Tom Carpentry Construction Co.

124 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Tormod Langemyr d/b/a Tom Carpentry Construction Co. and Tom Carpentry Construction Company, Inc. and Local 964, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO. Case 2-CA-11355 May 22, 1969 DECISION AND ORDER BY MEMBERS BROWN, JENKINS, AND ZAGORIA On October 23, 1968, Trial Examiner James T. Barker, issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that Respondents had engaged in certain unfair labor practices and recommending that they cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. Thereafter, the General Counsel filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision and a supporting brief. Pursuant to provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel. The Board has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and briefs of the General Counsel, and the entire record in this case and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner with the following modification.' ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board hereby adopts as its Order the Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner, as modified herein, and orders that Respondents, Tormod Langemyr d/b/a Tom Carpentry Construction Co. and Tom Carpentry Construction Company, Inc., its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Trial .We adopt the Trial Examiner's findings and recommendations as to the violations of Sec. 8(a)(l) and (5) of the Act with one exception. The Trial Examiner declined to recommend that Respondents make payment to the Charging Party's welfare, pension, vacation, and supplementary unemployment benefit funds beyond the expiration date of the agreement. Unlike the Trial Examiner, we find that the complaint encompasses the postexpiration period and that the issues underlying the imposition of such a reimbursement remedy were litigated . Moreover, we agree with the General Counsel that Respondents are obligated to continue in effect beyond the expiration date of the agreement certain conditions relating to employees working conditions and to pay into the Charging Party's welfare, pension, vacation, and supplemtary unemployment benefit funds such sums as would have been paid into said funds from January 18, 1967, until the parties either sign a new collective -bargaining agreement or reach an impasse in their negotiations . Harold W. Hinson, d/b/a Hen House Market No. 3, 175 NLRB No. 100. Examiner's Recommended Order, as so modified. 1. Delete paragraph 2(b) and substitute the following: (b) Make contributions to the Union's welfare, pension, vacation, and supplementary unemployment benefit funds of such sums as would have been paid into said funds from January 18, 1967, until the parties either sign a new collective-bargaining agreement or reach an impasse in their negotiations. 2. Delete the next to last indented paragraph of the notice and substitute the following: WE WILL. pay into the pension, welfare, vacation, and supplementary wage benefit funds of Local 964, such sums as would have been paid into said funds from January 18, 1967, until we either sign a new collective- bargaining agreement or reach an impasse in our negotiations with Local 964 TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE JAMES T. BARKER, Trial Examiner: This matter was heard in New York, New York, on June 10 and July 31, 1968. The complaint was issued on April 17, 1968, pursuant to a charge filed on July 17, 1967, and a first amended charge filed on March 19, 1968, by Local 964, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO. The complaint alleges violations of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act, hereinafter called the Act. The counsel for the General Counsel and the Charging Party timely filed briefs with me. Upon consideration of the briefs of the parties, and the record in this case,' and upon my observation of the witnesses, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT Tom Carpentry Construction Company, Inc., was formed as a New York corporation in 1966 for the purpose of engaging in the building, contracting and construction trade. On January 1, 1966, Tormod Langemyr executed a certificate of incorporation, in the capacity of incorporator, for the aforesaid corporation. Prior to the formation of the corporation, and commencing in the calendar year 1964, Tormod Langemyr engaged in the building and construction trade. The principal place of business of the individual proprietorship and of the subsequently formed corporation was at 58 N. William Street, Pearl River, New York. 'Counsel for Respondent filed an answer in this proceeding which, in effect, denied all of the allegations of the complaint. At the hearing, Respondent offered no defense and Tormod Langemyr, called as a witness by the General Counsel, declined on constitutional grounds to answer questions posed to him by counsel for the General Counsel. Respondent declined to enter a defense to the instant proceedings and Tormod Langemyr refused to testify because a criminal indictment had been entered against Tormod Langemyr in the county court of Rockland County, New York, assertedly involving the same facts as alleged in the complaint. 