Poloron Products of Indiana, Inc.

POLORON PRODUCTS OF INDIANA, INC. 435 Poloron Products of Indiana , Inc. and William H. King and James Pool and Terry T. Pavlack and Richard L. Eldridge and William Loggins and Albert Green, Charging Parties and United Steelworkers of America, Local Union No. 3889, Party of Interest. Cases 25-CA-3179-1, 25-CA-3179-2, 25-CA-3179-3, 25-CA-3179-4, 25-CA-3179-5, and 25-CA-3179-6 Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner, and hereby orders that the Respondent , Poloron Products of Indiana, Inc., Michigan City, Indiana, its officers , agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order. TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION June 30, 1969 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN MCCULLOCH AND MEMBERS JENKINS AND ZAGORIA On March 21, 1969, Trial Examiner Frederick U. Reel issued his Decision in the above-entitled cases, finding that the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices, and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. The Trial Examiner also found that the Respondent had not engaged in certain other unfair labor practices and recommended that these allegations of the complaint be dismissed. Thereafter, the General Counsel filed exceptions and the Respondent filed cross-exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision, and supporting briefs. The Respondent's brief was also in answer to the General Counsel's exceptions. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with these cases to a three-member panel. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in these cases, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner.' ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the 'Chairman McCulloch concurs in the result reached by the majority of the Panel. In his view, all of the evidence points to the fact that the strike of June 13 was precipitated mainly by the unresolved economic demands of the employees who walked out. In Mastro Plastics Corp. v. N.L.R.B.. 350 U.S. 270, the Supreme Court held that a standard no-strike clause should not be construed to apply to strikes directed against flagrant employer unfair labor practices. Chairman McCulloch believes that the clear implication of the Court' s decision, as well as the best interests of labor-management relations, dictates that a strike, such as this, which is motivated primarily by economic causes should not be deemed protected activity where the employees have bargained away their right to strike for such purposes. Statement of the Case FREDERICK U. REEL, Trial Examiner: This case, tried at Michigan City, Indiana, on January 21 and 22, 1969,' pursuant to charges filed the preceding July 9, an amended charge filed September 23, and a complaint issued October 31 and amended January 9, 1969,2 presents questions whether a strike arising in part out of an unlawful discharge has no statutory protection because it was in breach of contract and was not authorized by the bargaining representative, and if so , whether Respondent, herein called the Company , violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act when, following its alleged "condonation " of that strike, it relied on the fact of participation therein to differentiate in the discipline it meted out for participation in a second unprotected strike. Upon the entire record,' including my observation of the witnesses, and after due consideration of the briefs filed by General Counsel and the Company, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. THE BUSINESS OF THE COMPANY The Company, a New York corporation, engaged at Michigan City, Indiana, in the manufacture of riding lawnmowers and related products, annually ships products valued in excess of $50,000 to points outside the State, and is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. II. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Background - the Contract Late in 1967 the Company purchased the Michigan City plant from the prior owner, and, in the course of continuing the preexisting operation , continued to give effect to the collective-bargaining agreement which its predecessor had made with United Steelworkers of America for itself and on behalf of the members of its Local Union No. 3889, herein called the Union. This agreement, which ran from October 1, 1967, to July 31, 1970, contained a detailed grievance procedure, culminating in arbitration, which was specifically applicable to suspensions and discharges as well as to 'All other dates herein refer to the year 1968 unless otherwise noted. 'The amendment named an additional discriminatee, discharged at the same time, and as part of the same series of events , as the six Charging Parties . The amendment was permissible. NL.R.B v. Dinion Coil Company, Inc, 201 F.2d 484, 491 (C.A. 2); N.L.R.B v. Gaynor News Company, Inc., 197 F.2d 719, 721-722 (C.A. 2), affd. 347 U.S. 17, 34, In 30; N.L.R.B v. Kohler Company, 220 F.2d 3, 6-8 (C.A. 7). 