McGraw-Edison Co.

558 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Ingraham Industries-Division of McGraw-Edison Company and International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, Local 260, AFL-CIO. Case 1-CA-6536 September 22, 1969 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN MCCUL LOCH AND MEMBERS JENKINS AND ZAGORIA On May 6, 1969, Trial Examiner Harry R. Hinkes, issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices, and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. The Trial Examiner further found that the Respondent had not engaged in certain other unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint and recommended the dismissal of these allegations. Thereafter, the General Counsel filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision, and a supporting brief, and the Respondent filed limited cross-exceptions' with a supporting brief', and an answering brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel. The Board has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in this case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner, with the limited modification set forth below. "(a) Refusing to bargain collectively with International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, Local 260, AFL-CIO, as the bargaining representative of its hourly rated employees at its Bristol, Connecticut plant, by refusing to permit the Union, after the grievance procedure has been invoked, to perform independent time studies through its own experts on jobs involved in grievances arising under the parties' collective-bargaining agreement." 2. Delete paragraph 2(a) and substitute the following: "(a) Upon request, after the grievance procedure has been invoked, permit the Union through its own experts to perform independent time studies pertaining to jobs involved in grievances arising under the parties' collective-bargaining agreement." 3. Delete the first indented paragraph of the notice to all employees and substitute the following: WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, Local 260, AFL-CIO, by refusing to permit the Union, after the grievance procedure has been invoked, to perform independent time studies pertaining to jobs involved in grievances arising under our collective-bargaining agreement. 4. Delete the third indented paragraph of the notice to all employees and substitute the following. WE WILL, upon request, after the grievance procedure has been invoked, permit the Union to conduct its own time studies on the job with respect to jobs involved in grievances arising under our collective-bargaining agreement. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that those portions of the complaint as to which no violation have been found are hereby dismissed. TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board hereby adopts as its Order the Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner, and orders that the Respondent, Ingraham Industries-Division of McGraw Edison Company, Bristol, Connecticut, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order, as herein modified. 1. Delete paragraph 1(a) and substitute the following: 'The Respondent does not except to the Trial Examiner's findings and conclusions , but contends that the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order is too broad in scope As the modification set forth herein reflect;, the Respondent's exceptions have been granted to the extent we deem warranted. HARRY R. HiNKES, Trial Examiner. The complaint herein was issued on January 23. 1969, pursuant to a charge by International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers Local 260, AFL-CIO (herein called the Union), filed and served upon Ingraham Industries-Division of McGraw Edison Company (herein called the Company or Respondent), on or about November 21, 1968 The complaint alleges that Respondent in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act has refused the Union's request to time study a job and has failed to notify the Union and permit said union to attend a meeting with Respondent's employees. By answer duly filed, Respondent has denied the commission of any unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint A hearing was held before me at Bristol, Connecticut, on March 27, 1969, at which all parties were represented and were afforded lull opportunity to participate. examine witnesses, and adduce relevant evidence Briefs have been received from the Respondent and the General Counsel and have been given careful consideration. Upon the entire record in this proceeding, I make the following: 178 NLRBNo 89 INGRAHAM INDUSTRIES 559 FINDINGS of FACT i. JURISDICTION Respondent is and has been at all times material hereto a corporation duly organized under and existing by virtue of the laws of the State of Delaware. It maintains its principal office and place of business in Bristol, Connecticut, where it is engaged in the manufacture, sale and distribution of timing devices including clocks, watches, and related products. In the course and conduct of its business Respondent causes large quantities of metal and metal parts used by it to be purchased and transported in interstate commerce from and through various states of the United States other than the State of Connecticut, and causes substantial quantities of timing devices to be sold and transported from Connecticut to states of the United States other than the State of Connecticut. In the course and conduct of its business, the Respondent annually ships products having a value in excess of $50,000 to points outside the State of Connecticut The complaint alleges and Respondent's answer admits that the Respondent is and has been engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act. II. Till- I ABOR ORGANIZATION iNVOi yhD The complaint alleges and Respondent's answer admits and I find that International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers Local 260, AFL-CIO. is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act 111. THE UNFAIR i.