Blue Jeans Corp.

198 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Blue Jeans Corporation and Whiteville Manufacturing Company and Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, AFL-CIO. Case 11-CA-3543 June 30, 1969 DECISION AND ORDER BY MEMBERS BROWN, JENKINS, AND ZAGORIA The case was tried before me on June 4, 5, 27, and 28, 1968, at Whiteville, North Carolina. The parties were afforded full opportunity to file briefs with me and, subsequently, I received briefs from the General Counsel and the Charging Party on August 22, 1968. Upon the entire record in the case, including his observation of the witnesses , I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. JURISDICTION On November 6, 1968, Trial Examiner Ramey Donovan issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceedings, finding that the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices within the meaning of the Act, and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. Thereafter, the Respondent and Charging Party filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision and briefs in support of these exceptions. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearings and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in this proceeding, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board hereby adopts as its Order the Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner and orders that the Respondent, Blue Jeans Corporation and Whiteville Manufacturing Company, Whiteville, North Carolina, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order. TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION RAMEY DONOVAN, Trial Examiner: Subsequent to the filing of a charge by the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, AFL-CIO, on February 9, 1968 , herein the Union, the General Counsel of the Board issued a complaint under date of April 16, 1968 , against Blue Jeans Corporation and Whiteville Manufacturing Company, herein Respondent or the Company. The substance of the complaint is the allegation that Respondent has refused to bargain collectively with the Union, the certified collective-bargaining representative of the employees in the appropriate unit , in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. Respondent in its answer denies the aforesaid complaint allegations. Blue Jeans Corporation is a North Carolina corporation with a place of business in Whiteville, North Carolina, where it is engaged in the sale of children's outer garments at wholesale. During the past 12 months, a representative period, Blue Jeans Corporation sold and shipped from its place of business at Whiteville, children's wear valued in excess of $50,000, to points directly outside the State of North Carolina. Whiteville Manufacturing Company is a North Carolina corporation having a plant and place of business in Whiteville, North Carolina, where it manufactures and processes children' s garments, such garments being the property of Blue Jeans Corporation. In a representative 12-month period, Whiteville Manufacturing Company bought and received in its manufacturing processes materials valued in excess of $50,000, such materials having originated from points outside the State of North Carolina. Whiteville Manufacturing Company and Blue Jeans Corporation, at all times material, are affiliated businesses with common officers, ownership, directors and operators and constitute a single integrated business enterprise. Said officers, directors and operators formulate and administer a common labor policy for the aforementioned companies. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. II. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The Appropriate Unit and the Union's Representative Status It is found that the following, as previously determined by the Board, constitutes an appropriate unit for purposes of collective bargaining : all production and maintenance employees at the Respondent's Whiteville, North Carolina, plant, including maintenance mechanics and quality control girls, but excluding office clerical employees, the carpenter, the time motion and engineer trainee, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act. The Union was certified by the Board as the exclusive representative of the employees in the appropriate unit on October 16, 1967. The certification followed a secret-ballot election among the employees in the unit that was conducted by the Board on October 6, 1967, and in which a majority of the employees in the unit voted for the Union. B. The Negotiations Representatives of the Union and the Respondent met with each other in 10 mutually agreed upon meetings in Whiteville on the following dates: October 18, 19, 31, 1967; November 16; December 5 and 20, 1967; January 4, 177 NLRB No. 97 BLUE JEANS CORPORATION 18, 19, 25, 1968. The principal negotiator and spokesman for the Respondent was Regen, the executive vice president, who was present at all the sessions. Rodenborn, Respondent' s general manager, was also present at all meetings except the morning session of the January 25 meeting. Shay, the plant manager was present at three meetings, January 4 and 18, and the morning session on January 25 . McGill, an International representative of the Union in the geographical area where Respondent's plant was located, headed the union group at the October 18 and 19 meetings, which consisted of herself and a union committee of employees . The latter committee was also present at all subsequent meetings . McGill was present at all meetings except December 20. English , vice president of the Union in charge of the Southern area, was the principal union spokesman on October 31, November 16, January 4, 18, 19 and 25. Sydney , assistant southern director for the Union, headed the union group on December 5 and 20. Eames, an attorney for the Union, was present at all meetings at which English was present. The October 18 meeting was apparently initiated by the Respondent. According to McGill and Regen, whose testimony is in substantial agreement regarding the October 18 and 19 meetings, the Company explained that it found it necessary to curtail work in the plant to about 3 days a week . Economic reasons were given and the matter was discussed . The Union raised no objection. The Union, however, suggested that as far as practicable the available work should be divided equally among all employees on the job or in the section . The Company agreed to the foregoing and confirmed this agreement by letter of October 23. The aforementioned division of work agreement was placed in effect by the Company and was company policy until sometime in March 1968. The Company adhered to the policy of equal sharing of work until about March 7, 1968.' At approximately that time, according to the uncontroverted testimony of three employees, Nye, Smith, and Mincey, their supervisor, Register, advised them individually that higher management had informed Register that thereafter the low producers would have to stay home and that the high producers would work during periods of scarce work.' This change of policy was a unilateral act and was not discussed with the Union beforehand . The announced change of policy was also at variance with the agreement or understanding reached with the Union in October 1967. After the meetings of October 18 and 19, 1967, the Union presented a written contract proposal to the Company on October 31. The Company presented a written contract proposal to the Union on December 5, 1967. Another written contract proposal was submitted by the Company on January 4, 1968. The latter proposal was substantially the same as the original company proposal. The principal changes were a reduction of the trial period for new employees from 90 to 60 days, the Union having proposed 30 days; an elimination of the no-strike, no lock-out provision; and two paragraphs added to the recognition clause, whereby union representatives desiring to talk to employees regarding grievances or other union representation matters could come to the company office and ask for such employees and arrange for interviews if 'Prior to the October 1967 agreement between the Company and the Union about the equal sharing or rotation of work among employees during slack periods, the Company had handled slack periods by laying off low producing employees and retaining the high producers. 'For the next few weeks there was apparently no shortage of work in the department and thereafter a strike occurred 199 such could be held without interfering with plant work; and a statement that employees outside the unit would not ordinarily perform unit work, except in emergency situations. From October 31 , 1967, on, the parties in their meetings went over and discussed the various provisions of their respective proposals. The net result of all the negotiations, as described by Regen in his testimony, was that tentative agreement on the provisions of a contract was extremely meager and was limited to such items as the statement in the preamble of the Union's contract proposal that it was the intent of the parties through the contract to promote and improve industrial and economic relationships between them; the recognition clause whereby the Union was recognized as the representative of the employees in the unit; and the trial period for new employees to be 60 days instead of 30 or 90 days. It is therefore the period aforementioned , from October 31, that will merit our principal attention. In order to determine whether there has or has not been a violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act, it is necessary to consider the total relationship involving the two parties to the negotiations.' Since the aforementioned section represents "the policy of Congress ... to impose a mutual duty upon the parties to confer in good faith with a desire to reach agreement,"' the determination of "good faith" and "a desire to reach agreement" requires careful analysis of all relevant factors . These factors are not infrequently of a circumstantial rather than of a direct nature because of the very nature of Section 8 (a)(5) of the Act.' At the request of counsel for the General Counsel at the hearing, I have taken official notice of a Board and Trial Examiner's decision involving Respondent's conduct in May and June 1967 when the instant union was engaged in organizing activity at Respondent' s Whiteville plant.' In the above case, it was found that Respondent had strongly and illegally opposed the advent of the Union in its plant. Among the findings it was determined that Respondent had discharged five employees because of their union activities and the Board ordered their reinstatement. It was found that Respondent had illegally interrogated, surveilled, and threatened employees, including statements by the general manager to employees that "signing a union card was a pathway to trouble and that he would take whatever steps or means were necessary to keep the Union from coming in .... In the instant case where I must appraise the "good faith" of the parties in their collective bargaining and determine whether they bargained "with a desire to reach agreement," the manifest hostility of Respondent to having the Union in its plant, as found in the cited case, is 'A "determination of good faith or want of good faith normally can rest only on an inference based upon more or less persuasive manifestations of another's state of mind . The previous relations of the parties, antecedent events explaining behavior at the bargaining table, and the course of negotiations constitute the raw facts for reaching such a determination " Local 833, UA W Y. N L R B., 300 F.2d 699, 706 (C A.D.C.), citing concurring opinion in N.L R B Y. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U S. 149, 155. 'N.L R.B v. Insurance Agents International Union, 361 U S 477, 488. 