Combustion Engineering, Inc.

332 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD National Tank Company, Division of Combustion Engineering, Inc. and United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO. Case 16-CA-3351 TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE June 3, 1969 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN MCCULI OCH AND MEMBERS JENKINS AND ZAGORIA On March 4. 1969, Trial Examiner Boyd Leedom issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding. finding that the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. The Trial Examiner also found that the Respondent had not engaged in certain other alleged unfair labor practices and recommended dismissal of those allegations of the complaint. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision and a supporting brief. The General Counsel filed a Reply Brief to the Respondent's exceptions. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the Act. the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in this case, and hereby adopts the findings,' conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board hereby adopts as its Order the Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner, and orders that the Respondent, National Tank Company, Division of Combustion Engineering, Inc., Tulsa, Oklahoma, its officers, agents. successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that those portions of the complaint as to which no violations have been found be, and they hereby are, dismissed. 'The Respondent excepts to the Trial Examiner's credibility findings. It is the Board's established policy not to overrule a Trial Examiner's resolutions with respect to credibility unless, as is not the case here, the clear preponderance of all the relevant evidence in the case convinces us that the resolutions are incorrect. Standard Dry Waft Products, Inc., 91 NLRB 544, enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (C.A. 3). Accordingly, we find no reason to disturb the Trial Examiner's credibility findings in this case. BOYD LEEDOM, Trial Examiner: This case was tried in Tulsa, Oklahoma, on September 24 and 25, 1968, pursuant to a complaint dated July 31 based on a charge filed June 14, 1968, in behalf of the Union named above. The complaint alleges that Respondent through certain interrogations, threats and promises and the discriminatory assignments and finally three discharges of its employees violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act as amended. In its answer to the complaint Respondent denied the allegations. The issues raised by the pleadings are whether certain of the acts alleged actually took place and as to those acts that did take place, such as the discharges, whether they constituted violations as charged. On the basis of the complete record of evidence, the demeanor of the witnesses as I observed them on the witness stand and the briefs filed herein, I have determined that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act as hereinafter specified in the following: FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. THE EMPLOYER AND THE LABOR ORGANIZATION Jurisdiction I find and conclude that the allegations of the complaint as to the nature and extent of the business carried on by Respondent are true and conclude therefrom that Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act. I also find and conclude that United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of the Act. As to these matters there is no dispute. II. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The 8(ayl) Violations Respondent hires over 1,000 employees in the fabrication of oil and gas field equipment. In March, 1968 the United Steelworkers of America began a campaign to organize Respondent's employees. The complaint alleges numerous instances of unlawful interrogation, threats, and promises by various supervisory personnel. In connection with all of the violations hereinafter found no question was raised by Respondent as to the supervisory status of the person making the alleged unlawful statements; and I find and conclude from all of the evidence that in each instance the person making the statement was a supervisor. Doyle Culp was foreman of welding bay 7. Charles E. Busse was a welder, working under Culp's supervision, who as I hereinafter determine, was unlawfully discharged by Culp because of the employee's union activity. The record reveals intermittent periods of friction between the supervisor and this employee throughout most of the employment that lasted for about 18 months. Some of the disagreement was probably due to a tendency on the part of Busse to take it easy on the job and to assume that the supervisor was discriminating against him. The representation election, which the Union won, was held on May 29, 1968. The record reveals that Culp and 176 NLRB No. 39 NATIONAL TANK CO. other foremen and supervisors opposed the Union and advised certain of the employees of their opposition. Busse testified and I find that Culp came to him 2 or 3 days before the election and told him that "There's going to be heads roll after this election regardless of how it goes. . . I don't give a damn whether the Union gets in or not. There's going to be a lot of people out here looking for jobs after this is all over with. You can mark my word on that." Culp denied having made such statement. I discredit his denial however for several reasons. First, some of his testimony seems unreasonable: his statement that Busse's lack of a helper "absolutely" did not account for the length of time it took him to build a fire tube. The lack of a helper must have been a factor in the overall time taken in the fabrication. And in the light of the whole record, including Culp's own admission that he talked to some employees about the union , his answer "Absolutely not" to the question whether he ever had a conversation about it with Busse , was wholly unrealistic. Second, the brevity of Culp's denial of the "heads will roll" statement - almost a "denial in passing" type statement - seemed to be made without real conviction. And third, and perhaps most importantly, Busse's testimony as to the detail of the words used by Culp, and the manner in