Rea Trucking Co., Inc.

520 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Rea Trucking Company, Inc. and General Teamsters, Warehousemen and Cannery Workers Local Union 556, affiliated with International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of America, Independent and Rea Trucking Company, Inc., Shop Grievance Committee. Case 19-CA-3930 June 10, 1969 DECISION AND ORDER BY MEMBERS FANNING, BROWN, AND JENKINS On February 19, 1969, Trial Examiner William E. Spencer issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had engaged in certain unfair labor practices within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended , and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner' s. Decision. The Trial Examiner also found that the'Respondent had not engaged in certain other alleged unfair labor practices and recommended dismissal of these allegations . Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision and a supporting brief, and the General Counsel filed a brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and the briefs, and the entire record in this case , and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner, and hereby orders that the Respondent, Rea Trucking Company, Inc., Touchet, Washington, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order. February 8 and March 22, 1968, by the Union herein, the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board, the latter hereinafter called the Board, issued his complaint dated April 4, 1968, alleging in substance that the Respondent herein discharged some twenty of its employees in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, hereinafter called the Act; initiated the formation and dominated the functioning of a grievance committee in violation of Section 8(aX2) of the Act; by these, and numerous statements and acts, violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Respondent in its duly filed answer denied having engaged in any of the alleged unlawful acts. Pursuant to due notice, a hearing on the aforesaid complaint was held before me in Walla Walla, Washington, on June 6, 7, and 18, 1968, with all parties represented and participating. Upon the entire record in the case, my observation of the witnesses, and consideration of the briefs filed with me by each of the parties respectively, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. THE RESPONDENTS BUSINESS Respondent, a Washington corporation, is engaged at Touchet, Washington, in the manufacture of truck trailers. It annually received in excess of $50,000 from sale of trailers to customers located outside the State of Washington. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED General Teamsters, Warehousemen and Cannery Workers Local Union 556, affiliated with International Brotherhood of Teamsters , Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of America, Independent , herein called the Union, is a labor organization within the meaning of the Act. III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Interference, Restraint, Coercion 1. Organizational activity The Union began its organizational efforts among Respondent's employees in November 1967. On November 30, the Union petitioned for a Board election. The election, based on a consent agreement, was held on January 31. The Union was chosen bargaining representative by a majority of those voting. 2. The issues Numerous alleged coercive statements and coercive acts and conduct by the Respondent; Respondent's alleged assistance to and control of a "grievance committee" in violation of Section 8(a)(2) of the Act; and some twenty alleged discriminatory discharges, some occuring singly, some in groups. TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE WILLIAM E. SPENCER, Trial Examiner: Pursuant to an original charge and an amended charge filed respectively 3. Respondent's knowledge of union activities and of the identity of employees engaging therein It is firmly established that Respondent had knowledge of its employees organizational activities from the start. Employee Wilbur Knapp presented an authorization card 176 NLRB No. 67 REA TRUCKING CO., INC. 521 to Truck Foreman Buster Katsel, who rejected it with suggestions as to that part of the human anatomy where it might properly be interred. Respondent's vice president, John Rea, Jr., suggested that employee Arnold Chenoweth "talk to the men and talk them out of this union thing." He also told Chenoweth that if the plant went union his father would lock the doors. On or before December 6, the Respondent was in possession of the Board's letter advising Respondent of the filing of the Union's election petition. This letter was read to the employees at a meeting called by John H. Rea, Sr., Respondent's president, on December 6. 4. The December 6 and 12 meetings issued the threat that the three employees, as instigators of the Union, had better start looking for another job, that regardless of the outcome of the scheduled election their employment would be terminated and all he would need would be an excuse for their discharge.' Following his meeting with the three employees, Rea had all the employees assembled in the lunchroom, where he singled out several of them for questioning concerning their interest in the Union, among them Jerry Noblin and Knapp; said Knapp was poorly qualified to lead the men in organizational activities and would not long be working for Respondent because of his union involvements. Also, according to the General Counsel's witnesses, there was a considerable repetition of statements made by Rea, Sr., in the December 6 meeting. The meeting of December 6 was opened with a financial report of Respondent's office manager, William Martin, tending to show that Respondent was losing money.' During the meeting, Rea, Sr., announced that no more overtime would be allowed. Overtime was in fact thereafter discontinued. Rea testified that this announcement was made in the context of Martin's statement showing financial loss.' It is established, however, in the credible testimony of several witnesses, that during this same meeting, Rea read the letter announcing the filing of the Union's petition; suggested that employees take a straw vote to determine whether a majority wanted union representation - no such vote was taken; asked why the employees wanted a union, and when certain employees in answering referred to better wages, paid holidays, health insurance and the like, stated that Respondent would not pay an employee for any day that he did not work, nor would it pay his medical bills, and that he would lock the doors or sell the business rather than deal with the Union. He further stated that by refusing to bargain he would force the Union to strike, and that he, Rea, an expert marksman, would shoot the first picket who stepped on company property. In this last statement he referred a labor dispute at some other location and damage suffered to his equipment as a result of that dispute. Rea met with the employees a second time on December 12. Apparently, the December 6 meeting was the first that he had ever held with employees. Prior to the meeting of December 12, he summoned Employee Chenoweth to his office and told him, according to Chenoweth's credited testimony, that he knew Chenoweth was one of the instigators of the Union; asked Chenoweth to name four other employees involved with him in the organizational effort, and when Chenoweth refused, directed him to summon Wilbur Knapp and Lance Slack. When the three employees were in his office, Rea questioned them on why they wanted the Union to represent them, stated that he would not pay for health insurance or holidays, and that the employees would receive lower wages if they chose the Union. He then N 'Respondent would not stipulate that Martin was a supervisor within the meaning of the Act. He became office manager in October 1967, and on numerous occasions served as Respondent's spokesman in dealing with employees I find that in matters material to the issues herein he acted as Respondent's agent and that the employees would reasonably regard him as representing Respondent. 