176 NLRB No. 11 TOM CARPENTRY CONSTRUCTION CO. In the calendar year 1965 a corporate enterprise in which one Joseph Adler held a pecuniary interest engaged Tormod Langemyr to perform carpentry subcontracting work in the construction of residential homes. In the calendar year 1965 dispersements in the amount of $55,406, were made by the aforesaid corporation to an entity known as Tom Carpentry. During the calendar year 1966 Holland House and Moncie Homes, corporations of which Joseph Adler was president, made dispersements of $11,500 and $8,500, respectively, to Tom Carpentry. Additionally, during 1966, an enterprise known as Patricia Ann Homes made dispersements to Tom Carpentry for carpentry services in the amount of between $35,000 and $40,000. The gross annual revenue of the Adler owned corporations during 1966 exceeded $500,000 and that of Patricia Ann Homes approximated $750,000. The Adler owned corporations during 1966 made purchases of stoves for installation in newly constructed homes totalling approximately $5,800. During the same period of time the out-of-state purchases of stoves by Patricia Ann Homes totaled approximately $3,500. During the calendar year 1967 Guterl Construction Corporation, a builder of residential homes whose gross revenue in 1967 approximated $1,000,000, employed Tormod Langemyr as a carpentry subcontractor and made payments for these services of approximately $25,000, some of which were made to Tom Carpentry Construction Company and some to Tom Carpentry. During 1967, Guterl Construction purchased stoves from Caloric, Inc., a Pennsylvania enterprise, totalling $4,615 and made purchases of other supplies from an enterprise in the State of New Jersey totalling approximately $1,000. As the evidence reveals that in each of the three calendar years preceding the issuance of the complaint herein, the monetary value of the Respondent's services to retail enterprises satisfying the Board's discretionary jurisdictional standards' was substantial and de minimus, I find that Respondent's operations affect commerce within the meaning of the Act.' Moreover, I find that it will effectuate the purposes of the Act to assert jurisdiction in this proceeding by reason of the evidence establishing that at the time of the alleged violation of the Act on January 18, 1967, the Respondent met the Board's jurisdictional standards.' This finding is based on the concept that the Board, in the exercise of its discretion, is free to assert jurisdiction when commerce figures for the most recent annual or fiscal period are not deemed to fully reflect current or actual impact of a respondent's operation upon commerce.' In this respect it is to be noted that the General Counsel was inhibited in its investigation and prosecution of this case by the constitutional plea of the individual and corporate respondents, and by their consequent refusal to disclose 'Carolina Supplies and Cement Co.. 122 NLRB 88. 'See N.L.R.B. v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp.. 371 U.S. 224, wherein the Court recited its previous declarations that, "[[In passing the National Labor Relations Act, Congress intended to and did vest in the Board the fullest jurisdictional breadth constitutionally permissible under the commerce clause." 'See Skmons Mailing Service 122 NLRB 81; Montex Drilling Company. 122 NLRB 139; Acme Equipment Company. 102 NLRB 153, 161-162; The District Court of the Tenth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the county of Nez Perce. 164 NLRB No. 16; see also N.L.R.B. v. West Side Carpet Cleaning Co., 329 F.2d 758 (C.A. 6). 'See The District Court of the Tenth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the county of Nez Perce, supra,; Plant City Welding and Tank Company, 123 NLRB 1146; Montex Drilling Company, supra. 125 business records and commerce figures, or to offer testimony pertaining hereto. On the same ground, Respondent undertook no rebuttal of the General Counsel's commerce data which included General Counsel's showing, despite attendent impedements, that in 1967 Respondent received $25,000 from one employer alone for carpentry services rendered. Without derogating from the right of Tormod Langemyr, as an individual, to claim constitutional privileges, and although the evidence does not warrant the application of the Tropicana doctrine,' the evidence is such as to warrant the inference that the single 1967 commerce figure adduced by the General Counsel was not representative of the total monetary value of the services performed by Respondent in 1967. In the foregoing circumstances, and for the reasons stated, I find that at all material times herein Respondent was engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED The credited testimony of William Sopko, considered together with documents in evidence, reveals and establishes that Local 964, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO, hereinafter called the Union, through its agents, negotiates collective-bargaining contracts with employers containing provisions relating to terms and conditions of employment of employees in the carpentry and construction industry represented by the Union. Moreover, the evidence establishes that the Union exists, in part, for the purposes specified in Section 2(5) of the