Tiidee Products, Inc.

TIIDEE PRODUCTS, INC. Tiidee Products, Inc. and International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO. Cases 9-CA-4618,,9-CA-4639-2, and 9-CA-4710 June 24, 1969 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN MCCULLOCH AND MEMBERS BROWN AND ZAGORIA On April 11, 1969, Trial Examiner William W. Kapell issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices in violation of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. Thereafter, the Respondent and the Charging Party filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision and supporting briefs. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision,' the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in this case, and hereby adopts the findings,2 conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner and hereby orders that the Respondent, Tiidee Products, Inc., Dayton , Ohio, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order. ,in his Decision, the Trial Examiner inadvertently cites Case 9-CA-4440 as Can 9-CA-440. He also inadvertently failed to place the word "not" between the words "is" and "necessary" at I. 43 in fn. 23 of his Decision. These inadvertencles are hereby corrected. 'These findings are based, in part, upon credibility determinations of the Trial Examiner to which the Respondent has excepted. After careful review of the record, we conclude that these credibility findings are not contrary to the clear preponderance of all relevant evidence . Accordingly, we find no basis for disturbing these findings . Standard Dry Wall Products, Inc., 91 NLRB 544, enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (C.A. 3). 176 NLRB No. 133 TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE 969 WILLIAM W. KAPELL, Trial Examiner: Cases 9-CA-4618, 9-CA-4639-2, and 9-CA-4710, proceedings under Section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, herein called the Act, were heard in Dayton, Ohio, on September 18 and 19, 1968,' with all parties participating pursuant to due notice. The complaint= in Case 9-CA-4618 alleges that Tiidee Products, Inc., hereafter referred to as Respondent, during the latter part of January instituted plant rules threatening discharge of employees for talking about the Union during "company time" or for distributing literature on "company property," thereby unlawfully limiting union soliciting of employees in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act; and unilaterally changed the terms and conditions of employment by publishing and instituting new rules of employment in a unit of employees for which the Union is the exclusive bargaining representative, in violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. The complaint' in Case 9-CA-4639-2 alleges that Respondent constructively discharged employee John Haywood and refused to reinstate him in violation of Section 8(axl), (3), and (4) of the Act because of his union support and his adverse testimony to Respondent's interests in a prior Board hearing. The complaint' in Case 9-CA-4710 alleges that in violation of Section 8(a)(l) of the Act, Respondent interfered with, restrained, and coerced employees by admonishing them not to associate with union sympathizers and stating that union adherents were troublemakers, unliked by Respondent, that they would soon find out to whom to talk, and that involvement with union activity would be harmful; that in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act, employees David Leffler and Pauline Messer were discriminatorily discharged because of their union support; that employee Claudine Tackett was discriminatorily discharged because of her union support and adverse testimony in a prior Board hearing in violation of Section 8(a)(3), (4), and (1) of the Act; that employee Phyllis Wilson was constructively discharged or, in the alternative, discharged because of her union support and adverse testimony in a prior Board hearing in violation of Section 8(a)(3), (4), and (1) of the Act; and that the terms and conditions of employment were changed by unilaterally instituting new work rules and issuing written warnings to employees for alleged infractions of said rules, unilaterally adopting a 90-day probationary period for new employees, and not permitting an employee to be represented by a union agent with respect to a grievance concerning a condition of employment, in violation of Section 8(a)(3),(5), and (1) of the Act. Respondent duly filed an answer to each complaint denying the commission of any of the alleged violations. By order of July 19, the Regional Director for Region 9 of the National Labor Relations Board, hereafter referred to as the Board, consolidated the aforedescribed cases for purpose of hearing. 'All dates hereafter refer to the year 1968 unless otherwise noted. 'Based on charges filed on February 7 and March 7 and 28, respectively, by International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO, hereafter referred to as the Union. 'Based on charges filed on April 26 and May 27, respectively, by the Union. 'Based on charges filed by the Union on April 26 and May 17, respectively. 970 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD All parties were afforded full opportunity to be heard, to introduce relevant evidence, to present oral argument, and to file briefs. General Counsel, the Charging Union, and Respondent filed briefs which have been duly considered. On the entire record in the cases, and from my observation of the witnesses, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. COMMERCE Respondent, an Ohio corporation engaged in the manufacture of metal products at its plant in Dayton, Ohio, had a direct outflow during the past 12 months in interstate commerce of goods and products valued in excess of $50,000, which it sold and shipped from its Dayton plant directly to plants outside of Ohio. Respondent admits, and I find, that at all times material herein Respondent has been an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. If. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED Respondent admits, and I find, that at all times material herein the Union has been a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. following- 5. Soliciting or collecting contributions for any purpose whatsoever, on company premises, without the approval of the management. 9. Distribution of literature, written or printed matter of any description on company property, not incidental to company business. The rules and regulations state further that an employee committing minor offenses shall be warned, that two such infractions shall constitute a major offense subjecting an employee to a 3-day layoff, and that two major infractions constitute an intolerable offense for which an employee is subject to dismissal. Irvin Hollander, Respondent's president, testified that posted rules had been in effect since 1945, that due to a fire 2 years ago the posting was destroyed and he had neglected to replace it, and that they were reposted following the prior Board hearing because the employees began to neglect their work. He testified further that prior to the fire only part of the rules were posted on a small 3 by 5 card. The current posting contains 34 rules and regulations in addition to other typed matter and is 8 by l I inches in size. No evidence, however was presented to show which, if any, of the rules were allegedly previously posted. Conclusions III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The Prior Board Proceedings Pursuant to several charges' filed against Respondent by the Union during September, October, and November 1967, alleging violations of Section 8(a)(l), (3), and (5) of the Act, a hearing was held before a Trial Examiner of the Board during