179 NLRB 434

Mason and Hanger-Silas Mason Co., Inc.

Last amended: 1969Year: 1969Length: 10,444 wordsOfficial source
434 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Mason and Hanger-Silas Mason Co., Inc., The Rust Engineering Company, a joint venture d/b/a Mason-Rust and George Newsom. Case 14-CA-4664 October 30, 1969 DECISION AND ORDER BY MEMBERS FANNING, BROWN, AND JENKINS On April 17, 1969, Trial Examiner Harry R. Hinkes issued his Decision in the above-proceeding, finding that the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision and a supporting brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three- member panel. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and supporting brief, and the entire record in this case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner as modified herein.' ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner, and hereby orders that the Respondent, Mason and Hanger-Silas Mason Co., Inc., The Rust Engineering Company, a joint venture d/b/a Mason-Rust, St. Louis, Missouri, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order. ,in finding that the Respondent had discriminatorily denied employment to two Negro carpenters, Newsom and Criswell, because of their engagement in protected concerted activities, the Tridl Examiner also concluded that inasmuch as two other Negro carpenters were hired, the Respondent was not motivated by racial discrimination However, the Trial Examiner had earlier found, and we agree, that the protected concerted activities engaged in by Newsom and Criswell involved seeking a change in Respondent's hiring practices in order to get employment for themselves and other Negro carpenters Moreover, the mere fact that Respondent hired two Negro carpenters at a later date does not necessarily establish that Respondent's earlier refusal to hire Newsom and Criswell was not due to racial discrimination Accordingly, we do not adopt the Trial Examiner's subsidiary factual conclusion that the failure to hire Newsom and Criswell was not motivated by racial discrimination Our decision herein is grounded solely on the Trial Examiner's principal finding, in which we concur, that the Respondent's refusal to employ Newsom and Criswell was because of their concerted protected activities See Tanner Motor Livery. Ltd. 148 NLRB 1402, 1403-04 TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE HARRY R HINKES, Trial Examiner The complaint herein was issued on October 31, 1968 pursuant to an original charge filed by George Newsom on May 2, 1968 and served upon Mason & Hanger-Silas Mason Co , Inc , the Rust Engineering Company, a joint venture d/b/a Mason-Rust, herein called the Employer, Company, or Respondent, on or about the same date, as well as an amended charge filed by the same George Newsom on October 23, 1968, and served upon Respondent on or about the same date The complaint alleges that the Respondent, in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, failed and refused to employ George Newsom and Doyal Criswell on or about February 2, 1968, and at all times thereafter because they had engaged in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining and other mutual aid and protection By answer duly filed, Respondent denied the commission of any unfair labor practices as well as the supervisory status of Respondent's Project Manager Higgins, its Personnel Manager Hill and its carpenter-foreman, Martin, as alleged in the complaint.' Respondent's answer further denied the complaint's allegation that it is and has been an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act, admitting only that its operations placed its labor relations within the Board's jurisdiction. By way of affirmative defense, Respondent's answer denied that the unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint are within the jurisdiction of the Board and that since the complaint's allegation concerning the Respondent's refusal to hire Criswell on February 2, 1968, was first raised in the amended charge filed on October 23, 1968, more than 6 months after the date of the alleged misconduct, it is therefore barred from any consideration in this proceeding under the provisions of Section 10(b) of the Act. A hearing was held before me at St Louis, Missouri, on January 13 and 14, 1968, at which all parties were represented and were afforded full opportunity to participate, examine witnesses, and adduce relevant evidence Following the hearing Respondent moved to correct the transcript in a number of instances Counsel for the General Counsel in his reply to said motion indicated no objection except with regard to four items. After studying the record and my recollection of the testimony, I am inclined to agree with counsel for the General Counsel and grant the motion of counsel for the Respondent for correction of the transcript except for the four items objected to by counsel for the General Counsel. Briefs have been received from the Respondent and the General Counsel and have been given careful consideration Upon the entire record in this proceeding, I make the following FINDINGS OF FACT I JURISDICTION The complaint alleges and Respondent's answer admits that Mason & Hanger-Silas Mason Co., Inc., is a Kentucky corporation with its principal place of business in Lexington, Kentucky During the year ending January 1, 1968, which period is representative of its operations 'During the hearing, counsel for the Respondent stipulated that Higgins was a supervisor within the meaning of the Act 179 NLRB No. 71 MASON-RUST 435 during all times material herein, in the course and conduct of its business operations, it performed services valued in excess of $50,000, of which services valued in excess of $50,000 were performed in and for various enterprises located in states other than the State of Kentucky. The Rust Engineering Company is a Pennsylvania corporation with its principal office and place of business in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. During the same period which period is representative of its operations during all times material herein, it performed services valued in excess of $50,000, of which services valued in excess of $50,000 were performed in and for various enterprises located in states other than the State of Pennsylvania. Mason & Hanger-Silas Mason Co., Inc., and the Rust Engineering Co. are and have been at all times material herein, joint venturers doing business under the trade name and style of Mason-Rust and have been engaged in the construction of an ammunition plant for the United States Government in St. Louis, Missouri. During the past year, in the course and conduct of its business operations, Respondent furnished services valued in excess of $500,000 in the construction of the plant described above which services had a substantial impact on the national defense. The complaint alleges, and I find that the Respondent is now and has been at all times material herein an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act At the hearing in this proceeding, counsel for the General Counsel moved to strike as nonresponsive that portion of Respondent's answer which denied that Respondent was an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act. I adhere to my ruling granting the motion of counsel for the General Counsel inasmuch as Respondent in its answer has admitted the factual allegations concerning Respondent's business, as stated above, from which the legal conclusion necessarily follows that it is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act. With respect to Respondent's