Sweatermasters Co., Inc.

SWEATERMASTERS CO., INC. 301 Sweatermasters Co., Inc. and Local 815, International Production, Service and Sales Employees Union and United Knitwear Manufacturers League, Ing., and Knitgoods Workers' Union, Local 155, International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, AFL-CIO, Parties to the contract. Case 29-CA- 1350 June 2, 1969 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN MCCULI OCH AND MEMBERS BROWN AND ZAGORIA On February 25, 1969, Trial Examiner Richard D. Taplitz issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. The Trial Examiner also found that Respondent had not engaged in certain other unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint and recommended dismissal as to them. Thereafter, the General Counsel and Knitgoods Workers' Union, Local 155, International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, AFL-CIO, filed exceptions to the Trial Examiners' Decision and supporting briefs. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision, and exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in this case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner with the following additions and modifications: 1. We find, in agreement with the Trial Examiner, that Respondent did not refuse to bargain with the Production Union in violation of Section 8(a)(5). As more fully set forth in the Trial Examiner's Decision, on June 4, 1968, when the Production Union first made its demand for recognition, it did not have cards from a majority of Respondent's employees, and its demand was made on the very day that its representative had announced that he would begin to organize the shop. That evening two employees told Respondent's President, Gursky, that they preferred the Knitgoods Union. The next morning the two employees began soliciting for the Knitgoods Union among their fellow employees, some of whom asked Gursky what the union situation was. It was not until after the Knitgoods Union had been brought in on the initiative of the employees, that Gursky and Kobisher, Respondent's treasurer, said, in response to such employee inquiries, that if the employees were going to join one of the two unions presently in the picture, they thought that the Knitgoods Union was the better of the two and that the employees should sign cards for it. Cards for the Knitgoods Union were then passed out in the presence of Gursky and Kobisher. Meanwhile, on the afternoon of June 4 the Production Union had obtained cards from a majority of employees. On the evening of June 5, the Production Union officials renewed their demand for recognition by inquiring about the meeting with Respondent which had been scheduled for the next day. Gursky replied that there would be no meeting since he had signed a contract with the Knitgoods Union,' thereby refusing recognition of the Production Union. In concluding that the refusal of recognition of the Production Union on June 5 was not violative of Section 8(a)(5), we note that when the demand for recognition was first made by the Production Union, it did not represent a majority of employees. Further, Respondent could easily suspect that this was the case, since the demand was made on the very morning that the Union had indicated that it would attempt organization. Before the Production Union obtained cards from a majority of employees and renewed its demand, some of the employees had already begun an organizing drive for the Knitgoods Union. Respondent, well aware of this additional campaign, was therefore justified in not accepting the Production Union's demand for representative status. z 2. We find merit in General Counsel's contention that the Trial Examiner erred in failing to recommend that Respondent be required to reimburse employees for dues, initiation fees, assessments. and other moneys paid by them to the Knitgoods Union from the date of the execution of the unlawful union-security provision. Such reimbursement is necessary because the selection of that Union was the result of Respondent's encouragement to employees to join it in the face of a claim of majority status by another union.' Under these circumstances and in order to establish an atmosphere in which the employees may exercise the 'in fact, no such contract existed, and recognition had not yet been granted to that Union. 'Knitgoods Union, although violative of Section 8(ax2), was not of the type which would destroy the essential two-union nature of the situation. Thus, that unuin's organizational efforts were initiated by the employees, not by the Respondent Furthermore, Respondent's statements of preference for Knitgoods Union were in response to employees ' questions about the relative merits of the two unions, and it is clear that they were in the nature of advice, free from threats of reprisal or promises of benefits. Cf. Lake City Foundry Company, Inc. 173 NLRB No. 159. In these circumstances, we cannot presume that the Production Union would have remained the ultimate choice of the majority of the employees if the Respondent had not intervened in behalf of the Knngoods Workers. In reaching this conclusion , we do not adopt the personal observations of the Trial Examiner set forth in footnote 14 of his Decision. 176 NLRB No. 38 302 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD right to select or reject a bargaining representative, we shall order reimbursement, computed in the manner set forth in Seafarers International Union, etc., 138 NLRB 1142. However, it would be inappropriate to order reimbursement as to employees Leonard Corwin, Anthony Calabrese. and John Smith , who voluntarily signed cards for the Knitgoods Union before Respondent indicated to any employees a preference for that Union." ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner and hereby orders that Respondent , Sweatermasters Co., Inc., Brooklyn . New York, its officers, agents, successors. and assigns , shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order, as herein modified:' 1. Add the following as paragraph 2(c) and reletter the following paragraphs accordingly: -(c) Reimburse all present and former employees except Leonard Corwin, Anthony Calabrese, and John Smith for dues and other moneys unlawfully exacted under its illegal contract with the Knitgoods Union, together with interest at the rate of 6 percent per annum computed in the manner set forth in this Decision." 2. Insert the following as the next to last paragraph in the notice: WE WILL reimburse all present and former employees except Leonard Corwin, Anthony Calabrese, and John Smith for any dues and other moneys unlawfully exacted by us because of our illegal contract with the Knitgoods Union. together with interest at 6 percent per annum. IT IS I•URTHLR ORDERED that the complaint be dismissed insofar as it alleges violations not found herein. 'Intdeo Aluminum Corporation. 169 NLRB No. 136; Liareo Container Corporation. 173 NLRB No. 219; we also Virginia Electric ord Power Conrparv v. N.L.R.B.: 319 U .S. 533. See Cowles Communications. Inc.. 170 NLRB No. 177, fn. 3; Lianco Container Corporation. supra 'We note that the reference in In. 18 of the Trial Examiner 's Decision to Region 19 is a typographical error and accordingly, we shall change this to Region 29. United Knitwear Manufacturers League, Inc., herein called the League, and Knitgoods Workers' Union, Local 155, International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, AFL-CIO, herein called the Knitgoods Union, were parties to an invalid contract covering the employees of Respondent . e charge upon which the complaint is based was filT on June 6 by Local 815 , International -Production, Service and Sales Employees Union , herein called the Production Union . Respondent, the Production Union , the Knitgoods Union and the General Counsel were represented by counsel throughout the hearing and all parties were given full opportunity to participate, adduce evidence, examine and cross-examine witnesses and argue orally . Thereafter briefs , which have been carefully considered , were filed on behalf of the Respondent, the Knitgoods Union, and the General Counsel. THE ISSUES 1. Did the Production Union represent an uncoerced majority of Respondent 's employees in an appropriate unit and make a demand for recognition in that unit. 2. Did Respondent unlawfully assist the Knitgoods Union in securing authorization cards and unlawfully recognize and execute a contract containing a union-security clause with that union. 