Bob's Casing Crews, Inc.

BOB'S CASING CREWS Bob's Casing Crews, Inc. and Local 826, International Union of Operating Engineers, AFL-CIO. Case 16-CA-3401 August 1, 1969 DECISION AND ORDER BY MEMBERS FANNING, JENKINS, AND BROWN On March 18, 1969, Trial Examiner Joseph I. Nachman issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision and a supporting brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel. The Board has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions, the brief, and the entire record in the case, and adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner' with the following modification. Unlike the Trial Examiner, we do not find that the Respondent refused to reemploy Loper to discourage membership in any labor organization. Accordingly, we find no violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.' ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board hereby adopts as its Order the Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner, as modified herein, and orders that Respondent, Bob's Casing Crews, Inc., Odessa, Texas, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order, as so modified: 'The Respondent's motion to set aside the Trial Examiner's Decision is denied. As the Trial Examiner's Decision , the exceptions, the briefs, and the entire record in the case adequately present the issues and the positions of the parties, the Employer's request for oral argument is denied. 'The Trial Examiner' s finding of an 8(axl) violation , which we adopt, is based upon the Respondent 's refusal to reemploy Billy Ray Loper because of his protected concerted activities while employed by Red's Casing Crews. There is no showing that any labor union was involved in the activities at Red's. The Trial Examiner found it unnecessary to consider whether Loper's participation in the Charging Party's strike for recognition against the Respondent contributed to the Respondent 's decision not to reemploy him. Accordingly, and in the absence of exceptions to the Trial Examiner's failure to base his 8(a)(3) finding on Loper's strike activity, we conclude that a finding of an 8(a)(3) violation is not warranted. 3 1. Delete paragraph 1(b) from the Recommended Order and renumber paragraph 1(c) as paragraph 1(b). 2. Delete the final sentence in the notice attached to the Recommended Order. MEMBER BROWN , dissenting: The record, in my opinion, does not establish that Respondent refused to hire Loper for union considerations or for otherwise engaging in protected concerted activities. I would, therefore, dismiss the complaint. TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION JOSEPH I . NACHMAN, Trial Examiner: This proceeding tried before me at Odessa, Texas, on January 14 and 15, 1969, involves a complaint' pursuant to Section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act (herein called the Act), which as amended alleges that Bob's Casing Crews, Inc. (herein Respondent), refused to reemploy one Billy Ray Loper because of his assistance to and support of Local 826, International Union of Operating Engineers (herein the Union), and because of his concerted activities with other employees for their mutual aid or protection, in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act, and by threats and other conduct interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act, thus independently violating Section 8(a)(1) thereof.' For reasons hereafter stated I find and conclude that Loper was denied reemployment because of his concerted activities, but the General Counsel has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence, that Respondent independently interfered with the Section 7 rights of itsl, employees and that the allegations of the complaint in that regard should be dismissed. At the trial the parties were represented by counsel, and were given full opportunity to examine and cross-examine witnesses, to introduce relevant evidence, to argue orally on the record, and to submit briefs. Oral argument was waived. Briefs submitted by the General Counsel and Respondent, respectively, have been duly considered. Upon the entire record in the case, including my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, I make the following: 'Issued October 22, on a charge riled August 9, and amended charges riled August 19 and September 12. These and all dates hereafter mentioned are 1968, unless otherwise noted. 'This case originally came on for trial before Trial Examiner Jerry B. Stone, on December II. At that time par. 7(a) of the complaint alleged that between May 15 and June 15, Supervisor Newman ordered employees to refrain from discussing union matters among themselves during their nonworking time . On motion par. 7(a) of the complaint was amended by the General Counsel to allege that the event therein referred to occurred on or about June 1. Trial Examiner Stone, on the representation of Respondent's counsel that he needed further time to prepare for the amendment, granted a continuance . At the conclusion of the General Counsel's case in the trial before me, Respondent moved to dismiss all allegations of the complaint , individually and collectively, for lack of adequate proof. In response to my request of General Counsel to detail what evidence the record contained to support the allegations of par. 7(a), he answered "None." Accordingly, the motion to dismiss was granted insofar as it related to par. 7(a). This ruling makes it unnecessary to consider Respondent's further contention that par. 7(a) of the complaint as amended had no charge filed within 6 months of the event , to support it. If the point had to be decided I would have no hesitance in holding that the charges herein are adequate to support the complaint as amended. N.L.R.B. v. Fan! Milling Co., 360 U.S. 301. 