Folk Chevrolet, Inc.

FOLK CHEVROLET, INC. Folk Chevrolet , Inc. and Professional Automobile Salesmen Association . Cases 8-CA-4636, 8-CA-4654, and 8-CA-4736 May 29, 1969 SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN MCCULI OCH AND MEMBERS FANNING AND JENKINS On July 1, 1968, the National Labor Relations Board issued a Decision and Order in the above-entitled proceeding,' finding, inter alia, that the Respondent had discriminated in regard to the tenure of employment of Martin L. Wiggins, Kenneth S. Evans, Roy Kaplan, and Patrick J. Blanc, in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (I) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, and directing that the Respondent make the discriminatees whole for any loss of pay suffered as a result of said violations. On October 30, 1968, the Board's Acting Regional Director for Region 8 issued a backpay specification and notice of hearing, to which the Respondent duly filed an answer. A hearing was held before Trial Examiner Benjamin K. Blackburn on December 12, 1968, for the purpose of determining the amount of backpay due the four discriminatees. On March 12, 1969, the Trial Examiner issued his Supplemental Decision attached hereto, in which he found that the discriminatees were entitled to the following payments, upon which interest was to accrue at 6 percent per annum until paid, computed on the basis of the quarterly amounts of net packpay due, less any tax withholding required by law: Martin L. Wiggins, $2,643.15; Kenneth S. Evans, $1,103.60; Roy Kaplan, $2,087.10; and Patrick J. Blanc, $4,543.65. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Supplemental Decision and a supporting brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the entire record in this case, including the Trial Examiner's Supplemental Decision, and the exceptions and brief, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner. Not published in NLRB volumes. 176 NLRB No. 30 ORDER 277 Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that the Respondent, Folk Chevrolet, Inc., Akron, Ohio, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall make whole Martin L. Wiggins, Kenneth S. Evans, Roy Kaplan, and Patrick J. Blanc by payment to them of the amounts set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Supplemental Decision. TRIAL EXAMINER'S SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE BENJAMIN K. BLACKBURN, Trial Examiner: On July 1, 1968, the Board issued its Order herein, adopting, in the absence of exceptions, the Decision of Trial Examiner James V. Constantine, dated February 28, 1968. Trial Examiner Constantine found that Folk Chevrolet, Inc., referred to herein as Respondent, discriminated in regard to the tenure of employment of Martin L. Wiggins, Kenneth S. Evans, Roy Kaplan, and Patrick J. Blanc, referred to collectively herein as the discriminatees, thereby violating Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. The Board ordered, inter alia, that Respondent make the discriminatees whole for any loss of pay suffered as a result of said violation. A controversy has arisen over the amount of backpay due the discriminatees under the terms of the Board's Order. Consequently, the Board's Acting Regional Director for Region 8 (Cleveland, Ohio) on October 30, 1968, pursuant to Section 102.52 of the Board's Rules and Regulations, issued and caused to be served on Respondent detailed backpay specifications alleging the backpay due these men as required by the Board's Order. In accordance with Section 102.53(a) of the Board's Rules and Regulations, the specifications "specifically and in detail show, for each employee, the backpay periods broken down by calendar quarters, the specific figures and basis of computation as to gross backpay and interim earnings, the expenses for each quarter, the net backpay due, and any other pertinent information." In compliance with Section 102.54(b) of the Board's Rules and Regulations, Respondent, on November 14, 1968, filed a detailed answer to the backpay specifications. In addition to admitting or denying the various allegations contained in the specifications, Respondent stated that, subsequent to June 6, 1968, representatives of Region 8 repudiated an