'The parties after the hearing executed a stipulation clarifying one of the exhibits. This stipulation is hereby admitted into evidence as G.C. Exh 3A General Counsel filed a motion to correct certain errors in the transcript. This motion is hereby granted. 177 NLRB No. 54 436 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD other matters. Section 4 of the contract recited in part: There shall be no strikes, work stoppages, or interruption or impeding of work. No officer or representative of' the Union shall authorize, instigate, aid, or condone any such activities. No employee shall participate in any such activities. The applicable procedures of the Agreement will be followed for the settlement of all grievances. Section 8 of the contract provided in part: In the event of suspension or discharge, the employee may, within 5 calendar days after notice of such action, file a grievance in the second step of the grievance procedure. Final decision shall be made by the Company in this step within 5 calendar days from the date of filing thereof. Such grievance shall thereupon be handled in accordance with the procedures of Section 6 - Adjustment of Grievances and Section 7 - Arbitration. B. The Discharge of Bailey, the Ensuing Strike, and the Settlement Early in June 1968 certain employees in the welding department expressed dissatisfaction with their wages and with other working conditions, notably ventilation. On the morning of June 13 Plant Superintendent Robert Hammond, pursuant to an arrangement he had made previously with the welders, met with them as a group. Hammond informed them that the Company would grant no increases at that time. One member of the group, William Bailey, said that, if the Company could not help them, he would get someone who could. Hammond promptly asked Bailey his name, and upon hearing it told Bailey he was fired as of that moment. Bailey replied that he was going to quit anyway, and warned Hammond that the Company would hear further in the matter from some "board." Bailey thereupon left the plant. The record establishes that earlier that morning the Company had decided to terminate Bailey's employment (he was a probationary employee) at the end of the shift.' A few minutes after Hammond fired Bailey, the meeting broke up, but a group of welders continued to discuss the matter among themselves, and decided to strike. Shortly after 10 a.m. eight men (the six Charging Parties, Rudolph Divijak, and Donald Young) "punched out" on the timeclock and commenced picketing. Several employees testified that the immediate cause of the walkout was their resentment of the treatment of Bailey and some of the picket signs referred to the discharge. Thirty-six more employees joined the strike after 12 noon that day. When the strike started, the Company conferred with the Union's plant committee, and at its suggestion sent for Eugene Chlebowski, who is an International staff representative of the United Steelworkers, and administrator of the local union. When Chlebowski arrived, some time after 12 that afternoon, he reiterated 'The foregoing findings represent my synthesis of the credited testimony Some witnesses did not hear Bailey 's statement that he would get help elsewhere, and Hammond testified that he discharged Bailey because "I felt he was disturbing these people , that something most unpleasant could result from this, perhaps a walkout or perhaps something physical And observing the people around him, they were becoming more agitated the longer we talked ." 1 credit Bailey, and other witnesses (Pavlack, King, Divijak, and Green) that Bailey mentioned resorting to outside help, and that this apparently "triggered" the discharge As noted infra, however, I would find the discharge unlawful even if I accepted Hammond's version of its cause the view, previously expressed by the plant committee, that the Union had not authorized the strike and was not responsible for it, but he agreed to discuss the matter with the strikers in an effort to get information which would lead to a resolution of the issues. Chlebowski then ascertained that the strikers were concerned over wage rates, poor lighting, ventilation, and cooling, as well as the discharge of Bailey. After a further conference with Chlebowski, the Company agreed that it would take steps to improve the lighting and ventilation, and that within the next few weeks it would institute a complete wage review of the entire roster to see what increases, if any, would be given. The Company also offered to reemploy Bailey with his seniority unimpaired but as a new probationer. (Bailey refused this offer when Chlebowski communicated it to him.) Finally, Chlebowski asked the Company to promise that there would be no reprisals so he could "get the people back to work," and the Company agreed. All the employees, except Bailey, returned to work the next morning. C. The Strike of July I and the Disciplinary Action Taken That Day On the morning of July 1 the Company commenced the wage reviews it had agreed to as part of the strike settlement