Ingress-Plastene, Inc.

INGRESS-PLASTENE, INC. 481 Ingress-Plastene, Inc. and International Union, Allied Respondent of its desire to negotiate for a new Industrial Workers of America, AFL-CIO. Case contract. On September 21, 1967, Respondent 25-CA-2969 offered to meet at an agreeable time for that June 30, 1969 DECISION AND ORDER BY MEMBERS FANNING, BROWN, AND ZAGORIA On March 24, 1969, Trial Examiner Lowell Goerlich issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended , and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. Thereafter, the Respondent and the General Counsel filed exceptions to the Decision and supporting briefs. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner' s Decision , the exceptions and brief, and the entire record in this case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner, with the following additions and qualifications. 1. The Trial Examiner found that during the period from late September 1967 to early December 1967, the Respondent engaged in extensive unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. The Trial Examiner detailed many incidents of such illegal conduct, including instances of (1) interrogation of employees, (2) soliciting and assisting withdrawals of checkoff authorizations, (3) impressing upon employees the futility of continued adherence to the Union, (4) creating of the impression of surveillance, (5) announcement and promises of beneficial changes in wages and working conditions, and (6) disparagement of the Union by unilateral action. We agree with the Trial Examiner' s findings and conclusions in this regard. 2. The Trial Examiner also found that the Respondent illegally refused to bargain by withdrawing recognition and by unilaterally instituting changes in wages and conditions of employment, all in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. We believe that these conclusions are amply sustained by the evidence in the record. The Union was certified on September 30, 1966, and the first and only contract provided a term from April 24, 1967, to November 30, 1967. On September 13, 1967, the Union timely notified purpose. On October 18, 1967, the Respondent withdrew recognition, and on October 21 filed an RM petition which was dismissed on October 30. Thereafter, not only did Respondent refuse to recognize or negotiate with the Union, on November 1 it notified its employees it would put into effect on December 1 a number of beneficial changes which would be announced later. On November 10, Respondent announced that, effective December 1, employees would receive at least a 10-cent-per-mile wage increase, insurance improvements , and a bonus for a certain "four-crew" operation. On November 17, Respondent announced that certain noneconomic conditions would become effective on December 1. On December 1, these changes in wages and working conditions were placed into effect. It is well settled that a certified union, upon expiration of the first year following its certification, enjoys a rebuttable presumption that its majority representative status continues.' This presumption is designed to promote stability in collective-bargaining relationships, without impairing the free choice of employees.: Accordingly, once the presumption is shown to be operative, a prima facie case is established that an employer is obligated to bargain and that its refusal to do so would be unlawful. The prima facie case may be rebutted if the employer affirmatively establishes either (1) that at the time of the refusal the union in fact no longer enjoyed majority representative status;3 or (2) that the employer's refusal was predicated on a good-faith and reasonably grounded doubt of the union's continued majority status. As to the second of these, i.e., "good-faith doubt," two prerequisites for sustaining the defense are that the asserted doubt must be based on objective considerations" and it "must not have been raised in the context of illegal antiunion activities, or other conduct by the employer aimed at causing disaffection from the union or indicating that in raising the majority issue the employer was merely seeking to gain time in which to undermine the union."' Respondent does not contend that it has rebutted the presumption of majority status of the Union; it contends, rather, that it has demonstrated that it had reasonable grounds for doubting that the Union continued to enjoy majority support, and that its 'Celanese Corporation of America, 95 NLRB 664, 671-672. 'Id. "Majority representative status" means that a majority of employees in the unit wish to have the union as their representative for collective-bargaining purposes. Id. See Laystrom Manufacturing Company, 151 NLRB 1482, 1484, enforcement denied on other grounds (sufficiency of evidence) 359 F.2d 799 (C.A. 7); Terre!! Machine Company, 173 NLRB No. 230; N L R B v. Gulfmont Hotel Company, 362 F.2d 588 (C.A. 5), enfg 147 NLRB 997 And cf. United States Gypsum Company, 157 NLRB 652. 'Celanese Corporation of America, supra at 673. See also Terre!! Machine, supra;Bally Case and Cooler, Inc., 172 NLRB No. 106, C & C Plywood Corporation, 163 NLRB No. 136. 177 NLRB No. 70 482 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD good faith in withdrawing recognition from the Union has been shown by the fact that it filed a petition in order to have the question of representation resolved in accordance with the Board's election procedures. Considering all the circumstances, we find this defense to be without merit. Assuming, arguendo, that the facts concerning the small number of unit employees participating in the dues checkoff program, and the Union's purported lack of aggressiveness in asserting contractual rights and privileges, coupled with attempts to increase its membership among unit employees , constitute the type of objective considerations which reasonably could have led Respondent to doubt the Union's continued majority status,' it is apparent that Respondent was not willing to have the question concerning the Union's representative status which it claims existed resolved by the election machinery provided in the Act. Though it is true that Respondent filed a petition for an election, that petition was filed during the last 60 days of its contract with the Union and was subject to dismissal under the normal application of the Board's contract-bar rules. Although Respondent argued before the Regional Director that the petition should nevertheless be processed, it did not appeal to the Board from the Regional Director's dismissal of the petition. Instead, it intensified its unfair labor practice campaign , a campaign initiated even before it filed the petition, in a patent effort to dissipate employee support of the Union and to destroy the conditions necessary to a free election. Quite clearly Respondent has not conformed its conduct to the requirements of the Act as spelled out in relevant Board decisions.' Accordingly, as Respondent has not rebutted the presumption flowing from the Union's certification, and as it, in any event, has engaged in substantial independent unfair labor practices tending to preclude the holding of a fair election, we find that Respondent, by withdrawing recognition from the Union on October 18, 1967, and thereafter refusing to bargain with the Union, violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. `There is, of course, no necessary correlation between the number of employees who are willing to give financial support to a union and the number of employees who wish to be represented by a union. See, e.g., Gulfmont, supra Nor does the fact that the Union may not have been aggressive in asserting certain contractual rights on behalf of employees necessarily give rise to the inference that it lacked majority status. Clearly the Union was not a dormant organization. Cf. Dietz Forge Company of Tennessee, 173 NLRB No. 5. As to Respondent's contention that Union President Sheets conceded to one of Respondent's officials that the Union represented only those employees who had signed checkoff authorizations, we note that Sheets denied having so stated, and the Trial Examiner did not resolve the issue of credibility raised by the conflicting testimony Without attempting to resolve that issue ourselves, we note that even Respondent's version of the discussion between Furgeson , its personnel director, and Sheets demonstrates that they were discussing additional checkoff cards in the possession of the Union , when Furgeson asked Sheets if that is all the employees you represent at this time In this context, it is highly likely that Sheets understood the inquiry as relating to union membership rather than the number of employees represented by the Union In any event, Respondent does not rely on Sheet's response as THE REMEDY Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, we shall order that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. We expressly disavow the Trial Examiner's discussion in that section of his Decision entitled "Recommended Remedy." AMENDED CONCLUSION OF LAW Delete Conclusion of Law 6 and insert in its place the following: 6. By unilaterally changing wages and other terms and conditions of employment on December 1, 1967, the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board hereby adopts as its Order the Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner, as modified below, and orders that Respondent, Ingress-Plastene, Inc., Crawfordsville, Indiana, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order, as so modified: Delete paragraph 1(b) and insert in its place the following: "(b) Unlawfully changing working conditions unilaterally." proof that the Union did not represent a majority of the employees when Respondent withdrew recognition , and its later unfair labor practice demonstrates to our satisfaction that Respondent did not in good faith withdraw recognition from the Union. 