agreement reached on that date as to the formula to be followed in computing backpay and pleaded that "any backpay awards that are ultimately issued should not bear interest after June 6, 1968, the date upon which the Respondent was ready, willing and able to make a reasonable settlement with respect to backpay." Pursuant to due notice a hearing on the specifications and answer was held before me in Akron, Ohio, on December 12, 1968, at which the General Counsel and Respondent appeared by counsel and the discriminatees appeared as witnesses. All parties were afforded full opportunity to call and examine or cross-examine witnesses, to introduce evidence, and to argue orally. Briefs filed on behalf of the General Counsel and Respondent have been carefully considered. 278 DECISIONS OF.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Upon my observation of the witnesses , the testimony and evidence in this supplementary proceeding , and the entire record in the case , I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. THE MILEAGE ISSUE The discriminatees worked for Respondent as automobile salesmen . As a result of Respondent's discrimination against them, each lost, in addition to the commissions he would have earned on sales, the use of a so-called demonstrator automobile furnished by Respondent.' Demonstrator is something of a misnomer since the record reveals that each salesman was furnished a new car each year primarily for his own use and not for use in demonstrating Respondent 's product to potential customers . Salesmen were encouraged to permit prospects to test drive the specific model automobile they were interested in. Occasions when prospects test drove a demonstrator assigned to a salesman were extremely rare. Salesmen had to buy only gasoline and pay an insurance premium in order to use these automobiles. The General Counsel has computed the monetary value of the loss of use of the demonstrators by ascertaining from each discriminatee the average number of miles he drove his demonstrator each week prior to the discrimination ' and reimbursing each at the rate of 10 cents per mile on the theory that he would have continued to drive the same average number of miles each week during the period when Respondent denied him the use of a demonstrator. Respondent challenges the General Counsel' s computation on the ground that (1) the demonstrators were merely a selling tool furnished to the discriminatees for Respondent's benefit and therefore their loss is reflected in the discriminatees' loss commissions; (2) there is no evidence of how many miles the discriminatees actually drove other automobiles during the period when they were denied use of their demonstrators and the General Counsel' s constructive miles is an improper basis for the computation; and (3) there is no basis for valuing the loss of an automobile at 10 cents a mile. My finding that Respondent furnished demonstrators to its salesmen for their personal use as a perquisite of their employment and not as a selling tool disposes of Respondent's first argument . As to the second, it is true that the record does not reveal how many miles the discriminatees drove their own automobiles, if any, during the relevant period. However, the General Counsel's theory that the discriminatees would have continued to use Respondent's demonstrators in an average manner but for Respondent's discrimination is not unreasonable . Since the purpose of backpay is to make discriminatees whole, that is, to put them in the same position they would have been in if they had not been discriminated against, Respondent's argument that the true measure of their loss is the amount they were forced to drive their own cars is not well taken . But for Respondent's discrimination they would have driven Respondent' s demonstrators, not their own automobiles ., Finally, 10 cents a mile has been held by the Board to be a reasonable figure for computing the value of use of an automobile in a backpay proceeding. ,in Blanc's case, two automobiles are in issue, one furnished for his use and one for his wife's. 