Local 16, Longshoremen

LOCAL 16, LONGSHOREMEN 889 Local No. 16, International Longshoremen and Warehousemen's Union and City of Juneau. Case 19-CC-389 June 20, 1969 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN MCCULLOCH AND MEMBERS FANNING AND BROWN provisions of the Act."2 Thus it is apparent, as Congress intended, that Section 8(b)(4)(B) can apply to a particular dispute even though Sections 8(a) or 9 are inapplicable to the underlying controversy between an exempt person and its employees. ^ For these reasons, and because the operations of the City of Juneau and the State of Alaska have an impact on commerce, we agree with the Trial Examiner that it effectuates the purposes of the Act to assert jurisdiction herein. On December 18, 1968, Trial Examiner George H. O'Brien issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had not engaged in unfair labor practices as alleged in the complaint and recommending that the complaint be dismissed in its entirety, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner' s Decision . Thereafter, the General Counsel filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision and a supporting brief, and the Respondent filed cross-exceptions and a supporting brief. The National Labor Relations Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner 's Decision, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner. We agree with the Trial Examiner' s conclusion that Respondent's conduct constituted lawful primary activity and we therefore adopt his recommendation that the instant complaint be dismissed in its entirety. We also agree, essentially for the reasons stated by the Trial Examiner, that the Board has jurisdiction over the instant proceeding. Further comment is necessary, however, in view of the dissent's contention that Section 8(bx4)(B) may not be invoked where, as here, the primary and secondary employers are political subdivisions which do not meet the statutory definition of "employer" as set forth in Section 2(2) of the Act. Section 8(b)(4)(B), unlike Sections 8(a) and 9 of the Act, contains no language limiting its scope to disputes involving those who meet the statutory definition of "employer." Instead, Section 8(b)(4)(B) applies to alleged secondary activity affecting "persons." The definition of the term "persons" appearing in Section 2(l) of the Act plainly includes political subdivisions. Thus, the instant dispute falls within the literal terms of Section 8(b)(4XB).' Furthermore, the legislative history, in our opinion, reveals an intention on the part of Congress that the terms of Section 8(bx4)(B ) be given full effect in protecting municipal and State governments from secondary pressures. In 1959, that Section was amended so as "to extend the protection of the Act to public employers, railroads, or agricultural enterprises without subjecting them to other ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner, and hereby orders that the complaint herein be, and it hereby is, dismissed. MEMBER JENKINS, dissenting: I cannot accept the majority's assertion of jurisdiction over the instant picketing. The underlying dispute is between the City of Juneau, Alaska, and its employees. The alleged secondary employer is the Alaska State Marine Highway System, a Division of the Department of Public Works of the State of Alaska. There is no other employer party. Section 2(2) and (3), respectively, of the Act we administer specifically excludes any employer who is a State or political subdivision thereof, and individuals employed by them. The majority apparently concedes , as it must, that neither of the employer parties nor the employees involved herein are "employers" and "employees," as defined in Section 2(2) and (3) of our Act. Though the legislative history of Section 8(b)(4) indicates that Congress intended to relieve exempt employers of secondary pressures by unions who were subject to the Act, nothing in that history shows any intention to apply the prohibition of the Section in cases where not only the boycotted employer is exempt but the employees taking the action are also employed by an exempt employer and thus are not amenable to any other provisions of the Act. I am unwilling to project the reach of the Act so far, in the absence of a clear congressional mandate. Assuming, however, as the majority apparently does, that the foregoing explicit statutory exclusions are not applicable for 8(b)(4) purposes, and that the Board somehow has discretion in the matter, the assertion of jurisdiction in the circumstances here present would not effectuate the policies of the Act. Rather, the application of 8(b )(4), to the exclusion of all other provisions of the Act with which the 'Respondent, on the basis of its representation of nongovernment employees, is concededly a 'labor organization " within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, etc. (B. B. McCormick and Sons, Inc.), 150 NLRB 363, 370-371. 'Remarks of Senator Goldwater, II Legislative History of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, p. 1079, col. 3. 