January 1968. On August 27, the Trial Examiner issued a decision in which he found , inter alia, that Respondent (1) violated Section 8(a)(5) for its refusal to recognize and bargain with the Union as the exclusive bargaining representative of an appropriate unit of Respondent's production and maintenance employees pursuant to a certification' issued by the Regional Director for Region 9 on November 8, 1967, following a Board-conducted representation election on September 14, 1967; (2) violated Section 8(a)(1) by interfering with, coercing, and restraining its employees in a widespread manner in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act; and (3) violated Section 8(a)(3) by arbitrarily raising production quotas of employees and discriminatorily laying off and discharging employees in retaliation for their support of the Union. The Trial Examiner's findings, conclusions, and Recommended Order providing appropriate relief were adopted by the Board on February 24, 1969,' with slight modification not pertinent herein. B. The Alleged 8(aXI) Violations 1. The posted rules It was stipulated that in January following the prior Board hearing (January 16-18), Respondent posted a set of work rules and regulations containing , inter alia, the ' ases 9- A-440, 9-CA-4488, 9-CA-4536, and 9-CA-4563 'Challenged by Respondent but upheld by the Trial Examiner. '174 NLRB No 103. Regardless of prior postings of the rules, the nonsolicitation rule is invalid and in violation of Section 8(a)(l) of the Act. The rule applies to employees on their own time as well as to working time.' Moreover, it was posted not long after the Union won a representation election, and closely following the Board hearing at which several of Respondent's employees testified adversely to its interest. It appears, and I find, that Respondent was motivated to post the rules in retaliation against employees for their union support.' See Marlene Industries Corp., 166 NLRB No. 58; and Wm H. Block Company, 150 NLRB 341. The nondistribution rule is presumptively violative of Section 8(axl), unless rebutted by evidence of special circumstances demonstrating its need based upon safety factors, interference with plant production or plant discipline. No such showing was established herein." I, therefore, find that the nondistribution rule was also violative of Section 8(a)(l)." The threat to impose disciplinary measures for infractions of the posted proscriptions served to aggravate the interference with the rights and the coercion of the employees. 2. The alleged threats to, and unlawful interrogation of, Wells About 3 weeks after the prior Board hearing, Hollander, in a conversation with employee Bill Wells at his work station concerning his salary and the type of 'Any ambiguity in the scope of these rules is held against the promulgator rather than against the employees N.L R.B Y. Miller Charles A Co., 341 F 2d 870, 874 (C.A. 2), enfg. 148 NLRB 1579; Campbell Soup Company, 159 NLRB 704, enfd 380 F.2d 372 (C.A. 5). 'In the prior cases, Respondent was also found to have unlawfully retaliated against employees for their union support. "See Republic Aviation Corporation v. NLRB., 324 U.S. 793, 797-798. "The posting without consultation or negotiation with the Union is discussed, infra, as a violation of Sec 8(a)(5). TIIDEE PRODUCTS, INC. 971 work he is qualified to perform, stated ". . . because when you cut my throat you're cutting your own throat." About a week after the foregoing conversation, Hollander summoned Wells to his office and accused him of having made inconsistent statements in his testimony at the prior Board hearing, and also interrogated him as to what he had discussed with the General Counsel and union counsel during that hearing. On April 10, Wells was given a warning notice' _ pursuant to the posted rules because he allegedly failed to watch the work of a new employee, as directed, with the result that she turned out defective parts. Wells, however, testified that her work was satisfactorily performed while he was in a position to observe it but that inasmuch as he also had to attend to the operation of his own machine he was unable to check on all her work. His testimony was not refuted, nor was any evidence presented to indicate either in what manner or to what extent the new employee turned out defective work." On April 12, Hollander, in a conversation with David Leffler who began working for Respondent about the middle of March, inquired whether he was becoming intimate with some of the employees, mentioning specifically the names of Messer and Phyllis Wilson. Leffler replied that he had not but stated that he had a date with Messer for that evening. Hollander then told him to be careful with whom he associated or talked to because he could get into big trouble. The next morning, Saturday, a nonworkday, Leffler was summoned to the plant by Hollander who questioned him about his date of the preceding evening and then asked whether he realized what was meant by his remark of the preceding evening in connection with associating with the wrong people. When Leffler replied that he thought he meant "union sympathizers," Hollander denied it and stated he was referring to improper social relations between the women and men employees, which could subject the men to blackmail." Conclusions The General Counsel asserts that Hollander's "throat cutting" remark constituted a threat directed against Wells for his union activities, and that his interrogation of Wells interfered with his statutory rights in violation of Section 8(a)(1). I find that, although the "throat cutting" remark of Hollander raises a suspicion that it was related to Wells' union activity, the evidence reflects no reference to unionism or union activities during this conversation, and appears only to concern Wells' gripe that he was relegated to low-paying relatively unskilled jobs despite his ability to perform higher remunerative work. I conclude that the General Counsel has failed to establish by the preponderance of the evidence that this incident constituted a threat to Wells to abstain from union activity in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. I find, however, that Hollander' s interrogation of Wells concerning his conversation with the General Counsel and union counsel during the prior Board hearing constituted unlawful interrogation. Such interrogation can be reasonably equated with that regarding the contents of affidavits given to Board agents by employees, which under well-settled Board law has been found violative of Section 8(ax 1) of the Act. 3. The alleged coercion of Pauline Messer and David Leffler The uncontradicted evidence shows that on March 27, Hollander hired Pauline Messer as a 90-day probationary employee and, at that time, told her ". . . we have quite a few troublemakers here, and we do not like troublemakers," and that she should learn to whom she should talk and to whom not to talk. Messer admittedly did not comprehend the significance of these remarks at the time. It also appears that similar remarks were addressed to Messer by Supervisor Mary Burgher and Hazel Ward." However, Messer testified that neither Ward nor Burgher ever mentioned the Union to her in these conversations. Nor is there any evidence that Hollander referred to the Union in his comments to her when hired or at any other time. "The notice had notations of defective work and carelessness , and failure to perform work , as directed. "The effect of the warning notice as a violation of the Act is discussed, Infra Conclusions The General Counsel contends that through knowledge subsequently acquired by Messer while working on the job, she learned that the term "troublemaker" was synonomous with the term "union adherent ," and