first affirmative defense, that its alleged conduct was not within the jurisdiction of the Board because the complaint contains "an insinuation of racial discrimination" which is allegedly governed by other statutes, I note, however, that the complaint charges Respondent with a refusal to hire because of the concerted activity of Newsom and Criswell rather than a refusal to hire for reasons of race. I find it, therefore, unnecessary to decide whether racial discrimination is beyond the jurisdiction of the Board although in that connection note Packinghouse Workers v N.L R.B, 70 LRRM 2489 (C.A.D C.). I therefore adhere to my ruling during the hearing granting the motion of counsel for the General Counsel to strike the Respondent's first affirmative defense as nonresponsive Respondent's second affirmative defense is that consideration of Respondent's refusal to hire Criswell is barred by 10(b) of the Act because the amended charge concerning Criswell was filed more than 6 months after Respondent's alleged refusal to employ Criswell It was not disputed that the charge concerning Newsom was timely filed and that Respondent's alleged unlawful refusal to hire both men occurred at the same time In support of its position, Respondent cites Champion Pneumatic Machinery Co., 152 NLRB 300, in which the charge alleged violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, but,at the hearing evidence of violations of Section 8(a)(2) of the Act without a timely charge alleging a violation of that section was not permitted even though a violation of Section 8(a)(2) creates a derivative violation of Section 8(a)(1). . . The courts in sustaining the General Counsel's power to extend his complaint beyond the allegations of the charge have insisted that the new violation be "closely related to the violations named in the charge." [Citations omitted ] The "close relationship" may be found where the events are closely related either in time or in character to those alleged in the charge. But I cannot find that allegedly illegal wage increases and allegedly illegal transfers , both allegedly occurring on April 1, are "closely related" to the derivative 8(a)(1) violation inherent in sponsoring a labor organization at the end of January Champion Pneumatic Machinery Co , supra, p. 303. Counsel for the General Counsel cites Exber, Inc , dlbla El Cortez Hotel, 160 NLRB 1442. In that case several employees were discharged by the Respondent. A timely charge was filed concerning some of those discharged An amended charge concerning the other employees was filed and served more than 6 months after their discharge. The terminations of all the employees took place during the same week and resulted from the same alleged unfair labor practices Respondent' s motion for dismissal of the complaint under Section 10(b) of the Act was denied , citing N L.R B v. Local 1423, Carpenters (Columbus Showcase Co ) 238 F.2d 832, and Stainless Steel Products, Incorporated , 157 NLRB 232. Here the refusal to hire occurred allegedly on the same day and for the same reason, indeed, for Criswell 's acting in concert allegedly with Newsom. I therefore adhere to my ruling during the hearing denying Respondent's motion to bar the litigation of the complaint as it related to Criswell and granting General Counsel 's motion to strike Respondent 's second affirmative defense. Ii. THE SUPERVISORY STATUS OF PERSONNEL MANAGER HILL AND CARPENTER FOREMAN MARTIN Although Respondent's answer denied the supervisory status of both Personnel Manager Hill and Carpenter-Foreman Martin, I find that both men were supervisors of the Respondent within the meaning of the Act. Section 2(11) of the Act defines "supervisor" as any individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or responsively to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of independent judgment. Hill himself testified that his job title is "Personnel Manager" in charge of the employment section in the hiring and classifying of all applicants seeking employment Hill further testified that he had authority to hire certain employees: Q. Are there some employees which you hire on your own Mr. Hill? A. Yes sir Q. Would you tell us what kind of employees those are? A. These are supervisory, nonsupervisory, non-manual employees. s • s s Q Now then would you tell us who was in charge of the actual hiring of all craft employees9 436 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD A The general foreman of the craft involved. Q So, it would have been the general carpenter foreman who would have been responsible for hiring carpenters? A Yes sir There is no dispute that Martin was the carpenter foreman According to Project Manager Higgins, Martin, as the foreman on the job, was the "Company's agent for the purpose of hiring and firing" the manual employees in their craft. In view of the statements by Higgins and Hill concerning the job functions of both Hill and Martin and their authority to hire and fire different classes of employees "on their own" there can be little doubt that they satisfy the definition of supervisor in the Act. 111. THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS George Newsom, a Negro, has been a member of the Carpenters Union since 1953. During January 1968 to August 1968 he was a paid-up member of his Carpenters Local No. 47 in St Louis. On February 1, 1968, (according to Newsom) Newsom spoke with Doyal Criswell who is also a Negro carpenter and a member of the same Union and told him that he was going out to the Respondent's construction project because, unlike their employment at that time, the Respondent's jobs had overtime and were inside during the wintertime. He also told Criswell that the Respondent was hiring carpenters and that since the Respondent did not have any colored carpenters on the job they would have a chance to get on. The next day, Newsom visited the Respondent's project where a guard told him to make an appointment with Respondent's Personnel Manager Hill. He thereupon telephoned Hill and told him he was looking for a job as a carpenter. Hill invited him to come over and Newsom did so on the same day At this time he told Hill that he was a union carpenter and asked if Doyal Criswell was working at the project. Hill asked Newsom if Criswell was "a colored fellow" and, upon beug informed that Criswell was, replied "He isn't here because we don't have any colored carpenters." Hill then advised Newsom to come back and see Carpenter-Foreman Martin. He also told Newsom that it was the Union that did the hiring at the project When Newsom replied that that was not the custom in St Louis, Hill repeated that it was the Union that hired carpenters for the project. Newsom then went to the Building Trades Council to inquire about hiring of carpenters at the project. He was referred to the president of the Carpenters Union, a Mr Langhurst, who advised Newsom that the Respondent, not the Union, did the hiring of carpenters for the project That night Newsom once again spoke to Criswell and told him that Langhurst had instructed him to go out to the project and that the steward or the foreman had a list from which carpenters were hired. On Friday, February 9, 1968 (again according to Newsom), Newsom and Criswell met with Hill at the Respondent's project. Newsom told Hill of the advice he had received from Union President Langhurst, adding "This job is 100 percent government financed, I was wondering if they were going to put on any Negro carpenters." Hill asked them if they were union members to which Newsom answered that they were and both he and Criswell