World Carpets, Inc.

954 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD World Carpets, Inc. and Truck Drivers and Helpers, Local 515, Affiliate of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of America Cases 10-CA-7421, 10-CA-7492, and 10-RC-7450 June 24, 1969 DECISION AND ORDER BY MEMBERS FANNING, BROWN, AND ZAGORIA On March 27, 1969, Trial Examiner Lloyd Buchanan issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. The Trial Examiner also found that the Respondent had not engaged in certain other unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint, and recommended dismissal of such allegations. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner' s Decision and a supporting brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in this case, and hereby adopts the Trial Examiner's findings, conclusions, and recommendations, as modified herein. 1. We agree with the Trial Examiner's findings that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act and interfered with the election by making threats and promises as well as by bargaining directly with the employees. On June 15, 1968, just 2 days after the petition for election was filed, controller Farmer, accompanied by dispatcher Edwards, addressed the unit employees who had gathered at the company garage in response to employer notice on the plant bulletin board. He lead a general discussion concerning wages and working conditions. Initially, he acknowledged that the Company had received two letters from the Union (the demand letters) and he stated, in reference to the Union, that "he did not want outsiders coming in and telling him how to run the company." He also stated that if the Company were obliged "to pay as much as union scale, they could ship the carpet cheaper by piggy-backing it than they could by paying the full union scale ." We agree with the Trial Examiner's finding of an 8(a)(1) violation with respect to this 176 NLRB No. 138 threat to the jobs of the unit employees. Similarly, we concur with the Trial Examiner's finding that Respondent interfered with the election and violated Section 8(a)(1) by bargaining directly with the employees at a series of meetings on August 24, 25, and 26, whether or not Respondent was at that time under an obligation to bargain with the Union. Here again, the truckdriver employees gathered at the plant in response to a bulletin board notice and this time conferred with President Shaheen as well as with controller Farmer over wages and working conditions. On the morning of Saturday, August 24, Shaheen mentioned, among other things, that the Company was looking into the 10-cent-per-mile increase which the Respondent had refused the men in May prior to the advent of the Union. There had been no discussion of the 10-cent increase between the time it was first proposed by the men in May and the meeting held on August 24. At the completion of this meeting, Shaheen told the drivers to come to some sort of an agreement among themselves as to what their demands were and then to return to another meeting with him that same afternoon. A more specific list of demands was thereafter furnished to the Respondent by the men at the second meeting that day. Farmer told the men there were some things that Shaheen could go along with and others that he would not find agreeable. Thereafter, the men or their spokesmen on at least three more occasions on the 24th, 25th, and 26th, conferred with Farmer who had promised to inform them immediately of President Shaheen's reaction or answer to their demands. On the 26th, Farmer furnished the men with a copy of Shaheen's memorandum which was in fact the Respondent's answer to their demands. We agree with the Trial Examiner that this direct negotiation with the unit employees which occurred while the Union's demand for recognition and the election petition were pending restrained and interfered with employees' exercise of rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act and thereby violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Finally, the distribution of the Shaheen memorandum of August 26 constituted an aggravated violation of Section 8(a)(1). This memorandum which was distributed to the men through Farmer simultaneously promised benefits and threatened loss of jobs and constituted a calculated attempt to dissipate the union majority dust prior to the election. The Company here campaigned with a list of promised benefits to persuade the employees that they did not in fact need a union, among which was the long sought after 10-cent-per-mile wage increase, an increase in the amount of per diem payments for overnight layovers, and coverage under a profit sharing plant. As the promises ended, the threats began: "I think the . . . suggested changes in the drivers' mileage scale and benefits are as far as we can go with or without the union. If we are faced with costs any WORLD CARPETS, INC. 955 greater than this, then I think we should seriously consider discontinuing our trucking operation altogether." Significantly, the changes in wages and benefits were to go into effect immediately after the time for filing objections had passed without any objections having been filed if the Union lost the election. Conversely, if the Union were to win the election, the memorandum specifies plans to be implemented immediately in the event the Union refused to accept the detailed benefits and decided to strike. This total, balanced employer package of effective promises and threats was designed to and did in fact interfere with the election and thus violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 2. In agreement with the Trial Examiner, we find, on consideration of all the circumstances of this case, that Respondent's refusal to recognize the Union as the exclusive representative of its truckdriver employees violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. The Union's efforts to organize Respondent's employees began about June 1, 1968, and came to Respondent's attention almost immediately. By letter dated June 3, the Union gave the Respondent its first notice demanding recognition which inadvertently designated an incorrect unit. This mistake was corrected in the perfected bargaining demand made on June 11. The Respondent denied recognition, expressed doubt of the Union's majority, and stated that if the Union did not file a petition for an election, the Respondent would. On June 13, the Union did file a petition, and within 2 days the Respondent commenced its overt effort to discourage its employees from selecting the Union as their representative. On June 15, Respondent assembled the unit employees in the company garage and threatened their jobs when it informed them that the Company would switch to piggyback operations rather than pay union scale . On August 24, 25, and 26, at a time when the demand for recognition and the election petition were pending, the Company negotiated directly with the employees. On August 26, the Respondent caused a memorandum to be transmitted to the employees which simultaneously promised benefits if the Union lost the election and threatened loss of jobs if the Union won the election . On August 30, the Union lost the election as the result of a tie vote. It is plain from the foregoing recital of events that Respondent resorted to a consistent and insistent campaign of unfair labor practices in its effort to thwart the union organization drive . Respondent's contention that its unfair labor practices are insubstantial within the rule of the Hammond & Irving' decision is without merit. Threats of job loss and promises of substantially increased benefits for the purpose of subverting the election process can by no stretch of the imagination be deemed insubstantial interferences with employee exercise of Section 7 rights. The timing of Respondent's unfair labor practices, commencing almost immediately after the organizational drive began and persisting up to the time of the election, persuades us that the unfair labor practices