that, therefore, Hollander's comment to her when hired was coercive in violation of Section 8(a)(l) of the Act. Section 8(a)(l) of the Act provides that it shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to interfere with, restrain , or coerce employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed by Section 7. It is well settled that the test of interference , restraint, and coercion is whether the conduct involved may reasonably be said to tend in those directions. Kroger and Company v. N.L.R. B., 401 F.2d 682, 686 (C.A. 6). I find that the record fails to establish by the preponderence of the evidence that Messer, during the course of her employment , eventually comprehended the significance of Hollander's remark to mean that she was not to associate with union adherents . I, accordingly, conclude that Hollander 's alleged admonition to Messer did not tend , insofar as she was concerned, to interfere with her statutory rights in violation of Section 8(a)(l). The General Counsel contends that Hollander's remarks to Leffler were also directed against his association with union adherents, and, therefore, coercively similar to his remarks to Messer. It appears, and I find, that Leffler, in contrast to Messer's possible lack of sophistication , believed that Hollander was referring to union adherents . I am not persuaded by Hollander's belated explanation to Leffler that he was not referring to union adherents, and his expressed concern for the morals of his employees in their personal relations away from the plant. In these circumstances I find that Hollander's statements to Leffler may reasonably be found to have tended to interfere with or coerce him within the meaning of Section 8(a)(l) of the Act. C. The Alleged Violations of Section 8(a)(3) and (4) 1. The discriminatory discharges a. John Haywood "A procompany employee who testified on behalf of Respondent in the prior Board hearing as well as in the instant cases. "A few of the women employees, including Messer, were either separated from their husbands or divorced. Leffler was also either separated from his wife or divorced. 972 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Haywood, an ex-convict under the supervision of Parole Officer John Weiher, began working for Respondent on March 15, 1967. In June of that year, Hollander in a conversation with Weiher praised Haywood as a good worker. During November of that year Weiher received a call from Hollander complaining about his work. On November 20, Weiher visited Haywood at his home and informed him that he had received a telephone call from Hollander to the effect that he had become too involved in union problems." On March 7, Weiher received another call from Hollander complaining about Haywood's conduct at the plant in using foul language which would not be tolerated because of the women employed there." That night Weiher visited Haywood at his home and advised him that Hollander wanted him to quit because his work was poor and he had lied about Hollander at the prior Board hearing . Weiher urged him to quit but Haywood was reluctant to do so because he lacked l week's work to qualify for a week's vacation with pay. He, however, agreed to follow Weiher's advice if he were permitted to work 1 more week to qualify for the paid vacation. Weiher stated that he would take it up with Hollander the next day. The following afternoon Weiher called Hollander and after discussing Haywood's proposal, Haywood was called to the telephone and told by Weiher that Hollander was willing to give him the week's vacation pay if he quit then and there. Weiher also advised him that otherwise he was "afraid Mr. Hollander would write to Columbus [Ohio] and might cause you a lot of trouble later." Haywood then related to Hollander that Weiher advised him to quit to which Hollander replied, "Well, he's your boss; you ought to do what he says." Haywood agreed to leave, and upon receiving his paycheck from Hollander was told "you can call it a vacation check or a separation check."" Adam Campbell, an employee, testified that at the end of November 1967, he had a long conversation with Haywood about the latter' s immoral exploits with women, and that on January 8, he had another conversation lasting 3 to 4 hours during which Haywood neglected to remove certain castings from his machine, causing them to get scratched. Campbell also testified that he complained to Hollander that Haywood's long conversations with him interfered with his work. Haywood denied engaging in such conversations. Conclusions General Counsel contends that Haywood was constructively discharged in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (4) of the Act. Respondent asserts that Haywood resigned on the advice of his parole officer. It appears that Haywood had testified" on behalf of the General Counsel in the prior Board hearing, and had been unlawfully laid "In the preceding Board cases it was found that during the union campaign Hollander used Haywood to ferret out information about union adherents, but that Haywood later refused to sign a company -sponsored petition circulated among the employees to indicate whether or not they were in favor of the Union. "Haywood testified without contradiction that he had never been warned about using foul language in the plant. "The above findings are based upon the credited composite testimony of Haywood and Weiher. Although Hollander testified he made no reference to the matter. "It was stipulated that the alleged discriminatees herein, who testified at the prior Board hearing did so adversely to Respondent off in December 1967 in retaliation for his support of the Union." Hollander continued to show his opposition to and displeasure with union adherents when he complained to Weiher that Haywood was becoming too involved in union problems. Realizing the vulnerability of Haywood's position because he was on probation, Weiher advised him to quit otherwise Hollander could do him great harm by complaining to the (parole) authorities in Columbus (Ohio). Under these circumstances, Haywood was pressured into resigning because he had no alternative but to follow his parole officer's advice. I find that Hollander was motivated in applying this pressure by reason of his opposition to the Union and desire to retaliate against union adherents. I find further that the complaints against Haywood grounded on his profanity at the plant and his failure to diligently apply himself to his regular work tasks were pretextual and intended to mask Respondent's union animus. I conclude that Haywood's quit was induced by Respondent's discriminatory action against him and he was therefore constructively discharged in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (4) of the Act. b. David Leffler Leffler began working for Respondent in March, operating a sander and finishing mill. According to Hollander's son, Joseph, he had taught Leffler how to operate his finishing machine and had instructed him not to load it with castings for polishing if he were going to quit for the day before the polishing was completed, and instead to work on sand jacks until quitting time. Otherwise, a lubricating detergent would not be added to the machine every 15 minutes, as required, and the castings would get scratched. As related and found above Hollander asked Leffler, on April 12, whether he was getting friendly with the employees, mentioning, in particular, Pauline Messer and Phyllis Wilson," which could get him in trouble, and that he should be careful with whom he spoke, to which Leffler replied that he was having a date that evening with Pauline Messer. In that conversation Hollander also complimented him on his work and said he expected him to work there for a long time. Joseph Hollander