3. Did Respondent unlawfully refuse to bargain with the Production Union. Upon the entire record in the case and from my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT Respondent, a New York corporation, maintains an office and factory at 852 Monroe Street, Brooklyn, New York, herein called the plant, where it is engaged in the business of providing knitting, sewing, and finishing services, and related contract services for knitgood manufacturers. During a representative annual period from May 1, 1967, to April 30, 1968, Respondent performed services valued in excess of $50,000 for other enterprises located in the States of New York and Pennsylvania, each of which other 'enterprises annually produces goods valued in excess of $50,000 which are shipped directly out of the State in which such enterprise is located. The complaint alleges, the answer admits, and I find that Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE RICHARD D. TAPLrrz, Trial Examiner : This case was tried in Brooklyn , New York, on November 13, 14, 15, 18, and 19, 1968. The issues litigated were framed by a complaint dated July 24, 1968,' which alleges that $weatermasters Co., Inc., herein called Respondent, violated Section 8(a)(1), (2), (3), and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, and the answer of Respondent which denies that Respondent violated the Act. The complaint also alleges in substance that the [I. THE LABOR ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED The complaint alleges, the answer admits , and I find that the Knitgoods Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. The complaint also alleges that the Production Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. Respondent by its answer denies knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief concerning that allegation . The uncontradicted testimony of Saul Postman, the president of the Production Union, is that 'All dates are in 1968 unless otherwise specified. SWEATERMASTERS CO., INC. his organization on behalf of employees bargains contracts with employers relating to the employees ' working conditions, i.e., increases in pay, health and welfare, and pensions. Employees of various employers are members of the Union . The Board has recently found that the Production Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act, Pargament Fidler, Inc., 173 NLRB No. 102 , and I so find. III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The Facts 1. The organizational activities of the Production Union On the morning of June 4 , Serge Diaz, an organizer for the Production Union, was walking the streets of Brooklyn looking for nonunion shops to organize. When he came to the building in which the Respondent 's plant is located he asked the elevator operator whether he knew of any unorganized shops in the building . Upon being told that the Sweater Company on the third and fifth floors was nonunion, Diaz took the elevator to the fifth floor where he was met by Richard Kobisher , the treasurer of Respondent corporation .' Diaz showed Kobisher his business card and Kobisher took him to the company office to see Milton Gursky, Respondent's president and chief operating officer. According to the testimony of Diaz, Gursky looked at the business card and Diaz asked him if the shop was nonunion ; Gursky answered that it had been nonunion for 20 years and that it was not about to go union at that time ; Diaz thanked him and left. Gursky's version of the conversation was different. He testified that Diaz told him that he had eight or nine cards signed by employees and asked if he (Gursky) would be interested in talking to the president of the Union about a contract . Kobisher testified that Diaz simply told them that he wanted to organize the place because he had eight or nine signed cards. Credibility resolutions based on my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses in this case are going to be particularly difficult in that all three of the officials of the Production Union who testified and both of the officials of Respondent who testified were singularly unsuccessful in inspiring a feeling of confidence in the veracity of their testimony . However, in this particular conversation I credit Diaz' version of the conversation as Kobisher's testimony does not fully corroborate Gursky's with regard to Diaz' alleged proposal that they meet with the president of his Union. After his conversation with Gursky and Kobisher, Diaz left the building in which the plant was located and saw a worker, William Gardner, unloading a truck of yarn. Diaz engaged him in conversation and ascertained that he was employed by Respondent . Diaz explained that he was organizing for the Production Union and asked Gardner to sign an authorization card , which he did. Gardner told him that the pressers working for Respondent would be out of the building at 11:45 a.m., so Diaz waited for them. At 11:45 the two pressers, John Smith and Anthony Foster, left the building and Diaz solicited authorization cards from them . About noon groups of three or four employees at a time came down the stairs out of the 'Kobisher has a 50-percent ownership interest in Respondent, a closed corporation, and in addition runs the sewing department . I find that he as well as Milton Gursky, Respondent's president, are supervisors within the meaning of the Act. 303 building and Diaz spoke to them , some in English and some in Spanish . Smith identified which of the persons leaving the building were employees of Respondent and Diaz solicited authorization cards from them , telling them that the Production Union would try to get them paid holidays, vacations, and a hospital plan. Some of the employees signed the cards and returned them to Diaz, some others told Diaz that they would return the cards after they returned from lunch. Diaz testified that by 1:30 p.m. he had in his possession 16 authorization cards and he had been informed by some of the employees that the total employee complement was 20 or 24 . He then called Saul Postman , the president of the Production Union, and was instructed to return to the Production Union 's office, which he did. 2. The Production Union's demand for recognition Diaz returned to the plant later that day and brought Production Union President Postman and Secretary-Treasurer Candido Rodriguez with him. They went to the fifth floor where they saw Gursky. Postman identified himself and Gursky asked them into his office. What happened in the office is a matter of sharp dispute. Diaz testified as follows: Postman told Gursky that the Production Union represented a majority of Respondent's employees and that he wanted to negotiate a union contract. Gursky answered "How do I know you represent a majority of my employees?" Postman then told Diaz to show Gursky the authorization cards whereupon Diaz fanned out 16 authorization cards on Gursky 's desk. Gursky then said that he didn't want to see the cards at that time and to take them away . Diaz then put them back in his pocket. Gursky asked what the union contract would cost. Postman answered that there would have to be paid vacation , holidays, pension, hospitalization, and a minimum of a $10-a-week increase . Gursky said it would be impossible for him. About that time Kobisher entered the room and Gursky told him what the Production Union was there for. Kobisher asked how much it would cost. Gursky repeated the demands to Kobisher and Kobisher said that they did not have a union for 20 years and if they had to go for those prices they would go out of business. Gursky then asked if terms could be negotiated and Postman said that they were ready to talk. Gursky then asked for time to talk to his attorney and Postman told him that he would give him until Thursday which was 2 days.' Gursky then said that he would call Postman and give him a time on Thursday . Diaz placed this conversation as occurring about 2:30 p.m. on June 4. Postman and Rodriguez testified substantially the same as Diaz. However, neither of them testified that Gursky agreed to sit down on Thursday to negotiate a contract. Both Postman and Rodriguez placed this meeting about 2:30 or 3 p.m. on June 4. Gursky and Kobisher testified to a different version of this meeting. Gursky averred as follows : The meeting took place about 11 :45 a.m. on June 4. After taking the three representatives of the Production Union into his office 'Diaz testified We settled on Thursday . We would sit down Thursday to negotiate a contract." His testimony was not dear as to' who said that they would sit down and negotiate a contract or to whether it was a generall understanding of the parties. On cross-examination he was specifically asked whether Gursky at that point had agreed tb take in the Production Union as its union . Diaz did not answer that question, but merely replied that Gursky said he had to speak to his attorney and that they had a meeting tentatively set for Thursday. 