were calculated to, and did, dissipate the Union's majority. Clearly Respondent's unfair labor practices rendered the election timely held on the union petition an inaccurate register of employees' desires as to union representation and tended to preclude the holding of a fair election within a reasonable time thereafter. Accordingly, as there is no question that the Union had been validly designated by a majority of its truckdriver employees as their representative at the time it made its bargaining demand,2 we find that, by engaging in the foregoing conduct, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act, and that the policies of the Act will be effectuated by the imposition of a bargaining order as a remedy for such conduct.3 CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The Respondent is an employer within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act. 2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. All truckdrivers, including the spotter, employed at the Company's Dalton, Georgia, plant, but excluding the mechanics and all other employees, guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act. 4. On June 11, 1968, and at all times thereafter, the Union has been and is the exclusive representative of all employees in the aforesaid appropriate unit for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act. 5. By refusing on and after June 11, 1968, to bargain collectively with the Union as the exclusive bargaining representative of the employees of Respondent in the appropriate unit, Respondent has '154 NLRB 1071. 'We agree with the Trial Examiner that a majority of the unit composed of 32 employees executed valid designations of the Union as their collective-bargaining representative. Respondent, while not disputing the authenticity of the employees' signatures on the 21 union-authorization cards introduced into evidence , has excepted to the validity of certain of these cards, exceptions which are based on the testimony of 5 individual card signers; namely, Russell, Peden, Reynolds, Henry, and Edmonson. The Trial Examiner specifically discredited Peden and imphedly discredited Russell by "citing" him as one "who would impel to an acceptance of the opposite of what he told us," because of "the very evident disregard for the truth in what he allegedly recalled and did not recall, and his patently evasive manner " Even if the other three contested cards were invalid, the Union would have a majority (18 of the 32 unit employees .) However, the Trial Examiner also partially discredited the testimony of the other three and, in any event, found that their cards were not invalidated based principally upon the credited testimony of other witnesses; namely, Hughes and H. F. Farmer. On the basis of our careful review of the record we conclude that the Trial Examiner's credibility resolutions are not contrary to a clear preponderance of the relevant evidence . Accordingly, we find no basis for disturbing these findings. Standard Dry Wall Products, Inc, 91 NLRB 544, enfd. 185 F.2d 362 (C.A. 3). 'N L R B. v. Gissel Packing Co Inc, 396 U.S. 869; Sinclair Company v. N L R B, 395 U.S. 575. 956 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. 6. By bargaining directly with the employees and by making threats or promises of benefits Respondent has interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act and has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 7. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. FINDINGS OF FACT (WITH REASONS THEREFOR) AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. THE COMPANY S BUSINESS AND THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED The facts concerning the Company 's status as a Georgia corporation , the nature and extent of its business, and its engagement in commerce within the meaning of the Act are admitted ; I find and conclude accordingly. I also find and conclude that, as admitted, the Union is a labor organization within the meaning of the Act. If. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner and hereby orders that the Respondent, World Carpets, Inc., Dalton, Georgia, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order. TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION AND REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON OBJECTIONS TO ELECTION LLOYD BUCHANAN, Trial Examiner: As will be noted in the section on refusal to bargain , this case lends itself to consideration of the principles and practical problems involved in reliance on card majority for an order to bargain after interference with protected concerted activities. The complaints herein (issued September 3 and October 23, 1968; charges filed July 18 and September 13, 1968, respectively) allege that the Company has violated Section 8(aX3) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 73 Stat. 519, by discharging Oliver Pierce on July 10, 1968, because of his union membership and protected concerted activities; Section 8(a)(5) of the Act by refusing to bargain collectively with the Union as exclusive representative of employees in an appropriate unit, by bargaining directly with employees in the unit, by promises conditioned on rejection of the Union, by a threat in connection with collective bargaining, and by dispatching drivers so that they were unable to vote in a Board-conducted election; and Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by said acts and by a threat based on union activities. The answers, as amended, deny the allegations of appropriate unit, designation by a majority of the employees, and unfair labor practice. Consolidated for hearing and determination with the trial on the above issues was a hearing with respect to three objections to the election , filed by the Union. It was early agreed that the issues in connection with the objections are covered by the unfair labor practice pleadings. The case was tried before me at Dalton, Georgia, on January 7 through 9, 1968, inclusive. Briefs have been filed by the General Counsel and the Company, the time to do so having been extended. Upon the entire record in the case and from my observation of the witnesses, I make the following: A. The Alleged Violation of Section 8(aX3) Pierce was employed by the Company as a truckdriver for 7 years. On June 24, 1968, he was dispatched with a truckload of carpet rolls, most of it destined for the Company's warehouse near Chicago, but approximately 40 percent to be dropped off at Murphy Carpet, a customer located a few miles from the warehouse. With the expectation that delivery would first be made at the warehouse, its carpet was loaded at the rear of the truck, where the unloading would commence. Pierce testified that he arrived at the warehouse at approximately 1:30 or 2 p.m. on June 25; that the unloading began one-half to three-quarters of an hour later; that the man doing it was slow; that the warehouse portion was unloaded about 4:30; that with the need to place the Murphy rolls at the tail of the truck so that they could be unloaded at Murphy, they were first removed from the front of the truck and placed on the ground; and that it was now 5 p .m. This suggest a speed in unloading the Murphy carpet quite in conflict with Pierce's other testimony concerning the rate of progress . I credit the testimony below that by 4:30 all of the Murphy carpet had been unloaded and some of it returned to the rear of the truck. Pierce told us further that about 3:30 or 4 he asked one of the warehouse employees to call Murphy to find out when it closed, and that he was then told that it would remain open for the delivery as late as 5:30, but not later. (He assumed that it normally stayed open until 5. In fact, it normally closed at 4:30.) Pierce thereupon told the warehouse night shift foreman, Doris, that he did not see how the drop could be placed back on the trailer and delivery made by 5:30; and he suggested that it be left there so that he would not have to lay over in Chicago until the following day when the