Act and is, accordingly, a labor organization within the meaning of the Act. III. UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The Issues The substantive issues raised by the complaint and answer are (1) whether Respondent became a party to a collective-bargaining contract with the Union for a term ending June 30, 1968, and (2) whether, in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act, Respondent failed and refused to give effect to the union security and wage provisions of the agreement, to appoint a job steward as required by the agreement, and to make certain contributions to the Union's welfare and related funds. These questions raise issues relating to (1) the application of the 6-month limitation provision of Section 10(b) of the Act, both procedurally and remedially; (2) the effect, if any, of the Union's refusal to furnish Respondent with a signed copy of the alleged collective-bargain ing agreement and (3) the legal impact of the failure of Respondent to post a performance bond demanded by the Union, which Respondent contends, was a condition precedent to the contract's validity. B. Pertinent Facts 1. Background facts a. The agreement as executed On January 9, 1964, at which time Sidney Zenovic served in the capacity of business representative of the 'Tropicana Products, Inc.. 122 NLRB 121. 126 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Union, Zenovic met with Tormod Langemyr and presented Langemyr with unsigned copies of an agreement between Contractors and Suppliers Association of Rockland County, New York, and Local Union No. 964, effective from July 1, 1963, to June 30, 1968.' He discussed the agreements with Langemyr and presented him with three unsigned form-contracts which he requested Langemyr to study. He further requested Langemyr to sign two of the contracts , retain one in his possession and to return the two executed agreements to the Union. In due course, Zenovic received through the mails two copies of the agreement bearing a signature purporting to be that of Tormod Langemyr. Zenovic thereafter affixed his signature to the agreement. Zenovic informed Langemyr that, an executed copy of the agreement, containing Zenovic's signature would not be forwarded to Langemyr until he had secured a performance bond. Neither Zenovic nor anyone under his direction forwarded a signed copy of the agreement to Langemyr.' b. The terms of the agreement The collective- bargaining agreement, which Tormod Langemyr executed soon after commencing business in 1964,' by its terms was effective through June 30, 1968. It contained a 7-day union security provision and a maintenance of membership requirement ; a schedule of wage rates; provisions requiring employer contributions to welfare, pension, vacation and supplementary unemployment benefit funds; and a clause insuring the Union's right to appoint a job steward to jobs being performed under the terms of the agreement. Additionally, 'Consideration of events transpiring before January 18, 1967 , is for the purpose of shedding light upon events transpiring within the 6-month limitation period which may constitute unfair labor practices; and for the further purpose of fashioning a remedy . N L.R.B. v. Lundy Manufacturing Corp., 316 F.2d 921 (C.A. 2). 'At the in.. ant hearing the transcript of testimony of Sidney R. Zenovic, former business representative of the Union , was offered in evidence by the General Counsel and received by the Trial Examiner over the objection of the Respondent. The transcript was properly authenticated and the General Counsel represented on the record that Zenovic no longer resided in the State of New York and was not at the time of the hearing present within the State. This representation was not supported by current affidavit. Although the Trial Examiner urged as the best course Zenovic 's personal appearance as a witness , the General Counsel elected to rely upon the transcript in support of his burden in the case . A careful analysis of the transcript of the Zenovic testimony in the arbitration proceeding reveals that at that hearing Zenovic was asked by counsel for the Union to identify his signature on the agreement subsequently received in evidence in this case. Thereafter, Mr. Molony, counsel for Tormod Langemyr in the arbitration hearing, as well as in the instant proceeding, cross-examined Zenovic with respect to his purported signature and that of Langemyr contained on the document. Malony also, on cross-examination of Zenovic, probed the circumstances relating to the January 9 meeting between Zenovic and Langemyr . As I am convinced that the signature issue was raised at the arbitration hearing and Langemyr 's attorney had full opportunity to cross-examine Zenovie on the issue , and availed himself of the right to cross-examine on this issue , the testimony of Zenovic as memorialized in the transcript of the arbitration proceeding received in evidence in the instant case may be relied upon in support of findings herein made. See Rule 4517 New York Civil Practice Law and Rules; Rule 43(a) Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ; 5 Wigmore. Evidence Sections 1414, 1404 (3d ed. 1940). The representation of the counsel for the General Counsel in open hearing as to