which Busse testified "that heads would roll" simply seemed much more reasonable and persuasive. Furthermore Culp denied having told another employee, Paul Dean Gough, that he ever told Gough the Company would like to fire certain employees, including Busse . Gough had testified that Culp asked him what he thought about the Union, and stated that the Company" . . . didn't want to sign a contract"; also that there were people that the Company didn't want to keep on and would likely fire them, naming Busse and others. Gough's testimony, involving as it did a reference to a statement by Culp, that transfers rather than discharges might be involved, seemed entirely credible and actually in conformity with transfers made prior to two ultimate discharges. These statements made by Culp to Busse and to Gough clearly violate Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. I also find and conclude that a few days before the election Culp told another employee, Vernon Buttress that when the election was over they were going to have to shape up around the plant and that management would be making some changes, that there would be rules and regulations to go by. Culp did not deny making this statement but rather testified that he did not recall it but would not say that he did not make the statement to Buttress. There is no reason to question the veracity of Buttress' testimony and it is credited. Clearly this statement to Buttress in a context of a discussion about the Union, was threatening, and I find, and conclude in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. John Parks was a supervisor in the sand blasting department. Employee Calvin Boswell testified that Parks, his foreman, spoke to him often about the Union beginning about 3 weeks before the representation election. Some of these conversations respecting the Union occurred in the foreman's office, with other employees present. Boswell testified that in such a conversation with Parks, about 2 weeks before the election, Parks asked Boswell to give him some of the reasons why he thought the Union would help the Company and the employees. Parks then stated that if the Union was voted in things around the plant would be different, - the loafing would stop, and the work would pick up. Parks said he would see to it that the employees stayed busy most of the time, 333 - all of the time, - if the Union was voted in, also that if the Union were selected as the employees' representative it would be impossible for a contract to be entered into for at least a year and that during this time there would be no wage increases and more than likely no Christmas bonus at all. Boswell also testified that on another occasion at a neighboring grocery store where it was common for the employees to go after work and drink beer, John Parks said he had picked Boswell for a leadmans job and that if Parks would quit pushing the Union so much he would make Boswell a leadman "when this was all settled." Boswell testified he indicated he really wasn't interested in the job, because it paid only 21 or 22 cents more an hour than he was making, and that considerably more was required of a leadman. Parks, called as a witness in behalf of Respondent, testified at the outset that he had never asked any of the employees what their feelings were about the Union. Even according to his own later testimony respecting his conversations with some of the employees, his denial that he ever sought to ascertain their feelings, becomes incredible. When asked specifically as to whether he had ever told any employee that if the Union won the election there would be no more loafing, he would not categorically deny having made such statement but rather gave a somewhat lengthy explanation culminating in his statement, which his preliminary explanation seemed to justify to him, that they would have to change their ways and " . . go to work, because at this time it seemed that these men were not putting out what they had previously and that their work had slowed down." His explanation which he rested on the Union's motto, " .. . an honest day's work for an honest day's pay" seemed from his testimony also to serve as self-justification for the statement charged against him that there would be no wage increases. Thus he testified that he felt for "a wage increase they would have to do more work." In additional testimony he seemed to admit by implication that he had said there would be no wage increases, explaining that in a previous election, before Respondent had instituted automatic wage increases, the wages were frozen prior to the earlier election. The only reasonable interpretation of his explanation is that he had told the employees respecting the current election that because of the precedent of no increases at the earlier election, the same rule would apply now and there would be no increases at least not until the contract was made; then, he explained, he had misinterpreted the situation and had been so advised by his superior and that he sought to correct the current misinformation he had previously given the employees. The testimony of the employee Boswell was forthright insofar as I could ascertain from his demeanor, and in substance was reasonable. I therefore credit it over the somewhat involved testimony of Supervisor Parks which in the final analysis was not so much a denial as it was an effort to justify the statements charged against him, but which, on the surface, was given as a denial. Parks made a categorical denial that he ever offered a leadmans job to Boswell. Because however of the lack of directness of the whole body of his testimony, its resulting evasiveness and the persuasiveness of Boswell's testimony, I credit Boswell and discredit Parks. Consequently I find and conclude that Parks did tell Boswell and other employees that, if the Union came in, working conditions would change, that is that there would be less loafing and more hard work, that wage increases would be slow in coming, that the Company would be reluctant to sign a collective-bargaining agreement; and that there would 334 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD likely be no Christmas bonus at all (weakening his denial by adding the company had never guaranteed