176 NLRB No. 121 890 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Board is entrusted, constitutes a clearly disparate application because the Board does not and cannot apply 8(a) provisions where the employer involved falls within the exclusions defined in 2(2) of the Act. More specifically, the statutory scheme defined in Section 1(b) of our Act is to provide orderly procedures for the purpose of preventing interference by either employers or employees with the prescribed legitimate rights of the other, and a labor dispute between an exempt employer and its employees cannot be resolved by the Board within the statutory framework, for the Board is powerless to afford and protect rights of employees which would otherwise be guaranteed them by Section 7 of our Act. For the foregoing reasons, I would not assert jurisdiction. TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE GEORGE H. 0 BRIEN, Trial Examiner: Upon a charge and an amended charge filed by the City of Juneau, Alaska, on July 3 and August 14, 1968,' respectively, the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board, acting through the Acting Regional Director for Region 19 (Seattle, Washington) issued a Complaint and Notice of Hearing on August 21 and an Amended Complaint and Notice of Hearing on September 17. The Complaint as amended alleges, in substance, that Local No. 16, International Longshoremen and Warehousemen ' s Union, herein called Respondent, threatened to picket ferry boats owned and operated by Alaska State Marine Highway System, a Division of the Department of Public Works of the State of Alaska, threatened to appeal to ferry boat crews to refuse to berth the vessels or to perform services at the Juneau City Dock, did appeal to ferry boat crews and their union (Inland Boatmen's Union of the Pacific, herein called IBU) to refuse to perform services at the Juneau City Dock, and did picket a ferry boat on July 2, 1968 from a small boat in open water about half a mile from the Juneau City Dock. The Amended Complaint concludes with the allegation that Respondent induced individuals employed by the State of Alaska to refuse to perform services for the State, and threatened, coerced, and restrained the State and the City with the object of forcing or requiring the State of Alaska to cease doing business with the City of Juneau, and thereby violated Section 8(bx4)(i)(iiXB) of the Act. Respondent's answer denies any violation of the Act and avers, as affirmative defenses, that the National Labor Relations Board is without jurisdiction, and that the Respondent's conduct was in all respects primary and protected by Sections 7, 8, and 13 of the Act and the Eirst Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.' Pursuant to due notice, a hearing was held before me in the United States Court House in Juneau, Alaska, on October 8 and 9. All parties appeared at the hearing and were given full opportunity to participate, to adduce relevant evidence, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, to argue orally, and to file briefs. Briefs were filed by the General Counsel and by counsel for Respondent and have been carefully considered by me in arriving at my decision. Upon the entire record, including the briefs, and from my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying under oath, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. THE BUSINESS OF THE STATE OF ALASKA AND THE CITY OF JUNEAU Alaska State Marine Highway System, a division of the Department of Public Works of the State of Alaska, is a political subdivision of the State of Alaska, which owns and operates ferry boats operating between ports in the States of Washington and Alaska. The City of Juneau is a political subdivision of the State of Alaska. It owns and operates the Municipal Airport at Juneau, Alaska, and in the course of said operations sells landing and terminal facilities to interstate air carriers, such as Western Airlines, of a value exceeding $50,000 per annum. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED Respondent and IBU are labor organizations within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The Issues 1. Whether the Board has, or may assert jurisdiction over a labor organization, the acts of which did not affect any "employer" or any "employee" in a proceeding to which no "employer" is a party, and by which no "employer" is affected. 2. Whether Respondent induced or encouraged any individual employed by a person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce to refuse to perform services. 3. Whether Respondent threatened, coerced, or restrained any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce. 4. Whether Respondent, by picketing in a motorboat, at a distance from the site of its dispute with the primary "person" evidenced an object of enmeshing the secondary "person" in a dispute not its own. 5. Whether picketing by Respondent on July 2, 1968, at the shoreside of City Dock, and from a motorboat, was primary activity protected by the proviso to Section 8(b)(4)(B) of the Act. 