testified that on the night of April 12, after Leffler had left the plant, he found his machine running, loaded with castings which had been damaged, and that he had advised his father that night of the incident." The following morning (Saturday, a nonworking day) Leffler was summoned to the plant from his home. After questioning him about his date with Messer and referring to his conversation of the preceding day, as related above, Hollander told him that his work was not efficient, that on the preceding night at quitting time he had left castings in his machine, causing them to be scratched, and that he would have to let him go. Leffler claimed that he had been advised previously by Hollander that he could leave the castings in the finishing mill when he quit for the day, and that Adam Campbell, who was working overtime, would remove the castings "It was also found in the prior cases that when Haywood called for his check following that layoff, Hollander asked how he had voted in the election. After Haywood answered that he voted for the Union , Hollander stated that he knew it but was merely checking to ascertain what he would say "An avowed union adherent who had testified against Respondent at the prior hearing "He also testified that he had informed his father 2 weeks earlier that Leffler could not take instructions and was not working out. TIIDEE PRODUCTS, INC. 973 when finished , which took from 20 to 30 minutes. Hollander did not refute this claim , nor was there any denial of Leffler's assertion that this procedure had been previously recommended by Hollander , his son Larry, and Adam Campbell. Haywood also testified without contradiction that he not only never received such instructions as were allegedly given by Joseph Hollander to Leffler, but asserted that he was told to reload the polishing machine even when the castings would not be completed before his quitting time for the day because in that event the machine would be unloaded by one of the night men or Hollander. Conclusions Hollander's expressed concern and preoccupation as the guardian of the morals of his employees appears suspiciously pretextual as an attempt to immunize his new employees from contact with older employees who were known union adherents . His interrogation of Leffler on Saturday morning regarding his date with Messer , and his belated explanation that he was referring to immoral women employees rather than to union sympathizers, as understood by Leffler, was an attempt to dissipate any claim of antiunion motivation in preparation for Leffler's discharge immediately thereafter. Nor was there any reason or need to refer to the morality of the employees, if Leffler was being discharged because of his inability to perform his job properly. Furthermore, I find the evidence far from persuasive to establish that Leffler was disregarding instruction in the operation of the milling machine, which was asserted as the motivating cause for his discharge.. Oddly enough, no evidence was presented to show the extent of the damage to the scratched castings, which would indicate the gravity of the single alleged incident as warranting such drastic action as a discharge, especially in view of the fact that on the preceding day Hollander had complimented his work . Considering all the evidence in the context of Respondent 's antiunion propensity as found in the prior cases, I conclude that Leffler's discharge was, at least in part, motivated by Respondent's desire to discourage unionism in the plant in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and ( 1) of the Act. C. Pauline Messer (Thursday) Union Attorney Janetzke telephoned Hollander about mid-morning and informed him that Messer had signed a union card . Later that afternoon Hollander approached Messer, handed her a paycheck, and stated that he had been watching her and her attitude towards her work and did not think she was going to make it. Messer pointed out without avail that she had been hired as a 90-day probationary employee. Although her normal workweek was Monday through Friday, she was discharged on that Thursday and paid for 4 days. Ward testified on behalf of Respondent that for the first week or two she trained Messer on her moulding machine and she caught on quickly and was a good worker. Thereafter, she began to take long coffeebreaks and to carry coffee to the men, as a result of which her production fell off because she was not at her machine to unload and reload, when necessary. She reported this to Hollander, but said nothing to Messer . Messer denied taking long coffeebreaks, and stated, without contradiction, that she had never received any warning about her work . Based on the demeanor of the witnesses and the sequence of events precipitating her discharge, Messer's testimony is crt.dited. Conclusions The General Counsel submits that Messer was discriminatorily discharged because of her union support and to discourage unionism in the plant. Respondent contends that she was terminated because she failed to attend diligently to her machine causing her production to fall, and she had participated in the removal of a protective curtain hung between her machine and the one operated by Phyllis Wilson, which caused extensive damage to Wilson's machine." I find it highly significant that there is no evidence indicating that Messer was ever reprimanded for her alleged shortcomings , that she was praised for her learning ability and work not long before she was fired, that within hours after Hollander was informed that she had joined the Union, she was discharged, and that there was no immediate precipitating incident which necessitated or warranted her discharge a day prior to the ending of the normal workweek. These considerations viewed in the light of Respondent's antiunionism confirm the conviction that her discharge was motivated by antiunionism and retaliation against a union adherent in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. Messer was hired by Hollander on March 27 as a 90-day probationary employee to work on the moulding machine . As related above, Hollander told her at that time that they had quite a few troublemakers and that she should learn with whom to associate . During her first week Hollander informed her that he had received a favorable report about her ability to learn and work from Hazel Ward who was breaking her in . During lunchtime on April 1, as she passed by the table occupied by Supervisor Mary Burgher, she was invited to sit down with her. Messer declined stating that she was going to sit with Phyllis Wilson, an active prounion employee . Shortly after lunch Hazel Ward, accompanied by Burgher, approached Messer at her machine and cautioned her about with whom she should associate . On April 15, Messer signed a union authorization card at the request of employee Claudine Tackett . On April 17, Ward came to Messer's machine and observed her work all day long, which had not occurred previously . The next day d. Claudine Tackett Tackett began working for Respondent in January 1967. As found in the prior cases, she had been the chief union protagonist in the organizing campaign during 1967, had served as the Union's observer at the representation election, and had testified adversely to Respondent at the prior hearing. 