'As stated by the Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, "there is a duty on both sides, though difficult of legal enforcement, to enter into discussion with an open and fair mind, and a sincere purpose to find a basis of` agreement . ... N L.R B v. Herman Sausage Company, 275 F.2d 229, 231, Globe Cotton Mills v. N.L.R B., 103 F. 2d 91, 94. `Blue Jeans Corporation and Whttevdle Manufacturing Company, 170 NLRB No 149 200 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD a circumstance that is not to be ignored . But, by the same token it is a circumstance that is not to be exaggerated or to be made the determinant in the present case . After the Union was certified in October 1967, Respondent may have changed its feeling and thinking about having a union in its plant and may have determined to completely fulfill its obligation to bargain in good faith and with a desire to reach agreement. On the other hand, the hostility toward the Union may have been so basic that ostensible compliance with the law may have concealed a closed mind and an unwillingness to bargain in good faith with a desire to reach a viable agreement. The findings and conclusions that we are required to make in cases of this nature are not easy and to carry out this task we must resort to the record before us and our analysis and appraisal of all relevant factors. The evidence reveals that, shortly before the commencement of negotiations, the Company, on October 23, 1967, had posted a notice to its employees in which it referred to the fact that the Union had won the election and thereby became the bargaining agent . The notice, while stating that an employee could join the Union if he wished, confined its physical underscoring to, and repeatedly emphasized that "nobody will have to join the Union - either now or hereafter - in order to work in this Plant . . . But any employee who does not want to join the Union, is equally free to stay out of the Union . . .. Nobody who works here has to join any Union - and nobody who works here will ever have to join a Union - in order to hold a job in this Plant." The message of the notice in itself is unexceptional and Respondent was certainly within its rights in posting such a notice. Although North Carolina is a "right to work" state whose law has prohibited compulsory union membership for a period of years, we can have no quarrel with a company advising its employees that no one had to join the Union in order to work in its plant. Our interest in the notice is focused solely on whether it sheds any light on Respondent's state of mind toward the Union on the eve of the collective bargaining between the parties. The crux and the repeated emphasis of the notice was that no employee had to join or support the Union. Is the emphasis a projection of the basic hostility of the "old" preelection Respondent who discharged union adherents and warned employees that it would take whatever steps were necessary to thwart the Union; and is the Respondent's state of mind that of one who believes that, while the Union may have won the election, we will stress to the employees that they neither have to join it or support it? Was the Respondent basically unreconciled to having a Union or a viable union in its plant? Or does the notice reflect a state of mind in which the Union is accepted and the Respondent has put aside any thought of undermining the Union' s status as the choice of the majority of the employees; and does it reflect that Respondent is prepared to bargain in good faith in a genuine effort to reach agreement and establish a viable relationship with the Union as the representative of all employees in the unit? Or is the notice indicative of nothing regarding Respondent's attitude toward the presence of a union in the plant or toward its relationship with the union or toward its state of mind in contract negotiations? Quite clearly none of these questions can be answered satisfactorily or convincingly on the basis of the October 23 notice alone . It is simply a particle in a congeries of facts that must be evaluated in overall context. Coming now to the negotiations, the evidence reveals that the parties had no particular problem over a preamble statement in the contract whereby the intent was expressed that the contract would promote and improve their industrial and economic relationship. They also agreed on the "coverage" clause describing the unit of employees covered by the contract. The same was true of the recognition clause whereby the Union was recognized as the bargaining representative. The parties reached tentative agreement on a 60-day trial period for new employees. But that was about the extent of any mutuality. During the negotiations, the Union objected to article IV which was in both company contract proposals. The article stated that employees were free to be members of the Union or not to be members of the Union and were free to support or not support the Union and that neither the Company nor the Union would discriminate against employees because of membership or nonmembership in the Union. The Union's position was that the provision, about employees being able to be members of the Union or not to be members or to support or not support the Union, was in the nature of an advertisement or encouragement to employees not to join or support the Union and that it was a hostile gesture that was unnecessary as a contract provision if the parties were dealing in good faith. It was further pointed out that the employees already knew what the law was.' The Union also expressed the view during the negotiations that the Company's article IV was in conflict with the union cards that employees had signed when they had joined the Union.' Despite the Union's objections to the clause, the Company remained firm in its position that the provision must be included in any contract. As to the Company's reason for this position, Regen testified that he told the Union "we wanted the statement [the provision] to stick [remain in the contract proposal of the Company and in any contract agreed upon]" ... because "it is a law of the Federal Government and the State law" that a employee has "the right to join or not join the Union." The Union continued to oppose the inclusion of article IV in a contract,' referring to it as a hostile gesture by Respondent, a sentiment no doubt stemming from Respondent's prior effort to prevent the Union securing bargaining status in the plant and the Union's scepticism that Respondent had reconciled itself to having a viable union in the plant. In the course of negotiations, however, the Union did propose that it would withdraw its objection to the provision if Respondent would yield on Respondent's refusal to agree to a checkoff provision. Respondent did not alter its position either as to its refusal to agree to a checkoff or its insistence on the inclusion of its article IV. Article IV was certainly in itself a legal provision. It cannot be said that an employer who demands such a provision in a contract is thereby refusing to bargain in 'As previously mentioned, North Carolina is a state with a "right to work" law. Respondent had also posted a notice in the plant on October 23 advising the employees very clearly that no one had to join or to support the Union. 'The cards were a combination of union membership and an authorization for dues checkoff, the latter with a defined escape period. 'The Union had not objected to the October 23 notice advising employees of their rights but apparently believed that the incorporation of such advice or information was not appropriate in the contract and was not consistent with the mutual trust that was supposed to exist between the parties. BLUE JEANS CORPORATION good faith. But each case must turn upon its own circumstances and facts. The Union in the instant case had been exposed to a strong campaign by the Respondent against having its employees joining or supporting the Union. Respondent had made it clear that it did not want its employees to join or support the Union and had threatened and discharged employees in the implementation of its position. On October 23, after the election, Respondent, by notice, emphasized that employees need not join or support the Union albeit they were free to do so. Presumably, in view of the notice and the state law, employees were fully aware of their rights. Thereafter, the same theme as aforementioned was incorporated in Respondent's article IV and was undeviatingly adhered to by Respondent despite the fact that it becomes an obstacle, although , in my opinion, perhaps not a major one, to the parties reaching some common grounds and a state of mutual trust. The parties were obliged to negotiate in an effort to reach an agreement. They were not obliged to make concessions but they were obliged to give some manifestation of a desire for mutual understanding . Respondent stated that it would not yield on article IV because the Federal and State law provided that employees were not obliged to join or support a union. No one was contending to the contrary. Nor was there any claim by Respondent that the Union had been informing employees that because the Union had won the election all employees must therefore join the Union. Ordinarily, although the law contains many provisions in addition to those regarding the rights of employees to join or not to join a union, a contract is not regarded as a vehicle for memoralizing what is provided by the law itself. If there is some particular conduct, as, for instance, statements or leaflets by the Union that all employees must join the Union in order to work, then an effort or insistence by an employer to incorporate in the contract a provision that employees were free to join or not to join the Union would be understandable. But, as indicated, such factors are not here present. There had been, in fact, substantial emphasis and conduct by Respondent against employees exercising their right to join the Union. The conduct included threats and illegal discharges . And, on the eve of contract negotiations, Respondent, by notice, had left no doubt in the mind of anyone that no one had to join the Union in order to work for Respondent. The Union' s contract proposal included a provision preventing removal of the plant without union consent and a prohibition on subcontracting work out of the plant when the employees in the Whiteville plant had insufficient work. Respondent said that it had no intention of removing the plant but did not wish to write a plant removal provision in the contract . The matter of subcontracting was a topic of considerable discussion. Respondent at first said that it would not agree to the proposal. The Union pointed out that the Company had a nonunion plant in Henderson or Hendersonville and that the Union wanted to be sure that the Whiteville plant maintained an equal share of the work. Respondent said that it planned to share the work equally and fairly. Respondent said that it would present a counterproposal to the Union on the subject of subcontracting. Later, when the Union requested the counterproposal, Respondent said that it had changed its mind and it had no counterproposal to present because of the difficulty of writing such a clause. In this connection, Regen testified that he told the Union that Respondent had "a complex contracting operation" and had many items made outside 201 the plant and "that I couldn't even come up with the proper wording of how to handle this thing in a contract . On "hours of work," the Union contract proposal was that the regular daily hours of work , the starting and quitting time, be mutually agreed upon by the Company and the Union; that overtime be paid for hours in excess of 40 per week or 8 hours in any one day; that the Company give reasonable notice of when overtime was to be worked . Respondent did not agree that hours should be mutually agreed upon. Respondent said that it had no plan or intention of changing existing hours of work. The Union then proposed that the contract provide that existing hours would prevail and would remain the same or that existing hours be written into the contract. Respondent said that it did not wish to put that in writing in the contract. On overtime, Respondent said that it would continue to pay overtime for hours in excess of 40 per week as required by law . Respondent did not agree to pay overtime for hours in excess of 8 in any one day. Regen testified that there was no agreement on hours of work and overtime. Respondent's second contract proposal did provide that the Company would give notice by noon of the day on which overtime was to be worked to the employees affected. On January 23, 1968 the Respondent, without prior discussion with the Union, placed a notice to employees on the bulletin board. The notice stated that as of February 5, the working hours for everyone would be: 7:30-4:30; lunch hour, 12-1; break periods to remain the same, and the concluding statement , "We hope this change is to everyone's advantage and your cooperation will be appreciated." Regen testified that the change in hours was prompted by the fact that the plant had over 300 less employees than previously and that it was no longer necessary to have a 10 minute differential in the hours of the employees. Regen states that at the January 25 meeting he asked the Union if it had any objections and that the Union was noncommittal, so the change was placed in effect pursuant to the January 23 notice. There is no claim that the matter was mentioned by the Respondent at the January 18 or 19 meetings or at anytime prior to the posting of the notice. Although the change was relatively minor, the decision and announcement was a unilateral action and the notice was promulgated as a definitive policy to employees prior to any mention to the Union." On the Union's proposal for equal division of work when there was insufficient work , Respondent's second written proposal did embody this provision, "providing that this does not interfere with operating efficiency." As we have seen, a change in this policy was announced in about March 7, 1968, when certain employees were informed that management would revert to the former policy of laying off low producers and retaining only the high producers during slack periods. The Union proposed 2 weeks' vacation and a provision that the vacation pay be paid to employees entitled to it on the payday immediately before vacation. As to holidays, the Union proposed 7 holidays, and also proposed coverage by the insurance program that the Union had in effect in the garment industry. On vacation, holidays, and insurance, the Respondent adhered consistently to the position that it would provide no more "I credit Regen that he did mention the matter on January 25 as he testified. English had no recollection of such a conversation but was less than certain on this aspect. 