'See cases cited in fn 5 See also N L.R B v. Gissel Packing Company, 395 U.S. 575. Though the decision in that case did not discuss the issue involved herein, namely, the circumstances in which an employer is privileged to withdraw recognition from a certified incumbent union, we are satisfied that its teachings concerning the circumstances in which it is appropriate for the Board to find that an employer's refusal to recognize and bargain with a union which claims majority status on the basis of authorization cards signed by a majority of unit employees violates Sec. 8(ax5) supports our decision in this case TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE.CASE LOWELL GOERLICH, Trial Examiner: The original charge was filed by International Union, Allied Industrial Workers of America, AFL-CIO, herein referred to as the Union, on November 9, 1967, and served on Respondent, Ingress-Plastene, Inc., by registered mail on November 9, 1967. Complaint and notice of hearing was issued on February 27, 1968. The complaint charged that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended : ( 1) by refusing to bargain collectively with the Union on and after October 18, 1967; (2) by engaging in conduct designed to undermine the Union's majority; and (3) by unilaterally instituting INGRESS-PLASTENE, INC. various changes in employment conditions on December 1, 1967. The complaint further alleged that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(l) of the Act by certain specified acts of surveillance, interrogation,' and threats and inducements, all designed to dissuade employees from becoming or remaining members of the Union. The Respondent filed a timely answer denying that it had engaged in or was engaging in the unfair practices alleged. In its answer the Respondent, admitted that on September 30, 1966, the Union was certified by the Regional Director for Region 25 as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative, for the following unit of the Respondent's employees: All production, maintenance and warehouse employees of Respondent employed at its Crawfordsville, Indiana plant and warehouse exclusive of administrative executives, salesmen, office clerical employees, professional employees, foremen, assistant foremen, guards and all supervisors as defined in the Act. The Respondent further admitted that on April 24, 1967, it executed a collective-bargaining agreement with the Union which remained in effect until November 30, 1967. Affirmatively, the Respondent alleged that on or about October 18, 1967, and on or about November 1, 1967, it refused to recognize the Union for purposes of negotiating a new contract effective December 1, 1967. Respondent further stated that in good faith it believed the Union did not represent a majority of employees after October 1, 1967;= that the Union in fact did not represent a majority of employees after October 1, 1967; and that by recognizing and bargaining with the Union on the dates alleged in the complaint, Respondent would have violated the Act. Respondent also stated that it lawfully instituted certain changes in wages and conditions of employment on December 1, 1967. The case came on for hearing on April 15 through 19, and July 23 and 24, 1968, and January 14, 1969, at Crawfordsville, Indiana.' Each party was afforded a full opportunity to be heard, to call, examine and cross-examine witnesses , to argue orally on the record, to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions, and to file briefs. All briefs have been carefully considered by the Trial Examiner. Upon the whole record,' and upon his observation of the witnesses, the Trial Examiner makes the following: 'At the hearing the complaint was amended to list additional interrogations, allegedly violative of Sec. 8(a)(1). 'Respondent stated in its answer, "Respondent states that it was and is the Respondent's good faith belief that the Union at all times on and after about October 1, 1967, did not and does not represent a majority of employees in the unit ...... 'This matter was delayed pending enforcement of a subpoena ad testificandum 'There being no opposition thereto, the Respondent' s motion to amend transcript in the particulars stated therein is granted. 'In making his findings of fact and conclusions the Trial Examiner has considered the demeanor of the various witnesses who appeared before him and has passed upon their credibility. As to those witnesses who testified in contradiction to the Trial Examiner's findings, the Trial Examiner has discredited their testimony, either as having been in conflict with the testimony of credible witnesses or because it is in and of itself incredulous and unworthy of belief. In this respect the Trial Examiner is not unmindful of the Supreme Court's observation in N.L. R.B. v Walton Manufacturing Company, 369 U.S. 404, 408• FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS' 1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT 483 Respondent is now, and has been at all times material herein, an Indiana corporation, with place of business at Crawfordsville, Indiana. It is engaged in the manufacture, sale, and distribution of custom injection moldings. Respondent, during the past 12 months, which period is representative of all times material herein, manufactured, sold, and shipped from its Crawfordsville plant finished products valued in excess of $50,000 to points outside Indiana. The Trial Examiner finds, as is admitted by the Respondent, that at all times material herein the Respondent was an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED International Union, Allied Industrial Workers of America, AFL-CIO, as admitted by the Respondent, is and has been a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES First: The Union was certified on September 30, 1966. Negotiations commenced and, on January 23, 1967, a complete contract proposal was offered by the Respondent. The proposal was rejected by the Union and, an impasse having been effected, the Employer placed its proposal in effect on January 23, 1967, at 4 p.m. Thereafter the Union engaged in a strike which concluded with the execution of the contract, dated April 24, 1967. The contract, by its terms, among other things, provided that it would remain in full force and effect until midnight November 30, 1967, and "shall automatically renew itself thereafter from year to year unless written notice to terminate or amend the Agreement is given by either party to the other not less than 60 days prior to the expiration date (or any renewal expiration date)."6 On May 26, 1967, the parties agreed on a checkoff form (checkoff of dues to the Union was provided in the contract) and the first executed checkoff authorization was received by the Respondent on August 27, 1967. On September 13, 1967, by letter, the Union requested the Respondent to enter into negotiations for a new labor agreement. A part of the letter read, "The Union wishes to amend and add to the labor agreement and if an agreement cannot be reached by November 30, 1967, the agreement between the parties will be terminated." On September 21, 1967, the Respondent answered the Union's letter in which was included: "We hereby offer to meet and confer with you for the purpose of negotiating a new contract. Please notify us when you would like to meet." The letter also stated that it would serve as the Respondent's notification to the Union of its termination of the agreement at midnight November 30, 1967. On September 30, 1967, the Union's certification reached the end of its first year of being and on October For the demeanor of a witness .. may satisfy the tribunal, not only that the witness' testimony is not true, but that the truth is the opposite of his story; for the denial of one, who has a motive to deny, may be uttered with such hesitation, discomfort, arrogance or defiance , as to give assurance that he is fabricating, and that, if he is, there is no alternative but to assume the truth of what he denies." Dyer v. MacDougall. 201 F.2d 265, 269. The contract signed on April 24, 1967, conforms in all respects to the proposal instituted on January 23, 1967, except for the provisions concerning pensions and insurance benefits. 484 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 2, 1967, the 60-day insulated period "during which the parties may negotiate and execute a new or amended agreement without the intrusion of a rival petition"' commenced. On October 2, 1967, the Union addressed a communication to "All Production and Maintenance Employees" of the Respondent's employees enclosing therewith a checkoff-authorization form. In the communication employees were encouraged to sign checkoff authorizations, and (after noting that the present contract expired on November 30, 1967), employees were urged to 'join and support the Union," in order that employees might "work UNITED for the benefit of all employees."' On October 17, 1967, Britton Gene Furgeson, personnel director,' conferred with Treve K. Cramer, chairman of the board , and Verne Waldon, president, in respect to the current majority status of the Union . Furgeson's meeting with Cramer on this subject occurred shortly after he had engaged in conversation with John Sheets , president of Local 480. As a result of such conversation Furgeson had directed a note to Cramer which , in part, related, John stated he had two forms (checkoff-authorization forms) in his car but since it was raining he would bring them to me later unless I wanted them at this time. I informed John it would not be necessary to go out in the rain to get them . John stated he would bring them in the following day. I also asked John if the forms we have are all the people they represented at this time. John replied, "Well, I have the two in the car ...." At this point, I interrupted John and asked , "Including the two in the car, this is all you represent at this time?" John's reply was, "Right. With the two in the car, this is all at this time." To this, I replied, "O.K. So at this time, this is all the Union represents." The note concluded, "At this time, the Union represents by their own claim, at the most, 50 people out of a total bargaining unit of 155." According to Furgeson , the conferees discussed the event" referred to in his note on October 17, 1967, as well as other alleged indicia of the Union's lack of majority status. During the discussion Furgeson noted that there were 49 employees on checkoff and of these , 34 were those of the 72 employees who were on the payroll at the time of the election and 15 were of the 84 new employees hired since the election. The conferees also reviewed the fact that the Union had filed a number of grievances but had taken none of them to arbitration. It was observed that this was an "indication that this is not a majority representation of the people" or "a vigorous majority representation." 'Deluxe Metal Furniture Company, 121 NLRB 995, 1000 'Among other things the communication included: You permitted the Company to make decisions that was not in your best interest because you did not support your local Union or your fellow workers. I urge each one of you to join and support the Union .... To improve the conditions that now exist you should sign the enclosed Check-off Authorization form and drop it into the Union Communication Box . . Or you may give the Check-off Authorization to the President, John Sheets, Financial Secretary, Mary Chesterson ... Moore ... Cox ... Alexander .. Moore ... McClure ... Keller . . White . . McCloud ... Burnside ... Shanklin .... These people will see that the Authorization is given to John Sheets, President of Local Union 480 'Furgeson was also "director of purchasing , customer relations, production control, material or handling and security." "Sheets recollected the meeting with Furgeson on October 17, 1%7, but denied that Furgeson had asked him the question mentioned by Furgeson The conferees also commented on the fact that they had not received a reply setting forth superseniority employees selected by the Union until after May 26, 1967. The conferees attributed this to lack of union majority. The conferees also considered that while the Employer's proposal had been put into effect on January 23, 1967, the Respondent received no names from the Union for the union safety committee until May 26, 1967. They concluded that such inactivity on the part of the Union did not attract new employees as members. The conferees further noted that the Union had refused to accompany management on safety tours. Another matter which was discussed was the fact that that the Union submitted no checkoff authorizations until August 29, 1967. The conferees attributed such lack of submission as a failure to show a majority and noted that the Company had 48 checkoff forms in its possession out of a unit of 150." The conferees further observed that the Union had taken no advantage of the job promotion privileges under the proposal of January 23, 1967. The conferees also discussed the fact that some of the Respondent's supervisors had reported that they had heard that the checkoff authorizations had been obtained by coercion. The