14 "The curtain was hung to deflect plastic particles emanating from Messer's machine from penetrating Wilson's machine . There is conflicting testimony as to whether the curtain had been partially opened or removed prior to Messer's hiring. However, I find for purposes of adjudicating her discharge that it is necessary to resolve whether or not she was involved in the alleged curtain incident. "The findings in those cases also show that Hollander visited Tackett at her home during August 1967 while she was convalescing from her foot injury and gave her $50. At that time , apparently unbeknown to Hollander, she was acting as liaison between the Union and the employees. Immediately following the announcement of the election returns on 974 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL'LABOR RELATIONS BOARD On March 12, Tackett was recalled from layoff status by Hollander. Before she began working, Hollander warned her that he was tired of her bad work and she was' not to cause any more trouble ." He also changed her work procedures by restricting her to her work area, her boxes were to be brought to her and later removed to the shipping area, she was not to seal her boxes, Hollander was to inspect her work , and she no longer was to keep a record of her production, all of which she had personally done previously . And, whereas before she used to cut and wind five boxes of plastic water hoses and then place couplings on them, henceforth she would complete one box at a time . " On March 13, Hollander had her read the posted work rules and directed her to increase her production to 27 boxes a day, although previously she had produced 12 or 13 boxes a day and had not been pressured to augment her production. 17 During that week, Hollander also reprimanded her for quitting at 4:25 p.m., instead of 4:30 p.m., despite the established practice of the employees to stop working at 4:25 p.m. to wash up before leaving. On March 20, Tackett received a warning notice" from Hollander for allegedly placing three couplings instead of two on a 15-foot water hose which had been found on top of one of her unsealed boxes . Tackett stated that she could not tell whether it was her doing or that of other employees who worked on hoses before she began such work on that day." On April 17, Tackett received a second warning notice for allegedly packing 10-foot hoses in a box marked for 15-foot hoses, and was given a 3-day suspension . Tackett disclaimed responsibility for the error, claiming that it happened between the time she left the plant for the day and before she reported on the following morning . About 2 weeks later, Hollander accused her of being short in her count of hoses in one of her boxes, which she denied. During April she worked alternately on the winder and drill machines. About April 30, Hollander assigned her to learn and work on the elbow machine,'' despite her protestations that she was fearful of working on that machine. The morning after Tackett began working on the elbow machine, a new girl was hired to operate the drill doing the work previously done by her. Tackett operated the elbow machine for a day and a half and then asked Burgher to relieve her for an hour because her foot hurt * 31 Burgher replied that she would have to consult Hollander. Not long after, Hollander appeared at the machine and told Tackett he would see about relieving her the following day because they had only 45 minutes left to qutting time . Tackett did not report for work the September 14, Hollander turned to her and accused her of ungratefulness after all he had done for her . The morning following the election Tackett was the first employee laid off allegedly for lacking work . She was recalled on September 25 for approximately I week and again laid off ostensibly for lack of work . Her layoffs were found to have been discriminatorily motivated because of her union support. "No evidence was presented to justify these complaints. "These procedural changes, however, were not applied to other employees as appears from the testimony of employee Jewel Romaine. "Although Jewel Romaine testified on behalf of Respondent that she produced from 45 to 50 boxes a day, sometimes only 35, Tackett's testimony as to her production prior to her recall was not refuted. "The notice listed defective work and carelessness as infractions of the work rules, and stated that another infraction of a minor rule would subject her to a 3-day layoff. "Employee Romaine testified that it was virtually impossible for an operator not to detect so flagrant a defect (an inspection of Respondent's Exhibit I confirms that impression), and Respondent's witness, Eleanor Kleismit, stated that it was the only such defect she had seen in 15 years. following day, but showed up on May 6, when she told Hollander she declined to work on the elbow machine because she was afraid he would not relieve her in the event she became sick , and she was also afraid of what he might do to the machine to mess up her work in order to fire her. Hollander replied that he had nothing else for her to do and told her to wait for him in the lunchroom. Shortly thereafter, he appeared in the lunchroom and advised her that he had no other work for her and would call her when it became available . At that time there was practically no 10- or 15-foot hoses in stock , and there were outstanding orders for these products. Not hearing from Hollander, Tackett and her father appeared at the plant on May 16. Her father went into the office while she remained outside and he demanded her paycheck from the office girl. Hollander was summoned and ordered him out of the plant. He then asked Tackett, who appeared in the doorway, why she had not been in or called in and if she had quit. When she denied quitting, he asked her to wait a minute and went into his office and reappeared with a notice " which he gave her, and stated "Now, you are fired."37 Conclusions The evidence clearly establishes that beginning with March 12 when Tackett was recalled to work, Hollander resumed his harassment of her by warning her about her future conduct in the plant. It would also be reasonable to assume that Hollander was particularly incensed at her at that time because of his feeling that she had deceived him in supporting the Union and was regarded as ungrateful. He continued to harass her as is shown by his change of her work procedures, raising her production quota , taking her off the drill machine and hiring a new employee to operate that machine, assigning her to work on the elbow machine despite her protestations , and laying her off when she declined to work on the elbow machine, allegedly because there was no other work available despite a shortage of inventory . ' It also appears that in the first two warning notices issued to Tackett she was held responsible for alleged carelessness and defective work in circumstances where there was reasonable doubt as to her blame . Also, although Respondent claims that Tackett was discharged for her refusal to work on the elbow machine, it appears that she was only laid off at the time "This is a large machine which produces plastic elbows to fit on pipe in the plastic department . In its operation large pliers are used which require balancing on one foot and bracing the other foot against the machine. Although Respondent witnesses Connie McGoon, Barbara Tipton, and Mary Burgher testified that it was no harder to operate than other equipment, I find based on all the evidence that it was not only more cumbersome to operate but also required greater effort compared to a winder or drill. "She had sustained injuries to her foot the preceding August in an automobile accident, which incapacitated her for some time and of which Hollander was aware. "The notice, dated May 5, was designated "3rd Notice" and stated "Violation 6 Gross insubordination . Refused to operate a machine you were assigned to." "The above findings are based on the credited testimony of Marjorie Pratt, the office girl who witnessed the confrontation and testified on behalf of Respondent . Tackett's testimony of the incident differed in that she stated Hollander told her that she had quit and she denied it. According to Hollander, he asked Tackett