202 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD than its existing benefits on these items ; i.e., 1 week's vacation, four holidays, and the existing insurance." At one meeting, a member of the union negotiating committee mentioned the possibility of six holidays. The Union also submitted a modification of its proposal regarding the eligibility requirements of employees for various vacation entitlements . On insurance, the Union said that it is primarily interested in increased insurance benefits for the employees and it would entertain a company proposal for increasing benefits under the existing company plan or under some other insurance carrier. Without alteration, Respondent rejected any change in existing vacations , holidays, and insurance on the ground that its benefits on vacations and holidays were as good as those prevailing within a 25 -mile area of the plant and above the area insurance benefits , and it saw no reason to change. With respect to the Union's written contract provision that vacation pay be paid before the vacation commenced, Respondent said that it was its practice to do this but it did not wish to put it in the contract . Neither of the Company's written contract proposals contained this provision . Regen testified that the aforementioned provision "was not a big thing, we would have included it, and it was nothing final on my part that we would not include it." The witness was thereafter asked: Q. Did you agree to put it [the provision] in there [in the contract]? A. No. Article XIX of the Union's proposal provided that "all existing rules, regulations and shop practices of the employer that are more favorable to the employees shall continue in full force and effect." Respondent stated that it had no intention of changing the existing practices and rules but saw no reason for putting this in writing. The Company did not include this provision or any similar provision in any of its contract proposals . Regen testified regarding the above provision about maintaining existing practices that " . . . you never know what's going to happen tomorrow ... the clause you are referring to, you can't really agree to anything you don' t know about, you have so many changes . . . you can't agree to what you can't see and I had a feeling that that clause was way beyond what you saw." The union contract proposal provided that the Company would permit union representatives to visit the plant at any time during working hours . It was proposed that the Company make available to the Union "such payroll and production records as the Union may reasonably require as the collective-bargaining agent." Also, that the Company "shall inform the Union as to all new employees hired and employees whose services have been terminated and the reasons therefor." The Union asked for this information on a weekly basis. The two written proposals of Respondent dealt with the foregoing matters to the following extent : A provision in the recognition clause of both company proposals to the effect that "the Company will recognize and deal with such representatives of the employees as the Union may select or appoint"; a provision in the seniority clause of both Company proposals stating that the Company would prepare a seniority list of all employees in the unit and "The Company's second written proposed contract, like the first, set forth the existing situation in the plant on these items. For instance, ".. . the Company shall continue to provide and pay for employee insurance benefits to the same extent that it now provides and pays for such benefits." this list to be revised every 6 months and a copy furnished to the Union every 6 months. The Company's second written proposal included a provision that union representatives, desiring to talk with employees regarding grievances or other matters of representation and administration of the contract, may come to the Company's office and ask for such employees. Arrangements would then be made for the Union to interview such employees provided that it could be done as not to interfere substantially with work or production. The foregoing matters were discussed at length. The testimony in the record indicates that the inclusion of the union proposal for payroll and production records that the Union might reasonably require as bargaining agent was rejected as too broad by the Company. The Company said that it was prepared to furnish specific information on some item that might arise in the course of a grievance but not otherwise. The Company rejected the request for a weekly report or list of hires and terminations on the ground that this would be clerically burdensome. The Union proposed a biweekly list but this was rejected on the same ground. With respect to the Union's proposal that its representative have free access to the plant, the positions of the parties came down to the following: the Union wanted unhampered opportunity to enter the plant to investigate complaints or grievances ; the Company said that the Union representative could have such access I hour a week during working time at an agreed upon time. The Union said that some weeks it would require little or no time in the plant but in other occasions it would require more than 1 hour and therefore the proposal of the Company was not acceptable. At the hearing, Respondent stated that it also made it clear to the Union that, in the 1 hour a week proposed, the Union need not limit the visit to grievance matters but could check on other matters including hires and terminations. The parties negotiated regarding a contractual grievance procedure. They reached substantial agreement regarding various steps to be followed regarding grievances with the exception of the ultimate disposition of grievances that were not resolved through the grievance procedure. The union contract proposal provided for arbitration as the final step in the grievance procedure. The Company said that it was opposed to having any provision for arbitration in the contract. The topic of arbitration was discussed at substantially all the meetings of the parties. The Union argued that without an orderly way of disposing of unresolved grievances, the only alternative was for the Union to have the right to strike and that in a piece rate industry where there might be 30 or 40 disputes in a week there could be numerous or almost continuous strikes . Regen and Rodenborn testified that at one point the Union said that it would relinquish arbitration if it had the right to strike. The union witnesses deny this and state that at all times the Union stressed that it considered arbitration a vital necessity in the contract. My opinion is that at one point the Company apparently concluded that the Union had posed the right to strike as an alternative to arbitration and the Company, in its second proposed contract, did eliminate the no-strike clause that had been contained in its first proposal. I do not believe that the Union had said in substance that it would forego arbitration if the no -strike clause was eliminated and if it had the right to strike over unresolved grievances. In any event, whatever the precise language was on the occasion when striking was mentioned as the BLUE JEANS CORPORATION alternative to arbitration , the evidence satisfies me that it was part of the Union's attempt to secure an arbitration clause. Unsuccessfully, the Union apparently hoped that it might persuade the Company that it was preferable to have arbitration rather than strikes. However the Company may have construed what the Union said at one point, the record is clear that after this occasion the Company was aware that the Union considered arbitration an essential part of any contract that might be negotiated and that arbitration was a major source of disagreement. Witnesses for both parties agree on this. In the negotiations the Company said that it wanted no arbitration provision in the contract because it did not want a professor or other outsider deciding what was right or wrong in the plant and that arbitration would in effect take control of the plant out of the Company 's hands. The Union stated that the arbitrator need not be a professor but could be anyone of standing and that the Company could make up a list of persons who would be acceptable as arbitrators and the Union would see if it could agree to the names. The Company said it was opposed to arbitration in the contract. The Union pointed out that the Company had arbitration clauses in some of its commercial contracts and had won one such case that was arbitrated . While admitting the foregoing, the Company still said that it did not want arbitration in the labor contract. At the hearing, Regen testified that the Union in the negotiations would agree to practically any grievance procedure providing that the last step was arbitration. Regen states that he told the Union that he had serious misgivings about a preacher or law professor coming in and running the plant . The witness also testified that while the Company did have arbitration clauses in some of its commercial contracts he could not see any similarity between those situations and a labor contract. The Union's contract proposal provided for a checkoff of dues by the Company upon written authorization of individual union members. During the negotiations the Respondent said that it would not agree to a checkoff of dues. Various reasons were given for this position. Respondent asserted that the paperwork entailed would be burdensome . The Union pointed out that the Company already checked off insurance premiums from employees' pay. Respondent has stated that it believed that employees would be upset and unhappy about having dues deducted from their pay by the Company . It was also stated by the Company that it did not consider a checkoff to be any of its business and that it did not want to participate in the administration of employees' responsibilities to the Union. Regen testified that the Company was under a "lot of pressure" from employees in the plant, who had signed Union cards, that they did not want any part of the Union or deductions of dues from their pay. Regen states that he told the Union that he would not agree to a checkoff because it put the Company in the middle and that while the Union had won the election it did not have a majority thereafter and the Company did not want to have employees discontented over checkoff deductions from their pay . Rodenborn testified that during negotiation the Company told the Union that some employees who had signed union cards told their supervisor that they did not want deductions from their pay to the Union . Rodenborn also testified that employees generally resented having money deducted from their pay. Both Regen and Rodenborn testified that 10 or more years ago the Company had a voluntary payroll deduction savings plan for employees but had discontinued it because it created a 203 great many problems caused by employees repeatedly changing their minds . A new plant manager at one point had started having deductions made from employees' pay so that employee debts for retail purchases from the Company could be liquidated . This was stopped , however, as soon as higher management became aware of the situation. Regen testified that he also told the Union when he rejected the checkoff that there were alternatives but he never mentioned or proposed what the alternatives were. In his testimony, Regen, apparently by way of explanation for the last mentioned lack of explication of what the Company considered to be possible alternatives , stated that the Union never proposed alternatives to checkoff. Very briefly summarized , the Union's written contract proposal on wages provided that "wages would be paid in accordance with currently mutually agreed upon time and piece rates . ." By letter of November 22, 