McCann Steel Co., Inc.

12 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD McCann Steel Company, Inc. and Shopmen's Local Union No. 733 of the International Association of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers, AFL-CIO and J. C. Hindsley. Cases 26-CA-3661 and 26-CA-3717 April 23, 1971 DECISION AND ORDER BY MEMBERS FANNING, JENKINS, AND KENNEDY On December 10, 1970, Trial Examiner Herzel H. E. Plaine issued his Decision in the above-entitled pro- ceeding, finding that Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the at- tached Trial Examiner's Decision. Thereafter, Re- spondent filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Deci- sion and a supporting brief. The General Counsel filed an answering brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na- tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Ex- aminer made at the hearing and finds that no prejudi- cial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Ex- aminer's Decision, the exceptions, and briefs and the entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Re- lations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommended Order of the Trial Examiner and hereby orders that Respondent, McCann Steel Company, Inc., Nashville, Tennessee, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's recommended Order. TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION HERZEL H. E. PLAINE, Trial Examiner: In these con- solidated proceedings, the Respondent is charged in the first complaint with having failed to bargain in good faith with the certified Union representing its production and maintenance employees. The complaint alleges "surface" bargaining at the negotiating table and harassment and intimidation of em- ployees away from the table, causing an unfair labor practice strike of the employees, all in violation of Section 8(a) (1) and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act). This com- plaint, Case 26-CA-3661, was filed June 26, 1970, on a charge filed by the Union April 22, 1970. 190 NLRB No. 2 The second complaint, Case 26-CA-3717, was filed July 14, 1970, on a charge filed June 23, 1970, and amended charge July 9, 1970, by a nonbargaining unit employee, Hindsley. The complaint alleges that, in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, Respondent unlawfully discharged Hinds- ley, a draftsman engaged in technical work, when he refused to perform production work normally performed by the strik- ing employees. In response to the first complaint, by answer and at trial, the Respondent denied any wrongdoing at or away from the bargaining table, and claimed that it engaged in hard nonetheless good-faith bargaining. In response to the second complaint, Respondent contends it justifiably discharged em- ployee Hindsley for failure to obey the direct order to perform the assigned production work in an alleged emergency. The case was tried August 24-27, 1970, at Nashville, Tennessee. Counsel for the General Counsel and for the Re- spondent have filed briefs. Upon the entire record of the case, including my observa- tion of the witnesses, and after due consideration of the briefs, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. JURISDICTION Respondent is a Tennessee corporation engaged in the business of fabrication and erection of structural steel. Its plant is located in Nashville. Annually, Respondent sells and ships products valued in excess of $50,000 from Nashville, Tennessee, to points out- side Tennessee. Respondent is, as it concedes, an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. The Union is, as the parties admit, a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. II. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Background Respondent fabricates structural steel and erects or installs the products on jobs in and out of the Nashville area. At its Nashville plant, Respondent has about 50 production and maintenance employees, who are represented by the Union as their collective-bargaining representative as the result of an election, December 19, 1969, and Board certification on December 31, 1969 (Case 26-RC-3543).' In connection with the holding of the December 1969 elec- tion, and the employees' choice of the Union to represent them, Respondent was found to have violated Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (5) of the Act by, among other things, threatening before the election to cut wages and the Christmas bonus if the Union was chosen to represent the employees, and by unilaterally reducing the 1969 Christmas bonus after the Un- ion was voted in by the employees, McCann Steel Company, Inc., 184 NLRB No. 90 (decided July 31, 1970). B. The Contract Negotiations 1. Foot-dragging on information On January 8, 1970, the Union requested Respondent to supply it with information concerning the names, dates of hire, and wages of each employee, and information concern- ing holidays, vacations, insurance, pension, and other fringe benefits, if any, preparatory to making a complete contract ' Respondent's field