where she had been , and when she replied that he had told her he would call her, he accused her of lying and gave her the discharge ticket because she refused to run the elbow machine. Tackett's testimony to the effect that she denied quitting is credited "As appears above in the prior cases, Respondent was also found to TIIDEE PRODUCTS, INC. 975 of her refusal . The discharge was a later development. Based on the foregoing , I conclude that Hollander was motivated to discharge Tackett on May 16 because of his desire to retaliate against her for her union support in violation of Section 8(a)(3),(4), and (1) of the Act. e. Phyllis Wilson Wilson began working for Respondent on November 22, 1966. As found in the prior cases, she was discriminatorily laid off in September and October 1967, but had been recalled before the prior Board hearing at which she testified adversely to Respondent ." She had worked primarily on the assembly table before that hearing, and at no time had she operated the drill, the moulding machine , or the elbow machine . A few weeks after that hearing she was transferred to work on the elbow machine when Connie McGoon , who operated that machine , became ill . Upon McGoon's return to work, she alternated with Wilson in operating the elbow machine, each working half a day for the next few weeks until McGoon hurt her finger . Wilson then ran the elbow machine all day for the following month . She then complained to Supervisor Burgher about why she was not being relieved by McGoon . Burgher replied that she did not know and that if she had any complaints to take them directly to Hollander." Wilson decided that she would not continue working on the elbow machine unless she obtained relief and did not report for work on Monday , April 15. She called Mr. Janetzke, the union attorney, and explained her predicament to him . He suggested that she see Hollander about obtaining relief but she declined to go alone. He then asked whether she would see Hollander accompanied by Creola Reese , the union representative, to which she agreed . The following day she and Reese visited the plant where Reese explained to Hollander that she was there on behalf of Wilson's request for relief on the elbow machine. Hollander refused to discuss the matter and told her to see Harvey Rector, his representative , if it concerned any employee or union matter. Harsh words were then exchanged between them, and Reese, if not both of them, was ordered to leave the plant . Reese and Wilson then went to see Janetzke who called Rector and, after referring to and relating the Reese -Hollander incident, he discussed the failure to relieve Wilson on the elbow machine as was the practice with other female operators." Rector replied that Wilson had indicated animus towards Hollander by her testimony at the prior hearing. Janetzke admitted that there were hard feelings between them, and asked Rector to intercede on her behalf with Hollander in resolving the matter . Rector agreed to do so, and later that day he called Janetzke and informed him that he had spoken to Hollander who insisted that if Wilson wished to continue working , she would have to do so under the conditions assigned by him. have discriminatorily laid her off, allegedly for lack of work. "A week after the election Hollander warned Wilson "to watch her step and her mouth." "By that time McGoon had recovered sufficiently from her finger injury to relieve Wilson during her 10-minute mid-morning and afternoon coffeebreaks. "Although some female employees testified on behalf of Respondent that they operated the elbow machine all day for extended periods, Burgher admitted that for quite some time there had been a practice for two girls to alternate working on the machine for half a day at a time. Cn April 19, Wilson and her husband visited the plant to pick up her paycheck . There, they met Hollander who asked Wilson where she had been. She replied that she had received a telephone call from Janetzke to the effect that she had been fired . When Hollander remarked that he (Janetzke) knew more about it than he, Wilson stated that it made no difference because she quit on Monday." Hollander also informed her that not calling in for 3 days constituted an automatic quit , and he also complained that she had belittled him in her testimony at the prior hearing. Conclusions The General Counsel contends that Wilson was constructively discharged on April 19. Respondent in its brief appears to take the position that she quit on April 15. It appears, and I find, that Wilson declined to report for work on Monday, April 15, because of her decision to no longer operate the elbow machine unless she was given appropriate relief. With that in mind and pursuant to Janetzke's suggestion, she and Reese, attempted unsuccessfully to discuss the matter with Hollander. Upon learning how Hollander rebuffed them , Janetzke requested Rector to intercede on Wilson ' s behalf with Hollander. After consulting Hollander, Rector advised Janetzke that Hollander insisted that - his work assignments would have to be followed, which in effect, meant that no relief would be forthcoming for Wilson . At the subsequent meeting on April 19, Wilson or her husband plainly stated that she would not submit to any further harassment and would not operate the elbow machine without appropriate relief. I conclude from the foregoing that Wilson declined to work on or after April 15 unless regularly relieved on the elbow machine. Inasmuch as no such relief was thereafter offered to her, I find that she quit on the last working day preceding April 15 , presumably April 12. I find further that Hollander strongly resented her because of the testimony she gave in the prior hearing, which was personally degrading to him, and her union support, and he declined to follow in her case the usual and established policy of providing a half day relief on the elbow machine. Hollander was following his pattern of making it very difficult, if not intolerable , for union adherents to continue working in the plant . I conclude that Wilson's quit was induced by Hollander' s discriminatory tactics and constituted a constructive discharge in violation of Section 8(aX3), (4) and (1) of the Act. 2. The alleged discriminatory warning notices It is contended that the warning notices given to Wells and Tackett constituted discriminatory action in violation of Section 8(a)(l) and (3) of the Act. As appears above, Wells and Tackett received warning notices for alleged infractions of the posted rules. The evidence reflects, and I find, that both employees raised reasonable doubts as to their responsibility for the acts complained of by Hollander. Moreover, I find it unnecessary to resolve their responsibility. The evidence viewed in its entirety establishes that Hollander, motivated by vindictiveness, followed a pattern of retaliation against "These findings are based upon the credited composite testimony of Majorie Pratt, Hollander, McGoon, and Burgher. Wilson testified that Hollander asked her twice whether she was coming back , and that either she or her husband replied that she was not going to tolerate any more harassment. 