1967, the Union advised the Company that its economic demands were: that the contract provide for an increase of 15 cents per hour across the board and that after the increase was placed in effect that the Company "set rates so that the average piece work operator working in normal conditions who is fully trained shall have the opportunity to earn $1.85 per hour." The Company's two written contract proposals both provided that "Piece rates shall be increased by an average of 14.3 percent per hundred or the equivalent of .20 per hour to the piece worker. This increase will raise the piece rate base for sewing machine operators to $1.85 per hour, so that experienced operators should average $1.85 per hour." Before proceeding to describe the negotiations on wages, it is pertinent to observe that approximately 95 percent of Respondent's employees were piece workers. The latter work on a piece rate basis which is a system geared to provide an incentive to the piece worker so that she will maximize her production . In a plant such as Respondent's there are a large number of different operations, e.g., to mention a few, hem hip pocket; hem drop watch pocket; serge facings; set facings; hang pocket; tack pocket; set zipper; set hip pocket and so forth. Each operation has its own piece rate . Within each operation there are also different piece rates, as, for instance, for different items, styles, sizes, and materials. Thus, style 7000, dungarees for boys 3-7 years , would have a rate different from that of a man's garment for men size 42-46 and there would be differences according to the weight, bulk, and ease or difficulty of working on the particular fabric. The piece rate for particular operations is in essence based upon a time study of the actual individual operation by an industrial engineer . The engineer makes a determination regarding each operation of how many units per hour an average experienced employee working at a normal pace can produce. The aforesaid number of units is thereupon determined to be the standard for the particular operation . In arriving at the standard, the engineer has taken into consideration not only the factors mentioned above, such as style, material, size, but also the physical layout where the operation is performed, the movements of the operator in performing the operation, the location, speed and performance of the machines used, the flow of work and materials to the operator , and other elements. A judgment will also have been made in establishing the standard as to which operators the engineer appraises as a 100-percent operator or a 50-percent operator or some other figure . Thus, one operator may not have been regarded as 100 percent because of a great deal of talking to fellow workers as 204 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD contrasted with another operator who concentrated more on her work. When the piece work standards for the various operations have been determined upon, the operator on the job earns the minimum rate if she produces the standard number of units or if she produces less than the standard. However, in the latter situation the operator receives makeup in order to bring her up to the minimum. Thus, in Respondent's plant prior to February 1, 1968, the minimum rate was $1.40 per hour as provided in the Fair Labor Standards Act (Wage and Hour Law).'2 If a particular operation paid 2 cents per garment and an operator sewed 500 garments in an 8-hour day, this would be $10, but she receives the minimum of 11.20, the difference being the makeup. A high percentage of makeup over a period of time might indicate that the operator was slow or otherwise deficient, or that she was a learner and inexperienced, or that the flow of work was poor, or that the rate was too "tight" and set incorrectly. The incentive factor is based on a percentage that an average experienced operator working at normal speed can earn by producing more garments than the minimum. In the instant record there is evidence that both the Union and the Company generally believed that a genuine incentive should yield the average operator aforementioned about 15 percent more than the minimum and would thus be the incentive for her higher production. Thus, if the minimum was $1.40, the standard and rate on an operation would be generally such that the average experienced operator should earn approximately $1.61 on piece work through operation of the incentive. By the same token, if the minimum was $1.60, the same operator's yield would be approximately $1.85. At the inception of the negotiations the Union had asked the Company to furnish to it a representative payroll showing the earnings of piece workers in the plant. The Company complied with the request and submitted eight payroll sheets for the month of September, 1967, showing the names of the 329 employees, the departments, the hours worked by each, the piece work earnings for each, the timework earnings, the earnings on makeup, the percentage of makeup, and the average hourly earnings of each employee. Under the direction of English and Sydney, a staff man in the Union office prepared an analysis of the foregoing payroll information. This analysis showed that the piece work shop average was $1.37 per hour." During negotiations, the Company did not deny that the payroll it had submitted was representative but when the Union stated that its study of the payroll showed the shop average to be $1.37, the Company said that it computed the figure to be $1.49. Rodenborn, in testifying about the $1.49 figure, stated that he was unable to describe how that figure was reached because it "was done quite sometime back" but he said that the figure represented pay that was given for work performed and "my memory is that we included in the time work ...." English testified that the Company had indicated that its figure of $1.49 included makeup and time work and that the Union had said that the Union was talking about the piece rate and not the additional or supplemental makeup or time work given to a piece worker from time to time." "The law increased the minimum to $1.60 on February 1, 1968. "G.C. Exh. 13. English's testimony indicated that the average was a weighted average based on the distribution of the piece work earnings for each piece worker "We have previously described makeup . In addition to makeup, a piece Throughout their various meetings with the Company the Union said that the Company's proposal of an average 14.3 percent increase, the equivalent of 20 cents per hour, would not yield the average operator $1.85 per hour as also stated in the company proposal. The Company, in effect, said that it believed that, while not every employee would earn $1.85, its experience with earnings on the various operations and knowledge of its business convinced it that the average experienced operator could earn $1.85 as the result of the Company's proposed increase. The Union told the Company that in order for the Union to have sufficient knowledge of the potential yield of the rate increases proposed by the Company, the Union would have to have its own industrial engineer make a time study of the various operations performed by the piece workers. The Union said that this was necessary because many subjective factors of the particular engineer entered into a timestudy, such as the PFD factor (percentage allowed for fatigue and delay), how the engineer rated a particular operator as 50 percent or 100 percent or some other figure, and so forth. Although witnesses are in disagreement as to whether the Company at various times offered additional data and records to the Union, the evidence persuades me that the Union made it reasonably clear that it was not interested in perusing company timestudies and other related records and data. This is the basic reason that the Union said that it could not make an effective judgment on rates based on paper data but required a time study by its own engineer. I am also of the opinion that the record shows no refusal by the Company to produce data or records requested by the Union. The Company's response to the Union's proposal, that the Union would be in a position to say whether it agreed or disagreed with the proposed rates of the Company if the Union could first conduct its own time study, was that the Company did not want a partner in setting rates. The Company said that it wanted to set the rates and, if later, the Union believed that a rate was wrong, it could take the matter up as a grievance. The Union did not object to the idea itself that the Company should set the rates and in fact its contract proposal provided that the Company "set rates so that the average piece work operator . . . in normal conditions fully trained shall have the opportunity to earn $1.85 per hour." The Union said again that it did not consider it possible that an average 14.3 percent increase on existing rates could yield $1.85. Regarding a union proposal that when rates were established, they should only be changed by mutual agreement, the Company orally and in its written proposals rejected and omitted such a provision. English posed the situation during negotiations that, if the Union accepted the Company's proposed rates and if an employee was making 65 cents higher than $1.85, would the Company assume the right to cut her by 65 cents. The Company said, yes, on the basis that it would set the rates without a partner in setting rates." The Union then, in effect, summarized its position as offering two alternatives to the Company. The first worker might occasionally receive some time work , as, for instance, if her machine had a breakdown. "Presumably, the following provision in the Company's contract proposals would be relevant to such a situation . "If the Union or the employees consider that any new rates set by the Company are unfair, then the same may be made the subject of grievance under the grievance procedure herein provided for." Equally to be presumed is the Union's view that a grievance procedure without arbitration was ineffective. BLUE JEANS CORPORATION 205 alternative was that initially the Union be allowed to make its own timestudy with its own engineer and then it would either accept or not accept the rates proposed by the Company. The second alternative was that the Company set the rates but that if the rates did not thereafter yield $1.85, the Union would have the right to grieve and if the parties could not agree , the matter would be decided by a third party arbitrator. The Company had previously rejected arbitration as the final step in the grievance procedure and it was therefore not prepared to accept arbitration on wage rate grievances . The Company said that the Union was asking for a guarantee of $1.85 and the Company would not make such a guarantee. As previously indicated, the Company rejected an initial union timestudy because it said that it did not want a partner in setting rates. Regen testified that having a union engineer in the plant making a timestudy would disrupt operations and would be psychologically upsetting to employees." Various union witnesses testified one way and Company witnesses testified otherwise concerning an alleged statement made by Regen in one of the meetings. In resolving this conflict , I have relied primarily on Eula McGill. Like all the others, she was an interested witness but, in our opinion , in her two appearances on the witness stand, she was a reliable witness not given to exaggeration or misstatement. She credibly testified that Regen did say that he would have everybody in the area on his back if he let a union engineer in the plant . We neither ignore nor exaggerate this evidence by thus resolving a testimonial conflict in the record. The last time the parties met was on January 25, 1968. In the morning session the Company said that it wanted to put the new rates into effect on February l." The Company said it had a set of rates that it believed the Union could accept . The Union reiterated that it was not in a position to agree to the rates because of the reasons previously stated in prior meetings, namely, without a timestudy by a union engineer it could not make an adequate appraisal of what the rates would yield or, alternatively, a right to have the matter decided by an arbitrator if it was alleged or found that the rates did not in fact yield $1.85. The Union said, however, that it would look at the rates that the Company said it had to offer. The Company said that in the afternoon session it would have its industrial engineer , Jorgeson, on hand to answer any questions that the Union might have about the rates. In the afternoon of January 25, Jorgeson was on hand. The Company gave the Union a list of operations in the plant showing "Present rate" and "Rate after 2/ l/68."" At the Union's request, Jorgeson gave the y Union the percentages of increase on each of the