Union's October 2, 1967, communication noted above came under discussion . The conferees interpreted it as a renewed effort to organize and the Union's admission that it lacked a majority. As stated by Furgeson, "It expresses the fact that the Union knows that the people are dissatisfied, they have been disappointed. That in view of this fact this was further reason for us to believe at that point that the Union was not a majority representative." In the afternoon of October 17, after a consideration of the matters which had been raised during the discussion, Board Chairman Cramer made the decision "that he was going to withdraw recognition of the Union but he would continue to honor all of his commitments under the contract until midnight of November 30." On October 18, 1967, the Respondent directed the following letter to the Union signed by T. K. Cramer." Based on substantial information which we have received (including information received just yesterday), it is our belief that Allied Industrial Workers International Union and its Local 480 no longer represents a majority of our employees in the production, maintenance and warehouse collective bargaining unit . We must therefore respectfully decline to recognize the Union for purposes of negotiating a new contract effective December 1, 1967. We will, of course, continue to recognize the Union for purposes of administration of the current contract which expires midnight, November 30 (and will continue to honor all of our contract obligations thereunder). On October 20, 1967, Employer filed a representation petition requesting that the National Labor Relations Board "precede under its proper authority pursuant to Section 9 of the National Labor Relations Act." Submitted with the petition was the statement , "Although we understand that the Board does not normally process Petitions filed within 60 days of the contract expiration date, we request that the enclosed Petition be processed in or that he had made answer to such a question. "By October 17, 1967, six employees had revoked their checkoff authorizations and four other employees who had signed checkoff authorizations had been terminated from employment. After October 17, 1967, several other employees revoked their checkoff authorizations. (See infra.) "Cramer did not appear for testimony. INGRESS-PLASTENE, INC. view of the unusual circumstances as disclosed on Attachment A" to the Petition . Please notify us immediately in the event you wish additional data such as information showing you the basis for our good faith belief that the Union no longer represents a majority of employees in the bargaining unit." By letter dated October 30, 1967, Respondent's counsel was informed by the Regional Director for Region 25: "As a result of the investigation , it appears that, because the collective-bargaining agreement currently in effect, from April 24, 1967 to November 30, 1967, between the Employer and International Union, Allied Industrial Workers of America, AFL-CIO and its Local 480, constitutes a bar to investigation of representatives, further proceeding are not warranted at this time. I am, therefore, dismissing the petition in this matter." The letter advised the Respondent: Pursuant to the National Labor Relations Board Rules and Regulations, you may obtain a review of this action by filing an appeal with the National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D.C., 20570. A copy of such appeal must be served upon each of the other parties to the proceeding , including the undersigned. This appeal must contain a complete statement setting forth the facts and reasons upon which it is based. The appeal (8 copies) should be filed with the Board in Washington, D.C., 20570, by close of business November 13, 1967, except that the Board may, upon good cause shown, grant special permission for a longer period within which to file.14 A copy of any request for extension of time should be submitted to me. By letter dated October 31, 1967, the Union again requested the Employer to meet for the purpose of negotiating a new agreement . By letter dated November 1, 1967, the Respondent again advised the Union that it declined "to recognize [the] Union for purposes of negotiating a new contract effective December 1" and declined to meet with [the Union] for that purpose. On the same date the Employer placed in employees' pay envelopes a general notice announcing among other things that the Employer anticipated "placing into effect on December 1st a number of changes which [were] beneficial" to its employees and which it intended to announce as the month progressed.t6 On November 9, 1967, the Union filed Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (5) unfair labor practice charges which were received by the Respondent on November 10, 1967. Also on November 10, 1967, the Respondent posted economic changes for production , maintenance, and warehouse employees "to become effective December 1." Each employee was granted at least a 10-cent-an-hour wage increase and improved group insurance . Additionally there "The unusual circumstances were set out as follows in Attachment A: The above named union was certified on September 30, 1966. The current contract expires on November 30, 1967, and employer notified union by letter on October 18 that it declines to recognize union for purposes of negotiating a new contract effective December 1 . Union by letter of September 13th claimed recognition for purposes of negotiating a new contract effective December 1, 1967. 'The appeal period having expired on November 13, 1967, and no appeal having been filed , the case was closed on November 14, 1967. "The full notice was as follows: GENERAL NOTICE Monthly Union dues in the amount of $4.00 have been deducted from the enclosed paychecks of the minority of employees who have signed checkoff authorizations. (We understand that even some of those who signed the authorizations did so under pressure and scare tactics.) No deduction has been made from the pay of the large majority who have not signed these authorizations. Under the Union contract, which ends as of November 30th, dues and fees of authorizing employees are deducted 485 was provided an attendance bonus for four-crew operation. On November 13, 1967, the period for filing an appeal from the Regional Director's dismissal of the Respondent's RM petition expired. On November 17, the Respondent posted the following noneconomic conditions effective December 1, 1967: 1. Full seniority, as currently established, will be continued except for super-seniority for Union officials and notices to the Union. 2. Provisions for no discrimination and no lockout by the Company, as currently established, will be continued. 3. Limitations on production, maintenance and warehouse work by supervisors, as currently established, will be continued. 4. Grievance and arbitration procedures , as currently established, will be continued but revised to provide for employee handling of grievances at all steps and for arbitration by mutual agreement of the grievant and the Company. 5. The work week and hours of work, as currently established, will be continued. 6. Current rest period policy, and other current written practices, will be continued. 7. Current provisions relating to the Union such as recognition, notices to the Union, checkoff (previously announced), strikes, Union Stewards, Union representation , Union bulletin board and communication box, and Union safety committee will be deleted. The policies as outlined above will be written up and placed in the standard practice manual on December 1. On the same date the Respondent addressed a letter to "Dear Fellow Employee": The Allied Industrial Workers Union apparently is getting desperate in its attempt to organize our employees. As you know, the Union does not represent a majority of our people and therefore it is making all kinds of promises in an effort to get your support. We think that you should have the true facts. Here are some of them: 1. The Union is making "pie in the sky" statements about "demands" it will make if it ever gets in here again . Those of you who were at Ingress-Plastene during the AIW's organizing drive last year will remember that they made the same kind of promised demands then. Well, performance is better than promises -- and the current "Union Contract" does not contain many of those old promised demands. Frankly, we don't understand why the Union is squawking so much about things which are in the contract which they, themselves signed just a few months ago. 2. The Union claims it will demand back pay and retroactive benefits to December 1, 1967 from the Company if it gets in. Of course, it takes a Company to agree before a Union's demands can come true. And apparently the Union doesn't realize that a fine new wage program is going into effect on December 1. from the first paycheck of the month; consequently the checkoffs being made today are the last ones under that expiring contract. We anticipate placing into effect on December 1st a number of changes which are beneficial to our employees - and which we intend to announce as this month progresses. The first change which we are happy to announce is the elimination of checkoff for Union dues and initiation fees. No authorizations currently on file will be recognized for December checkoff and commencing December I there will be no checkoff of Union dues and initiation fees for anyone. 486 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 3. The Union threatens that it will go to the Labor Board and the court to enforce some of its economic demands. This is just a lot of talk. When a Union is in a plant, economics are settled in bargaining and not by anyone else. 4. The Union has sent a pamphlet on what foreman allegedly can't do. All we can tell you is that Unions can't discriminate either. Remember you are protected by law from discrimination by either a Company or a Union. 5. The Union status is clear - the Company is recognizing it for purposes of administering the current contract which expires November 30th - but the Company is not recognizing the Union for purposes of negotiating a new contract because the Union does not represent a majority of our employees in the bargaining group. 