304 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Gursky immediately went into the plant and brought back Kobisher, who was present during the entire conversation. Postman told Gursky that he had 9 or 10 employees signed up and that he would probably get more during the course of the day and "You might just as well sign the contract with us now, otherwise we will throw a picket line around here so fast it will make your head swim and stop all shipments out of your factory and paralyze you." Gursky then asked to see the cards and Postman answered that it was none of his business and that if Gursky was ready to talk about a contract then they would talk about cards. Postman then said, "What do you say about signing a contract?" and Gursky answered that he would need time even to consider the matter. Gursky asked until the end of the week to think about it and Postman answered that he would not give him that much time but that he would give him until Thursday morning. Nothing was said about the Production Union's demands. Kobisher's testimony corroborates Gursky's in that the meeting was before noontime. He also averred that he was present during the entire meeting and that no union authorization cards were produced. I credit the representatives of the Production Union insofar as they testified that the meeting occurred about 2:30 or 3 o'clock on June 4, that the Production Union claimed to represent a majority of Respondent's employees, and that a demand for recognition was made at that time. Diaz knew from his 10 o'clock meeting with Gursky that recognition was not going to be summarily gained . As he was busily engaged in obtaining authorization cards, it appears unlikely that he would have returned with the two other union representatives before rather than after he had made a serious effort to obtain cards. Even though there is an implication in Diaz' testimony that Gursky agreed to bargain with the Production Union, it is clear not only from his evasion on that point on cross-examination but from the testimony of the other witnesses that no such agreement was made. I credit the testimony of Gursky and Kobisher that Kobisher was present during the entire meeting. I believe that all the participants at the meeting were anxious to have witnesses present. Gursky wanted his partner to be present at what promised to be an important meeting. He would not meet alone with three representatives of the Production Union if he could help it, and he could help it simply by calling in Kobisher. I also credit Gursky's testimony that he was never shown the Production Union's authorization cards. The testimony of the officials of the Production Union that the cards were shown to Gursky before Kobisher came into the meeting is unconvincing. In addition, in the circumstances of the June 4 meeting, I find it difficult to believe that Postman would willingly divulge the names of the employees who had authorized his union to represent them by showing Gursky the authorization cards. In summary I credit the testimony of the Production Union officials that the meeting took place about 3 o'clock on June 4, that Postman claimed to represent a majority of Respondent's employees, and that a demand for recognition was made, but as to the rest of the meeting I credit the testimony of Gursky. After the meeting the representatives of the Production Union left the plant. About 4:30 p.m. they returned in order to make arrangements for a meeting with employees the following night. At 5 o'clock they spoke to employees who were leaving work and solicited more authorization cards. When knitter mechanic Leonard Corwin and his assistant Anthony Calabrese left the plant at 6 p.m. the representatives of the Production Union unsuccessfully solicited their signatures on authorization cards. The following day, June 5, Diaz and Rodriguez came back to the plant and handed out booklets on the Production Union's welfare program and reminded employees of the meeting that had been scheduled for 5 o'clock that evening . At 5 o'clock that day Diaz together with two other representatives of Respondent Union, Moody Gallant and Postman, were once again at the plant. Diaz testified that he was told by employees that Gursky had signed a contract with another union and that they did not want to go to the meeting . Diaz reported this to Postman on the telephone and Postman came to the plant. Both Diaz and Postman testified that they confronted Gursky in front of the plant about 5:10 p.m ., that Postman asked Gursky what time their meeting was scheduled for the following day, and that Gursky answered that the meeting was off because he had signed a contract with the Knitgoods Union . Gursky specifically denied this conversation and testified that he never saw any representative of the Production Union from the June 4 meeting until the hearing in this matter . I credit Diaz and Postman . I cannot believe that Postman , who is by no means a shy individual, would sit back in the face of employee reports that Respondent had signed a contract with another union the day before a meeting was scheduled for his organization , and refrain from a face-to-face confrontation with Gursky . Gursky's denial of any conversation is unconvincing. 3. The appropriate bargaining unit Respondent is engaged in the production of knitgoods as a contractor. It employs knitters, knitter mechanics, cutters, pressers, machine operators, labelers, packers, and other categories of employees needed in the production of sweaters. All of Respondent's employees spend at least some of their time in the production of knitwear and none work solely on the repair of machines or solely on maintenance work. The complaint alleges the following: All production and maintenance employees, including mechanics, of Respondent, employed at its Brooklyn plant, exclusive of all office clericals, guards, watchmen, salesmen and all supervisors as defined in Section 2(11) of the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act. Respondent in its answer admits that the above unit is appropriate for collective bargaining except that it denies that maintenance employees and mechanics not engaged in the maintenance of productive machinery are properly included within such a unit. However, Gursky in his testimony admits that Respondent had no employee that would fall in the exception set forth in Respondent's answer. A production and maintenance unit as set forth in the complaint is presumptive appropriate and I find that the unit as so set forth is appropriate in the instant case. Mark J. Gerry, Inc. d/b/a Dove Manufacturing Co., 128 NLRB 778. 