'The weekly figure used in each case was the discriminatee's estimate of his annual mileage divided by 52. There is no reason for departing from that precedent here. M. J. McCarthy Motor Sales Co., 147 NLRB 605; Rice Lake Creamery Company, 151 NLRB 1113. II. THE EMPLOYMENT AGENCY FEE ISSUE The General Counsel has claimed as an expense in computing the backpay due Roy Kaplan a debt of $450 which he incurred to an employment agency in the course of seeking interim employment . Kaplan testified that he obtained a job with the New York Life Insurance Company through Allstate Employment Service on June 12, 1967, and was charged $450 for the service rendered. The only other evidence in the record of the fee charged Kaplan is a receipt from Allstate dated January 15, 1968. It shows a $25 payment on an "amount of account" of $175 and a new balance due of $150. The backpay specification admits earnings by Kaplan from New York Life Insurance Company of $2,215 in the second and third quarters of 1967. Respondent contends that the $450 expense item should be disallowed as a credit to Roy Kaplan because ". . Respondent's Exhibit 1 [the Allstate receipt] is the only evidence of this alleged expense. . It does not state when the indebtedness was incurred and, most significantly, it contradicts Kaplan as it states that the amount of the account was $175.00. No court could accept Kaplan's statement that his bill was $450.00 when the only record states $175.00. Moreover Kaplan did not state that he paid any amount other than the $25.00 appearing on Respondent's Exhibit 1. If he had, he would have similar receipts or cancelled checks. The evidence in the record shows that Kaplan paid $25.00 to an employment agency well after the period of discrimination and this certainly does not prove the $450.00 claimed as an interim expense by the General Counsel." I reject Respondent 's argument . The Allstate receipt is not the only evidence of the expense in the record. On the contrary, there is Kaplan's direct testimony that he was charged a fee of $450 in obtaining the job the interim earnings from which are deducted from his gross backpay. I credit his testimony. I further find that the import of the Allstate receipt is that, as of January 15, 1968, Kaplan had paid off $300 of the $450 debt he incurred. Moreover, whether he has ever paid the other $150 is immaterial to the issue before me. The mere fact that he incurred that debt is sufficient to make the entire $450 fee a proper credit to him in computing the backpay due him. III. THE INTERIM EMPLOYMENT ISSUES A. Self-Employment Martin L. Wiggins and Patrick J. Blanc did not seek jobs during the backpay period . Instead, each went almost immediately into business for himself as a used-car dealer.' The backpay specifications admit, as their interim earnings, the amounts of money which each withdrew from his business during the backpay period. Each testified, in effect, that he withdrew money when and as the earnings of the business permitted. Each produced the 'Blanc spent 10 days considering an offer to become general manager of one of Respondent's competitors . He turned it down when the management refused his demand for a share of the profits . He then opened his own business as a sole proprietorship . Wiggins immediately went into business with a man named Likens as "Likens Automotive Sales," an Ohio corporation. FOLK CHEVROLET, INC. records of his business and made them available to Respondent . When Respondent requested time at the hearing to study the records, it was arranged that counsel for General Counsel and counsel for Respondent would together work out an exhibit to be marked Respondent's Exhibit 3 which would reflect any information in Wiggins' and Blanc's business records which Respondent wanted to include in the record. Instead, a letter from Respondent's counsel to me dated January 21, 1969, has been received in evidence as Respondent's Exhibit 3. It reads: Please be advised that Respondent's Exhibit No. 3 will not be submitted. Mr. Watters ['Respondent's office manager] is not able to determine from the business records of Wiggins and Blanc what their businesses were earning during the period of discrimination. This information is not shown by the accounting records and it is necessary to look at individual car records. In the case of Wiggins, he does have the car records