6. The Union has filed another charge with the NLRB. This is the third time they've done this since last January. The Union wasn't successful the first two times and we don't think they'll be this time either. Don't let your self be deceived - we will keep you posted on development." Wage increases were made effective on December 1, 1967. Second: During the period when the foregoing events were occurring, certain supervisors of the Respondent engaged in activities which the General Counsel claims violated Section 8 (a)(1) of the Act. A. The Activities of Supervisor Guerney Williams About 2 weeks before Shirley York signed a union authorization card on November 30, 1967, Supervisor Guerney Williams asked her whether she had signed a union card . She truthfully answered , "No" to which Williams responded that he "wished no one on his shift would throw in it." York replied, "that was just the breaks of life." About a week or two after York had signed her union authorization card Williams again asked York whether she "belonged to the Union." She falsely answered, "No." He also inquired whether Barbara Blotgett, an employee who worked on the same shift as did York, "belonged" to the Union. York replied that she didn't know; that "he would have to ask her."" On October 16, 1967, the date employee Alice Anna Cary revoked her union checkoff authorization, Williams, as verified by his testimony, inquired of her whether she "really" had dropped out of the Union. Cary answered, "Yes." Continuing the conversation he asked her for her reasons. While he did not remember her reply, he recalled saying to her, "I'm glad you did; I wish everyone on the night shift would." Cary signed a new union authorization card on November 25, 1967. About a week later Williams came to her press and said, "I heard you belonged to a union."" Cary answered, "Yes." Williams continued, "The Union won't do you any good." Cary replied, "I don't know, I have to find out for myself." Williams then asked her whether her mother belonged to the Union. Cary responded, "I don't know, Guerney, you will just have to ask her.s 19 B. The Activities of Supervisor Charles Grady On or about November 1, 1967, when employees Margaret McClure, Rosemary Bowles, and Rebecca Jane White opened their pay envelopes in which was enclosed the Respondent's notice to employees that the first change beneficial to the employees would be that "commencing December 1, there will be no check off of union dues and initiation fees for any one," Supervisor Charles Grady remarked, "Aren't you glad you don't have to pay your $4 union dues any more."'" Employee McClure responded that they would pay their union dues in cash. During the conversation Grady remarked that the Union would not do the employees "any good." He further commented that "the Company would not bargain with the Union anymore." Employee White responded, "They have to bargain that is the law." Finally Grady said that "they would bargain, but there would never be another contract signed in the plant." Grady admitted that he "possibly did tell employees that the Company would never again bargain" at the time he had passed out employee paycheck envelopes with the above-mentioned notice included. Norma A. Cronke related a conversation which occurred between Charles Grady and Rosemary Bowles during the first week of December 1967. Grady was quoted as saying , "It is my opinion when you go on strike and when you come back you will be fired. . . . This Company is not so dumb. It is going to tie up this proceeding for two to five years, and when they do get around to it, they will negotiate a contract because by that time all your back pay and benefits will be down the drain and we will start out fresh." The latter portion of the above statement was modified to relate "the slate will be wiped clean." Rosemary Bowles, who was present at the conversation, disputed Cronke's version. Bowles had been asked to give a statement in regard to her version to the NLRB representative and she said that after having read the statement of Cronke, she did not give a statement because "it would be different from hers and it would hurt the Union that [she] wanted to help." Patricia Keller, who was called by the General Counsel, testified that she could not recall that Grady said that "those that went on strike would be fired." However, she testified that Grady said "The Respondent's letter was apparently in response to union leaflets which , among other things, stated The International Union, Allied Industnal Workers of America, AFL-CIO has filed charges against Ingress-Plastene Inc. for refusal to bargain. The National Labor Relations Board is processing the charges If the Company continues its unfair practices of refusing to bargain, the Union will demand from the Company back pay and retroactive benefits to the December 1, 1967 Also an additional 6% interest penalty on the Company for holding the benefits from the Employees "Williams denied that he had questioned York but admitted he had said to her, "I wonder if Blotgett belonged to the Union " and that York responded, "Why don' t you ask her " Williams also admitted that York had said, "I guess those are the breaks of life." In view of Williams' admissions and the considerations noted in fn 5, the Trial Examiner credits York. "The card signed by Cary on November 25, 1967, was an "Authorization for Collective Bargaining " Unlike the checkoff card there is no credible evidence that this card was lodged with the Respondent. Thus, the inference is that Williams' knowledge of the card must have come to him through a rank-and-file employee "Williams denied that he had asked Cary whether she belonged to the Union but admitted that he "could have" told her "the Union wouldn't do her any good " Williams did not deny that he had asked Cary whether her mother belonged to the Union. Williams' admissions together with the considerations noted in footnote 5 persuade the Trial Examiner that where there is a conflict between the testimony of Cary and Williams, Cary's testimony is to be credited. "Employee McClure quoted Grady as saying, "aren't you glad there won't be any more taken out." INGRESS-PLASTENE, INC. that "the Company was not going to negotiate the contract"; that it wanted "to take the matter to trial"; that the Company "wasn't dumb"; that "was why they had their smart lawyer"; that "they would take it and drag it out to two to five years"; and that "after that it wouldn't matter. 1121 Grady did not specifically deny the remarks attributed to him by employee Keller. In respect to the conversation which was overheard by Patricia Keller and Norma A. Cronke which involved Grady and Bowles, the Trial Examiner is of the opinion that Cronke placed an emotional interpretation on the words used by Grady and that he did not actually state that if the employees went on strike they would be fired when they returned. However, the Trial Examiner credits witness Keller, whom he found to be honest and forthright. C. The Activities of Joseph Gill Supervisor Joseph Gill remarked to employee Terrie Miles 2 or 3 days after she had signed a union-checkoff authorization on September 25, 1967, that he did not think she would benefit from the Union and that if she "wanted to drop off he would get the papers for [her] to sign." Thereafter, unlike prior practice, she was transferred from press to press. Although the work on the presses to which she was transferred was not more difficult, upon some of the presses to which she was assigned, she had had no experience. On October 12, 1967, Miles had another conversation with Gill at which time he told her that "Burns" wanted to see [her] in the office." She went to the office where Burns said to her that "Joe had told her that [she, Miles] wanted to drop out of the Union and she had the papers ready for [her] to sign." Miles was instructed by Burns to copy the following words, "I hereby revoke this check off authorization" which she was directed to place at the bottom of her checkoff authorization and sign her name. This she did. In November Miles was discharged for absenteeism.2J About 2 weeks after employee Patrina Ford executed her checkoff-authorization card on October 7, 1967, Gill "Grady's version of the conversation was as follows. . . she asked me if the company or me - I don ' t remember how she worded it would fire usif we wentout on strike. I said, "Why would you want to go out on strike before not being represented by any union?" and she said, "Yes, we are." I said, "Are you paying dues?" She said, "No." Then the conversation led into the amount of time to be involved if it went to court. * * I believe she had mentioned about going to court and I said , "Well, if -", as I mentioned earlier there , I asked her if she was still paying dues and she said no, so I wouldn' t hardly think so. She said , "Something like this could be tied up in court." She had mentioned going to court from, they say, two to five years. "Marge Burns was secretary and assistant to Personnel Director Furgeson. "Gill denied that he had asked Miles to revoke her checkoff. Burns testified she had never offered the revocation clause to any employee before it was requested, and had never sent for an employee to come to her office to execute a revocation. Burns did not specifically deny that she had said to Miles that "Joe had told her that she wanted to drop out of the Union and she had the papers ready for [her] to sign." Gill impressed the Trial Examiner as an unreliable witness. Thus where his testimony is in contradiction with that of other credible witnesses, it is discredited. In view of this fact and the fact that a number of employees had similar experiences in connection with the revocation of their checkoff authorizations, and in view of the lack of specificity in Burns' denials, the Trial Examiner credits Miles as to the events which occurred in connection 487 asked her "if he had done anything to - that made [the employees] want to join the Union." Ford told him that he had done nothing to her or any of the other girls as far as she knew. She stated that the reason the employees joined the Union was because they "were tired of working this seven-day shift and not getting paid for it." Two or three days later Gill again conversed with Patrina Ford at which time he asked her whether she had taken her name off the checkoff list. She replied that she had not. Gill said, "Well, you and Jennifer Cook, you are the only ones left in it. Don't you think you ought to get up there?" Ford asked him why she should do this and he answered that he did not want the employees "to go out on strike or anything like that." About half an hour later Ford went to Burns' office and said to her "I heard you have a paper that you want me to sign." Burns answered, "Yes." Burns handed Ford her checkoff authorization with the comment "Here, this is for you to sign." The revocation wording was furnished by Burns who directed Ford to write it on the bottom of her checkoff authorization.24 Sometime prior to October 27, 1967, and after September 8, 1967, the date Sandra K. Beck executed a union card, Gill remarked to her that there were "only two people that was still in the Union," and that "they were fools for being in there." Later, according to Beck, Gill approached her and asked her whether she was "going to drop out of the Union." As explained by Beck "he kept coming around wanting to know when I was going to drop out of the Union. I didn't say anything. He just kept coming around and coming around. I finally got tired of it and I went up and signed off," on October 27, 1967. Employee Betty Woodcock accompanied Beck to Burns' office. Beck told Burns she wanted to drop out of the Union. Burns gave her a paper with the revocation wording on it.25 Personnel Relations Director Furgeson was present at the time. When Beck returned, according to Woodcock, Gill asked her, "Did you do it?" and she answered, "Yes" and "smiled at him." Later Gill phoned Beck and told her that she "wasn't supposed to say anything about him asking [her] to drop out of the Union," if the "union people" appeared at her home. 26 On October 25, 1967, Gill approached Betty Houchens and said, "Thanks." She said, "For what?" He answered, with the revocation of her checkoff authorization "Burns did not specifically deny that Ford said to her, "I heard you have a paper that you want me to sign ," and that she answered "Yes." Gill generally denied the testimony of Ford. He told of a parking lot incident which occurred after an Ingress-Plastene club party at which Ford had been drinking "Slow Gin Fizzes " He said that Ford told him, "I will get even with you" a number of times . Her only explanation for the remark was "You will find out one of these days." As to the events in connection with the revocation of Ford's checkoff, Ford is credited. "Employee Woodcock testified that Burns "pulled out some papers and laid it on the desk and told Sandy to copy this here and sign your name to IC, '.Gill testified that it was Beck who phoned him and said that Union Representatives Sheets and Walker were "out to pin some stuff" on him and that they were "going around the houses trying to collect information about [him] on this grievance views " Gill generally denied Beck's testimony. Bad blood apparently existed between Beck and Woodcock at the time of the hearing. Woodcock testified that she told Beck, "Let me tell you one thing, Sandy, if they take me to court and I become a nervous wreck and have to go to the hospital, you might as well figure your ass belongs to me " Woodcock continued, "Yes, if I have to come to the plant and drag you out." As between Gill, Woodcock, and Beck the Trial Examiner credits Beck as to the above events. 