showed Hill their union cards . Hill then instructed them to see Foreman Martin the next morning at 6.30 am Newsom and Criswell left their names and telephone numbers with Hill's receptionist and then left. Hill in his testimony admitted that the applicants told him they were union members and that Newsom asked for jobs for himself and Criswell Hill placed this meeting about the first week of March, 1968.' Hill also testified that Newsom "pounded upon my desk saying that we had no carpenters on the payroll, no Negro carpenters on the payroll, that we had to hire him." Neither Newsom nor Criswell kept their appointment with Martin on the following morning under the mistaken belief that Respondent did not work on Saturdays ' Instead, they came to the plant on the following Monday morning. Martin and Hill were at the jobsite at 6 30 at which time Hill told Martin that Newsom was to meet him Martin waited some 20 minutes for Newsom to show up and then went to work inside the plant A few minutes later Newsom and Criswell arrived Criswell left without seeing anyone, but Newsom went around to the front of the plant to see Hill and talk to him According to Hill, Newsom was then told that this was his second time to miss an appointment (Hill having testified that Newsom had missed a earlier appointment). He did not, however, make any effort to contact or locate Martin, telling Newsom "It could be difficult to get ahold of him [Martin]." According to Hill, Newsom then "became upset again," and threatened to picket the place saying that he had picketed other places and he had sued other places because of discrimination Hill denied any discrimination and told Newsom that he would make another appointment for the next morning. That night Newsom met again with Criswell and told him of the appointment for the next morning Accordingly, the next morning both Newsom and Criswell went to the plant and spoke to Foreman Martin. Hill was not present at this meeting. Martin advised them that he had a list of applicants with about 150 names. Newsom then told Martin that "This is a United States Government plant and you haven't got a Negro carpenter in here " To this Martin replied "The hiring is being taken care of at the office, you will have to take that up at the office." At Criswell's request, Martin took the names and addresses of both Newsom and Criswell and recorded them in a book Criswell then left and Newsom went to see Hill. Newsom told Hill "What is the story anyway? Now you give me the run around here that Mr. Martin is hiring and the Union is hiring You don't know anything about this thing " Hill replied that Newsom should keep going back around that back gate where he had found Martin that morning. Newsom told Hill that he was going to see the government. This same instruction to Newsom was given by Hill some days later, with a similar reply by Newsom Newsom then went to the Corps of Engineers' office in St. Louis to complain and was referred by that office to its office at the Respondent's project. Newsom visited that office where he complained that the Respondent was not hiring Negro carpenters although "a friend and I both" were trying to get on as carpenters. There Newsom was told that Higgins was the Respondent's project manager 'The contradiction in the testimony concerning the date of this meeting is not important except with respect to the remedy which will be discussed below According to Hill, there was no contact between him and Newsom until early March 1968, when Newsom telephoned and Hill invited him to come in that afternoon and meet Martin Newsom failed to appear, according to Hill, but came in the following day, together with Criswell, at which time Hill was advised that Newsom and Criswell were union carpenters seeking jobs at the Respondent's project 'Hill's testimony makes no reference to Newsom ' s failure to show up that Saturday morning MASON-RUST and that the Respondent's home office was in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania Newsom then telephoned Higgins complaining about "getting the run-around" and Higgins referred him to Personnel Manager Hill. Newsom replied that Hill did not want to speak to him and Higgins told Newsom that the Union did the hiring of carpenters. Newsom told Higgins, however, what he had learned from Union President Langhurst. Newsom then told Higgins he was going to the Corps of Engineers, saying "I am going to get me a job," to which Higgins replied "You do exactly what you want to" and terminated the conversation by hanging up Newsom then spoke to Criswell and told him he was going to call the Respondent in Pittsburgh Criswell offered to pay half of the cost of the call and did so the next day when the call was completed At this call Newsom reported that "We are having a problem getting a job as a Negro." He was told "There was a man here by the name of Higgins," and was told to call Higgins back later on in the afternoon. Newsom called Higgins that afternoon Higgins was not in and Newsom left his telephone number. Later Higgins called Newsom back and asked Newsom to come to a meeting the next morning At this meeting which was held on April 2, 1968, Newsom brought along a friend, Duffy, who was also seeking a job with the Respondent Representing the Respondent were Mr Hill and Mr. Higgins Newsom testified that there was a gentleman from the Corps of Engineers present who turned the meeting over to Higgins but this was denied by Higgins and Hill. According to Higgins, Generally the things that he [Newsom] told me was that he was a qualified journeyman carpenter, that he was a charter member of the local, he was a charter Negro member, that he had been carpentering for about 15 years, and that all that time he had been working in behalf of getting employment for Negro carpenters in the St. Louis area. He implied to me, me, who was really a newcomer to this area, that this had been an uphill fight for all of these years. He told me that he had considerable difficulty with the Carpenters local, that he had sued the Carpenters local, I forget the reason, and he told me that he had difficulty with other contractors in the area. I remember he mentioned that he worked at one time for a Mr Milstone. It was pretty much a brief rundown of his try in the area as a carpenter on behalf of colored carpenters Higgins promised to look into "this because as to why we didn't have colored representation among carpenters," but, advised Newsom that they had laid off 18 carpenters just a day before. According to Higgins, they made an agreement for Newsom to fill out an application at Hill's office which Newsom did. Among other things, Newsom also said that he wanted "to get on the gravy train," by which he meant that he wanted to earn overtime which he was not earning on his other fob. Newsom also said that they should have hired a Negro foreman and that they should lay off a white carpenter because there were no colored carpenters Thereafter, Higgins instructed Hill to hire minority group personnel in all craft classifications As a result, Hill contacted union stewards and craft general foremen as well as the state employment service, expressing the Company's interest in hiring minority personnel. Higgins also spoke to Martin about this matter but did not tell him either to hire Newsom or not to hire him. Higgins explained his failure to instruct Martin to hire Newsom, testifying that Newsom had acted in an abusive manner 437 towards both Hill and the resident engineer from the Corps of Engineers as well as towards Higgins himself, from which behavior Higgins concluded