'Rea testified that he discussed the matter of overtime as an economic factor, unrelated to the Union ; that overtime had already been cut down "gradually" since July I; that because of excessive costs in relation to selling prices, he told the employees that there were three alternatives "to go out of business , get more production out of the fellows . . . or cut our crew back to a small volume." 5. Other alleged antiunion statements It was Employee George Elwell's credited testimony that on about December 6, after overtime had been stopped, he told Rea, Jr., that he was not making enough in wages on a 40-hour week, to which Rea replied, "You guys should take Bill Knapp out and nutted [sic] him for bringing the Union in. Don't blame me." Office Manager Martin twice interrogated Frank Moss on how he would vote in the election, and said if the employees chose the Union everyone would be out a job and Rea, Sr., would close down the business. 6. Concluding findings on alleged coercive statements and conduct The findings above are based on a composite view of credible testimony of the several witnesses for the General Counsel, whose testimony while differing in details, repetitive to a degree, and at times somewhat confused in such matters as dates, was on the whole, and in material respects, mutually corroborative. No reliance has been placed on testimony that I considered of doubtful credibility. Rea, Sr., without specifically denying many of the antiunion statements attributed to him, gave a different version of the two meetings he had with employees in December, but even if his explanations were credited in full there would remain enough of uncontradicted testimony to establish his strong antiunion bias, interrogations of employees under coercive circumstances, and threats of retaliatory actions in the event the employees chose union representation. His testimony that his announcement of overtime was unrelated to the employees' organizaional activities, was hardly credible considering the entire context of his remarks in which the announcement was made, and his threat to shoot the first picketing employee who set foot on his property was both gratuitous and coercive in view of his prior statements that by refusing to bargain with the Union he would force it to strike. His explanation of the threat of discharge made during his interview with Chenoweth, Knapp, and Slack, I find unacceptable because the thrust of the entire interview was to interrogate these employees concerning their union activities and to express his resistance to union demands. In such a context his threat of discharge would reasonably be construed as having its base in their union affiliation, 'Rea admitted that his meeting with the three employees occurred, that he questioned them about the Union, and that at the end of the meeting he told them that if they did not get their production up they might just as well look for another job. 522 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD whether or not it was as pointed and emphatic as it would appear to have been in the testimony of the three employee witnesses. The threats to close the plant rather than deal with the Union, made by both himself and subordinates, harkens back to an earlier day in labor relations when there was little novelty in this type of employer reaction to his employees' organizational activities . In all, we have in Respondent's statements and conduct the grossest sort of interference with its employees' right to organize. Independently of the discharges, such statements and conduct are flagrantly violative of Section 8(axl) of the Act, and it is so found. 7. The incentive pay increases On January 12, 1968, only a little more than 2 weeks prior to the election of January 31, the Respondent announced to its employees that it was instituting an incentive pay program, by which a 20-cents-an-hour bonus to be increased as the number of hours to construct a trailer decreased, would be paid employees . This increase, without parallel in Respondent's history , under other circumstances may well have been viewed as economically motivated, but when it is viewed in the light of layoffs occurring on February 1 and thereafter, and Respondent's open hostility to its employees' organizing activities, its timing can only be seen as still another effort by Respondent to influence the results of the forthcoming election . Accordingly , it is found that the granting of the increases was violative of Section 8(aXl) of the Act. Promise of benefits and threats of reprisal are, under the decisions, equally coercive. 8. Alleged 8(a)(2) At the December 6 meeting, after questioning his employees on their reasons for wanting a union , Rea, Sr., suggested the formation of a "grievance committee"; called for nominations for places on such a committee; and with the nominees out of the room , in the presence of Rea, Sr., Martin, and Katsel , the employees elected Chenoweth and Jack Gawith, with George Elwell as alternate, to constitute a committee to represent employees in presenting grievances to management. Rea, Sr., directed the employees to channel all complaints to him through this committee. The Committee thus constituted met twice with Rea, Sr., and at these meetings discussed a heating problem and the matter of overtime pay- It is obvious, I think, that Rea, Sr., proposed the formation of this committee as a substitute for union representation and that under the conditions attending its formation it was incapable of functioning as a bona fide labor organization . The fact is, however, that it had no constitution , no bylaws, and that after the meetings it ceased to function . The probabilities of its revival as a labor organization are so remote that I do not deem a disestablishment order justified . In fact, I am unable to consider that in its brief existence it ever functioned as a labor organization . However, Rea's action with respect to it was an unlawful interference with his employees' organizational rights and a restraint upon those rights. I shall accordingly find an 8(aXl ) violation, while recommending dismissal of the alleged 8(aX2). B. The Discharges 1. Richard Angell Beginning with May 29, 1967, Angell was employed by the Respondent as a draftsman, a fulltime employee until the fall college term began, and thereafter until he was discharged about December 16 on a part-time basis. In June, according to Angell, he asked Martin what he thought would happen if the plant was organized and Martin said Rea, Sr., would close it. Angell at that time expressed the opinion that a union might be a good thing for the employees. It is by no means clear, however, that Martin at that time occupied a supervisory position. Rea, Sr., testified that Angell was employed as "summer help" but following Respondent's practice of helping its student employees, was kept on for part-time work, with the understanding that he would keep regular hours. In late November, a dispute arose between Angell and Rea, Jr., about his keeping regular hours and Rea, Jr., told him that he was discharged. Due to the intervention of Rea, Sr., he was kept on and there appears to have been no further question about the regularity of his working hours. Admittedly, however, there was friction between Angell and Martin over the preparation of a parts book. To resolve their differences, Angell went to Rea, Sr., and the upshot was that Rea, Sr., told him that if he could not work out his differences with Martin satisfactorily one of them would have to go. On the morning following this conversation Rea, Sr., discharged Angell. This was a few days after the December 12 meeting of Rea, Sr., with his employees. Angell testified that on the occasion of his discharge, Rea, Sr., referred to him as a "trouble maker" and said that he should never have let