&tiOR PRACTICFS A Background The complaint alleges and Respondent's answer admits that at all times since June 15, 1950, the Union has been the representative for the purposes of collective bargaining of a majority of the employees in a unit consisting of all hourly rated employees of the Respondent employed at its Bristol plant, exclusive of officers, executives, office and salaried employees. foreman, assistant foreman, line foreman, sub-foreman, titnekccpers, assistant timekeepers. engineers, draftsmen, janitors, nurses, clerks, uniformed plant protection employees and all supervisors as defined in Section 2(11) of the Act. In November and December 1967, a contract was negotiated by the Company and the Union which was signed in May 1968 retroactively effective. however, to January 1. 1968. Among other things. said contract at article V I lI provides: 2. (a) Piece or incentive rates, when once set after a reasonable trial period, shall not be reduced unless changes in methods, processes or material amounting to five per cent (5%), up or down, shall indicate the propriety of such a change in the rate. (b) Revisions to standards as a result of changes will be to only those elements affected unless it is possible for time values of unchanged elements to be different as a result of their occurring at different points in the sequence, in which case those elements too will be included in the revised study (c) The Company will furnish to the Union, upon request, all data, including a copy of the time study, to show the accumulation of elements and time equal to or in excess of five per cent (5`h) on which the change is based, but provided that such copies of the time study will not be removed from the premises, except for safe keeping in Local Union files, nor allowed to be disclosed to anyone other than the Union officials and the particular operators whose job is under discussion. (d) When there has been an accumulation of changes amounting to five per cent (5%) or more, up or down, the changes will be made effective and the standard will he corrected to include them (e) The Union will have the right to challenge any standard set by the Company through the grievance machinery up to and including arbitration. 3 No employee shall suffer a reduction in his day rate because of the temporary transfer from one job to another, unless the employee requests the transfer or voluntarily agrees to the transfer. 19. After a temporary piecework rate has run for three (3) calendar months and for not less than 480 work hours of actual operation either a permanent rate shall be set on the job or the rate on the job ,it the expiration of such temporary rate period shall stand as a permanent rate and shall not thereafter be changed except as otherwise provided in the contract. 20. A special day rate of S1.85 per hour is established for all pieceworkers when temporarily working on day work for any reason. Said agreement also speaks of grievance procedures and arbitration. Article XIV provides. In the event that differences arise between the Company and any of its employees within the scope of the provisions in this contract. means are provided for the settling of such differences by the grievance procedure outlined in the following sections: (a) Between the department steward and the foreman. (b) Between the department steward and shop steward and the general superintendent's representatives. (c) Between the Union Committee, consisting of not more than five (5) employees and the management * * * * * 6. All differences, disputes and grievances between the parties, that shall not have been satislactorily settled after following the procedure hereinabove set forth shall, at the request of either party, be promptly submitted to arbitration by a Board of Arbitration . . 8 Grievances. within the meaning of the grievance procedure, shall consist only of disputes about working conditions, about the interpretation and/or application of particular clauses of this agreement, and about alleged violations of the agreement, including alleged abuses of discretion by supervisors in the treatment of employees. Changes in general business practice, the opening or closing of new units, the choice of personnel, the choice of merchandise to he sold, or other business questions of a like nature not having to do directly and primarily with the day-to-day life of the employees and their relations with their supervisors shall not be the subject of grievances and shall not be arbitrable If any question arises as to whether a particular dispute is or is not a grievance within the meaning of these provisions. the question may he taken 560 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD up through the grievance procedure and determined if necessary by arbitration. 