Jefferson House Nursing Home

MOOREHAVENS, INC. Moorehavens, Inc. d/b/a Jefferson House Nursing Home and Service Employees' International Union, Local 38, AFL-CIO. Case 19-CA-4069 June 24, 1969 DECISION AND ORDER BY MEMBERS FANNING, BROWN, AND ZAGORIA On February 27, 1969, Trial Examiner Martin S. Bennett issued his Decision in this proceeding, finding that Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. He also found that Respondent had not engaged in certain other unfair labor practices and recommended that the allegations of the complaint pertaining thereto be dismissed. Thereafter, Respondent and the General Counsel filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision and supporting briefs, and Respondent filed a brief in opposition to the General Counsel's exceptions. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in this case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner. ORDER Rursul nt to Section 10(c) of the National Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board hereby adopts as its Order the Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner, and orders that the Respondent, Moorehavens, Inc. d/b/a Jefferson House Nursing Home, Tacoma, Washington, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order. TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE MARTIN S. BENNETT, Trial Examiner : This matter was heard at Tacoma, Washington, on December 3, 1968. The complaint, issued October 4 and based upon a charge filed June 28, 1968, by Service Employees' International Union, Local 38, AFL-CIO, herein called the Union, alleges that Respondent, Moorehavens, Inc. d/b/a Jefferson House Nursing Home, had engaged in unfair 989 labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. Briefs have been submitted by the General Counsel and Respondent.' Upon the entire record in the case, and from my observation of the witnesses, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. JURISDICTIONAL FINDINGS Moorehavens, Inc. d/b/a Jefferson House Nursing Home is a Washington corporation engaged in the operation of four proprietary nursing homes in that state. One of these is Jefferson House Nursing Home at Tacoma, Washington, and is the only ho zo involved in this proceeding. Respondent enjoys a gross volume of business in excess of $500,000 and purchases goods and supplies which originate outside the State of Washington in excess of $5,000 per annum . I find that the operations of Respondent affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED Service Employees' International Union, Local 38, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Introduction; the Issues The Union commenced an organizational campaign among the 35 to 40 employees at this installation on April 26, 1968, after being contacted by employee Margaret Hales. The General Counsel alleges that Respondent engaged in various acts of interference, restraint, and coercion during May and June and that it discriminatorily discharged Hales, Josephine Mitchell, and Arnold Christensen, three out of five card signers, during June because of their union activities. William Moore is president and general manager of Respondent. Duane McCormies is executive vice president and maintains his office at this installation. McCormies had also managed this home until some time in June when John Gregory, the assistant manager, assumed that post. Fronia Barlindahl is the head nurse and the evidence demonstrates that she is a supervisor. The head housekeeper is Mary Lopez whose supervisory status is not clear, although she did participate in one decision to terminate employees. In any event, she is privy to management decisions. Moore and McCormies admitted that they learned of the union activities in late May or early June. B. The Discharge of Arnold Christensen Christensen entered the employ of Respondent in May of 1968 in a general maintenance capacity. One week later, he was placed in charge of maintenance with two subordinates and given an increase of $25 per month. I 'After the close of the hearing, the General Counsel moved, without opposition, for the correction of certain minor errors in the transcript. The motion is hereby granted. 'These findings are based in part upon testunony herein which, in effect, adopts stipulations entered into by Respondent in Cases 19-RC-4726 and 19-RC-4712 involving two other nursing homes operated by Respondent. 176 NLRB No. 135 990 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD find that this post was at best that of job leader and that he was not a supervisor. This was 2 months sooner than was customary. His work was complimented on many occasions by McCormies and he received no criticism thereof. Christensen became interested in the Union, signed a card on June 17 and distributed 8 to 10 cards, as he testified , after June 14 or 16; one of these was given to Head Housekeeper Mary Lopez.' McCormies singled out Christensen for a talk on a date specifically placed by McCormies as the morning of June 18; Christensen placed it I week before his discharge, but conceded that he might be "totally incorrect" as to the time. I find that it was June 18. Here, as elsewhere, there is conflict in the testimony. Christensen testified that on this occasion, in the presence of Assistant Manager Gregory and David Peuse,4 McCormies said that he understood Christensen had been engaging in union activities . Christensen admitted that this was the fact. McCormies replied that "there would be no union activity going on on the premises" and that if there was a repetition thereof, he "would run me out of there