erection employees are not part of the production and maintenance unit and are not directly involved in these proceedings. McCANN STEEL COMPANY 13 proposal for negotiation (G.C. Exh. 3). Absent receipt of any such information in advance of the first negotiating meeting, held January 23, 1970,2 the Union nevertheless submitted, about a week in advance of that meeting, a contract proposal embodying 27 sections (G.C. Exh. 4), which was a complete proposal except for wage classifications and wage rates (sec. 10) and a welfare plan (sec. 14). While the Respondent never refused to supply information, it did not begin to turn over the information requested by the Union until the first nego- tiating meeting had commenced, and it did not provide the whole of the information asked until the meetings were well along.' 2. Some preliminary observations The first of 19 negotiating meetings were held on January 23, 1970; the last on July 10, 1970. By the time of the last meeting there was no agreement on any substantial economic items, such as wages, overtime and its pay scale, vacations, holidays, insurance, and pensions, and there was no agreement on noneconomic items of sub- stance, except a grievance procedure adopted after major concessions by the Union. Indeed at the last meeting and for the preceding half dozen meetings, the parties appeared fur- ther apart than they had been at the conclusion of the first meeting on January 23, when they had agreea on a number of either minor or scarcely debatable noneconomic matters, such as union plant visitation (sec. 22), availability to the Union of bulletin boards (sec. 23), establishment of a safety committee (sec. 24), a contract severability clause (sec 25), recognition of management's right to establish shop rules (sec. 6), and regular paydays (sec. 11); and had agreed on a few substantial noneconomic matters, later repudiated by Re- spondent. Thus, there had been agreement at this first meeting on items such as sec. 7, hours of employment, including recogni- tion of overtime (sec. 7(h)) which, with Respondent's amend- ment accepted by the Union substituting advance notice for overtime "by noon" in place of "eight hours" advance notice, was approved in its entirety; and agreement on parts of sec. 19, concerning a grievance procedure, and on part of sec. 20 concerning arbitration, in particular subsec. 20(A) relating to the selection and functioning of an arbitrator. However, the later repudiation by Respondent of subsec. 7(H) and 20(A), along with other discouraging actions and proposals by Respondent in and out of the negotiations, brought on the deterioration of meaningful negotiations. 3. The representatives In the negotiations, the Respondent was principally repre- sented by its lawyer, Charles H. White, chief negotiator, present at all sessions; by its lawyer, W. Gordon McKelvey; and by the chairman of Respondent's board of directors, John McCann, Sr. Also present for Respondent at various meet- ings were Plant Superintendent Logan Hicks, Respondent's corporate secretary, Russell Nash, and insurance man Sweeney. The Union was represented by a committee comprising the Union's general organizer, Carl W. Franklin, who was chief negotiator, present at all sessions; Union Business Agent Wil- liam Wright; and six employees, Ivy Smith, Tommy Hall, ' Respondent's chief negotiator, White, conceded that the request for the information (G.C. Exh.3) was in his office by at least January 14, 1970. ' For example, a summary of insurance benefits (Resp. Exh. 7) was handed to the Union on February 11, at the 2d meeting, but a copy of the insurance policy was not given to the Union until April 27, at the 11th meeting, according to Respondent's chief negotiator, White. Russell Bentley, Thomas Hale, Larry Farrell, and Joe Spann. Both Chief Negotiators Franklin and White kept fairly detailed notes and, with the aid of their notes, provided a full account of the 19 meetings. Apart from some differences in emphasis and the meaning attached to certain happenings, their testimony on what transpired largely coincided. 4. The wage matter At the start, the Union indicated it preferred to negotiate noneconomic matters at first, whereas the Respondent wanted to talk about wages first. The parties adopted the procedure of moving through the Union's draft contract proposal (G.C. Exh. 4) section by section, eliminating in the succeeding cycles discussion of sections on which agreement was reached and normally taking the unresolved sections in numerical order.' This process included section 10, wage clas- sification and wages, except that the Union was unable to include a section 10 in its initial submission of G.C. Exh. 4 for lack of wage classification data from Respondent. When the Union got the classification data it turned out to be inac- curate in certain respects, and required debate down through the 11th meeting, April 27, to get agreement on the classifica- tions involving only 52 employees. One particularly egregious situation was Respondent's denial, and the onus put