178 NLRB No. 2 4 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD FINDINGS OF FACTS A. The Unfair Labor Practices Alleged 1. Background The Union began its organizational campaign in late February or early March, and within the following 30 days held several meetings with employees at which authorization cards were signed. Company President Blackmon admittedly learned of the Union's activity among Respondent's employees on or about March 10. Later in March, the Union orally requested recognition from Blackmon, and thereafter renewed its request in writing. Such requests either went unanswered , or were denied . Shortly after learning of the Union' s campaign, Blackmon made a speech to his employees that he caused to be assembled for the purpose. Although the General Counsel concedes that the speech was protected by Section 8(c) of the Act, he contends, and I find, that the speech and other events hereafter referred to, demonstrate Respondent's hostility to the organizational activity of its employees.' On April 17 the Union hand delivered a letter 'The complaint herein alleges that the Union is a labor organization within the meaning of the Act . Respondent's answer states that it "neither admits nor denies" that allegation . No claim was made that Respondent was without knowledge of the facts . As the answer did not comply with Sec. 102 .20 of the Board's Rules and Regulations, the averments of the complaint in that regard are deemed admitted , and I find that fact to be as there alleged . With respect to commerce , the complaint alleges and the answer admits that Respondent is engaged at Odessa , Texas and Hobbs, New Mexico , in the business of running casing for the oil well drilling industry , and in renting tools and equipment for such purposes , and that during the past year it performed services valued at more than $50,000 for customers outside the State of Texas, and also performed services valued at more than $50,000 for customers within the State of Texas who made sales to customers engaged in interstate commerce . Although Respondent admitted those allegations of the complaint , it argues that the Board is without jurisdiction over its operations because they are essentially local and there has been no showing that a strike among its employees would have any impact upon interstate commerce or the free flow thereof. The contention is plainly without merit . See N.L.R.B. v . Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371 U.S. 224, and the cases there cited. Respondent further argues that while its business fits the Board's $50,000 outflow test announced in Stemon's Mailing Service , 122 NLRB 81, that standard cannot be applied to its operations because the casing business is new and was not before the Board when the test announced in Stemon , supra. was adopted, and hence cannot be said to have been contemplated by the Board as applicable to the casing business . In support of this argument Respondent cites Seattle Real Estate Board, etc., 130 NLRB 608, 610. 1 find the -.argument unconvincing . Stemon , supra, was intended to lay down the broad rule, that absent unusual circumstances, such as were present in Seattle Real Estate Board (which decision has not been cited or relied upon by the Board since it issued), that the Board would assert jurisdiction "over all nonretail enterprises" meeting the $50,000 inflow or outflow test, and Stemon , supra, has been applied by the Board to the oil well drilling industry , of which it regarded the running of casing as an integral part. Hondo Drilling Company N .S.L.. 164 NLRB No. 67; Carl B. King Drilling Co., 164 NLRB No. 68 ; Colo. Well Service. Inc., 163 NLRB 101; Wek Drilling Co. Inc.. 174 NLRB No. 92. Moreover, the Board has in fact found the Union to be a labor organization, and has asserted jurisdiction over Respondent . In Bob's Casing Crews, Inc.. 16-RC-4968, a representation proceeding filed by the Union on July 31, 1968, and still pending, a hearing was conducted at which Respondent raised the same jurisdictional issue it raised here . The Regional Director on October 8, issued his Decision and Direction of Election , finding the Union to be a labor organization , and specifically rejecting the defense of lack of Board jurisdiction . The Board, on December 4, denied Respondent's Request For Review, holding that the Request "raises no substantial issue warranting review." The Regional Director's Decision and the Board's denial of review, are exhibits 'in the instant case. to Respondent's office, which Blackmon admitted he received, again demanding recognition , and stating that unless such was granted by midnight that day, there would at that time "be a work stoppage by your employees." Respondent did not reply to the Union's letter, and at midnight April 18, a number of Respondent's employees left their jobs and engaged in a strike against it.' On May 9, the Union wired Respondent that it was unconditionally offering to return all striking employees to work as of 8 p.m., May 10. Respondent replied that although Union did not represent a majority, the company would reinstate those striking employees who had not been discharged for cause,' and who individually unconditionally offered to return to work. The strike thereupon terminated.' 