The Stevens Machine Co.

144 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Richard V. Stevens, An Individual, d/b/a The Stevens Machine Company ; Richard V. Stevens and Robert L. Stevens, Partnership, d/b/a Stevens Equipment Company and Lodge 1580, International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO. Cases 3-CA-3644 and 3-CA-3711 August 19, 1969 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN MCCULLOCH AND MEMBERS BROWN AND ZAGORIA On June 6, 1969, Trial Examiner Henry L. Jalette issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. He also found that the Respondent had not engaged in certain other unfair labor practices and recommended that said allegations be dismissed. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions to the Decision. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions, and the entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner, and hereby orders that the Respondent, Richard V. Stevens, An Individual, d/b/a The Stevens Machine Company; Richard V. Stevens and Robert L. Stevens, Partnership, d/b/a Stevens Equipment Company, Belmont, New York, their agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order. TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE HENRY L. JALETTE,Trial Examiner:'The original and amended charges in Case 3-CA-3644 were filed on November 7, 1968, and January 17, 1969, respectively; the original charge in Case 3-CA-3711 was filed on February 24, 1969. The Charging Party is Local 1580, International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, hereinafter referred to as the Union. The charges are against the above-captioned individual proprietorship and partnership as a single employer and Respondent. On December 18, 1968, pursuant to an agreement for consent election arising out of a petition filed by the Union in Case 3-RC-4542, an election was held in a unit of Respondent's employees in which three challenged ballots were cast which were determinative of the results of the election. Pursuant to section 6 of the agreement for consent election, the Regional Director directed a hearing on the challenges on January 20, 1969. On January 22, 1969, the General Counsel issued a complaint in Case 3-CA-3644 and an order consolidating that case with Case 3-RC-4542, for purposes of hearing, ruling and decision, and providing that thereafter Case 3-RC-4542 be severed and transferred to the Regional Director for further processing. On March 13, 1969, the General Counsel issued a complaint in Case 3-CA-3711, and on March 14, 1969, he issued an order consolidating Case 3-CA-3711 with Cases 3-CA-3644 and 3-RC-4542. The complaints allege that the Respondent engaged in conduct violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, and that Respondent discharged Richard Patterson, Larry M. Cline, and Laverne Ramsey because of their union activities in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act. Of the three challenged ballots in Case 3-RC-4542, two are the ballots of Richard Patterson and Larry M. Cline, the alleged discriminatees in Case 3-CA-3644. The third challenged ballot is that of one David Mack whose ballot was challenged by the Union on the ground he lived with the owner of Respondent. On March 26 and 27, 1969, the case was tried in Belmont, New York. Upon the entire record, including my observation of the witnesses, and after due consideration of the brief filed by, Respondent, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT The Stevens Machine Company is the trade name and style of an individual proprietorship owned by Richard V. Stevens, which is engaged in the manufacture and distribution of machine parts and related products at 3373 Riverside Drive in the town of Scio, New York. The Stevens Equipment Company is the trade name and style of a partnership consisting of Richard V. Stevens and his son, Robert L. Stevens, which is engaged in the manufacture, repair, purchase, sale and distribution of farm implements and machinery and related products at the same location as Stevens Machine Company. The complaint alleges, and the answer denies, that Stevens Machine and Stevens Equipment are affiliated businesses under common ownership and management, whose owners formulate and administer a single common labor policy, and that they constitute a single-integrated business enterprise and a single employer within the meaning of the Act. As already indicated, Richard Stevens is owner of one business and a partner in the other, and both businesses are located at the same place. They occupy a single building with a single office and office staff. Richard Stevens is active in both businesses. He fired alleged discriminatee Larry Cline, who was an employee of Stevens Machine, and made the decision to 178 NLRB No. 26 RICHARD V. STEVENS fire alleged discriminatee Richard Patterson, who was employed by Stevens Equipment. The employees of both businesses were included in a single unit in the Agreement for Consent Election in Case 3-RC-4542 which was executed by Richard Stevens on behalf of both businesses. Based on the foregoing and the record as a whole, I conclude that Stevens Machine and Stevens Equipment constitute a single employer within the meaning of the Act. The complaint alleges, and the answer admits, that the Respondent during the year preceding the issuance of complaint, in the course and conduct of its business operations, manufactured, sold and shipped from its place of business in Scio, New York to points outside the State of New York goods and products valued in excess of $50,000. Accordingly, I find that Respondent is, and has been at all times material herein , an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 11. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED The complaint alleges, the answer as amended at trial admits, and I find, that the Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The Independent 8(a)(1) Conduct 1. Interrogation, impression of surveillance, and threats of discharge and plant closure The independent 8(a)(l) conduct discussed under this subheading is that alleged in paragraphs IX(A) and (B) of the complaint in Case 3-CA-3644 and attributed to both Richard Stevens and Robert Stevens. It is not clear from the form of the pleading which conduct is being charged to Richard Stevens and which to Robert Stevens. It is clear from the record that both Stevens were not being charged with all, or the same, 8(a)(l) conduct, although it is not clear even now which act of which Stevens constitutes which independent 8(a)(l) violation. In the circumstances, I am setting forth those incidents which appear to me to have been within the intendment of the allegations, all of which were fully litigated without objection of Respondent at the trial. Preliminarily, it should be noted that we are dealing here with what is basically a small family enterprise, with approximately 10 employees during the events to be described. Following some discussion among the employees of the desirability of a union, employee Richard Patterson obtained some authorization cards of the Union which he brought to the shop on September 19, 1968.' During the lunch hour that day, all but two employees and Foreman Harold Wyckoff signed cards and returned them to Patterson. The record does not indicate what, if any, union activity the employees engaged in after the initial card signing, but on October 22, the Union made a demand for recognition, which was rejected by letter dated October 25. On October 30, the Union filed the petition in Case 3-RC-4542. According to employee Thomas Hickey, about a week after the employees signed cards, Richard Stevens came into the tool room and told him he had heard there was union agitation going on in the shop, and he wanted to 'Unless otherwise indicated , all dates refer to 1968. 