upon the Union to prove, that Respondent had "leadmen" and the classification "leadman" or "leaderman"; and it was not until the Union combined naming of the specific employees with unearthing certain wage slips and an insurance brochure printed by Respondent, providing among other things insur- ance for leadmen,5 that Respondent conceded it had such a classification. Notwithstanding the absence of total agreement on wage classifications until the 11th meeting, Respondent pressed from the beginning and constantly for wage proposals by the Union. At the second meeting, February 11, responding to the pressure, but absent the wage classification data, the Un- ion proposed, orally, a $1-per-hour wage increase for all em- ployees. At the third meeting, February 16, with the Respon- dent's classification data in hand, the Union submitted in writing a sec. 10 (G.C. Exh. 12) proposing wage classifica- tions but incorporating the previous oral proposal for a $1- per-hour increase for all employees. Respondent called the wage proposal ridiculous and asked for another proposal. At the fifth meeting, March 2, the Union verbally revised its wage proposal, and submitted it in writing at the next meeting March 9 (G.C. Exh. 14). The Union's revised wage proposal was spelled out under five groupings of wage classifications, and represented a reduction in the Union's initial wage proposal of as much as 40 percent, but not uniformly. Thus, in one group the reduction in demand was 40 cents, making the proposed increase over existing wages 60 cents per hour. In another group the reduction was 22 cents, making the proposed increase over existing wages for that group 78 cents per hour. Respondent rejected this proposal when made, and the Union asked for a wage proposal from Respondent. Respondent made its proposal at the sixth meeting, March 9 (G.C. Exh. 13). As shown in G.C. Exh. 13(b), Respondent proposed to reduce the existing wages of 26 men (or over half ' Nothing was said about whether a party could or could not withdraw its agreement to sections approved and eliminated from the discussion. ' When the union negotiating committee discovered also that the insur- ance brochure provided a higher life insurance coverage for leadmen (who were not classed as supervisors) than was currently in effect for most of the employees, it demanded parity for all at the higher figure. This was the only instance that might be termed an increase in demand over original propos- als, on the part of the Union. 14 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD of the employees) by 4 cents to 28 cents per hour, to keep 19 men at the same wage currently paid , and to increase the wages of only 6 men in a range from 8 cents to 34 cents per hour. It was not without significance that five of the six employees on the union negotiating committee were among those whose wages would be reduced , and the sixth member would remain at his present wage.6 Needless to say, the Union rejected Respondent's wage proposal which , as the Union analyzed it (without contradic- tion), would cut the wages of a majority of the employees and represent no improvement for almost all of the rest. Lawyer White testified he did not expect the Union to accept Respon- dent's wage proposal , and was not surprised that it was re- jected. Nevetheless, as he said, it remained Respondent's one and only wage proposal, from which it never deviated throughout the negotiating meetings. The Union, on the other hand , in addition to its earlier alterations in proposed wages, offered at the seventh meeting, March 16 , a further cut of 1 cent per hour in its preceding proposal (G.C. Exh. 14); and offered a fourth wage alteration at the final (19th) session, July 10, through Federal Mediation Service Commissioner Bradley, who was present , but Bradley reported back to the union committee, according to Union Negotiator Franklin, that Respondent was not in a mood to give anything , and the negotiations were adjourned without any new date fixed. While Respondent argued at the negotiations and trial that it was concerned with "real" wages , which would include the value of other economic benefits in addition to the hourly wage rates, Lawyer White conceded that Respondent made no effort during the negotiations, nor did it at trial, to analyze or explain to the employees the real gain or loss to them under its one and only wage proposal , with the slight increment from its one additional paid holiday and life insurance cover- age for dependents (see fn . 