2. Independent interference, restraint, and coercion To establish this aspect of his case, the General Counsel relies entirely upon the uncorroborated testimony of Cecil Earnest, who testified that "on or about" April 1, "late in the morning," at Respondent's shop, Blackmon stated to him, in the presence of four or five other employees, in substance, that he had been in business for 13 years, that he would run it as he saw fit, and that he would padlock his doors before he would have a union telling him what to do. According to Earnest, those present were standing in a group, within 6 or 8 feet of each other, that Blackmon spoke in a normal tone of voice so that none of those present should have had any difficulty hearing what was said . When pressed for the identity of those present, Earnest could name only J. R. Tankersley, and Glen Golden, the supervisory status of the latter not being in question, claiming inability to recall the names of the others. In addition to Blackmon who denied that he made any statement of the nature attributed to him by Earnest, Respondent called the three employees regularly assigned to the shop,' who testified that they never heard Blackmon make such remark at any time or place. Paul Burns, employed by Respondent as a caser, testified that he normally worked as a member of Earnest's crew, and when he did so accompanied the latter to the shop to turn in work tickets, and that he never heard Blackmon make a remark of the nature here involved. Although Earnest claimed that he had discussed Blackmon's statement with Glen Golden, the latter denied that he had heard such a 'Blackmon's speech was tape recorded, and a substantial portion of it was transcribed into the record . I deem it unnecessary and of no particular benefit to refer to specific portions of the speech. Suffice it to say, the speech read in its entirety, plainly shows that by comments entirely legitimate, Blackmon was conveying to the employees that he did not want a union in his operation , and tried to convince them that it would be in their interest not to select union representation . To that extent the speech evidences antiunion animus. 'There is a conflict in the evidence as to the number and identity of the employees who engaged in the strike. The General Counsel contends that about 13 employees did so, while Blackmon claims there were only about seven or eight . Except with respect to Loper, the alleged discriminatee, the pertinent facts of which are hereafter dismissed, I find it unnecessary to resolve the conflict. 'The record shows that on April 23 , Respondent discharged employees Earl Pierce, Cecil Earnest, and Jimmie Branum . According to the letters sent these employees, each was discharged "for assaulting an employee of this company on or about April 21, 1968 ." The legality of these discharges is not in issue here. 'According to Blackmon, whose testimony in that regard is uncontradicted, all striking employees who applied for reinstatement, were returned to work. Three employees not involved here did not apply for reinstatement. It is undisputed that Loper did not do so. 'These are Floyd Bingham, Bidal Moya, and Charles Dugan. BOB'S CASING CREWS remark by Blackmon at any time . In addition Golden identified a work ticket showing that on April 1, he was on a job about 75 miles from Odessa , and testified that the job required his absence from town for something over 15 hours. Conclusions as to the Section 8(a)(1) Allegations Upon consideration of the entire record relating to this aspect of the case , I find and conclude that the General Counsel has failed to prove by a preponderence of the credible evidence that Blackmon made the remarks which Earnest attributed to him . I reach this conclusion because of (1) Earnest' s demeanor while testifying which did not impress me as evidencing a credible witness ; (2) the General Counsel's failure to call, or explain why he did not call Tankersley, one employee whom Earnest identified by name as having allegedly heard Blackmon's statement; and (3) the fact that Earnest had a motive for testifying as he did, namely his discharges by Respondent in April , as noted fn . 