that Newsom was "emotionally unstable." He did not, however, instruct Martin not to hire Newsom ' Neither Newsom nor Criswell were hired by the Respondent. Newsom's application for employment executed on April 2, 1968, contains the following comment* Qualified journeyman carpenter with many years experience At present no vacancies. Applicant was informed he would be given every consideration as vacancies exist (Applic Incomplete) Signature of department or section head M R. Hill Date 4-2-68 There is considerable confusion as to whether there was a carpenter vacancy on April 2. Hill first testified that there was an opening for a carpenter on that date but that neither Criswell nor Newsom were hired to fill that vacancy. Later he changed his testimony stating that he was "in error." He added that he had examined Company records and discovered that the vacancy arose on April 4, not April 2 The Company records which Hill had examined indicate that a personnel requisition for 13 carpenters was issued on March 16, 1968, of which 8 were hired on March 19 and 5 were hired on March 20. The next requisition was on April 4 and was for one carpenter. It therefore would appear that Hill was in error when he first testified that a vacancy for one carpenter existed on April 2. This conclusion, however, is not necessarily correct. Although Hill testified that a vacancy could not exist 2 days before a requisition, Higgins stated the opposite According to Higgins, the Respondent' s general construction superintendent consults with the craft superintendent for carpenters as well as Martin, the general foreman for carpenters Afterwards, the general superintendent executes a personnel requisition form. It is therefore not impossible for a vacancy to exist prior to the date on which a requisition is executed, and it is quite possible that the vacancy for one carpenter which was In this connection , counsel for the Respondent states that Newsom "admitted that he cursed " I do not so read Newsom 's testimony When asked if he had cursed, Newsom answered Well, I don't make it a-well, nothing of cursing , that is right When I get ready to curse I am fighting I don't curse, I mean if I curse you better start running because I am going to fight, that is right As I reconstruct that testimony with my recollection of the intonations and gestures of the witness as he testified, I took his testimony to be that he did not curse and that he resorts to cursing only as a last resort and preliminary to fighting which did not happen here As respects the alleged cursing to Higgins , Higgins testified that Newsom "lapsed into some cussing and some threats I don't remember the specific cuss words now, but they were insulting cuss words , and also nasty threats of who he was going to call and what he was going to do " The so-called threat according to Higgins was Newsom's threat to call the Mayor of St Louis and Mr Meany, the AFL-CIO executive I do not regard Newsom's expressed intention of calling the Mayor of St Louis or Mr Meany as a threat, which is defined by lexicographers as an expression of intention to inflict evil, injury or damage Nor is Higgins' conclusionary description of "insulting cuss words " sufficiently probative to establish that Newsom did curse 438 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD requisitioned on April 4, 1968, existed on April 2, 1968. Indeed, although Hill denied knowing that a carpenter vacancy existed on April 2, an affidavit given by Hill to a Board representative states On April 2, 1968, prior to the time that Newsom came to the project to meet with Higgins , I called Martin and told him that Newsom was coming out to the project to meet with Higgins. Martin was told by me that Newsom would be here at about 2 p.m Martin said, okay, Martin did not say anything about the vacancy for the carpenter which he had I knew that there was a vacancy for one carpenter on 4/2/68. Moreover, although the Company records heretofore referred to (which caused Hill to change his testimony concerning the carpenter vacancy on April 2) appear to indicate that the personnel requisition of March 16 for 13 carpenters was filled by March 20, Hill's affidavit states The 13 carpenters requisitioned on 3-16-68 were filled as follows: 7 on 3-19-68, 5 on 3-20-68, and Tausafari on 4-8-68. Hill testified that the affidavit merely reflects his recollection of the event. Copies of the Respondent's personnel requisitions furnished to the Board show that the March 16 carpenter requisition was filled on April 8, 1968 and that the last one hired under that requisition was one Charles Williams. Similar records show that the single carpenter vacancy requisitioned on April 4, 1968 was filled on April 26, 1968 by the hiring of Tausafari. Inasmuch as these records are corroborative of the testimony of both Williams and Tausafari, which will be referred to later, I conclude that they represent the correct version of the hiring at that time. From this I conclude that on March 16, 1968 a vacancy for a carpenter existed and that the vacancy was filled on April 8, 1968 by the hiring of Williams. On April 4, 1968, another vacancy for a carpenter arose which vacancy was filled by the hiring of Tausafari on or about April 26, 1968 Moreover, I find that both Hill and Martin were aware of that carpenter vacancy on and after March 16, 1968 when the requisition was executed. Both Williams, who was hired on April 8, and Tausafari, who was hired about April 26, are Negroes. Williams testified that in February, 1968, hearing of the overtime at Respondent's project, he decided to seek employment there. Around April 4 or 5 he was advised by the union secretary to contact the union steward at the Respondent's ^project or Foreman Martin or Personnel Manager Hill. He thereupon came to the Respondent's gate where he was met by Union Steward Brooks who told Williams that he, Brooks, had heard that Williams was looking for carpenter work It does not appear how Brooks got this information . Brooks asked if Williams had a card and upon being informed that he did, instructed Williams to leave his name and number with the personnel manager. A day or so later, Williams received a telephone call from Hill instructing Williams to come in with tools at 7:30 a.m. the following Monday, prepared to go to work. On Monday morning, Williams was met by Hill and taken to the personnel office where he was told to fill out an application form. According to Williams, Hill said "Take your time, fill it out right, we have already talked with you and you are already hired This is just a formal application." Q Did he indicate that you would be losing any time while you were filling out the application form? A. He said my time started already. Williams further testified that Hill told him that "they normally hire from a list" but "the Company reserved the right to hire on an individual basis if they so desired, so they were doing so in this particular case " It should be noted that Williams, an applicant for a carpenter vacancy, was hired before he had filed an application for employment, before being interviewed by Foreman Martin, and before being listed on Martin's list of 150 applicants. On April 15, 1968, Newsom sent a telegram to a conference of State Governors which was being held in St Louis. In it Newsom stated that the Respondent "hired one Negro carpenter to keep us off of him Please look into this matter." About a week later Union Steward Brooks told Williams that Personnel Manager Hill wanted to see him. Williams went to Hill's office. There Hill inquired of Williams how