Industrial Motor Sales, Inc.

270 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Industrial Motor Sales, Inc. and Automotive Salesmen's Association ( A.S.A.), affiliated with SIUNA, AFL-CIO. Case 7-CA-6970 Findings and Conclusions 1. BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT; LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED June 30, 1969 DECISION AND ORDER BY MEMBERS FANNING, BROWN , AND JENKINS On April 11, 1969, Trial Examiner Samuel M. Singer issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding finding that Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision and a supporting brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in this case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner and hereby orders that Respondent, Industrial Motor Sales, Inc., Ecorse, Michigan, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order. TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION SAMUEL M. SINGER, Trial Examiner: This proceeding, tried before me at Detroit, Michigan, on February 4 and 5, 1969, pursuant to charges filed on September 24 and October 22,' and complaint issued on November 14, 1968, concerns allegations that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, by refusing to meet and bargain with the Charging Party as representative of its employees. All parties appeared and were afforded full opportunity to be heard and to examine and cross-examine witnesses . Briefs were received from General Counsel and Respondent. Upon the entire record in the case' and from my observation of the witnesses, I make the following: 'At the hearing the parties stipulated that the October 22, 1968, amended charge, insofar as it alleged certain violations not covered by the complaint, was withdrawn on November 5, 1968 Respondent, a Michigan corporation with its office and place of business in Ecorse , Michigan , is engaged in selling and servicing automobiles and trucks. During the year ending December 31, 1967, a representative period, Respondent's gross volume of business from sales and services of automobiles and trucks exceeded $500,000; during the same period it received goods and materials valued in excess of $10,000 directly from points outside of Michigan . I find that at all material times Respondent has been and is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act, and that assertion of jurisdiction here is proper. The Charging Party (herein called the Union or ASA) is, and has at all times been , a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 11. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICFS A. Certification of Union On February 7, 1967, the Regional Director certified ASA as the exclusive bargaining representative of Respondent's new and used car and truck salesmen based on an election it won 3 to 2 on December 8, 1966 (Case 7-RC-7608). On November 20, 1967, ASA filed a petition with the Regional Director to amend its certification so as to reflect its recent affiliation with the Seafarers International Union of North America (SIUNA), AFL-CIO (Case 7-AC-67). After a hearing on this petition, as well as similar petitions involving ASA certifications involving other automobile dealers in the Detroit area, the Regional Director on February 9, 1968, issued a Decision amending the certification.' On April 26, 1968, the Board dismissed the appeal of Respondent (and other dealers from the Regional Director's action. B. Respondent's Refusal to Bargain 1. Sequence of events4 On February 23, 1967 (about 2 weeks after its certification), ASA requested a negotiation meeting. When the parties met on February 27, the Union gave Respondent's Attorney Colombo its proposed contract.' On July 27, 1967, the Union asked for another meeting, but received no response . On August 30, Union Attorney Ashley requested a reply by September 8 - also so far as the record shows, without response. On November 29, 1967, Colombo wrote Ashley canceling a meeting scheduled for December 19, on the ground that "all bargaining ... should be suspended and held in abeyance until such time as the NLRB reaches a decision in this matter"; assuring the Union, however, that "our client 'Transcript corrected by my order or notice dated March 21, 1969 'See my decision in Beglinger-Massie Oldsmobile-Cadillac, Inc, Case 7-CA-6971, issued this date, which presents questions similar to those in the instant case . As noted in that Decision (at fn. 3), on February 9, 1968, the Regional Director held that the affiliation did not affect the identity of the certified ASA Internal structure , officers, and collective-bargaining procedures remained unaltered; and the ASA membership by vote approved the affiliation . Counsel for General Counsel and Respondent are the same in this case and in Begl,nger-Massie 'Findings in this section are based almost exclusively on documentary evidence. 