6, supra.' When these factors are considered in the light of the affirmative evidence adduced by Respondent on this issue, I must and do find and conclude , that the General Counsel failed to prove this allegation by a preponderence of the credible evidence, and that the same should be dismissed.1° 3. Alleged failure to reemploy Loper Loper had been employed by Respondent since about July 1967 , as a regular caser, and worked in that capacity until about December 20, 1967 . During this time he worked in a crew supervised by Raymond Northcutt." Because Loper wanted to return to his home in Mississippi for the the impending Christmas holiday, he asked Northcutt for the time off. Northcutt explained that 'because the work was of an emergency nature , and that Loper's absence might make it necessary for another employee to loose his holiday by having to work in Loper's place, it was company policy not to grant time off during a holiday , and that any regular employee who was not available if called for work on a holiday, would be discharged . A day or two later , Loper told Northcutt that he was going home for Christmas , but rather than risk discharge he would quit , and when he returned to the Odessa area would work as an extra . Loper testified without contradiction that Northcutt raised no objection to what Loper proposed to do , saying only that he hated to loose Loper, and would call him as an extra when such. work was available . The regular employment which Loper thus terminated ended on or about December 20, 1967.12 Following his return to the Odessa area , Loper worked as an extra for Respondent and some four or five other employers, including Red's Casing Crews . The record is clear that during 1968 , Loper worked for Respondent as an extra a total of 9 days, the last one being on April 18." 'I have given no consideration to the statement in Respondent 's brief that on April 29, Earnest filed a charge with the Board alleging that his discharges by Respondent was discriminatory , which charge was dismissed by the Regional Director on July 19 , because such facts are not of record in this case, and the Board's records available in Washington are not of such a nature as to permit verification of the alleged facts. "This conclusion makes it unnecessary to consider whether, as Respondent contends , Earnest was a supervisor within the meaning of the Act and that there is no proof that any employee heard the statement. "Respondent's employees work in crews ; a crew consisting of a crew hauler, and normally four casers . The crew hauler is the one who gets the job order, assembles the crew by calling the casers who normally work for him, or if a particular man is unavailable , an extra that works when called by any crew hauler. The extras work not only for Respondent, but for any other employer in the industry who might call them . The crew haulers admittedly are supervisors. 5 During the Union campaign heretofore mentioned, Loper attended some four or five union meetings, and at the first such meeting along with a number of other employees signed a Union card . That was also attended by one "Russell," who is identified in the record only as "a crew hauler for Bob's," as well as by Glen Golden and Billy Gilbert, both admitted supervisors of Respondent, Golden also then signing a card . On April 18 , when the Union struck Respondent for recognition , Loper was at work for Respondent in a crew supervised by Golden, and left that job before it was completed , as a striker. After April 18 , Respondent's crew foremen did not call Loper for "extra" work, nor did Loper apply to Respondent or any crew hauler for work . During that period Loper worked for other employers , but their identity nor with what regularity, does not appear . Although Company President Blackmon testified that on April 18, he was not aware that Loper had participated in the strike against Respondent, he admitted that he learned of that fact when the payroll covering that period was prepared . Although the date of this does not appear , it could not have been more than a week or 10 days later. As heretofore stated , after the conclusion of the strike which began April 18 , Respondent did not call Loper to work, nor until the events hereafter referred to, did Loper ask it for work, although he was available for such on the basis of an "extra." On or about August 6, Loper telephoned crew hauler Golden, and in the course of the conversation asked Golden if the latter had work for him, saying that he had been discharged by Red 's Casing Crews, the employer for whom he had worked immediately prior thereto . Golden told Loper that he would hire him, but could not do so unless the latter first cleared through the office, stating that his standing instructions were not to hire anyone without such clearance. Loper agreed to seek the required clearance."' Loper then called Company President Blackmon and asked whether he (Loper ) was barred from working for Respondent . Blackmon replied "No, I don't guess. Why." Loper replied that he had theretofore regularly worked for Respondent, but had quit and then worked as an extra until he left the job to engage in the strike which occurred on April 18 . Blackmon asked where he (Loper) had been working. Loper replied that he had been working for Red's Casing Crews , but had been fired because he and some fellow employees left a job after having worked more than 20 consecutive hours, and Red's failed to send relief. Blackmon told Loper that in the oil fields there were good jobs and bad jobs, that a worker stood to make them all , that Loper would have to file a new application, but that the matter of screening applicants had been delegated to Billy Gilbert, an admitted supervisor, and that Loper should communicate with Gilbert . However, Blackmon also told Loper that leaving a job in the middle wasn't much of a recommendation to go to work for Respondent. 