976 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD employees who supported the Union and/or testified adversely to him in the prior Board hearing. He used the warning notices, apparently as a new device, to" indicate his displeasure with union adherents and opposition to the Union. I, therefore, conclude that the issuance of the warning notices changed the terms and conditions of employment, and thereby constituted violations of Section 8(a)(l), (3), and (4) of the Act. Furthermore, regardless of whether Wells and Tackett actually committed infractions of the rules, the rules, themselves, as appear infra, were adopted and implemented in violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. Thus, the use of the warning notices were per se violative of the Act. D. The Alleged 8(aX5) Violations The General Counsel contends that in violation of Section 8(aX5) of the Act, Respondent unilaterally instituted the work rules referred to above, including penalties to be imposed on offenders, issued warning notices pursuant thereto for infractions, and unilaterally instituted a 90-day probationary period for new hires, at a time when Respondent was obligated to recognize and bargain with the Union pursuant to its certification. The General Counsel contends further that Hollander's refusal to discuss Wilson's grievance with Reese for relief on the elbow machine, denied union representation to Wilson, also in violation of Section 8(aX5). As found above, the evidence does not establish the prior existence and/or posting of each or any of the rules before their posting herein. Even assuming that some had been posted years ago, I find they had been abandoned by lapse of time and were unilaterally revived and invoked. Nor is it necessary to determine which, if any, of the rules constitute mandatory subjects of bargaining. The fact that penalties were prescribed for breaches thereof sufficiently affected the conditions of employment to make them mandatory subjects of bargaining. Their unilateral promulgation and implementation were in derogation of Respondent's obligation to bargain pursuant to the Union's certification in violation of Section 8(aX5) and (1) of the Act." The evidence shows that in March, Messer was hired as a 90-day probationary employee. According to the unrefuted testimony of Wells, that practice had not been followed previously. The General Counsel contends that instituting a probationary hiring practice following the Union's certification without consultation with it was in derogation of Respondent's obligation to bargain in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. It is well settled, and I find, that unilaterally instituting a new hiring practice, a mandatory subject of bargaining, constitutes a violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. I find no merit in General Counsel's contention that Wilson was deprived of union representation when Hollander declined to talk to Reese about her grievance. The testimony of Reese shows that in refusing to discuss anything with Reese, Hollander told her "If you have anything to say about the Union or any of my employees you are to go to through my representative, Harvey Rector," and that she was ordered to leave the plant. It appears further that shortly thereafter Janetzke discussed "The Timken Roller Bearing Co.. 70 NLRB 500, 502, In. 3, set aside on other grounds 161 F.2d 949 (C.A. 6k Tower Hoskry Mills. Inc.. 81 NLRB 658, 660. the matter with Rector and it was expeditiously resolved adversely to Wilson. I find that Hollander did not deny Wilson union representation but, in fact, declined to represent himself and insisted that the grievance or other union matters be discussed with Rector, his representative, which is what subsequently transpired. In view of these circumstances, I find that the General Counsel has failed to establish a violation of Section 8(aX5) of the Act with respect to Wilson's grievance and union representation. Upon the foregoing findings of fact and upon the entire record in the cases, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. At all times material herein the Union has been a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 2. At all times material herein, Respondent has been engaged in commerce as an employer within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 3. The Union is the duly certified collective-bargaining representative of Respondent's employees in the following appropriate unit: All production and maintenance employees at the Employer's Dayton, Ohio, plant, excluding all office clerical employees, professional employees, technical employees, guards and supervisors, as defined in the Act. 4. Respondent has interfered with, restrained, or coerced its employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, within the meaning of and in violation of Section 8(aXl) of the Act, by promulgating and maintaining no-solicitation and no-distribution rules, interrogating employees concerning union matters, and admonishing employees not to associate with union adherents. 5. In violation of Section 8(aX3) and/or (4) of the Act, Respondent discriminatorily discharged John Haywood, David Leffler, Pauline Messer, Claudine Tackett, and Phyllis Wilson. 6. In violation of Section 8(aX3), (4), and (1) of the Act, Respondent discriminatorily changed the terms and conditions of employment by issuing warning notices to employees Wells and Tackett. 7. In violation of Section 8(ax5) and (1) of the Act, Respondent failed to bargain with the Union by unilaterally and without consultation with the Union posting and adopting work rules, and instituting a probationary period of employment for new employees. 8. Respondent did not commit alleged violations not specifically found herein. 9. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(aXI), (3), (4), and (5) of the Act, I shall recommend that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. Having found that Respondent has discriminatorily discharged certain employees, I shall recommend that Respondent recall all employees so discharged and offer to reinstate them to their former or substantially equivalent positions, without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges, and make them whole for any loss of earnings they may have TIIDEE PRODUCTS, INC. 977 suffered as a result of the discrimination against them. Backpay shall be computed on a quarterly basis and in a manner consistent with the Board policy set forth in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289, and Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716. Having found that warning notices were issued to certain employees by Respondent in violation of the Act , I shall recommend that it rescind such notices and delete them from the employment records of said employees . Having found that Respondent failed to consult and/or bargain with the Union as the duly certified bargaining representative of its employees in the unit found appropriate regarding the terms and conditions of employment , I shall recommend that it rescind and withdraw its posted work rules and regulations and the practice of hiring new employees on a probationary basis, and bargain with the Union concerning such terms and conditions of employment. The Union also requests, in addition to backpay recommendations made herein, that the employees be made whole for any wages and benefits which they might have received had Respondent bargained in good faith and negotiated a bargaining agreement . The request is not recommended on the rounds that the Board has not adopted that policy , which is pending consideration before it, nor was evidence adduced for its support at the hearing herein. In view of the broad scope and nature of the unfair labor practices found herein and Respondent's past history of unfair labor practices, I shall recommend that it cease and desist from infringing in any manner upon the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law and upon the entire record in these cases, I recommend the following: RECOMMENDED ORDER Respondent, Tiidee Products, Inc., its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Promulgating and maintaining no-solicitation rules prohibiting employees during nonworking time from soliciting for the Union on Respondent ' s property. (b) Promulgating and maintaining no-distribution