6, supra); nor did Respondent explain how it established its wage proposal. Respondent said it made use of two of the Union's con- tracts with two of Respondent's local competitors , Englert Engineering and Volunteer Structures (Resp . Exh. 8, nego- tiated in early 1969, and Resp. Exh. 9, negotiated in early 1968, respectively), in arriving at the wage rates it proposed, but conceded that both contracts have wage classifications that are not the same as Respondent's. Respondent argued at the negotiations, and at trial , that its proposal was compara- ble to the Englert and Volunteer contracts . Respondent pro- vided no analysis, and from the evidence this contention did not appear to stand up . For example, in the negotiating de- bate on overtime and how it would be computed (sec. 8), the Union's position was that overtime was any hours worked outside regular working hours in any day, whereas Respond- ent contended that overtime was hours in excess of 40 hours worked in any week, and rejected any other concept at the sixth meeting , March 9. Thereafter the Union suggested that Respondent use either the Englert or Volunteer contract provisions for overtime . Lawyer White examined the Englert overtime provision and declined , saying it was even worse, or more costly , than the Union's proposal . And indeed it was, because the Englert contract (and the Volunteer contract, as well) not only recognizes the concept of overtime as time beyond regular daily hours but computes overtime at time and a half for the first 4 hours and double time after 4 hours, whereas the Union's proposal here computes overtime uni- formly at time and a half (compare Resp . Exh. 8, sec. 8, with G.C. Exh. 4, sec. 8). Another example in testing "real" wages was the Englert contract provision for eight paid holidays as against Respon- dent's proposal of six. Union Negotiator Franklin also pointed out, among other things , that the Englert and Volun- teer contracts state their wage rates as minimum rates, and asserted that both companies were currently paying more than the minimum, whereas Respondent's wage proposal (G.C. Exh. 13) is not in that style but proposes fixed rates.' 5. Other matters Respondent came to the negotiating table with a fixed, no-give-and-take, position in other areas , as well as its wage proposal . An example was the interrelated issues involved in secs. 10(C) and 17(B) in the matter of seniority rights for nonprobationary employees . In defining probation, the Union wanted a probationary period for new employees of 30 days, Respondent wanted 60 days. The Union indicated its willing- ness to settle on 45 days, Respondent insisted on 60 days. In the matter of rights, the Union felt that seniority should apply in the making of temporary reassignments or transfers and layoffs of nonprobationary employees , whereas Respondent wanted freedom from seniority in such matters.' The Union revised its proposal and removed the automatic requirement of seniority for temporary assignments but Respondent would not accept unless the Union would also eliminate seni- ority for temporary layoffs as well. As the negotiations wore on Respondent increased its de- mands by repudiating agreements reached at the first session and asking for more than it had initially agreed upon. For example under sec. 7(H) of the Union's proposal (G.C. Exh. 4) the Union recognized compulsory overtime, provided that an employee would not be required (although he might choose) to work more than 48 hours in any week. This was apparently a better deal than Respondent currently had since, according to Union Negotiator Franklin, Respondent's chair- man of the board, John McCann, had declared that Respond- ent did not have compulsory overtime, Saturdays or other- wise, and was not interested in compelling it - it was there if the employees wanted it .Respondent agreed to sec. 7(H) at the first meeting, January 23, with a change that it proposed, substituting advance notice to an employee "by noon" in place of 8 hours' advance notice. At the ninth meeting, January 30, a Monday, Respondent complained in the meeting that the employees had failed to show up for work the previous Saturday , March 28, not a regularly scheduled workday. Superintendent Logan Hicks reported that following the close of the previous meeting, Friday, March 27, at 3:05 p .m., he notified men to report for overtime work the next day, Saturday , but they failed to show. Lawyer White wanted to know what rights Respond- ent would have had if sec. 7(H) were in effect. Union Negotia- tor Franklin, while disclaiming knowledge of the actual situa- tion, replied that it would depend on the number of hours each employee involved had worked in the week , and, if it did not mean working more than 48 hours in the week , failure to work scheduled overtime would be a failure to report.' White said Respondent needed a guaranty and that for this failure of the men to show on Saturday, March 28, he was withdraw- The Respondent made one oral addition to its proposal (G.C. Exh. 13); namely, to add one more paid holiday to the five paid holidays already recognized , and to pay the premiums for the limited life insurance coverage that dependents of employees might be eligible for, under the group policy. (Employees' coverage was already an undertaking of Respondent up to $5,000 per employee.)' Apart from the lack of contract comparability, the Union 's basic con- tention in the negotiations was that Respondent's competition was broader and involved many more companies than Englert and Volunteer in making comparisons. ° There