him and Knapp come back. There is no evidence that Angell ever affiliated with the Union, and the only testimony elicited from him on direct examination relating to a union was the conversation he had with Martin in June 1967. On redirect, however, he testified that he had numerous conversations of like nature with Martin. His characterization of these conversations was that "they were just friendly and across the board, sort of. ." Concerning the only conversations he had about the Union with Martin after the latter became office manager, he testified: We talked about what people in the shop were saying about the union , what I had heard and what he heard to a certain extent. I didn't reveal any names. I just said what they wanted, benefits and things like this, and I remember talking to him about they wanted paid holidays and asking him it won't be so bad if John would go along with some paid holidays, meaning John Rea, Sr. He said that would never happen. And we talked about the things that had happened in the meetings. And this was just over the board, an exchange of opinions like it had been before. Any discharges involving employees known to Rea as favoring the Union , occurring after Rea's remarks to his employees at the December meetings, require careful though objective scrutiny, but there is enough substance to Angell's friction with Martin over the parts book that I find it as reasonable to believe that it was this which precipitated his discharge as to attribute it to his union activities, which as far as we know, consisted entirely of what he described as a friendly give-and-take of opinion with Martin. It is not even certain that he would have been included in the voting unit. If it was Rea's intention to get rid of the most active of the union adherents - and REA TRUCKING CO., INC. 523 there is good reason in his own statements to believe that he would undertake this - there still would remain a doubt as to why he would single out part-time employee Angell . Knapp's testimony that Martin said Angell was discharged for his union activity was not very convincing in view of his placing the alleged statement on a date prior to Angell 's actual discharge, and in view of the actual friction which developed between Martin and Angel, friction serious enough that Angell bypassed Martin and went to Rea, Sr., with his complaint . This is another of those times when I must recommend dismissal of a case while harboring some doubts as to the actual causation of the discharge. 2. Wilbur Knapp Knapp , known to the Respondent as one of the instigators of the organizational movement, was in Respondent's employ from May 1966 to December 14, 1967. In late November, he was given a "probational" wage increase . Rea, Sr., testified : "during that next week he refused to do some of the jobs that he was told to do, or asked to do politely. On numerous occasions he refused to do the work for the individuals that needed the material , so he just plain told them to go to the devil. He didn't really care. . .And when Friday rolled around that week, why, . I called him into my office , and I told him that he hadn' t proved to me that he was doing his best at the job, and I was going to take the 10 cents an hour away." This occurred about December 1. Knapp admitted on cross-examination that in late November he had a dispute with Martin about keeping time records, and when Rea talked to him about it, he told Rea that Martin had no business giving him orders because Martin was only a draftsman , whereupon Rea advised him that Martin was following his , Rea's, orders. Knapp admitted that his differences with Martin were "vigorous"; and questioned on cross-examination : "You swore at him, at Martin?" testified , "I told him to go . . ." to "Get out of here and let me do my job." Knapp also admitted on cross-examination that on an occasion in September he was told by his shop foreman that he was on probation. Coming to the incidents relied on by the Respondent as precipitating Knapps' discharge, it appears that on or about December 16, the Respondent instituted a job training program for its employees under the Government's Manpower Training and Development program . In this connection employees were asked to sign certain forms. James Strand , one of two government representatives on hand at the time , testified: Well, we were filling out the personal characteristic forms and of course the pledge form that he [Knapp] would agree to report on time and to take part in the training as outlined in the contract . I explained the program to him as best I could and he did not seem to comprehend or he did not seem to sign the forms after I was through , so I could not quite determine whether he did not understand or whether he did not want to sign . He made a statement he did not like to sign a legal contract . I explained this was not a contract and he still did not want to sign, so I called John Rea, Jr., over to explain , thinking perhaps that he would trust John Rea a little more than he trusted me. So John Rea, Jr., explained it to him and at that time he did sign it . My thinking , also, is that possibly he did not quite see the form well enough to sign , because earlier he claimed to me he did have trouble with his eyes ... . He did have to find out , on the sheet of paper, where he was supposed to sign. After having signed and after having returned to the shop, Knapp came back a second , and possibly a third, time. He testified: I wanted to find out whether I was to be a trainer or trainee . I thought I understood I was to be trained on the saw and I had already been there a year and a half, and there was nothing to train me at in another year. Phyllis Dial, Respondent's bookkeeper , testified that on one or both of these later appearances at the office, Knapp's attitude was one of belligerance, that he spoke in a loud voice , etc. This is borne out to a degree by the testimony of Ivan Bailey , the second of the government representatives on hand during the Knapp interview, that Knapp, on his return trip to the office , seemed "a little aggravated," and that he, Bailey, said to Rea, Sr., subsequent to Knapp's discharge, that Knapp "seemed kind of worked up." Concerning the actual discharge , Rea, Sr., testified that when Dial reported that Knapp did not want to sign the training program forms he instructed her to tell Knapp that he did not have to sign, that it was to his advantage, not Rea's. Shortly thereafter , when Dial reported that Knapp was causing a disturbance about the form, Rea had Knapp brought to his office where he told him, according to his testimony , that he was "through," that Rea had "had enough." " I instructed him," Rea testified, "to get his time card and bring it back here and not to stop and visit along the route, and I followed him out there to make sure he did." Knapp testified that on the occasion of his discharge, Rea referred to him as a "trouble maker." Employee Chenoweth , a credible witness, testified that Rea told him that he had discharged Knapp because "he was a trouble maker among the crew." Granting that from the entire record it may be inferred that Knapp, aside from his union activities, was to some extent a troublesome employee , no contention is made that he was actually incompetent, he continued in Respondent's employ after having been placed on probation, and his probationary wage increase was withdrawn subsequent to the time when he had solicited Foreman Katsel to sign a union authorization card. Not only was he known to the Respondent as one of the instigators of the organizational movement , but he was one of the three employees called to Rea's office on December 12 where they were questioned by Rea on their union inclinations and warned by him, according to their testimony, that they would be out of work as soon as he could find an excuse for discharging them.4 The discharge followed two days later and under circumstances that add to rather than subtract from the equivocal posture of Respondent's defense. I am convinced , as Knapp testified, that the job training program had not been explained to him in advance to a degree that when asked to sign the forms he would have been fully acquainted with what he was signing . Obviously, when he returned to the office after signing the forms , he was disturbed for fear that he had signed up to become a trainee on a job in which he was already proficient. He doubtless was somewhat As previously found, Rea's version of these remarks was that he told the three employees "to go back out to the shop and go to work ." that "if they didn't get their production up that . . . they had just as well look for another job." I am convinced that whether or not he used exactly the words attributed to him by the three employees , that the context of his remarks was such that the employees would reasonably believe that the threat of discharge had its basis in their union activities. 