488 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD "For signing that paper ." She then said, "Oh, you mean the union paper." Thereupon he wanted to know what he had done to her. He said that he "didn 't think his girls would cut him like that" and asked Houchens what her reason was for cutting him off. She answered that she "thought it was the best thing to do." On October 27, 1967, Gill again approached Houchens and told her that she and Jennifer Cook where the only ones left in the unit and that they might as well drop out too. Houchens replied that she "knew better"; Gill said, "they dropped out this morning." He further advised Houchens that if she "went up stairs before Tuesday" and signed "off this slip" the union dues would not be taken out of [her] check. On October 30, 1967, Gill again approached Houchens. He asked her whether she had been "upstairs yet." She answered, "No." He inquired whether she was going. She replied, "If it would make you feel any better ." He said, "It would." Houchens said, "O.K." Gill replied, "Get yourself upstairs and see Marge." Houchens went upstairs and signed a checkoff revocation , the words for which were furnished by Burns . During the conversation with Gill, Houchens told him that she "didn't really want to revoke her checkoff." On November 1, 1967, Gill asked Houchens if Walker and Sheets had been around and whether she had talked to them . She answered in the affirmative." Lois Marie Gaines testified, [Gill] said, "Hey! ... I didn't know that you belonged to the Union .... Marge tells me these things." And I said, "Yes. Does it make any difference?" He said no, and I said, "Well, I never worked in a factory before." "But," he says, "you and Cookie are the only ones that belong." He said, "If you want to get out, sign out by tomorrow and it won't be taken out of your check, the four dollars." On November 2, 1967, Gaines rejoined the Union. On November 3, 1967, Gill asked Gaines whether Union Representatives Sheets and Walker had been to see her the prior afternoon. She responded affirmatively. Gill inquired, "What did they say? Did they ask if I pressured you into dropping out of the Union?" Gaines responded that she "told them no." Gill added that he tried to get in touch with her but could not. He said that "some girl" had called him and told him that the union representatives were coming to see Gaines." Alvin Vosten Clayton testified that on the Saturday following November 29, 1967, Gill said that he had driven past the city building when the Union was holding a meeting. He related that he had observed "only six or seven cars at the union meeting." Gill observed that "the Union surely wasn't very strong in the plant or there would have been more people there." Third.- The Trial Examiner finds, upon the consideration of the record as a whole, that the Respondent interfered with, restrained, and coerced employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act and thereby violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act in that: "Gill was asked, "Did you ever tell Mrs. Houchens that it would make you feel better if she revoked her checkoff." He answered, "Well, if I did say it to her, I don't remember, if I had, it would have been in a joking way." Gill denied that Houchens had informed him that she had revoked her checkoff, but admitted that he had asked her "if Sheets had her sign a paper against [him]" Houchens is credited. "Gill denied that he had discussed checkoff cards with Gaines but admitted he asked her if "John Sheets got her to sign a paper against [him]." Gaines is credited. 1. Supervisor Williams unlawfully interrogated employee York concerning her union membership and the membership of employee Blotgett.29 2. Supervisor Williams unlawfully inquired of employee Cary whether she "really" dropped out of the Union and her reasons therefore in the light of his comment that he was glad she had dropped out of the Union and he wished "everyone on the night shift would." 3. Supervisor Williams unlawfully interrogated employee Cary concerning her union membership and the membership of her mother. J0 4. Supervisor Gill unlawfully interrogated employee Ford concerning whether he had done anything to make employees join the Union and whether she had taken her name off the checkoff list. 5. Supervisor Gill unlawfully interrogated employee Beck concerning when she was going to drop out of the Union and whether she did drop out of the Union. 6. Supervisor Gill unlawfully interrogated employee Houchens concerning her reason for her cutting him off and what he had done to her to cause her to affiliate with the Union. 7. Supervisor Gill unlawfully interrogated employee Houchens concerning whether she had been "upstairs yet" to sign a union-checkoff revocation and whether Union Representatives Walker and Sheets had been around and whether she had talked to them. 8. Supervisor Gill unlawfully interrogated employee Gaines concerning whether Union Representatives Sheets and Walker had been to see her, what they said, and whether they asked if Gill pressured her into dropping out of the Union." 9. Supervisor Gill and Marge Burns restrained employee Miles in her rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act by their part in effecting the withdrawal of her union-checkoff authorization. 10. Supervisor Gill and Marge Burns restrained employee Ford in her rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act by their part in effecting the withdrawal of her checkoff authorization. "The Board has said in Abex Corporation-Engineered - Products Division, 162 NLRB 328, "interrogation which seeks to place an employee in the position of acting as an informer regarding the union activity of his fellow employees is coercive." "Such interrogation may not be dissociated from Williams' remark, "The Union won't do you any good." "The interrogations of the Respondent's supervisors, as noted above, included in their scope inquiries of employee union membership, inquiries of employees' reasons for dropping out of the Union , whether employees had removed their names from the union-checkoff list, whether Supervisor Gill had done anything to cause employees to join the Union, whether employees had been visited by union representatives, and whether the union representatives asked if Supervisor Gill had pressured an employee into dropping out of the Union . These interrogations, some accompanied by encouragement to execute checkoff withdrawals , not only disclosed the Employer's hostility to union membership, but were calculated and had the natural tendency to frustrate union affection by instilling fear of anticipated retaliatory tactics. "It is enough that employer interrogation has a tendency to inhibit the free exercise of rights protected by the Act." Winchester Spinning Corporation v. N.L.R.B.. 402 F.2d 299 (C.A 4). Moreover, the Employer has shown no proof that such questioning was pursuant to the Employer's legitimate business interests. On the other hand, the inquiries elicited information most useful for discrimination as well as a basis for assisting the Employer in separating its employees from union affection and bolstering up a competitive advantage for its own interests, one of which it appears was to make stick its withdrawal of union recognition. The aggravated demeanor of the questioned employees and their responses buttress the conclusion that the questioning was coercive. INGRESS-PLASTENE, INC. 489 11. Supervisor Gill restrained employee Beck in her rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act by his part in effecting the withdrawal of her checkoff authorization and telling her that she "wasn't to say anything about him asking [her] to drop out of the Union" if the "union people" appeared at her home. 12. Supervisor Gill restrained employee Houchens in her rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act by his part in effecting the withdrawal of her union-checkoff authorization. 13. Supervisor Gill restrained employee Gaines in her rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act by his part in effecting the withdrawal of her union-checkoff authorization." 14. Supervisor Grady unlawfully interfered with employees' Section 7 rights by impressing upon employees the futility of continuing adherence to the Union by his remark that the Employer would "never again" bargain with the Union and another contract would "never" be signed. 15. Supervisor Grady unlawfully interfered with employees Section 7 rights by impressing employees with the futility of continuing adherence to the Union by his remarks "the company was not going to negotiate the contract," that it "wanted to take the matter to trial"; that "the company wasn't dumb, that was why they had a smart lawyer"; "that they would take it and drag it out to two to five years and that after that it wouldn't matter."" "In soliciting the withdrawal of union-checkoff authorizations and by assisting various employees in withdrawing their union-checkoff authorizations during a period in which the Employer knew that the Union was attempting to increase its strength , the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act . Priced-Less Discount Foods, Inc.. 157 NLRB 1143, affd. 405 F.2d 67 (C.A. 6). In Porter County Farm Bureau Co-operative Association, Inc.. 133 NLRB 1019, 1024, the Board said: We find that the assistance to employees in effectuating withdrawals from the Union at a time when the Respondent was raising a question of the Union's majority status and while the RM petition was pending cannot be viewed as a, ministerial act . . . but constitutes an effort to undercut the Union's majority status and is itself violative of 8(a)(1). The reversed Trial Examiner's comments and findings were as follows (at 1050): It should be kept in mind that there is no evidence in the instant matter of any antiunion animus on the part of the Respondent. There is also no pattern of related unfair labor practices. Nor was there any instigation of these resignations by the Respondent or any showing that Miller's activity in connection therewith went beyond the kind of customary assistance rendered other employees by this then nonsupervisory employee. As to Cooper's suggestion about working, while it may well be that these resignations ultimately were couched in approximately the wording suggested by Cooper, his suggestion was made in response to a request for assistance by the oil drivers, who were owners of their own trucks and of both common and preferred stock of the Respondent, who were working on a commission basis which had not been covered by union contracts , and who were accustomed to getting office services and assistance. Further, these oil drivers patently wanted to go back to work and to get out of the Union, which had called a strike against their wishes and to the detriment of what they considered their own businesses. Hence the initiative came from employees whose employment relationship materially differs from the usual employee-employer pattern; the request was only for assistance in performing a ministerial act which the employees themselves had decided should be done; and the assistance rendered, when considered in the light of all of the circumstances, was minimal . Accordingly, I am of the opinion that the evidence does not warrant a finding of violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act because of assistance rendered in effectuating these withdrawals. "An employer's remarks which are calculated and tend to impress upon employees the futility of selecting a bargaining representative" are in violation of Sec. 8(a)(1) of the Act. Brandenburg Telephone Company. 