next truck could make the drop. Pierce did not know that another truck would be arriving the next day but he assumed so since trucks were going to the Chicago warehouse about every day. (The next truck arrived on June 28.) The foreman signed the manifest for the drop and, after some coffee and a bit of talk, Pierce left about 5:15, returning to Dalton about noon on June 26. Pierce also told us that, while he was not told that the drop had to be made that day, a rush marking may be placed on the manifest or the roll, but that the driver does not look at the manifest, which is in an unsealed envelope. Whatever is to be made of this (counsel have not adverted to it), the responsibility for the drop was Pierce's. Murphy sent its own truck later that evening to pick up a roll of 525 pounds and, as we shall see , the remainder of the drop was delivered by an independent trucker the next WORLD CARPETS, INC. 957 day. Rizzi, the warehouse day foreman , testified that he told Pierce that "the drop had to be made that night." Rizzi's time estimates were markedly inconsistent with his loading breakdown per roll and with the rate of progress described by Sias, who unloaded the truck . But the variance went so far beyond even Pierce's expectation as to indicate that the attempted breakdown , while indicating the General Counsel' s ingenuity , was wholly unreliable and lacking in probative value since it betokened a delay which even Pierce did not suggest. Templin , the warehouse employee whom Pierce had asked to inquire how long Murphy would remain open, testified that he was told that someone would be there until 5:30, that he told Pierce "that there would be somebody there to accept the drop ," and that no question was raised whether Pierce could make it . Templin told us further that the truck had been completely unloaded and two or three Murphy rolls placed back on it 5 or 10 minutes before he left at 4 :30; and that the reloading could have been completed in approximately 15 minutes. Sias testified that about 4:25 (this was after Templin had relayed to Pierce the message that Murphy would stay open; if before, Pierce did not thereafter correct his statement to Sias) Pierce told him and Doris , his foreman, that Murphy would close at 4:30, and there was no time to make the drop . Doris thereupon told Sias to take off the truck those Murphy rolls which he had reloaded (14 or 15 by that time and quite consistent with Templin's testimony) because there was no time to make the drop. It does not appear that Doris knew of the telephone call to Murphy and the extension of time for receipt of the carpet. It was Doris who apparently signed the manifest for the Murphy carpet. I find , from all of the testimony, pro and con, and on the basis of the demeanor of the witnesses as they testified , that Pierce could have made the drop on June 25 and that he was told that Murphy would remain open later . The picture portrayed is that of a driver who was reluctant and even unwilling to make the drop, which necessitated another stop and delay for unloading, and who did not inform the foreman who gave the order finally to unload at the warehouse that Murphy would remain open later ; and that Pierce was thus able to have the reloaded rolls removed from his truck . Shoemaker, Pierce' s second driver, had a secondary role; the responsibility was Pierce's. But beyond the failure to make the Murphy drop, Pierce was guilty of a serious breach in not having the manifest properly signed . Neither Doris nor Rizzi had authority to sign a manifest . A signed manifest is more than a receipt or acknowledgment that material has been delivered : It relieves the driver of all responsibility, even for the condition of the load ; it indicates not only that delivery was made, but that it was made as called for; and it authorizes him to proceed free from further accountability of any kind. From the testimony, there appears to be a distinction between a receipt for carpet delivered and a release of the driver from responsibility, which requires the manifest to be signed by an authorized agent, as noted. Driver Hughes testified that he had never been criticized for leaving a drop at a warehouse when he was unable to make it as directed. Driver Fariss expanded on this as he testified that in such a situation he calls for instructions and speaks to someone with authority to give instructions. It stands uncontradicted that only certain warehouse officials, who know the customer's needs, are empowered to sign a manifest; that where none is available, Edwards, the dispatcher, is available to give the driver instructions by telephone; and that, while Edwards had never informed Pierce of such a rule, the latter having been hired several years before Edwards came on the scene, it has been followed by the drivers, including Pierce, who had himself called Edwards previously for release . Shoemaker testified similarly that it is the practice to call Edwards when it is too late to make a drop. Beyond the matter of receipt or release for carpet destined for a warehouse, our concern is with a release for a drop left at a warehouse instead of the indicated place for delivery . There is no question but that, where drops could not be made on time , they have been left at a company warehouse . The issue is whether this is first authorized , and by whom . Whatever his authority over warehouse employees, it stands uncontradicted that a warehouse foreman is not authorized to release a driver. Excluding this instance involving Pierce and except when Edwards released a driver from a drop, not an instance was cited of carpet to be dropped at a customer's but being left at a warehouse on release by someone other than the warehouse manager, the administration manager, and the latter's assistant. One employee had previously been discharged for failing to make a pickup , and we are told that a drop is more important. Whether or not we assume that the manifest was signed for the warehouse carpet by an authorized representative (this was not brought out), we recall that Pierce testified that the warehouse foreman signed the manifest "for this drop." To the extent that any such finding is necessary in view of Pierce's violation of the requirement with respect to dropoffs not made, I find also that Pierce did not take or seek to take advantage' of the extension of time allowed when Murphy agreed to accept delivery after its normal closing time . Some light is cast on this by spotter Williams' uncontradicted testimony that, before leaving for Chicago on June 24, Pierce said that "he didn't know whether he would make the drop or not."2 It is not for us to determine the reasonableness of the action taken against Pierce because of this offense; it cannot be held to be so unreasonable as to indicate discriminatory intent . The Company was moved by the information which it had and which reasonably indicated that the drop could have been made ; by the additional expense incurred in having an independent trucker pick up the load on the morning of the 26th after Murphy sent for one roll the evening before ; by understandable concern with respect to its customer; and by Pierce's violation of the rule with respect to the manifest . I find and conclude that the discharge was not violative . It does not appear that Pierce even denied or disclaimed knowledge of the arrangements made for late delivery when , prior to his discharge, he was shown by Edwards a letter which stated that he had refused to make the delivery although arrangements had been made for Murphy to accept a late arrival. That Murphy needed and was insistent upon immediate delivery appears from the fact that it did send for one roll of carpet on the evening of June 25 , the remainder of the 'To speed delivery of the dropoff, the warehouse carpet rolls, which had to be removed from the truck first , were placed on the floor instead of directly into the warehouse bins 'While this reflects on Pierce's motive and explains his acts, it does not appear to have been communicated to the Company or to have been considered in connection with the discharge. 