so fast it would make my head swim." McCormies admitted that he had heard of Christensen's union activities and testified that he spoke with Christensen and Peuse in the presence of Gregory, commented on the union activities and asked them to restrict it to "off-duty hours" and not to waste "duty time." He admitted that his nephew had previously advised him that paid time was being wasted and denied forbidding Christensen to engage in union activity on company time or on company property. He was shown his affidavit wherein he deposed that he forbade Christensen on penalty of discharge to "conduct any union activities on our time or premises." McCormies testified further that at the time he gave this statement he told his interrogator, counsel herein, that he objected to the use of the word "premises" on the ground that he had not used it. He was under the impression that it had been stricken as was done with five other corrections he had requested. He claimed that his interviewer said that he saw nothing wrong with the use of the term . This latter claim is unrefuted. It would seem that company counsel was not present on this occasion . Gregory was not questioned concerning the incident and the testimony of Peuse° is similarly silent. McCormies testified further that Respondent had previously encountered this problem at its other homes, that it had received advice as to its rights and restrictions and that he was aware of the significance of restricting union activities on company premises as such . He pointed further to a speech read by him to employees that afternoon which is a one-page document wherein he, inter alia, commented on the union campaign , stated that they had a free choice, made several statements of a non-coercive nature and invited their questions in the future. Therein, at the close, he requested that they not use "your scheduled work time in this manner," i.e., in effect contending that he followed a consistent course in his talk that morning with Christensen. In this posture of the matter, I credit McCormies and find that he did not -TITTis- testimony is viewed literally, he may have signed his own card after at least part , if not all, of this distribution. '?use was Christensen's helper and the nephew of McCormos. 'As reflected only in his pretrial affidavit , the parties having stipulated that it be thus received because of his unavailability . This was also done for the same reason in the cases of David Walters and Vivian Everett. impose an undue restriction upon Christensen on this occasion . Stoddard-Quirk Mfg. Co., 138 NLRB 615. Christensen's employment terminated on June 19 or 20, 1968, under the following circumstances , and here as well there is considerable conflict. Early in the morning , according to Christensen, he visited the office and spoke with Gregory and McCormies. He variously and successively testified that he spoke to them "regarding union activities "; that the pressure upon him "because of my union activity was intolerable"; that "if I wanted to be in the Union, I couldn't live in that place. I couldn't work in the place"; that "there was an area of harassment"; that "They were harassing me regarding my union activities"; that it had become intolerable"; and that "Under these circumstances, I would prefer to quit." He later denied, in effect, that he had quit on this occasion. I note that there is no evidence of "harassment" of Christensen other than the respective versions of his conversation with McCormies on June 18, set forth above. On the other hand, Gregory testified that Christensen came to the office and announced "I quit." When asked for the reason, he explained that he resented Gregory coming to him from time to time with instructions how to do his work . Gregory replied that his resignation was accepted and asked him to put it in writing . Christensen responded that he would do so during his lunch hour and left. McCormies basically agreed with Gregory. Christensen entered the office, referred to a major fence project on which he was engaged, and mentioned other "mundane" and. "superfluous assignments." He then stated that he .,was going to quit." Gregory accepted the resignation and asked him to put it in writing . Christensen responded that he would do so on his coffeebreak . I find, on their versions, that Christensen contemplated working for at only a portion of the day and turning in his resignation later. David Walters corroborated Gregory and McCormies. He deposed that at 9:30 that morning he entered the storage room and encountered Christensen, who stated "I just quit your establishment." Walters expressed surprise and Christensen then advised him to contact the Union, presumably for more desirable employment . David Peuse deposed only that he observed Christensen and Walters conversing in a low voice on this occasion and that he then heard Christensen advise Walters how to obtain a job through a union. To sum up, the theory of the General Counsel is that inasmuch as Christensen worked a short additional period that day, he did not quit . The mutually corroborative evidence by Respondent preponderates otherwise. And, Christensen in large measure supports this evidence because he admittedly introduced the topic of quitting. Respondent was willing to accept an immediate letter of resignation , but Christensen chose to submit the letter later; this is not inconsistent with a quit that morning. A request for such a letter by an employer in an organizational context would appear entirely understandable . I find, therefore, that Christensen quit his employment that morning