164 NLRB No. 26, Orkin Exterminating Company of Florida. Inc.. 152 16. Supervisor Gill created an unlawful impression of surveillance when he advised employee Clayton that he had driven past the city building and observed "only six or seven cars at the union meeting" and that the Union "surely wasn't very strong in the plant.""' Fourth: As noted above the Union on October 2, 1967, addressed a communication to the Respondent's employees in which, among other things, the Union urged each employee "to join and support the Union" and to sign the "enclosed check-off authorization form." On November 8, 1967, the Union addressed another communication to the Respondent's employees, in which, after referring to the dismissal of the Respondent's representation petition and its promise of benefits to go into effect on December 1, 1967, appealed to employees to "re-affirm" their "position as a union member," and show the Company they were "100 percent Union" by signing the enclosed union-authorization card." On November 14, 1967, the Union addressed yet another communication to the Respondent's employees, in which, referring to the unfair labor practices filed by the Union, it urged "those few employees" who had not signed cards to do so "to-day and drop in the Mail Box." While the Union campaigned for additional checkoff authorizations and 100 percent union participation, the Respondent pressed its refusal to bargain and, vieing with the Union for its employees' allegiance, embarked on a campaign of its own, the natural and probable consequences of which was to discourage employees from union affiliation. Through a supervisor, the Respondent unlawfully effected the withdrawal of at least five employees' checkoff authorizations on October 12, 14, 27, and 30, 1967. These withdrawals were not without significance because, according to Furgeson , out of a complement of 150 employees, he believed the number of employees represented by the Union to be 48. Thus it is plain, that, with the withdrawal of five employees, the Union would have retained less than the 30-percent interest required by the Board for the entertainment of a union's representation petition (see Board's Statements of Procedure, Sec. 101.18). Assuming that the Union had garnered no more authorizations, the employer, by NLRB 83. "By confronting Clayton in this manner Respondent created the impression that Gill had driven past City Hall for the purpose of ascertaining the Union's strength. Surveillance of this character, in essence coercive, is unlawful. See N L.R B. v. Ralph Printing and Lithographing Company, 379 F.2d 687, 691 (C.A. 8). "The card was as follows- ALLIED INDUSTRIAL WORKERS AUTHORIZATION FOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 1, the undersigned employee of the Company City State hereby authorize the International Union, Allied Industrial Workers of America, through its agents or representatives , to act for me as the collective bargaining agence in all matters pertaining to wages, hours and all other conditions of employment. Signature Sign your name-don't print Address City Date-Department-Tel. The AIW-AFL-CIO is an Industrial Union whose policy is ONE UNION in the plant 490 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD October 30, had eliminated the Union's chance of resolving its contested bargaining status by a representation petition . Hence, the withdrawals effected by the Respondent were of a crucial character , and may not be treated with insignificance. Additionally, however, the Respondent was engaged in another campaign. It withdrew union recognition on October 17, 1967. On November 1, 1967, it announced beneficial changes in the offering, "the first change" the "elimination of checkoff for union dues and initiation fees." Next, it granted economic benefits on November 10, 1967, and noneconomic benefits on November 17, 1967, to take effect on December 1, 1967. To drive home the Respondent's point, Cramer wrote the employees on November 17, 1967, among other things: 1. The Union is making "pie in the sky" statements about "demands" it will make if it ever gets in here again. Those of you who were at Ingress-Plastene during the AIW' s organizing drive last year will remember that they made the same kind of promised demands then . Well, performance is better than promises - and the current "Union Contract" does not contain many of those old promised demands. 2. The Union claims it will demand back pay and retroactive benefits to December 1, 1967 from the Company if it gets in. Of course, it takes a Company to agree before a union's demands can come true. And apparently the Union doesn't realize that a fine new wage program is going into effect on December 1. [Emphasis supplied.] With the reference to Union's lack of realization of the "fine new wage program" to become effective December 1, 1967, Cramer stressed the superflousness of the Union and the absurdity of its pressing any demands. By the noneconomic offer granting to its employees benefits such as full seniority (except superseniority for union officials and notices to the Union), current provisions for no-discrimination and no-lockout, current limitations on work by supervisors, current grievance and arbitration provisions (except revised "for employee handling of grievances at all steps and for arbitration by mutual agreement of the grievant and the Company"), current workweek and hours of work , and current rest policy written practices, together with the deletion of union recognition, notices to the Union , checkoff, strikes, union stewards, union representation, union bulletin board and communication box, and union safety committee, the Respondent pointed the uselessness of the Union and its lack of need. "An employer interferes with the right of self-organization when he emphasizes to his employees that there is no necessity for a collective bargaining agent." N.L.R.B. v. Bailey Company, 180 F.2d 278, 279 (C.A. 6). There is little doubt that the Respondent 's grant of these benefits offends the teachings in N.L.R.B. v. Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405.'° The Respondent's conduct which was immediately favorable to employees and undertaken with the undisguised purpose of weaning employees from union affection impinged upon their freedom of choice and may reasonably be calculated to have had that effect. The Respondent's tactics, as disclosed by its effectuation of checkoff withdrawals, grant of benefits, and the stressing of the lack of need for union, were employed for the clear purpose of annihilating the Union as a contender for collective-bargaining representative . Without other logical explanations it must be concluded that by its machinations it sought to make sure that the Union could not muster a majority or, in any event, maintain a showing of employee interest. The Respondent's grant of benefits effective December 1, 1967, had the effect of undermining the Union and were in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. "The danger inherent in well-timed increases in benefits is the suggestion of a fist inside the velvet glove." N.L.R.B. v. Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405, 408-410. Accord: Northwest Engineering Co., 148 NLRB 1136, 1144-45, enfd. sub nom. United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO v. N.L.R.B., 126 U.S. App. D.C. 215, 376 F.2d 770 (C.A.D.C.), cert. denied 389 U.S. 392; N.L.R.B. v. Shelby Mfg. Co., 390 F.2d 595, 595-596 (C.A. 6). The unilateral action taken here could only result in the disparagement of the Union' s position as the bargaining representative of Respondent's employees. See Porter County Farm Bureau Co-operative Association, Inc., supra, 1024. The Trial Examiner finds that: (1) The Respondent, by its announcement enclosed in the employees' paycheck envelopes dated November 1, 1967, in which was promised beneficial changes for its employees distributed during a period when the Union's majority status was under challenge, interfered with, restrained, and coerced employees in rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act. (2) The Respondent, by its announcement on November 10, 1967, in which was promised increased wage and group insurance and attendance bonus for four-crew operation effective December 1, 1967, published during a period when the Union's majority status was under challenge, interfered with, restrained, and coerced employees in rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act. (3) The Respondent, by its announcement on November 17, 1967, in which was promised certain noneconomic benefits effective December 1, 1967, published during a period when the Union's majority status was under challenge, interfered with, restrained, and coerced employees in rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act. Fifth: While the good faith of the Respondent is suspect" the Trial Examiner is of the opinion that the question of the Respondent's good faith as it relates to the alleged violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act, under the circumstances of the case, is immaterial. "In N L.R.B v. Douglas & Lomason Co, 333 F 2d 510, 514 (C.A. 8), it was stated interferences, accomplished by allurements, are as much condemned by the Act as is coercion. "The Board has said: It is the antithesis of good faith to insist upon the right to test a union's majority in an election and then obstruct the election processes by unilaterally granting increases in benefits which can only foreclose the possibility of a fair election being held . Bally Case and Cooler, Inc . 