was no debate over permanent transfer and layoffs. He might also have said, but did not , that the notice to report had not been given by noon, as would be required under sec. 7(H). McCANN STEEL COMPANY ing agreement on sec. 7(H). Seven meetings later, at the 16th meeting, May 26, Respondent proposed for the first time that it have the right to schedule and compel 15 hours of overtime in a 55-hour week per man instead of 8 hours' overtime in a 48-hour week per man, as initially agreed upon at the first meeting. The Union took the position that the 48-hour week had already been agreed upon. A similar technique was used by Respondent in respect of a major nonmonetary item, arbitration, sec. 20. Sec. 20(A), concerning the selection and functioning of an arbitrator (fol- lowing exhaustion of the grievance procedure), was agreed upon in the first meeting, January 23. At the sixth meeting, March 9, Respondent submitted a whole new proposal for sec. 20 (G.C. Exh. 9), which included some of the original sec. 20(A) but revised it to add a time limit between the last step of the grievance procedure and the requesting of arbitration, and use of the American Arbitration Association (AAA) rules in place of procedure determined by the arbitrator or agreed upon by the parties (as originally provided). Respond- ent also proposed excluding from the arbitrator's jurisdiction a number of new matters not heretofore specified, including matters over which Respondent "has exercised unilateral dis- cretion in the past." The Union was not directly informed that Respondent had withdrawn approval of sec. 20(A) until the 12th meeting, May 5, when Lawyer McKelvey so stated without explanation, said Union Negotiator Franklin. Never- theless, the Union did not refuse to negotiate from Respon- dent's drafts of the proposals, including a redraft of sec. 20, G.C. Exh. 10, substituted for G.C. Exh. 9 at the 15th meeting, May 21. Indeed the Union agreed to subsec. (C), part of subsec. (D), and subsec. (E) of G.C. Exh 10, sec. 20, accord- ing to Lawyer White, but Respondent continued to insist on its changes to sec. 20(A) respecting the time limit and use of AAA rules of procedure, as well as the bulk of the new exceptions to the jurisdiction of the arbitrator, which the Union would not accept.'° Of the important nonmonetary items, the only agreement was on sec. 19, the grievance procedure, where agreement was reached as the result of the Union yielding to major changes in its proposal, propounded by Respondent. Al- though Respondent had initially agreed to sec. 19(A) and (B) and a union revision of (C), Respondent later offered a coun- terproposal (G.C. Exh. 6). The Union acquiesced in Respon- dent's proposal, reducing three grievance steps to two and limiting the number of paid stewards to two, and G.C. Exh. 7 became the agreed article. Respondent's handling of the checkoff provision, sec. 5, became an irritant that fed the growing feeling among the union negotiating team that Respondent was not bargaining with any serious intent to reach an agreement. At the first six meetings Respondent asked that the item be passed over. At the seventh and ninth meetings, Respondent said it would not discuss the checkoff until all monetary items were agreed upon, a situation it was not helping to achieve. At the ninth meeting, March 30, Lawyer McKelvey asked what benefit would the checkoff be to the Respondent. Union Representa- tive Franklin replied it would not benefit the Respondent but would benefit the employees and the Union, and proceeded to explain why he thought this. Respondent repeated the same question in the 12th meeting, May 5, and in the 17th meeting, June 1, drawing the same response each time, but never indicating whether it would or would not accept, and never making a counterproposal to sec. 5. 10 Lawyer White's acquiescence in some languages changes suggested by Union Representative Franklin in Section 20 were, by White's admission, mere corrections of oversights in drafting his proposals on sec . 19, 20, and 21. 15 Lawyer McKelvey apparently helped fan the feelings of irritation and mistrust of Respondent's intentions by coming into the ninth meeting, March 30, and separating the tables where the two teams of negotiators sat, and thereafter repeat- ing the performance whenever he attended the meetings. Prior to March 30 and in his absence thereafter, the two tables would be together. On March 30 and the later occa- sions, without a by-your-leave or explanation, McKelvey would thrust the tables apart at the start of meetings he attended. The union committee members regarded his con- duct as insulting and commented to that effect across the table." Their lack of confidence in Respondent's intentions to bargain seriously was not alleviated by McKelvey's remark to the union negotiating committee that Respondent was at the negotiating table only because of the directions of the Na- tional Labor Relations Board. C. Misconduct Outside The Negotiating Sessions Respondent's conduct in the negotiations, characterized