and his letter of resignation was to be turned in by him an hour or two later at the most, with the apparent aim to work until then. About 1 hour later, Christensen and employee David Peuse were in the pantry during their coffeebreak. A kitchen helper named David Walters was also in the area on an errand. MOOREHAVENS, INC. 991 Christensen testified that Moore passed by and, visibly agitated, stated that there would be "no union activities going on here." Christensen did not reply . Moore told him to collect his pay and leave the premises. He went to the office and Moore instructed McCormies to pay off Christensen because he was fired . Moore was not questioned concerning the incident and the record does not disclose whether he was aware of the Christensen quit earlier that morning. As found, Walters was previously told by Christensen that he had quit. Walters deposed only that Moore spoke on this occasion, but was not asked as to the content except to state that "Mr . Moore did not want anyone unionizing on company time . Mr. Christensen knew this." Peuse deposed that Moore stated that if they were "talking Union on the job," this was not agreeable and that he, Moore, "would accept your time as of that moment." Christensen was the only one of the three who responded and he stated that there was no need to "run me out because I'll just walk out." He proceeded from the scene with Moore to the office and it is undenied that McCormies handed him a document to sign . This stated that he was terminating his employment by mutual agreement with Respondent . McCormies and Christensen differed as to whether Christensen read this. The depositions of Peuse and Walters have been previously relied upon rather than the version of Christensen and are again relied upon herein. The affidavit of Peuse discloses, and I find, that Moore offered to accept the resignation of the three if they were talking about the Union on company time. No one pointed out that, in fact, two of the three were on a coffeebreak. To the contrary, only Christensen spoke up and he, in effect, quit again . In view of the foregoing considerations, I find that Christensen quit his employment on this date and that Respondent has not engaged in conduct violative of the Act in this respect.' C. Josephine Mitchell Mitchell entered the employ of Respondent on December 1 , 1967, as a laundress and was the only one in the home . While at work on a Friday morning near Christmas, she telephoned Head Housekeeper Lopez at the latter's home and informed her that she was leaving the employ of Respondent at the end of the day to accept other employment; she did finish the day. Mitchell uncontrovertedly testified , and I find , that during that day McCormies visited her and told her that if her new employment did not work out, she could return to Respondent with a 25-cent raise to $1.50 per hour. After 1 day at her new position, Mitchell changed her mind and telephoned McCormies who promptly rehired her, stating that he would terminate her replacement at the end of the week and that Mitchell should return on the following week. She did return to work for Respondent around January 1 at the higher rate of pay. This raise, it may be noted, was generous, because Respondent then customarily - gave employees a 5-cent raise every 6 months. Mitchell uncontrovertedly testified, and I find , that on several occasions she told Lopez that she was eager to have a union in the home , that she wanted the home "to 'While it is possible to construe Moore's conditional statement as imposing an invalid rule, I do not believe that the evidence is sufficiently clear and substantial to warrant a finding that this was an-attempt to curtail union activity during nonworking time. go Union" and that if an organizer appeared on the scene, she wanted her name to be first on his list. It would appear that this took place after the commencement of the Union campaign in April. On one of these occasions, late in her employment, Lopez told her that this talk could "run you into trouble" and to keep her voice "down." About 2 weeks .before her termination on June 11, 1968, Mitchell filed an application to take a Civil Service examination as a dental assistant and so informed Lopez at the time. She told Lopez that if and when she received a notice to take the examination she would advise Lopez thereof and, further, that if she were offered other employment she would give 2 weeks' notice because she had "done wrong" in leaving without adequate notice the previous December.' On June 10, Mitchell visited the union hall and signed a card. On June 11, Head Nurse Barlindahl asked Mitchell, as. the latter testified, if it was true that she had applied for a Civil Service test. Mitchell said that this was the fact. Barlindahl then gave her 2 weeks' notice, stating that Respondent needed someone permanent on the job; no other reason was given. Barlindahl was asked why Mitchell and Margaret Hales, who also received 2 weeks' notice on June 11, were terminated. She replied generally that "they" were not cooperating with other people in the home and that their work was sloppy and unsatisfactory. She further testified that she did not know "for sure" whether they had signed cards as of June 11. Lopez, while citing instances of improper laundering, gave the Civil Service application as the reason. On June 18, McCormies held a general meeting of employees, discussed the union campaign, and made a reference to two employees who had been laid off, but assigned no reasons. Mitchell, who was serving out her 2 weeks' notice, uncontrovertedly testified, and