such bonus any way); furthermore that he promised a leadman's job to Boswell if Boswell would let up in his support of the Union . The latter statement is a clear promise of reward for not supporting the Union , and the statements first mentioned are threats of reprisal for continued support, all in violation of Section 8(axl) of the Act. Tony Loretta was a foreman in welding bay 10, where many if not all employees learning a welder 's skill were started out. Carl Oldham , a welder's helper working for Loretta, testified that after the election the foreman told the employees in his bay that the coffee break would be cut from 15 to 10 minutes , and did thereafter reduce the nonworking time accordingly . Loretta did not testify and so there is no direct refutation of the statement attributed to him by Oldham . Respondent did however call Robert W. Greenwood, one of three assistants to the plant superintendent, as a witness. Among other things Greenwood testified in effect that there was never a hard and fast rule about the time allowed for a coffee break, but that in Loretta's bay there was a tendency for the employees to abuse the privilege , taking sometimes more than one break in the morning and often excessive time; that he "went by there " and told the employees to try to hold it down to 10 minutes, that management couldn't tolerate so much abuse ; and that this effort to correct the practice, coming soon after the election, was like other previous attempts made to eliminate abuse of the custom of coffee drinking that had grown up among the employees. In view however of the whole body of testimony, revealing as it does (according to my findings and conclusions) not only coercive opposition to the Union prior to the election, but certain other acts of retaliation afterward, I find and conclude that this change in the practice relative to the coffee break was made in retaliation for the employees' support of the Union, and therefore in violation of Section 8(a)(l) of the Act. The testimony of the employee Richard Fisher supports this finding. He said on the witness stand that right after the election Loretta, the witness' foreman at the time, told the employees that Greenwood had requested that he tell all the employees in his bay that the coffeebreak would be cut from 15 minutes to 10 minutes. The testimony of the employees in this connection , all intrinsically related to the results of the election , is more persuasive than the conclusary testimony of the supervisory personnel that the privilege was being abused . Even according to the latter's testimony a 15-minute break was deemed acceptable practice prior to the election; but the corrective action applied did not limit it to 15 minutes but imposed a 5-minute reduction to 10 minutes , - action hardly accountable under any theory other than as retaliation. Fisher also testified that Loretta, both before and after the election, interrogated him concerning his interest in the Union. Against the background of the conduct of Loretta and other supervisors, much of which violated the Act, I find that this interrogation of Fisher also violated Section 8(a)(l) of the Act. Inasmuch as Loretta did not testify, there is no refutation of Fisher's testimony and he seemed to be a credible witness in all respects. Another allegation of violation of Section 8(a)(1) by Tony Loretta is not supported by the evidence . It relates to testimony of the employee Carl Oldham who clearly was convinced that Loretta was engaging in harassment of Oldham and other employees because of their union activity. As to the one most significant incident in this connection, Oldham testified he copied into his "little notebook" Loretta's statement that he would fire the next man who came down to the work area of Oldham and Carl Fisher. Oldham's testimony however, relates the foreman 's attitude to union activity so uncertainly, if at all, that it is not deemed adequate support for a finding of violation of the Act. I do find and conclude however from the testimony of Fisher that Foreman Loretta did violate Section 8(a)(1) of the Act in another incident. Fisher testified, and I find, that soon after Fisher and some 20 or 25 other employees had signed a letter directed to Loretta complaining of his conduct toward the employees because of their union activity, Loretta came to Fisher and Carl Oldham, where they were working, and told them that Union or no Union they could be fired and that he was going to quit popping off and "just start firing people ." This constitutes a clear threat of reprisal for the employees' support of the Union. It is noted again that inasmuch as Loretta was not called to testify, there is no refutation of this testimony of the employee. The employee Charles E . Busse testified that in one of several trips he made to the office of then Plant Manager Jack Godwin to complain about the way he was treated by his Foreman Doyle Culp, Godwin invited him into the office to talk about the Union. There he was asked by Godwin what it was that the Union was offering to make things better, how many men were supporting the Union, and stated that the Union would not do any good but only take money out of the employees ' pockets once a month. While Godwin took the stand to testify respecting Busse's work record , more specifically his absenteeism and his attitude toward his foreman , all of which was related to his subsequent discharge, Godwin did not deny that he made the inquiries respecting the Union , attributed to him by Busse . Against the established background of management interference with the employees Section 7 rights I find these interrogations and comments by Godwin to be in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Other allegations of independent violation of Section 8(axl) relate to interrogations by supervisory personnel somewhat like those heretofore found to constitute violations. Some of these allegations appear to be supported by the evidence but are of such nature as to add nothing to the remedy in the case , and such as hardly justify extending this decision . The issues raised by these allegations are therefore not here resolved. B. The 8(aX3) Violations I find and conclude for all of the reasons hereinafter set forth that Respondent discharged Charles E . Busse, Carl Oldham, and Alfred Rice because of their support of the Union , all in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. All three employees were ardent supporters of the Union both before and after the representation election ; and according to the record of evidence were well known as such throughout the plant . From such evidence (concerning which there is no real dispute ) I find and conclude that the Company had knowledge of these employees' union activity at the time of their unlawful discharges. 