'Dates are 1968, unless otherwise specified 'As subsidiary grounds for dismissal Respondent avers that the State of Alaska and City of Juneau constitute one person under the principles of Municial Corporation Law, that the State of Alaska is an ally of the City of Juneau, hence is nit statutorily shielded as a neutral, that the facts of this case present no more than an ordinary jurisdictional dispute, that Section 8(bX4XD) is not applicable because it incorporates the word "employer" and that if 8(bx4)(D ) were applicable Respondent is entitled to the work My disposition of the primary issues removes these subsidiary matters from issue. B. The Testimony In 1963 the State of Alaska instituted a ferry system to operate between ports on the Inland Passage. When officials of the City of Juneau learned that the State did not plan to have the ferries dock at the Juneau waterfront, but proposed to serve the City by a dock at Auke Bay, 15 LOCAL 16, LONGSHOREMEN protest. Following negotiations between the City and the State a "Use Agreement" was signed on May 1 , 1963, by the Governor of the State and by the acting Mayor of the City. The City agreed to construct and maintain terminal facilities and specifically agreed to bear the "tie up and cast off costs" of the ferries at the terminal. The State agreed that for 20 years it would pay an annual rental of one-twentieth of the cost of construction to the City for the use of the terminal . The State was guaranteed the use of the premises during the ferries' calls, and the City was left free to permit its use by others where it would not interfere with the operation of the ferries. Juneau is a seaport and normal dockside work is performed by members of Respondent under collective bargaining agreements. These agreements required that for "tie up and cast off" there be employed a minimum crew of five men for a minimum of four hours to each. As a result of negotiations between the Respondent and the City a memorandum was signed on March 27, 1963. The memorandum was entitled : "THIS IS NOT A CONTRACT BUT ' A MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING." It incorporated by reference all terms of the local Longshore agreements except for those relating to tie up and cast off time and pay. It specifically provided that , for the ferries only, the minimum should be two men for two hours pay each. A bond issue was authorized by general election, the ferry terminal was constructed , called by the name of the City Dock, and the State ferries called regularly at the City Dock from Autumn 1963 at least through 1967. At each call two longshoremen were dispatched by Respondent and each received from the City, pay for 2 hours' time. Under date of April 30, 1968, the City Manager, Herbert W. Lehfeldt, sent a letter to Respondent, reciting: A review of City records reveals that the City of Juneau does not at this time have a contract for the tie-up of the State of Alaska Ferry Boats. Inasmuch as the State Ferries are not using the City Dock at this time and the City will not be required to provide tie-up services until after the reconstruction of the dock is completed, the City will not be needing I.L.W.U. members to tie up the ferries. In the future all ferry tie-ups will be performed by City of Juneau personnel. Should you have any questions regarding this matter please feel free to contact me. Pursuant to this invitation , Respondent's secretary, Tom Scott, and a member of its labor relations committee, Mr. Vollenweeder, met with City Manager Lehfeldt and City Attorney, Joseph Henri, at the City Hall. Lehfeldt testified that the union representatives "indicated" that if the City persisted in its refusal to employ longshoremen , Respondent would picket the ferries. Henri testified that there was no mention of picketing by either of Respondent's representatives at this first City Hall meeting. Neither Scott nor Vollenweeder was called as a witness. On May 24, Respondent placed two pickets at the City Hall carrying signs, the legend on which read: CITY OF JUNEAU REFUSE TO HONOR ILWU LOCAL 16. 891 Pickets carried these signs at the City Hall from 11:30 a.m. to 1:30 p.m . 5 days a week until September 11. There was no picketing on Saturday or Sunday and there was no picketing on primary election day. There was a second meeting at the City Hall on the morning of June 17 which was attended by City Manager Lehfeldt, City Attorney Henri, Respondent's president, Guy, and by Ferral Campbell, District Representative of the International Union of Operating Engineers. Campbell, who had represented the Engineers in Alaska for 21 years, and who had also been a special representative of the Inland Boatmen's Union from 1963 to 1965, arranged the meeting in an attempt to mediate the dispute between the Respondent and the City. Campbell did not then represent, nor had he at any time prior thereto represented , Respondent . Henri testified that Campbell stated, that if the ferries came in at City Dock, Respondent would picket there and would use boats to get right next to the ferry boat, Henri further testified that Guy was in the conversation, and agreed that that was what Respondent would do, and that Guy did not repudiate Campbell's statement that Respondent would use boats with which to picket. Campbell denied making the statement attributed to him by Henri. Guy, though not questioned specifically about the June 17 meeting in City Hall did testify that he told both the City and the State Ferry service that there would be picketing at the City Dock if an attempt was made to bring in a ferry without longshoremen to handle the mooring lines . Lehfeldt, when questioned about the second meeting at City Hall testified