'The February 27 meeting was a joint meeting with other dealers represented by Mr Colombo 177 NLRB No. 42 INDUSTRIAL MOTOR SALES, INC. will again be willing to meet " with ASA "if and when" the certification is amended . On December 7, 1967, Ashley wrote Colombo that in view of his "parallel stand" in "refusing to bargain until the resolution of the AC Petitions" involving other employers whom he represented in the AC proceeding, Ashley "would naturally expect that these same dealers will take a parallel and simultaneous stand on future negotiations."" On February 23, 1968, Ashley, after referring to the Regional Director's February 9, 1968, letter amending the certification so as to reflect ASA's affiliation with the International , requested "immediate good faith bargaining with the Union." Insofar as appears, Respondent did not respond to this communication, but the Company sought Board review of the Regional Director's determination, which the Board dismissed on April 26, 1968. On August 22, 1968, Union Business Agent White wrote the Company: A review of the Union records indicates that as yet, we have been unable to meet for the purpose of negotiating towards a collective bargaining agreement. Therefore I request that you contact this union, who is the certified bargaining agent for your sales ei.iployees in order that we may mutually agree upon an immediate negotiation date. On August 27, Colombo's secretary notified White that Colombo would for personal reasons be unavailable until September 4. Hearing nothing further around the latter date, White on September 6 again requested Respondent for "an immediate negotiation date." On September 11, 1968, Company Attorney Colombo wrote to the Union, rejecting its renewed bargaining request. The letter stated:' we wish to advise you that our client has been informed by a majority of its sales employees that they are no longer desirous of representation by the Automotive Salesmen's Association, S.I.U.N.A., AFL-CIO. As a result of these conversations and discussions, the employer has a good faith doubt as to whether or not your union represents a majority of its employees as of this date. Accordingly, our client sees no useful purpose in attempting to negotiate a contract when its employees do not wish to be represented by the Automotive Salesmen's Association, S.I.U.N.A., AFL-CIO. Responding on September 13, Union Attorney Ashley reminded Colombo of the Union's previous attempts to obtain negotiation meetings and then stated: "this dealership happens to contain some of the most active members in the Union" in the area and "it is inconceivable that they are no longer desirous of representation" by ASA. Ashley told Colombo that the Union would file unfair labor practice charges unless Respondent reconsidered its position . On September 24 the Union filed the charges resulting in the complaint here. `Colombo's November 29 and Ashley 's December 7 letters are identical to those in Beglinger-Massie (supra, fn. 3) See also Barnett Pontiac, Inc . 174 NLRB No. 57 'Except for addressee , this letter is identical to that sent to the Union by Colombo in Beglinger-Massie (supra , fn. 3). 2. Respondent's alleged good-faith doubt of the Union's majority 271 The five salesmen participating in the December 8, 1966, Board election are still employed by Respondent. it was stipulated that two of the three who voted for the Union (Pittman and Davies) "have remained steadfast in their belief they wanted the Union to represent them"; that two others (Honour and Weglarz) voted against and are still opposed to the Union; that General Manager Eby "was aware and cognizant of the feelings" of all four from the time of election (December 1966) through September 11, 1968, when Respondent communicated to the Union its "good-faith doubt" of majority; and that Eby is "still so aware of it." Respondent predicated its "good-faith doubt" on the contention that it knew, or had reason to believe, that the third salesman (Guy) who (as it knew) voted for the Union no longer wanted it to represent him on September 11, 1968. In support of its position, it called two witnesses (Eby and Honour). General Manager Eby testified that in October or November 1967 Guy told him that he "didn't like" the Union's tactics toward a struck dealer,' and that Guy "was disenchanted with the union, the way they were operating, that he hadn't been going to meetings and he wasn't paying any dues." Eby further testified that in May 1968, Guy indicated that he did not attend a Union meeting at which the Union's steward (Pittman) lost an election for the office of "director"; that in July or August 1968, he overheard a conversation in which Guy told two other salesmen (Honour and Weglarz) that "if they think he is going to pay the $140 back dues [Guy purportedly owed] they are crazy"; and that in December 1967, Guy told Eby that he "wanted to take" a sales manager position with another dealer. Eby admitted on cross-examination that in his October 29, 1968, prehearing affidavit, furnished in the presence of his attorney, he did not mention the Union's "tactics" as supporting his alleged belief that Guy was "no longer interested in ASA," there limiting his basis of alleged belief to the circumstances that Guy "was not paying his dues," that he "was looking for a sales manager's position elsewhere," and that he "applied for a dealership of his own."