things were going with him and if he had any complaints Williams replied that he did not have anyone to work with on a regular basis but was being assigned to one group one day and another group the next day Hill then asked Williams if Williams knew where he could find another carpenter. Williams replied that he had a friend who could do that kind of work and told him his name was Tausafari. Hill then told Williams to have Tausafari call him [Hill]. At that time Tausafari was working at a local department store doing shoe repair work. Upon hearing from Williams that there might be a possibility of getting hired at the Respondent's project, he visited the project on April 20, 1968, where he filled out an application for employment. Later he telephoned Hill and was invited to return to the plant. Accordingly, he met with Hill on the next day and told Hill that he was a journeyman carpenter but was nonunion. Hill thereupon gave Tausafari a letter to take to the union hall so that Tausafari could be issued a permit. Tausafari gave his employer I day's notice and then reported for work at the Respondent's project There for the first time he met Union Steward Brooks and Foreman Martin. It should be noted that Tausafari executed an application for employment before he was hired, unlike Williams who did so after he was hired. Both applicants, however, were hired before being interviewed by Foreman Martin and before being listed on Martin's list of 150 applicants The foregoing experiences as related by Williams and Tausafari during this hearing are not contested by the Respondent. IV RESPONDENT'S CONTENTIONS Respondent urges that the complaint be dismissed for various reasons. 1. Neither Newsom nor Criswell was an employee for purposes of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act 2 Newsom and Criswell did not act in concert 3. Neither Newsom nor Criswell were treated discriminatorily I find these contentions without merit and will discuss them seriatim. 1. The "employee" issue Respondent argues that neither Newsom nor Criswell was an "employee" of the company. The act, however, defines "employee" to MASON-RUST 439 include any employee, and shall not be limited to the employees of a particular employer, unless the act explicitly states otherwise. The Supreme Court, considering the language of the act, the legislative setting and the function of that statute, held Section 8(a)(3) applicable to applicants for employment who were refused employment because of their affiliation with the Union Phelps Dodge Corp. v. N L R.B, 313 U.S 177. Similarly, in John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co v N L R.B., 191 F.2d 483 (C.A.D.C.), the court held Section 8(a)(4) of the Act applicable to an applicant for employment who was denied employment because he had given testimony in a proceeding under the Act. In that case, the court cited the Act's definition of an employee quoted above and concluded Thus, in the absence of specific limitation, it [the act's definition of employee] includes not only the existing employees of an employer but also, in a generic sense, members of the working class. The "specific limitation" can be illustrated by Section 8(a)(5) which makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse to bargain collectively with representatives of his employees. Because of this limitation, an employer need not bargain with a representative of applicants for employment. Piasecki Aircraft Corp., 123 NLRB 348, enfd. 280 F 2d 575 (C.A. 3), Union Texas Petroleum, 153 NLRB 849, and Houston Maritime Association, Inc, 168 NLRB No 83. Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, which is the provision of the act involved here, declares it an unfair labor practice for an employer to interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed in Section 7. Section 7 gives employees "the right to self-organization . and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection." There are no words of special limitation in those provisions of the Act. There is, therefore, no reason to circumscribe their applicability, just as there is no reason to circumscribe the applicability of Sections 8(a)(3) and 8(a)(4). Thus, in Time-O-Matic, Inc v. N.L R B, 264 F. 2d 96, 99 (C.A. 7), a company's supervisor told two applicants for employment that nonmembership in the Union was a condition of employment. The court found a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. A violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act was complete when the statements were made to prospective employees who are employees for the purposes of the Act. Respondent cites N L R B v. Texas Natural Gasoline Corp., 253 F.2d 322 (C.A. 5), where the Court held that "The statement that `employee' includes any member of the working class is too broad." In that case, however, the Court made it clear that this limitation did not encompass applicants for employment saying "We do not have a case where it is claimed that an applicant for employment is an employee." Finally, counsel for Respondent argues that if applicants for employment are given Section 8(a)(1) protection "all one need do to get employed where he desires is apply for a job and then engage in `protected' activity." His conclusion, however, omits one essential finding: that the prospective employer refused employment to the job seeker because of his participation in a protected activity. I conclude, therefore, that Newsom and Criswell, applicants for employment with the Respondent, were employees within the meaning of the Act and entitled to the protection of Section 7. To hold otherwise would lead to inconsistent results. Thus, although an applicant for employment may not be denied employment because he is a member of a union , such behavior being a violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, the same applicant for employment would be denied employment because of his concerted activity for mutual aid or protection . This result would not be consistent with the language of Section 7 which gives employees "the right to self-organization, to form , join, or assist labor organizations , to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection." The Supreme Court has admonished against interpreting the "broad" language of Section 7 in a "restricted fashion" which "would only tend to frustrate the policy of the Act to protect the right of workers to act together to better their working conditions ." N L.R.B. v Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9. See also Tanner Motor Livery , Ltd., 148 NLRB 1402. Accordingly, I read the language of the Act to give applicants for employment protection against discrimination both for union membership and for protected concerted activities. 