on June 13. The review interviews had barely commenced (one welder, Nixon, had been notified of a 10-cent increase) when another "walkout" occurred. The record is far from clear as to what caused this walkout, but apparently some of the employees were dissatisfied with the progress made in improving the working conditions and were also disturbed because they learned that not all the employees would receive increases and the increases granted would not become effective for several weeks. In any event, whatever the cause or fancied cause, not only did the same employees who initiated the walkout of June 13 punch their clocks on July 1 and start picketing, but a large number of other employees also punched out at the same time . More precisely, six of the eight who walked out on June 13 punched out at 10.20 on July 1, and the other two punched out at 10.22. In addition 6 other employees (who had either not struck at all on June 13, or had joined that strike after 12 noon) also punched out at 10.20, 3 at 10.22, 14 at 10.24, 2 at 10.25,' and 11 at later points before 1 p.m. Again the Company summoned Chlebowski, and again he made it clear that the Union had not called, and did not condone or support, the strike. Chlebowski ascertained from the strikers that their complaint centered on the delay in making the merit increases effective. He and the Company then arranged a satisfactory compromise, setting July 15 as the effective date for the increases, even if the protracted "merit review" process had not been completed as to all employees by that date. The Company stated, however, that it would not let the July 1 walkout pass without disciplining the participants. It suspended for the balance of that week all who walked out that day, except for the eight men who had also walked out on the morning of June 13. These men the Company discharged on July 1, advising them that the discharge was "for violation of union contract, sec. 4."" 'The time is expressed in decimals and not in minutes. Thus, 10 20 is 10 12 a m., 10.22 is 10:13, 10.24 is 10:14, and 10 25 is 10.15 'There is some evidence that one of these men, Pool, told the plant superintendent that he had quit , and that this occurred before the POLORON PRODUCTS OF INDIANA, INC. 437 After their discharge, several of the affected employees wrote the Company on July 3 to "submit the following grievance concerning our unjustified discharge ...." The Company replied on July 10 that the letter did not constitute a "grievance" within the meaning of the contract, and that, even if it did, the discharge was for cause and was proper. On July 15 the Union gave notice that it desired to appeal the grievances concerning the discharges to the third step of the grievance procedure, and to discuss them on July 18. On July 23 the Company replied that after discussion it adhered to its decision as set forth in its letter of July 10. The Union did not press the matter to the next stage, arbitration. D. Contentions and Conclusions The Company distinguished between two groups of strikers on July 1, suspending some but discharging others. General Counsel contends that in meting out the harsher penalty the Company was motivated by the fact that the eight dischargees had led the walkout on June 13. General Counsel further contends that the June 13 walkout was an activity protected by the Act, or in the alternative that the Company had condoned it and could not lawfully use participation therein as a basis for discriminatory treatment. The Company argues that the discharges were based on the July 1 walkout, that in any event the June 13 walkout was not a protected activity, and that the doctrine of condonation is inapplicable. 1. Basis for selection for discharge The parties agree, and the record is clear, that the walkout of July 1 enjoyed no statutory protection. The Company was free, without offending the statute, to discharge employees for having participated in that walkout. But the Company could not lawfully differentiate in the discipline it invoked on that occasion if the basis for the differentiation was an activity protected by the Act. To take an obvious illustration, the Company could not lawfully say that because all employees participated in an unprotected strike it would discharge those who were union members and merely suspend the rest. It could, however, lawfully take the position that it would discharge the leaders of the walkout and merely suspend the followers. Thus we reach the first issue in the case: did the Company discriminate between the two groups (those suspended and those discharged) because of the latter's leadership of the earlier walkout, or solely because of their activity on July 1? This question, I believe, must be answered in favor of the General Counsel's contention. The Company makes some effort to establish that it believed the June 13 leaders to have instigated or led the July 1 walkout, and to claim that its decision as to whom to discharge rested solely on the events of July 1. For