4. The Production Union's authorization cards It was stipulated that as of June 4, the date of the Production Union's demand for recognition, there were 24 employees in the above-described unit., SWEATERMASTERS CO., INC. 305 Authorizations cards on behalf of the Production Union purportedly signed by 17 employees in the unit were received in evidence.' Twelve of the cards were signed on June 4 before the Production Union made its demand for recognition.' A 13th card, purporting to bear the signature of employee Margaret Staten , was a subject of conflicting testimony . Staten testified that she was given the card by Diaz in the morning while she was rushing to work and that she signed it in front of Diaz. However , she did not remember the date that she signed the card as someone else had filled in the date space and she did not recall what she did with the card after she signed it . She did remember that she signed it before June 5, which was the date that she also signed an authorization card for the Knitgoods Union . Diaz credibly testified that the only day he distributed authorization cards for the Production Union was on June 4 and that his first contact with the employees was after the workday started. Though Staten testified that she signed the card when she was "rushing to work," she was later shown her timecard and testified that she was absent from work on June 4. Ordway Hilton, a witness called on behalf of the Knitgoods Union , was duly qualified as a handwriting expert . He testified that in his opinion the signature on the Production Union's authorization card, which purported to be that of Margaret Staten , was not signed by the same person who signed other documents which contained the stipulated signature of Margaret Staten . Combining the testimony of the handwriting expert with the admission of Staten that she did not remember when she signed the card or what she did with the card and the further admission that she was not working on the date that the card was purportedly signed , even though she testified that she signed it as she was rushing to work, I am unable to give any credence to the card. On June 4, after the demand for recognition, four additional employees executed authorization cards on behalf of the Production Union.' In summary I find that at the time of the demand on June 4, 12 employees out of a total of 24 in the bargaining unit had authorized the Production Union to represent them and that by the end of June 4 the number had been increased to 16 authorizations. 5. The organizational activities of the Knitgoods Union As stated above, about 6 p .m. on June 4 representatives of the Production Union approached knitter mechanic Leonard Corwin and his assistant Anthony Calabrese in an unsuccessful attempt to secure their allegiance to the Production Union. Though Corwin was not active on behalf of the Knitgoods Union for the 6 years that he was working for Respondent, he had at one time belonged to that Union . Calabrese had on many occasions during his 20-year employment with Respondent sought to organize Respondent's employees on behalf of the Knitgoods Union and he kept authorization cards for that Union in the plant at all times. Corwin and Calabrese discussed the matter and agreed that Calabrese would get more authorization cards from the Knitgoods Union. When Calabrese got home that evening he called an organizer for the Knitgoods Union and told him that he needed more authorization cards . About 9 :30 a.m . on June 5 the cards were brought to him. At 7 or 8 p.m. on June 4 Corwin called Gursky on the telephone and told him that he had been approached by the Production Union to sign an authorization card . Gursky replied that he knew the Production Union was trying to organize because he had received several visits from that Union . Corwin then said that if the shop was going to be organized he wanted it to be by a Knitgoods union and that he was going to get cards from the Knitgoods Union . Gursky replied in substance that Corwin could do whatever he wanted to do. When Calabrese received the Knitgoods Union authorization cards on the morning of June 5 he gave them to Corwin . Calabrese and Corwin work on the third floor of the building in which Respondent is located. The bulk of the employees work on the fifth floor. That morning J. Smith, a presser who worked on the fifth floor, came to the third floor and signed an authorization card for the Knitgoods Union . About noon on June 5 Corwin brought the Knitgoods Union authorization cards to the fifth floor where many of Respondent's employees were assembled before going to lunch and distributed the cards. During the course of that day, June 5, 19 employees in the bargaining unit signed cards authorizing the Knitgoods Union to represent them for collective bargaining.' G.C. Exh. 15 is Respondent's payroll journal showing 2 employees for the pay period ending June 8, 1968. However, it was stipulated that three persons named on the list were not employees on June 4. They are E. Balmers, D. Jefferson. and M . Bolanos. 'The cards read in part "I hereby authorize Local 815. to represent me and, in my behalf, to negotiate and conclude all agreements as to hours of labor, wages, and other employment conditions." 'Employees Cato, Echaverria, Vasquez, S. Calabrese, Franklin, Smith, and Mercado each authenticated his or her own card and placed the timing of the execution of the card before the demand . Mercado witnessed the signing of cards by Montenez and Anaya, also before the demand. Production Union Organizer Diaz witnessed the signing by employee Gardner before the demand . Diaz also gave a card to employee Foster and Foster returned it to Diaz before the demand . The card signed by employee Donald is also counted in this group . Donald, who authenticated her own card, signed the card before the demand but did not deliver it to the Production Union until the evening of June 4, which was after the demand . As she did not vacate her authorization between signing and delivering the card, it may be counted as an authorization as of the time of the execution of the card . Retail Clerks International Association. 153 NLRB 204, enfg. 366 F.2d 642 (C.A.D.C.). 'Diaz witnessed the signing of cards by employees Cassin, Cruz, Lawrence , and Muldrow . As to the latter two employees Diaz was unable to say whether the cards were signed in the day or the evening of June 4. 6. Respondent's alleged assistance to the Knitgoods Union at the noon meeting In the early morning of June 5 Corwin and Calabrese approached Gursky and told him that the Production Union was trying to organize the shop and that they wanted the Knitgoods Union . Gursky answered that they could do as they pleased. Between 8:30 a.m. and noon other employees came to Gursky and asked him what the union situation was. He answered that he would not discuss it with each employee individually but that at lunchtime if the employees had anything to ask he would answer their questions. At noon, before the employees left for lunch, Corwin told them not to go to lunch quite yet because Gursky had something to tell them. Gursky and Kobisher both addressed the employees . There were serious conflicts in the testimony of witnesses as to what 'The cards read in part "I, of my own free will, hereby authorize the KNITGOODS WORKERS' UNION, LOCAL 155. I.L.G.W.U. - AFL-CIO, and its representatives, to act exclusively as my agent and representative for the purpose of collective bargaining." 306 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD was said and done at this meeting. Gursky testified as follows: Employees asked Gursky what each union had to offer and which union they should choose . Gursky replied that he did not know anything about the Production Union but that he had heard of the Knitgoods Union because it was a union for the knitgoods industry. He added that he did not know what either of them had to offer and told them that he would prefer to have neither of the unions in the factory but that if the employees wanted a union it was up to them to decide which one it was going to be . Some of the employees spoke only Spanish so Gursky asked Kobisher to speak to them . Gursky did not see any authorization cards for the Knitgoods Union being passed out or signed. After speaking to the employees both Gursky and Kobisher went into the office for lunch. Kobisher also testified that he did not see any Knitgoods Union cards . He stated that at the meeting some of the employees asked him to find out what Gursky had been telling the other employees and which union he recommended , and he answered that he didn 't recommend any union because he didn't want a union. Knitter mechanic Corwin testified to a slightly different version of the meeting as follows : Gursky spoke to the employees while Corwin was standing about 10 feet away holding the Knitgoods Union cards. Gursky told the employees that he knew the shop was going to be organized and that the knitters felt that they would prefer to be organized by a Knitgoods union but that it was up to the employees to decide which union they wanted to join . A few minutes after Gursky spoke to the employees, Corwin passed out the authorization cards for the Kn itgoods Union to the employees. Gursky was present when the cards were handed out. Kobisher spoke to the employees about 5 minutes later. Calabrese's