2. The "concert" issue Respondent contends that Newsom was acting alone, not in concert with Criswell. It cites Continental Manufacturing Corp, 155 NLRB 255, where an employer's dismissal of an employee was upheld. In that case, the employee had written a letter of complaint to the employer but without consulting any other employee about the writing of the letter. I consider that case, however, inapposite here. Newsom consulted with Criswell as early as February concerning the Respondent's hiring practices and their chances of getting employment as carpenters Afterwards, both he and Criswell met with Personnel Manager Hill to inquire about the employment of Negro carpenters. Hill corroborated Newsom's testimony in this respect adding that Newsom, in the presence of Criswell, demanded that the Respondent hire Negro carpenters. Later Criswell accompanied Newsom for the appointment with Martin, although Criswell did not stay to speak to anyone. Newsom and Criswell, however, returned to see Martin again . This time Martin was told by Newsom that there were no Negro carpenters employed by the Respondent and Criswell asked that Martin take their names and addresses for employment. Finally, when Newsom telephoned the Pittsburgh office of the Respondent he did so only after first consulting with Criswell and receiving Criswell's offer to pay for half of the cost, which he did the next day when the call was completed. The record evidence is clear that Newsom was not acting alone although, admittedly, he took the lead Moreover, group action is not a prerequisite to concerted activity, Salt River Valley Water Usersl^ Association, 99 NLRB 849, 853, citing Office Towel Supply Company, Inc., 97 NLRB 449, and Root-Carlin,' Inc., 92 NLRB 1313. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit puts it this way: [A] conversation may constitute a concerted activity although it involves only a speaker and a listener, but to qualify as such, it must appear at the very least that it was engaged in with the object of initiating or inducing or preparing for group action or that it had some relation to group action in the interest of the employees. Mushroom Transportation Co. v N L R.B., 330 F.2d 440 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 683 See, also, Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp v. N.L.R B, C.A. 4, Dec. 4, 1968 That Newsom's and Criswell's activities had "some relation to group action in the interest of the employees" is clear. Reference has already been made to the several instances in which Newsom as well as Criswell made it clear that they were seeking a modification of the Respondent's hiring practices to have it employ Negro carpenters. Of course, both men were interested in obtaining jobs for themselves But this was not their only objective. Repeatedly one or both of these men made mention of the fact that no Negro carpenters were employed by the Respondent, despite the fact that the local union had a number of Negro carpenters on its roster Indeed, it seems clear to me that as a result of the prodding by Newsom and Criswell, Respondent, through its project manager and personnel manager, began vigorous efforts to employ Negro carpenters. The first Negro carpenter was employed by the Respondent within 6 days after Newsom's meeting with Higgins. The second Negro carpenter was employed by the Respondent less than 3 weeks thereafter. Counsel for the Respondent argues, however, that the Company was not aware of any concerted activity on the part of Newsom and Criswell. He cites N L R B v. Burnup & Sims, Inc., 379 U.S 21, where an employer was held to have committed an unfair labor practice in discharging two employees in the mistaken belief that they had engaged in misconduct during the course of a protected activity. The Supreme Court held Section 8(a)(1) is violated if it is shown that the discharged employee was at the time engaged in a protected activity, that the employer knew it was such, that the basis of the discharge was an alleged act of misconduct in the course of that activity and that the employee was not, in fact, guilty of that misconduct. Respondent argues that it did not know that Newsom and Criswell were engaging in concerted activities and that under the Burnup & Sims criteria it cannot be held to have engaged in an unfair labor practice in refusing to hire these men I cannot agree As early as March, 1968, (or possibly even earlier) Personnel Manager Hill was advised by Newsom in the presence of Criswell that the Company employed no Negro carpenters and that it should have done so. Similar advice was given to Carpenter Foreman Martin when Newsom and Criswell met with him. At the April 2, 1968, meeting with Higgins and Hill, Higgins admitted that Newsom told him that he [Newsom] had been working in behalf of getting employment for Negro carpenters in the St Louis area. "It was pretty much of a brief rundown of his try in the area as a carpenter on behalf of colored carpenters." There can be no doubt that the three supervisory agents of the Respondent, Martin, Hill and Higgins, learned at one time or another during the period from March through April 1968, that Newsom and Criswell were seeking to have the Company employ Negro carpenters, an activity which had much more than "some relation to group action in the interest of the employees " Specifically, however, I find that Higgins learned of the protected activity of Newsom on April 2 when he met with Newsom and Hill and was told by Newsom that Newsom had been working for the employment of Negro carpenters in the St. Louis area. Martin became aware of the concerted activities of Newsom and Criswell around early March when he met with both men at the gate and was told of the company's failure to hire Negro carpenters and their desire to be so employed by the Respondent. Hill first learned of Newsom's and Criswell's concerted activities with respect to the employment of Negro carpenters by the Respondent in early March, 1968, when both applied for work and were directed by Hill to see Foreman Martin 3 The discriminatory issue The testimony by witnesses for the Respondent establish that the hiring of carpenters was one of the functions of Foreman Martin. The uncontradicted testimony of Williams and Tausafari, however, is more to the point. Williams was hired after being interviewed by Union Steward Brooks and Personnel Manager Hill, but without seeing or talking to Foreman Martin Williams, in turn, sought out Tausafari who was then interviewed by Personnel Manager Hill and put to work before seeing or talking to Foreman Martin or even Union Steward Brooks. It is obvious, therefore, that although Martin may have had the authority to hire carpenters, he was not the only one so empowered. Certainly, Personnel Manager Hill who admitted having the hiring authority over nonmanual employees was able to exercise a similar authority effectively over carpenters after April 2, 1968. Nevertheless, although fully aware of Newsom's and Criswell's efforts to be hired by the Respondent, he made no attempt to reach them to fill the vacancies for carpenters that arose. According to Company records, 10 such vacancies arose on February 22, 1968, two more were hired on February 27, 1968, six more were hired on March 6, 1968, eight more on March 19, five more on March 20, one more on April 8 (Williams), and one more on April 26 (Tausafari) Although Hill testified in this proceeding, he offered no credible explanation for his failure to employ either Newsom or Criswell. Hill testified that Martin tried to call Newsom several times but got no answer Martin himself, however, did not testify in this proceeding and we do not know under what circumstances he allegedly failed to reach Newsom by telephone. Newsom, on the other hand, credibly testified that the number he had given Respondent was the number of a tavern in St. Louis where his sister was employed and that the tavern was open from 7 to 1.30 a.m. every day except Sunday. This is the same number that other employers have used to reach Newsom and that Higgins used on April 1 Another explanation offered by Hill for failure to hire these men was that although he raised no question concerning Newsom's qualifications for carpentry work he had no proof that Criswell was so qualified. On cross-examination, however, he admitted that it was possible that Newsom had told him Criswell was a journeyman carpenter. In any event he knew