145 know if Hickey was part of it. Hickey told him no, although he had in fact signed a union card. Stevens remarked that he thought he knew who one of the employees behind the Union was. "It's the guy you ride with," (this was Larry Cline), and "I'm not about to let anything like that get started." Stevens did not deny that such a conversation took place, but denied that he made the statement that one of the employees behind the Union was the guy Hickey rode with.' I credit Hickey's testimony.' A few days later, Stevens remarked to Hickey that Hickey must have signed one of the cards. Hickey assured Stevens he had taken no part in such activity. This testimony is undenied. According to employee Richard Patterson, 1 week or 2 weeks after the union cards were signed, Richard Stevens asked him, Laverne Ramsey and David Freeman if they knew anything about the Union. Patterson said no. Stevens added that he was footing the bills and he was going to run the shop the way he wanted to. Patterson could not recall that Ramsey or Freeman said anything, and Freeman did not testify to such an incident. Ramsey testified to an incident wherein Richard Stevens remarked that the Union would never get in the shop, but he placed only Freeman as being present. While his description of the incident leads me to believe it was the same incident described by Patterson, the record is not sufficiently clear on the point to make such a finding. The issue is not critical, because neither the testimony of Patterson on this point, nor that of Ramsey, was denied. About the first of November, employee John Shaw was called into the office and was told by Richard Stevens that because of defective work he had performed, Stevens deemed it necessary to discharge him. Shaw explained to Stevens that he had bought a new car on which he had to make payments and he asked to be permitted to continue working until the end of the year when he expected to begin military service. Stevens acquiesced. The foregoing is undisputed. According to Shaw, however, at the conclusion of the foregoing, Stevens asked him if he knew anything going on about the union matter, and who was the head of it. Shaw said he did not know, that there were rumors going around, and there had been talk, but he did not know who started it. Richard Stevens denied that there was any mention of the Union in this conversation with Shaw, and he is corroborated by his son and his wife who were present during the conversation. I was favorably impressed by Shaw's demeanor and I credit his testimony. I cannot say as much for either Richard or Robert Stevens, and Mrs. Stevens' demeanor conveyed such a strong sense of familial unity that I can accord no weight to her testimony. If her description of Shaw's behavior on this occasion is accurate, it is difficult to conceive that Shaw was lying when he testified. For example, she testified that when her husband talked to Shaw, "... John sort of begged to stay. And I never saw anyone shake so hard in my life, ."An. employee so 'According to Hickey, Robert Stevens was present during this conversation, but Robert Stevens was not examined on this point. 'Respondent contends that Hickey is not a credible witness for several reasons, including an alleged conflict between his testimony and that of Foreman Wyckoff about statements made by Hickey to Wyckoff about the work performance of Larry Cline. From my review of the testimony, any conflict between the two is more apparent than real. In any event, whatever conflict there exists between Hickey's and Wyckoff's testimony affords no basis for discrediting Hickey in a conflict of testimony with Richard Stevens. In such a conflict, for reasons appearing fully herein, Richard Stevens emerges the loser. 146 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD frightened of his employer would hardly risk discharge by fabricating a conversation, particularly where there is no showing that he has a special interest in the outcome of the proceeding. Shaw was still employed at the time of the trial and was not scheduled to enter military service until August. On or about October 25, Stevens gave each employee a slip of paper to read, sign, and hand back to him before the end of the workday. This slip was never produced at trial, but it is undisputed that it asked each employee to indicate whether or not he was interested in having the Union as a bargaining agent. Only Wyckoff and Colesof, neither of whom had signed union cards, returned the slips. Employee Utter, who also had not signed a union card, had not received a slip because he was on vacation when they were passed out. At quitting time the same day, Stevens asked employee Hickey if he had signed the slip. Hickey replied that this was the third time Stevens had asked him (about his union sentiments, that is) and that he did not want to hear any more about it. Stevens said, "Well, I want to know your position" and Hickey replied, "You know my position, I wouldn't sign this for you or anybody else." About the same time, Stevens also asked employee David Freeman for his slip and when Freeman replied he did not have it, Stevens stated he wanted it back. Freeman repeated that he did not have it. Stevens also asked employee John Shaw if he had signed his slip and when Shaw said no, Stevens asked him where it was and Shaw said he threw it away. Stevens then asked him whether or not he was interested in the Union and Shaw, who was leaving, did not reply. Respondent offered no testimony relative to the circulation of the slips and none of the foregoing conversations was denied. However, the issue of Respondent's purpose in polling its employees was opened up by General Counsel on cross-examination and Stevens thereafter set forth his reasons as follows: I was trying to find out information; that's all. Just to know who was interested in the Union. Also to corroborate the information that Mr. Wyckoff had given me that the fellows signed cards. I wanted to find out if as stated, the majority of my employees in the machine shop were in fact, in favor of the Union as a bargaining agent. If they were, then I would have determined to talk to the Union about it. On recross-examination, Stevens disclaimed any intention to recognize the Union stating that if he had learned the employees were for the Union, "I was going to look into it. I would have investigated the possibility of the Union if the majority of the boys in the machine shop wanted it." In my view, this shifting and evasive testimony indicates clearly that the purpose of the poll was not to determine the truth of the Union's claim of majority. I so find. Summarizing the foregoing, I find that all the foregoing interrogations and the attempted poll were coercive and violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. The attempted poll and the systematic interrogations apart from the attempted poll were not conducted under the safeguards enumerated by the Board in Struksnes Construction Co., Inc., 165 NLRB No. 102. Specifically, there was no legitimate purpose, employees were not told of a purpose and were not assured against reprisals, the attempted written poll was not secret, and the interrogations occurred in the context of other unfair labor practices. Additional circumstances indicative of the coercive nature of the interrogations are: In Hickey's case, the interrogations were repeated and persistent; in Shaw's case, the interrogation followed a conversation with all the earmarks of a performance staged to frighten him; in Patterson's case, he was to become a discriminatee. In addition to the foregoing respecting the conduct of Richard Stevens, General Counsel elicited testimony from Foreman Wyckoff that a week or more after the union cards were signed Richard Stevens told him that if the Union came in, he might have to close the doors because he would not know what demands they would make. I have no indication what the General Counsel's position is about this testimony which was undenied, but, apart from any other considerations, it cannot be construed as an unlawful threat because I find that Wyckoff was a supervisor within the meaning of Section 2(11) of the Act° General Counsel also elicited testimony from Larry Cline that 2 or 3 weeks after he signed a union card, Richard Stevens remarked to him that he had heard by word of the grapevine that