recollection of what Gursky said was substantially the same as Corwin 's, but Calabrese made no mention of whether Gursky was present when the cards were passed out. A number of employees testified to various versions of this meeting. Employee Cato' stated that Corwin passed out the cards in Kobisher's presence, that Kobisher asked the employees to sign for the Knitgoods Union because the Production Union was no good and that Kobisher told the employees that he would get them into a better union. Employee Donald stated that the Knitgoods Union cards were lying on the table and that Gursky or Kobisher told the employees to sign because the Knitgoods Union was a good union, he didn't know about the other Union and he wanted them to join a union that he knew something about and would be best for them . Employee Echevarria stated that she saw Kobisher place the Knitgoods Union cards on the table and that Kobisher told them to sign because the other Union had no funds . She also testified that she saw Gursky talk to the employees before they signed the cards. Employee Vasquez stated that she received the Knitgoods Union card from Kobisher who told the employees that the Production Union was no good and that with the other Union "we will have more benefits." Employee Franklin testified that the cards were given out by employee Corwin but that Gursky told Corwin to give out the cards and told the employees that the Production Union was crooked and that they should sign with the Knitgoods Union. Employee Mercado testified that Richard Kobisher simply said that no one knew the other union . Employee Ferrigno testified that Gursky told the employees that there was another union but that it was up to the employees to decide. I believe that all of these witnesses were honestly trying to recall what happened at the meeting but it was clear that some of the witnesses were having difficulty expressing themselves and that others had a somewhat blurred recollection of what occurred at this meeting. After observing all of the above witnesses as they testified, I credit the following version of the meeting: About noon on June 5 employee Corwin told the employees gathered on the fifth floor not to go out for lunch because Gursky wanted to speak to them. Gursky then addressed the employees and in substance told them that the Production Union was not a good union but that the Knitgoods Union was a good union and that they should sign cards for the Knitgoods Union. While Gursky was speaking Corwin was standing about 10 feet away from him holding the Knitgoods Union cards. A few minutes after Gursky stopped and while Gursky was still present, Corwin passed out the Knitgoods Union cards to the employees. About this time Kobisher spoke to the Spanish speaking employees and in substance repeated to them what Gursky had said and urged them to sign the Knitgoods Union card. Kobisher was also present when the cards were handed out by Corwin. A number of employees signed the cards and returned them to Corwin. Anthony Calabrese credibly estimated that about 15 or 18 cards were signed during the lunch hour on June 5. In all 19 Knitgoods Union authorization cards were authenticated and received in evidence. Of these 13 were executed by employees who had previously signed authorization cards for the Production Union. 7. Respondent's contract with the Knitgoods Union On the morning of June 6 Gursky received a call from a Mr. Jacobson, an organizer for the Knitgoods Union. Jacobson told him that the majority of his employees had authorized the Knitgoods Union to represent them and he asked for a meeting to discuss a union contract . Gursky replied that he would be in the plant if Jacobson wanted to come down to see him. About a half hour later Jacobson, together with another organizer, Mr. Cincromani, came to the plant and had a meeting with Gursky and Kobisher. Jacobson repeated that his union represented a majority of the employees and that he wanted to talk about a union contract.10 Gursky questioned the majority status of the Knitgoods Union and Jacobson answered that the cards were on file at the union office and that Gursky could arrange to have them verified. Jacobson showed Gursky a copy of the contract that the Knitgoods Union had with the United Knitwear Manufacturers League and its employer-members and said that his union wanted the same contract that the other knitgood and sweater shops in the industry had. Gursky replied that he had to give the matter thought and Jacobson answered that they should get in touch with each other in the next few days. After the union representatives left Gursky discussed the matter with Kobisher and they decided to get advice on what action to take. Shortly thereafter Gursky called the League and spoke to an 'Cato also testified that on June 4 after signing the card for the Production Union, Gursky asked her if employees had filled out cards, she answered that they had, and he told her that they should not fill out any more cards because the first union was no good . Later in her testimony she in effect retracted her former testunony and denied that Gursky had said anything to her about signing cards at that time. I believe that the witness was confused in her first statement and that her subsequent correction was credible. SWEATERMASTERS CO., INC. official named Foreman. Foreman agreed to come to the plant and discuss the matter with him. Later that morning Foreman came to the plant and Gursky told him that the Production Union had approached him on one day and that the Knitgoods Union had claimed to represent a majority on the following day. Foreman replied that the only way he could give advice would be for Gursky to become a member of the League and that the fee was $125 for 6 months. Gursky gave him a check for $125 but did not sign any membership application. Foreman told Gursky that he would speak to the counsel for the League and see what information he could get. He then left. Later he called back and said that the membership wasn't accepted yet but that he would keep in touch. A few days after June 6 Foreman called Gursky back and told him that he had discussed the matter with the legal counsel to the League and that he had verified that the Knitgoods Union did represent a majority of Gursky's employees and that the only thing that they could advise him to do was to enter into a contract with the Knitgoods Union. Though in his testimony Gursky stated that he recognized the Knitgoods Union at that time, there is no evidence in the record to indicate that he took action to recognize the Knitgoods Union until July 10. Gursky also testified that he joined the League on June 6, but the record discloses no action that he took in this regard, until July 10, other than the tender of his check for $125. On that date Respondent , by Gursky, signed two documents . The first was an application for membership in the League which contained a provision by which Gursky ratified and accepted the League' s agreement with the Knitgoods Union, effective as of July 17. This application was accepted by the League on July 10. The second document was a "certification of authorization and ratification" by which Respondent undertook to be bound by the collective-labor agreement mentioned above. Since the effective date of the agreement it has been maintained and enforced. Said agreement contains the following provision: 2.(a) It shall be a condition of employment that all workers employed by members of the League on any work performed in the crafts enumerated in Schedule A attached to this agreement shall be deemed covered by this agreement and all such workers, who are members in good standing of the Union on the date of execution of this agreement, shall remain members in good standing, and those who are not members in good standing on the date of execution of this agreement shall, on the thirtieth (30th) day following the date of execution of this agreement , become and remain members in good standing of the Union. It shall also be a condition of employment that all workers covered by this agreement hired on or after the date of execution hereof shall, on the thirtieth (30th) day following the beginning of such employment , become and remain members in good standing of the Union. 