that both men were members of the carpenters union. Even if they had not been journeymen carpenters and members of the union it would not explain his failure to hire them inasmuch as this deficiency was overlooked in the employment of Tausafari Counsel for the Respondent also argues that Higgins refused to order Martin to hire Newsom because Newsom had allegedly behaved in an abusive manner. This, however, is irrelevant. If Higgins had refused to employ Newsom this testimony might be relevant in explanation. But Higgins made no such determination. According to him, the hiring of Newsom was left to Martin under normal hiring procedures. There is nothing in the record to indicate that Martin ever became aware of Newsom's MASON-RUST alleged abusive manner which Higgins had found objectionable Reference has already been made to Hill's denial of any authority to hire carpenters, putting that authority completely in the hands of Foreman Martin This testimony, however, is not consistent with the uncontroverted testimony of Williams and Tausafari whom he hired without Martin's prior approval. I am not unmindful of Hill's testimony that he did not make the decision to employ Williams or Tausafari According to him, that decision was made by Martin, Hill merely carried out Martin's decision I do not credit that testimony It was neither corroborated by Martin who did not testify in this proceeding nor is it consistent with the stipulated testimony of Williams who related that Hill told him he was being hired on an "individual basis" rather than from a list. Respondent has failed to explain why neither Newsom nor Criswell were not also hired on an "individual basis " That Respondent was free to refuse employment to anyone for cause or even for no cause is beyond dispute, provided that refusal was not in derogation of the applicant's rights to engage in concerted activities for mutual aid or protection. V CONCLUSIONS From the foregoing I reach certain conclusions. 1. Both Newsom and Criswell, applicants for employment with the Respondent, were "employees" within the meaning of the Act, entitled to the protection of Section 8(a)(1) against employer interference with their rights among which, under Section 7, was their right to act concertedly for mutual aid and protection 2 Newsom and Criswell acted in concert for the objective of changing Respondent's hiring practices to include Negroes among its carpenters 3. Newsom and Criswell were qualified carpenters and members of the Carpenter union and these facts were known to the Respondent at all times material herein 4 Neither Newsom nor Criswell were hired following their concerted activities as described above although vacancies for carpenters existed and were filled by the Respondent. 5 Respondent's failure to hire Newsom and Criswell was not due to racial discrimination as evidenced by the fact that two Negro carpenters, Williams and Tausafari, were hired after April 2, 1968. 6 Respondent has offered no explanation for its failure to hire Newsom or Criswell This was illustrated by the following exchange Trial Examiner . Williams, a Negro carpenter, was hired Newsom, a Negro carpenter, was not hired. Both events took place when it was the Company's policy to recuit and hire members of minority groups. Now can you explain the difference9 Personnel Manager Hill No, sir. I can't. Carpenter-Foreman Martin who might have been able to explain the difference did not testify I note, however, that the two Negro carpenters, Williams and Tausafari, who were hired by the Respondent after April 2, 1968, were in no way connected with the concerted activities of Newsom and Criswell who put pressure upon the Respondent in various ways to accomplish the hiring of Negro carpenters at the project Indeed, it appears that both Williams and Tausafari were hired on an "individual basis" despite Respondent's knowledge that two qualified 441 union carpenters had applied for such position some time previously and were actively seeking those positions. It seems clear to me that when an employer fails to employ an applicant who has engaged in concerted activities for mutual aid or protection , the burden of going forward with evidence should shift to that employer to explain his failure to hire such applicants , where, as here, others not involved in such concerted activity and with even lesser qualifications for the job are hired. This burden has not been met by Respondent It is asking too much to require the General Counsel or the Charging Party to delve into the mind of the employer for a rationale when that rationale , if it exists , should be easily demonstrable by the employer 7. Respondent cites the recent case of United Packinghouse Food & Allied Workers v . N L R.B, 416 F.2d 1126 (C.A.D C) where the Court held an employer's policy and practice of invidious discrimination on account of race or national origin is a violation of Section 8(a)(1). The court added however In order to hold that employer racial discrimination violates Section 8(a)(1) it must be found that such discrimination is not merely unjustified but that it interferes with or restrains discriminated employees from exercising their statutory right to act concertedly for their own aid or protection as guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act. From this Respondent argues that it did not interfere with anyone' s Section 7 rights because Newsom quit a union scale job and , when he met with no immediate success, he quickly regained employment . This argument, however, is best addressed to the measure of damages The Packinghouse case held that racial discrimination was a violation of Section 8(a)(1) precisely because it interfered with the employees' right to act concertedly A refusal to hire those who act concertedly is an even more direct interference with the right to act concertedly and is a fortiori a violation of Section 8(a)(1) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Mason-Rust , Respondent herein, has been at all times material herein an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6) and (7) of the Act. 2 The complaint which charges Respondent with a refusal to hire because of the concerted activity of Newsom and Criswell is within the jurisdiction of the Board. 3 The allegation of the complaint charging Respondent with the refusal to employ Criswell is not barred by Section 10(b) of the Act, despite the fact that the charge concerning Criswell was filed more than 6 months after the Respondent's refusal to employ Criswell. 4 Newsom and Criswell as applicants for employment with the Respondent are entitled to the protection of Section 8(a)(1) and Section 7 of the Act. 5 Respondent's Personnel Manager Hill, Carpenter-Foreman Martin and Project Manager Higgins are its supervisors within the meaning of the Act 6. Newsom and Criswell were acting concertedly when they applied for employment with the Respondent seeking to have the Respondent employ Negro carpenters on its project 7. Newsom's and Criswell's concerted endeavors were for mutual aid or protection within the meaning of the Act 8 Respondent knew that Newsom's and Criswell's activities were concerted protected activities. 