16 Following his conversation with Loper, Blackmon called Crew Foreman Northcutt, for whom Loper had worked prior to December 1967, and inquired as to the circumstances under which Loper had then quit. "The findings to this point are based on a composite of the credited testimony of Loper and Northcutt , which basically is not in conflict. "The exact dates are January 5 and 25, February 3 and 28, March 13 and April 1 , 3, and 18. "To this point there is no basic conflict in the evidence ; the foregoing findings being based on a composite of the credited testimony of Loper and Golden. "My findings with respect to this conversation are based on a composite of the testimony of Loper and Blackmon which , to the extent credited is 6 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Ascertaining that Loper had quit to enable him to go home for Christmas, and to avoid being fired for not being available at that time, Blackmon then communicated with Billy Gilbert. Blackmon told Gilbert of Loper's call to him for employment, and that he had referred Loper to Gilbert. He also told Gilbert the reason for Loper's quitting before Christmas 1967, and that he had walked off the Red's job, and remarked that while Gilbert would have to pass on the matter, in his (Blackmon's) view this was not much of a recommendation for employment with Respondent. Following his conversation with Blackmon on August 6, Loper sought to telephone Gilbert, but was unable to reach him until the evening of August 7. Loper told Gilbert that he had applied for work and that Golden had agreed to hire him if he (Gilbert) gave his approval. Although Gilbert had been told by Blackmon about Loper "walking off" the job at Red's, as well as the circumstances under which Loper had quit in 1967, he pretended to be unaware of those facts, his admitted comment to Loper being, "I thought you were working at Red's." Gilbert also admitted that Loper then told him that he had been discharged by Red's, and that he (Gilbert) replied that being fired by another company was not much of a recommendation for employment by Respondent. Gilbert did not deny Loper's testimony, which I credit, that he was told by Gilbert "it is nothing personal, but it is just that I had rather not have you back out there on account of you walking off those jobs," and that "you have walked off here twice and quit ...",16 nor did he deny, but in fact tacitly admitted that Loper's conduct at the Red's job was one of the principal reasons for refusing to rehire Loper. Both Blackmon and Gilbert admitted that a number of casers were hired as regular full time employees after Loper was denied employment on August 7. The uncontradicted evidence in the case is that Loper was discharged by Red's because he and a number of his fellow employees had left the job to protest what they, correctly or incorrectly, regarded as excessive hours of work without relief, and as I have found, Loper informed Blackmon of these facts in their conversation on August 6. Like the quitting of work to protest excessively cold conditions, involved in Washington Aluminum , supra, the quitting of work by Loper and his fellow employees to protest excessive hours, was equally protected by Section 7 of the Act as concerted activity for which they could not lawfully be discharged or denied employment. That Loper's leaving the Red's job was a critical and substantial factor in Respondent's decision not to reemploy Loper is plain from the testimony of Blackmon and Gilbert, for both admittedly told Loper that his leaving Red's job was not a recommendation for employment with Respondent. It follows, therefore that Loper was denied reemployment by Respondent because he engaged in protected concerted activity at Red's." This refusal to reemploy was not only interference, restraint and coercion with respect to Loper's Section 7 rights, in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the act, but plainly has the foreseeable effect of discouraging membership in the Union, and therefore violated Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. I so find and conclude. Having reached the conclusion just stated, it becomes unnecessary to decide whether Loper's participation in the April 18, strike played any part in Respondent's decision not to reemploy him as, in any event, it could be no more than another reason for concluding that Respondent's conduct was unlawful. Upon the foregoing findings of fact and the entire record in the case, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW Conclusions on Alleged Refusal To Hire Loper The General Counsel contends that Respondent's refusal to reemploy Loper was predicated upon two factors; (1) that Loper had engaged in the April 18 strike against Respondent, and (2) that he had engaged in conduct at Red's which was plainly concerted activity. The authorities are clear that if either of the two factors mentioned was a motivating reason for Respondent's decision not to reemploy Loper, the Act was violated. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 313 U.S. 177; N.L.R.B. v. Washington Aluminum Company, Inc., 370 U.S. 9." In the view which I take of the case, only the second of the General Counsel's contentions need be considered. not regarded as in conflict. Blackmon did not deny that Loper explained fully why be had been discharged by Red's, indeed Blackmon admitted that the subject was discussed . On the other hand Loper did not mention, but neither did he deny , that Blackmon told him that walking off the Red's job was not much of a recommendation to work for Respondent. "As Loper had only left Respondent 's jobs only on two occasions-once when he quit in December 1967, and the other on April 18, when Loper went on strike-Gilbert's remark must have had reference to Loper 's strike activity, notwithstanding the fact that he also testified that Loper 's going on strike did not constitute "walking off" the job, nor did it in any way breach Respondent 's rules. "While Washington Aluminum , supra, involved a discharge for engaging in concerted activity, the discrimination or interference proscribed by the 1. Respondent is an employer within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act, and is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. The charges filed herein were sufficient to invoke the Board's jurisdiction and to support the complaint both as issued, and as thereafter amended. 4. By denying reemployment to Loper because the latters engaged in protected concerted activity at Red's, Respondent interfered with, restrained and coerced its employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act, and discriminated against him to discourage membership in the Union, and thereby engaged in and continues to engage in unfair labor practices proscribed by Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act. 5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 6. The General Counsel failed to prove by a preponderence of the evidence that Respondent otherwise interfered with, restrained or coerced its employees in the Act is broad enough to include a reTusal to hire or rehire because the employee had engaged in concerted activity. Phelps Dodge Corp., supra. "Although notall concerted .activity is protected--forlexample a strike in violation of a contractual no-strike provision , Southwest Banana Distributors . Inc., 145 NLRB 815, 819 -the burden of proving facts to establish the unprotected character of Loper's concerted activity, being a matter of defense, was on Respondent . Not only did it fail to establish that fact, but neither at the trial, nor in its brief does Respondent contend that Loper's conduct at Red' s was in fact unprotected. BOB'S CASING CREWS exercise or'rightsiguaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act, and the allegations of the complaint in that regard should be dismissed. THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I shall recommend that it be required to cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action found necessary and designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. Having found that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act by denying reemployment to Billy Ray Loper because he had engaged in concerted activity protected by Section 7 of the Act, I shall recommend that it be required to forthwith offer him employment as a regular full time caser, the job for which he applied, without prejudice to his seniority or other rights, privileges and working conditions, and make him whole for any loss of earnings he suffered as a result of Respondent's refusal to employ him on August 7, 1968, by paying to him a sum of money equal to that which he would have earned had he been employed by Respondent on August 7, 1968, to the date he is offered such employment, less his net earnings during that period, computed in accordance with the Board's formula set forth in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289, with interest thereon at the rate of 6 percent per annum, as provided in Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716. To assist in procuring compliance with this provision, it will be recommended that Respondent be required to preserve and make available to authorized agents of the Board, all payroll and other records necessary or useful to determine compliance with the Board's order, or in computing the amount of backpay due thereunder. Because of the character of the unfair labor practices found, which go to the very heart of the Act, I shall recommend that Respondent be required to cease and desist from in any manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act. N.L.R.B. v. Entwistle Mfg. Co., 120 F.2d 532 (C.A. 4). RECOMMENDED ORDER Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law and the entire record in the case, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, it is recommended that the National Labor Relations Board order Bob's Casing Crews, Inc., its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, to: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Refusing to employ or reemploy applicants for employment because they have engaged in concerted activities protected by Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended. (b) Discouraging membership in Local 826, International Union of Operating Engineers , AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization , by discharging, refusing to employ, or in any other manner discriminating against any employee in regard to his hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment. (c) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of the right to self-organization, to form labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, 7 or to refrain from any and all such activities. 