172 NLRB No 106. In this respect it is of significance that , while the Respondent, according to its answer, possessed a good-faith doubt on October 1, 1967, at a time when the Board would have entertained its RM petition , it came forward with no plausible explanation as to why it waited until October 17, 1967, to file its RM petition at a time when (as it wrote the Board ) the Board would "not normally process petitions" because the petition was filed "within 60 days of the contract expiration date." It is of further INGRESS-PLASTENE, INC. The Respondent refused to bargain with the Union on October 18, 1967, well within the period 60 days prior to the expiration of the contract on November 30, 1967. During this period the Respondent attempted to raise a question of representation . From an adverse ruling by the Regional Director it did not appeal to the Board. The Board has held in Nelson Name Plate Company, 122 NLRB 467, that "the rule in Deluxe Metal Furniture Co., 121 NLRB 995, establishing a 60-day insulated period during which petitions will not be entertained applies to all petitions." The rule in the Deluxe Metal Furniture Co., case, supra, modified by Leonard Wholesale Meats, Inc., 136 NLRB 1000, provides that representation petitions filed more than 60 days but not over 90 days before the terminal date of a valid labor agreement will be timely and that a "petition filed during the 60-day insulated period will be dismissed as untimely, regardless of any conduct of the parties during that 60-day period." Deluxe ' Metal Furniture Co., supra, 1000. Petitions filed during the 60-day insulated period are dismissed in that "no question affecting commerce exists concerning the representation of employees of the Employer within the meaning of Section 9(c)(1) and Section (2)(6) and (7) of the Act." Deluxe Metal Furniture Co., supra, 1007. If the procedure provided in Section 9(c)(1) of the Act is not open to an employer, the employer has no alternative but to continue to bargain with the certified incumbent union . As a corollary, a union is entitled to exclusive recognition at least for the period of a valid contract even though the union may have lost its majority status. Hexton Furniture Co., l l l NLRB 344, Shamrock Dairy, Inc., 124 NLRB 494, 496. Hence, the Respondent was under the duty to bargain during the 60-day insulated period immediately prior to November 30, 1967, the terminal date of the contract. A contrary conclusion may not be sustained for it would allow an employer to rely on employees' rights in refusing to bargain , a course of conduct which is inimical to the underlying purpose of the Act, industrial peace . See Ray Brooks v. N.L.R.B., 348 U.S. 96, 103. The Respondent was not only obligated to bargain for the reasons above detailed, but on and after October 20, 1967, the date its representation petition was filed, it was the Employer's duty to continue to bargain in good faith "at least until the Board ha[d] given some indication that [its] claim ha[d] merit." Ray Brooks v. N.L.R. B., 348 U.S. 96, 103. The Respondent was derelict in this duty. An employer may not ignore, as here, the procedural requirements of the Act which Congress has devised as a means of securing industrial stability and industrial peace, and resort to self-help. Although the Board may, if the facts warrant, revoke a certification or agree not to pursue a charge of an unfair labor practice, these are matters for the Board; they do not justify employer self-help or judicial intervention . The underlying purpose of this statute is industrial peace. To allow employers to rely on employees' rights in refusing to bargain with the formally designated union is not conducive to that end, it is inimical to it. Congress has devised a formal mode significance that the board chairman , Cramer, as detailed above, commenced a course of conduct which contributed to the creation of an atmosphere incompatible with a free and unfettered expression of its employees' choice of a bargaining agent even before the Respondent's RM petition was dismissed and the time for appealing such dismissal had expired. 491 for selection and rejection of bargaining agents and has fixed the spacing of elections, with a view of furthering industrial stability and with due regard to administrative prudence.38 If all employers, sua sponte, determined the statutory bargaining status of the bargaining representative certified for their employees without the discipline of the procedures approved by Congress for such purpose, chaos in industrial relations would result and the uniform system adopted by Congress for promoting industrial peace and stability would be frustrated and flouted . Thus, if the statutory purpose is to be accommodated, the procedural requirements of the Act, which in this case the Respondent pretermitted (including the failure to appeal the Regional Director's dismissal of its RM petition), must be adhered to. That an employer accepts the duty to "recognize the Union for the purpose of administration of the current contract" does not relieve the employer of the obligation to bargain as commanded by Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. The obligation to bargain does not exist piecemeal. Within the duties imposed by the Act it is either plenary or it does not exist at all. Moreover, if an employer during the 60-day insulated period is excused from its obligation to bargain in respect to the negotiating of a new contract, the policy which motivated the Board to institute the 60-day insulated period would be meaningless and fruitless, for the 60-day insulated period was adopted so that "the parties may negotiate and execute a new or amended agreement." Deluxe Metal Furniture Co., 121 NLRB 995, 1000. The Act commands bargaining in good faith in respect to "the negotiations of an ageement." (Sec. 8(d) of the Act.) In this respect the Respondent has failed to fulfill its statutory obligations. Accordingly the Respondent is guilty of a violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. See also Siskin Steel and Supply Co., 160 NLRB 1038. The lines drawn by the Board marking off the 60-day insulated period have prevailed since 1958. These lines drawn on rational considerations must be adhered to (see 10 East 40th Street Bldg., Inc. v. Callus, et al. , 325 U.S. 578, 584) and are as fixed as the Board's now ancient rule that "absent unusual cirsumstances, the majority status of a certified union is presumed to continue for one year from the date of certification"" or as stated in Kimberly-Clark Corporation, 61 NLRB 90, 92 (1945), "in cases rising under Section 9(c), that a Board election and certification must be treated as identifying the statutory bargaining agent with certainty and finality for a reasonable period of time - about a year, under ordinary circumstances." (Emphasis supplied.) The same pursuasive reasons which have caused the Board to adopt this rule, and which were approved by the Supreme Court and allowed to stand by Congress, are equally pursuasive of the appropriateness of the 60-day-insulated-period rule which like the 1-year-certification rule binds the obligation to bargain for a specified period under ordinary or usual circumstances. 4' "Ray Brooks v. N.L.R.B, supra, 103 "Celanese Corporation of America, 95 NLRB 664. "The Trial Examiner has reviewed Kenrich Petrochemicals, Inc., 149 NLRB 910, and Hart Motor Express, Inc., 164 NLRB No. 60, cited by the Respondent, and finds them inapposite . Unlike the instant case, these cases involve circumstances in which there was proof that a majority of the employer's employees had in fact repudiated the union or had in fact selected a new bargaining agent and that such facts were known to the union and to the employer. Here such facts were not credibly proved. 492 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Moreover, an employer must be presumed to know the rule," and, absent unusual circumstances, may rely upon the representation of his employees that, by reason of their failure to raise a question of representation either through a union or by a decertification petition, they choose the continued representation of the certified incumbent union on their behalf for at least the 60-day insulated period . By such inaction, employees manifest an acquiescence in the continued agency of the certified incumbent union . Absent unusual circumstances, the employer may not assert otherwise during the 60-day insulated period. The Respondent specifically requested the Regional Director to weigh the "unusual circumstances" which prompted it to file its RM petition . Apparently the Regional Director was not persuaded . By abandoning its appeal the Respondent left the inference that it was in agreement with the Regional Director. The Trial Examiner, having reviewed the entire record, finds no unusual circumstances which would have relieved the Respondent from its obligation to bargain with the Union as the exclusive bargaining agent of its employees during the 60-day insulated period. It is settled law that an employer who is under a statutory duty to bargain with the designated representative of its employees violates that duty when it unilaterally changes wages or other terms and conditions of employment. N.L.R.B. v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736. The employer violates that duty even if the changes instituted are beneficial to the employees, because such unilateral action in and of itself "amount [s] to a refusal to negotiate about the affected conditions of employment . . . and must of necessity obstruct bargaining, contrary to the congressional policy." N.L.R.B. v. Katz, supra, 369 U.S. at 747. Since the Union remained the statutory bargaining agent on and after October 18, 1967, the unilateral institution of economic and noneconomic benefits thereafter was a refusal to bargain in violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. N.L.R.B. v. Mid- West Towel and Linen Service, Inc., 339 F.2d 958 , 963, 964 (C.A. 7). IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of the Respondent set forth in section III, above, occurring in connection with the Respondent's operations described in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. V. RECOMMENDED REMEDY The Supreme Court has lately said that "the business of the Board, among other things, is to adjudicate and remedy unfair labor practices," and that the "grant of remedial power is a broad one." N.L.R.B. v. Joseph T. Strong, d/b/a Strong Roofing & Insulating, 393 U.S. 357. Justice Harlan has written: The primary purpose of the provision for other affirmative relief has been held to be to enable the Board to take measures designed to recreate the conditions and relationships that would have been had 17he Respondent wrote the Board , "Although we understand that the Board does not normally process petitions filed within 60 days of the contract expiration date, we request that the enclosed petition be processed in view of the unusual circumstances. .."