958 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD drop being made the following morning . Quite as evident is the Respondent Company's concern as indicated by the latter prompt delivery, aside from whatever testimony might properly have been offered to show possible loss of business with Murphy as a result of the incident with which we are concerned. If Rizzi's attempt to break down the time which Pierce spent at the warehouse and his ingenuous attempts at time study proved unreliable, the fact remains that Pierce did not follow the required procedure which he had himself previously followed; and the Company sustained a financial loss and was understandably concerned over its relations with its customer. Self-serving and hearsay statements aside, we have serious departure from company rules and procedure with respect to dropoffs , evidence of delay and expense incurred , and proof of company concern when it discharged Pierce. Nor should we overlook in all of this that Pierce could not have been selected (no action was taken against Shoemaker) because he was or was believed to be an active, much less leading , union protagonist. His activities were limited to the signing of a union card (20 other drivers signed ), which was not brought to the Company's attention . Hughes was the moving spirit throughout; we need not now detail his activities. He testified that he gave some cards to Pierce. The sole basis suggested for company suspicion of union activity by Pierce lies in his reply to Farmer "that he already knew of all of [the men 's] grievances or had already heard them ." This was made at the end of a meeting with the drivers (one of several such called by the Company) about the middle of June, and in response to Farmer's call for suggestions , comment, or grievances. By contrast, at a meeting on June 1 when Farmer announced a small increase , Hughes replied that it was "an insult." If no others said anything when Pierce did, various others spoke up at other meetings. As for complaints, virtually all of the drivers expressed grievances with respect to the low mileage rates , absence of a profit-sharing arrangement, too many delays, and too many drops . In the latter connection, Williams, after a leading question and in a too obvious attempt to "strengthen the case " against Pierce for willful refusal, testified that, while other drivers complained also, he "would say" that Pierce complained more than the other drivers. Considering that such complaints may have constituted concerted activity , it does not appear that any such excess by Pierce was communicated to the Company by Williams, a rank-and-file employee. B. The Alleged Independent Violation of Section 8(a)(1 ) and the Objections to Election It stands uncontradicted that, whatever the Company's ability to grant an increase (this could be tested during negotiations), Farmer, its controller, warned the drivers on June 15 at a meeting , which it had called and within a few days after the Union's request for recognition and its filing of a representation petition, that the Company could shift to piggyback operation if compelled to pay the union scale. I find and conclude that this threat in connection with union activities violated Section 8(axl) of the Act. The General Counsel is at least perserverant in his claim, by brief, "that the Trial Examiner erred in not permitting General Counsel to explore this area which was the subject of a specific allegation in the complaint in Case 10-CA-7421." Without any intent to instruct him, it may be pointed out that, if his reference is to the allegation considered immediately above, it had been testified to by his witness and, as noted, without contradiction. Were he referring to anything else 3 he would be going into matters not covered in direct examination of the Company's witness, and apparently not even within the allegations of the complaint . The issue being Farmer's threat, which the General Counsel recognizes and argues in his brief and which at that point, the close of the Company' s case, had not been (here for the third time) contradicted, it would in any event be supererogatory to cite Pierce 's comment and then again to elicit Farmer's threat (conceivably now eliciting a denial of any threat!) as "that which prompted the comment." With respect to any attempt to introduce new matter on cross-examination of a company witness (we do not know whether there had been an oversight or whether the General Counsel had no witness of his own ), it is not "better practice"' to permit a party to play ducks and drakes with proper procedure and the right of another party to a fair hearing. To whatever extent this is discretionary with the trier of the facts, I exercised my discretion to limit any attempt, if made . This extended reference may clarify on review what appears to be clear enough but for the extended argument submitted at the hearing and continued in the brief. With the election scheduled for August 30, the Company called a meeting of all of the drivers on Saturday, August 24.' President Shaheen and Farmer at length discussed with the drivers such matters as rates of pay, other terms of payment, and "conditions in general." At Shaheen's suggestion , it was agreed to meet again that afternoon. The Company's activities in connection with this meeting and two others which followed that day and the next are not to be condoned because two employees had requested a meeting . Not only was the purpose declared to be "to get this thing straightened out" and to "see if some way [they] could get this election set aside," but although prompted by only 2 employees, the Company called a meeting of all drivers, and 16 or 17 attended . With the men making various requests , Shaheen suggested that they "get together" and meet again later that day. A second meeting was held in the office that afternoon, only four or five drivers attending. One of them, Estes, submitted a list of their demands or desires , the Company replying correctly that it was not allowed to make any promises but that the proposals would be studied and a further meeting arranged for the following week. That evening Estes telephoned Farmer and told him that a group of the men would like to meet with him. It was arranged to meet at Estes' home the next afternoon. Four of the men then met with Farmer, they went over the proposal of the day before item by item, and Farmer, without acceding to any, said that he would try to get the Company's position on each. As it had previously recognized the two drivers as spokesmen for all in arranging the August 24 meeting, the Company now dealt with Estes later that day and again with the drivers 'It appears from the General Counsel's brief that his plaint relates to further questioning concerning that uncontradicted threat. Perhaps because I would not believe that, it seemed to me at the trial that he was seeking to inquire concerning new matter. 'Kpbride d/b/a Abbot Construction Company, 162 NLRB 516. Cf 3 Wigmore, Evidence Sec. 1873. 