9 Until the foregoing grievance procedure shall have been fully exhausted, there shall be no interruption or curtailment of operation by any employee on account of a grievance, and the parties agree to handle each stage of the grievance procedure in as prompt a manner as possible. B. The Tirnestudy Issue In June, 1968, the Union requested permission to have some of the jobs studied by their own timestudy expert "especially where the job has been cut drastically and the ones on which we have filed grievances." Within a few days thereafter, General Manager Modeen of the Special Products Division of the Respondent replied stating that the Company had furnished copies of the Company's timestudies in all cases where piece or incentive rates have been set or changed as provided in Article VIII, Section 2(a). (b), (c), and (d) of the agreement between the Company and the Union effective January I, 1968. No job has been `cut drastically' as alleged by the Union's letter of June 13, 1968. All grievances challenging piecework rates will be defended on this basis. In August, 1968, the Union began receiving complaints from some of the employees who were being transferred from their jobs to new jobs on a new conveyor being installed. and who were allegedly experiencing a loss in their wages as a result. At about the same time the Company supplied the Union with its timestudies covering those fobs. Union President Owens, an employee of the Respondent, then asked Manager Modeen that the Union be permitted to make its own timestudy, to which Modeen replied that it could not be done. The union president then wrote to Modeen requesting the Union's timestudy man for the various jobs At a subsequent committee meeting the Company replied that its position was unchanged. That position was stated by the Company on September 10, 1968 in its answer to the grievance filed by the Union concerning the employees' loss of pay by their changeover to the new conveyor. In it the Company slated The Company exercised its contractual right when it instituted a piece work conveyor operation. Article 11 grants the Company the right, among other things, "to determine the methods, processes and means of manufacture." Article VIII, Section 2(a). (b), (c) and (d) are pertinent only to revisions of standards and rates that have been enforced beyond a reasonable trial period. While it is true in Section 2(e) that the Union has the right to challenge any standard set by the Company, Section 19 of Article VIII defines a period of three calendar months or not less than 480 work hours as the trial period. Therefore the conveyor rate in question would assume a permanent status on at the expiration of this contractual time period A contractual step "c" meeting concerning this grievance was held between the Company and the Union on October 7, 1968, at which meeting the Company again raised the defense of the propriety of pursuing step "c" meetings or arbitrations in view of section 19, article VIII, which allegedly creates a 3-month trial period for standards set by the Company. On November 7, the Union requested arbitration on this grievance and on November 16 the matter was referred to the American Arbitration Assocation . As of March 27, 1969, the date of the hearing in this matter, said arbitration was still pending before the arbitrator . In the meantime, however, the Union had filed its charge in this proceeding on November 20, 1968, and the complaint and notice of hearing had been issued on January 23, 1969. C. Analysis and Conclusion on the Timestudy Issue It thus appears that the grievance filed by the Union with respect to the new conveyor was concerned with an alleged loss in pay sustained by the employees in that department. The Company denied the grievance, arguing that the 3-month trial period provision of the contract between the Company and the Union barred the Union's challenge. That issue has been referred to arbitration for a decision. it is not, however, before the Board for adjudication. The issue before the Board, generated by this proceeding, is whether the Union's request for their own timestudy of the new conveyor, in support of their grievance concerning the rate of pay in that department, should he enforced. The Company's position was clearly expressed by Manager Modeen in his testimony: Q. So you turned down the Union request to have job studies made by their own time-study expert? A. Yes. Q. Why did you do that? A. I felt the issue of time study is well covered in our contract through the clauses that relate to the method in which rates shall be set and wages shall be paid and how they shall be challenged. Q. When you state how they shall be challenged are you referring to Article VIII, Section 2(e)? A. Yes, I am on page 19. Article VIII, section 2(e), gives the Union the right to challenge any standard set by the Company through the grievance machinery up to and including arbitration. Counsel for the Respondent correctly states that Section 8(a)(5) of the Act requires an employer, upon request, to furnish all information relevant to the bargaining representative's intelligent performance of its function. He adds Insofar as grievances are concerned, it has been held that intelligent performance includes conducting of independent time studies to determine whether the Union should accept proposed piece rates or proceed to arbitration, the final step in the grievance procedure Counsel for the Respondent further notes that all material relevant to the arbitration of the new conveyor grievance was supplied to the Union and that the Union has elected to proceed to arbitration under the provisions of the contract between it and the Company, making that election without waiting for its own independent timestudy report. He further notes that said election to go to arbitration was made by the Union even before it filed its charge against the Company. From this he argues that since the Union has already made its decision to proceed to arbitration, it has thereby waived the general rule which gives it the right to have its own independent time studies to determine whether it should proceed to arbitration I do not agree. It is true, as argued by Counsel for the Respondent, that in Fafnir Bearing Co v. N L R.B. 362 F.2d 716 (C.A. 2), enfg. 146 NLRB 1582, the Court noted that the timestudies were needed by the Union to determine "whether to take the grievances to arbitration in the first INGRAHAM INDUSTRIES place " Here. of course, the matter has been referred to arbitration even without the Company's permission for an independent time study. 