that Guy and Scott "indicated" that if the City failed to meet Respondent's demands for employment "they would picket the City Dock and the ferries". When asked on cross-examination whether it was Campbell, and not Scott who attended the second meeting he reaffirmed his testimony and stated that it was some later meeting which Campbell attended. Lehfeldt was not asked to state his recollection of anything that Campbell said at any meeting. On the afternoon of June 17 the same four conferees met in the office of the Commissioner of Public Works for the State of Alaska with Commissioner Harold Strandberg, Deputy Commissioner Linn Forest, and Gregory O'Claray, Alaska Representative for Inland Boatmen's Union of the Pacific . Henri testified that O'Claray stated that Respondent had asked for the help of the IBU in its dispute with the City and that IBU was going to give Respondent that help, and that Guy sat mute when the statement was made by O'Claray. O'Claray denied that he made the statement attributed to him by Henri. Guy freely admitted that he had talked to O'Claray five or six times about the problem raised by the City's April 30 letter but denied that he ever asked O'Claray or any member of the IBU for help in Respondent's dispute with the City. Lehfeldt testified that he did not recall any statement by any representative of the Respondent about picketing the ferries if they were to use the City Dock . Neither Strandberg nor Campbell was questioned regarding any statement by O'Claray, and Forrest did not testify. A second meeting was held in Commissioner Strandberg's office on June 28 . The meeting was arranged by Representative Bill Ray, a member of the State Legistature. Those in attendance were : Commissioner Strandberg, Walter Cublay, assistant to the Governor, George Benesch , Assistant Attorney General, Captain Merle Adlum, head of the Inland Boatmen 's Union in 892 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Seattle, Gregory O'Claray, Joe Guy, and Bill Ray. Ray called the meeting because the State wanted to know what would happen if they brought a ferry into the downtown dock and he brought the parties together to try to work ouf some agreement so Juneau could have regular downtown tie-up service. Ray put a direct question to Captain Adlum : "Would the sailors respect a Longshoremen's picket line?" Adlum replied according to the credited testimony of Commissioner Strandberg, corroborated by the testimony of Guy, that each individual sailor would make his own decision as to whether or not to respect the picket line, that the Inland Boatmen's Union would not take any position and would not give any instructions to its members. Commissioner Strandberg further testified: There was no doubt in my mind what Mr. Guy was going to do but I can't remember whether Mr. Guy came out and said flatly, "If you bring a vessel into the port we are going to picket it" I couldn't testify to that, but I most assuredly had the impression that the union was going to picket the dock if we brought the vessel in. Henri testified that Captain Adlum stated : "Local 16 had requested the help of his union and his union was going to give them the help." This testimony is not corroborated by any other participant . Captain Adlum did not testify. At various times City Manager Lehfeldt urged Commissioner Strandberg by telephone and by letter to send a ferry in to the City Dock and assured Strandberg that the City was willing and able to provide tie-up service. Strandberg, though he believed this would be an exercise in futility, pursuant to advice from an Assistant Attorney General ordered Captain Herbert J. Lockert, Director of the Division of Marine Transportation for the State of Alaska, to bring a ferry in to City Dock as soon as possible. Captain Lockert directed the master of the ferry, Matanuska, to call at City Dock on the morning of July 2, after it made its regular stop at Auke Bay. On July 1, late in the afternoon, Mr. Lehfeldt instructed Grant K. Ritter, public works foreman for the City of Juneau, to install ropes on the land side of the City Dock about 50 feet back from its water edge. The work was completed about 4:30 p.m. "No trespassing" signs were hung on the ropes. Lehfeldt testified that the ropes were put up to keep Longshoremen pickets and other unauthorized personnel off the dock. Guy, when he observed the ropes, instructed the men who had been picketing City Hall to be at the Dock the next day, and to picket as close as they could to the ropes when the Matanuska came in . Guy also arranged with a neighbor to have the use of his small motor boat which was moored in Douglas harbor, across the Gastineau Channel from Juneau. On the morning of July 2 Guy and his neighbor drove across the bridge to Douglas , entered the neighbor's boat and motored back to the Juneau side. They selected a vantage point where they would be able to observe whether the Matanuska rounded the end of Douglas Island and came up the channel to Juneau , or whether it would continue on its regular route south to Ketchikan. Guy had a picket sign in the boat, identical with the signs carried at City Hall. As the Matanuska rounded the end of Douglas Island and proceeded north in Gastineau Channel the small boat left the shore. At about the