1. Alfred Rice The evidence fails to disclose any substantial lawful reason, whatever, for the discharge of Alfred Rice. He was fired suddenly the morning after the discharge of NATIONAL TANK CO. Charles Busse . Having learned of Busse's discharge the evening of the day it occurred as they left work, Rice and Oldham made plans to call on Busse's foreman, Culp, to discuss Busse's discharge before reporting for work the next morning. Accordingly they went to the foreman's office and Oldham asked if Culp would step outside to talk to him. Then ensued a conversation between Oldham and Culp about the discharge the night before. The discrepancies in the versions of the two participants as to the conversation, according to their testimony, are slight and not of substantial legal significance . According to both it was a heated discussion which Oldham opened with either a question or a statement indicating that Busse had been fired because of his union activity. The evidence indicates that Culp then either gave a reason for firing Busse or asked if Oldham was threatening him. As Culp turned and moved back toward the office door he responded to the charge that Busse had been fired for union activity by saying he didn't give a damn what Oldham thought; and Oldham made the statement, according to his own testimony, that Culp should be glad that it wasn't Oldham he fired. It was likely at this point Culp asked whether this constituted a threat. Oldham answered that it wasn't but that he just wouldn't have taken the kind of treatment Busse got when he was fired, interspersing his words with a vulgar expletive. Thus the conversation ended; Culp returned to his office and the two employees went to work . Both were fired in a matter of minutes after the incident had been reported by Culp to his superiors. Throughout the conversation Rice said not a word. Culp's reference to Rice in his testimony about this incident was that Rice merely stood some short distance away and sneered at him. In the brief, Respondent simply argues (as to Rice) that "Oldham and Rice were discharged after they literally accosted Supervisor Culp in an insolent and insubordinate manner." By this statement Respondent seeks to involve Rice in complicity with Oldham whose conduct, it is argued, was such that his discharge was unlawful. Respondent, however, cites no authority and none is known , that holds one employee guilty of insubordination by reason of his mere presence (as here) when another employee engages in insubordinate language with a superior. And if there were any such theory the insubordination of the passive bystander would of course depend on actual insubordination on the part of his fellow employee. Inasmuch, as hereinafter appears, the authorities do not support Respondent 's contention that it was justified in discharging Oldham for insubordination, it follows the summary discharge of Rice was not justified for two reasons, first that he could not be held responsible for Oldham's language ; and second that Oldham's language was not in itself insubordinate . Thus it follows that the discharge of Rice was not for just cause and therefore cannot be accounted for on any ground excepting retaliation for his union activity. This I find and conclude was the reason he was discharged , in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. Not only was the Rice discharge unlawful but it tends to bring into focus the unlawful intention in the two other discharges involved, those of Busse and Oldham , in neither of which is the unlawful intention quite so clear as in the case of Rice. 2. Oldham 335 Carl Oldham was admittedly a strong supporter of the Union in its effort to organize Respondent's employees. He was in fact a zealot , so enthusiastic and aggressive in his efforts to win the election for the Union, that the evidence respecting his conduct clearly justifies the inference that he was a thorn in the side of management, - to management clearly offensive in much that he did. It is of course the law that an excess of exuberance combined with total commitment to the principal of collective bargaining can carry an employee beyond the law's protection of his right to engage in concerted action with other employees for their own good. Respondent's management decided that Oldham had reached such point of excess when he called on Foreman Culp to reprimand him for firing Busse; for Culp's discharge of both Oldham and Rice had at least the silent blessing of the plant superintendent. Respondent argues and seeks to cite authority for the proposition that Oldham had gone beyond the limit of protected activity. Counsel for the General Counsel on the other hand, cites authority which in his opinion holds that Oldham's conduct was protected. By most any standard Oldham had made a nuisance of himself throughout the organizational campaign. Not all nuisances however are unlawful; and as hereinafter appears I find that the authorities cited by counsel for the General Counsel are more apposite in the circumstances of this case than the authorities cited by Respondent. Under the decisions of the Board Oldham's conduct (and Rice's too of course) seems to be protected activity. See Hugh H. Wilson Corporation, 171 NLRB No. 145; Falcon Plastics, etc., 164 NLRB No. 101; and Thor Power Tool Co., 148 NLRB 1379. In all probability Oldham's hostility the morning of his encounter with Culp was due in part to the fact that he had been transferred 2 days before to a task more arduous and less desirable than the work involved in his regular classification of welder's helper. The day before Oldham was transferred to the bolted tank division, where he was put to work