8. The discharge of Maude Franklin August 5 was Maude Franklin's last day of employment with Respondent. Franklin testified as follows: On August 511 Kobisher approached her and asked what her intentions were with respect to the Union. She answered that she did not want to get involved with "The same day the Knitgoods Union mailed to Respondent a written demand for recognition which was received by Respondent on June 7, 1969. 307 any unions and he replied that unless she joined the Union she couldn't work for Respondent. Kobisher then left her and returned a short time after with employee Anthony Calabrese, who had been appointed shop steward for the Knitgoods Union. Calabrese took her alone into the office and told her that she would have to leave, which she did. Kobisher's version of these conversations was different. He testified that he never told Franklin that she had to join the Union but rather that Calabrese told her that she had to join the Union if she wanted a job there. According to Kobisher, after Calabrese spoke to Franklin she yelled that she quit her job because she didn't want to join any union and left the plant. Kobisher admitted that he never tried to get her back or tell her that she did not have to become a member of the Union and he never reprimanded Calabrese for having told Franklin that she had to become a member of the Union in order to work in the shop. Sometime thereafter Franklin came back to the plant to pick up her check but Kobisher did not tell her that she could work even though she was not a member of the Knitgoods Union. At that time Kobisher knew what Calabrese had done. I credit Kobisher's version of the conversation. After observing Kobisher testify on the stand it is difficult for me to believe that he would voluntarily interpose himself in a matter of this nature. His testimony that he stood passively by while the shop steward took the action is credible. However, by his mere passivity in the circumstances of this discharge I find that he and through him Respondent ratified the conduct of the shop steward in discharging Franklin and therefore were responsible for the discharge. However the discharge of Franklin is not alleged in the complaint as a violation of the Act. Though the discharge was alleged as a violation of the Act in Case 29-CA-1433, that matter was settled by a settlement agreement approved on October 11 by the Regional Director of Region 29 of the Board. That settlement agreement provides in part that "nothing herein shall preclude General Counsel from adducing evidence concerning the allegations of unfair labor practices herein settled in any other preceding against Respondent .... Further, nothing herein shall be construed to affect the issues involved in Case 29-CA-1350." The General Counsel does not allege that the settlement agreement has been breached but instead urges that the facts set forth above be considered as additional evidence to support the General Counsel's contention that Respondent unlawfully refused to bargain with the Production Union. As any violation of the Act relating to the discharge of Franklin has been remedied by the settlement agreement and as the instant complaint does not allege any violation in that regard, I cannot now question the legality of the discharge. Moreover, the testimony concerning the discharge of Franklin does not shed light on the alleged violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. Other testimony establishes that Respondent executed an agreement which bound it to a contract with the Knitgood Workers and that the contract contained a union-security clause. Even if the union-security clause was enforced or even overzealously enforced without a 30-day grace period, it adds very little to the General Counsel's case with regard to the refusal-to-bargain allegation . On the other hand, the execution of the agreement is a matter which will require substantial discussion below. "Franklin testified that the date was October 3, but it was stipulated that her last day of work was August 5. 308 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD B. Analysis and Conclusions 1. Introductory remarks Through the morass of conflicting testimony in the record the basic facts in this case emerge as follows: On June 4, in a 1-day organizing effort, the Production Union secured authorization cards from a majority of Respondent's employees in an appropriate production and maintenance unit. On the same day , but prior to securing a majority of the authorizations, the Production Union demanded recognition as the bargaining agent of Respondent's employees. Respondent questioned the Union's majority status but agreed to talk to that Union again in a few days. The following day, June 5, employee Corwin distributed Knitgoods Union cards among Respondent's employees and a majority of the employees authorized the Knitgoods Union to represent them. Most of the cards were signed during the lunch hour when two high ranking officials of Respondent, Gursky and Kobisher , actively assisted employee Corwin in obtaining employee signatures on the authorization cards. This assistance consisted of speeches by both Gursky and Kobisher in which they expressed their preference for the Knitgoods Union and urged the employees to sign the cards, together with their physical presence when the cards were being distributed. The following day, June 6, Respondent made overtures towards the League which had a contract on behalf of its employer -members with the Knitgoods Union , by tendering $ 125 as partial dues. On July 10 Respondent formally applied for membership in the League, was accepted as a member, and adopted the contract which contained a union-security clause between the Knitgoods Workers Union and the League, effective as of July 17. Since July 17, the contract has been in full force and effect.' 2 2. The alleged violations of Section 8(a)(1), (2), and (3) The speeches of Gursky and Kobisher at the noon meeting on June 5 contained no threat of reprisal or promise of benefit and in so far as they merely set forth the opinions of those officials relating to what they considered to be the relative worths of two unions, the speeches might have come within the definition of free speech set forth in Section 8(c) of the Act. However, Gursky and Kobisher went further and actively solicited the employees to sign authorization cards . The context in which the speeches were made must also be considered. At the time of Gursky's speech Corwin was standing near Gursky holding the Knitgoods Union authorization cards. Corwin distributed the cards almost immediately after Gursky spoke when Gursky was still present and Kobisher spoke about the same time. In addition the speeches were "Paragraph 13 of the complaint alleges in part that Respondent warned its employees to refrain from joining the Production Union and to join the Knitgoods Union . I find no credible evidence in the record of any warning and I therefore recommend that that part of the complaint be dismissed. Paragraph 14 alleges that Respondent promised and granted wage increases and other benefits to induce employees to refrain from becoming members of the Production Union and to induce them to join the Knitgoods Union . I find no credible evidence in the record of promises of benefit . Though it can be argued that the contract in itself granted benefits, the real question being litigated is the legality of the contract. The "benefit" issue mentioned in paragraph 14 is so subsidiary to the central question that it adds nothing to this case and I therefore recommend that those allegations of the complaint be dismissed. made only 1 day after the Production Union had demanded recognition. Viewing the incident as a whole, I find that Gursky and Kobisher unlawfully assisted the Knitgoods Union in securing a majority of its authorization cards and in so doing violated Section 8(a)(1) and (2) of the Act. It follows that at the time that Respondent recognized the Knitgoods Union and adopted the contract between that Union and the League, the Knitgoods Union did not represent an uncoerced majority of the employees and Respondent therefore further violated Section 8(a)(1) and (2) of the Act. As the contract contained a union-security clause , Respondent also violated Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. Raymond Buick, Inc., 173 NLRB No. 199; Carlton Paper Corporation, 173 NLRB No. 26; Hampton Merchants Association, 