point where the Matanuska entered the Juneau City limits, one half mile from the Dock and 200 yards from the ferry, Guy raised his picket sign and accompanied the ferry as it made its approach. As the two vessels sailed up to the dock together, the small boat at all times maintained a safe distance. When the Ferry approached the dock, Lehfeldt, standing by a bollard on the water's edge, wearing a business suit, called to the seaman in the bow to throw him the heaving lines. Lehfeldt heard the Captain on the bridge call to the seaman to throw the heaving line. The bos'n came up to the seaman and spoke to him. The bos'n then went on the Bridge and spoke to the ferry' s master, Captain Johnson. The bos'n then returned to the bow (where the seaman was still standing) and threw one heaving line to Lehfeldt. Lehfeldt pulled in the mooring hawser, and placed the loop over a bollard. The seaman then threw the second heaving line, Lehfeldt pulled in the second bow hawser and placed the loop over a bollard. The stern line was thrown to City Attorney Henri who attached the stern hawser to a bollard and the ferry was moored. As the boat approached, the two pickets remaining outside the ropes, raised their signs, and Guy, in his boat, holding on to a piling at the end of the dock held his sign aloft. Captain Lockert was standing on the dock inside the roped off area watching the operation and talking to James Doss, manager of Universal Services which supplied provisions to the ferries. When the Matanuska took on provisions at Auke Bay the chief steward had phoned Doss that he was short of butter and asked to have forty pounds delivered to him at City Dock. Doss' warehouseman handed the butter over the rope in the presence of the pickets as the ferry was tying up. Lockert told Doss that he should not put the butter on board, and Doss took it back to his store. After the ferry was moored the automobile ramp was lowered and Lockers walked on board. Captain Lockert and Captain Johnson entered the Captain's room where Assistant Attorney General Benesch was waiting . Lockert testified: Q. (by Mr. Nielson) Can you tell us as best you can recall what you said and what the captain said and what Mr. Benesch said? A. The substance was what our purpose was in bringing the vessel in. Obviously we had taken care of normal business at Auke Bay, so this was a test to see what would happen. And in our opinion, jointly expressed, we didn't believe that anything particularly had been proved. So at the suggestion of Mr. Benesch, he asked the captain to order the baggage cart taken ashore. No particular purpose, but to see if our crew would or would not go across the picket line. Lockert then went below and spoke to the bos'n. The bos'n told Lockert that he had received the order and had refused to obey. Lockert testified: "Well, the bos'n seemed a little nervous. I assured him that he and I had no quarrel having refused an order, we had to find out what was going to happen. He understood this, and I had a few words'of conversation with the crew members and I left." The ferry remained at City Dock from 30 to 40 minutes. There is no evidence that the waiting room was opened or that the ticket booth was manned. It did not take on or discharge either passengers or cargo. It was not scheduled to do any business at City Dock. Picketing took place only while individuals, Henri and Lehfeldt, employed by the City were performing the services required of longshoremen by the City. These are, to be on the dock when the vessel arrives, to receive the heaving lines, to pull the mooring hawsers ashore and throw the hawser loops over bollards, to detach the heaving lines and carry them back on shipboard, to stand by until the vessel is ready to sail, and to throw off the hawsers when they are slacked by the boat's crew preparatory to sailing. LOCAL 16, LONGSHOREMEN 893 C. Conclusions 1. Jurisdiction The language of Section 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii)(B) was first proposed by Senator Dirkson on April 21, 1959 as an amendment to the Kennedy-Ervin Bill then under consideration . Senator Goldwater , speaking in support of the Dirkson amendment, stated: The word "person" is used in the proposed amendment to the secondary boycott provision rather than "employer" in order to extend the protection of the secondary boycott provisions of the act to public employers, railroads, or agricultural enterprises without subjecting them to other provisions of the act. The language proposed by Mr. Dirkson was adopted and incorporated in the first draft of the Landrum -Griffin Bill introduced to the House on July 27 , 1959. The language of the Dirkson proposal became law on September 14, 1959 when the final draft of the Landrum -Griffin Bill was signed by President Eisenhower. There is no ambiguity in the statute , and the comment of Senator Goldwater demonstrates that its purpose was to extend to political subdivisions, such as the City of Juneau, protection from the secondary boycott activities of labor organizations. Respondent seeks to evade this clear language and express intent by one principal and one subsidiary argument. His principal argument is based on the holding in N. L.R. B. v. International Longshoremen's Association , 332 F .2d 992 (C.A. 4, 