° Honour, a longtime friend of Guy's father, testified that a week or 10 days after the December 1966 election Guy told him that he "felt bad" that he "let Bob [Eby] down by voting for the Union" and that around the March 1967 strike Guy told him he would not go on strike and that he opposed violence against dealers' property; also, that in August 1968, Guy remarked that he was not going to pay a Union dues bill. Honour conceded that Guy did not say that he "didnt want them [the Union] to represent him" nor did Honour claim that he relayed to management any of his conversations with Guy. Honour also admitted not knowing whether or not Guy had paid his dues. Furthermore, although Honour testified that Guy would 'Around March 1, 1967, ASA struck certain dealers in the Detroit area. Respondent's employees did not join the strike Eby testified that around this time Guy told him he was opposed to striking against Respondent 'Asked why in his affidavit he did not cite the claim that Guy objected to the Union's tactics, Eby explained that he had answered only the specific questions put to him by the Board agent, which were limited to events in 1968. Eby later admitted that he "discussed with the Board agent things with respect to the ASA back to 1966" when "asked" about them He also admitted that the Board agent had put to him the general question of "why you believed Mr Guy was no longer and since when you believed he was no longer interested in ASA " 272 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD "at times" favor the Union and "then the next day he would be against it," he admitted swearing in his November 4, 1968, prehearing affidavit that it was "common knowled^e" that Guy was one of the three who is "for the ASA.'" Guy admitted telling Eby that he was opposed to striking against Respondent , unless all area dealers were struck simultaneously, since a strike would hurt the dealership competitively. He also admitted telling Eby that he was opposed to Union tactics involving violence or damage explaining that "[i]f the Union told me to do this I wouldn't do it." However, Guy also testified that although he "heard about it," he saw no such Union "tactics"; and that he was never instructed and knew of no one instructed by the Union "to engage in any form of improper conduct." Guy also stated that while he had once been delinquent in dues (as much as $ 100 or $120), he had paid up. He further testified that he has attended two Union meetings within the last year, including an election meeting at which employee Pittman was defeated for the office of Union vice president." Guy credibly explained that his purpose in contemplating a sales manager's position and obtaining a dealership - which he admitted mentioning to Eby - was to make "more money," "not for the purpose of getting out of the union." Finally, Guy testified that he never told Eby or anyone else that he was withdrawing or had withdrawn from the Union or that he did not want the Union to represent him. Guy testified that he has been a Union member since 1966 and still is, that he favored unionization of Respondent, and that he had picketed (without pay) four other dealers on behalf of the Union . While admitting being "critical" of certain reported Union tactics and that his "attitude" toward the Union was not at all times the same, Guy swore that this did not affect his desire "about representation." I credit him. C. Conclusions 1. As found, about 2 weeks after its February 7, 1967, certification, ASA requested Respondent to bargain collectively. The parties met only once - on February 27, 1967. The Union made six additional written requests to bargain (February 27 and August 30, 1967; and February 23, August 22, and September 6 and 13, 1968)," of which Respondent ignored four, canceled one, and in response to another finally withdrew Union recognition (on September 11, 1968). In its November 29, 1967, communication to the Union, Respondent suspended further negotiations until the Board disposed of the Union's pending petition for amendment of its certification to reflect affiliation with an International (Seafarers). Although Company Attorney Colombo assured the Union that his client would resume negotiations upon its approval, Respondent never offered or agreed to do so. On September It, 1968, "Honour did not impress me as a forthright or reliable witness . I credit his testimony only to the extent it is consistent with and corroborated by credited testimony of Guy and Eby. Honour was frequently unresponsive and inconsistent, and at times had to be prodded . Admitting it was "common knowledge" that he was "against the ASA," at one point Honour denied being "opposed to the union." "To the