the employees were trying to get a union there, and that he wanted nothing to do with it. Stevens said if any of the employees were not satisfied with their jobs they could leave any time they wanted to. This testimony is undenied. As noted under this subheading, General Counsel alleges that Respondent conveyed the impression of surveillance to its employees; however, it is not clear which conduct is alleged to fall in this category. If he contends that Stevens' remark, supra, that he had heard "by word of the grapevine" of the employees' union activities conveyed the impression of surveillance, I do not agree. Apart from the card signing in the plant in the presence of a supervisor, there is no showing what other union activities the employees engaged in; for example, there is no showing they were holding union meetings. In these circumstances, it is difficult to understand how Stevens could have engaged in surveillance or how his remark could reasonably be construed as conveying an impression of surveillance.' The other remark that may fall under this complaint allegation is that of Stevens to Hickey that he thought he knew who one of the employees behind the Union was, a reference to Cline. But Cline, like Hickey, was merely one of the card signers and Hickey knew this. In this circumstance, and the circumstances referred to in the preceding paragraph, this statement could not reasonably be construed as conveying the impression of surveillance. Paragraph IX(b) of the complaint in Case 3-CA-3644 includes the phrase ". . . and advised its employees that if they wanted the Union, they should resign from their employment." The form of the allegation makes it difficult to determine whether the allegation is directed to Richard Stevens' remark to Cline, supra, that if the employees were not satisfied they could leave anytime, or to a somewhat similar remark attributed to Robert Stevens by other employees, or both. David Freeman testified that sometime after the union cards were signed Robert Stevens stated to the employees of Stevens Equipment that there was talk in the other part of the building about getting union representation and that if they wanted any part of it they might as well go out the 'There is undisputed testimony that Wyckoff is responsible for the operation of the machine shop, that he assigns work to employees in a manner requiring the exercise of independent judgment, and has the authority to grant time off to employees. 'Cf. Bryant Chucking Grinder Company, 160 NLRB 1526, 1546. RICHARD V. STEVENS door because he did not want any part of it. Richard Patterson, described Robert Stevens' statement to be if "we were talking about getting the union in there we might as well look for another job." Laverne Ramsey described the statement to be that there was talk of a union in the shop and if "any of us three were thinking of the Union, we were automatically fired." Robert Stevens did not expressly deny the statements variously attributed to him above. He did deny them by implication, in my view, by his testimony that after hearing of the union activity, he called the employees named above together and told them . there was apparently some union activity in the machine company and that if they were interested in the equipment end that it was very possible that I would have to cease business because at that time we weren't making any profit, anyway." I was not impressed by Robert Stevens' demeanor on the witness stand and I obtained the impression that this testimony was partly a recitation of what had occurred and partly his statement for the record of the reasons for his conduct I do not believe that he made any statement which qualified the patent threat with a statement of the company's profit position; if he did, I believe he omitted from his testimony that part described by Freeman and Patterson as "go out the door" or "look for another job," which are essentially the same in idea and which I credit. I attach no weight to Ramsey's version which I believe represents his interpretation of Stevens' remarks, although offered by him as the remarks made. In short, I find that Robert Stevens' statement as described by Freeman and Patterson not only indicated that the Union was not wanted, but also, that employees in favor of one were not desired and impliedly would be terminated. Respondent thereby violated Section 8( a)(1). Stewart & Stevenson Services, Inc , 164 NLRB No 100; The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company, Inc., 167 NLRB No. 110, enfd. 408 F 2d 374 (C.A. 5). The same considerations apply to Richard Stevens' remark to Cline which I also find violative of Section 8(a)(1) as alleged in paragraph IX(b) of the complaint in Case 3-CA-3644. The remarks of Robert Stevens are deemed to be the threats alleged in paragraph IX(a) of the complaint in Case 3-CA-3711. Employee Freeman testified credibly that on the date of Cline's discharge, Robert Stevens came into the shop and "kind of joking" said, "Well, now, we got rid of the Union agitator." Freeman is corroborated by Hickey and Ramsey and Robert Stevens did not deny making the statement. Such a statement to employees, whether or not it is in fact the true motive for the discharge, is coercive as it clearly implies that the discharge was because of union activity and implies that the employees to whom it is made will also be discharged if they assist the Union. Mid-South Manufacturing Company, Inc., 120 NLRB 230; Inland Motors, 175 NLRB No. 139. Moreover, it is reasonable to conclude that whatever humor Robert Stevens may have seen in the discharge of a union agitator would not be shared by the employees. Freeman did not testify that he considered the announcement humorous. A few days before December 3, Hickey asked Robert Stevens how serious the union business was and remarked that he thought it was something to laugh at. Robert Stevens replied, no, it had gone beyond the laughing stage He added, "Well, I'll tell you. If anything happens to my dad in the way of a heart attack or say anything like that 147 and I find out he-I found out the one that started this-" he said, "I'll take a gun and kill the son of a bitch." Bob's wife remarked that that kind of talk would only get him behind bars and Bob replied, "Well, this is the only dad I've got." This testimony is undenied and I credit it. Respondent contends that the statement is so outrageous that it is unbelieveable and, thus, hardly threatening I do not believe, however, that it is necessary to conclude that Stevens really meant what he said in order to hold that the statement is coercive. The intensity of animus against the Union and the employees adhering to it reflected in such a statement is so great that the statement cannot but have a coercive effect on employees, and I find the remarks violative of Section 8(a)(1). 2. The granting of wage increases The complaint in Case 3-CA-3711, as amended at the trial, alleges that on December 4, Richard Stevens offered, promised and granted wage increases and other benefits to its employees if they refrained from union activity. The only evidence offered in support of this allegation related to wage increases given to John Shaw and Larry Cline. At quitting time on December 4, Richard Stevens gave Shaw his paycheck as usual and told Shaw there was something extra in it, that Shaw had been doing better welding and he appreciated it. Stevens added, "If you could help me out . . I would appreciate it." In his direct testimony about this conversation, Shaw adverted to the fact that it was before the election, but he did not quote Stevens as expressly referring to the election. On cross-examination Shaw testified that Stevens said, " . . would you help me out when election time came," and Shaw indicated that his use of the word election was not an interpretation of Stevens' remarks, but that he was quoting Stevens "Without an if, and, or but." Stevens denied mentioning the election, or voting, or the Union. I credit Shaw. I have previously indicated my reasons for crediting Shaw. In addition, I have considered in connection with this instance the fact that the day before he granted the wage increase, Richard Stevens had signed an Agreement for Consent Election scheduling an election for December 18, the fact that it had only been 3 months since Shaw had received an increase, that he had not requested an increase and it came as a surprise to him, and Stevens' failure to offer any credible explanation for giving the increase at that time. Accordingly, I find that the granting of the wage increase was violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. NL.R.B. v. Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405. Two or three weeks before his discharge, Larry Cline received a 10-cent-per-hour wage increase. Cline had asked for an increase several times (according to Richard Stevens, Cline was "continually bitching for more money"). Cline could not recall what Richard Stevens told him when he granted him the wage increase, but according to Stevens, when he told Cline there was a little more in his check, Cline said, "Well, there had better be." I do not know what significance is to be attached to this remark other than as confirmation that Cline did not deserve the increase. Stevens testified he had told Cline several times that it was not in the cards, adding on the witness stand, "And, as you know, he has been quite a bad workman." Stevens then added, "Now, Larry is a fellow who doesn't have much. And he-upstairs either-and I did feel sort of sorry for the kid and would have like to 148 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD help him along and try to. But it got to the point where I said, `Well,' to myself, `Maybe a ten cent increase will make him produce better or make him shape up.' So, I gave him a ten cent increase." Yet, on Stevens' own admission, when he gave Cline his check he said nothing to him about his reasons. Had these been his true reasons, it would seem that he would have told Cline that Cline might have understood that improvement was expected of him. Under all the circumstances, I am persuaded that the wage increase to Cline was motivated by Stevens' desire to combat the union activity of his employees and to influence Cline to refrain from supporting the Union. Accordingly, I find the wage increase violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. B. The Discharge of Richard Patterson , Larry Cline and Laverne Ramsey 1. The facts relating to the discharges a. Richard Patterson Patterson was employed on June 24 by Stevens Equipment as a mechanic and general laborer. He was discharged on October 14. He was the employee who procured union cards and who brought them to the shop on September 19. On Thursday, October 10, Patterson asked Richard Stevens for, and received, permission to leave work early. He gave no reason for wanting to leave early, but stated at the trial that it was because he did not feel well. According to Patterson, whom I credit, nothing was said about his coming to work on Friday. On Friday, Patterson did not report to work, nor did he report his absence. He testified he did not feel well, had a slight cold and a headache, that he went to a doctor, but that the doctor did not prescribe anything. Patterson admitted that after his visit to the doctor he and a friend went to a cabin in the woods which they own where he spent about three quarters of an hour checking things, returning home at 3:30 p.m. He admitted he was probably well enough to go to work that day. Saturday was not a regular workday and Patterson did not report for work. Patterson was not asked whether he had been told to report to work on Saturday. On Monday, October 14, Patterson reported to work and was told by Robert Stevens that he was running short of work and he did not need three guys anymore, and he was going to let Patterson go. Patterson said nothing. No mention was made of Patterson's absence from work Friday and Saturday. Robert Stevens confirmed that the only reason he gave Patterson for the termination was lack of work, but he testified that there were in fact other reasons, namely, his tardiness, the lack of work, and the fact that he had told Richard Stevens he would be in on Friday and he was not.' He did not mention these other reasons because he wanted Patterson to leave with a favorable attitude towards Respondent and he did not want to appear to be an ogre. Richard Stevens testified that when he gave Patterson permission to leave early on Thursday, he specifically 'On Friday, an investigator from the Bureau of Criminal Investigations had made inquiries at the shop about Patterson whom he wanted to interview about a burglary . This matter was discussed among the Stevens and referred to by Robert Stevens when terminating Patterson; however, it was not asserted to be one of the reasons for discharging him. asked him if he would be in the next day and Patterson said he would. Richard Stevens also testified in the following fashion that Patterson had been asked to come in on Saturday: in answer to the following question by his counsel, "You had asked him?" he replied, "Right." Yet, when I asked him who had asked Patterson to work on Saturday, he replied, "Bob had asked him ." Bob testified he could not say whether Patterson had been told to report to work on Saturday. b. Larry Cline Cline was employed on January 31, 1967, and discharged October 23, 1968. At the time of his discharge, he was the senior employee, only Foreman Wyckoff having more seniority. He signed a union card on September 19. On Monday morning, October 21, Cline asked Foreman Wyckoff for, and received, permission to take the rest of the day off to do work at home. On Tuesday, Cline reported to work and after about 2 hours, he asked Richard Stevens for permission to leave early. Stevens gave him no answer. Shortly, thereafter Cline left work without permission. (Cline testified he also asked Wyckoff for permission on this day, but I do not credit him. His testimony that he asked Wyckoff for permission was elicited by a leading question, and when testifying about his termination conversation with Stevens he was again led to state that he told Stevens he had received permission from Wyckoff; yet, when I examined Cline, I found him to be uncertain about everything. Despite reservations about certain aspects of Wyckoff's testimony with regard to Cline, I credit his testimony that Cline did not request permission on Tuesday.) On Wednesday, Cline reported to work and punched his timecard as usual. He was called into the office where Richard Stevens told him that if he thought his work was more important than the company's, he was going to let him do it. According to Stevens, he gave Cline his check and Cline left without saying a word. According to Cline, he protested that he had received no warning and that he had Wyckoff's permission. For the reasons given above, I do not credit Cline about this conversation. c. Laverne Ramsey Ramsey was employed by Stevens Equipment in July 1967, and was discharged January 20, 1969. He signed a union card on September 19. On December 3, Ramsey went to Buffalo to attend the R case hearing on behalf of the Union. Ramsey had owed a substantial amount of money to Respondent for a long time and the day following the hearing Robert Stevens handed him a statement of account, putting it "right under his nose," which stated that unless the account was paid by December 6, Respondent would file suit. Ramsey did not pay and suit was filed. Ramsey owns a large farm and he agreed to go to work for Respondent after several discussions with Robert Stevens in which Ramsey indicated that he would accept employment only on condition that he would have adequate time off to plant and harvest his crops. The record does not indicate the specific terms of the arrangement agreed to. Although Robert Stevens denied making any special arrangements, he admitted to a general agreement with Ramsey to take time off for planting and harvesting, and the record shows , that Ramsey took time off in the December 1967-January 1968 RICHARD V. STEVENS 149 period and the June-July 1968 period. In the week before