1964), that a "labor dispute" is an indispensable prerequisite to exercise of Board jurisdiction . There the Court, denying enforcement to Local 1355 International Longshoremen 's Association (Maryland Ship Ceiling Company , Inc.), 146 NLRB 723, held that a union's refusal to refer men to ships trading with Cuba was in consequence of a political controversy and was not part of a "labor dispute." Respondent, after citing and discussing the definitions of "employer," "employee," and "labor dispute," states in his brief: These pertinent statutory definitions, when read together make it plain that no "labor dispute" exists in the present case over which the Board may assert jurisdiction . For a "labor dispute" to exist, there must be a controversy over the "terms and conditions of employment." Section 2(13) In order to have such a controversy, an absolute prerequisite is an "employer" and "employees". In the present case, there is no "employer," and there are no "employees " within the meaning of Sections 2(2) and 2(3) of the Act. Therefore, since there is no employer subject to Board regulation and no employees subject to Board jurisdiction , it is impossible, under the Act, to have a "labor dispute." There being no labor dispute, no basis exists for the Board to assert jurisdiction. This argument has two fatal flaws : ( I) The Board specifically held in National Maritime Union of America, 147 NLRB 1243, 1246, fn. 9 (June 31, 1964): "the existence of a dispute with an employer is not a precondition for application of the Act's boycott provisions," and (2) the controversy between the City of Juneau and Respondent is a "labor dispute" as defined in Section 2(9) of the Act, which reads in full: The term "labor dispute" includes any controversy concerning terms, tenure or conditions of employment, or concerning the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee. The City of Juneau and Respondent are "persons" engaged in a "controversy" over "tenure" of "employment." National Maritime Union of America v. N.L.R.B., 342 F.2d 538 (C.A. 2, 1965), enfg. National Maritime Union of America, supra. Respondent as a second and subsidiary ground for dismissal states: The Board has regularly maintained a series of tests by which it decides whether to exercise jurisdiction in a given case. These standards have always been based upon the effect on commerce an employer 's operation will have. However the Board has never issued standards for asserting jurisdiction over political subdivisions. The reason is clear - the language and intent of the Act exclude governmental units from coverage. In short, whether the Board will assert jurisdiction is determined by applying certain standards to the particular employer involved. In the present case, none of the Board's tests are applicable because there is no employer. Hence, the Board is without jurisdiction and the Complaint should be dismissed. The argument ignores the fact that the Act does not preclude the Board from broadening the scope of its discretionary jurisdiction , and it has done so in several cases following the enactment of Section 14(c)(l) of the Act, September 14, 1959. Among these cases are: Carol Management Corporation, 133 NLRB 1126; Lansing Automakers Federal Credit Union, 150 NLRB 1542; El Dorado Inc., 151 NLRB 579; Parkview Gardens, 166 NLRB No. 80; and Butte Medical Properties, 168 NLRB No. 52. The record establishes that the business of Juneau at its Municipal Airport alone, would satisfy published standards for asserting jurisdiction over Respondent, were Juneau an "employer." In Local 456 Teamsters (Strauss Paper Co.), 149 NLRB 49, fn. 1, (1964), the Board held that jurisdiction should be asserted where the primary employer is engaged in commerce and that there was no requirement that the secondary employer be engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce. In H.P.O. Service, Inc., 122 NLRB 394, the Board announced that it would thenceforward assert jurisdiction over any "enterprise" which functioned as an essential link in the transportation of passengers or commodities in interstate commerce, and which derived at least $50,000 in gross revenues per annum from such operations. The Juneau Municipal Airport is an "essential link" which meets the dollar requirement of the H.P.O. standard. Finally, Juneau, the Capital City of Alaska has no highway or rail connection with any other part of the State. It is dependent for its very existence upon air and waterborne transportation . The importance to the community of regular convenient ferry service is self evident. Congress in outlawing the secondary boycott in 1947 sought to protect the public interest by prohibiting unions from enmeshing neutral "employers" in disputes, over the resolution if which they had no control . In 1957 Congress sought further protection of the public interest 894 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD by prohibiting unions from enmeshing "persons" such as the State of Alaska in such disputes. The Board, in the exercise of its discretion should assert the full extent of its statutory power to ensure that the operations of the State Ferries are not impeded by any secondary boycott. I find that the City of Juneau and the State of Alaska are persons engaged in commerce and in an industry affecting commerce and that it would effectuate the purposes of the Act to assert jurisdiction herein. 