loading tanks into box cars, he had written and delivered a letter to his own foreman Tony Loretta, that was critical of Loretta's "harassment" of the employees. I find and conclude that the transfer from the welding bay to bolted tanks was discriminatory and made in retaliation for, and to discourage, his support of the Union. While it was not uncommon for Respondent to transfer an employee from one department to another, as revealed by Respondent's Exhibit 1, it is clear that usually such transfer was made to a department or part of the operation requiring extra help, and at the request of the foreman of the department where the help was needed. The timing of the transfer of Oldham, following so closely the delivery of the letter to Loretta, makes the reason for his transfer suspect, especially against the background of the friction that had grown up between Loretta and Oldham over the Union; and the fact that the foreman of the bolted tank division did not even know that Oldham was being sent to him, preponderates in favor of the finding and conclusion that the assignment was discriminatory and in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. Oldham's testimony, which I credit, to the effect that the foreman at bolted tanks did not ask for him, did not even know that he was being assigned there for work, but that he would nevertheless find something for him to do, is not refuted. This foreman was not called to testify. 336 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 3 Charles E. Busse I think it fair to say that the evidence as a whole reveals that at certain times at, least during his employment with Respondent , Busse's record was not the best. Specifically the record reveals his absenteeism was high and he was admonished about it in February of 1968, prior to the instigation of the Union 's campaign in the plant. Busse had, however, worked to the top classification of welder and had been given a succession of pay increases . This record of promotions, indicating a reasonably satisfactory record at least prior to the difficulties growing out of the Union campaign, plus the circumstances of the discharge hereafter discussed, lead to the conclusion that the discharge was actually discriminatory. I have already indicated that Culp's testimony - to the effect that Busse's lack of a helper would have nothing to do with his rate of production, was not impressive. On the other hand Busse 's recital of the difficulties under which he worked without a helper seems to make it quite clear that his production rate would have been appreciably better if he had a helper to perform the helper's tasks he enumerated. Thus the evidence adduced in behalf of Respondent to establish a record of poor production, or that Busse was a poor worker , as a factor in his discharge, loses much force. In addition to this, the reason stated as the immediate cause for Busse's discharge , that is that he quit early on the day of the discharge, is hardly a reasonable ground . The testimony of Busse and of Culp, the two principals involved in the discharge, leaves one in doubt as to whether Busse actually quit productive work any earlier than he should have , allowing for usual clean up time at the end of the day. Another telling circumstance in the evidence respecting the discharge of Busse, is his testimony as to his conversation with the plant superintendent. His testimony stands unrefuted that when he went to the plant superintendent to advise him that Foreman Culp had fired him, the plant superintendent said that he knew nothing about it but that "there are things going on right now that don't look right to me in this plant, but there is nothing I can do about it. I have got to stand behind what my foremen say." Not only was the plant superintendent not called to testify, leaving the Busse testimony in this respect not in dispute as stated , but Busse's story from which the foregoing is an excerpt, was impressive and I credit it. Culp's statement to Gough, heretofore mentioned, that Respondent did not want to keep on certain employees, including Busse, also damages Respondent's defense. I cannot find substantial support in the evidence for Respondent's contention that it fired Busse for justifiable cause . On the contrary I find by a preponderance of the evidence that the discharge was discriminatory and in violation of Section 8(a)(3) as herembefore stated 4. The Fisher allegations I find that the proof adduced by counsel for the General Counsel in support of the allegations of the complaint that employee Richard Fisher was discriminatorily assigned to more arduous and less agreeable tasks, and was denied a half day's pay by being forced to punch out his timecard prematurely, is not sufficiently substantial to support these allegations; and therefore recommend that the complaint as to these allegations be dismissed. III. THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices, I shall recommend that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative actions more fully set forth in the recommended order that follows, including the posting of an appropriate notice, to effectuate the policies of the Act. In view of the nature of the Respondent's unlawful conduct and its underlying purpose and tendency, I find that the unfair labor practices found are persuasively related to other unfair labor practices proscribed and the danger of their commission in the future is to be anticipated in the course of Respondent's conduct as revealed in the instant case. N.L.R.B. v. Express Publishing Company, 312 U.S. 426, 437; N.L.R.B. v. Entwistle Mfg. Co., 120 F.2d 532, 536 (C.A. 4). In order therefore to make effective the interdependent guarantees of Section 7, I shall recommend that the Respondent cease and desist from infringing in any manner upon the rights guaranteed in said section. Where unlawful discrimination has been found against any employee he shall be made whole for any loss of pay suffered by reason of the discrimination against him, by payment of a sum of money equal to the amount he would normally have earned as wages from the date on which his employement was terminated by Respondent to the date on which Respondent shall offer him proper reinstatement as herein