extent that Guy 's foregoing testimony is inconsistent with that of Eby, I credit that of Guy, who had firsthand access to the facts Furthermore, Guy impressed me as an essentially honest and credible witness His description of the election meeting was vivid and detailed. Likewise to the extent that Guy's testimony differs from that of Honour, I credit that of Guy Colombo notified the Union of Respondent's final refusal to bargain, based on the claim that "the employer has a good-faith doubt" of the Union's majority "as of this date." 2. My Beglinger-Massie decision (supra, fn. 3) reviews the law applicable. Identical defenses and issues are raised herein by the same counsel. As indicated in Beglinger-Massie, absent "unusal circumstances," a union's majority status is irrebuttably presumed during the first year following certification. Thereafter the presumption continues, but is rebuttable; if the employer entertains a good-faith doubt that the union still represents a majority, he may lawfully withdraw union recognition. However, the employer's asserted doubt must have a "rational basis in fact." N.L.R.B. v. John S. Swift Co., 302 F.2d 342, 346 (C.A. 7). "The assertion must be supported by objective considerations." Laystrom Manufacturing Co., 151 NLRB 1482, 1484." Furthermore, the claimed doubt may not be asserted "in a context of illegal antiunion activities, or other conduct by the employer aimed at causing disaffection from the union." Celanese Corporation of America, 95 NLRB 664, 673; Woody Pontiac Sales, Inc., 174 NLRB No. 81. Here, Respondent raised the issue of Union majority on September 11, 1968 - 7 months after the certification year expired - averring that as "a result of . conversations and discussions [with employees], the employer has a good faith doubt" of the Union's majority "as of this date." In issue, therefore, is whether Respondent had a "rational basis in fact" for questioning the certified Union's majority on September It, 1968. The validity of the claimed doubt "is to be determined as of the time the employer refused to recognize the union." Snow & Sons v. N.L.R.B., 308 F.2d 687, 694 (C.A. 9). See also N.L.R.B. v. Kellogg's Inc., d/bla Kellogg Mills, 347 F.2d 219, 220 (C.A. 9). 3. At the hearing Respondent indicated that its alleged "good-faith doubt" was bottomed solely on the claim that one of the three salesmen in the five-man bargaining unit who voted for the Union (Guy) no longer wanted it to represent him. Respondent stipulated that it knew that two others "have remained steadfast in their belief they wanted the union to represent them." The record establishes, however, that Guy neither possessed nor communicated to management any desire to repudiate the Union nor to have it cease representing him. General Manager Eby testified that he premised his belief that Guy no longer wanted Union representation upon: (a) Guy's statement in October or November 1967 that he did not like the Union's strike tactics at other dealers and that he was not attending Union meetings and paying dues; (b) his remark in December 1967 that he was interested in a sales manager position;" (c) his further statement in May "Unlike in Beglinger-Massie (supra, fn 3), General Counsel did not introduce evidence of any oral bargaining requests, limiting his case-in-chief to introduction of the correspondence on the meetings. (General Counsel also obtained stipulations concerning the Union attitude of employees in the unit prior to resting his case ) Additional verbal request for bargaining is indicated by Respondent's November 29, 1967, letter canceling a meeting scheduled for December 19, 1967 , although there is no previous written mention of such a meeting. "See also N.L R B. v Ruh Equipment Company, 407 F.2d 1098 (C.A 4), N L.R:B. v. Gulfmont Hotel Co, 362 F 2d 588, 589 (C A. 5); N L R B v Howe Scale Co., 311 F 2d 502, 504 (C.A. 7); N L.R B Y. Downtown Bakery Corp., 330 F.2d 921, 925 (C.A. 6); J C. Penny Co, 162 NLRB 1553, 1554, 1558, enfd. 391 F 2d 935 (C.A. 6) "In his October 29, 1968, preheating affidavit, Eby also mentioned that Guy applied for his own dealership , presumably in 1968. INDUSTRIAL MOTOR SALES, INC. 273 1968 that he did not attend a Union election meeting; and (d) a conversation Eby overheard in July or August 1968 in which Guy told two other salesmen that the Union would be "crazy" to think that he would pay it $140 back dues. In the context of the record presented, Respondent's resurrection of stale conversations held in October and November 1967 to justify its questioning of the Union's majority in September 1968 may not be regarded as devoid of significance. The same is true of Guy's more recently alleged statement about failing to attend the May 1968 Union election meeting and his July or August 1968 alleged remark overheard by Eby that the Union would be "crazy" to expect him to pay $140 back dues. The fact is that Guy did attend the May 1968 meeting; and the further fact is that he paid up all his dues. To be