2. The first meeting in City Hall The Respondent through its representatives Scott and Vollenweeder, at the first meeting in City Hall did not threaten "to picket the ferries." I base this finding on the vagueness of Lehfeldt's recollection , his use of the word, "indicated," and on the fact that his City Attorney, Henri, testified that there was no mention of picketing at this meeting. 3. The second meeting in City Hall Campbell did not represent Respondent at the June 17 meeting in City Hall. Campbell did not state at that meeting that the Respondent would use boats with which to picket. I base this finding in part upon Campbell's denial and in part on the failure of Lehfeldt to corroborate Henri in this particular. The General Counsel argues that since a picket boat was used on July 2, the threat must have been made, and that Guy's failure to disavow the threat makes Respondent liable. I cannot accept this argument. Guy testified, and I credit his testimony that the decision to use a picket boat was made only after Lehfeldt had erected ropes to keep Respondent's pickets off the dock. I find that Guy did state that Respondent would picket at City Dock if an attempt was made to bring in a ferry without longshoremen to handle mooring lines. I find that this statement by Guy was a statement of intent to engage in protected primary picketing. 4. The first meeting in the commissioner's office O'Claray did not represent Respondent at the June 17 meeting in Commissioner Strandberg's office. O'Claray did not state that Respondent had requested help from the Inland Boatmen and that the Inland Boatmen had promised to help Respondent. I base this finding on the denials of Guy and O'Claray and on the failure of any of the parties present to corroborate Henri. 5. The second meeting in the commissioner 's office Captain Adlum did not represent Respondent at the June 28 meeting in Commissioner Strandberg's office. Captain Adlum did not state at that meeting that Respondent had requested help of the Inland Boatmen and that the Inland Boatmen were going to give Respondent the help requested. I base this finding on the failure of any other participant to corroborate Henri on this point, and on the straightforward and wholly credible testimony of Commissioner Strandberg, a completely disinterested witness, as to what Captain Adlum did state. 6. The picketing on July 2 The Respondent's primary object is to regain for its members the work of tying up and casting off the ferries. Part of this work was to receive a heaving line when thrown to the dock by a member of the ferry's crew. Since the City was required by its contract with the State to tie up and cast off the ferries, this same work constituted part of "doing business" within the meaning of the Act. Picketing in these circumstances constituted inducement of an individual to refuse to perform services and constituted coercion of persons engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce with an object of forcing or requiring one person to cease doing business with another person . The General Counsel has proved all the elements of Section 8(b)(4)(i)(ii)(B); i.e., jurisdiction, means, and object. It does not follow, however that he has proved any violation of the Act. The Supreme Court in Local 761, International Union of Electrical. Radio & Machine Workers AFL-CIO v. N.L.R.B, 366 U.S. (the General Eectric case), states at 681: The 1959 amendments to the National Labor Relations Act, which removed the word "concerted" from the boycott provisions, included a proviso that "nothing contained in this clause (B) shall be construed to make unlawful, where not otherwise unlawful, any primary strike or primary picketing." 29 U.S.C. (Supp. I, 1959) Sec. 158 (b)(4)(B). The proviso was directed against the fear that the removal of "concerted" from the statute might be interpreted so that "the picketing at the factory violates Section 8(b)(4)(A) because the pickets induce truck drivers employed by the trucker not to perform their usual services where an object is to compel the trucking firm not to do business with the manufacturer during the strike." In United Steelworkers of America (Carrier Corporation) v. N.L.R.B, 37h U.S. 492, the Supreme Court held, at 499: The primary strike, which is protected by the proviso is aimed at applying economic pressure by halting the day-to-day operations of the struck employer. But Congress not only protected the right to strike; it also saved "primary picketing" from the secondary ban. Picketing has traditionally been a major weapon to implement the goals of a strike and has characteristically been aimed at all those approaching the situs whose mission is selling, delivering or otherwise contributing to the operations which the strike is endeavoring to halt. [Emphasis supplied.] "Important as is the distinction between legitimate `primary activity' and banned `secondary activity', it does not present a glaringly bright line. The objectives of any picketing include a desire to influence others from withholding from the employer their services or trade." (General Electric Case, supra, at 673) And, "However difficult the drawing of lines more nice than obvious, the statute compels the task. Accordingly, the Board and the Courts have attempted to devise reasonable criteria drawing heavily upon the means to which a union resorts in promoting its cause. . 