January 13, 1969, Ramsey had made arrangements to have a field of his corn combined by one, Roger Granger. On the day Granger started, January 13, Ramsey's wife called Respondent to advise that Ramsey was ill. Ramsey did not report to work during the entire week of January 13, and during 4 days of that week Granger was combining the corn and Ramsey was in the field helping him. Although Ramsey denied that he did any work in the field, he admitted that on two or three occasions he moved the truck into which the corn was loaded and that he was present during part of the..time Granger was working. According to Granger, Ramsey was there all the time he was combining. In fact, Ramsey and he had agreed to meet in the field on Monday when Granger started the combining. Ramsey returned to work January 20, 1969, and was discharged. Robert Stevens asked him where he had been the preceding week and Ramsey told him he had been ill and also that he had "visited" with the man combining his corn. Robert Stevens remarked that Ramsey had visited several times according to his understanding. He also mentioned an account owed Respondent by Ramsey, but Ramsey disputed the amount claimed. Richard Stevens told Ramsey he was going to be discharged, that he was among several others in the organization costing them a lot of money. Ramsey asked what he meant and Stevens replied "You know attorneys cost a lot of money." Ramsey remarked that he could not see how Stevens felt he was the one costing Respondent money and Stevens replied, "Well, I, among others in the organization, were costing them money." According to Robert Stevens, on' the previous Tuesday, he had heard that Ramsey had been seen with the man he had hired to combine his corn, and on the same day his father had called Ramsey's house with regard to a machine part he could not find and had received no answer. On Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday, Stevens received information indicating that Ramsey was not in his house, and on Sunday, January 19, he talked with Granger, the combine man, who confirmed that Ramsey was helping him. When Ramsey reported to work on Monday, Robert asked him why he had not been at work and Ramsey told him he had been sick and he asked when Stevens was going to get off his back. Stevens told him that was as good a time as any and Ramsey replied that was perfectly alright, but if Stevens thought he had trouble in the past, he wanted him to know it was just beginning. Stevens testified there was no mention of how much money Ramsey had cost the Company or how expensive attorneys were. Richard Stevens did not testify about this conversation. 2. Analysis and Conclusions The record in this case is a welter of inconsistencies, contradictions, and plain falsehoods, and threading ones way through it to determine Respondent's motive in discharging Cline, Patterson, and Ramsey is not a simple task. Although each employee gave cause for discharge, this does not mean that Respondent may not have been motivated, in part, by their union activities in deciding to terminate them. "The circumstances of each case must be weighed to determine what motivations truly dominated the employer in laying off or discharging the employees." N.L.R.B. v. Jones Sausage Co., 257 F.2d 878, 882 (C.A. 4). One circumstance which weighs heavily in my findings about the motivation of Richard Stevens in discharging Cline and Patterson is Stevens' lack of credibility. From my observation of Richard Stevens, at the time he testified he was still angry with his employees because they had signed union cards and he still conveyed the impression of a determination to show them he was "footing the bills" and running the shop. On the basis of his demeanor alone, I would discredit him. However, there are additional guides to his lack of credibility. I have previously pointed out his shifting and evasive testimony on the purpose of the attempted poll, and his testimony on his reasons for giving Cline a wage increase is patently incredible. Equally incredible, and patently so, is Respondent's contention that Stevens had no knowledge of Cline's and Patterson's union sympathies. As noted earlier, the employees signed union cards on September 19, in the presence of Foreman Wyckoff, who testified that on the same day he told Richard Stevens that the boys were trying to start a union, and he mentioned specifically the boys involved in signing cards. Stevens admitted that Wyckoff told him about the card signing, but denied that Wyckoff mentioned any specific names. I credit Wyckoff who appeared to me generally credible, although his inclination to generalize in testifying about Cline created false impressions about Cline's attitude and cooperation. Moreover, Richard Stevens' own testimony belies his assertion of a lack of knowledge. In essence, his testimony amounts to no more than an assertion that he did not have the certain knowledge of personal observation. As Stevens stated, "The only suspicion I could have was that Mr. Wyckoff had told me these fellows had signed cards. I didn't see them do it." On the basis of the record as a whole, I find he had the required knowledge. The next circumstance which has been weighed in evaluating Respondent's motivation is the evidence that Richard Stevens regarded the employees' union activities as an act of belligerence which he determined to meet "head-on." Of course, Stevens did not state that he regarded the employees' union activities as their act of belligerence; rather, he claimed that they became belligerent: "Well, there was a definite trend towards belligerence as far as the employees were concerned, as far as answering to any requests. You could tell there was a definite attitude that apparently they were going to do about what they saw fit." This having been said, one would have expected specific examples. There are none that are worthy of credence. Thus, one example given was of an alleged drop in production. Not a single detail, even less any records, was offered to support such an assertion. Another example of change of attitude was more griping, the only example of which was a good deal of talk about more wages, and the only two employees identified with this talk being Cline and Hickey. In Cline's case, on the basis of Stevens' own testimony it appears that any talk about more wages antedated the union activity. Cline only worked about 5 weeks after he signed a union card, so he could only have asked for a wage increase a limited number of times; yet, Stevens described him as "continually bitching" for more money.' In Hickey's case, the demand for more money had occurred before he even reported to work several weeks before the union activity occurred. 'Foreman Wyckoff also attributed a change of attitude to Cline, stating, "He had gotten almost to the place to where he just simply didn't care 150 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Stevens also included the conduct of Patterson and Cline in being absent from work as part of the attitude of belligerence and lack of cooperation. There is a superficial appeal to this attempt to enlarge the absences of Patterson and Cline just prior to their discharge into a pattern of belligerence and lack of cooperation. The flaw of the appeal, however, is that it is built up on the unsupported assertions discussed above, it presupposes that there is evidentiary support of a trend of belligerence I find no such evidence. Rather, I believe the conclusion is inescapable that Stevens construed the adherence of his employees to the Union as belligerence and that his animus against them because of such adherence was at the root of the discharges, at least in the case of Patterson and Cline. There are several reasons why I conclude that Patterson's discharge was discriminatorily motivated. While it is true that he was absent without permission on Friday, the evidence establishes that Respondent was very permissive on the question of attendance. This was attested to not only by employee David Freeman, but Robert Stevens' own testimony about his alleged talks with Patterson