umon campaign in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. E. Wilma Davis Respondent first hired Wilma Davis in February 1964. After working about 6 months she quit voluntarily on ac- count of pregnancy. She returned to the plant in 1966 where after working about 8 months she again quit , having lost her means of transportation. She was employed for the third time in September 1967. Davis first heard of the Union's organizational campaign in April 1969. She talked about the Union with some of the other employees, attended several union meetings, and signed a union authorization card. In May 1969 she asked for and obtained a leave of ab- sence for medical reasons. The following month she visited the plant to inquire about her vacation pay. This was re- fused her in the belief that she had not worked a sufficient length of time, or would not work a sufficient length of time, to entitle her to the vacation pay. At the same time Davis presented Leiby with a note from the doctor indicating that she would be off work until September. Davis wrote the state labor board in an effort to collect her vacation pay. Leiby was called by that board, whereup- on he reviewed the matter and paid Davis her vacation pay. Thereafter, Respondent received the Union's charge in Case 26-CA-3396, in which Respondent was charged with an unfair labor practice involving its denial of vacation pay to Wilma Davis, among others. On September 1 Davis reported to the plant with a doctor's release for work. Leiby called her into his office and asked her to sign a statement which he had prepared. The statement read: I, Wilma Davis, hereby agree within two weeks to make as much or more than my fellow-worker on a like oper- ation since I am experienced. If not, I will leave the employment of Spotlight Co., Inc., no questions asked because of my inability to do so. She asked for and received permission to take the note home for her husband to review. Davis returned to the plant the following day and told Leiby she did not think it was necessary that she sign the note. Leiby told her she would have to sign it or go home because she had not been making production before she left. The production quota for Davis was $12.80 per day on a piecework basis, but her average earnings had been between $8 and $10 per day. The only evidence with respect to her production compared to others is the uncontradicted testimony of Leiby that Davis was "below average when it came to the operators on that same particular operation , other girls were making better than she was." Davis nevertheless refused to sign the note and in- stead demanded a statement from Leiby for the purpose of filing for unemployment compensation benefits. Leiby re- plied that such a statement was unnecessary in order to get compensation, but Davis threatened to remain in the office and if necessary follow Leiby all over the plant until she got such a statement. Leiby then told his secretary to call the police, whereupon Davis left. Counsel for the General Counsel urges a finding that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) of the Act by dis- charging and failing to reinstate Davis on September 1, 1969. In support of this argument, he cites Respondent's failure to mention Davis' low production to her until after Leiby had prepared the statement for her to sign . He argues that if Davis were guilty of low production Respondent would have mentioned it to her when Davis visited the plant in June to inquire about vacation pay. The discussion in June, however, centered about her vacation pay and the termination of her leave which was due in September. A discussion of her low production at that time would not be necessarily in order inasmuch as Davis was not applying for reinstatement at that time. There would be no reason for Leiby to talk about her low production not knowing if or when she would ask for reinstatement. Counsel for the General Counsel also argues that discrim- inatory motivation is shown by Leiby's insistence that Davis sign a written note promising to do better work. Admittedly, Leiby made no such demand upon any other employee. He explained, however, that he had made such requests of other employees orally, but that since Wilma Davis had such a "erratic work record" and was "constantly low," and fur- ther since the Company had spent $2,000 training her, he felt a written statement from Davis was necessary. I credit Leiby's testimony in this respect, and find as a result insuffi- cient evidence of discriminatory treatment toward Davis. Counsel for the General Counsel also cites Leiby's testi- mony to the effect that he was trying to build a record for future use by having Davis sign this statement, arguing that no employer need build a record if there is no unlawful motivation. I do not agree. Records are prepared and kept for many purposes other than ones involving illegal motiva- tion. In this instance, the record could be deemed necessary to avoid later arguments on whether Davis had been warned on her low production. Finally, I note that unlike Dodson, Bryan, and Sewell, Davis was not a member of the organizing committee of the Union, did not distribute literature at the plant, nor obtain signatures from other employees to the union cards. There is nothing to indicate that the Respondent was aware of any union activities on the part of Davis. Counsel for the Gener- al Counsel argues, however, that this knowledge came to the Respondent when it received the Union's charge in Case 26-CA-3396 involving Respondent's denial of vacation pay to Wilma Davis and other employees. Davis, however, re- ceived her vacation pay before Respondent