'in the absence of admissions by the union of an illegal intent, the nature of acts performed shows the intent.' " (General Electric Case, supra at 674.) The first "means" resorted to by the Respondent was picketing at the dock, as close as possible to the point at which persons employed by the City were actively engaged in performing longshore tasks, and the signs used LOCAL 16, LONGSHOREMEN 895 identified the primary "person ." The second "means" was the picketing of the Matanuska from a small boat in Gastineau Channel . The City had erected ropes which prevented the Union from stationing pickets at the precise situs of the dispute, i.e., the waterline of City Dock. The General Counsel points out that this did not prevent Respondent from picketing by boat at the waterline. He argues that the fact that the picket sign was raised at a point half a mile from the dock, while the Matanuska was in open water , evidenced an unlawful object and deprived Respondent of the protection of proviso. This argument is without validity . The Board held in Newspaper and Mail Deliverers' Union of New York (Interborough News), 90 NLRB 2135, that it was not unlawful for a union to address appeals to employees of secondary employers at points remote from a primary picket line so long as such appeals "invited action only at the premises of the primary employer." The General Counsel seeks to distinguish Interborough News and related cases, stating: These cases deal only with situations where the inducement was for refusals of pickups or deliveries at a single situs, the natural incidents of a primary picketline, and not with inducements which involve work refusals at a common situs which do not involve business with the primary person alone, as such pickups and deliveries do. In other words, if all the Ferry System was doing when it made a call at the City Dock was making a pickup or delivery as customer or supplier for the City, these cases might operate as defense . Since it is clear that the Ferry System was doing more than that , or at least trying to more than that, these cases are inapposite. That this is a distinction without a difference is made evident by the holding of the Supreme Court in Steelworkers v. N.L.R.B. (supra), that primary picketing, protected by the proviso is "aimed at all those approaching the situs whose mission is selling , delivering or otherwise contributing to the operations which the strike is endeavoring to halt." The picketing by boat was conducted only while persons employed by the City were performing longshore tasks on the dock , and the picket sign identified the City as the primary person. The normal course of the Matanuska from Auke Bay to Juneau took it around the west and south shores of Douglas Island thence northerly up Gastineau Channel to City Dock. Ferries which do not call at City Dock , after clearing the southern end of Douglas Island proceed in a southerly direction through Stephens Passage, and do not enter Gastineau Channel. Respondent did not attempt to divert the Matanuska from its course. Guy stationed himself at a point where he could observe whether the ferry turned north toward Juneau, or continued on a southerly course. Only after the ferry was committed in a Juneau landing and at the approximate point where it crossed the Juneau City limits, did he raise his picket sign , and then he took care not to interfere with the operation of the ferry. At all times, while the picketing continued it was within the power of the City to,stop the picketing and put an end to the dispute. The City Manager, who was on the dock, could have called to Guy, in the boat, to tell the longshoremen pickets to drop their signs and man the mooring lines. The pressure of the picketing was direct and primary. I find that the Respondent's picketing at the dock and on the water was protected and made lawful by the final sentence of Section 8(b)(4xi)(ii)(B) of the Act: "Provided, that nothing contained in this clause (B) shall be construed to make unlawful, where not otherwise unlawful, any primary strike or primary picketing:" In connection with this finding, I specifically find that but for the City's action in roping off the dock, there would have been no picketing by boat. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The State of Alaska and the City of Juneau are each a person engaged in commerce and in operations affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. The State of Alaska and the City of Juneau are each a person engaged in commerce and in an industry affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8(b)(4xi) and (ii)(B) of the Act. 3. International Longshoremen and Warehousemen's Union Local No. 16 is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 4. The allegations of the Amended Complaint that International Longshoremen and Warehousemen's Union Local No. 16 has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii)(B) of the Act have not been sustained. RECOMMENDED ORDER It is recommended that the complaint be dismissed in its entirety.