but numerous dates are missing . In the case of Blanc, he has no car records and it is impossible to trace particular cars with regard to the time and cost of acquisition and the time and selling price. Respondent contends that the General Counsel has failed to prove Wiggins' and Blanc's "gross backpay" because it has failed to prove their interim earnings, as distinguished from their withdrawals, from their used-car businesses. It cites Mastro Plastics' in support of the proposition that the burden of proof in establishing the gross backpay due to an employee is upon the General Counsel. The citation supports the proposition, but the proposition does not support Respondent's argument. For, as Mastro Plastics makes clear, the General Counsel must, indeed, establish the gross backpay due a discriminatee, that is, the gross amount of money he would have earned had he continued in the discriminator's employ, but the burden of proving interim earnings, that is, the amount of money the discriminatee did or should have earned during the period of the discrimination, in order to establish net backpay, that is, the sum required to make the discriminatee whole , is upon Respondent. Any efforts expended by the General Counsel in establishing interim earnings or a willful loss of interim earnings are simply a public service and not a part of his burden in proving a backpay claim. Here, the General Counsel, as a public service, made Wiggins, Blanc, and their business records available to Respondent so that Respondent could prove, if such were the fact, that Wiggins' and Blanc's earnings from their used-car businesses were substantially larger than the amounts of money they withdrew from the businesses during the backpay period. Respondent has failed to carry its burden. Since I credit the testimony of Wiggins and Blanc that their withdrawals were roughly equal to the earnings of their businesses and since , on the record considered as a whole, such a correlation is not an unreasonable way of establishing their interim earnings so as to arrive at the net backpay due them, I find that the General Counsel has met his general burden of proof in establishing the damage which has resulted from Respondent's established discrimination , as that language is used by the, Board in Mastro Plastics, Cornwell Company, Inc., 171 NLRB No. 43. 'Mastro Plastics Corporation , 136 NLRB 1342, and 145 NLRB 1710, enfd. as modified 354 F.2d 170 (C.A. 2). B. Failure to Seek Jobs as Automobile Salesmen 279 Kenneth S. Evans did not seek new employment as an automobile salesman. Instead, he elected to return to his old occupation of mechanic, and, a day or two before he left Respondent's employ, arranged to be hired immediately by another automobile dealer as foreman of his garage. Respondent links Evans with Wiggins and Blanc in arguing that all three disqualified themselves for backpay by refusing to seek substantially equal employment. Respondent relies on the undisputed fact that none of the three accepted reinstatement when it was offered by Respondent in either September or October 1967. With respect to Evans, it argues that, since he selected his own termination dates and carefully arranged less lucrative employment in advance, he should be distinguished from an employee who must seek any employment in order to live when he is suddenly discharged. With respect to Wiggins and Blanc, it argues that self-employment as sufficient effort by a discriminatee to mitigate losses by seeking interim employment is limited only to situations where the self-employment is obviously an interim attempt to maintain earnings until reinstatement. I can find no justification for the distinctions Respondent would draw. While Evans may not have been required to accept a less desirable job in order to avoid a finding of willful loss of interim earnings, the fact that he elected to take such a job cannot be held against him. I find, therefore, that he did not disqualify himself by seeking and accepting interim employment as a garage foreman rather than as an automobile salesman and thereafter declining reinstatement when it was offered to him. East Texas Steel Castings Company, Inc., 116 NLRB 1336; Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 170 NLRB No. 198. Similarly, I find that Wiggins and Blanc did not remove themselves from the automobile salesman employment market by going into business for themselves, even though they too subsequently declined reinstatement. Heinrich Motors, Inc., 166 NLRB No. 88. IV. THE GROSS BACKPAY FORMULA ISSUE The major issue raised in this proceeding is the formula used by the General Counsel in computing the gross backpay due the discriminatees. Wiggins, Evans, Kaplan, and Blanc were full-time salesmen for Respondent during all of 1966.' Only four other full-time salesmen - W. L. Burch, J. E. Dixon, W. R. Kerns, and O. E. Morehart - worked for Respondent during all of 1966 as well as during the entire backpay period from April 24 through October 23, 1967. Numerous other persons worked as salesmen for Respondent at various times in 1966 and 1967, either full time or part time. In arriving at the gross backpay figures contained in the specifications, the General Counsel first averaged the 1966 earnings of Burch, Dixon, Kerns, and Morehart. Into this figure he divided the 1966 earnings of each of the discriminatees to establish the ratio between the- earnings 'Trial Examiner Constantine found that Evans and Wiggins were constructively discharged. 'Trial Examiner Constantine found that Evans, hired by Respondent as a mechanic in 1963, was designated a salesman in "early 1966." However, Evans testified before me, without contradiction , that he became a full-time salesman on the first day of that year Respondent does not dispute the use of 1966 commissions as the base period for establishing the ratios from which commissions lost by the discriminatees are to be computed. 280 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD of an average full-time salesman other than the discriminatees and the earnings of each of the discriminatees in the 1966 base period. The results ranged from a high of 1.423 for Blanc to a low of .689 for Evans. Next, the General Counsel averaged the earnings of Burch, Dixon, Kerns, and Morehart for the second and third quarters and for October 1967. He converted this figure into an average weekly earning during the second and third quarters and an average earning for the relevant number of days in October 1967. Finally, the General Counsel applied the ratio for each discriminatee to these average figures for the various portions of the backpay period to determine the amount of commissions each would have earned in the portions of the backpay period relevant to him. Respondent's business declined substantially between 1966 and 1967. In fact, the situation ultimately became so bad that General Motors terminated Respondent's new-car dealership in 1968. Respondent contends that the only fair way to compute the commissions the discriminatees would have earned during the backpay period is to determine what portion of all the commissions paid by Respondent to its salesmen in 1966 went to each of the discriminatees and credit him with the same portion in the backpay period. Stated another way, Respondent's formula would compare the discriminatees with Respondent's entire staff of salesmen. If discriminatee A's total earnings for 1966 were 10 percent of all the commissions paid by Respondent to salesmen in 1966, Respondent would compute his gross backpay at 10 percent of the total commissions paid by Respondent during the backpay period relevant to him. Respondent's argument is based on the premise that only a certain amount of business was available for salesmen during the backpay period and the discriminatees, by their presence, could not and would not have increased that total. Therefore, only a percentage of that total as established in the 1966 base period can reasonably be assumed as the earnings of each discriminatee during the period in which he was discriminated against . The General Counsel attempted to counter this argument by having each discriminatee estimate what percentage of his sales was to "walk-in" customers, i.e., to customers who came to Respondent's showroom to purchase a car, thus creating a sale which would have been consummated regardless of whether one of the discriminates or some other salesman handled the transaction, and what