'Hughes and another driver had asked Farmer to arrange a meeting to see whether they could get the imminent election "set aside." WORLD CARPETS, INC. 959 directly while the issue of representation was pending. While there were considerable confusion and discrepancies in the versions submitted by Hughes and Estes, it is clear that proposals were called for by Shaheen and that a list was submitted by Estes at the second meeting on August 24. Whether or not the Company was at that time under obligation to bargain with the Union, its request for proposals by the drivers and the several discussions on August 24 and 25 impeded a fair election and interfered with employees' protected concerted activities; I so find and conclude.' As a sequel, Farmer met with Hughes and Estes late in the afternoon of Monday, August 26, and submitted to them a memorandum which included Shaheen's "decision" with respect to rate increases, payments generally, and a profit-sharing plan. Whether Farmer handed the memorandum to the others or whether he put it on the table before them is unimportant; similarly whether or not it was expressly said that it would be submitted to the other drivers. There was no limitation in the latter respect. There could hardly be any in view of the acknowledged purpose of the document and the discussions held. While addressed to Farmer, this memorandum was not only to be made available to the drivers, but it was issued as promised by Farmer as a statement of the Company's position in response to their proposals. The memorandum was the Company's proposal to the drivers and was declared to be in response to "the requests ... from the drivers themselves." Whether or not and to what extent there was actual interference (Estes testified that the memorandum was thereafter shown to 10 or 12 other drivers), the tendency to interfere, which is the basis for finding this violation, is clear. If Shaheen had earlier been "working on" increases, no such indication of that had been given to the employees prior to the advent of the Union as to necessitate or justify the direct negotiations. The Company was here campaigning with promises of benefits to persuade the employees that they did not need a union, and was thereby guilty, I find and conclude, of violative interference. There is no basis for distinction in this respect between announcement or promise, and actual grant.' This finding supports the second objection to election, which is hereby sustained. Finding of interference in the instant case is supported by the majority opinion in the recent Primco Casting case,' where a union had campaigned with benefits and where, in the attempt to distinguish that from action by an employer, it was declared that "the presence of an implied threat of future [sic] reprisal cannot properly be found to be present [sic] where a union takes [the] action" cited. (Perhaps it should be noted that even if there could be no "threat of future reprisal" by a union, there can be a promise of benefit, equally violative and equally impairing a free choice in an election.) Nor is a contrary finding here indicated in the dissenting opinion in Primco by Board Member Zagoria who was evidently moved by the not at all naive belief that if we would enjoin the goose, we should not encourage the gander. In his memorandum of August 26 Shaheen also declared that the benefits which he was suggesting were as 'Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corporation, 169 NLRB No. 11. 'Hudson Hosiery Company, 72 NLRB 1434, 1435; Waycross Sportswear, Inc., 166 NLRB No. 14; Casey Manufacturing Company, 167 NLRB No. 13; Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., supra 'Primco Casting Corporation, 174 NLRB No. 44. far as the Company could go with or without the Union, adding : "If we are faced with costs any greater than this, then I think we should seriously consider discontinuing our trucking operations altogether. From the survey we have taken, I was surprised to learn that many of our competitors do not truck their own goods." This was no statement of fact or prophecy but, with an election imminent, a warning of adverse consideration by one who could act thereon, issued in anticipation of greater demands. I find and conclude that this was another violative threat.' I also sustain the third objection to election. Of a different nature is interference alleged in the dispatching of drivers on trips of such distance that they were unable to return to the plant in time to vote in the election held on the afternoon of August 30. The first election objection referred recites interference with four drivers, Fariss, Hughes, Page , and Smith. The objection is overruled and the allegation dismissed as to the latter two, the Regional Director having declared that they were not available for interview, and no testimony concerning them having been received at this trial. Hughes testified that on August 27 he and Fariss had been dispatched to make deliveries in Falls Church, Virginia; Plainfield, New Jersey; and Westbury, on Long Island in New York. (Fariss was himself a first driver. But his truck had been in an accident, and Hughes now asked that Fariss be permitted to go with him, no other driver having been assigned . Edwards agreed.) On the way back they were to stop at a pier in Brooklyn to pick up some machinery. After he had testified concerning the deliveries and the problem which developed, and in response to a suggestion that he had mentioned this to Edwards on the 27th, Hughes told us that, on receipt of the assignment from Edwards, he had said that they could not make the various stops for deliveries and the machinery pickup and be back in time for the election (Fariss did not take part in the conversation; he testified that he "didn't object" to making the trip); that Edwards had replied that he would speak to Farmer; and that at 10:30 that night Edwards telephoned and told him to "go on and deliver the carpet." Hughes again told Edwards that they wanted to be back in time. According to this version, the pickup was left in the air, not being mentioned at that point although it was the reason for Edwards' calls to Farmer and then to Hughes; and despite this alleged indefiniteness, Hughes attempted on the 29th, as we shall see, to make a contact for permission to make the pickup later. He thereafter called Edwards to tell him that he had been unable to make that contact, not to ask the question which had allegedly been left open, whether the pickup had to be made - although he did now again express the desire to be back to vote - but to tell him that he would be unable to get through the pier gates in time. According to Edwards, when the assignment was made, about 2 or 3 p.m. on August 27, Hughes expressed doubt that, with the election on the 30th, the trip could be completed on time; but that he had replied that there would be plenty of time; that Hughes returned about 4 p.m. and asked whether they had to pick up the machinery, Edwards replying that he would find out; and that the trailer was hooked to the tractor, ready to go out, at that time. Although Edwards told us that he reached Farmer about 5:30 (Farmer said that the pickup had to be 'Cf. T M. Duche Nut Co., Inc, 174 NLRB No. 72, where there was no context of mterference. 960 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD made to avoid a dock charge of $400-$500 for another month), it was about 7 p.m. when he called Hughes and told him that the pickup had to be made . It is agreed that Hughes and Fariss left at midnight. Hughes testified first that the Westbury delivery was completed at 1:30 p.m. on August 29. When he called to say that he would be too late at the pier , Edwards gave him the telephone number of a man in Brooklyn who could arrange for a later loading ; Hughes called the number but without the area code, called Edwards again and got the code , and finally reached the man , who told him to come down to the pier. Hughes and Fariss arrived there about 3 p.m. and were admitted, but a problem of credit developed , and "the man" told them that they could not be loaded until the next morning . Hughes testified that he did not call Edwards again at this point, the latter having told him to lay over until the next day if he could not get loaded . The drivers returned to Dalton on August 31, after the election. It appears from documents which we shall further consider and from possible reconciliation of those documents with testimony on which both sides rely that the men had laid over in Westbury for 31 or 12 hours. Whatever the explanation for this, an earlier departure for Brooklyn would have gotten them to the pier in time, without any calls for an extension, and would have enabled Hughes and Fariss to pick up the machinery without a layover there and to return to Dalton in time to vote. With respect to objection 1, which is covered by this allegation of interference, the Regional