operations and the Union wrote the percentages on the list. Thus, to take the first job or operation on the list , the data was, "Present Rate, .59; Rate after 2/1/68, .67; [increase] 13.5 percent." The percentage increases on the various operations ranged from 6 percent to 22.5 percent. The Company said the increases, while varying for each operation, averaged overall about 14.3 percent. The Union said that it could not tell from looking at a list of rates what the rates would yield or that they would yield $ 1.85 to the average experienced operator . The Union pointed to one of the "The only specifics as to what would be entailed in a time study, aside from all the operative factors to be appraised by the engineer , was Shay's testimony that the Union said that each operation would require an 8-hour timestudy and Shay testified that the study would therefore take about a month considering the number of different operations in the plant. "As previously mentioned the FLSA minimum rose from $1.40 to S1 60 on February 1. operations on the list, the "set fly" operation. The Company's figures showed a proposed 9-percent increase. The September payroll data that the Union had analyzed had shown a $1.29 job average for this operation." On January 25, the Union mentioned these figures on "set fly" and said in effect that the proposed 9-percent increase would not yield $1.85. Rodenborn testified that he told the Union that the Company had checked the rates and past earnings on the operation and would make them available. In his testimony, Rodenborn admitted that the particular operation did look bad from the standpoint of what the Union had, i.e., the September figures and the January 25 proposed 9-percent increase on the particular operation. He said that the other rates checked out. Jorgeson testified that he had time studies and other data on hand on January 25. English states that the Union neither asked for nor was it offered additional wage data at this time nor previously. The Company says that during the various meetings it had told the Union that it had earnings and other records for the period after September but that the Union displayed no interest in obtaining such records. Either at this point or earlier in the afternoon session the Union had gone through a sort of checklist of all the contract items on which the parties were apart and it was ascertained that they were still apart. The Union ended the January 25 meeting by saying that it was prepared to meet again but that the parties would have to check with each other on a mutual date. The meeting, which had lasted about 30 minutes in the afternoon, then ended. The parties have not met since. By letter of January 29, 1968, addressed to the Union at its Whiteville office, attention of English, Regen stated that at the last meeting the Company had advised the Union of the impending new minimum wage required by the FLSA and that unless agreement was reached on wages, the Company would have to proceed on February I and place in effect wage increases to meet the requirements of the law. The letter said that the Company had, on January 25, submitted its proposed wage increases to the Union but the latter did not agree to the increases. The Company said it was going to place the increases into effect to comply with the FLSA. A notice to employees that the Company said it planned to post was enclosed. The letter said that the Company was prepared to discuss this and other matters further if the Union wished to do so and that the Company was prepared to bargain regarding wage increases or wage changes. The aforementioned notice to employees , dated January 26, was posted. The notice stated that during negotiations the Company had offered substantial wage increases but the Union had not agreed to the increases . "But as we have expressed to the Union, the new Federal requirements are such that we now need to go ahead and put increases into effect. We are therefore doing so as of February 1, 1968. As we have informed the Union we are still ready to continue our bargaining negotiations on wages, as on all other matters." Pursuant to the notice, "Regen testified that the list of rates was for 5 pocket jeans which encompassed about 50 percent of production . He said that the Company also had with it on January 25 similar information for other items produced in the plant and had sheets that showed the back history of the rates and their yield . The witness said this other data was not opened up and shown at the meeting because the Union indicated no interest in such information but adhered to its proposal about either making its own time study or having a right to grieve to arbitration about rates that did not prove to yield $1.85. "There were four operators on the operation whose piece rate earnings in September were $1.33; 1.06 , 1.36, 1.41. 206 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD wage increases were thereafter placed in effect. The letter and notice that had been sent to the Union's office in Whiteville did not reach English, whose office was in New York until sometime after the increases became effective. Regen, who was aware that English's office was in New York, testified that all Company correspondence with the Union had been addressed to the Union office in Whiteville. Conclusions There have been many descriptions of the meaning of collective bargaining under the Act in Board and court cases. For the most part they relate or are intended to relate to a particular case and its own particular facts. We believe that the following statement is less conclusionary in its nature than some others and that it is of some help in approaching the instant case : "Good faith bargaining does not require the making of concessions or the granting of wage increases but it does require that parties justify positions taken by reasoned discussions and at least make a good faith effort to reach a solution of their differences."" The complaint allegation that is broadest in scope is paragraph 14(h) which alleges that Respondent "negotiated with the Union in bad faith and without an intention of entering into any final and binding collective bargaining agreement." We have as a consequence endeavored to consider carefully the entire bargaining picture as revealed in the record as well as the other specific allegations of bad-faith bargaining alleged in the complaint. Although the evidence is in some respects limited, it is uncontroverted and without explanation by the Company, that the agreement with the Union, made in October 1967, that in slack periods work would be shared equally by employees in a section or department, was repudiated in an announcement made by an undoubted supervisor=' in March, 1968 to individual employees to the effect that thereafter, in slack periods, the low producers would stay home and the high producers would work. The supervisor stated at the time that she had been so advised by higher management. This unilateral action without discussion with the Union , the collective-bargaining representative, constituted, in our opinion, a repudiation of the understanding and agreement between the parties and was a violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. With respect to the Union's proposal for a contract clause on the subcontracting out of work from the Whiteville plant, Respondent did not manifest a good faith effort or desire to reach agreement as required by Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. Without repeating all the facts, heretofore described, we believe that it was incumbent upon Respondent, as it said it would , to make some effort to draft a counterproposal that, while protecting what Respondent regarded as its own vital interests , might be acceptable by, or negotiable with, the Union in the light of the fact that Respondent had said that it planned to share the work equally and fairly between its plants. Instead, when later asked by the Union for its promised counterproposal, the Respondent simply said it had "Alba- Waldensian, Inc., 167 NLRB 101. Factually, the cited case, in our opinion, had significant elements not present in the instant case but we believe that the quoted sentence has broader application than the Alba case itself. "This supervisor, Register, is also referred to in the prior Board case and her status is not disputed herein. changed its mind about submitting a counterproposal because its operations were too complex. On "hours of work," Respondent said that it had no plan or intention of changing the existing plant hours. The Union had proposed initially that hours of work be mutually agreed upon but this was not acceptable to Respondent. The Union then proposed that the existing hours, starting and quitting times, be incorporated into the contract. Despite Respondent's assertion that it had no plan or intention to change existing hours, Respondent said that it was unwilling to place such hours in the contract or have the contract provide that existing hours would prevail. Subsequently, however, during the October-January period when negotiations were taking place, Respondent did announce to the employees a change in starting and quitting time and concurrently placed the change in effect. The foregoing was done unilaterally and without discussion with the Union. Although the changes were relatively minor and although the explanation for the change that was given at the instant hearing appeared to be quite reasonable, the situation had not been of an emergency nature and no explanation appears for the bypassing of the Union. It is our opinion that on the hours of work aspect of the negotiations, Respondent did violate the requirements of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. In connection with its vacation proposal, the Union proposed that the contract provide that vacation pay be paid on the payday immediately before the vacation. Respondent said that it was its practice to give the vacation pay before the vacation as proposed by the Union but it did not wish to have such a provision in the contract. Respondent did not change its position in this matter and neither of its written proposals contained the provision. Although Respondent admitted at the hearing that this was a minor matter as far as it was concerned and that it had no real objection to the provision, it did not agree to place such a provision in the contract. It is difficult to see how parties can make any progress toward establishing a mutual understanding and arriving at agreement in the face of such an approach. Manifestation of good faith and agreement on relatively minor matters about which there is no real disagreement are the building blocks for any possibility of reaching or even approaching agreement on an overall contract. We find the foregoing conduct of Respondent to be inconsistent with the obligations imposed by Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act and to be a violation of those sections. The Union proposed a provision that existing plant practices and rules that were more favorable to the employees should be continued. Respondent said that it had no intention of changing existing rules and practices but saw no reason for having such a provision in the contract. At the hearing, Respondent stated, in substance, regarding its position on the above matter that it would not agree to the provision because " . . . you never know what's going to happen tomorrow ...." While the latter observation is no doubt true as to all human activities, including those of employers, employees, and Unions, its ostensible logic would seem to preclude any agreement or contractual understanding between human beings or organizations composed of beings other than those who could foresee and predict the future with certainty. Moreover, as to the proposal, no one knew or was in a better position to know its own existing plant rules and practices than the Respondent itself. Respondent, with such knowledge, was in a position to offer some qualification as to the continuation of existing rules and BLUE JEANS CORPORATION practices if there was an area in which it believed it might possibly wish to make a change . But this was not done and despite a statement that it had no intention of changing existing rules and practices Respondent rejected the union proposal. The sole reason offered by Respondent for its position that appears in this record is that, you never know what is going to happen tomorrow. This approach foredooms any possibility of contractual agreement for a reasonable future period . We cannot reconcile this position of Respondent with the obligations of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act and we consider it to be in violation thereof. The Union proposed that the Respondent furnish information to the Union on a weekly basis showing which employees were hired and which were terminated.22 