I find, that she telephoned McCormies that evening and asked why she had been terminated. He replied that this was because she had looked for work elsewhere; Mitchell denied this. He then stated that "maybe" it resulted from the shrinkage of clothes in the laundry. After this statement from McCormies, Mitchell left Respondent's employ before her notice expired. Lopez testified also that the decision to terminate the two women was made at a meeting late in May attended by Barlindahl, Lopez, and McCormies at which Lopez informed the others of the Civil Service application by Mitchell; Gregory apparently was also present. There are a number of reasons why Respondent's contentions herein do not stand up. (1) Respondent has shifted its defenses in Mitchell's case. While originally relying on her !Civil Service application, it, later in the day, raised her alleged deficiencies as a laundress. (2) Barlindahl, when asked why Mitchell was not discharged until June 11 when the decision had been made back in May, replied that Lopez had hired Mitchell, that she and Lopez worked different shifts, and that they planned to be together and announce this decision to Mitchell. Yet, the record discloses that Barlindahl alone confronted ' Mitchell with the bad news on June 11. 'This finding is based on the testimony of Mitchell , a clear and articulate witness. Lopez testified that Mitchell told her that she might hear about this opportunity in a day, weeks or a month, but that as soon as she did she would have to leave . Lopez was a vague and unsatisfactory witness in a number of respects, as will appear below. 992 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL Moreover, Barlindahl is contradicted by Lopez, who testified that at the May meeting it was decided that Barlindahl would hand out the notice. This, therefore, is indicative of a hastily arrived at decision in June to eliminate an outspoken union advocate. (3) Despite attempting to portray Mitchell as an unsatisfactory worker, the fact is that Respondent gave her a raise in excess of its normal wage policy after observing her work for 3 or 4 weeks, in an effort to procure her return and indeed terminated her replacement. This appears to be a more objective indication of her true ability. (4) Respondent's contention concerning the Civil Service examination is predicated upon much speculation. For example, the test might not be given; if it were given, Mitchell might not take it; if she took it, she might fail; if she passed, she might not be offered employment; if she ultimately were offered employment, she might reject it. This is hardly a logical predicate on which to terminate one whose return it had sought. (5) The evidence of garments allegedly mistreated by Mitchell is not impressive. Respondent brought to the hearing a sweater coat allegedly shrunk to the size of a sweater by improper washing and a dress faded by the use of excessive bleach. These were cited as examples of her negligence and allegedly there were unspecified others. Lopez testified that Mitchell's work was originally satisfactory but had deteriorated. As for the sweater, Mitchell allegedly washed it in the washing machine with hot water instead of doing it in a stationary tub by hand as advised by Lopez. As for the dress, it was colored and should have been done with a diluted rather than full strength bleach. Lopez claimed that Mitchell admitted using the wrong bottle of bleach on this occasion by error. She claimed that she had told Mitchell to be more careful with the clothes of the patients. Mitchell testified that some of the clothes, such as wools or mohairs, should properly be cleaned, but that drycleaning establishments would not accept them because of the nature of their soiling by patients. A month or 6 weeks before June, as she uncontrovertedly testified, she took up the problem with Moore and proposed that they install their own drycleaning equipment to avoid shrinkage. Moore replied that he was not operating a drycleaning establishment and that Mitchell should do the best she could. Mitchell also testified that upon entering the employ of Respondent Lopez showed her the machinery. Thereafter, on several occasions, woolen blankets and linen pants had shrunk. She spoke to both Lopez and Barlindahl about this and was told only to try to avoid a repetition, to try to figure out another method and also to do the best she could. She was never reprimanded or told that her job was in jeopardy. Here, too, Lopez was unimpressively vague as a witness. She had not seen the garments prior to laundering and could not place the occasions except as prior to the departure of Mitchell in June. Considering that Mitchell worked there some 6 or 7 months, if Respondent's premise has merit, it would follow that the establishment would have been in sore straits for blankets and clothes, inasmuch as Mitchell was the only laundress. This reinforces the previous finding that this was strictly an afterthought in an effort to buttress Respondent's position because its primary reason from which it shifted lacked true substance. I have, therefore, credited Mitchell where her testimony is in conflict with LABOR RELATIONS BOARD that of Lopez. To sum up, Mitchell was an employee of 6 to 7 months' tenure from December 1, 1967, whose return was solicited by Respondent following her quit after several weeks of work. On that occasion, her replacement was terminated and Mitchell was given an unprecedented raise. She was an open advocate of the Union and Lopez was aware of this. Mitchell was discharged the day after she visited the union