Director, while referring it for hearing and determination , tentatively declared that "Hughes and Fariss had no opportunity to vote, through no fault of their own . . . ." While I have found , on the basis of the evidence at the trial , that the drivers were at fault both in leaving Dalton late and in further delaying their departure from Westbury, the cases cited by the Regional Director in his Supplemental Decision are helpful. T;►e principle stated in Yerges is that, without assessment of responsibility , an election is to be set aside where an employee "had no opportunity to vote through no fault of his own but because at the time of the election he was away from the plant in the usual course of his duties for the Employer." In Alterman it was held that an opportunity to vote is not subject to waiver by the employer or the union , the opportunity and right to vote being the employees'. But an employee , to whom the right belongs, may lose it through his own fault as the Board evidently recognized when it used the phrase "through no fault of his own" in Yerges. A different holding would provide a built-in opportunity for any employee to invalidate an election . The finding declared below that Hughes and Fariss were at fault indicates that objection 1 be, and it is, overruled. A finding with respect to the objection to the election in this connection or in connection with the violation charged does not appear under the cases or in principle to depend on whether the employees immediately involved are pro or antiunion . Nor is any offense aggravated if more than one employee is thus involved; and to that extent we need not reflect on the fact that it was Hughes who suggested that Fariss, presumably a union supporter , be his second driver although that might be a consideration to minimize or lessen the offense of interference, if any. "Yerges Van Liners , Inc, 162 NLRB 1259; Alterman-Big Apple, Inc., 116 NLRB 1078. We consider now the issue whether the Company violated the Act when it dispatched Hughes and Fariss. Since employee fault is recognized in connection with objection to election, the employer must a fortiori be absolved of interference under such circumstances. Were the delay in return attributable to the drivers either because they delayed their departure or because they dawdled en route, I would not hold the Company responsible and liable. Whatever the rule with respect to conduct of elections and the annulling effect of unforeseen circumstances (and the annulling power of employees unless their own fault be proved?), to find interference in such a case would be to make the employer the guarantor of the employees' return regardless of the employer's carefulness and the employees' indifference or even willful absence or other fault (each of which can be seen here). Even were the election set aside because of the assignment, it would not necessarily follow that such assignment constitutes a violation of Section 8(a)(l). Indeed the General Counsel , relying on the two cases cited and ignoring the element of employee fault , argues for too much when he overlooks such possibilities among others as an assignment which, although when made permitted a timely return, was extended by unforeseen or unexpected circumstances. Such a situation, supporting an objection to election, would not be chargeable to the employer as a violation. Was Hughes, as he testified, to be told later whether he had to make the trip; or, assigned to the trip , whether he had to make the pickup in Brooklyn? I credit the latter version, testified to by Edwards and supported by the testimony that Hughes had suggested that Fariss accompany him and that Edwards had agreed . It is less likely that the question of assignment of Hughes and Fariss or of other drivers was left open after the explicit request by Hughes and the agreement and assignment by Edwards. The assignment, I find , was definite; whether the pickup had to be made was at first left open. Hughes and Fariss were free to leave on the trip at any time and, if really concerned with getting back in time to vote, could have telephoned Edwards while en route later that day or the 28th, or even the 29th as Hughes did from Westbury. If this be so, it matters not that Hughes decided that he would go home, there to await Edwards' call, and that he so told Edwards. The latter testified without contradiction that he leaves it to the drivers to decide when to depart on trips. The dual assignment made, the responsibility for making the trip and starting on time was the drivers'. Having found that Hughes and Fariss could have left many hours before they did, I further note their log records and reject Hughes' admittedly unreasonable explanation, which I do not credit. These records indicate a layover of 31 hours at Westbury. Aside from any charitable aspect in accepting the logs prepared by Hughes and Fariss as required by regulations, they can be deemed objectively reliable - or should we accept an oral contradiction on the basis of alleged unreliability of such records? According to the logs and to Edwards , who relied on them, the men arrived in Westbury at 2 a.m. on August 29 and were off duty a total of 31 hours. Whether 31 hours or not, they had plenty of time. Clearly, had they taken less time before leaving for the pier in Brooklyn, they could have returned to Dalton in time to vote in the election . Their delay in returning is not chargeable to the Company. Indeed, had they left Westbury earlier, it would WORLD CARPETS, INC. not have been necessary to make the telephone call to someone in Brooklyn for permission to load the machinery after 3 p.m. Even with the misunderstanding and loss of considerable time as Hughes made calls to Edwards in Dalton and several attempts to • reach "the man" in Brooklyn , the drivers arrived at the pier "around" 3 o'clock according to Fariss (perhaps before the hour since they did get past the guardhouse). Quite as clearly, had Hughes and Fariss left Dalton earlier, as they could have, they would have made the Brooklyn pickup in time to return and vote in the election. Whether we rely on log entries which show a layover of 31 hours" in Westbury, or on the arrival time shown as 2 a.m. on August 29, which would suggest that the drivers were there some 12 hours since we were told in detail of their departure about 2 p.m., the testimony is such that it can most charitably be called unreliable. At one point, the General Counsel as charitably does not insist that the oral testimony concerning arrival time in Westbury must be credited . I shall therefore say only that I do not credit that oral testimony . But in accepting the departure time from Westbury as testified to, we must not overlook the fact that, but for the prior layover, there would have been no problem concerning the machinery pickup. I do not credit the testimony that only 2 to 2 1/2 hours were spent in Westbury. Nor do I accept the General Counsel's argument that, having allegedly falsified the logs, Hughes "at great personal risk" now "admitted" their inaccuracy. He had every motive to claim late arrival in Westbury (if the reason for late arrival were overlooked) to support the claim that the fault was the Company ' s. (Now the risk is indeed Hughes' as the General Counsel - even if he did not anticipate the denouement when he questioned Hughes concerning the logs - belabors the point with a reference to Hughes' "risk of admitting violation of the law ....") It is at least as easy to believe that falsification occurred in the efforts made to prevail in this case as that it characterized the logs which were prepared in the face of the declared desire to return early. It was contrary to the drivers' interest in an early return to prepare logs which showed an unnecessary and inordinately long layover. The Company did not prompt any delay in starting on the trip or en route. The assignment was lawfully made, and it was not the Company's responsibility thereafter to police the departure or to monitor the trip so