The Union said that it wanted the information because as bargaining representative it needed to know whom it represented and their status . Neither in negotiations nor at the hearing did Respondent contest the right of the Union to the information but it rejected the proposal on the ground that it would be clerically burdensome for Respondent to furnish such a list . At the hearing Respondent said that its IBM office machines were already overburdened without additional work being assumed. The Union then proposed that the information be furnished every two weeks. Respondent rejected this proposal . Respondent's written proposals, on the score of information that it would furnish to the Union, provided that Respondent would furnish a seniority list every 6 months. Under a provision dealing with discharges, Respondent said that it would notify the Union of discharges made. In substance, the Union said it did not consider that Respondent was meeting the Union's right to, and need of, reasonably current information on hires and terminations. At the hearing , Respondent stated that in response to the Union's proposal that a Union representative have free access to employees in the plant regarding complaints or grievances, Respondent had offered that the representative could have such access 1 hour per week at an agreed upon time. Respondent asserts that in that one hour the Union could have checked not only on complaints and grievances but on other matters such as hires and terminations. Aside from the testimony of the Union that the matter of a list of hires and terminations on a weekly or biweekly basis and the matter of access to the plant to handle grievances were two different topics and were discussed separately, there appears to be some inconsistency in the Company's position. The Company did not wish to furnish a weekly, biweekly, or any other period, list of hires and terminations because it would be clerically burdensome . Yet, at the hearing, Respondent states that it was willing that, during the 1 hour a week it would allocate to the union representative on grievance matters, the Union have access to Company books and records. At one point in his testimony Regen said, " . they could come in that hour, and look at any kind of hire and fire list." If this indicates that Respondent did maintain such a list, presumably available each week, the burden of making a copy of the list and sending it to the local union office or furnishing the list to the Union would be a simple routine matter scarcely burdensome in any respect. If such a list was not maintained , presumably the Union representative, under Regen's thesis, could, during the 1-hour weekly visit on other matters , have access to "The Union was not asking for a weekly plantwide seniority list 207 payroll records and time cards and ferret out therefrom the information as to which employees had been hired or terminated. It requires little imagination to foresee that the union representative, unfamiliar with Respondent's office and records, would reasonably have to invoke some assistance from Respondent's clerical staff in order to secure the appropriate records and, possibly, to interpret their meaning. This would almost certainly be more burdensome to Respondent than the simple furnishing of a list. The list could evidently show the names and next to each name possibly a symbol "H" for those hired; "D" for discharges and reasons, such as excessive absence, poor work, fighting or whatever. A symbol of "Q" could indicate quit. Respondent could have proposed modifications as to any list but this was never done and the Union's request was rejected as burdensome. I have difficulty in seeing that Respondent, on the above matter, was negotiating in good faith and evincing a reasonable desire to reach agreement as required by the Act. We find the conduct to be in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. As mentioned above, the union contract proposal provided that a union representative have the right to visit and come into the plant and talk to employees at any time during working hours. This proposal was asserted to be necessary for the proper administration of the contract and the servicing of employees regarding their rights, particularly as to problems and complaints and grievances regarding employees and their work. Respondent rejected this proposal but proposed that the union representative be accorded the right to come into the plant 1 hour a week during working hours at a mutually agreed upon time. The Respondent said that after working hours it would discuss, without particular limitation, grievances or other matters raised by the union representative or discovered by the representative in the course of the representative's 1 hour weekly visit. Respondent also proposed that it would allow the union representative an initial general indoctrination and educational tour of the plant so that the representative would have general familiarity with the plant's operation. The Union rejected the Respondent's proposals and never altered its basic demand for unlimited access to the plant during working hours to investigate grievances. As summarized in its brief, p. 8, the Union took the position that it considered its proposal essential and it could not accept those of the Company as a substitute. The reasons stated for this position were that the investigation of grievances "could take more than an hour as well as less than an hour and . . . the investigation must be made at the moment when the particular work which the grievance concerns is going through the factory - not at some time when it suits management to permit the business agent to see the plant." I do not find that Respondent violated the Act on the above matter of access to the plant. The parties bargained about the matter and they were apart on their positions. As earlier described, the Union proposed 7 instead of four holidays, additional vacation periods, and adoption of the insurance program that the Union had instituted elsewhere in the industry. The Respondent said that on all these items it considered its existing vacations , holidays, and insurance to be equal to or better than those in other plants in the area. It therefore said that it would not accept the Union's proposals. The Union gave specific indications on all the items that it was not opposed to possible alternatives or modifications of its proposals. 208 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Respondent adhered to its position for the reasons stated. Because of the previously described specific instances of Respondent's failure to bargain in good faith as required by the Act and the manifestation of an approach to bargaining inconsistent with its legal obligation, we entertain a serious doubt about its good faith and motives in the position it adopted regarding vacations, holidays, and insurance. However, as I understand Section 8(a)(5) of the Act, we are not warranted in concluding that because Respondent did not offer concessions on vacations, holidays, and insurance, it therefore was not bargaining as required on these working conditions. Respondent gave its reasons for its position and they are not untenable . Whether or not we agree that they are good reasons is not determinative. I also conclude that Respondent's insistence on article IV of Respondent's proposed contract, providing that employees shall be free to be members of the Union or not, or to support or not support the Union as they see fit, was not illegal or that it warrants an adverse finding as to good faith. Despite the background and context previously described and the Union 's objection to the provision, the clause itself is too innocuous and consonant with the provisions of the Act to warrant an adverse finding. The parties were in substantial agreement about a grievance procedure except as to the ultimate method of disposing of a grievance that had proceeded through the procedure without being mutually resolved . The Union consistently adhered to its position that arbitration by a third party was essential as the final grievance step. The Respondent consistently opposed arbitration . Initially, the Company's contract proposal included a no-strike provision as well as a grievance procedure without arbitration. In the belief that, by indicating that strikes were the only alternative to arbitration in unresolved grievance situations, the Union would accept the right to strike as an alternative to arbitration , the Respondent removed the no-strike provision from its proposal. The Union, however, made it clear that it considered arbitration absolutely essential in any contract with Respondent. The Respondent continued to oppose arbitration . The parties discussed the matter but remained firmly apart. In essence, Respondent said that it did not want arbitration because it did not want a third party having decisional power regarding the running of the plant. The fact that Respondent had arbitration provisions in some of its commercial contracts is a factor we have not ignored but we do not regard it as determinative of the issue. I do not find a violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) on the issue of arbitration. The checkoff of union dues by the Company was another demand that the Union told the Company was essential in any contract that might be agreed upon. We have previously described in some detail what the parties said to each other on the matter of checkoff. Basically, the Company said that it considered the collection of dues to be none of its business and that it would be burdensome because of the expense and time involved. The Company also said that employees would be unhappy about additional money being deducted from their checks. Respondent testified that employees had told the Company that they did not want their dues checked off. Since the Respondent did check off taxes, and Blue Cross and Blue Shield pursuant to its insurance program, the burden of an additional item on the office machines and clerical staff would probably have been minimal. However, from another aspect of this matter of deducting items from employees' pay, the evidence shows that Respondent, in the past, had deliberately discontinued a savings plan deduction program for employees as well as any deductions from pay to liquidate debts of employees to the Company . Respondent had no community chest fund deductions or flower fund deductions or things of that type. On taxes, of course, the Respondent had no option except to make payroll deductions . Evidently on Blue Cross and Blue Shield insurance the Company saw no practical alternative to deductions." The aforementioned insurance program was a company sponsored one and it was no doubt something that the Company regarded to be in its own interest as well as that of employees, since such a fringe benefit was probably deemed a necessary element to attract and retain employees. But other than on taxes and insurance, and wherever the Company had a real choice it opposed and did not make payroll deductions . It is fairly clear that in many respects and certainly from the Respondent's viewpoint, the checkoff of union dues was in a different category than either taxes or a company insurance program and that dues check off was in the same optional category as other checkoff programs that the Company had discontinued and opposed. Respondent's testimony that some employees who had signed union cards had told the Company that they did not want their dues deducted is appropriately to be considered in conjunction with one of the union's arguments to Respondent on the checkoff matter. The Union pointed out that the checkoff would apply only to those employees who had signed a card authorizing a checkoff of their dues. One aspect of this matter of authorization cards is that the cards were dual purpose cards. In other words, when the Union was organizing the plant, those employees who wished to join the Union signed a card which set forth not only a request for and acceptance of membership but also stated that the employee authorized the employer to deduct dues to the Union. It is possible that some employees might have wished to join the Union but without wishing to have their dues checked off. It does not appear that they had an option. Some of their people might have been among those who allegedly told the Company that they did not wish their dues checked off. Although the Company's testimony regarding the latter is not specific as to names, the testimony is not controverted. Perhaps the most effective contravention to this aspect would be a union offer to produce current dues-checkoff authorizations, separate and distinct from the original dual purpose cards. In rejecting the checkoff, the Company told the Union that there were alternatives. The Company never mentioned what alternatives it envisaged and the Union never asked . The Union did not offer any alternative as to methods of collecting dues to the proposal that the company checkoff the dues from the paychecks." There is little doubt that the Union considered the checkoff to be of major importance to it and it made this clear to Respondent. But, in my opinion, the evidence does not warrant the conclusion that by rejecting the "These are probably very few companies that sponsor a health insurance plan for their employees who do not make payroll deductions for the plan or who believe it to be feasible not to do so. "In my opinion, the parties in the negotiations on another topic, the matter of access of a union representative to the plant during working hours, supra, never mentioned dues collection in that connection. The Union was talking of free access to investigate complaints and grievances, and the Company spoke of I hour access for such purpose and allegedly for the additional purpose to obtain hiring and other information. BLUE JEANS CORPORATION 209 checkoff Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. We believe that the evidence herein is distinguishable from the situation in such cases as Roanoke Iron & Bridge Works , Inc., 160 NLRB 175 and H. K. Porter, Inc., 153 NLRB 119, enfd . 