by Lawyer McKelvey's remark to the union negotiating com- mittee supra, was a reflection of conduct by Respondent, and what it was telling its employees, outside the meeting room. By way of background, employee Russell Bentley, a mem- ber of the employees' negotiating team, recalled that in a speech to the employees prior to the representation election in December 1969, Respondent's chairman of the board, John McCann, Sr., told the employees that if they chose the Union he would make it hard on them - hard as hell - and that the law required him to listen to the Union but not to sign a contract. Employee Bentley and employee Tommy Hall, also a member of the employees ' negotiating team, tes- tified that following one of the April 1970 bargaining meet- ings Supervisor Brady (conceded to be a supervisor within the meaning of the Act) told each of them that McCann was going to sit at the table and listen, but that was all - they were not going to get a contract.12 Earlier in mid-February 1970, the Respondent posted at the plant clock a notice of wage reductions." At the close of the third negotiating session, February 16, Union Negotiator Franklin asked Respondent's Lawyer White about the posted notice and was told that the notice had been taken down and was of no effect. In mid-April 1970, Superintendent Logan Hicks and the two other plant supervisors who responded to him, Brady and Eubanks," caused the rumor to be spread among the em- ployees that Chairman McCann was buying a plant in Florida and would move the operation there taking only a few of the present employees (testimony of employees Ivy Smith, Russell Bentley, and Gary Harrison). Superintendent Hicks and Supervisors Brady and Eubanks admitted that the rumor was all over the plant, and Eubanks testified that he helped spread it." Supervisor Brady said he asked Superintendent Hicks about the rumor that McCann was selling the Nash- ville plant and moving to Florida after employees had ques- 11 At trial, Lawyer White sought to excuse McKelvey's conduct on the ground that McKelvey was hard of hearing and the separation of the tables helped him talk more privately with his colleagues. Unfortunately, White didn 't make the point in the negotiating sessions where it needed to be made. 11 Brady's absolute denial that he had these conversations was impugned by his affidavit to the Board, given a few weeks after the conversations, saying he didn't think he said these things to the employees. " It will be recalled, as noted under heading A, supra, that Respondent President McCann had threatened in the preelection campaign that there would be wage cuts if the employees brought the Union into the plant. 14 All supervisors within the meaning of the Act. " Eubanks also corroborated employee Ivy Smith's testimony that Eu- banks had said to Superintendent Hicks in employee Smith 's presence that he (Eubanks) had his house up for sale and was ready to go to Florida. 16 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD tioned Brady about it. Hicks, according to Brady, replied he had heard employee Smokey Tomlin talking about it, but did not enlighten Brady as to whether it was true or not. Superintendent Hicks sought to place the responsibility for the rumor and for spreading it on employee Smokey Tomlin, and Tomlin came forward and accepted the responsibility. However, it turned out, according to Tomlin, that nobody knew that he was responsible , including counsel with whom, he said, he never discussed the matter before taking the stand. Superintendent Hicks claimed that Supervisor Eubanks told him that employee Tomlin started the rumor , but Eubanks testified he did not know where he had learned of the rumor. It would appear that Superintendent Hicks was not telling the truth, and I credit the testimony of employees Smith and Harrison that, in the conversations involving them and em- ployee Tomlin, Hicks directly asserted that the plant was being moved to Florida without most of the current em- ployees. Additionally, as the whole evidence on this subject indicates, Superintendent Hicks fostered the spread of the story through his supervisors. Employee Ivy Smith was the shipping and receiving clerk for the plant and occupied a desk in Superintendent Hicks' office. When employee Smith became a member of the em- ployees' negotiating team , he experienced , he said, a change in attitude toward himself by Superintendent Hicks from one of reasonableness to harassment . Smith testified that Hicks began taking over his duties as shipping clerk , withholding information from him and leaving him little to do, neverthe- less holding him responsible for errors . Smith referred to an incident where Hicks asked him to ship material that was not on a list to be shipped , but blamed Smith for the resulting error and told President McCann the Company would have to let Ivy (Smith) go. On the morning of March 26, 1970, Hicks told employee Smith that the best thing he could do was hunt for another job. Employee Smith said he wasn't fired, but he observed that