2. Take the following affirmative action designed and found necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Forthwith offer Billy Ray Loper employment as a regular full time caser, without prejudice to his seniority, or other rights privileges or working conditions, and make him whole for any loss of earnings he suffered, in the manner set forth in the section hereof entitled "The Remedy." (b) Preserve and, upon request, make available to authorized agents of the Board, for examination and copying, all payroll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other records necessary or useful to determine compliance with this order, or in computing the amount of backpay due hereunder. (c) Notify Billy Ray Loper if presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United States of his right to employment with Respondent upon application, after discharge from the Armed Forces, in accordance with the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Training and Service Act, as amended. (d) Post at its shop and plant premises in Odessa, Texas, copies of the notice attached hereto marked "Appendix."" Copies of said notice on forms furnished by the Regional Director for Region 16 of the Board (Fort Worth, Texas), shall after being duly signed by an authorized representative, be posted immediately upon receipt thereof and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to its employees are customarily posted, and take all reasonable steps necessary to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced or covered by any other material. (e) Notify the aforesaid Regional Director, in writing, within 20 days from the receipt of this Decision, what steps it has taken to comply herewith." IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint herein, to the extent that it alleges that Respondent interfered with, restrained and coerced its employees, other than by its refusal to reemploy Loper, be and the same is dismissed. "In the event this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the notice. In the further event that the Board's Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision and Order." "In the event these Recommendations are adopted by the Board, this provision shall be modified to read: "Notify the aforesaid Regional Director, in writing, within 10 days from receipt of this Order, what steps it has taken to comply herewith." APPENDIX NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board and in order- to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our employees that: After a trial at which all sides had the chance to present evidence, a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the law and has ordered us to post this notice to inform our employees 8 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD of their rights. WE WILL NOT fire, refuse to hire, or in any other manner discriminate against any employee because he joins, assists, or supports a union. As the Trial Examiner found that we violated the law when we refused to reemploy Billy Ray Loper as a regular full time caser , WE WILL offer him a job as a regular full time caser; with full seniority, and we will make up the pay he lost, together with 6 percent interest. WE WILL notify Billy Ray Loper, if presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United States, of his right to employment, upon application, in accordance with the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Training and Service Act, as amended, after discharge from the Armed Forces. The law gives all our employees these rights: To organize themselves To form, join, or help unions To bargain as a group through a representative they choose To act together for collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection To refuse to do any or all of these things We assure you WE WILL NOT do anything to interfere with you in the exercise of these rights . Every employee is free to become or remain a member of Local 826, International Union of Operating Engineers , AFL-CIO, or any other union, or not to become or remain a member of any union. Dated By BOB'S CASING CREWS, INC. (Employer) (Representative ) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered , defaced, or covered by any other material. If employees have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions they may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, Room 8A24, Federal Office Building , 819 Taylor Street , Fort Worth, Texas 76102, Telephone 817-334-3921.