example, Plant Manager Harmyk testified that on July 1 he at first saw only "a small handful" on strike, and that he ascertained who the leaders were by checking the timecards. Similarly Personnel Manager Andrews testified that "the ones that were discharged we felt were the primary leaders of the walkout on July 1," and that only one or two other men punched out at the same time. And the Company brief quotes the opening statement of General Counsel that Company sent him his discharge notice . Pool was not called as a witness. If necessary to resolve the point, I would find adversely to Pool in view of his failure to testify "the same eight welders . again walked out on the morning of July 1, leading another walkout." The Company's own records establish, however, that the walkout on July 1 involved 33 men who punched out between 10:12 and 10:15, inclusive, that 12 men punched out at 10:12, of whom only 6 were discharged, and that 5 men punched out at 10:13, of whom only 2 were discharged. Moreover, Harmyk expressly testified: We discharged the people who punched out during working hours on July 1 who had also punched out during working hours on June 13. Andrews similarly testified: That we would, those people that walked out on July 1 would receive a week's suspension, those that walked out on both occasions would receive a discharge. and again: (By Mr. Wolfe) Mr. Andrews, directing your attention back to July 1st, 1968, wherein the company decided to discipline employees, now, isn't it true that the company in making their decision on who to discharge based their selection . . . on the fact that the people who were ultimately disciplined and were then selected for discharge were those employees who clocked out on June the 13th at 10:16 or whatever Exhibit 2 will show? A. That is correct. Although it is doubtless true that, but for the walkout of July 1, no one would have been discharged, I find that the reason for meting out the harsher penalty to the eight men here involved was their leadership of the June 13 walkout. 2. Was the June 13 walkout protected? The walkout on June 13 was a wildcat strike, and in breach of the no-strike clause. Under familiar principles, employees who engage in such a strike do not ordinarily enjoy the statutory protection normally given strikers. General Counsel urges, however, that this strike was caused by an unfair labor practice, the discharge of Bailey, and that the statutory protection therefore adheres. I agree with General Counsel that the discharge of Bailey was an unfair labor practice. Bailey and the other welders were engaging in a protected concerted activity when they met in a group with Plant Superintendent Hammond to discuss wage increases. Hammond fired Bailey, apparently in irritation at Bailey's remark that, if Hammond was not going to give increases, Bailey would get help from outside sources.' Even accepting Hammond's version of the episode, Bailey's discharge resulted from statements he made in the meeting tending to foment discontent among the assembled employees. Bailey's comments at this meeting were within the ambit of statutory protection, and he could not lawfully be discharged therefor. N.L.R.B. v. Thor Power Tool Company, 351 F.2d 584 (C.A. 7). As his discharge was one of the causes of the strike which followed immediately thereafter,' it was an "unfair labor practice strike," even though economic factors (dissatisfaction over wages and working conditions) also contributed to the strike. 'The Company made no contention that this remark was unprotected because Bailey already had a bargaining representative For all that appears on the record Bailey might have been referring to the Union. Only after he was fired did he mention going to "CORE" or a "board." 'The Company argues that the original charge in the case fails to mention Bailey's discharge as a cause of the June 13 strike, and that one of the strikers, King, in later conversations with his helper referred only to other causes. But the testimony of several witnesses , the language on the 438 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD I further find , however, that even though the strike was an unfair labor practice strike , it did not enjoy statutory protection . Mastro Plastics Corp., and French-American Reeds Mfg. Co, Inc v. N.L.R.B., 350 U.S. 270, is sometimes cited as holding that an unfair labor practice strike is a protected activity even though in breach of contract, but analysis of Mastro and of subsequent decisions construing it suggest that its scope is less far reaching. See particularly Arlan 's Department Store of Michigan , Inc., 133 NLRB 802, holding that under a "no-strike" clause a strike to protest the discriminatory discharge of a union steward was not protected by the Act. Arlan's seems to me to be controlling here, and in reliance thereon I find that because of the no -strike clause the June 13 walkout was not protected by the Act.' 3. Effect of the condonation The Company agreed to take back all the June 13 strikers