Superintendent Hicks' several con- versations with Supervisors Eubanks and Brady and em- ployee Tomlin and estimator Wilson in Hicks' office (where Smith sat) about getting rid of a half dozen employees, and firing a "bunch of asses," and moving the plant to Florida and laying off most of the employees , were spoken loudly with special emphasis for Smith to hear.16 D. The Strike and Violence by Respondent At the ninth negotiating session on March 30, on the occa- sion of the previously described exchange between the parties concerning the failure of the men to report for overtime work on Saturday , March 28, the Respondent withdrew its agree- ment on sec. 7(H), concerning overtime , because of this fail- ure to report, it said. Franklin, for the Union , warned if Respondent was going to make agreements and then with- draw, the Union would have to strike the plant . Franklin testified that the possibility of striking was discussed with the employees several times thereafter , and on May 11, following the 13th negotiating meeting, the employees authorized the union negotiating committee to withdraw the employees from the plant when it deemed it advisable. On the morning of May 14, 1970, the union negotiating committee agreed to strike, and the plant was struck at noon. A picket line and picket signs announced the fact . Next day, at the May 15 meeting, Lawyer White asked if the Union had struck the plant, and Union Negotiator Franklin said yes. White asked if it was because of a discharged man, and Franklin said no, that the strike had occurred because of 16 Superintendent Hicks denied all of these conversations but his credibil- ity was impeached , as previously indicated. Respondent's unfair labor practices , because of its attitude in the negotiations and in the plant, and because of its attitude in general." In this connection the Union filed unfair labor practice charges against the Respondent on April 22, following the 10th meeting on April 20. Previously, in mid-April, the Un- ion had sought the assistance of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, and a Commissioner Bradley attended the negotiations for the first time at the 12th meeting on May 5, and he or Commissioner Popular were present at succeed- ing meetings. At the 14th meeting , May 15, the first after the strike, Commissioner Bradley advised that negotiations ought to continue, since the men would not go back without an agreement, and the parties continued the negotiating ses- sions through the 19th meeting on July 10, when they were suspended subject to the call of the Federal mediator. The employees were still on strike at the time of the trial. A few days after commencement of the strike in mid-May 1970, on May 23, Respondent 's chairman of the board, John McCann, Sr., came out of his office at the plant, got into his car, and charged at a group of the employees who were picketing. He got out of his car yelling and waving a blackjack in his right hand and holding what appeared to be a gun in his pocket with his left hand, according to employee Tommy Hall, who was one of the pickets . The pickets backed away and McCann made off with some of their union picket signs, which were not returned, though return was requested at the next negotiationg meeting by Franklin and the union com- mittee. McCann repeated this violent performance on June 1. Employee Hall and Union Business Agent Wright went to the local criminal court seeking a warrant for McCann 's arrest. Judge Burch told employee Hall he could have the warrant if he insisted , but advised Hall against it and to ignore what had happened . 1e Hall did not press for the warrant. The physical attack by Chairman McCann and his seizure of, and failure to return, the union picket signs found their way into the discussions at the negotiating sessions and, ac- cording to union representative Franklin, further confounded the efforts to reach an agreement. E. The Discharge of Employee Hindsley Employee J. C. Hindsley , who worked for Respondent over 3 years before he was discharged on June 23, 1970, was a structural draftsman whose work was the preparation of blue- prints. He worked in the engineering department in a building separate from the main building, under the supervision of the Chief Draftsman Kenneth Wayman . He was not , and was not eligible to be, a member of the bargaining unit represented by the Union. " Respondent suggested , at trial, that the strike was over the discharge of an employee , Jones , that occurred in the morning of May 14. The evi- dence does not support this. Jones filed an unfair labor practice charge with Board, on his own and not through the Union, which charge was dismissed by the Regional Office, Case 26-CA-3680 , on June 10, 1970 (see Resp. Exh. 5). Lawyer White thought Franklin had included " discharge of an em- ployee," though not specifying Jones , in his string of reasons for the strike in the discussion of May 15 ; but on a challenge by Respondent of Franklin's notes, the notes bore Franklin out. Even if they had not, under