the unavailability of Zenovic is considered a sufficient showing of unavailability to meet the requirements of Rule 4517. Contrary to the Respondent, no affidavit of unavailability is required under this rule, although , manifestly an affidavit would be a high order of proof There is no suggestion that the unavailability of Zenovic was procured by the General Counsel. the agreement contained a provision requiring employers who were parties to the agreement to post a surety bond in the amount of $5,000 with the Union prior to the commencement of any work. c. Operations under the agreement The evidence of record reveals that in 1964, subsequent to executing the collective-bargaining agreement with the Union, Langemyr employed carpenter employees who were members of the Union. The evidence further reveals that for the first 8 months of 1964 Langemyr made contributions to the Union's welfare, pension and vacation funds. He thereafter ceased making contributions and made none during the period January 18, 1967, to the date of the hearing herein.10 d. Langemyr refuses to honor agreement William Sopko credibly testified that in August 1964, at which time he was serving in the dual capacity of business representative of the Union and vice president of the local, he was appointed by the president of the Union and union trustees to make a survey of the home building industry to confirm whether the home building contractors were making required contributions to the welfare and pension funds. Sopko further credibly testified that incident to this assignment he spoke with Tormod Langemyr in August 1964, and urged Langemyr to pay the fringe benefits which he was obliged to pay and to comply with the union security provisions . Langemyr responded that he was having trouble with the Union at the time and that after the trouble had been resolved he was no longer going to "bother" with the Union." 2. The alleged unlawful conduct Sopko further credibly testified that on June 20, 1967, he again spoke with Langemyr and requested that Langemyr place a union shop steward on the job pursuant to the terms of the collective- bargain ng agreement. Langemyr refused to do so observing that he did not have any union men on the job. Additionally, during this conversation Sopko requested Langemyr to employ union carpenters and to make payments required of him pursuant to the terms of the contract. William Sopko further credibly testified that in April 1968, he again met with Langemyr at a work project and requested Langemyr to give effect to the collective-bargaining agreement until it had expired on July 1, 1968 . In this connection, Sopko observed that if Langemyr did not desire after July 1, to enter into a new collective-bargaining agreement this was his prerogative. Sopko insisted however, that until July 1, Langemyr was bound by the agreement with the Union. Sopko further requested that Langemyr place a shop steward on the job. 'This execution is established by a statement contained in the pretrial affidavit of Tormod Langemyr, received in evidence, and by the authenticated signature of Langemyr on a collective- bargaining agreement between Contractors and Suppliers Association of Rockland County, New York and Local Union No. 964 effective from July 1, 1963, to June 30, 1968. "The credited testimony of William Sopko so indicates. January 18, 1967, commences the period cognizable under Sec. 10(b) of the Act. "The testimony of William Sopko and an affidavit of Tormod Langemyr, in evidence, revealed that at this point in time the Union had placed a picket line on a job at which Langemyr's employees were performing work. TOM CARPENTRY CONSTRUCTION CO. Langemyr was reticent and observed that he had no contract with the Union. William Sopko testified that Tormod Langemyr has made no payments to the union welfare, pension and vacation funds since September 1964, and has not honored the Union's demand that he place a union steward on the jobs on which Langemyr has performed services. Conclusions Initially, I find that, as principal owner of Tom Carpentry Construction Company, Inc., and through his authority - which the record reveals he possessed - to engage the corporation in carpentry construction work and to receive payments for these services on the part of the corporation, Tormod Langemyr is the alter ego of the corporation and is a proper party to this proceeding.'2 Additionally, I find that Tormod Langemyr gave his assent to be bound by the terms of the collective-bargaining agreement with the Union by signing the agreement and by transmitting the signed instrument in the mail to the Union. It was not specified as a condition precedent to the agreement's effectiveness that both parties execute the agreement . After Langemyr signed the agreement he indicated his assent to be bound by the agreement by giving effect to its terms." Thus, the agreement was a valid one and Respondents incurred legal liabilities as a result of its validity even though the Union failed and refused, for a reason quite separate from the question of the existence of a binding agreement, to forward signed copies of the agreement to Respondent." It is clear that the Union refused to furnish Langemyr with a signed copy of the agreement because