percentage was to prospects the discriminatees uncovered by their own efforts. Wiggins and Kaplan testified, respectively, that 60 and 65 percent of their 1966 sales were walk-ins. Evans testified that practically all of his sales were to walk- ins; Blanc, practically none. I credit their estimates although I have not relied on them, since I consider them immaterial to the issue. Which formula is used makes a substantial difference in gross backpay due the discriminatees. I have attempted to work out the computations using Respondent 's formula. The results, in tabular form and utilizing the figures for demonstrator cars, insurance premiums, interim earnings, and expenses contained in the backpay specifications, are attached as Appendixes A-1 through A-4. The figures entered in the gross commissions column are a percentage of the total commissions paid by Respondent in each month which varies from discriminatee to discriminatee: depending on the ratio of his 1966 earnings to the total commissions paid by Respondent in 1966. I have determined from Respondent's records which are in evidence that, in 1966, Wiggins earned 9.04 percent of the commissions paid by Respondent; Evans, 6.58 percent; Kaplan, 6.64 percent; and Blanc, 13.59 percent. I find Respondent's argument without merit because the premise on which it is based is faulty. Even if only a certain quantum of business was available during the backpay period and the discriminatees, by their efforts, would not have added substantially to that total, an analysis of the commissions earned by Burch, Dixon, Kerns, and Morehart in 1966 and during the backpay period shows that, while sales did indeed decline in 1967, the only full-time salesmen with whom the discriminatees can reasonably be compared in both 1966 and 1967 earned a substantially higher proportion of the commissions paid in 1967 than they did in 1966. Such an analysis is attached as Appendix B. The consistent pattern of a higher percentage of commissions paid to each man in 1967 than in 1966, as well as in the relevant quarters and month of 1967 as contrasted with 1966, speaks for itself I conclude, therefore, that the formula used by the General Counsel is a reasonable and proper one and more correctly reflects the amount of commissions each discriminatee would have earned but for Respondent's discrimination against him than the formula advanced by Respondent. Story Oldsmobile, Inc., 145 NLRB 1647. See also American Manufacturing Company of Texas, 167 NLRB No. 71, 'and N.L.R.B. v. Kartarik, Inc., 227 F.2d 190 (C. A. 8). V. THE AMOUNT OF BACKPAY DUE Having resolved the various issues litigated before me against Respondent, I find that the sums set forth in the backpay specifications filed and served upon Respondent by the Board, as amended,' are due the discriminatees, as follows: Martin L. Wiggins - $2,643.158 Kenneth S. Evans - $1,103.60 Roy Kaplan - $2,087.10 Patrick J . Blanc - $4,543.658 In addition, Respondent produced no evidence at the hearing in support of the allegation in its answer that circumstances exist which should toll the accumulation of interest on the above sums after June 6, 1968. Therefore, since the Order herein provides for interest at 6 percent per annum on the above sums, to be computed in the manner specified in Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716, such interest will continue to accrue until the date of payment of all backpay due. Finally, payment of all sums due shall also be less any taxes required, to be withheld by Respondent under Federal or State law. 'The General Counsel's motion, contained in his brief, to amend the backpay specification with respect to Wiggins to show interim earnings during the third quarter of 1967 of $1,312 rather than $1,475 is granted. 