rules prohibiting employees during nonworking time from distributing materials on behalf of the Union in nonworking areas of Respondent' s property. (c) Interrogating employees concerning union matters within the meaning of Section 8(a)(l) of the Act. (d) Coercing or restraining employees from associating with union adherents within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. (e) Discriminatorily discharging, laying off, or forcing termination of, or otherwise discriminating against, employees in order to discourage membership in or support of International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization. (f) Failing to bargain with the aforesaid Union by unilaterally posting and adopting work rules without consultation with the Union as the duly certified exclusive bargaining representative of its employees concerning terms and conditions of employment in the following appropriate unit: All production and maintenance employees at Respondent's Dayton , Ohio, plant, excluding all office clerical employees, professional employees, technical employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act. (g) Discriminatorily changing the terms and conditions of employment by issuing warning notices to employees imposing disciplinary measures for infraction of work rules in order to retaliate against union adherents and to discourage membership in the aforesaid Union. (h) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended. 2. Take the following affirmative action which I find will effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Offer John Haywood, David Leffler, Pauline Messer, Claudine Tackett, and Phyllis Wilson , immediate and full reinstatement to their former or substantially equivalent positions without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges previously enjoyed, and make them whole for any loss of earnings they may have suffered by reason of the discrimination against them, in the manner set forth in the section of this Decision entitled "The Remedy." (b) Notify those employees set forth above if presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United States of their right to full reinstatement upon application in accordance with the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Training and Service Act, as amended, after discharge from the Armed Forces. (c) Rescind and withdraw the posted work rules and regulations. (d) Rescind and delete from the personnel files of employees William Wells and Claudine Tackett the warning notices heretofore given to them for alleged infractions of the posted work rules. (e) Upon request, bargain collectively with the aforesaid Union as the duly certified collective-bargaining representative of its employees in the unit found appropriate with respect to the terms and conditions of employment and embody in a signed agreement any understanding reached. (f) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all payroll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other records necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due and the rights of employment under the terms of this Recommended Order. (g) Post at its Dayton, Ohio, plant copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." '19 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 9, after being duly signed by Respondent ' s official representative, shall be posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places , including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered , defaced, or covered by any other material. (h) Notify the Regional Director for Region 9, in writing, within 20 days from the receipt of this Decision, " In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the notice. In the further event that the Board's Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision and Order." 978 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD what steps have been taken to comply herewith." IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the complaint be dismissed insofar as it alleges violations of the Act not specifically found. " In e event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, this provision shall be modified to read- "Notify the Regional Director for Region 9, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith." APPENDIX NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our employees that: This notice is posted pursuant to a Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner , issued after a trial in which both sides had the opportunity to present evidence. The Trial Examiner found that we violated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to inform our employees of their rights. The Act gives all employees the following rights: To organize themselves , to form, join , or help unions, to bargain as a group through a representative of their own choosing, to act together for collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection or to refuse to do any and all of these things. We assure all our employees that: WE WILL NOT unlawfully interrogate employees concerning their union activities. WE WILL NOT discharge, lay off, force termination of, or otherwise discriminate against employees in order to discourage membership in or support of International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization. WE WILL NOT promulgate , maintain, or enforce no-solicitation rules prohibiting solicitation on behalf of the Union during nonworking time on our property. WE WILL NOT promulgate , maintain , or enforce no-distribution rules prohibiting the distribution of material on behalf of the Union during nonworking time in nonworking areas of our property. WE WILL NOT change working conditions of our employees by posting work rules and regulations and imposing penalties for infractions thereof without consulting with the Union , nor will we post such rules and regulations in order to retaliate against our employees for their union support. WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain , or coerce our employees in the exercise of their rights under the Act. WE WILL make whole John Haywood, David Leffler, Pauline Messer, Claudine Tackett, and Phyllis Wilson for any loss of earnings they may have suffered by reason of their discriminatory discharges and offer them reinstatement to their former or substantially equivalent positions without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges previously enjoyed. WE WILL notify any of the above-named employees if presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United States of their right to full reinstatement upon application in accordance with the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Training and Service Act, as amended, after discharge from the Armed Forces. WE WILL rescind and delete from the personnel files of employees William Wells and Claudine Tackett the warning notices heretofore given to them for alleged infractions of the posted work rules. WE WILL rescind and withdraw the posted work rules and regulations. WE WILL, upon request, bargain collectively with the above Union as the duly certified collective-bargaining representative in the unit found appropriate for bargaining purposes with respect to the terms and conditions of employment and, if an understanding is reached, we will embody such terms in a signed agreement. Dated By Tiidee Products, Inc. (Employer) (Representative) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered , defaced, or covered by any other material. If employees have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions, they may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office , Federal Office Building, Room 2407, 550 Main Street , Cincinnati, Ohio 45202, Telephone 513-684-3686.