sure, Guy expressed himself as opposed to strike violence and misconduct and objected even to peacefully striking against his employer. But - as Guy testified and as is obvious - such statements are in no way inconsistent with continued desire for union representation. Furthermore, as Eby knew, Guy applied for his own dealership and for a managerial position at another employer in order to make more money. None of these factors, singly or in the aggregate , negated Union adherence or retention of Union representation while an employee. Guy's own experience proves the point. He picketed four dealerships on behalf of the Union, attended two Union meetings in 1968, and paid all his dues. He has been a member of the Union since its inception at Respondent and still is. Moreover, Guy never told Eby or anyone else that he withdrew or contemplated withdrawing his Union membership or the Union's authority to represent him. The fact that he was at times "critical" of the Union and that his enthusiasm varied in degree is inconclusive, since the most ardent unionist may be critical of his union without being opposed to unionization. Weighing credibility as well as probability, I find that Respondent's alleged "good-faith" doubt concerning the Union's majority has not been established by a fair preponderance of substantial credible evidence as required. 4. Despite indicating at the hearing that its "good-faith doubt" of the Union's majority was predicated solely on employee Guy's changed Union attitude and despite its September 11, 1968, letter premising the claimed doubt only on "conversations and discussions" with employees, Respondent in its brief (p. 10) now adds five other "objective considerations" (most of them identical to those advanced in Beglinger-Massie) in purported justification of its assertion that "the union has lost its majority status since certification." These are: (a) the "close vote" (3 to 2 for the Union) in the December 8, 1966, election; (b) the fact that no employees "walked out on strike"; (c) failure of ASA representatives to appear at the dealership premises ; (d) the salesmen's failure to attend negotiating meetings during the certification year; and (e) the Union's "refusal to submit to an[other] election and its adamant demand to go through `AC' hearing."" In addition , Respondent claims (br. pp. 8, 12) - as also did the employer in Beglinger-Massie - that the Union "is estopped to argue that [it] has refused to bargain because of [the Union's] own dilatory tactics." I find that the additional factors now relied upon neither constituted "objective considerations" supporting a good-faith doubt of union majority, nor in fact motivated Respondent's purported "belief" that the Union was without a majority. As in Beglinger-Massie, and as there explained, these "objective considerations" are sheer afterthoughts advanced to cloak a deliberate scheme to avoid a statutory duty to bargain. The "close vote" in the election is not in itself significant," the critical question being whether Respondent in good faith believed that the "swing man" (Guy) had revoked his Union authorization. The fact that no Company employee went out on strike is immaterial since (a) there is no evidence that the Union called a strike against Respondent; and (b) failure of employees to go out on a strike may be based upon a variety of personal reasons wholly unrelated to union repudiation. Celanese Corporation of America, 95 NLRB 664, 674. Similarly, it has not been shown that ASA representatives never appeared at Respondent's premises nor that any of Respondent's employees failed to attend "a negotiation meeting" - even if it be assumed that these factors were material considerations (see Beglinger-Massie, supra, section C, 2). Respondent errs in inferring from the "union's refusal to submit to a [second] election" and "adamant demand to go through" an "AC" hearing "a strong presumption that even the Union knew that they did not represent a majority of the men." In view of the irrebuttable presumption of union majority during the certification year and of the rebuttable presumption thereafter which the law accords a certified union, the Union here had no reason to seek to reaffirm its majority in another Board election. Finally, as to the contention that the Union could have been more diligent in pressing for negotiation meetings, it is clear that Respondent itself resisted and rejected those meeting requests which the Union did make. In any event, "Assuming ... the Union was `lax and negligent' in this respect ... such conduct is no defense to the [employer]." McLean, d/b/a Ken's Building Supplies v. N.L.R.B., 333 F.2d 84, 88 (C.A. 6). "[I]t constituted more of a violation of duty owing to its members than to the [employer]." Ibid. Accordingly, I conclude that the substantial credible evidence establishes that Respondent's refusal to bargain with the Union on September 11, 1968, was not based on a good-faith doubt of the Union's majority; that