provided, less his interim net earnings, to be computed on a quarterly basis in a manner set forth in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289. Interest on backpay shall be computed in the manner set forth in Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., Inc. 138 NLRB 716. RECOMMENDED ORDER Upon the entire record in this case and the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, I recommend that National Tank Company, Division of Combustion Engineering, Inc., its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Discharging , transferring to more arduous and less desirable tasks, or otherwise discriminating against employees in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment in order to discourage membership in United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO or any other labor organization. (b) Interrogating any employee concerning activity in respect to union organization by him or other employees in a manner constituting a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended. (c) Threatening employees with discharge or other reprisals if they become or remain members of the Union or give any assistance or support to it. (d) Promising any employees with a promotion or other reward if they will cease or refuse to become members of the Union or give any assistance or support to it. (e) Altering working conditions or imposing rules for the purpose of defeating or discouraging the organizational efforts of its employees, or in retaliation for their support of the Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO. (f) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist United NATIONAL TANK CO. 337 Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization , to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing , and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or mutual aid or protection , and to refrain from any or all such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as authorized by Section 8(a)(3) of said Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action which the Board finds will effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Offer to the employees Charles E. Busse, Carl Oldham , and Alfred Rice reinstatement to positions in their former or substantially equivalent classifications, without prejudice to their seniority and other rights and privileges previously enjoyed ; and to make each such employee whole for any loss he may have suffered by reason of the Respondent's discrimination against him in the manner described in "The Remedy " section of this Decision. (b) Notify employees Busse , Oldham, and Rice, if presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United States of their right to full reinstatement upon application in accordance with the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Training and Service Act as amended, after discharge from the Armed Services. (c) Preserve and, upon request , make available to the Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all payroll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other records necessary to analyze the amounts of backpay due and the rights of employment under the terms of this Order. (d) Post at its plant in Tulsa , Oklahoma, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix ."' Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director of Region 16, after being signed by a duly authorized representative , shall be posted by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by it to insure that such notices are not altered , defaced or covered by any material. (e) Notify the Regional Director for Region 16, in writing, within 20 days from the receipt of this Decision, what steps have been taken to comply herewith.' APPENDIX NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended we hereby notify our employees that: WE WILL NOT coercively interrogate our employees regarding their, or other employees' activities or sympathies for or against any union. WE WILL NOT fire any employee or transfer him to more arduous or less desirable tasks, or treat him differently in any way because he joins or favors the United Steel Workers of America, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization. WE WILL NOT threaten to change working conditions or impose rules and regulations, or actually change, or impose them, unlawfully because you joined or supported or shall continue to support, a union. WE WILL NOT promise any employee a promotion or any other reward for not supporting or joining the Union, nor will we threaten to discharge any employee, or make any other threats, because he supports or joins the Union. WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights to self organization, to form, join, or assist United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or mutual aid or protection, and to refrain from any or all such activities (except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in the labor organization as authorized by Section 8(a)(3) of said act.) WE WILL offer Charles E. Busse, Carl Oldham and Alfred Rice their old jobs back because we violated the law when we fired them and we will give them backpay, with seniority and all their other rights, as required by the law. All our employees are free to become or remain members of the Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO or any other labor organization. In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner " in the notice. In the further event that the Board's Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court,of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision and Order." 'In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, this provision shall be modified to read : "Notify said Regional Director, in writing within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith." Dated By NATIONAL TANK COMPANY, DIVISION OF COMBUSTION ENGINEERING, INC. (Employer) (Representative) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. If employees have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions, they may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, 8A24 Federal Office Building, 819 Taylor Street, Fort Worth, Texas, Telephone 817-334-3921.