(Emphasis supplied.) there been no unfair labor practice." In Republic Steel Corporation v. N.L.R.B., 311 U.S. 7, 10, Chief Justice Hughes, speaking for the court, said: The remedial purposes of the Act are quite clear. It is aimed, as the Act says (Sec. 1) at encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and at protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, of self organization and of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection through their freely chosen representative. [Emphasis supplied.] The appropriate remedy which will effectuate the policies of the Act is deemed to require the restoration of the status quo ante which the employees would have enjoyed except for the employers' misconduct, for a failure to restore the status quo ante "allows the employer to retain the fruits of its unfair labor practices ." Beacon Piece Dyeing and Finishing Co., Inc., 121 NLRB 953, 963. See also N.L.R.B. v. Armco Drainage & Metal Products, Inc., 220 F.2d 573 (C.A. 6); Piasecki Aircraft Corporation v. N.L.R. B., 280 F.2d 575, 591 (C.A. 3). The Respondent in the instant case is presently enjoying the fruits of its unfair labor practices. It has been operating and continues to operate its business without response to a collective-bargaining agent and is currently enjoying benefits which come by reason of the Union's forced impotency as a collective-bargaining agent. The Respondent, by its tactics, has unlawfully interfered with the balance of bargaining power which the Act anticipates will be maintained. Moreover, the bargaining impotency foisted upon the Union and the Employer 's grant of benefits, in total disregard of the Union's statutory role, were and are powerful incentives for discouraging employees' participation in union activities. On the other hand, employees lost what benefits may have been gained through collective bargaining during the period in which the Respondent refused to assume and fulfill its statutory duty to bargain . Additionally, by reason of the Respondent's unfair labor practices, the Union was denied the opportunity of increasing and retaining its membership and, by its bargaining with the Respondent , demonstrate to the employees that it was a satisfactory and desirable collective-bargaining instrument. The language of the Board in International Broadcasting Corporation (KWKH), 99 NLRB 130, 133, seems appropos: It was the duty of the Respondent to refrain from disturbing the status quo by coercive conduct pending the resolution of the representation question, and to permit the Union to have a free opportunity to increase and retain its membership by legitimate organizational activity and to participate in a free and uncoerced election, which would determine whether or not it was the statutory representative International Broadcasting Corporation (KWKH), 99 NLRB 130, 133. The Union had the right during the 60 -day insulated period to press its bargaining prerogatives and the employees had the right to enjoy any fruits which may have resulted therefrom . The time open for testing the majority status of the Union, if need be , was after the Employer had fulfilled its statutory obligation to bargain in good faith . Indeed, it may be anticipated that, if bargaining in good faith had shown promise, employee adherence to the Union may have been so demonstrated as to have dispelled Respondent's alleged good-faith "Local 60, United Brotherhood of Carpenters [Mechanical Handling Systems] v. N.L.R. B., 365 U .S. 651, 657. INGRESS-PLASTENE, INC. 493 doubts as to the Union ' s majority status. Hence, the procedures and practices of collective bargaining would have been accommodated and the stability in industrial relations envisioned by the Act maintained for the Respondent's plant. The restoration of the status quo ante compels that the Respondent be ordered to bargain in good faith at least during a period equal to that during which the Respondent unlawfully deprived its employees of the services of their statutory bargaining agent . Such period was a minimum of 44 days. (October 18, 1967, to November 30, 1967.) Thus the Trial Examiner recommends that the Respondent be required to bargain in good faith in accordance with the duties imposed by the Act for a period of 44 days and thereafter (in the event a question of representation is asserted) until such time as the Board has given some indication that the claim has merit. The 44 days shall commence to run upon the Union 's request for bargaining but, not later than 10 days after the notice herein recommended for posting is posted. If the Employer "dilly-dallies" so as to exhaust the 44 days or engages in tactics repugnant to the demands of good-faith bargaining," the order to bargain shall continue until the Respondent has discharged its statutory duty of good-faith bargaining. During the period established for good-faith bargaining, if an understanding is reached, the understanding shall be embodied in a signed agreement. The purpose of the 44-day period referred to above is to insure that the employees in the appropriate unit will be accorded the services of their selected collective-bargaining agent for the period provided by law. The 44-day period will restore for the Union the time it had left on October 18, 1967, in which to bargain and prove the worth of its services prior to a lawful presentment to the Board of a question of representation. Thus the Trial Examiner further recommends that, if Respondent fulfills its duty to bargain in good faith as herein recommended, the order to bargain herein recommended shall not constitute a bar to the resolution of a question of representation , if one exists within the meaning of the Act and the Board's Rules and Regulations at the expiration of the 44 days." CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5). 3. All production, maintenance, and warehouse employees of Respondent employed at its Crawfordsville, Indiana, plant and warehouse, exclusive of administrative executives, salesmen, office clerical employees, professional employees, foremen, assistant foremen, guards, and all other supervisors as defined in the Act constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act. ""An unpretending, sincere intention and effort to arrive at an agreement is required by statute"; N L.R.B. v. Stanislaus Implement and Hardware, Ltd., 226 F.2d 377, 380 (C.A. 9). "[G]ood faith bargaining" requires the parties to negotiate "with a desire to reach agreement," N.L.R.B. v. Insurance Agents' International Union, 361 U.S. 477, 488. 'The Trial Examiner is of the further opinion that the remedy for the 8(ax5) violations of the Act recommended by the Trial Examiner in Stayer's Johnsonville Meats , Inc., 164 NLRB No. 94, is appropriate in this case. 4. On October 18, 1967, and at all times thereafter, the Union has been and is the exclusive representative of all employees in the aforesaid appropriate unit for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act. 5. By refusing on October 18, 1967, and at all times thereafter, to bargain collectively with the Union as the exclusive bargaining representative of the employees of Respondent in the appropriate unit, Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. 6. By unilaterally granting wage increases on December 1, 1967, the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. 7. By interfering with, restraining, and coercing its employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act, the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 8. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. RECOMMENDED ORDER Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law and upon the entire record in this case, it is recommended that the Respondent, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Refusing to bargain collectively with International Union, Allied Industrial Workers of America, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive bargaining representative of its employees in the following appropriate unit: All production , maintenance and warehouse employees of Respondent employed at its Crawfordsville, Indiana plant and warehouse exclusive of administrative executives, salesmen, office clerical employees, professional employees, foremen, assistant foremen, guards and all supervisors as defined in the Act. (b) Unlawfully changing unilateral working conditions of its employees. (c) Unlawfully interrogating any of its employees. (d) Unlawfully soliciting its employees to withdraw their checkoff authorizations to the Union. (e) Unlawfully engaging in surveillance of its employees' union activities. (f) Unlawfully threatening employees that it will not enter into any contract with the employees' majority representative. 2. Take the following affirmative action which it is found will effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Upon request, bargain collectively with the International Union, Allied Industrial Workers of America, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive representative of all the employees in the appropriate unit described above with respect to rates of pay, hours of employment, and other terms and conditions of employment, including changes in working conditions put into effect on December 1, 1967, and thereafter and if an understanding is reached embody such understanding in a signed agreement. (b) Post at its Crawfordsville, Indiana, plant copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix.""' Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 25, after being duly signed by the Respondent's representative, shall be posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive "In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, 494 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered , defaced, or covered by any other material. (c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 25, in writing, within 20 days from the receipt of this Decision, what steps have been taken to comply herewith.'6 IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the complaint be dismissed insofar as it alleges violations of the Act other than those found in this Decision. the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the notice. In the further event that the Board's Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision and Order " "In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, this provision shall he modified to read : "Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order , what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith." APPENDIX NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our employees that: The Act gives all employees these rights: To organize themselves To form and join or help unions To bargain as a group through representatives they choose To act together for collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection To refuse to do any or all of these things WE WILL NOT do anything that interferes with these rights. WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with International Union, Allied Industrial Workers of America, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive representative of the employees in the bargaining unit described below. WE WILL NOT interfere with the efforts of International Union, Allied Industrial Workers of America, AFL-CIO, to negotiate for or represent as exclusive bargaining agent of the employees in the bargaining unit described below. WE WILL, upon request, bargain with the above-named Union as the exclusive bargaining representative of all the employees in the bargaining unit described below with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and, other conditions of employment and, if an understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agreement. The bargaining unit is: All production, maintenance and warehouse employees of Respondent employed at its Crawfordsville, Indiana plant and warehouse exclusive of administrative executives, salesmen, office clerical employees, professional employees, foremen, assistant foremen, guards and all supervisors as defined in the Act. WE WILL NOT unilaterally change the working conditions of our employees. WE WILL NOT unlawfully interrogate our employees about their union activities. WE WILL NOT engage in surveillance of our em loyees' union activities. WE WILL NOT unlawfully encourage employees or persuade them in any manner to revoke any checkoff authorizations which they have given to the Employer on behalf of the Union. All of you are free to become or remain , or refrain from becoming or remaining , members of any labor organization. Dated By INGRESS-PLASTENE, INC. (Employer) (Representative) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. If employees have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions , they may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, 614 ISTA Center, 150 West Market Street, Indianapolis, Indiana 46204, Telphone 317-633-8921.