the Union since its certification on February 7, 1967, in fact represented and still represents a majority of Respondent's employees in the bargaining unit; and that Respondent at no time intended to engage in good-faith bargaining, its failure and refusals to bargain being based on a rejection of the collective-bargaining principle. Cf. Woody Pontiac Sales, Inc., 174 NLRB No. 81; Barnett Pontiac, Inc., 174 NLRB No. 57. The multiplicity of the "grounds" advanced by Respondent for its alleged good-faith doubt concerning the Union's majority, as well as the unsupported and specious character of some of them, reflect on Respondent's bona fides. Cf. N.L.R.B. v. Austin Powder Company, 350 F.2d 973, 977 (C.A. 6)." "In Beglinger-Massie, the employer also relied on employee turnover and fluctuation in unit size. In the instant case, it was stipulated that both personnel and unit size remained constant throughout the 19 months here in question. "See N L R B v. Austin Powder Company, 350 F 2d 973, 974, 977 (C A. 6); The Colson Corporation v. N.L R B, 347 F 2d 128, 134 (C A 8); Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, AFL-CIO [Hamburg Shirt Corp I v N L.R B , 371 F 2d 740, 745 (C.A.D C ). "In view of the time limitation prescribed in Section 10(b) of the Act barring findings of violations prior to March 24, 1968, the date fixed by the filing of the Union's original charge, Respondent's refusal to bargain is found to have commenced on that date. However, Respondent's conduct prior to the March 24, 1968, cutoff date could properly be considered for 274 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce and the Union is a labor organization within the meaning of the Act. 2. All new and used car and truck salesmen at Respondent's Ecorse, Michigan, place of business, excluding office clerical employees , guards and supervisors as defined in the Act, and all other employees, constitute a unit appropriate for purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act. 3. At all times since February 7, 1967, the Union has been the exclusive representative of all employees within said appropriate unit for purposes of collective bargaining in respect to wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, and other terms and conditions of employment within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act. 4. By refusing since March 24, 1968, to meet and bargain with the Union as exclusive representative of the employees in the above-described appropriate unit, Respondent has engaged and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a)(5) and (1) of the Act. 5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by refusing to meet and bargain with the Union as the exclusive representative of its employees in an appropriate unit , I will recommend that Respondent be required to cease and desist from engaging in such unfair labor practices and, upon request, bargain collectively with the Union concerning wages , rates of pay, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, and to embody in a signed agreement any understanding reached. General Counsel requests that, as part of the remedial order, the certification period be extended for 1 year from the date when Respondent begins to bargain in good faith in compliance with the Order herein, so as to afford the Union a full year of good-faith bargaining. Respondent, on the other hand, contends (br. pp. 9-10) that even if "a determination is made that the employer should be made to bargain then the certification period should only be extended a period no longer than 70 days or a period equal to the period of time from November 29, 1967 [when it suspended bargaining pending the outcome of the "AC" proceeding] to February 7, 1968 [the end of the initial 1 -year certification period]." General Counsel's requested remedy is normally provided in cases of this type in order "to insure that the employees in the appropriate unit will be accorded the services of their selected bargaining agent for the period provided by law ." Barnett Pontiac, Inc., 174 NLRB No. 57 (fn. 1), and cases cited therein . See also Beglinger-Massie, supra ("The Remedy" section). However, in Dean Sellers, Inc., 174 NLRB No. 56 (70 LRRM 1186)," the Board , overruling the Trial Examiner, recently refused to extend the initial 1-year certification period where the certification had expired before the 10(b) cutoff date. Since the 1-year certification here ended on February 7, 1968, and since Respondent's refusal to bargain (by reason of the 10(b) limitation) is found to purposes of evaluating the nature and character of its conduct during the statutory period . (See Beglinger-Massie , at fn. 22.) have begun on March 24, 1968 (supra, fn. 17), under the Dean Sellers ruling I am constrained to deny General Counsel's request to extend the certification year beyond the date Respondent begins to bargain in good faith in compliance with this Order." However, compliance with the terms of this Order still requires it