hall and signed a card. The decision to terminate her was allegedly made in the previous month but delayed for a reason not supported by the record. The reasons for her discharge were shifting and not substantially supported. I find, therefore, that the evidence preponderates in favor of the position of the General Counsel. I further find that Respondent has discriminated with respect to the employment of Josephine Mitchell within the meaning of Section 8(aX3) of the Act and has thereby also engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(axl) of the Act. D. Margaret Hales Hales entered the employ of Respondent as a housekeeper on December 1, 1967, and was given 2 weeks' notice of her discharge on June 11, 1968; as noted, Mitchell was similarly terminated. Hales made the initial contact of the Union on April 26 and signed a card on that date. Executive Vice President McCormies in effect admitted that he learned Hales had signed a card shortly after her employment began. Hales uncontrovertedly testified that about 1-1/2 months after signing a card, and prior to being told of her discharge, she informed Head Housekeeper Lopez that she had joined the Union. In addition, Vivian Everett deposed that Head Nurse Barlindahl had told her that Hales was behind the union campaign and proceeded to question Everett as to what Hales had told her. As found, Barlindahl testified that she did not know "for sure" whether Hales had signed a card prior to her discharge. The decision to terminate Hales was made at a meeting late in May of McCormies, Barlindahl, and Lopez with Gregory present. On June 11, Barlindahl summoned Hales to her office and, in the presence of Lopez, told Hales, as the latter testified, that she, Hales, was unhappy with her job and that Respondent was giving her 2 weeks' notice so that she could find other employment. There is evidence of bad feeling between Hales and a coworker, Leatrice Calvin, but Hales testified that she was never told that her difficulties with Calvin or any other employee could result in the loss of her job. Calvin entered the employ of Respondent as a housekeeper on March 26, 1968, and replaced Mitchell in the laundry after June 18. She testified that she and Hales worked together, although not daily. Hales at one point became angry with Calvin because of her disapproval of the treatment of a friend of Hales by Calvin. Calvin also claimed that Hales resented her because she, Calvin, was colored. This became a matter of discussion among Barlindahl, Lopez and Calvin. Barlindahl testified that Hales was a competent worker when she worked alone, but became quarrelsome when paired with other employees. This ties in with her testimony that Hales was not cooperative with other employees. Lopez agreed, testifying that Hales came to her on several occasions during a 2-month period and complained that she could not work with the other girls as they were either too slow or too fast and that she could not get MOOREHAVENS, INC. along with them . According to Gregory, Hales came to him, immediately after receiving her notice from Barlindahl, and complained that she had been terminated because Lopez was favoring colored persons and disliked her because she was white. She also admitted in this conversation that there had been some quarrels and mentioned Calvin. Respondent also adduced the testimony of Fumiko Bercier, who is Japanese and has a limited command of English . Bercier worked for Respondent as a housekeeper until January 6 or 7, 1968 , when she quit, and returned to work approximately November 1. She testified that Hales did not like her and liked to argue and fight but also admitted , however, that she never mentioned this to Lopez or Barlindahl ; she also testified generally that she quit because of fights and arguing and that her health was involved . Hales testified that she was advised that Bercier quit because of her and asked Lopez if this was true. Lopez replied that this was not the case and that she had left because of her health . As is readily apparent, the two concepts are not mutually exclusive. Hales admitted that she did have difficulty getting along with Calvin because Calvin tended to give her orders. She complained to Lopez about this and then told Calvin, who entered the scene, that they had been talking about her. Calvin responded "if you call me a colored I will floor you on the ground ." This took place in May and followed an incident in April when Calvin criticized Hales because, in cleaning a patient's room, Hales had removed his beer bottles . Calvin, it may be noted, is substantially larger than Hales. Hales further admitted that she told Lopez on several occasions that Lopez favored colored persons, that Lopez made "us" do the work and that she permitted the ones she favored to "do nothing." Hales also admitted telling Lopez that there were four people Lopez so favored and testified that when she "couldn't stand it any more when they bullied me" she complained to Lopez, but that Lopez took no action in the matter. The timing of the discharge and its coupling with that of Mitchell is indeed suspicious. But the fact is that Hales encountered problems with Bercier in January and with Calvin in April and again in May. Although there is evidence that Barlindahl was hostile to Hales, the evidence preponderates in favor of the position of Respondent that Hales was discharged for cause . Stated otherwise, the evidence does not preponderate in favor of a finding that Respondent would not have terminated Hales but for her union activities. I shall therefore recommend that this allegation