524 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD agitated, and may well have spoken in a loud voice, but there is no evidence that he was profane or abusive, or deliberately attempting to cause trouble. I can only conclude that, viewing Respondent's defense in its most favorable aspect, there was mixed motivation in Rea's discharge action in which a substantial element was Knapp's union activities. Accordingly, I find his discharge in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act. 3. Jerry Noblin Noblin, in Respondent's employ from August to December 18, 1967, worked in Respondent's shop and when directed to do so drove a truck. The reason advanced by Respondent for his discharge on December 18 was that he refused orders that he was to haul wheat. Shortly after he was hired, Noblin told Rea, Sr., that he would not drive a truck the way the schedule was then set up, and at that time Rea discharged him. It does not appear, however, that the discharge became effective. Noblin testified that he told Rea he thought things could be worked out, and that he then went ahead and drove truck in a manner that conformed to his original suggestion . According to him, he was instructed to work in the shop on December 18 by Rea, Jr. The previous week or so, he had hauled wheat and found it unsatisfactory because some days he was paid only $4, and some days was unable to haul on account of rain. Because of this experience he went to Rea, Jr., the foreman of the shop, and asked if he could return to the shop. Rea informed him that he could. Noblin admitted that early in the morning of December 18, Earl Bruskirk, a truck driver, called him about hauling wheat. Noblin's explanation of his refusal was that Rea, Jr., was a foreman whereas Bruskirk was not, and that in reporting for work in the shop rather than hauling wheat he was but obeying the orders of his superior. Truck Foreman Katsel testified that, unable to reach Noblin on the Thursday previous to the discharge, he told Bruskirk to instruct Noblin to report for a trucking assignment, and that Bruskirk later reported to him that he had reached Noblin, and Noblin "wasn't going to make the trip." Katsel then assigned another driver to the job. According to Katsel, he at that time decided to discharge Noblin for refusing a trucking assignment, but was unable to reach him until the following Monday, December 18, when he saw Noblin working in the shop. Rea, Jr., the shop foreman, admitted that on the occasion in question he authorized Noblin to work in the shop. He testified that Noblin came to his house, said he was all through hauling and didn 't want to sit around doing nothing, and wanted to know if there was any work to do in the shop. Rea replied that there was work in the shop and that if Noblin was sure he had no more hauling he should report Monday morning (December 18) for shop work. According to Rea, Jr., Katsel and Rea, Sr., on the morning in question, wanted to know of him why Noblin was working in the shop. It was only then that he learned that Noblin had refused to haul grain. Noblin was then called into Rea, Sr.'s office and discharged. Noblin admitted on cross-examination that he told Rea, Sr., that he could not make enough money hauling wheat and wanted to work in the shop. He denied that he refused to haul. The General Counsel appears to think that Noblin was framed or entrapped by Rea, Jr., and Katsel giving him conflicting directions and then discharging him because he relied on Rea's instruction rather than instructions relayed to him by Katsel through truckdriver Bruskirk. Katsel testified that it was not unusual for him to issue his instructions through one of the truckdrivers, and I accept this testimony. In view of Respondent's strong antiunion bias, the theory of entrapment is interesting though not quite convincing. Admittedly, Noblin did not like hauling and this was true from early in his employment when he was tentatively discharged for insisting on shop work. It was equally true at the time of his discharge. Upon the entire evidence, I believe that an equally reasonable inference is that he refused or evaded instructions to drive a truck on a job which obviously and admittedly was distasteful to him. It is true that at the December meeting with employees, Rea, Sr., specifically asked Noblin what he thought of the Union, and that Noblin replied in effect that he thought it was a good thing though he could also understand Rea's opposition to it. Aside from this one incident, there is no foundation for finding that Noblin was active in the organizational movement or contributed to it in any way further than signing an authorization card. He admitted as much. It also seemed to me that in several instances during his examination Noblin's faculty for recall was restricted somewhat except in matters which bolstered his case. In all, I must find that the evidence does not preponderate in establishing that his discharge was violative of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, and therefore I shall recommend dismissal of his case. 4. Lance Slack It is alleged that Slack was constructively discharged on about December 30, 1967. He was known to the Respondent as one of the instigators of the organizational movement and was active in passing out authorization cards to fellow employees. He was one of the three employees summoned to Rea, Sr.'s office on December 12, interrogated about union activities and warned of discharge. Slack testified that on this occasion Rea said, "You three sitting here might as well start looking for another job because no matter which way the union vote goes you are out just as soon as I can find an excuse to let you. . " Slack testified that after overtime was eliminated on or about December 8, he suffered a substantial cut in his total wages. On December 30, Slack gave a week's notice to Rea, Sr., that he was quitting. Questioned, 'Did you state any reason at that time why you were quitting?" he testified, "Just that I had found better employment." Later he testified, "I don't remember what I told him. I think I told him that I could find a better job." He had not actually obtained another job at that time. He testified that he also told Rea that he was quitting because of the "confusion" in the shop. In his prehearing affidavit he referred to confusion in the shop, and in his testimony to too much "rework" and too"much confusion because of union activities." In the period immediately preceding the elimination of overtime he had worked a considerable amount of overtime, but his total wages were not thereafter reduced to the degree that he testified to, and he did not work the entire 40 hours a week allowed him during all the weeks subsequent to the elimination of overtime. Furthermore, there is no evidence that he was discriminated against in the matter of wages, hours, or working conditions, unless we hold that all employees were discriminated against because of the elimination of overtime, in which event he would still stand in the same position as other employees. REA TRUCKING CO., INC. 525 It could be argued that any employee who has been told by his employer that he will be discharged because of his union activities the first time a pretext is found, is not required to wait around to find out just when that pretext occurs, but on the other hand the employer may be using the threat merely as a tactical device for sidetracking the union, with no real intention of effectuating it. In short, Slack never put his employer to the test, and there is no evidence that subsequent to the interview in which the threat was made he was singled out in any way for discriminatory treatment. I shall recommend dismissal of his case. 5. The group layoffs On January 30, 1968, within hours after the results of the bargaining election were published showing that the Union had won, after consultation with his father who was then out of town, Rea, Jr., laid off the entire night shift. The posted notice of the layoff stated that it was required because of "lack of material and insufficient funds needed to keep a full crew busy." The notice continued, "It is the sad decision that a general layoff is mandatory." On the following day or a day or so later, there were further layoffs, the last of which was announced by Rea, Sr., to a group engaged in having Iun"ch. In all, the following employees named in the complaint were laid off: Frank Moss, George Elwell, Jack Gawith, Duane Hubbs, Del White, Earl Lyons, James Sali, Wilbur Bundy, Guy Reynolds, Leon Creel, James Bradshaw, Merritt Benson, Darrel Ard, and Gene Crump. The last four of these employees named above, and one more, were reinstated, and it is the Respondent's position that certain others were reinstated, or offered reinstatement. These layoffs or discharges, as the case may be , occurring in quick succession , and the Respondent offering the same defense as to each, with few exceptions, need not for purposes of this decision be broken down into individual groups. The Respondent's defense to these group layoffs is lack of work due to shortage in a certain part admittedly essential to the construction of trailers in which Respondent is principally engaged. This part was known as a D-26 cross member or extrusion. According to Rea, Sr., this part was designed in his shop, was not to be duplicated by other similar parts, could not be reproduced in the shop, and a substitution could be made only with the consent of the buyer. Respondent's order for the part was placed November 21, 1967, with a prominent steel company, was promised for delivery in January 1968, by error the wrong material was delivered in February, and it was not until April 18, 1968, that the D-26 was actually received. This is Respondent's story, corroborated to a degree by its records, and a letter from the steel supply company with whom the order was placed, dated May 24, 1968 (after the complaint had been filed in this case) which stated, inter alia, "Your extruded section (die 26) which was promised for January was not finally received until early April. This was due to a delay in the approval of your drawings, and to a mix up at the mill which resulted in wrong material being shipped to us." As to the timing of the layoffs, Respondent's defense is that it held up the layoffs until after the election in order to avoid the charge of unlawful interference with the election. It was the testimony of Rea, Sr., and his son, that the identity of those to be laid off had been determined in advance of the election. I do not intend to go into reasons advanced by Respondent for its choice of certain individuals to be laid off, because it is clear to me that the motivation for the layoffs considered in their entirety, regardless of the individuals affected, is the issue, and that the selection of certain individuals to be included in the layoffs is not an issue. If the motivation for the layoffs was solely economic, we need look no further; if in whole or in part, the layoffs were motivated by management's desire and intent to punish its employees for having voted union representation, and to thwart the processes of collective bargaining, regardless of the individuals chosen, the layoffs, and all of them, were illegal.' I accept Respondent's position that a shortage of the D-26 cross-member would in time cause some dislocation, though not necessarily the cessation, of normal production procedures. There is no probative evidence, however, that any employee had been idled by this shortage, assuming that it existed, at any time prior to the January 30 election, or that "makework" had been resorted to to keep the employees occupied. As was seen in the case of Noblin, there were jobs to be done other than building new trailers, though the latter may have been the mainstay of Respondent's business. There was testimony from Respondent's witnesses about falling production and financial losses but little or no record corroboration of such testimony. It was the credible testimony of Employee Ronald L. Williams, then and now employed by Respondent and neither discharged nor laid off at any time, that a shipment of materials was received at the plant on January 30, that there had been shortages of materials at various times in the past without layoffs (Rea, Jr.'s testimony was to the same effect), and that there were no more general shortages on January 30 than on prior occasions. (The D-26 was not included in the January 30 shipment.)6 He also testified that work had been stopped on the construction of a single trailer prior to that date due to the D-26 shortage, but this does not appear to have idled any employee prior to January 30. Upon the entire evidence, including the fact that delivery of the D-26 was not expected until some unspecified date in January, it seems unlikely that the layoffs were delayed until after January 30 in order to avoid a charge of election interference. As noted, the first of the layoffs occuring within hours of the announcement of election results, involved the entire night shift. Rea, Jr.'s testimony that the night shift was chosen for this initial layoff because it was a "temporary" arrangement is not to be credited because it had been operating without layoff for some 7 months, and was continued after Respondent had shut off all overtime work. Furthermore, if the entire matter of the layoffs had 'There is no merit in Respondent's argument that the burden was on the General Counsel to prove that the employees laid off were affiliated with or active in behalf of the Union The discharge of these employees immediately following the Union's victory at the polls would reasonably tend to discourage union affiliation , and if the motivation, or any part of it, was to demonstrate the futility of union representation and to discourage further participation of employees in organizational activities, it makes no difference whether the individuals chosen for the layoffs were actually affiliated with the Union , or voted for it. 'Admitting that he made no inventory of materials, Williams testified, "There were several times we were short of materials, and there were times he [Rea, Sr.] deviated from one job site and go to another ,lob," and that this happened "fairly regularly." Admittedly , there had been no prior group layoffs, and in fact the record is barren of any prior layoffs due to shortages of materials. 526 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD already been convassed by Rea, Sr., and his son, prior to the election, it is to be wondered why the layoffs followed in separate groups. The last of them, involving some four employees, was announced by Rea, Sr., to a group of employees in the lunchroom.' It was employee Williams' testimony that Rea, Sr., in announcing further layoffs, said that he hated to spoil the employees' lunch. Williams did not recall whether Rea gave a reason for the layoff at that time. It was Williams' further credited and undisputed testimony that, about January 25, in Rea's office, he told Rea that if he did not change his "attitude" soon the employees would vote the Union in, to which Rea replied, "You don't know what you are talking about." When Williams asked, "What if they do vote it in?" Rea replied, "I will either sell out or close the doors." Williams further testified that at the meeting (which he placed on February 2) when Rea, Sr., announced the last of the layoffs, Rea said, "You fellows thought I was bluffing as to what I would do if the union was voted in. If you don't believe me now dust ask Frank Moss." (Employee Frank Moss, included in the first group layoff, rented a property owned by a son of Rea, Sr. When following notice of his layoff he was in the office for his check, Martin handed him a notice raising his rent from $35 to $70. He had received no prior notice of the rental increase.) Duane Hubbs, included in the last group layoff, testified that in announcing this layoff, Rea, Sr., said, "You guys thought that I was bluffing on this. All you s - t on me and I will s - t on you." Employee Chenoweth testified that Rea said on this occasion, "You fellows think you have me over a barrel, but I am going to show you that you don't have me over a barrel, and if you don't believe me, just ask Frank Moss." Chenoweth further testified, as did Williams, that on this occasion Rea repeated what he had earlier said in his December meetings with employees, that he would not bargain with the Union, that to gain anything the Union would have to strike, and that any picket that trespassed on his property would be shot. Though there are some variances in the testimony of the several employees present when Rea, Sr., announced the last of the layoffs, and though there may have been some confusion as to dates, I could detect nothing that seemed rehearsed in concert or fabricated in this testimony. As we have seen, both in statements made at the time of the layoffs, and earlier statements made to employees generally or individually, beginning with his earliest knowledge of organizational activities among his employees, Rea, Sr., directly or through his subordinates, threatened his employees with retaliation in one form or another if they chose union representation, and repeatedly stated his intention to close down his operations rather than recognize and bargain with a union. While the layoffs beginning almost immediately after the announcement of election results did not close down all operations, they did result in loss of employement to a substantial proportion of Respondent's total employment. As previously noted, delivery of the D-26 was not expected until some unspecified date in January, and while this part when delivered was defective, that delivery did 'Ac co Wi ng to General Counsel' s witnesses, this occurred on February 2. Contradicting this, Rea, Sr., testified that he had not returned to the plant on that date. I think it makes little difference whether he made the announcement of further layoffs on February 2, or 3. or 4. I am convinced, and find, that he did make the announcement in person under the circumstances described by Williams and others, on a date in February prior to February 5. not occur until after all of the layoffs in question had been effectuated. Respondent therefore could have had no knowledge at the time of the layoffs that it would prove defective. There is no probative evidence that Respondent at any time in January prior to the layoffs made any effort to ascertain a date certain on which it might expect delivery of the D-26, though it would seem that under normal procedures such effort would have been made before Respondent decided to lay off a substantial part of its work crew. Also, the announcement of a wage incentive program, at the very time when we are asked to believe that Respondent was expecting the D-26 to be in short supply and planning a layoff of personnel, does not increase our confidence in Respondent's defense. When all the factors most favorable to that defense are weighed against Respondent's numerous threats and discriminatory acts preceding the layoffs, as well as Rea, Sr.'s statements made at the time of, and concurrent with his announcement of the last layoff, constituting in and of themselves an admission of improper motivation, the evidence as a whole preponderates, I believe and find, in support of the General Counsel's position. Accordingly, I find that in effectuating the layoffs of the employees named in this section of the decision, the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(I) and (3) of the Act.' 6. The reinstatements It is admitted that following their layoff on about February 2, Bradshaw , Benson , Ard, Moore, and Crump were reinstated. The General Counsel seeks no reinstatement remedy with respect to them. The Respondent contends that Lyons, Halbert, and Creel refused reinstatement, and that Reynolds, Elwell, and White made no response to Respondent's inquiry in the matter. In support of these claims, Respondent relies on a series of letters sent to these individuals on or about April 3, the first of which bore this text: "Please advise this office by return mail if you are presently available for work," the second, where no reply was received to the first, the following additional text, "You are hereby notified that if you do not answer the second notice you will hereafter consider yourself terminated and no longer subject to recall by Rea Trucking Company, Inc." Employees who have been discriminatorily laid off or discharged are entitled to a specific and unequivocal offer of reinstatement. An inquiry of availability is not such an offer. A discharged employee lis not to be held to have refused reinstatement until he has received such an unqualified offer, or until he has made some statement or engaged in some conduct which clearly renders such an offer futile, or relieves Respondent of the obligation of making it . I do not think the failure to answer Respondent's query on availability, unaccompanied by an offer of reinstatement, discharges Respondent's obligation to make the offer. While the response of Lyons, Creel, and Halbert to Respondent's inquiry stated that they were employed elsewhere, I think they are entitled to accept or refuse reinstatement when the offer is made and none has yet been made. If after being discharged by Respondent they did not seek other employment, and accept it when offered, they would be liable for willfully incurred loss in 'I eerit in Respondent's claim that Sali. one of those laid off, quit his employment prior to or at the time of the layoff Admittedly, Sali was looking for other employment , and this may have been known to Respondent, but I credit his testimony that he at no time during the period in question advised the Respondent that he was quitting REA TRUCKING CO, INC 527 the computation of their backpay In short , I am unable to accept their respective responses to Respondent's inquiry as a refusal to return to Respondent's employ and an order of reinstatement will be recommended as to them along with the others named above who have not yet received an offer from Respondent 7 Arnold Chenoweth Chenoweth had been in Respondent's employ about 2 years when he was discharged on about February 5 1968 following the mass layoffs Respondent's defense to the discharge was (1) that Chenoweth was a supervisor and (2) that he was habitually late to work Chenoweth described his position in Respondent's employ as welder and metal fabricator or welder and finish man on the cattle trailers ' He was not questioned on the topic of supervising functions Employee Slack referred to Chenoweth as his immediate superior or foreman, and testified that he assigned and checked his work He also testified "he worked with me' Rea Jr testified that Chenoweth spent approximately fifty percent of his time supervising the work of other employees and had the power to effectively recommend discharge On the other hand Chenoweth was probably the prime instigator of the organizational campaign, along with Knapp and Slack made the first employee contact with a union organizer was one of three employees called to Rea Sr 's office on December 12 for purposes of interrogation concerning their union activities and a recipient along with the other two of Rea s threats of discharge, was elected to the grievance committee formed at Rea's suggestion and apparently voted in the election of January 30 without challenge Respondent does not appear to have questioned his inclusion in the voting unit at any time and its treatment of Chenoweth as an instigator and participant in union activities is hardly consistent with its present contention that he was a supervisor, with authority to effectively recommend the discharge of other employees Had Respondent so regarded him, it is reasonable to assume that it would have discharged him the first time it had a whiff of his organizational activities had his fellow-employees so regarded him it hardly seems likely that they would have made common cause with him in organizing the plant, and had he so regarded himself his whole course of action in defiance of Respondent's wishes in the matter would be equivocal to say the least The matter is made difficult by the General Counsels failure to develop more fully his duties through Chenoweth's own testimony and the testimony of others but on the entire evidence I am persuaded and conclude that he was not a supervisor within the meaning of the Act Chenoweth's discharge occurred on a day when he was some 5 1/2 hours late in reporting for work It appears that he relied on his own car for transportation to and from work, and on this occasion he reported that he would be late due to car trouble Rea Jr , to whom he reported, told him, "All right, but hurry, we need you today ' Due to his lateness in reporting Rea Sr according to his testimony drove by Chenoweth s house saw Chenoweth's car parked there knocked on the door but got no response On returning to the plant he found Chenoweth on the job and then had him brought to his office He confronted Chenoweth with being late whereupon Chenoweth explained that he had to go into town to get a part for his car (a fuel pump), that he had borrowed his babysitter's car9 for that purpose since his own car could not be used Rea, after reminding him that on some previous occasion he had warned all employees about being late discharged him, after asking him "What would you do in my case if I were in your seat and you were in my seat what would you do)" to which Chenoweth replied, "I think I would let you go" Rea further testified that in the first week following the election he had called for the timecards and could `hardly believe ' that Chenoweth had been tardy so many times As a matter of fact in the pay periods between January 3 and February 12, 1968 Chenoweth, contrary to his testimony, had been late in reporting to work on 14 occasions, his tardiness ranging from 6 to 36 minutes to 8 hours on one occasion and 5 hours, 36 minutes on the day of his discharge This testimony was corroborated by Respondent's records Chenoweth's situation as the wifeless father of five boys was known to the Respondent,10 and there is no showing that his tardiness was on any occasion unauthorized, or that he was ever singled out for warning on account of his tardiness On one occasion he was absent from his job for 8 hours and no contention is made that this absence was unauthorized or unaccounted for That he took some 30 minutes off during the period of his tardiness on the day of his discharge to visit the union hall was not known to the Respondent according to Rea until after the discharge had been effectuated and there being no further showing in the matter, no inference adverse or favorable to Respondent's position is drawn there from It does appear, however, that Rea, Sr's concern in Chenoweth's tardiness arose only after the Union's victory at the polls, though it must have been well known to Rea Jr , the shop foreman as it occurred, and Rea's general warning to employees on tardiness is not shown to have occurred within months of the discharge It is such circumstances as these that take on significance when the whole background of Chenoweth's involvement in union activities is reviewed and in particular the occasion when he was brought to Rea, Sr's office on December 12 along with Knapp and Slack when, according to Chenoweth's credited and corroborated testimony Rea "stated that he knew the three of us were the big instigators of bringing the union in and we had just as well start hunting another job because we were out All he was waiting for was the excuse to discharge us " Rea s continued identification of Chenoweth as favorable to the Union is shown in Chenoweth's undisputed testimony, previously reported of his conversation with Rea in the latter's office shortly before the election On the entire evidence I am convinced and find that a substantial element in Rea's discharge of Chenoweth without warning was the latter's prominence in organizational activities and Rea's determination following the election to thwart the Union in its representation of employee interests Obviously if Respondent sees fit to promulgate and enforce nondiscriminatory rules on tardiness that is its prerogative, but the exercise of such a prerogative does not fit in with Chenoweth's discharge 'Chenoweth lived alone with five children his wife having left him '•Chenoweth s undisputed testimony I explained to Mr Rea that there would be times when I might be a few minutes late because I had to be there to see that the boys got off to school properly and sometimes there were little last minute problems that arose that required a few minutes of my extra time Mr Rea agreed that this would be satisfactory as long as I got there as soon as possible This occurred in November 1967 528 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of the Respondent set forth in section III, above, occurring in connection with the operations of the Respondent described in section I, above , have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. V. THE REMEDY The Respondent having discharged certain of its employees because they engaged in union and concerted activities and having refused reinstatement to certain of them for the same reason , or reasons, it will be recommended that the Respondent offer Wilbur Knapp, Frank Moss, George Elwell, Jack Gawith, Duane Hubbs, Del White, Earl Lyons, James Sali, Arnold Chenoweth, Wilbur Bundy, Guy Reynolds, and Leon Creel immediate reinstatement to their former or substantially equivalent positions, without prejudice to their seniority and other rights and privileges, and make them and James Bradshaw, Merritt Benson , Tom Moore, Darrel Ard, and James Crump, whole for any loss of pay suffered because of the discrimination against them, by payment (I) to the aforesaid Knapp, Moss, Elwell, Gawith, Hubbs, White, Lyons, Sali, Chenoweth, Bundy, Reynolds, and Creel, of a sum of money equal to that which they normally would have earned in Respondent's employ from the date of their respective discharges, or layoffs, as the case may be, to the date of Respondent's offer of reinstatement; (2) by payment to Bradshaw, Benson, Moore, Ard, and Crump, of a sum of money equal to that which they normally would have earned in Respondent's employ from the date of their respective discharges, or layoffs, to the date of their reinstatement without prejudice to their seniority and other rights and privileges; (3) less the net earnings, if any, of each of the above named employees, respectively, during the said period, or periods. Backpay shall be computed in the manner set forth in 90 NLRB 289, and Isis Plumbing & Heating Co.. 138 NLRB 716. Respondent' s statements, conduct, and acts found herein to constitute violations of the Act, are of such gravity and scope that a broad cease and desist order is required to prevent further violations. Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and upon the entire record in the case , I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The Respondent is an employer within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act, engaged in commerce and a business affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. By discharging its employees Knapp, Moss, Elwell, Gawith, Hubbs, White, Lyons, Sali, Chenoweth, Bundy, Reynolds, Creel, Bradshaw, Benson , Moore, Ard, and Crump, and refusing reinstatement to all the aforesaid employees except Bradshaw, Benson , Moore, Ard, and Crump, because of their union and concerted activities or for the purpose of discouraging membership in a labor organization, Respondent has engaged in, and is engaging in, unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act. 4. By coercively interrogating its employees concerning their union affiliation and activities; threatening them with reprisals if they chose union representation; threatening them with refusal to recognize and bargain with a union of their choice; threatening them if they engaged in picketing activities; interfering with and restraining them in a choice of a grievance committee; offering them an incentive wage program as an inducement to reject the Union at the polls; and by related statements, conduct, and acts, the Respondent has engaged in, and is engaging in, unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(I) of the Act. 5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. RECOMMENDED ORDER Upon the entire record in the case, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, as amended, it is hereby ordered that Respondent, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Discouraging membership of any employee in the Union, or any other labor organization, by discharging or in any other manner discriminating against any employee with regard to his hire or tenure of employment, or any term or condition of employment, except as authorized in Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. (b) Interrogating in an unlawful manner its employees concerning their union affiliation and activities; threatening them with reprisals if they choose union representation; threatening them with a refusal to recognize and bargain with a union of their choice in the event they choose union representation; threatening them with violence if they engage in picketing activities; initiating and dominating the formation of a grievance committee or other organization engaged in the presentation of employee grievances, or other matters relating to wages, hours, and conditions of employment; offering them incentives for the purpose of inducing them to reject union representation. (c) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the right to self-organization, to form their own labor organization, to loin or assist the Union, or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively with representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or for other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any or all such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as authorized in Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Offer Wilbur Knapp, Frank Moss, George Elwell, Jack Gawith, Duane Hubbs, Del White, Earl Lyons, James Sali, Arnold Chenoweth, Wilbur Bundy, Guy Reynolds, and Leon Creel immediate and full reinstatement to their former or equivalent positions, and make the aforesaid employees and James Bradshaw, Merritt Benson, Tom Moore, Darrel Ard, and James Crump whole for any loss of pay they may have suffered as a result of the discrimination against them, in the REA TRUCKING CO., INC. 529 manner set forth in the section above entitled "The Remedy." (b) Upon request make available to the Board or its agent, for examination and copying, all payroll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other records necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of this Recommended Order. (c) Notify any of the said employees not already reinstated if presently serving in the Armed Forces of their rights of reinstatement upon application in accordance with the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Training and Service Act, as amended. (d) Post at its place of business in Touchet, Washington, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."" Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 19, shall, after being duly signed by the Respondent's authorized representative, be posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (e) Notify the Regional Director for Region 19, in writing, within 20 days from the receipt of this Decision, what steps it has taken to comply herewith." "In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the notice . In the further event that the Board' s Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision and Order." "In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, this provision shall be modified to read : "Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order , what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith." APPENDIX NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our employees that: WE WILL NOT discourage membership in General Teamsters, Warehousemen and Cannery Workers Local Union 556, affiliated with International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of America, Independent, or any other labor organization, by discharging or laying off any of our employees because of their concerted or union activities or in any other manner discriminate in regard to their hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment. WE WILL NOT coercively interrogate any of our employees concerning their union affiliation and activities; threaten to close the plant or curtail operations or otherwise threaten them with reprisals if they choose union representation; threaten them with a refusal to recognize and bargain with the union of their choice; threaten them with violence in the event they engage in lawful picketing; initiate, unlawfully support or dominate any employee organization engaged in the presentation of grievances or other matters relating to wages, hours, and conditions of employment; offer our employees rewards, incentives, or inducements for the purpose of causing them to withdraw from, or reject union representation. WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist the above-named Union, or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, or to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any or all such activities. WE WILL offer immediate and full reinstatement to Wilbur Knapp, Frank Moss, George Elwell, Jack Gawith, Duane Hubbs, Del White, Earl Lyons, James Sali, Arnold Chenoweth, Wilbur Bundy, Guy Reynolds, and Leon Creel, and will make the aforesaid employees and James Bradshaw, Merritt Benson, Tom Moore, Darrel Ard, and James Crump whole for any loss of pay they may have suffered because of the discrimination against them. WE WILL notify the above-named employees not already reinstated if presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United States of their right to full reinstatement upon application in accordance with the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Training and Service Act, as amended, after discharge from the Armed Forces. All our employees are free to become, remain, or refrain from becoming or remaining members of the above-named or any other labor organization. We will not discriminate in regard to hire or tenure of employment, or any term or condition of employment, against any employee because of membership in or activity on behalf of any labor organization. Dated By REA TRUCKING COMPANY, INC. (Employer) (Representative ) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. If employees have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions, they may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, Republic Building, 10th Floor, 1511 Third Avenue, Seattle, Washington 98101, Telephone 583-7473.