about his leaving work early or being absent on Saturdays conveys a sense of permissiveness; significantly, Robert Stevens did not say he warned Patterson. The evidence of other discharges suggests the same permissiveness and indicates a greater tolerance than was shown to either Patterson or Cline. Moreover, although Robert Stevens was the partner who generally supervised the employees of Stevens Equipment, it was his father who made the decision to fire Patterson.' Although Patterson had not been told to report to work on Saturday, Richard Stevens did not inquire about his absence, but simply presumed he had been told to report for work. Next, there is the admitted fact that Robert Stevens lied about the reason for discharge in the termination conversation. Although he claimed that lack of work was in fact one of the reasons, I do not believe him and there .is no evidence to support the assertion. Nor am I impressed by his stated reason for not telling Patterson the true reason, if the reason was his prior absence. This was not a reason to be hesitant to state, especially where he claimed to have spoken to Patterson about the matter before.' In view of the foregoing, and in light of Respondent's proven animus against the Union and its contemporaneous 8(a)(1) conduct, I find that the discharge of Patterson was motivated not by his absence on Friday, but by his union activities, and that Respondent thereby violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. In the case of Cline, Respondent asserted two reasons for his discharge: his work was poor and he absented himself from work without permission. The first asserted whether he came in and worked or not." Wyckoff based this statement on the fact that Cline had applied for work elsewhere However, Cline had applied elsewhere before the union activity and Wyckoff could not say when this alleged change of attitude first manifested itself, gave no specific examples, and did not even recall mentioning it to Richard Stevens I can accord no weight to such generalizations 'On direct examination , Robert Stevens said the decision to discharge Patterson was primarily his, on cross -examination , he stated the decision had been made and "I was agreeable ." I believe this latter statement reflects accurately that it was Stevens pere who made the decision 'Cf N L.R.B. v. Dominick 's Finer Foods, Inc, 367 F.2d 781 (C A 7), where the reasons for discharge were the personal habits, including the general appearance , of the alleged discriminatee , and the supervisor wanted to spare her feelings. reason is patently pretextuous. Cline was the most senior employee and, whatever his shortcomings they can hardly have been so bad else he would have been discharged earlier. There are notably few details about his poor work and no evidence of any warnings, for example, as was given to John Shaw. Finally, nothing was said about his work when he was discharged. What of his unexcused absence? In rejecting Respondent's assertion that this was the reason for his discharge, I rely as I did in the case of Patterson on the evidence that Respondent had a permissive operation. In addition, I note the testimony of Foreman Wyckoff that requests for permission to leave early happen frequently, and "If someone of the employees has something he had to tend to, why we let them go." Yet, Cline was abruptly discharged for leaving work early without permission on 1 day. There was no warning, nor any inquiry about his reasons. As a matter of fact, at the time of the discharge Richard Stevens had not even bothered to inquire whether Cline had permission to leave early the first day. Finally, I cannot ignore the uncontradicted evidence that Robert Stevens told employees that same day that "Well, now, we got rid of the Union agitator." Cf. Inland Motors, supra. Accordingly, and in view of Respondent's proven animus against the Union and its contemporaneous 8(a)(1) conduct, I find that Respondent discharged Cline to discourage membership in or adherence to the Union and that it thereby violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. The case of Ramsey has certain significant differences which compel me to conclude that the evidence is insufficient to warrant a finding that his discharge was discriminatorily motivated. To begin with, I do not credit Ramsey. His conduct during the week of January 13 as described by Granger belie his claim that he was sick. Ramsey did not go to a doctor until after he was discharged, and it is clear from Granger's testimony, which I credit, that Ramsey had planned to work with him and that the claim of illness was a pretext to be absent from work. For this reason, I see no relevance to all the testimony that Ramsey had an agreement with Robert Stevens that he could have time off for planting and harvesting his crops. When the time arrived to combine his corn the week of January 13, Ramsey did not assert his right under the agreement to take time off to harvest his corn, but instead chose to report that he was sick. In this circumstance whatever agreement there was between Ramsey and Robert Stevens cannot be relied upon as justification for his absence for the week in question. I conclude, therefore, that Ramsey was not sick and that his absence from work constituted ground for discharge. As in the cases of Patterson and Cline, one must still look to Respondent's true motive in discharging him, only in this instance, I find no parallel to Ramsey's conduct, and Respondent's permissiveness adverted to earlier was not shown to extend to a week's absence, in particular, an absence for which the Respondent had been given a false reason and which it had learned was false. Under these circumstances, including the fact that the discharge occurred several weeks after the election and that Ramsey's discharge could in no way affect the results, I am not persuaded that there is a preponderance of evidence to support a finding that the discharge was discriminatorily motivated. In arriving at this conclusion, I have carefully considered Robert Stevens' action on December 4 in putting right under Ramsey's nose a statement of account with a threat of suit on December 6. Such action can be RICHARD V. STEVENS 151 attributed to nothing other than Stevens' resentment of the fact that Ramsey was a union adherent and that he had attended the R case hearing. The debt in question was one of long standing, and although Robert Stevens may have discussed payment with Ramsey before December 4, Respondent had not seriously pressed the matter before. In other circumstances, the malice in this action would be sufficient to warrant a finding that the subsequent discharge was unlawfully motivated. In this case, however, the discharge did not occur until 6 weeks later, after an election had been held and after Ramsey had absented himself for a week by falsely claiming he was ill. The circumstances surrounding Ramsey's discharge offer no evidentiary support for a finding of unlawful motivation. The statement attributed to Richard Stevens by Ramsey about costing the organization money, if credited, arguably had reference to Ramsey's union activity. However, I do not credit it. Ramsey was a generally unreliable witness, and I perceive no reason to credit this particular bit of his testimony. For all the foregoing reasons, I shall recommend that the allegation that Ramsey was discriminatorily discharged be dismissed. IV. THE CHALLENGED BALLOTS: CASE 3-RC-4542 The tally of ballots in the Case 3-RC-4542 showed four votes cast for union representation, four against, and three challenged ballots. Two of the challenged ballots were those of Cline and Patterson who were challenged by the Board agent on the ground they were not on the eligibility list, and they were not on the eligibility list because they had been discharged prior to the election. Since I have found that they were discriminatorily discharged, it follows that they were eligible to vote. In the case of Patterson, Respondent asserts that should it be concluded that he was discriminatorily discharged, the challenge to his ballot