received the charge, and in any event it appears that the charge was withdrawn and never made the basis of a formal complaint. I consider this insufficient evidence of Respondent's knowl- edge of Davis' union activities, which were apparently mini- mal. I conclude and find that the General Counsel has not sustained his burden of proof to establish that Respondent has committed an unfair labor practice in refusing to rein- state Wilma Davis. SPOTLIGHT COMPANY, INC. 783 CONCLUSIONS OF LAW (b) In any manner interfering with, restraining, or coerc- ing its employees in the exercise of their right to self-organi- 1. Mattie Dodson was not a supervisor for the Respon- dent within the meaning of Section 2(11) of the Act. 2. Respondent discharged Mattie Dodson on August 19, 1969, for her union activities, in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and 8(a)(1) of the Act. 3. Respondent discharged Lydia Marie Sewell on May 27, 1969, and refused to recall or reinstate her thereafter be- cause of her union activities, in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and 8(a)(1) of the Act. 4. Respondent refused to recall Polly Bryan following her leave of absence which ended on September 1, 1969, be- cause of her union activities, in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and 8(a)(1) of the Act. 5. Counsel for the General Counsel has failed to meet his burden of proof to establish that Respondent's failure to recall Wilma Davis following her leave of absence which ended on September 1, 1969, was due to her union activities, in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and 8(a)(1) of the Act. THE REMEDY Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices I shall recommend that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action which I find necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act. Having further found that the Respondent discharged employees Mattie Dodson and Lydia Marie Sewell and re- fused to recall employee Polly Bryan in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act, I shall recommend that the Res- pondent offer them immediate and full reinstatement to their former jobs or, if those jobs no longer exist, to substan- tially equivalent positions, without prejudice to their senior- ity or other rights and privileges, and make them whole for any loss of earnings suffered by reason of the discharge or failure to recall by payment of a sum of money equal to that which they normally would have earned as wages from the date of discharge or refusal to recall to the date of Respondent's offer of reinstatement less any net earnings during this period and in the manner described in F. W. Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB 289, together with interest thereon at 6 percent per annum as set forth in Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716. RECOMMENDED ORDER On the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclu- sion of law, I recommend that the Respondent, Spotlight Company, Inc., its officers, agents, successors, andpassign, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Discouraging membership in the Union or concerted activities for the purpose of mutual aid or protection by discharging or otherwise discriminating against employees because they have engaged in union or concerted activities. zation, to form, tom, or assist the Union or any other abor organization, to bargain collectively through representa- tives of their own choosing, or to engage in other concerted activity for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any such activi- ty. 2. Take the following affirmative action which I find will effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Offer to employees Mattie Dodson, Lydia Marie Se- well, and Polly Bryan immediate and full reinstatement to their former jobs or, if those jobs no longer exist, to substan- tially equivalent positions , without prejudice to their senior- ity or other rights and privileges , and make them whole for any losses they may have suffered by reason of the discrim- ination aggainst them in the manner set forth in the section entitled "The Remedy." (b) Preserve and, upon request , make available to the Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all payroll records, social security payment records, timecards, person- nel records and reports, and all other records necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due under this Recom- mended Order. (c) Post at its Ashdown, Arkansas, place of business cop- ies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."3 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 26, after being duly signed by Respondent's repre- sentative, shall be posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted . Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (d) Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 20 days from the receipt of this Decision what steps Respon- dent has taken to comply herewith.4 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that those portions of the complaint as to which no violation has been found are hereby dis- missed. 3 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions, recommendations, and Recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and order , and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall be changed to read "Posted pursuant to a judgment of the United States Court of Appeals enforcing an order of the National Labor Relations Board " ° In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, this provision shall be modified to read: "Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith "