Autotronics, Inc.

AUTOTRONICS, INC. 705 Autotronics, Inc. and International Union, Allied Industrial Workers of America, AFL-CIO. Case 17-CA-3518 June 16, 1969 DECISION AND ORDER BY MEMBERS BROWN, JENKINS, AND ZAGORIA On October 21, 1968, Trial Examiner Horace A. Ruckel issued his Decision in the above-entitled case, finding that the Respondent had engaged in certain unfair labor practices within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. He further found that the Respondent had not engaged in certain other unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint and recommended that they be dismissed. Thereafter, the Charging Party filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision and a supporting brief, and a letter correcting an error in the brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and brief, and the entire record in this case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner except as modified below. 1. Contrary to the Trial Examiner, we find merit in the Charging Party's contention that Dewane Hopkins is a supervisor and that his interrogation of employees Hinds and Owen constitutes a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. In regard to the supervisory status of Hopkins, the unrefutted testimony of employees Hinds and Owen reveals that Hopkins assigns work, directs the work of some 10 to 12 employees, grants time off, makes out appraisal sheets for employees, told employee Hinds he was promoting him to setup man, and thereafter Hinds was reclassified to finish machine setup man and operator and received a 31-cent-an-hour raise. Hinds also testified that his appraisal sheet, made out by Hopkins, described Hinds' work as "better than average." Clearly, in view of the foregoing, and on the basis of the entire record, Hopkins is a supervisor within the meaning of the Act. On May 15, 1968, while in the production manager's office, Hopkins had a conversation with employees Hinds and Owen. According to Hinds, Hopkins asked them what their reaction would be "to a paper going around to get signatures to take a 176 NLRB No. 96 vote to see if the union would stay in the plant." Hinds asked Hopkins if there was such a paper and Hopkins said he heard there was. According to employee Owen, during this conversation, Hopkins also asked what they would do if such a paper came around to sign . It further appears that although Hopkins told the employees he made such an inquiry for his own satisfaction, nevertheless he informed them that if they resented it they would never see the paper. We find that Hopkins' questions about the reaction of employees Hinds and Owen to a paper to obtain signatures to see if the Union would stay in the plant constituted coercive interrogation and violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 2. We also find merit in the Charging Party's contention that Respondent's failure to furnish the Union with data about the group insurance plan constitutes a violation of Section 8(a)(5). The record shows that at the bargaining meeting on February 23, 1968, Curry, Respondent's representative, brought up changes they were trying to make in the insurance plan concerning coverage. Robbins, the Union's representative, asked about the cost of the plan, to which both the Company and the employees contributed, and, according to Robbins, stated that he was concerned over any increase in the premium that employees might have to pay. Robbins told Curry that he wanted information on the cost of the insurance plan by an outside agency and requested from Curry the employees' marital status, age, and sex. Curry stated that he had part of this information in his office but that it was not complete and that he would have it compiled and would give Robbins a copy. Again at a bargaining meeting on February 29, Curry presented Robbins with a copy of the company's insurance proposal. Robbins told Curry he thought the premium was high for the coverage and he again requested the same data he had requested on February 23. Curry gave the same answer he had given on February 23. The Respondent never provided this data. We find that the failure of the Respondent to furnish the data relating to the insurance plan constitutes a violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. AMENDED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and the entire record in this case, we hereby adopt the Conclusions of Law of the Trial Examiner, as modified herein . The Conclusions of Law as amended are stated below: 1. Respondent is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. International Union, Allied Industrial Workers of America, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. Dewane Hopkins is a supervisor within the meaning of the Act. 706 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 4. By Hopkins' inquiring of employees as to their reaction to the circulation of a paper to obtain signatures to see if the Union would stay in the plant, Respondent engaged in coercive interrogation and, by such action, Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8(ax 1) of the Act. 5. All production and maintenance employees of Respondent at its Joplin, Missouri, plant, excluding office clerical employees, engineering department employees, professional employees, guards, combination watchmen janitors, and supervisors as defined in the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for the purpose of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act. 6. The said Union has been since November 29, 1966, and now is, the certified representative of all employees in said appropriate unit for the purpose of collective bargaining with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment , and other terms and conditions of employment. 7. By refusing after February 23, 1968, to furnish the Union with requested data about the group insurance plan, including the employees ' marital status, age, and sex, Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(ax5) and (1) of the Act. 8. By refusing generally since March 7, 1968, to bargain collectively in good faith with the said labor organization as the exclusive representative of all employees in the said appropriate unit , Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. 9. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 10. The remaining allegations of the complaint setting forth acts said to constitute specific instances of a refusal to bargain [ing] do not constitute individual violations of Section 8(ax5) of the Act. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that the Respondent, Autotronics, Inc., Joplin, Missouri, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Coercively interrogating employees concerning their Union sentiments. (b) Refusing to furnish International Union, Allied Industrial Workers of America, AFL-CIO, information requested for bargaining about the group insurance plan, including information relating to the marital status, age, and sex of its employees. (c) Refusing to bargain collectively with International Union, Allied Industrial Workers of America, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive representative of its employees in the appropriate unit, which is: All production and maintenance employees of Respondent at its Joplin, Missouri, plant, excluding office clerical employees, engineering department employees, professional employees, guards, combination watchmenjanitors, and supervisors as defined in the Act. (d) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization , to form labor organizations, to join or assist the above-named labor organization or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the purposes of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection , or to refrain from any or all such activities, except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment, as authorized in Section S(aX13) of the Act, as modified by Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959. 2. Take the following affirmative action which the Board finds is necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act. (a) Furnish International Union, Allied Industrial Workers of America, AFL-CIO, the requested information for bargaining about the group insurance plan , including the marital status, age, and sex, of its employees. (b) Upon request, bargain collectively with the above-named labor organization as the exclusive representative of all employees in the appropriate unit with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, and, if an understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agreement. (c) Post at its plant in Joplin, Missouri, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."' Copies of said notice to be furnished by the Regional Director for Region 17, shall, after being duly signed by Respondent's authorized representative , be posted by it for a period of 60 days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken to insult that said notices are pot altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 17, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith. Except to the extent found herein, the allegations of the complaint are hereby dismissed. ' In event that the Board's Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, there shall be substituted for the words "a Decision and Order" the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order." AUTOTRONICS, INC. 707 APPENDIX NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to the Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations Board and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our employees that: WE WILL NOT coercively interrogate employees concerning their union sentiments. WE WILL NOT refuse to furnish International Union, Allied Workers of America, AFL-CIO, information requested for bargaining about insurance, including information relating to the marital status, age, and sex of our employees. WE WILL NOT fail or refuse to bargain collectively with International Union, Allied Industrial Workers of America, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of our employees in the appropriate bargaining unit described below, by failing or refusing to furnish said union, on request, the data relating to the group insurance plan, or by failing .or refusing to bargain with said union with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other terms and conditions of employment. The, appropriate bargaining unit of our employees is as follows: All production and maintenance employees of Autotronics, Inc. at its Joplin, Missouri, plant, excluding office clerical employees, engineering department employees, professional employees, guards, combination watchmen-janitors, and all supervisors as defined in the Act. WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of your right to self-organization, to form labor organizations, to join or assist International Union, Allied Industrial Workers of America, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of your own choosing, or to engage in other concerted activities for the purposes of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any or all such activities, except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment, as authorized in Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. WE WILL furnish International Union, Allied, Industrial Workers of America, AFL-CIO, the requested information for bargaining about the group insurance plan, including the marital status, age, and • 'sex of our employees. WE WILL, upon request, bargain collectively with International Union, Allied Industrial Workers of America, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive representative of all employees in the bargaining unit described above with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment , and, if an understanding is reached , embody such understanding in a signed agreement. All our employees are free to become or remain, or refrain from becoming or remaining , members of the above-named or any other labor organization. AUTOTRONICS, INC. (Employer) Dated By (Representative ) (Title) This Notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. If employees have any question concerning this Notice or compliance with its provisions, they may communicate directly with the Board' s Regional Office, 610 Federal Building, 601 East 12th Street, Kansas City, Missouri 64106, Telephone 816-374-5181. TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE HORACE A. RUCKEL, Trial Examiner: This case comes before me upon an amended complaint of unfair labor practices, issued on June 27, 1968, by the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board , through the Board's Regional Director for Region 17 (Kansas City, Missouri), against Autotronics, Inc., herein called the Respondent, based upon a charge filed on March 20, 1968 by International Union, Allied Industrial Workers of America, AFL-CIO, herein called the Union. The complaint alleges that the Respondent from about February 6, 1968 has failed and refused to bargain collectively with the Union as the exclusive representative of its employees in an appropriate unit, in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C., Sec. 154, herein called the Act, as the result of which the employees on March 1 went on strike. The Respondent filed an answer denying the commission of any unfair labor practices. Pursuant to notice I conducted a hearing'on July 23 and 24, 1968, at Joplin, Missouri, at which 'the parties were represented by counsel. The" General Counsel and the Respondent have filed timely briefs.' Upon the entire record of the case, and from my observation of the witnesses, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT The Respondent is a Missouri corporation which operates a plant in Joplin , Missouri, where it is engaged in the manufacture of electromagnetic devices and related products. During the year 1967 Respondent directly sold and shipped products valued in excess of $50,000 to customers located outside the State of Missouri. The complaint alleges, and Respondent's answer admits, that Respondent is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. IL THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED International Union, Allied Industrial Workers of America, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization admitting employees of Respondent to membership. III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The Alleged Refusal to Bargain' 'Subsequent to the close of the hearing the General Counsel filed a motion to correct the transcript of testimony with respect to 29 typographical errors, most of them minor. No objection has been made by the Respondent and the motion is granted. 708 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1. The appropriate unit and the Union's certification therein On November 29, 1966, the Board certified the Union as the exclusive bargaining representative for the Respondent's employees in the following described unit, approximately 50 in number: All production and maintenance employees of Autotronics, Inc., at its Joplin, Missouri, plant excluding all office clerical employees, engineering department employees, professional employees, guards, combination watchmen-janitors, and all supervisory employees as defined in the Act. Thereafter on March 1 , 1967, the Union and the Respondent executed a collective-bargaining covering the period from March 1, 1967, to March 1 , 1968, and renewable thereafter subject to a 90-day notice of termination or amendment. 2. The bargaining prior to the strike; the strike On December 28, 1967, the Union advised Respondent that it wished to negotiate a new contract. The first bargaining session took place on February 6, 1968 at the plant, where the Union was represented by Archie Robbins, its international representative, and a committee composed of five employees, and the Respondent by Carl Curry, its personnel manager, and Ray Cassidy, production manager. It was quickly agreed at this meeting that the provisions of the current contract concerning which neither party submitted a proposal should be part of the new contract. The General Counsel's brief concedes, and the record supports the concession, that during the period from February 6 to 22 the parties held seven bargaining sessions, which served to reduce substantially the issues separating the parties. At an eighth meeting on February 23 Robbins reminded Curry that the Union , and this is not controverted, had submitted written proposals covering all the unresolved contract clauses excepting the three matters of job classifications, wage increase, and contract duration , and then handed Curry a copy of a union proposal relating to job classifications. At the same time Curry handed Robbins an outline of the various skills and training needed to fill various jobs. Robbins reminded Curry that time was pressing, since the existing contract would expire at midnight on February 29. At the next meeting, on February 27, the parties were joined by Harry O'Connell, a Federal mediator. The issues on which agreement had not been reached remained substantially the same and included most of the substantial provisions of the contract, including wages, a wage progression system, job clssification structure, insurance, nonbargaining unit personnel, and other provisions. Respondent's representative, questioned by Robbins, indicated that Respondent's position was "flexible" on most of these issues . Before the close of the meeting, Respondent submitted to the Union a written proposal having to do with unit placement of quality assurance and inspection employees , which, if adopted, would have resulted in the exclusion of such employees from the appropriate unit. Robbins asserted that this was a new issue and that it was late in the day to "throw new material on the table." The parties next met during the afternoon of February 29 at 1 p.m. At the start of the meeting Robbins announced that a meeting of the Union was scheduled for 5 p.m. to permit a vote on the acceptability of the proposals advanced by the Respondent, and asked Respondent to prepare an agreement which covered all the issues still in dispute . Thereupon Curry submitted a written proposal concerning job classification , establishing maximum and minimum rates . The Union submitted a wage increase proposal to Curry of 11 cents an hour. A recess was taken and when Respondent's representatives returned Respondent withdrew its prior proposal concerning the accumulation of unit seniority, which the Union had found unsatisfactory, and agreed to retain the language in the expired contract . The same action was taken with Respondent's proposal pertaining to the exclusion of assurance and inspection employees from the unit. In return, Robbins withdrew the Union's proposal on union membership and accepted the provision in the prior contract, as well as the provision pertaining to job classifications . Curry presented Robbins with a copy of Respondent's insurance proposal. Robbins protested that the premium was too high and asked Curry to furnish the Union with data concerning the marital status, age, and sex of the employees. Curry promised to procure this information . No meeting of minds was had on the nonbargaining unit personnel clause . Respondent then offered a wage increase of 2 1/2 cents an hour, and an additional 2 1/2 cents increase each 3 months thereafter over a 2-year period . Robbins announced he was leaving for the union meeting and he wanted Respondent's position on the remaining issues, which were wage language and wage progression.' Respondent's representative stated that he could take no position on these subjects at that time. Robbins stated that this left him with an incomplete proposed agreement to present to the union meeting and that he would therefore recommend that the membership reject it . On leaving the room Robbins remarked to Respondent's representatives that it was "a shame" that they did not have "more time" to negotiate since they were "not too far apart," and suggested that the Union would agree to extend the expired agreement for a few days without a strike, if Respondent would make retroactive to March 1 any wage increase which might be agreed upon . Respondent's representatives refused the suggestion. At the meeting at 5 p .m. the union membership rejected the proposed agreement and voted a strike which began the following morning. CONCLUSIONS The complaint alleges that the facts above related, as to which there is a minimum of dispute, taken as a whole constitute a failure to bargain in good faith with the Union in contravention of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act, and that the strike which began on March 1, 1968, was caused by this failure and was hence an unfair labor practice strike. I cannot agree . It was quickly decided when the parties first met on February 6 to discuss the renewal of the contract which was due to expire on March 1 , that the provisions of the current contract concerning which neither party submitted a proposal should become part of the new contract . This removed a good part of the contract from the area of dispute, although not the "'Wage language" deals with an employee's rate of pay upon recall from layoff or transfer from one classification to another . "Wage progression" pertains to the method by which he advances in his wage rate within a classification. AUTOTRONICS, INC. 709 important issues of wages, job classifications, nonbargaining unit personnel , and other matters. The above narration shows that the parties met regularly to discuss these issues, and that the bargaining which resulted was more than surface bargaining . Agreement was finally reached on various disputed matters, although, as has been noted, this agreement was frequently only to re-enact provisions of the existing agreement . On the last day prior to the expiration of the contract Respondent offered a wage increase of 2 1/2 cents an hour, with an additional increase in that amount every 3 months thereafter over a 2-year period; offered to accept, with certain modifications, the Union's proposal on nonbargaining unit personnel, or, in the alternative, the provisions of the former contract. The Union insisted it was standing by its submitted proposal. Upon this record I am unable to conclude that the Respondent, prior to the strike , failed or refused to bargain in good faith with the Union . I find to the contrary that it did so bargain and that the strike which ensued on March 1 was economic in character and designed to strengthen the Union's bargaining position. My conclusion that the strike was not caused by any unfair labor practices by Respondent is strengthened by the consideration that there is in the complaint no allegation of any independent act of interference, restraint, or coercion in violation of Section 8(a)(l) of the Act, nor was there any evidence whatever adduced at the hearing of any such violation, or of any hostility to the Union on the part of Respondent. In my view the parties did not allow themselves enough time to compose the differences which remained between them and the Union was determined not to continue work without a contract. 3. Bargaining during the strike ; alleged conversion to an unfair labor practice strike Bargaining continued without interruption following the strike, with the first meeting of the parties on March 7. At a meeting on March 15, Robbins asked Curry if he would let the striking employees return to work under the old agreement, pending a new one. Curry refused to answer the question . Asked by Robbins for a position on the Union's proposals concerning wage language and wage progression, Curry answered that he did not have a position on these issues, and further that Respondent was not sure what its future relationship with the Union would be. At a meeting on April 1, on the subjects of nonbargaining unit personnel and a wage progression system, concerning which the Union had made proposals, Curry stated that he could not commit Respondent. Robbins, on behalf of the Union, reduced its wage increase demand from an immediate 11 cents an hour to 6 cents and an additional 5 cents beginning September 1. Curry replied that he had no answer at that time, but would have to consult his superiors. On April 16 Robbins told Curry he was withdrawing its previous demand concerning nonbargaining unit personnel and would accept Responent's last offer made the day prior to the strike to go along with the language in the expired agreement. Curry replied that he could not agree to this at the time and would have to do some checking. Robbins asked Curry Respondent's position regarding the Union's proposed wage language. Curry repeated Respondent's position that wage language should be separated from wage progression system . Thereupon Robbins submitted a revised written proposal concerning wage language from which had deleted a reference to a wage progression system . With reference to Responent's proposal on group hospitalization insurance , made on February 29, Curry stated that Respondent could not agree to it at that time, but would have to do some checking. At the hearing he testified that a previous quotation he had received might no longer be valid because of the lapse of time since obtaining it. Similarly, Robbins stated the Union' s willingness to accept Respondent's February 29 offer on the job classification structure, but Curry refused to sign it, stating that he would have to do some checking. On April 24 the parties met again . Curry presented Respondent's proposals concerning wage progression and wage language, the former based on merit alone. The Union disagreed with these proposals and promised to submit modifications thereof. The same understanding was reached concerning the nonbargaining unit issue , which is the time allowed nonunit employees to spend performing work similar to that done by employees in the unit. Curry at the April 24 meeting raised the subject of contract duration, saying that Respondent was agreeable to a 2-year contract instead of the 1-year period which was the Union's proposal, and which was the duration of the previous contract. The Union stated it wished to consider the contract length together with the issue of a wage increase. Curry replied by saying that Respondent was withdrawing its offer made on February 29, the day before the strike, of a 2 1/2-cent-an-hour wage increase. Respondent sustituted no other offer of a wage increase.3 At the next meeting, on May 2, the Union presented ,the rewritten proposals it had made , pertaining to wage language, wage progression, and nonbargaining unit personnel. Curry, on behalf of Respondent, said he could not give an answer at that time . Concerning wages, Robbins said that if Respondent would make a "realistic" wage offer, he thought that the union membership would accept the agreement containing Respondent's other proposals, which had been previously discussed. Curry promised an answer at the next meeting. The next meeting was held on May 8. Curry opened by saying that Respondent was refusing the Union's proposals of May 2 concerning wage progression, wage language, and nonbargaining unit personnel. On Robbins' insistence, however, Respondent signed the Union's written, signed, proposal concerning wage progression.4 It also signed the wage language clause, which was Respondent's own proposal. Prior to the adjournment of the May 8 meeting, Robbins pointed out that the Union had by now accepted virtually all the Respondent's counterproposals on matters at issue, excepting wages and the duration of the contract, and demanded proposals on these two matters, and a recess was taken until that evening. At the evening meeting, Curry stated that Respondent would make no offer of a wage increase, thus withdrawing its previous offer. As to contract duration, its proposal was that it should be 30 months, instead of the 12-month period the Union had demanded, and 6 months longer than Respondent itself had originally indicated it would accept. Curry stated that this represented Respondent's final position . At the same time, Curry demanded that 'At the hearing, Curry testified that Respondent could not afford any wage increase, and that the strike had worsened its financial situation. 'this was the Respondent's own proposal. The only advantage gained by the Union was that when an employee was refused a merit increase he should be advised of the reason for the refusal. 710 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD inspection employees be excepted from the already existing job classifications, and that merit increases were to be determined solely by Respondent without recourse to the grievance procedure. When Robbins pointed out that this raised new issues, Curry replied that the Union had asked for Respondent's final proposals and this was it. Curry further advanced for the first time during the negotiations which had begun the previous February, that union security and checkoff provisions should be abolished. This was the last meeting of the parties in spite of written requests from the Union on June 17 and 24 and July 1 that the parties meet and resume negotiations, to which the Respondent did not reply. Curry testified that it did not do so because Respondent had "ample" evidence that the Union did not represent a majority of employees at that time. No such evidence was adduced. On May 12 Robbins sent a telegram to Curry advising him that the Union was terminating the strike as of that date, and offering unconditionally to return the striking employees to work. On May 24, Respondent replied that reinstatement would be accomplished by May 27, with one employee scheduled to return on June 3. Some employees were immediately reinstated. No striking employee failed of reinstatement. Conclusions Although I have found that Respondent did not refuse to bargain in good faith prior to the strike, the same thing cannot be said of its conduct during the strike. As has been seen above, Respondent on several occasions responded to proposals advanced by the Union by refusing to give any answer to them, at times withdrew its own previous proposals when the Union agreed to accept them, and introduced proposals on matters which had not previously been brought up such as union security provisions and checkoff of dues, both of which had been in the previous contract. Finally, after having proposed an immediate 2 1/2 cent an hour wage raise, with an additional increase in the same amount every 3 months, and the Union having accepted this proposal, Respondent promptly withdrew it. With respect to the length of the agreement which the Union proposed be for 1 year but which the Respondent demanded be for 2 years, Respondent receded even from this position and demanded a contract for 30 months. When the Union, on June 17, 24, and July 1 wrote Respondent requesting further meetings, Respondent failed to reply, and the negotiations were broken off. This stiffening of Respondent's bargaining position after the strike represented an embarkation on a course of action which step by step drove the Union to an unconditional surrender. This course of action may have been due to a misconception of the requirements of the Act, and the belief that it was exonerated from bargaining in good faith by the Union's rejection of the incomplete contract proposals on February 29, and the walkout of the employees in the unit the following day. Hence Curry, asked on cross-examination why Respondent on April 16 rejected the Union's acceptance of Respondent's own previous proposal on job classification, replied: " . . . I felt that the membership had rejected the total contract, in effect, cleared the board of those offers at that time." Whatever Respondent's motivation, I find that Respondent, beginning with the strike, engaged in bad-faith bargaining generally in violation of the Act. 4. The refusal to bargain in good faith did not convert the strike into an unfair labor practice strike I have found that Respondent failed to bargain in good faith during the strike, in violation of the Act. But no evidence whatever was offered that this refusal served to prolong the strike. The Board has consistently held' that in the absence of such prolongation an economic strike does not become converted into an unfair labor practice strike. This is analogous to a situation prior to a strike where unfair labor practices, though committed, have no causal connection with the strike. 5. Further alleged specific instances of failing to bargain The complaint alleges that beginning on March 1, the day the strike began, Respondent unilaterally, without obtaining agreement from the Union, "conferred additional benefits upon the employees, consisting of free lunches, additional coffee break periods, and the institution of recreational facilities." The evidence in support of the last assertion consists solely of the testimony of Jack Hinds and Alfred Owen who stated that when they returned to work they observed a ping-pong table and a dart board in the cafeteria which had not been there prior to the strike. Neither testified, nor is there any other evidence, that either was in current use or had been used during the strike. To the contrary, the credited testimony of Curry is that these "recreational facilities" belonged to an employee who brought them to the plant for a St. Patrick's Day celebration on March 17, and had not yet removed them, and that they lay on a bench in the lunchroom and had been used only on the one occasion. , The evidence concerning "free lunches," and coffee breaks rests likewise on the same foundation - that Hopkins said that free lunches had been supplied the employees during the strike, and employees had as many coffee breaks as they wanted. There is no direct evidence in support of this. The credited testimony of Curry is that Respondent provided two coffee breaks previous to the strike, during the strike, and following the strike, and no more. As to the free lunches, Curry testified credibly that deliveries of food with which to service the slot machines in the cafeteria were not delivered across the picket line, as a result of which Respondent provided food for the technical and supervisory employees, outside the unit, who did not go out on strike. There is no evidence as to whether these employees paid for the food thus consumed. These particular allegations of refusal to bargain are unsubstantial and should be dismissed. Hinds and Owen additionally testified that they were asked by Hopkins the day after their return to work what their reaction would be "to a paper going around to get signatures to take a vote to see if the union would stay in the plant." The two employees replied that they would not have anything to do with it. No such paper was circulated so far as the record shows. I find that this inquiry does constitute coercive interrogation , as contended, and shall recommend that the complaint be dismissed as to this allegation.' 'For example see: Stowe- Woodward, Inc., 123 NLRB 287. The matter here approaches the academic since no striker was refused reinstatement upon the Union's request. 'In view of my finding on the above questions I do not consider it necessary to resolve the question of Hopkins' supervisory capacity. AUTOTRONICS, INC. 711 IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of the Respondent set forth in section III, above, occurring in connection with the operations of the Respondent set forth in section I, above , have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States , and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. V. THE REMEDY Having found that the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8(aX5) and (1) of the Act, I shall recommend that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action which will effectuate the policies of the Act. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Respondent is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. International Union, Allied Industrial Workers of America, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. All production and maintenance employees of Respondent, at its Joplin, Missouri, plant, excluding office clerical employees, professional employees, engineering department employees, guards, combination watchmen janitors, and supervisory employees as defined in the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for the purpose of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act. 4. The said Union has been since November 29, 1966, and now is, the certified representative of all employees in said appropriate unit for the purpose of collective bargaining with respect to rates of pay, wages , hours of employment and other terms and conditions of employment. 5. By refusing generally since March 7, 1968, to bargain collectively in good faith with the said labor organization as the exclusive representative of all employees in the said appropriate unit, Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and (1)of the Act. 6. The strike which commenced March 1, 1968, was not caused by any unfair labor practices of Respondent. 7. The refusal to bargain during the strike, which constituted an unfair labor practice, did not prolong the strike and convert it into an unfair labor practice strike. 8. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 9. The remaining allegations of the complaint setting forth acts said to constitute specific instances of a refusal to bargain, discussed above, do not constitute individual violations of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. [Recommended Order omitted from publication.]