that, whatever Hughes and Fariss did before or after they left Dalton, it could be looked to as guarantor of an early return . I find and conclude that this allegation of interference has not been proved. It is not by hindsight that this after-the-event decision is made that the deliveries, pickup, and return could have been effected in plenty of time . We have here followed the various steps and seen that the time actually required supports the Company's judgment and lawful action in dispatching the truck on August 27. Unlike this analysis, however, that judgment was not ex post facto, but was based on experience and expert knowledge; it was vindicated by the subsequent events. If an employer's activity must be limited insofar as dispatching drivers is concerned , there is no warrant for attacking a reasonable limitation or for finding that it must be unreasonably extended . Although Hughes testified that, while he was not paid for the pickup, he did not mind and did not try "It was not clear to me at the trial that the 31 hours listed included time after the drivers had evidently (if it be not reckless to use that word in the light of such testimony ) left Westbury and had arrived in Brooklyn. 961 to get out of it, one could fairly conclude that he delayed willfully in or before he arrived at Westbury since the time sequence testified to suggests further that, despite the earlier procrastination, he could have reached the pier well before the 3 p.m. deadline had he been minded to and had he not spent time for the various telephone calls. Somewhere it may be noted that Hughes' alleged concern over getting back in time to vote was in marked contrast to his complacency in waiting Edwards' telephone call on the 27th and leaving 1-1/2, 5, or 8 hours later than he could have left. Similar contrast is provided by the long layover en route and Hughes' telephone calls on the 29th in which he told Edwards and repeated, "You know that we want to be back" for the election. The apparent concern, prior to completion of the Westbury delivery, over the time factor and the need to make the pickup is compatible with realization that there was plenty of time. Nowhere does it appear that, even with the late departure, the trip could not have been completed before the election. C. The Alleged Violation of Section 8(aX5) I find and conclude that, as found in the representation proceeding and herein alleged , the following is an appropriate unit within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act: All truckdrivers, including the spotter, employed at the Company' s Dalton, Georgia, plant, but excluding the mechanics and all other employees, guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act. There were 32 employees in the unit on June 1, 1968. Twenty-two signed union authorization cards, most of them on June 1 and the last on June 9. Despite leading questions directed toward denial of the validity of the cards, the designations were valid . Indeed, checkoff authorizations and assignments were executed at or before the time when cards were signed , Henry, a company witness testifying that he signed the latter on June 1 as a paper to get the majority of the drivers . (Some statements allegedly made and elicited at the trial to destroy the validity of the cards were made while or after they were signed.) Certainly checkoff authorizations contemplate (I refer to the documents themselves and intent as indicated by them) membership in the Union (as do the signed cards), not a request for election. Were we to emphasize an alleged statement that a purpose in signing a card was to have an election "because it didn't look like we would get a raise from the Company"; ignore driver Reynolds' further testimony that the cards were good for a year, within which period they could call off the election or "get the company to give [the men] a raise"; and overlook leading by counsel, we could invalidate the card signed by Reynolds. As has been noted, elements of unreliability appear in the testimony of witnesses for each side; but the testimony as a whole and from all leaves little doubt concerning the findings to be made . For example, Henry, who testified in response to a leading question that Test,' 2 the Union's business agent, told the men that the cards didn't mean anything until they had an election ," had earlier testified, also in response to a leading question , that concerning "[t]he purpose of the cards, we wanted a union ." Because of the very evident disregard for the truth in what he "Test told us that there was no meeting as testified to by Henry. "this does not negate an application for membership and designation of representative, dependent on the election result. 962 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD allegedly recalled and did not recall, and his patently evasive manner, I am led to cite the witness Russell who would impel to an acceptance of the opposite of what he told us. With respect to the other drivers who signed cards but testified to their limited effect, Peden testified that he was called to Hughes' house "to sign an application," and that he went and did sign the application and also a checkoff authorization. I do not credit Peden's picture of extreme casualness in signing the documents without reading them or even the large print. I credit employee H. F. Farmer's and Hughes' testimony concerning examination of the cards and what was said. Aside from the question whether anything was said concerning an election when driver Edmondson signed his card, he claimed only that he was told that a certain percentage was needed for an election and that he would be under no obligation to vote either way. If this could be construed as a disclaimer of authorization, the card and Edmondson's action in filling it out and signing it are more convincing. As for Poteet, called by the Company to testify concerning his card, nothing that he said impaired its validity. Despite my finding with respect to the assignment of Hughes and Fariss on August 27, 1 find from the testimony pro and con and from my observation of these witnesses, all of them literate, that Hughes' testimony concerning the various cards is credible and reliable. Under detailed questioning, his answers with respect to the cards were straightforward, consistent, and equally detailed. Analysis of all of the testimony concerning the cards, made both as it was received and since, indicates their validity and sufficiency. I find and conclude that a majority of the employees in the unit executed valid designations of the Union as their collective-bargaining representative. Also before us is the issue of request by the Union and refusal by the Company to bargain. By letter dated June 3 the Union notified the Company that it represented a majority of the Dalton employees "including Over-the-Road Drivers," and requested recognition and bargaining. The Company replied on June 10, questioning the Union's claim of majority and suggesting a Board-conducted election. On June 11 the Union corrected its earlier claim, now stating that it represented a majority of the over-the-road drivers; it also declared that it was petitioning the Board for an election. There is no inconsistency between a request for recognition and the filing of a petition for an election. The second letter, for correction, did not nullify or withdraw the request for recognition. That request was a continuing one, as was again made manifest in the complaint and at the trial; maintaining that the Union lacked a majority in an appropriate unit, the Company refused and has continued to refuse recognition. Demand and refusal are established; I so find and conclude. The Regional Director, sustained by the Board, has found that there is no separate classification of over-the-road drivers. He grouped all of the truckdrivers, as noted above, and included the spotter. Aside from the reasons which he declared and his decision to include the spotter in the unit of truckdrivers, outright addition of that employee