151 NLRB 1307; cf. Coamo Knitting Mills, Inc., 150 NLRB 579. Even if Respondent had not unlawfully assisted the Knitgoods Union in obtaining authorization cards the recognition of the Knitgoods Union and the adoption of its contract would still have violated Section 8(a)(1), (2), and (3) of the Act. The demand of the Production Union for recognition on June 4 was backed by authorizations of close to a majority of the employees and raised a real question concerning representation under the Midwest Piping & Supply Co., rule, 63 NLRB 1060. In the face of such a question concerning representation "an employer cannot arrogate to himself authority to determine which of two or more contending unions is entitled to recognition as exclusive bargaining agent." Teramana Brothers Coal Mining Company, 173 NLRB No. 93. See also Iowa Beef Packers, Inc., 144 NLRB 615, enfd. in part 331 F.2d 176 (C.A. 8, 1964). In the Raymond Buick case, supra, the Board adopted the Trial Examiner's finding that similar conduct constituted additional unlawful support of the recognized union in violation of Section 8(a)(2) and (1) of the Act. In that case as in the one at bar, an employer unlawfully assisted the union in securing authorization cards. Thereafter a second union lawfully secured a majority of authorization cards. After the second union demanded recognition the employer executed a contract with the first union. The rationale of the Midwest Piping rule was used to find the execution of the contract unlawful. 3. The alleged violation of 8(a)(5) In Hammond & Irving, Inc., 154 NLRB 1071, the Board set forth the criteria to be applied in the so-called Joy Silk Mills type of case: The Board has long held that an employer may insist upon a Board election as proof of a union's majority if it has a reasonable basis for a bona fide doubt as to the union's representative status in an appropriate unit. If, however, the employer has no such good-faith doubt, but refuses to bargain with the majority representative of its employees because it rejects the collective-bargaining principle or desires to gain time within which to undermine the union and dissipate its majority, such conduct constitutes a violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. ( Joy Silk Mills, Inc., 85 NLRB 1263, enfd. as modified on other grounds 185 F.2d 732 (C.A.D.C.), cert. denied 341 U.S. 914.) In determining whether the employer 's action was taken to achieve either of the said invalid purposes, the Board considers all the surrounding circumstances as well as direct evidence of motivation. Absent such direct evidence, where extensive violations of the Act SWEATERMASTERS CO., INC. accompany the refusal to grant recognition, they evidence the employer 's unlawful motive and an inference of bad faith is justified. In Aaron Brothers Company of California, 158 NLRB 1077, it was made clear that the General Counsel has a burden of affirmatively establishing the existence of bad faith and that the determination as to whether the employer acted in good or bad faith must be made in the light of all the relevant facts of the case including the unlawful conduct of the employer, the sequence of events, and the time lapse between the refusal and the unlawful conduct. In the instant case the unlawful conduct consisted of the assistance Respondent rendered to Knitgoods Union in securing authorization cards on June 5 and the recognition of and adoption of a contract with that Union on July 10 effective July 17. Respondent engaged in this conduct in the face of the Production Union's demand for recognition on June 4. That demand was in an appropriate unit and was still outstanding in the afternoon of June 4 when the Production Union had been authorized by a majority of the employees in the unit to represent them." However, all the surrounding circumstances must be considered . In this case two unions were competing for the loyalty of the employees . While the Knitgoods Union was unlawfully assisted there is no evidence in the record to establish either that the Knitgoods Union was a creature of Respondent or that Respondent introduced it into the shop . Prior to any assistance by the Respondent, two employees , Corwin and A. Calabrese, had not only opted for the Knitgoods Union but had notified Respondent in a telephone conversation with Gursky that the Knitgoods Union was very much in the picture. On the morning of June 5 employee Smith went along with Corwin and Calabrese by signing a card for the Knitgoods Union. Thus by the time Gursky and Kobisher began their unlawful conduct at noon on June 5 it was clear that both the Production Union and the Knitgoods Union were actively organizing in Respondent 's plant . Respondent's subsequent conduct did not indicate a rejection of the collective- bargaining principle . Rather it demonstrated an attempt through unlawful means to engage in collective bargaining with one union rather than another. In a two-union situation the discouragement of one union is always inherent in the encouragement of another and in that sense Respondent did undermine the Production Union. However, I do not believe that in the entire context of this case it has been established that Respondent did not have a good-faith doubt that the Production Union represented a majority of the employees . At the time the Production Union demanded recognition on June 4 , Respondent questioned its majority status. In fact that Production Union did not represent a majority of the employees at that time. Subsequently Respondent in a two- Union situation assisted one of the unions. That assistance certainly indicated a strong preference for one of the unions rather than the other but it does not in itself establish that Respondent failed to have a good-faith doubt that the Production Union represented a majority of the employees. "Though the Respondent refused to recognize the Production Union on June 4 in the sense that Respondent did not take any action at that time, Respondent did not affirmatively reject the demand until the following day when it told the Production Union that the meeting was off . At least until that time it is clear that both parties understood the demand was still outstanding. By that time the Production Union had authorizations from a majority of the employees. 309 In Irving Air Chute Co, Inc., Marathon Division, 149 NLRB 627, the Board held that certain conduct in violation of Section 8(a)(2) did indicate a lack of good-faith doubt on an employer's part and found a violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. That case is distinguishable in that the 8(a)(2) violation related to Respondent's actions in the formation of an employee committee. Thus a two-union situation was not present. In Grafton Boat Co., Inc., 173 NLRB No. 150, the Trial Examiner found that the employer engaged in various unfair labor practices including the use of a dominated labor organization to defeat collective bargaining. The Board held "because of the nature of the unfair labor practices found, their timing and limited number, we are not persuaded that they are sufficiently substantial to demonstrate Respondent's bad faith and vitiate its claim that its refusal to bargain was lawfully motivated." I find that the Respondent's unlawful conduct at the June 5 meeting was not of such nature as to establish that it lacked a good-faith doubt as to the Production Union's majority status. In addition the subsequent recognition and adoption of a contract with the Knitgoods Union did not reflect backward to establish a lack of good-faith doubt as of June 4 but was rather an additional violation of Section 8(a)(2)." ° I therefore recommend that the Section 8(a)(5) allegations of the complaint be dismissed. iv. the effect of the unfair labor practices upon commerce The activities of the Respondent set forth in section III, above, occurring in connection with the operations of Respondent described in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing such commerce and the free flow thereof. v. the remedy Having found that the Respondent engaged in unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8(a)(1), (2), and (3) of the Act, I shall recommend that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action which will effectuate the policies of the Act. As I have found that Respondent recognized the Knitgoods Union