Langemyr failed and refused to post a performance bond as provided by the thirteenth article of the agreement. Quite clearly, the performance bond requirement was a term of the agreement, but it was not a condition precedent to the effectiveness of the agreement. The Respondent may not breach a contractual term and rely upon its own breach to excuse it from the legal obligations of the agreement. There is much in the tone and tenor of the proceeding to suggest that in entering into the collective- bargaining agreement with the Union, Langemyr did not fully perceive the extent of his commitment. But the evidence is persuasive that he freely executed and entered into an agreement which obligated him to give effect to a union security arrangement, pay a prescribed wage scale, make certain welfare and fringe benefit contributions and to permit the Union to designate a union steward on all jobs. After the agreement became effective, Respondent abided by its paramount terms for a time, but relations between Respondent and the Union deteriorated and Langemyr resolutely and with finality ceased giving effect to the agreement. The evidence establishes that on June 20, 1967, and again in April 1968, within the 10(b) period, Langemyr rejected a union request to abide by the terms of the contract by employing union carpenters, permitting the selection of a union steward and making welfare and benefit payments as required by the contract. In rejecting these requests, Langemyr left no room for doubt that he "Ogle Protection Service. Inc., and James L. Ogle , 149 NLRB 545, 546 at fn. I. "See Williston on Contracts, 3d ed., 90 A. "Tow v. Miners Memorial Hospital Association . Inc.. 305 F.2d 73, 75; Newburger v. American Surety Co.. 242 N.Y. 134 151 N.E. 155, 157; see also John Wiley & Sons v . Livingston 376 U.S. 543. 550. 127 intended not to be bound by the agreement. He pointedly remonstrated that he no longer had union carpenters on the job. This failure and refusal to give effect to and abide by the terms of the collective-bargaining agreement during the term of the agreement constitutes an unlawful withdrawal of recognition of the exclusive collective-bargaining representative and results in unilateral modification of the agreement violative of Section 8(aX5) of the Act." No absolution from the Act's strictures is derived by reason of any personal assessment Langemyr had of his legal obligation, the binding nature of the agreement or its ethical foundations; or by his personal notions of equity. There exists statutory procedures for petitioning the Board for relief if doubt arises as to the legal propriety of or obligation to continue recognition of a bargaining agent. However, self-help through unilateral abrogation of an agreement is not justified. 16 "An employer's duty to bargain under Section 8(a)(5) would be empty, indeed, if after reaching agreement the employer could treat the contract as a scrap of paper."" Nor is abrogation, in the circumstances of this case, to be equated to a contract breach susceptible of remedy solely through civil litigation." IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of the Respondent set forth in section III, above, occurring in connection with the operations of Respondent described in section I, above, have a close, intimate and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and "Hexton Furniture Company. III NLRB 342; Durdite Co., Inc.. 132 NLRB 425, 427; The Cresent Bed Company. Inc., 157 NLRB 296. Jurisdiction for making this determination exists under Sec. 10 (b) of the Act when nothing more is undertaken remedialy than an enforcement of statutory rights arising from the unambiguous terms of the collective-bargaining agreement . See N.L.R.B v. C & C Plywood Inc.. 385 U.S. 421 (1967). Moreover, the aforesaid determination is not precluded by the arbitration award of a sum of money due the union pension, welfare, vacation and supplemental wage benefit funds by virtue of the Company's contractual breach . The applicability of the doctrine of Spielberg Manufacturing Company, 112 NLRB 1080, was not raised at the instant hearing . While at the arbitration proceeding the Respondent contested the contractual foundation of the arbitor's jurisdiction, and while the arbitrators decision appears to have rendered a determination with respect to the existence of a binding contract, and to have made the aforesaid monetary award, the arbitrator's decision did not reach the wage, job steward and withdrawal of recognition issues of the instant proceeding. In these circumstances, as the arbitrators decision did not purport to deal with the unfair labor practices deriving from the latter three issues, the Board, with respect to those issues, is not bound by the arbitration award. See Raytheon Company. 