should nevertheless be sustained because the Union paid Patterson because he voted. After his discharge Patterson went to work for an employer in Rochester, New York, and on the day of the election he took a day off to travel to Scio, New York, in order to vote. After Patterson had cast his vote, and as he was leaving the shop, he met Union Representative John Jackson who told him that the Union had a policy of compensating individuals who lost wages to cast their ballots in a Board election. Jackson asked for his address in Rochester and his rate of pay. Both Patterson and Jackson testified that they had never discussed the question of such a payment at any time prior to the election, and Patterson had not been promised payment. There is no evidence to the contrary and I credit both Patterson and Jackson. Patterson testified that long before the election, even before his employment by Respondent, he had discussions with a relative who was a union member in which mention had been made of situations where an employee would be reimbursed for loss of pay incurred in going to the polls, and Patterson thought he might get reimbursed when he traveled from Rochester to Scio to vote, although "I was coming down anyway to vote." Respondent contends that Patterson's testimony about a conversation or conversations with a relative presents an incredible story and that it must be concluded that Patterson was in fact told prior to the election that he would be reimbursed. Alternatively, Respondent contends it must be found Patterson knew he would be paid, and that, coupled with the fact of reimbursement, is enough to invalidate his vote. I find no merit to these arguments, and I do not deem any of the cases cited by Respondent apposite. The parties to a Board election have a legitimate interest in seeing that employees exercise their franchise. For this reason, the Board has long held that a union may provide transportation to employees in order that they may vote (Charles T. Brandt, Inc., 118 NLRB 956, 959) or even make payments constituting a reasonable reimbursement for expenses of transportation (Federal Silk Mills, 107 NLRB 876). Whether or not a particular payment is improper must depend upon all the circumstances of the case. Included among these circumstances is the fact that Patterson was the employee who brought the union cards to the shop and signed one himself, and that at the time of the election there was pending an unfair labor practice charge filed by the Union on his behalf alleging that he had been unlawfully discharged. In my opinion, neither a promise nor the reimbursement of actual wages lost by an alleged discriminatee in casting his ballot in these circumstances can be deemed to be improper. In any event, not only was there no promise of reimbursement prior to the voting, but also Patterson had decided to vote and had cast his ballot before he learned that he would be reimbursed. Under the circumstances, there is no basis for invalidating his ballot.10 The remaining challenge is that of the ballot cast by David Mack on the ground that he lived with the Stevens family Mack was a student at a nearby college and had boarded at the home of Richard Stevens during his first year of college in 1967 and again in the second year beginning September 1968 In the fall of 1968, Mack asked Richard Stevens for employment because he was low on money and needed money for a trip to Europe that he was planning on. Stevens agreed to give him employment and Mack began working at the beginning of November and worked until March 19, 1969. He received $1.75 per hour and worked regularly from 2 to 4:30 p.m., Monday through Friday, and sometimes on Saturday. At the time he asked for and received the job, there was no special understanding about the duration of his employment, although Mack had advised Richard Stevens of the possibility that the school might assign him to work block" in the spring of 1969, in which event he could no longer work. If that did not materialize, Mack intended to quit in June 1969, when he graduated and to return to his hometown, Utica, New York. The basis of the challenge "lives with family" is legally insufficient. Mack is not a relative of the Stevens and enjoyed no special privileges as an employee. However, it appears that Mack's ballot is subject to challenge on another ground, namely, that he was a temporary employee, with no community of interest with Respondent's regular employees.12 Respondent contends that a regular part-time employee, even a student, is eligible to vote, and that the evidence clearly shows that Mack was a regular part-time employee. However, Mack's eligibility is not to be determined solely on the "Respondent also contends that the payment to Patterson constitutes ground for setting aside the election , and that unusual circumstances (i.e , Respondent lacked knowledge of the payment ) justify an exception to the 5-day rule for filing objections contained in Sec 102.69(a) of the Board's Rules and Regulations. Since the payment was not improper, there is no need to reach this contention "A program whereby a student works for a company and receives college credit "Although this was not the basis of the challenge, Respondent does not dispute that the Regional Director could rely on any other grounds for invalidating a ballot discovered in the course of his investigation Mitchiyoshi Uyeda , d/b/a Udaco Manufacturing Company. 164 NLRB No. 84 152 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD basis of his status as a regular part-time employee. "Eligibility to vote depends on whether an employee is sufficiently concerned with the terms and conditions of employment in a unit to warrant his participation in the selection of a bargaining agent." N.L.R.B. v. Belcher Towing Co., 284 F.2d 118 (C.A. 5). It is abundantly clear in this case that Mack's employment was of a temporary nature and that he lacked a community of interest with the regular employees. While he could theoretically have continued to work for Respondent as long as he wanted to, the expiration of his period of employment was in fact certain, the only uncertainty being the causal event, assignment to-work block or graduation. Mack admitted he "had no interest in the Union and I paid very little attention about it, because I was just working there to go to Alfred." The only reason he voted was that he was asked to do so by Stevens. Under all the circumstances, I find that Mack was a temporary employee ineligible to vote. V. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of the Respondent set forth in section III, above, occurring in connection with its operations described in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic and commerce among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow thereof. VI. THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act, I shall recommend that it be ordered to cease and desist therefrom and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. As I have found that Respondent discriminatorily discharged Richard Patterson and Larry Cline, I shall recommend that it be ordered to offer them immediate and full reinstatement to their former or a substantially equivalent position, without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges, and to make them whole for any loss of earnings they may-have suffered by reason of the discrimination against them by payment to them of a sum of money equal to that which they normally would have earned as wages from the date of their discharge to the date of the offer of reinstatement, less net earnings, to which shall be added interest at the rate of 6 percent per annum in accordance with the formula set forth in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289, and Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716. In view of the nature of the unfair labor practices committed, and the substantial evidence of Respondent's disregard for the Section 7 rights of its employees, in order to prevent the commission of other unfair labor practices, I shall recommend that Respondent be placed under a