at a time when that Union did not represent an uncoerced majority, I shall recommend that Respondent be ordered to withdraw recognition from the Knitgoods Union and to cease giving effect (except as hereinafter stated) to the collective-bargain ing agreement between the League and the Knitgoods Union. As Respondent has given authority to the League to bargain with the Knitgoods Union on Respondent's behalf, I further recommend that Respondent be ordered to withdraw such authority." "Both the Production Union and the Knitgoods Union engaged in lightening organizational drives each of which lasted less than I day. The employees never had an opportunity to evaluate the relative merits of the two unions. Under the circumstances of this case I believe that justice to the employees would require that the effects of the Respondent's unfair labor practices be dissipated through the Respondent 's compliance with the Recommended Order and that the employees then be permitted to express their preference in an election. "In his brief the General Counsel urges that Respondent be ordered to reimburse employees for dues and other moneys paid by them to 'the Knitgoods Union In the circumstances of this case I do not believe that any remedial purpose would be served by such an order 310 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and upon the entire record in this case, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Respondent is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. The Knitgoods Union and the Production Union are labor organizations within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. By participating in the organizational activities of the Knitgoods Union, by soliciting authorization cards on behalf of the Knitgoods Union, and by recognizing and adopting a contract with the Knitgood s Union at a time when that Union did not represent an uncoerced 'majority of its employees, Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8(aX2) and (1) of the Act. 4. By adopting the aforesaid contract which contained a union-security clause, Respondent also violated Section 8(aX3) and (1) of the Act. 5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 6. Respondent has not engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. Upon the foregoing findings and conclusions and the entire record in the case, I recommend that the Board issue the following: Garment Workers' Union, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive representative of its employees for the purposes of collective bargaining, unless and until said labor organization has been certified by the National Labor Relations Board as the exclusive representative of such employees. (b) Withdraw authorization from the United Knitwear Manufacturers League to represent Sweatermasters Co., Inc., in collective bargaining with Knitgoods Workers' Union, Local 155, International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, AFL-CIO, unless said labor organization is certified as set forth above. (c) Post at its Brooklyn, New York, plant, in both English and Spanish," copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."" Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 29, after being duly signed by an authorized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days therafter , in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered , defaced, or covered by any other material. (d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 29, in writing, within 20 days from the receipt of this Decision, what steps have been taken to comply herewith.18 RECOMMENDED ORDER Sweatermasters Co., Inc., its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Participating in the organizational activities of Knitgoods Workers' Union, Local 155, International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, AFL-CIO, or soliciting employees to sign authorization cards for that labor organization. (b) Recognizing, contracting , or adopting a contract with Knitgoods Workers' Union, Local 155 , International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, AFL-CIO, as the representative of its employees for the purposes of collective bargaining, unless and until said labor organization has been certified by the National Labor Relations Board as the exclusive bargaining representative of such employees. (c) Giving effect to, performing, or in any way enforcing the collective-bargaining agreement between Knitgoods Workers' Union, Local 155, International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, AFL-CIO, and the United Knitwear Manufacturers League, Inc., which Sweatermasters Co., Inc., adopted on July 10, 1968, effective July 17, 1968, or to any modification, extension, renewal, or supplement thereto; provided however that nothing herein shall require Sweatermasters Co., Inc., to vary or abandon any wage, hours, seniority, or other substantive features of its relations with its employees which have been established in the performance of this agreement, or prejudice the assertion by employees of any rights they may have thereunder. (d) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action designed and necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Withdraw and withhold recognition from Knitgoods Workers' Union, Local 155, International Ladies' "The record indicates that a substantial number of Respondent's employees are familiar only with the Spanish language. "In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner " in the notice . In the further event that the Board's Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision and Order." "In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, this provision shall be modified to read - "Notify the Regional Director for Region 19, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith." APPENDIX NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our employees that: The Act gives all employees these rights: To engage in self-organization To form, join, or help unions To bargain collectively through a representative of their own choosing To act together for collective bargaining or other aid or protection and To refrain from any or all of these things WE WILL NOT do anything that interferes with these rights. WE WILL NOT participate in the organizational activities of Knitgoods Workers' Union, Local 155, International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, AFL-CIO, or solicit employees to sign authorization cards for that labor organization. WE WILL NOT recognize, contract, or adopt a contract with Knitgoods Workers' Union, Local 155, SWEATERMASTERS CO., INC. 311 International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, AFL-CIO, as the representative of our employees for the purposes of collective bargaining, unless and until said labor organization has been ' certified by the National Labor Relations Board as the exclusive bargaining representative of such employees. WE WILL NOT give effect to, perform, or in any way enforce the collective -bargaining agreement between Knitgoods Workers' Union, Local 155, International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, AFL-CIO, and the United Knitwear Manufacturers League, Inc., which we adopted on July 10, 1968, effective July 17, 1968, or to any modification , extension , renewal, or supplement thereto; provided however that nothing herein shall require us to vary or abandon any wage , hours, seniority, or other substantive features of our relations with our employees which has been established in the performance of this agreement, or prejudice the assertion by employees of any rights they may have thereunder. WE WILL withdraw and withhold recognition from Knitgoods Workers' Union, Local 155, International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive representative of our employees for the purposes of collective bargaining , unless and until said labor organization has been certified by the National Labor Relations Board as the exclusive representative of such employees. SWEATERMASTERS CO., INC. (Employer) Dated By (Representative) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. If employees have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions they may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, Fourth Floor, 16th Court Street, Brooklyn, New York 11201, Telephone 212-596-5386.