140 NLRB 883; Monsanto Chemical Company, 130 NLRB 1097. Moreover, in light of the close interrelationship of those issues to the Respondents' failure to comply with the contractual provisions relating to pension, welfare, vacation and supplemental wage benefit payments, which requires the Board to undertake close scrutiny of the contractual provisions and the conduct of the Respondent pertaining thereto, the Board, in the exercise of its discretion, may decline to give conclusive effect to the arbitration award and may exercise its powers under Sec. 10(b) of the Act. "Ray Brooks v. N.L.R.B., 348 U.S. 96; Hexton Furniture Company, supra "N.L.R.B. v. M & M Oldsmobile. Inc.. 377 F.2d 712 (C.A. 2), enfg. 156 NLRB 903. "See N.L.R.B. v. M & M Oldsmobile. Inc, supra. N.L.R.B. v. Gene Hyde, d/b/a Hyde 's Supermarket, 399 F.2d 568 (C.A. 9), enfg. 149 NLRB 1252; W. P. Ihrie & Sons. Division of Sunshine Biscuits, Inc.. 165 NLRB No. 2. 128 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD commerce among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow thereof. V. THE REMEDY Having found that Respondents have engaged in unfair labor practices violative of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act, I shall recommend that they cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. Having found that during the term of their collective-bargaining agreement with the Union, and having found more specifically that at all times on and after January 18, 1967, the Respondents have failed and refused to give effect to the terms of the aforesaid collective-bargaining agreement relating to recognition of the Union as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of employees in an appropriate collective-bargaining unit, the schedule of wage payments, the designation of a job steward, the union security provision, and the payments by Respondents of contributions to the welfare, pension, vacation and supplementary wage benefit funds, I shall recommend that the Respondents pay into the Union's welfare, pension, vacation and supplementary unemployment benefit funds such sums as would have been paid into said funds from January 17, 1967, until June 30, 1968." I shall further recommend, that, upon request, Respondents bargain collectively with the Union as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of Respondent's employees in an appropriate collective-bargaining unit and, if an understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agreement. As it has herein been found that Tormod Langemyr was the owner of the Respondent individual proprietorship and the alter ego of the Respondent corporation, I shall recommend that he individually, together with Respondent individual proprietorship and Respondent corporation, be responsible for compliance with all of the provisions of this Recommended Order.30 CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Respondents are engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. On January 18, 1967, and at all material times thereafter the Union was, and is now, the exclusive representative of all carpenter construction employees of Respondents, exclusive of supervisors as defined in the Act, within the meaning of Section 9(a) and (b) of the Act. 4. By failing and refusing, on and after January 18, 1967, to give effect to the provisions of a collective-bargaining agreement between them and the "See George E. Light Boat Storage. Inc, 153 NLRB 1209, 1210. Offsets against these sums shall be allowed for payments , if any, made pursuant to the arbitration award referred to herein . No obligation beyond the June 30, 1968, expiration date of the agreement is here imposed, as the complaint is not deemed to encompass the postexp iration period and the issues underlying the imposition of such a reimbursement remedy were not litigated. Cf. Industrial Union of Marine and Ship Building Workers of America. AFL-CIO, v. N.L.R.B.. 320 F.2d 615, 620 (C.A. 3), enfg. in pertinent part 136 NLRB 1500. "See Ogle Protection Service. Inc.. and James L. Ogle, 149 NLRB 545. Union, Respondents engaged in and are engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(6) of the Act. 5. By withdrawing recognition of the Union, by failing and refusing to give effect to the union-security provision of the agreement, by failing and refusing to abide by the wage scales provided in the agreement, by failing and refusing to appoint a job steward and by failing and refusing to make payments to the welfare, pension, vacation and supplementary wage benefits funds of the agreement the Respondents engaged in conduct violative of Section 8(ax5) of the Act. 6. By the aforesaid unfair labor practices, the Respondents have interfered with, restrained and coerced their employees within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 7. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. RECOMMENDED ORDER Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and upon the entire record in this case, I recommend that the Respondents, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, and Tormod Langemyr, individually, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Refusing to bargain collectively with Local 964, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive representative of employees in an appropriate collective-bargaining unit, by withdrawing its recognition of the Union; and by failing and refusing to comply with the provisions of a collective-bargaining agreement with the Union containing a union security provision, and providing for the placement of a job steward on construction jobs, the payment by Respondents of a certain wage scale and other payments in the form of contributions for welfare, pension , vacation and supplementary wage benefits on behalf of its employees. (b) Interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them in Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Upon request, bargain collectively with Local 964, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive representative of employees in the appropriate collective-bargaining unit, with respect to wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, and other terms and conditions of employment, and if an understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agreement. (b) Make contributions to the Union's welfare, pension, vacation and supplementary unemployment benefit funds of such sums, in the manner and for the period of time specified in the portion of this Decision entitled the Remedy. (c) Post at its Pearl River, Rockland County, New York, office and place of business and at all jobsites within the territorial jurisdiction of the Union at which Respondents are engaged in providing carpentry service, copies of the notice attached hereto and marked TOM CARPENTRY CONSTRUCTION CO. "Appendix."" Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for Region 2, shall, after being duly signed by a representative of Respondents, be posted by it on receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted . Reasonable steps shall be taken to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (d) Mail to the Regional Director for Region 2 , copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix" for posting by Local 964, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO, Local 964, willing, at its offices, meeting halls and jobsites , and places where notices to members are customarily posted . Copies of said notice to be furnished by the Regional Director , shall, after being duly signed by a representative of Respondents be forthwith be returned to the Regional Director for said posting. (e) Notify the Regional Director for Region 2, in writing, within 20 days from the receipt of this Decision, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith.22 "In the event this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the Recommendations of a Trial Examiner " in the notice. If the Board's Order is enforced by a decree of the United States Court of Appeals , the notice will be further amended by the substitution of the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order" for the words "a Decision and Order." "In the event this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, this provision shall be modified to read : "Notify the Regional Director for Region 2, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith." APPENDIX NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our employees that: After a trial in which both sides had the opportunity to present their evidence , a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the law by failing and refusing to give effect to and honor the collective-bargaining agreement we had with Local 964, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO, which agreement expired on June 30, 1968. The agreement required us to recognize Local 964 as the exclusive bargaining representative for all our carpenters and the agreement had a union security 129 provision , allowed the Union to place a job steward on our construction jobs and required us to make payments into the union pension , welfare, vacation and supplementary wage benefit funds. The agreement also required us to maintain a certain wage scale. The Trial Examiner ordered us to post this notice and to agree that: WE WILL NOT withdraw recognition of Local 964 as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of our carpenters in the following appropriate collective-bargaining unit. All carpenter construction employees , exclusive of supervisors, as defined in Section 2(11) of the National Labor Relations Act as amended. WE WILL recognize Local 964, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO, as the bargaining representative of the carpenters in the above unit, and upon request of the Local 964, bargain collectively with it in good faith with respect to the terms and conditions of employment of the carpenters in the unit described , and will, if an understanding is reached , embody such understanding in a signed agreement. WE WILL pay into the pension, welfare, vacation and supplementary wage benefit funds of Local 964, such sums as would have been paid into said funds from January 18, 1967, until June 30, 1968, absent our violation of the law. WE WILL NOT interfere with , restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act. All our employees have the right to self-organization to form, join, or assist labor organizations, and to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing. TORMOD LANGEMYR D/B/A TOM CARPENTRY CONSTRUCTION CO. (Employer) Dated By (Representative ) (Title) Dated By TOM CARPENTRY CONSTRUCTION CO., INC. (Employer) (Representative) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. If employees have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions, they may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, Federal 'Building, 36th Floor, 26 Federal Plaza New York, New York 10007, Telephone 212-264-0340.