to the unit would not constitute a substantial variance so as to vitiate the request and justify the refusal. We come now to the question of remedy for the refusal to bargain. It has been found that the Company on June 15 and August 26 made threats in connection with unionization; that it bargained directly with its employees on August 24 and 25; and that on August 26, shortly before the election, it campaigned with promises. Were our purpose punitive or merely preventive, the Company would be effectually estopped from complaining about an order to bargain. But beyond this and aside from any tendency to interfere, our concern now is with actual interference and whether it warrants a direction to bargain: with the rights of employees to be represented or not, as they prefer. We must consider not only the sins of the employer but the rights of the employees. Elsewhere and more than once I have expressed my concern over an order to bargain where it has not been sufficiently shown that the employees involved desired the representation. (The question is, what is "sufficiently shown," by direct proof or through inference?) In such a situation, even if the employer, because of its violations and indicated or inferred bad faith," is estopped from questioning the union's majority, its acts and bad faith do not serve to deprive employees of their right to designate or to refuse to designate a collective- bargaining agent; and such an agent is not to be imposed upon them or to be denied them.'s Beyond the question of employer's bad faith, we should consider actual dissipation of possible majority and frustration of employees' desires. If no hard and fast formula can be invoked which could automatically and conveniently decide the issue in this and other cases, we can here narrow the focus as we consider the card majority, the interference, and the tie vote." The facts clamor for an order to bargain. The Company maintains that it did not interfere; I have found the contrary. It cannot reasonably be maintained that the interference was innocuous. This is not a Hammond & Irving" situation, where the election tally and the violations found indicate or warrant the inference that the latter were not sufficient to have changed the outcome. The alternative being to ignore the well-established principle that the interference found may support and warrant a bargaining order, I am impelled to find that, but for the Company's last-minute attempts to circumvent the Union by bargaining directly with the employees, and its threats and promises, the election would have ended, not in a tie, but in a majority for the Union: The card majority in this case is a reliable one and more accurately represents the employees' choice than does the postinterference election tally. We may reasonably infer" from the circumstantial evidence that the interference influenced some employees - in this case even one to vote against the Union. The Company may not, by its violative conduct which is here directly chargeable to top management, delay or deny to the employees their right to be represented by the agent of their choice. The interference found negates any claim of good-faith doubt of majority, and the circumstances warrant an order to bargain. "Joy Silk Mills, Inc, 85 NLRB 1263, enfd as modified on other grounds 185 F.2d 732 (C.A D.C.), cert. denied 341 U S. 914. "Cf. Stayer's Johnsonville Meats, Inc, 174 NLRB No 94, where with seven cards among nine employees , an order to bargain was based on a great deal of interference , despite a one to seven vote, against the union "Cf. The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company 174 NLRB No 167, where the circumstances included a majority of one, lapse of 6 months, and turnover in the unit "Hammond A Irving, Incorporated, 154 NLRB 1071. "See N L R B v Clement Brothers Company, Inc, 407 F 2d 1027 (C.A. 5). WORLD CARPETS, INC. RECOMMENDED ORDER Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and upon the entire record in the case, I recommend that the Company, World Carpets, Inc., Dalton, Georgia, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Threatening or promising benefits to employees in connection with protected concerted activities. (b) Bargaining directly with employees in the appropriate bargaining unit. (c) Refusing to bargain collectively with the Union as exclusive representative of all employees in the appropriate unit with respect to rates of pay, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment. (d) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action which is necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Upon request, recognize and bargain collectively with the Union as the exclusive representative of the employees in the appropriate unit, and embody in a signed agreement any understanding reached. (b) Post at its place of business in Dalton , Georgia, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."" Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 10, shall be posted by the Company, after being duly signed by its representative, immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to its employees are customarily posted . Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Company to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 10, in writing, within 20 days from the receipt of this Decision, what steps have been taken to comply herewith.'' I FURTHER RECOMMEND that the complaint be dismissed insofar as it alleges violation of Section 8(aX3) of the Act. I FURTHER RECOMMEND that the election in Case 10-RC-7450 be set aside and the petition dismissed." "In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the notice. In the further event that the Board's Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals , the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision and Order." "In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, this provision shall be modified to read : "Notify the Regional Director for Region 10, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith." "Ruling on the objections to election (the second and third objections having been sustained and the first overruled , above) thus becomes immaterial. 963 APPENDIX NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our employees that: WE WILL NOT threaten or promise benefits to employees in connection with protected concerted activities. WE WILL NOT bargain directly with employees in the appropriate bargaining unit. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the right to self-organization, to form labor organizations, to join or assist Truck Drivers and Helpers, Local 515, affiliate of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of America, or any other labor organization , to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any or all such activities. WE WILL recognize and bargain , upon request, with Truck Drivers and Helpers, Local 515, affiliate of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of America, as the exclusive representative of all employees in the bargaining unit described herein with respect to rates of pay, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment, and embody in a signed agreement any understanding reached. The bargaining unit is: All truckdrivers, including the spotter , employed at the Company's Dalton, Georgia, plant, but excluding the mechanics and all other employees , guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act. All our employees are free to become or remain, or refrain from becoming or remaining, members of Truck Drivers and Helpers, Local 515, affiliate of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of America, or any other labor organization. WORLD CARPETS, INC. (Employer) Dated By (Representative) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. If employees have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions, they may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, 730 Peachtree Street, NE., Atlanta, Georgia 30308, Telephone 404-526-5760.