be dismissed. E. Interference Restraint, and Coercion There are several items for consideration herein, one of which, the alleged warning to Christensen by McCormies on June 18, has already been disposed of. In the same vein, the General Counsel relies upon a speech made by McCormies to the employees on the afternoon of June 18. A former employee, Vivian Everett, stated in her pretrial affidavit received in evidence in lieu of testimony that McCormies told them not to discuss unions "on the job or on the place" on penalty of layoff. However, immediately prior to this statement, she deposed that Head Nurse Barlindahl told her and allegedly each girl separately that "if we discussed unions on the job we would get fired. Duane [McCormies] said the same thing at the meeting." This obviously does not go as far as the 993 portion relied upon by the General Counsel as it does not go beyond forbidding union activities on working time. McCormies testified that he told the employees, in essence, the same thing he told Christensen earlier that day and placed no restrictions on activities on company premises as such. He claimed that he told them that union activities were not to take place on the "employer' s time." Respondent also introduced in evidence a copy of the speech he read. It contains a discussion of the organizational campaign , arguments against organization and falls entirely within the ambit of Section 8(c) of the Act. Near the close thereof, McCormies stated that "we only ask that you do not use your scheduled work time for this matter." I credit McCormies and find no violation herein. The complaint further alleges that Respondent ordered an employee to return and destroy her previously executed authorization card under penalty of losing her job. Sherry Gertsch, currently a nurse's aide, signed a card on June 17. Gertsch, a highly nervous witness, testified herein that she thought it was for insurance and that she changed her mind . She had received the card from Christensen and had no idea it was connected with joining the Union. She spoke with Head Nurse Barlindahl and asked her advice. Barlindahl told her that it was her choice to sign or not. Gertsch then went to the union organizer and asked for and obtained her card . Thereafter, her husband directed her to sign another card and she did so, contrary to her wishes. Gertsch also testified that christensen gave her a second card, told her it was a union card and she signed it despite her reluctance to do so. Mary Bruce, an organizer for the Union until October 1, 1968, testified that it was the second card that Gertsch retrieved. She claimed that Gertsch came to the job in tears and asked for the return of her card because Mrs. Barlindahl had told Gertsch she would be discharged if she did not turn the card back to Barlindahl; there was no discussion of insurance. It appears that Gertsch did retrieve this card. Barlindahl was not questioned concerning the episode. While the testimony of Gertsch is somewhat difficult to accept, the fact is that there is only uncorroborated hearsay evidence to support the General Counsel herein . I shall therefore recommend that this allegation of the complaint be dismissed. The record also contains one other matter. In her statement, as noted, Vivian Everett deposed that prior to the layoff, Mrs. Barlindahl asked if she was interested in the Union, who else was interested and whether Everett attended meetings . She also questioned her concerning the identity of the leadership in the organizational campaign, attributed this leadership to Margaret Hales and asked what Hales had told her; this was undenied. I find that by this repetitive and intensive questioning concerning the union activities not only of Everett but of other employees and by naming a specific person as the leader of the campaign, Respondent has gone beyond the bounds of free speech, has conveyed the impression of surveillance of union activities and has restrained and coerced employees in the exercise of their rights under Section 7 of the Act, thereby violating Section 8(a)(l) thereof. IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICIES UPON COMMERCE The activities of Respondent set forth in section III, above, and occurring in connection with its operations set forth in section I , above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among 994 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow thereof. V. THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices, I shall recommend that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. It has been found that Respondent has discriminated with respect to the tenure of employment of Josephine Mitchell . I shall therefore recommend that Respondent offer her immediate and full reinstatement to her former or substantially equivalent position without prejudice to seniority or other rights and privileges. See The Chase National Bank of the City of New York, San Juan, Puerto Rico Branch , 65 NLRB 827. I shall further recommend that Respondent make her whole for any loss of pay suffered by reason of the discrimination against her. Said loss of pay, based upon earnings which she normally would have earned from the date of thq discrimination to the date of the offer of reinstatement, shall be computed in the manner established in F. W. Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB 289. See N. L. R. B. v. Seven- Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344. Interest thereon at the rate of 6 percent per annum shall be added, as provided in Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716. The unfair labor practicies committed by Respondent involve a pretextuous discharge calculated to restrain and coerce employees in the exercise of their rights under the Act and disclose a disposition to impinge upon such rights . I shall therefore recommend that Respondent be ordered to cease and desist from infringing in any manner upon the rights guaranteed under Section 7 of the Act. On the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record in the case, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Moorehavens, Inc. d/b/a Jefferson House Nursing Home is an employer within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act. 2. Service Employees' International Union, Local 38, AFL-CIO is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. By discriminating in regard to the tenure of employment of Josephine Mitchell, Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. 4. By the foregoing, by coercively interrogating employees concerning union activities and by creating the impression of surveillance of union activities, Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 6. Respondent has not otherwise engaged in unfair labor practices. RECOMMENDED ORDER Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that Respondent Moorehavens, Inc. d/b/a Jefferson House Nursing Home, Tacoma, Washington, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Discouraging membership in Service Employees' International Union, Local 38, AFL-CIO, or in any other labor organization of its employees, by discriminating in regard to hire or tenure of employment, or any term or condition thereof. (b) Coercively interrogating employees concerning their union activities or creating the impression of surveillance of union activities. (c) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to form labor organizations, to join or assist the above-named or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and to refrain from any or all such activities, except to the extent • such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization, as authorized by Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action which is deemed necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Offer to Josephine Mitchell immediate and full reinstatement to her former or substantially equivalent position without prejudice to seniority or other rights aud privileges and make her whole for any loss of earnings suffered by reason of the discrimination against her in the manner set forth in the section above entitled "The Remedy." (b) Preserve and make available to the Board or its agents, upon request, for examination and copying, all payroll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other records necessary to determine the amount of backpay due under the terms of this recommended order. (c) Post at its home at Tacoma, Washington, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."' Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 19, shall, after being signed by Respondent, be posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof and maintained for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in. conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 19, in writing, within 20 days from the receipt of this Decision, what steps it has taken to comply herewith.' 'In the event this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the notice. In the further event that the Board's Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals, Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision and Order." .In the event this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, this provision shall be modified to read - "Notify the said Regional Director, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith. " APPENDIX NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board and in MOOREHAVENS , INC. 995 order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our employees that: WE WILL NOT discourage membership in or activity in behalf of Service Employees' International Union, Local 38, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization of our employees, by discriminating in any manner in regard to hire or tenure of employment, or any term or condition thereof, except to the extent authorized under Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. WE WILL offer Josephine Mitchell immediate and full reinstatement to her former or substantially equivalent position , without prejudice to seniority or other rights and privileges , and we will make her whole for any loss of pay suffered as a result of our discrimination against her. WE WILL NOT coercively interrogate employees concerning their union activities and we will not create the impression that we are engaging in surveillance of union activities. WE WILL NOT interfere with , restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to form labor organizations, to join or assist the above-named or any other labor organization , to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and to refrain from any or all such activities, except to the extent such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment, as authorized in Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. Dated By MOOREHAVENS, INC. D/B/A JEFFERSON HOUSE NURSING HOME (Employer) (Representative) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. If employees have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions , they may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, Republic Bldg., 10th Floor, 1511 Third Avenue, Seattle, Washington 98101, Telephone 583-7473.