363 F.2d 272 (C.A.D.C.). The Union's original contract proposal , which was its standard Cotton Garment Industry Contract , did not propose specific piece rates for Respondent's plant. The specifics as to the Union' s economic demands on piece rates was set forth in a letter to the Company on November 22, 1967. The proposal therein was for an across-the-board increase of 15 cents per hour and that thereafter that "the Company agrees to set rates so that the average piece work operator working in normal conditions who is fully trained shall have the opportunity to earn $1 .85 per hour." English testified: I have been administering contracts for 30 years and we [the Union] have many contracts where companies set rates unilaterally, but no contracts where once they are set unilaterally we don't have the right to grieve on the basis of certain standards. The witness was asked if there are not many provisions or situations in a contract "where the Company takes the initial action unilaterally and then that action is subject to grievance." English answered: And that was exactly what we were proposing to this Company. We didn' t care . We would take their rates, but we wanted the right to check them if they did not yield $1 .85. This is a common procedure we use everywhere. We preferred the Company to set the rates first . .. . The Company's written proposals provided that "Piece rates shall be increased by an average of 14.3% per hundred or the equivalent of 20 cents per hour to the piece rate workers. This increase will raise the piece rate basis for sewing machine operators to $1.85, so that experienced operators should average $1.85 per hour." It is apparent that both the union proposal and the Respondent's proposal used the figure of $1.85 as the objective, i.e., that the piece rates would be increased so that the average experienced operator could earn $1.85 an hour under the incentive system . The mathematics of the $1.85 were based on the fact that the Federal minimum wage was to be increased from $1.40 to $1.60 as of February 1, 1968. A percentage increase of 14.3 percent on $1.40 would be in round numbers $1.60. In addition both the Union and the Company recognized that an incentive factor of at least 15 percent was necessary. This percentage on $1.60 would yield approximately $1.85 to the experienced operator . As English testified, "It's a piece rate industry" and both the Union and the Company subscribed to the necessity of an incentive since otherwise the operators would be content to earn only the minimum and would secure the latter whether or not they produced less than the standard number of garments on a particular operation. Despite the $ 1.85 figure in both the union and the company proposals the Union was critical of the company proposal. The Union argued that , in October, when the Union asked the Company for a representative payroll, the Company had furnished the September payroll." As a result of its analysis of this payroll , the Union told the Company that the plant average for piece workers was $1.37 and that a 14.3 percent increase or approximately 20 cents per hour would not place the rates in a position to yield $1.85. The Union also told the Company that under the latter' s written proposal there was only a pious hope expressed that the increases would yield $1.85 and that the Union had no effective recourse if the yield was not $1.85 . The Union argued and states in its brief, p. 15, that the company's contract language '"should average' was not an effective protection of earnings"; if the rates did not yield $1.85, then, in order to rectify the situation "the Union needs two things : ( 1) an effective grievance procedure, terminating in arbitration . . . . (2) and a contract provision to which the arbitrator can look to see whether or not the rate is fair." The Union claims that under its proposal, that the Company should set rates so that an average trained operator working normally "shall have the opportunity to earn $1.85,"26 "then if the evidence at the arbitration shows that average experienced operators were working normally and did not make $1.85, an arbitrator can conclude that this earning experience falls short of the contractual criterion and that the rate must be raised. But if the contract language expresses only one definite commitment - that piece rates will be increased 20 cents-and then expresses simply a pious hope that 20 cents should yield $1.85 . . ." [then if] "the rates did not yield $1.85 . . ., an arbitrator could not find the rate wrong, because the contract would provide no measure of what would be right and what would be wrong, save for the 20 cents measure, which the Company complied with." Although, in stating its opposition to the company proposal the Union did propose that the Union make its own timestudy of the plant so that it could agree or disagree with the Company's initial rates, it is my opinion that the basic premise was that the Company should set the rates so that they would yield $1.85. This was the position of both parties and the Union in its written proposal and otherwise made it clear that this was its position. But the Union wanted two things in conjunction with the latter: (1) the union language , in substance at least, that the contract provide that the rates be set so that the average operator have the opportunity to earn $1.85; and (2) arbitration when the Union believed that the earnings of certain average operators were not yielding $1.85. The Company did not agree that its plant average was $1.37 and used the figure of $1.49. This position was muddied and unconvincing, in our view, because it was indicated that the $1.49 included makeup and time earnings. But the Company also said , in substance, that the earnings were higher than the figures used by the Union and expressed confidence that its experience and knowledge of its operation indicated that its new rates would yield $1.85. Regen testified that the average experienced piece workers in the plant were making $1.83-$1.87 and that some were making $2.05-$2.15 and others making less than $1.83. Regen states, "We were willing to make our records available , any request they made we were willing to give them, they made no request." Whether the Company did, throughout the negotiations, offer additional records, as it claims, is a matter of sharp dispute in the testimony. I am uncertain what precisely the Company said along these lines but he does believe that the Company did refer to current earnings of "And, therefore , in effect, as far as the Union was concerned , that was the controlling payroll. "This quote is from the Union's contract proposal ; the following quote is from the Union's brief to me. 210 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD employees as supporting its contentions on earnings. I also believe that the Union did not ask for additional records and that the Company never refused any request for such records. We believe that the evidence shows that, on January 25, the Company was prepared with a substantial amount of data and records and that if the Union had asked for such records they would have been produced. The indication is that the Company would have undertaken to secure additional data, if not present, if requested by the Union. The Union adhered to its $1.37 analysis of the September payroll, saying in effect that it had asked for and received a representative payroll and that it was convinced that a 14.3 percent or 20-cents-an-hour increase thereon would not yield $1.85. Both parties consistently adhered to the $1.85 figure. Both agreed on the necessity of an incentive of approximately 15 percent on the $1.60 minimum. Both agreed on the definition of an average experienced operator working under normal conditions as the employee who should be able to, or have the opportunity to, earn $1.85. But one of the basic problems, in my opinion, and one that the parties never actually got down to was a specific delineation of which operators in the various operations the respective parties considered to be average operators. The Union was using a September plantwide average figure and the Company was evidently using a more restrictive figure and one that, according to its testimony, was based on additional months' experience from September on. I am of the view that the Union did not bring the Company's good faith or lack of good faith, depending on what the evidence would show, into focus. A critical issue was whether the increases that the Company proposed would or would not yield $1.85 to the average operator. The Union said they would not and the Company said they would. Highly material and relevant on this issue, in our opinion, were the piece work earnings of the average operators not only in September but in October-January and even possibly prior months. It would be a matter of mathematics whether looking at those earnings, perhaps an average of September-January, and, adding the proposed increases, the yield could reasonably be seen to be $1.85. If the Union asked for and secured the data, the Company would either show its good faith or not by producing or not producing such material. If after the data was produced, it did not reasonably support the Company's position, the Company's explanation or lack of a cogent explanation could be appraised, as could any proposal for rectifying some rate that was out of line. The net result would have been an opportunity to evaluate the Company's statements and good faith regarding the asserted $1.85 yield. The foregoing, however, never took place and the bargaining, in our opinion, never came into true focus. One of the problems that apparently affected the Union's position was that it used the September payroll earnings in conjunction with a figure of an increase 14.3 percent or 20 cents an hour. This appears many times in the Union's testimony and it appears from the statement in the Union's brief that "14.3 percent was the only figure which the Union had seen until January 25 ...." 