1 do not, however, read the Fafnir decision as limiting a union's right to timestudies to situations where the Union is considering the advisability of going to arbitration. The Supreme Court has explicated the duty of an employer to furnish information to the representative of its employees more broadly In N L R B v Acme Industrial Co . 385 U S. 432, the Union tiled grievances charging the employer with violations of their collective agreement by the removal of certain machinery from the plant Thereafter the Union requested certain information concerning that removal which the Company refused to furnish arguing that the grievances were barred by certain time limitations specified in their collective agreement. The Board held that the Union was entitled to the information requested without waiting for the arbitrator's determination of the relevancy of the requested information. The Court affirmed the decision of the Board citing Section 8(d) of the Act which defines collective bargaining as including "the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer good faith with respect to . . . any question arising [under an agreement] The Supreme Court went on to say For when [the Board] ordered the employer to furnish the requested information to the Union, the Board was not making a binding construction of the labor contract. It was only acting upon the prohahliliti that the desired information was relevant and that it would he of use to the union in carrying out the statutory duties and responsibilities. This discovery-type standard decided nothing about the merits of the union's contractual claims. When the Respondent furnished the requested information, it may appear that no subcontracting or work transfer has occurred, and, accordingly, that the grievances filed are without merit. . Far from intruding upon the preserve of the arbitrator. the Board's action was in aid of the arbitral process. Arbitration can function properly only if the grievance procedures leading to it can sift out unmeritorious claims. [Emphasis supplied.] Here, too, the granting of an independent timestudy to the Union might very well either assist the Union in presenting a more persuasive argument before the arbitrator when it appears before him in its function as the bargaining representative of the employees affected or, in the alternative, may convince the Union that further litigation even before the arbitrator may be advantageously discontinued. In that sense the timestudy requested is needed by the Union for the proper performance of its duties. I conclude, therefore, that the Union is entitled to make its own independent timestudy of the jobs involved in the pending grievance. The fact that such requests for timestudies may be subject to grievance and arbitration procedures does not constitute a waiver of the Union's statutory right to such mformation. N L R B v. Perkins Machinery Co , 326 l-.2d 488 (C.A. 1). Timken Roller Bearing Co. 138 NLRB 15, 16. Nor does the fact that the Union elected to proceed with its grievance and arbitration of the alleged wage loss without receiving the requested permission to conduct its own timestudy relieve the Respondent from its statutory duty to grant such requests. It is conceded that the requests for time studies were made before the grievance procedures were completed. The Respondent was under a 561 duty to grant those requests at that time. In failing to do so it violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act for which a remedial order is warranted Moreover, I see no logic or justification in denying the Union its right to an independent timestudy merely because it attempted to win its grievance under the contract without such a timestudy due to the refusal of the employer to furnish it. To adopt the argument of counsel for the Respondent would mean that an employer could block a union's attempt at utiliLation of a contractual grievance procedure by an unlawful refusal to grant a union an independent time study or other information to which it is entitled statutorily and without which it may he unable to prevail in the grievance or arbitration procedures. On the other hand, if the union attempted to go forward with the grievance and arbitration procedures handicapped by the employer's unlawful refusal to allow an independent timestudy, counsel for the Respondent would consider this to he a waiver of their right to the timestudy. A waiver of a statutory right, however, must be clearly and unmistakably established and it is not likely to be inferred. Cloverleaf Division of Adams Dairy Co., 147 NLRB 1410 Moreover, the employer should not be permitted to gain advantages by his unlawful refusal to permit timestudies. Counsel for the Respondent places great reliance upon the decision of the Board in Ilerculec Motor Corporation, 136 NLRB 1648, where it held that the employer had not violated the Act in refusing to furnish wage data requested by the Union. That decision, however, was explained by the Board in its later decision in Timken Roller Bearing Company, 138 NLRB 15, 16, fn 4. The Board pointed out that in Hercules the Union asked for wage data with respect