442 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 9. Respondent has refused to employ both Newsom and Criswell because of their concerted protected activities in violation of Section 8(a)(I) of the Act. THE REMEDY Having found that the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, I shall recommend that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act I have found that Newsom and Criswell began their concerted activities for the purpose of obtaining employment for Negro carpenters at the Respondent's project around February 1, 1968. Newsom further testified that on the following day he spoke to Personnel Manager Hill about a carpenter's job and was instructed by Hill to see Foreman Martin. This meeting, however, was not sufficient to apprise the Respondent of the concerted activity nor is it sufficient evidence of Respondent's refusal to hire Newsom. Newsom further testified that he met with Hill a second time on February 9, at which time, in the presence of Criswell, he raised the subject of Respondent's failure to employ Negro carpenters. Within a few days thereafter, both Newsom and Criswell spoke to Foreman Martin about the employment of Negro carpenters and left their names and addresses with him Hill, in his testimony, however, places these latter events in the month of March and, more specifically, early March I am inclined to accept the testimony given by Hill with respect to the date of these events rather than that given by Newsom Newsom's testimony is at variance with some of the statements given by him to an agent of the Board. Moreover, there is an unexplained hiatus between the alleged February meetings of Newsom and Criswell with both Hill and Martin and the April 2 meeting with Higgins It appears more likely that the meetings with Hill and Martin took place as testified to by Hill in early March and, that after several tries at employment coupled with an interval of intermittent employment elsewhere, Newsom met with Higgins on April 2 1 conclude, therefore, that Respondent became aware of Newsom's and Criswell's concerted activities with respect to Respondent's employment of Negro carpenters around early March, 1968. The first requisition for carpenters thereafter was dated March 16, 1968, and, as found earlier, a need for a carpenter continued from March 16, 1968, until at least April 26, when Tausafari was hired. More carpenters were hired in May, July, and September, 1968. I shall therefore recommend that if Respondent still needs carpenters on its St. Louis project, it shall offer Newsom and Criswell immediate employment as carpenters at that project without prejudice to such seniority or other rights and privileges as each would have enjoyed had he been hired on March 16, 1968, discharging, if necessary, any carpenter hired on that project on or after March 16, 1968 1 shall further recommend that Respondent make each of them whole for any loss of earnings suffered by reason of the failure to employ them since March 16, 1968 by payment of a sum of money equal to that which they normally would have received as wages from March 16, 1968 to the date of Respondent's offer of employment as above required or the date on which their employment on the St. Louis project would normally have ended, whichever is earlier, less any net earnings during said period (Crossett Lumber Co, 8 NLRB 440) and in the manner described in F. W Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289, together with interest thereon at the rate of 6 percent per annum as set forth in Isis Plumbing & Heating Co, 138 NLRB 716. RECOMMENDED ORDER On the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, I recommend that the Respondent, Mason and Hanger-Silas Mason Co., Inc., The Rust Engineering Company, a joint venture d/b/a Mason-Rust, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall. 1. Cease and desist from. (a) Refusing to employ applicants because they have engaged in concerted activities for their mutual aid or protection. (b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization to form labor organizations, to join or assist any labor organization and to engage in any other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or any other mutual aid or protection or to refrain from any and all such activities 2. Take the following affirmative action which is necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Offer George Newsom and Doyal Criswell, in that order, immediate employment as carpenters at its St. Louis project, if Respondent still needs carpenters on that project, without prejudice to such seniority or other rights and privileges as each would have enjoyed had he been hired on March 16, 1968, discharging, if necessary, any carpenter hired on that project on or after March 16, 1968, and make them whole for any loss each of them may have suffered by reason of the discrimination against each of them in the manner set forth in the section of the above Decision entitled "The Remedy " (b) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all payroll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other records relevant and necessary to a determination of compliance with (a) above. (c) Post in conspicuous places, at its project in St Louis, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."' Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 14, after being duly signed by the Respondent's representative, shall be posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter Steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced or covered by any other material. (d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 14, in writing within 20 days from the date of this Recommended Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith 6 'if this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "The Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the notice If the Board's Order is enforced by a decree of the United States Court of Appeals, the notice will be further amended by the substitution of the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order" for the words "a Decision and Order " 'If this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, this provision shall be modified to read "Notify the Regional Director for Region 14, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith " MASON-RUST APPENDIX NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES AND APPLICANTS FOR EMPLOYMENT Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act we hereby notify you that. WE WILL NOT refuse to employ applicants simply because they have engaged in concerted activities for their mutual aid or protection. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of your right to self-organization, to form labor organizations, to join or assist any labor organization and to engage in any other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or any other mutual aid or protection or to refrain from any and all such activities. WE WILL offer George Newsom and Doyal Criswell, in that order, immediate employment as carpenters at our St. Louis, project, if we still need carpenters on that project, without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges as each would have enjoyed 443 had he been hired on March 16, 1968, discharging, if necessary, any carpenter hired on that project on or after March 16, 1968, and WE WILL make them whole for any loss of pay they may have suffered because of the discrimination against them Dated By MASON AND HANGER- SILAS MASON CO., INC., THE RUST ENGINEERING COMPANY, A JOINT VENTURE D/B/A/ MASON-RUST (Employer) (Representative ) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced , or covered by any other material If employees have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions , they may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, 1040 Boatmen's Bank Building , 314 North Broadway, St Louis, Missouri 63102, Telephone 314-622-4167.
179 NLRB 434: Mason and Hanger-Silas Mason Co., Inc. | Justis AI