to bargain in good faith for a reasonable period of time. See Frank Bros. Co. v. N.L.R.B, 321 U.S. 702; N.L.R.B. v. Universal Gear Service Corp., 394 F.2d 396 (C.A. 6); NL.R.B v Miami Coca-Cola Bottling Co., d/b/a Key West Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 382 F.2d 921, 923-924 (C.A. 5). RECOMMENDED ORDER Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law and the entire record in the case, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I recommend that Respondent, Industrial Motor Sales, Inc., of Ecorse, Michigan , its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Refusing to meet and bargain collectively in good faith with Automotive Salesmen's Association (A.S.A.), affiliated with SIUNA, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive bargaining representative of its employees in the appropriate bargaining unit , with ' respect to wages, rates of pay , hours of employment, and other terms and conditions of employment , and embodying in a signed agreement any understanding reached. (b) In any like or related mangler interfering with the effort of the above-named labor organization to bargain collectively on behalf of the employees in the bargaining unit. 2. Take the following affirmative action which will effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Upon request, meet aid bargain with the above-named labor organization, as the exclusive representative of all of its employees in the appropriate bargaining unit with respect to w ages, rates of pay, hours of employment , and other terns and conditions of employment, and embody in a signed agreement any understanding reached. I (b) Post at its place of busine s in Ecorse, Michigan, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 20 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 7, after being duly signed by Respondent's representative, shall be posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places , including all laces where notices to employees are customarily posted , Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any, other material. "This case involved one of the employers in the consolidated "AC" proceeding (supra, fn 3) "But compare N L.R B v Lundy Manu actunng Corp, 316 F.2d 921, 927 (C.A 2), cert. denied 375 U.S 895, here In affirming the Board's findings of assistance to a labor organization, the Court held that the Board properly considered (136 NLRB at 1233-34) pre-Section 10(b) employer conduct in fashioning its remedial order. Quoting from Local Lodge No 1424, I A M (Bryan Manufacturing Co ) v N L R B. 362 U.S. 411, that "earlier events may be utilized to shed light" on the nature of the conduct within the limitations period, the Court stated, "It follows a fortiori that in such a situation the Board may look to earlier events to determine the appropriate remedy to be prescribed ." 316 F 2d at 927. See also Arden Furniture Industries of Pennsylvania, Inc, 164 NLRB No. 159. "In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the notice In the further INDUSTRIAL MOTOR SALES, INC. 275 (c) Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 20 WE WILL, upon request, meet and bargain days from the receipt of this Decision, what steps have collectively with Automotive Salesmen's Association been taken to comply herewith ." (A.S.A.), affiliated with SIUNA, AFL-CIO, as your event that the Board's Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision and Order." "In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, this provision shall be modified to read "Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith " APPENDIX exclusive representative in the appropriate bargaining unit, regarding wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, and sign our name to an agreement containing any understanding reached. The bargaining unit is: All new and used car and truck salesmen at our Ecorse, Michigan, place of business, excluding office clerical employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act. INDUSTRIAL MOTOR NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES OF INDUSTRIAL MOTOR SALES, INC. SALES, INC. (Employer) Posted pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board, an agency of the United States Government After a trial at which all sides had the chance to give evidence, it has been decided that we, Industrial Motor Sales, Inc., violated the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, and we have been ordered to post this notice. Among the rights which the National Labor Relations Act gives you, as an employee, is the right to bargain collectively through a representative of your own choosing. Accordingly, we hereby assure you that: Dated By (Representative) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. If employees have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions, they may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, 500 Book Building, 1249 Washington Boulevard, Detroit, Michigan 48226, Telephone 313-226-3200.