to a particular matter on which a grievance had been filed. The Company contended, contrary to the Union, that the matter could not properly be made subject of a grievance under the terms of the party's contract. In view of these conflicting contentions, the Board majority concluded that the basic issue was not one concerning the production of wage data but rather one of contract interpretation, i.e., whether the matter in dispute was arbitrable and this question, it held, was for the arbitrator. Here, however, there is no dispute concerning the arbitrability of the Union's request for an independent timestudy. Indeed, the Respondent's refusal is based upon their contract with the Union providing for grievance and arbitration procedures. Consequently, unlike the Hercules case, this case presents the issue concerning the production of data rather than one of contract interpretation. Accordingly, I conclude that Respondent's failure to grant the Union's requested independent timestudy was an unfair labor practice in violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act, in the absence of any showing that the request was improper or unreasonably burdensome on the company, Wilson Athletic Goods Manufacturing Co., Inc., 169 NLRB No 82. D. The Meeting Issue The complaint alleges: Since on or about November 19, 1968, Respondent failed to notify the Union and thereafter refused to permit the Union to attend a meeting with its employees relative to the pension and profit sharing plan. By such actions Respondent bargained directly and individually with its employees in the unit described in respect to rates of pay, wages , hours of employment, or other conditions of employment. 562 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Moreover, Respondent thus deprived the Union of information necessary and relevant to the Union's administration of the collective-bargaining agreement. In the agreement of January 1, 1968, referred to earlier, article IX includes a so-called McGraw-Edison Company Profit Sharing Plan. In addition , there are provisions relating to a so-called Ingraham Company Retirement Income Agreement (hereinafter referred to as the "pension plan") During January 1968, the Company held a number of meetings with a total of 650 to 750 of its employees for the purpose of properly enrolling them in the Profit Sharing Plan. The Union was represented at all such meetings. The Profit Sharing Plan requires 3 years of continuous service for automatic qualification. January 1 and July 1 of each year are dates when such newly qualified employees are enrolled and others can stop, start, decrease or increase their voluntary contributions. Accordingly, meetings were held shortly before July, 1968 and in November 1968. Attendance at the July meeting was limited to seven and attendance at the two November meetings was divided between 36 employees The employees who attended the November meetings were those who had attained the 3 years of continuous service required under the plan. Union President Owens and Union Steward Medley heard of the November meetings and requested permission to attend, charging that the employer had misinformed the employees concerning their eligibility in the January meeting. This was denied by Company Superintendent Bordan, and I credit his testimony in this respect, particularly since the employees were given brochures describing the Profit Sharing Plan as well as copies of the agreement containing details on the pension plan Moreover, it appears that counsel for the General Counsel does not insist that the company "misinformed" its employees. The brief of counsel for the General Counsel states his position clearly Here the company was explaining matters relating to the Profit Sharing Plan, clearly a subject covered by the current contract The testimony by the Union officials was that some confusion existed as a result of meetings held by the company in January. [Emphasis supplied.] Without going into the merits or even the details of the plan, it is crystal clear that the Union had a right to be present while the plan was being explained to the employees. If there was any possible ambiguity certainly the Union was entitled to make sure the facts were correctly explained to the employees. No assertion is being made that the Plan was changed unilaterally, only that the Union has a right to be present during the explanation period. Nor is any contention made that the Company did not have a right to address the employees. Simply staled, the Union has a statutory right to be present. Counsel for the Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the November meetings were simply routine in notifying the newly eligible employees of their coverage and benefits. He cites the fact that no negotiations took place nor did the Company bargain directly and individually with its employees in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment or other conditions of employment In addition, neither party could unilaterally change the Profit Sharing Plan Finally, I note the testimony in the record that union representation is neither customary nor generally desired in meetings of the company with individual employees concerning their Blue Cross, insurance benefits, accident and sickness insurance and personal individual problems The Board has recognized that an employee's right to union representation does not apply to all dealings with his employer which may eventually or ultimately affect the terms and conditions of his employment. Jacobe-Pearson Ford, Inc, 172 NLRB No 84: Chevron Oil Co., 168 NLRB No. 84. In both of these cases, the Board found no unfair