broad order to cease and desist from in any manner infringing upon the rights of employees guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. In accordance with the order consolidating cases and the terms of the agreement for consent election providing for a final decision of the issues in the R case by the Regional Director rather than by the Board, I shall order that Case 3-RC-4542 be severed and remanded to the Regional Director for Region 3 for further processing as he deems appropriate. Upon the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record in this case, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Richard V. Stevens, an individual, d/b/a The Stevens Machine Company, and Richard V. Stevens and Robert L. Stevens, partnership, d/b/a Stevens Equipment Company, constitute a single employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. Lodge 1580, International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. By interrogating its employees under the circumstances described herein, by threatening employees with discharge and bodily harm because of their union activities, and by granting wage increases to induce employees to withdraw support from the Union, Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Sections 8(a)(1) and 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 4. By discharging Richard Patterson and Larry Cline because of their union activities, Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Sections 8(a)(1) and (3) and 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 5. General Counsel failed to establish by a preponderance of evidence that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act by discharging Laverne Ramsey. Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the entire record in this case, I hereby issue the following: RECOMMENDED ORDER Respondent, Richard V. Stevens, an individual, d/b/a The Stevens Machine Company, and Richard V. Stevens and Robert L. Stevens, partnership, d/b/a Stevens Equipment Company, its agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Discouraging membership in or activities on behalf of Lodge 1580, International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, or in any other labor organization of its employees, by discharging or otherwise discriminating in regard to the hire or tenure of employment or any terms or conditions of employment of its employees. (b) Interrogating its employees concerning their union activities or desires in a manner constituting interference, restraint, or coercion in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. (c) Threatening employees with discharge or bodily harm because of their union activities. (d) Granting wage increases to employees to induce them to withdraw their support from the Union. (e) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of their right to RICHARD V. STEVENS self-organization to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection as guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act, or to refrain from any or all such activities. 2. Take the following affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Offer Richard Patterson and Larry M. Cline immediate and full reinstatement to their former or a substantially equivalent position without prejudice to their seniority or other rights or privileges, and make them whole for any loss of pay they may have suffered by reason of the discrimination against them by payment to each of them a sum of money equal to the amount they normally would have earned as wages from the date of their discharge to the date of their reinstatement in the manner set forth in the section entitled "The Remedy." (b) Notify the above-mentioned employees if presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United States of their right to full reinstatement upon application in accordance with the Selective Service and Universal Military Training and Service Act, as amended, after discharge from the Armed Forces. (c) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board and its agents for examination and copying, all payroll records, social security records, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other records relevant and necessary to a determination of the amounts of backpay due under the terms of this Recommended Order. (d) Post at its Scio, New York, place of business copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."" Copies of said notice on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 3, after being duly signed by Respondent, shall be posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof and maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced or covered by any other material. (e) Notify the said Regional Director, in writing, within 20 days from the receipt of this Decision, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith." As to the allegations of the complaints found not to have constituted violations of the Act, it is recommended that they be dismissed. ORDER SEVERING AND REMANDING CASE 3-RC-4542 Case 3-RC-4542 is hereby severed from the consolidated proceeding and remanded to the Regional Director for Region 3 for further action as he deems appropriate in accordance with Section 102.62(a) of the Board's Rules and Regulations. "In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the notice. If the Board's Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, the notice will be further amended by the substitution of the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order" for the words "a Decision and Order." "In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board this provision shall be modified to read : "Notify the Regional Director, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith." APPENDIX NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 153 Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended , we hereby notify our employees that: After a trial in which both sides had the opportunity to present their evidence, the National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the law and has ordered us to post this Notice and to keep our word about what we say in this Notice. The Act gives all employees these rights: To engage in self-organization To form , join, or help unions To bargain collectively through a representative of their own choosing To act together for collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection To refrain from any or all of these things. WE WILL NOT do anything that interferes with those rights. More specifically, WE WILL NOT question you about your union membership , desires or activities, unless we have a lawful purpose , and then we will tell you our purpose and we assure you we will not punish you because of your answers. WE WILL NOT threaten you with discharge, bodily harm , or any other reprisals, because of your union membership, desires or activities. WE WILL NOT grant wage increases to induce you to withdraw support from the Union. Since the Board found that we violated the law when we fired Richard Patterson and Larry Cline We will offer them their jobs back and pay them for any loss of pay they may have suffered because we fired them. You are free to become and remain members of Lodge 1580, International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization, and we won't punish you in any way if you do. Dated By STEVENS MACHINE COMPANY AND STEVENS EQUIPMENT COMPANY (Employer) (Representative) (Title) Note: Notify Richard Patterson and Larry Cline if presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United States of their rights to full reinstatement upon application in accordance with the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Training and Service Act, as amended, after discharge from the Armed Forces. This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. If employees have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions, they may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, Fourth Floor, The 120 Building, 120 Delaware Avenue, Buffalo, New York 14202, Telephone 716-842-3100.