37 While the Union's proposal had been for an across the board increase," both the Company's proposals had used the term of "as average of 14.3 percent [increase]" and, "The implication being that the Union was surprised when , on January 25, the Company's proposed increases ranged from 6 to 22 percent which the Company said would average out to about 14.3 percent. by the same token, when the Company proposal read "an average of 14.3 percent or the equivalent of 20 cents per hour . " it meant, in our opinion, an average of 14.3 percent which is equivalent to an average of 20 cents per hour.29 Here, again, the proposed increases, ranging from 6 to 22 percent, either would or would not be reasonably expected to yield $1.85 on the current earnings.39 The Company said the increases would yield $1.85 and it said that it had the data to support its position. The Union, in our opinion, did not go into the matter at any length or put the Company to its proof, and the entire afternoon session, on January 25, when the Company had its industrial engineer present, was terminated after 30 minutes, which encompassed not only the wage issue but a rundown or recapitulation of all the other issues on which the parties were apart. In our opinion, the issues were not sufficiently brought into focus by the fact that on one operation, set fly, the Union pointed out the inadequacy of the increase of 9 percent for that operation, based on the September payroll. But even on this one operation involving four operators the situation issue could have been joined, by the Union asking the Company to produce the earnings data on which the Company was saying a 9 percent increase would yield $1.85. The Company's good faith could then have been appraised. Similarly, on the other rates, the precise situation could have examined and tested. As previously described, what the Union wanted was an arbitration provision so that if the rates did not yield $1.85, it could have the disputed rate issue decided by the arbitrator. It is also the Union's position that its proposed contract language that the Company set the rates so that the average operator "shall have the opportunity to earn $1.85 per hour" would establish a "fair rate" in the contract to which an arbitrator could refer. The Union contended that the Company's proposal which contained the statement that an increase of an average of 14.3 percent "will raise the piece rate base for sewing machine operators to $1.85, so that experienced operators should average $1.85 per hour" was simply a pious wish and could not be used effectively by an arbitrator. It is not necessary for the Examiner to decide this aspect but we are less than certain that language providing that rates be such that an experienced operator "shall have the opportunity to earn $1.85 per hour" would be more determinative to an arbitrator than language stating and expressing the intent that a 14.3 percent average increase "will raise the rate base ... to $1.85, so that experienced operators should average [should have the opportunity to?] earn $1.85 per hour." In any event, we believe that the parties were entitled to their respective positions on the wage language of the contract. Since the Company would not agree to arbitration, the matter of what an arbitrator could or could not do with the respective language proposals is somewhat academic. The question is whether under the Company's proposed language (or the Union's, minus arbitration) the Union, by agreeing that the Company set the rates, was thereby being cut off from any meaningful and informed bargaining about a rate or rates which, in its opinion, did not yield an experienced operator $1.85. We believe that "I understand such an increase to entail that each employee receives the same increase. "Under an average, the range of increases could reach from high to low percentages "It is probably true that the variety of the increases was indicative of some weakness in the prior rates but apparently the Company was endeavoring to bong its rates into line. BLUE JEANS CORPORATION the Union could present its argument to the Company on rates that it said did not yield $1.85. The Company would be obliged to respond meaningfully if it disagreed with the Union. Supporting books or records could be called for and good faith would entail their production. Both parties would have been committed to the proposition that the increases were supposed to raise the rates to yield $1.85 to an experienced operator or that such an operator should earn or have the opportunity to earn $1.85. What the evidence would show as to the good-faith bargaining on the issue, we do not know, but the Union did have the rights and remedies under Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. If the Union argues, as it does, that such grievance handling and bargaining is ineffectual without arbitration that is certainly a position that it can hold. However, the Company's refusal to agree to arbitration, in our opinion, is not a violation of its duty to bargain. It may be that there should be a grievance arbitration provision in all contracts or else the ultimate decision rests with the employer but this is not the law as we understand it. In the preceding paragraphs we have set forth our view of the basic issue on wages between the parties. As we see it, the issue was could the proposed company increases reasonably be expected to yield $1.85 to the average operator and was the Union in a position to call for information from the Company that would show whether or not the increases could reasonably be expected to yield $1.85. On this record we do not know whether the increases could be expected to yield $1.85. We believe that the Union did not bring the issue into full focus by asking for and examining and analyzing available company records and data which the Company asserted did support its contention that the increases would yield $1.85 and thereby putting the Company's good faith in full issue. It is clear that the Union wanted an arbitration provision and the Company refused. This was a major problem and the subject of much discussion. In their discussions, apparently based on what the Union said an arbitrator could or would do if the contract provided that an experienced operator should have the opportunity to earn $1.85, the Company said the Union wanted a guarantee of $1.85. The Union in turn sought to deal with the Company's refusal of arbitration by saying that it would then have to conduct its own time study initially because without arbitration it would have no effective way of doing anything about rates that did not yield $1.85. In our opinion neither the guarantee allegation nor the time study were the real issues. With a time study of its own, the objective of the Union was still increases of rates that would yield $1.85. The Union, pointing to its own timestudy, could argue that an initial rate should be set at a certain figure. The Company could disagree. One engineer might assess the fatigue and delay factor at 25 percent and the other at 15 percent. There might be agreeement or disagreement on other factors. But the objective would still be increases that would yield $1.85. On this issue, perhaps the most cogent evidence was the actual earnings of the operators on the same jobs over a period of months. The jobs were the same. New jobs were not being set up. It was principally a matter of mathematics. If an operator's piece earnings over a period of months were a certain figure and the minimum was raised from $1.40 to $1.60, would an 8-percent increase or a 20 percent increase or some other figure raise her potential earnings to $1.85 with a 15 percent incentive factor on the new minimum of $1.60. And, if the rate did not thereafter yield $1.85, it would have been subject to the grievance procedure and the obligations of Section 8(a)(5)." 211 We conclude that the bargaining on wages was inconclusive and we do not find that Respondent refused to bargain thereon.32 Consistent with this view we do not sustain the complaint allegation that the Company violated Section 8(a)(5) by placing in effect the wage increases on February 1, 1968. The Company had told the Union what it proposed to do on January 25 and had generally indicated the wage formula prior to that time. There was no agreement on the increases but this was, in our opinion, in a context of inconclusive bargaining on increases and not in a context of refusal to bargain by Respondent. For reasons previously described on specific aspects of the negotiations, the Examiner is of the opinion that Respondent did not bargain in good faith as required by law. Respondent's conduct, with respect to items on which it had no real disagreement with the Union but to which it refused to agree on in a contract, and, in other described respects, warrants the conclusion that, overall, Respondent's approach to bargaining was not that required by the Act and that Respondent did not fulfill its obligations under Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. We believe that this conclusion is warranted despite the fact that on some specific aspects of the bargaining we found no refusal to bargain. The net result of the bargaining was, in substance, that there was no agreement on anything that would distinguish or significantly distinguish the plant from a nonunion plant. It is our opinion, based on the evidence in the record that the strike of employees against Respondent that commenced in March 1968, was caused by the employees' and the Union's justified belief that Respondent had not bargained in good faith with the Union as required by the Act. A strike thus caused is, in its inception, an unfair labor practice strike. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW As found and concluded hereinabove, Respondent did not bargain collectively in good faith and Respondent did thereby engage in unfair labor practices and did violate Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent did not bargain in good faith as required by the Act, it will be recommended that, upon request, Respondent bargain collectively with the Union as required by Section 8(a)(5) of the Act and that if an understanding or agreements are reached on terms of a contract they be embodied in a signed agreement. In its brief, the Union argues, in effect, that such an order in the instant case would be "meaningless." We understand the contention but we do not agree that it is meaningless and whatever its limitations it is in the context of a statute that expressly provides that the obligation to bargain collectively "does not compel either "The Examiner is satisfied, from the record as a whole, and from specific testimony, as well as the language in the company proposal defining a grievance, that wage rates would have been subject to the grievance procedure. "We regard the matter of the Union conducting its own timestudy in the plant as neither something to which it was entitled per se nor as something that could not be appropriate under any circumstances. If some of the matters that we have referred to had been brought into full focus, it might be that a picture of such unreliability could be demonstrated that a union timestudy might be the only reasonable alternative 212 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession."" RECOMMENDED ORDER Upon the basis of the above findings and conclusions and upon the entire record in this case, it is recommended that Respondent, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from refusing to bargain collectively in good faith with the above-named union as the exclusive representative of the employees in the appropriate unit described hereinabove. 2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the purposes of the Act: (a) Upon request, bargain collectively in good faith with the above union, as the exclusive representative of the employees in the unit heretofore found appropriate, concerning wages, hours, and other conditions of employment and, if an understanding or agreement is reached embody such understanding or agreement in a signed agreement. (b) Post at its Whiteville, North Carolina, plant copies of attached notice marked "Appendix."" Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 11 , after being signed by a representative of Respondent, shall be posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered , defaced, or covered by other material. (c) Notify the Regional Director, Region 11 , in writing, within 20 days of receipt of this Decision, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith." "Sec 8(d) of the Act. "In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the notice. In the further event that the Board's Order be enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision and Order." "In the event that this Recommended Order be adopted by the Board, this provision shall be modified to read- "Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith " APPENDIX NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our employees that: After a trial in which all parties were represented by their attorneys and had an opportunity to present their evidence, a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board, who heard the evidence, has found that we have violated the law and has ordered us to post this notice and to comply with what we say in the notice. WE WILL, upon request, bargain collectively in good faith with Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive bargaining representative of our employees in the unit named below. This bargaining will be with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other conditions of employment, and, if an understanding is reached, WE WILL embody it in a signed agreement. The bargaining unit found to be appropriate is the same unit that was certified by the Board in the prior election . The unit is: All production and maintenance employees at our Whiteville, North Carolina plant, including maintenance machanics and quality control girls, but excluding office clerical employees, the carpenter, the time motion and engineer trainee , guards and supervisors as defined in the Act. BLUE JEANS CORPORATION AND WHITEVILLE MANUFACTURING COMPANY (Employer) Dated By (Representative) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. Any questions concerning this notice may be directed to the Board's Regional Office, 1624 Wachovia Building, 301 North Main Street, Winston-Salem, North Carolina 27101, Telephone 919-723-2303.