and to visit no reprisals on them because of their participation in that walkout. General Counsel contends this constituted a "condonation" of the June 13 strike, and that the Company could not lawfully rely on the fact that an employee was one of the leaders of that strike to justify enforcing more stringent discipline on him for the July l walkout than it imposed on other employees who also walked out on July 1. Laying to one side as inapplicable several so-called "condonation" cases which can be explained on other grounds, we are left with a hard core of Board and court decisions which stand for the proposition that, if an employer following an unprotected concerted activity such as a strike in breach of contract "condones" that activity by reinstating the employees, he violates the Act if he subsequently visits reprisals on them for that activity. See the general discussion in Brantly Helicopter Corporation, 135 NLRB 1412, 1414, 1417-18. The doctrine of those cases is easier to state than to rationalize. The original activity never was protected; its "protected" nature was forfeited by some characteristic (such as the breach of contract) which inhered in the activity and accompanied it throughout its existence. Thus if an employee struck in breach of contract, was thereafter reinstated, and then is discharged for the original activity, it is easy to see that the employer's action is a breach of his agreement, but it is somewhat more difficult to find the statutory violation, for that must hinge on protected activity of the employee. The policy of the cases appears to be that strike settlements are to be favored, and that employers must therefore be held to promises made as part of such settlements. But to establish violations of the Act it has been necessary to couch the matter in terms of activity protected by the statute. This has been achieved by declaring that once "condoned" the originally unprotected concerted activity lost its "unprotected" character so that only "concerted activity" remained, or by arguing that by "condoning" the employer demonstrated that he "forgave" the "unprotected" character, so that the real reason for his subsequent reprisal was his dislike of the "concerted" aspect. General Counsel in his brief states the matter in terms of estoppel, arguing that, because the men abandoned their strike on picket signs, and Chlebowski 's representations to the Company establish that the Bailey matter was one of the causes of the strike 'I note Arlan's expressly modifies some of the language in Ford Motor Co, 131 NLRB 1462, cited by General Counsel See 133 NLRB at 808, fn 13. the promise that no reprisal would be visited upon them, the Company "is estopped from now asserting that the concerted activity of June 13 was unprotected ...." The authorities cited by the parties and my independent research in the matter have not led me to any case in which, as here, the discipline was invoked after subsequent unprotected activity, and the severity of the penalty was determined by reference to the condoned activity. In the "condonation" cases thus far decided the employer ostensibly visited the reprisal on the employee for the very activity the employer had condoned. I have little doubt that the doctrine would apply even in cases where the employer "revived" the condoned misconduct in an effort to justify disparate treatment for subsequent offenses unrelated to the condoned offense. For example, if some weeks following a condoned but otherwise unprotected strike, two employees were tardy, the employer, in my opinion , would violate the Act if he varied the discipline meted out for the tardiness because one of the two employees had been involved in the prior activity. In the instant case, however, the subsequent offense was a repetition of the very activity which had originally been condoned. As the Company puts the matter in its brief, the employees were reinstated after the first walkout with the implicit understanding that they would remain at work, and their subsequent walkout less than 3 weeks later, and for a related cause,10 constituted a breach by them of their part of the "condonation" agreement. I find merit in the Company's approach To be sure, the employees did abandon the June 13 walkout and returned to work, and this was the immediate quid pro quo for the condonation. But fairly implied, it seems to me, was an understanding to remain at work for a reasonable period, and not to walk out again in the immediate future for a similar cause. Of course the Employer was free to invoke penalties against the second walkout, and the complaint here is that by invoking disparate discipline he reneged on his condonation. But by participating in the second walkout, the employees also reneged on their part of the settlement. The policy favoring strike settlements, which is the real heart of the condonation doctrine, requires more than just a temporary abandonment of the strike. Analogy to the Board's own policies on settlements seems appropriate. If, after a settlement agreement procures a dismissal of a complaint, the employer commits new unfair labor practices, the Board will vacate the agreement and will hold the employer liable for his presettlement, as well as his postsettlement , conduct. The Wallace Corporation v N.L.R.B., 323 U.S. 248, 254-255; N.L.R.B. v. Western Meat Packers, Inc., 368 F.2d 65, 70 (C.A. 10). I therefore conclude that the employees who led the walkout on June 13 and who again walked out on July 1 cannot, in the circumstances of this case, rely on the condonation of the June 13 walkout to render illegal the Company's action on July 1 in visiting harsher discipline on them than on other participants in the latter walkout. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The Company by discharging William Bailey on the morning of June 13 because of statements he made in the course of activities protected by the Act engaged in an unfair labor practice affecting commerce within the meaning of Sections 8(a)(1) and 2 (6) and (7) of the Act. "The desire for wage adjustments was a partial cause of the June 13 walkout and the sole cause on July 1 POLORON PRODUCTS OF INDIANA, INC. 2. The Company has not engaged in the other unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint. THF REMEDY As the record demonstrates that Bailey would have been discharged at the end of his shift on June 13, 1 shall recommend that he be given backpay for that day only, with interest in accordance with the formula approved in Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716. General Counsel points out that Bailey was offered the opportunity to return the next day as a beginning probationer, and correctly observes that while this was less than full reinstatement it demonstrates the Company's willingness to keep Bailey on the job. The offer, however, was part of a strike settlement. So far as the Board's remedial power goes, restoration of the status quo ante is achieved by paying Bailey for the time he lost because of his premature discharge. The Company was not legally obligated to hire him back, and as he rejected the offer I see no reason for the Board to reimpose it. I shall also recommend the customary cease-and-desist order and notice posting. I have some doubt as to the advisability of a notice under all the circumstances, but I have decided to adhere to the convention although the Board may wish to reconsider the matter if the case is reviewed. Also if the Board should disagree with me on either of the two close questions of law discussed above (the scope of Mastro Plastics and the condonation), it may wish in framing a notice to consider the problem dealt with in Brantly Helicopter, 135 NLRB at 1419, 1420. Accordingly, upon the foregoing findings and conclusions, and upon the entire record, I recommend, pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, issuance of the following: ORDER Respondent, Poloron Products of Indiana, Inc., its officers, agents, successors , and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from discharging, or threatening to discharge or otherwise discriminate against, any employee for engaging in concerted activity for mutual aid or protection. 2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Make William Bailey whole in the manner described in the portion of the Trial Examiner's Decision entitled "The Remedy" for any loss of earnings suffered by reason of the discrimination against him. (b) Post at its plant at Michigan City, Indiana, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."" Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 25, after being duly signed by Respondent's authorized representative, shall be posted by the 439 Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 25, in writing, within 20 days from the receipt of this Decision, what steps have been taken to comply herewith.': In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the notice In the further event that the Board's Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision and Order " "In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, this provision shall be modified to read- "Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith " APPENDIX NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our employees that: WE WILL pay William Bailey back wages and interest thereon for June 13, 1968. WE WILL NOT take or threaten to take any action against any employee for engaging in protected concerted activity for mutual aid or protection, but employees are hereby cautioned that a strike in breach of a no-strike clause in a contract is not ordinarily regarded as a "protected" concerted activity. POLORON PRODUCTS OF INDIANA, INC. (Employer) Dated By (Representative) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. If employees have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions, they may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, 614 ISTA Center, 150 West Market Street, Indianapolis, Indiana 46204, Telephone 317-633-8921.