labor practice in a company's refusal to allow union representation at a meeting called merely for the purpose of gathering information from employees I see no basis for according a union even greater rights where the purpose of the meeting is merely to disseminate information to the employees, but without any attempt at negotiation or adjustment of grievances. See also, American Printing Company, 173 NLRB No. 17, where despite the absence of the employees' union representative at a meeting called by the employer, the Board found no unfair labor practice in an employer's meeting with his employees to tell them that their wage demand could not be met and asking them to be "reasonable " Here, where the meeting was to disseminate information to the employees concerning a profit-sharing plan which had been negotiated by the Company with union representatives of the employees, without any attempt to modify or re-negotiate such plan, the details of which must have been well known to the union representatives, I find no basis for concluding that the company thereby refused to bargain collectively with the representatives of the employees within the meaning of Section 8(a) (5) of the Act. Accordingly, I shall recommend that this allegation of the complaint be dismissed. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW I By refusing the Union's request for an independent timestudy of jobs whose pay rates were the subject of grievances filed by the Union, the Company has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. 2. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meanmg of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act 3. By meeting with its employees to explain the provisions of a profit sharing plan, the terms of which had been agreed upon between the Company and the union representatives of its employees, the Company did not engage in an unfair labor practice within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act despite its refusal to permit union representatives to attend such meetings. Tiiu REMEDY Having found that the Company engaged in certain unfair labor practices I shall recommend that it cease and desist therefrom and that it take certain affirmative action which I find necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act. RECOMMENDED ORDER On the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law. I recommend that the Respondent, Ingraham Industries-Division of McGraw-Edison Company, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall. 1. Cease and desist from: INGRAHAM INDUSTRIES (a) Refusing to bargain collectively with International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, Local 260, AFL-CIO, as the bargaining representative of its hourly rated employees at its Bristol, Connecticut plant, by refusing to permit the Union to perform independent time studies through its own experts on jobs involved in grievances arising under the party's collective-bargaining agreement. (b) In any like or related manner interfering with the efforts of the Union to bargain collectively with it in behalf of the hourly rated employees at the Bristol, Connecticut, plant. 2. Take the following affirmative action: (a) Upon request, permit the Union through its own experts to perform independent time studies pertaining to jobs involved in grievances arising under the party's collective-bargaining agreement. (b) Post in its offices and plant at Bristol, Connecticut, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."' Copies of said notice on forms to be furnished by the Regional Director for Region I. shall, after being duly signed by the Respondent's representative, be posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places where notices to employees are customarily posted Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 1, in writing, within 20 days from the receipt of this Decision, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith.' IT IS FURTHER RECOMMLNDED that the complaint be dismissed in all other respects. 'In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the notice. If the Board's Order is enforced by a decree of the United States Court of Appeals, the notice will be further amended by the substitution of the words "a decree of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order" for the words "a Decision and Order " 'In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, this provisions shall be modified to read "Notify the Regional Director for Region 1, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith " 563 APPENDIX NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our employees that: WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, Local 260, AFL-CIO, by refusing to permit the Union to perform independent time studies pertaining to jobs involved in grievances arising under our collective-bargaining agreement. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interlere with the efforts of the Union to bargain collectively on behalf of the employees covered by our collective-bargaining agreement. WF WILL, upon request, permit the Union to conduct its own time studies on the job with respect to jobs involved in grievances arising under our collective-bargaining agreement INGRAHAM INDUSTRIES-DI\•iSION 01 MCGRAW-EDISON COMPANY (Employer) Dated By (Representative) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. If employees have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions, they may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, John F Kennedy Federal Building, Cambridge & New Sudbury Streets, Boston, Massachusetts 02203, Telephone 617-223-3300.