'The breakdown for each discriminatee by quarters is set forth in Appendix C. FOLK CH€VR(M.El', INC. APPENDIX A-1 MARTIN I.. WIGGINS: RaLkpay period - .Iuls 19-October 23, 1967 ; denied us 281 GROSS DFMONSTRA'I'OR INSURANCE EARNING. INTERIM NET COMMISSIONS CAR PRF MIIJMS Al F'OI K EARNINGS EXPENSES BACKPA Plus Plus Minus Minus Plus Equals 2d DARTER 317.35 317.35 July 1967 443.74* 484.31 August 461.76 September 333.00 3d QUARTER -112385 750.10 40 95 484.31 1,312.00 233.24 October 625.35* 41hQUARTER 625.35 173.10 13 65 68400 128.10 TOTAL 678.69 * 1 ot,tl figure for month used rather than more appropriate figure for relevant part of month because records of Respondent used in making L omlattation,, do not gise daily, week IN, or other figures for period, of Less than month. API'I \DIX t% 2 KI NN-1 I II S I VANS, Rack 1s Period - J uly 6-October 16, 1967• denied Use of Car, May 2i. 1967 GROSS r)I'MO\S1 It \I OR I\Sl'R,\NCF 14R\INGS INl I RIM NET COMMISSIONS ('\R PRI \111 NIS \I FOI K FAR\I\GS I:XPFNSFS BACKPAI Plus Plus \linu, \lino, Plus Equals 2d QUARTER 105.60 105.60 July 1967 322,99* 258 09 August 136.10 September 242. IS 3dQl'ARTER 901.47 249 60 25% (19 1.51900 0 October 455.1'* 4th QUAR I f R 455 I' 38.40 338 0(1 155.57 TOTAL. 261.17 *Total figure for month used rathcrthan more approptt.te figure for telesant part of month because record, of Respondent used in making computations do not gis i1,uty.\seekh.ot other ttgutCslurperiodsot less than month. 282 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD APPENDIX A-3 ROY KAPLAN: Back Pay Period : Mai, 25 .- October 23 1967, denied Use of Car. Ma 23. 19 GROSS DEMONSTRATOR INSI^RANCE EARNINGS INTERIM NET COMMISSIONS C%R PRI MINIMS Al t-OLK EARNINGS EXPENSES BACKPA Plus Plus Minus sinus Plus Equals May 1967 521.70* 633.25 June 336.70 2dQUARTER 858.40 84.70 633.25 240.00 240.00 309.85 July 325.93 August 339.17 September 244.60 3d UARTE R 909.70 200.20 1.975.00 210.00 October 459.32* 4thQUARTER 459.32 46.20 53.20 239.00 213.32 TOTAL 523.17 'Total figure for month used rather than more appropriate figure for relc%ant nart of month because records of Kespondent used in making computations do not give daily, weekly. or other figure-. for periods of less than month. APPENDIX 4 4 PATRICK J. BLANC: Backpay period; April 24 to September 25, 1967; denied Uses of Car, April 25, 1967. GROSS DEMONSTRATOR INSt I+ 4Ni I EARNINGS INTERIM NIT COMMISSIONS CAR I'RI \IIt'MS Al FOLK EARNINGS EXPENSES BACKPA Plu. Plus Minus Minus Plus Equals April 1967 808.64* 489.13 May 1,067 . 75 26.80** June 811.93 2dQUARTER 2,688 . 32 425 .30 36.40 515 .93 1,050 .00 1,584.09 July 667.08 August 694.17 September 500.61 3d QUARTER 1,861.86 793 .75 54 .60 3,424.00 0 TOTA L 1,584.09 *Total figure for month used rather than more appropriate figure for relevant part of month because records of Respondent used in making computations do not rise daily, s cekh . of other figures for pet iods of less than month *'There is no explanation for this figure in the record . Pte.umahly Blanc recessed his commission in May for a sale made prior to his discharge on April 24, 1967. FOLK CHEVROLET, INC. AI'I'I \1)IX B COMMISSIONS I ARNFD BY "COMPARABLE " FULL-TIME SALESMEN PERIOD Dol to nc 1966 130 1967 73 2d Qtr 1966 35 2d Qtr 1967 ue 3d Qtr 1966 28 3d Qtr 1967 13 Oct 1966 12 Oct 1967 6. 283 TOTAL. W. 1.. BUIRCH J. E. DIXON W. R. KERNS O. E. MOREHAR7 lars 1967 as Dollars r4 of total Dollars %of total Dollars %oftotal Dollars cJooftots crest ri of to nearest for to nearest for to nearest for to nearest for 1 966 S 10 period $1U period $10 period $ 10 period ,310 12,630 9. 7 14,100 10.8 11,730 9.0 11,360 8.7 ,710 56.6 11,220 15. 2 14,140 19 . 2 11,810 16.0 12,720 17.3 ,840 3,260 9.1 3,770 10.5 2,560 7.1 3,220 9.0 ,780 55.2 2,550 12.9 3,740 18.9 3,240 16.2 3,810 19.3 480 3.860 13.6 2,990 10.5 2,530 8.9 2,200 7.7 ,700 48 .1 3,110 22.7 3,400 248 3.220 23.5 2,690 196 500 980 7.8 1,890 15.1 1,210 9.7 920 7.4 920 55.4 2300 i3.2 1,350 19.5 1,650 23.8 1,310 18.9 APPFNDIX C 1 COMMIS IONS DEMONSTRATOR I IPRI \III MS I A RI (1 K1 IIARNIVMSI EXPFNSES I BACNET KPAY Plus Plus Minus !Minus Plus I quals Martin .I. '\ igbms: 2d Qtr. 317.35 317 35 3d Qtr 2,373.00 750.10 40.95 1,312.00 1,852.05 4th Qtr 971 (X) 173.10 13.65 684.00 473.75 TOTAL 2,643.15 Kenneth S E'ana 2d Qtr. .105.60 105.60 3d Qtr 1,980.00 249.60 1 ,519.00 710.60 4th Qtr 587.(X) 38.4() 338.00 287.40 TOTAL 1.103.60 Roy Kaplan: 2d Qtr 890.00 84.70 240.00 240.00 974.70 3d Qtr 2, 15&00 200.20 1,975.00 210.00 593.20 4th Qtr 712.00 46.20 239.00 519.20 TOTAL. 2,087.10 Patrick J Blanc : 2d Qtr 3,458 (X) 425.30 36.40 1,050.00 2,869.70 3d Qtr. 4,250.0() 793.75 54.60 3,424.40 1.673 95 TOTA 1. 4,543.65