White's own version of what was said , Respondent was clearly on notice that the Union was striking at least because of Respondent 's unfair labor practices in threat- ening to discharge employees, riding the backs of employees , and dragging its feet in negotiations. " Employee Hall said he believed McCann was drunk on these two occasions because he had seen him drunk before, but never unfriendly of carrying a blackjack or other weapon when drunk before. McCann was nol friendly on these two occasions , said Hall. Respondent offered no testimony concerning those incidents. McCANN STEEL COMPANY 17 Following the commencement of the strike on May 14, 1970, employee Hindsley continued to report to work and perform his duties as a draftsman. Respondent had been able to get other companies to do some of its work for it with Respondent's materials and, additionally, on May 21, Presi- dent Charles McCann organized his supervisors to perform some of the struck production work, commencing the next' day. He also asked employee Hindsley to participate and do some of the welding, with which he had had some experience. Hindsley refused. He was told again on June 11 and June 18 to come prepared to go into the shop and weld, and refused again. On June 23, President McCann discharge him for refusing to obey a direct order. From their testimony, both President McCann and Chief Draftsman Wayman knew, as a result of their discussions with employee Hindsley, that he objected to working in the production shop because he did not want to perform the work of employees who were on strike." President McCann said he would not have asked employee Hindsley to work in the plant if there was not the emergency caused by the strike, and, even with the emergency would not have discharged Hindsley and would have made do with whatever substitute welding help was mustered, if Hindsley had not had several (unspecified) shortcomings as an employee. F. Section 8(a)(1) and (5) Findings 1. Failure to bargain, threats, and harassment The evidence is persuasive that from the beginning Re- spondent did not bargain in good faith, but rather engaged in protracted, dilatory talk designed to prolong fruitless negotia- tions in order to undermine the Union as the representative of the employees. On the bargaining issue that it characterized in the negotia- tions as the most important issue, wages, Respondent made one and only one proposal, which it admittedly knew would not be accepted by the Union; and thereafter never altered or offered to alter the proposal throughout the almost 6 months of negotiating sessions. Respondent refused to discuss the Union's wage proposals, other than to suggest that the Union revise them downward, which the Union did several times to no avail. For the 50 employees involved, Respondent's wage proposal provided wage reductions (from what employees were currently earning) for over half of the men, no change in wages for most of the others, and increases for only a handful. Pointedly, five of the six employees on the union negotiating committee were among those slated to receive wage cuts, and the sixth employee would stay at his same wage. Respondent never explained or analyzed for the em- ployees its wage proposal, with or without the slight and only increment over existing economic conditions it offered (one extra paid holiday and some insurance coverage for em- ployees' dependents), but argued a good deal that the proposal was comparable to contracts of two local competi- tors who had contracts with the Union. Again there was no analysis provided, and comparisons, as developed in the bar- gaining sessions, indicated that Respondent had not included, and would not adopt, some of the significantly higher eco- nomic provisions for the employees contained in the two competitors contracts; and had not, as in those contracts, treated the wage scale proposed as a minimum rather than a fixed scale. As was aptly said in N. L. R.B. v. Reed and Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131, 139 (C.A. 1, 1953), cert. denied 346 U.S. 887: "It is difficult to believe that the Company with a straight face and in good faith could have supposed that this proposal had the slightest chance of acceptance by a self-respecting union, or even that it might advance the negotiations by affording a basis of discussion; rather, it looks more like a stalling tactic by a party bent upon maintaining the pretense of bargaining." And compare N.L.R.B. v. Deena Artware, Inc., 198 F.2d 645, 648, 650 (C.A. 6, 1952), cert. denied 345 U.S. 906, where, in particular, the company's no-increase wage proposal and proposed reduction in existing vacation privi- leges furnished "a reasonable basis for the conclusions" that the company did not bargain in good faith. From all appearances, Respondent's wage proposal was a step toward effectuating the threat it had made to the em- ployees prior to their election of the Union as bargaining representative, a threat that Respondent would cut wages of some employees if the Union was voted in, McCann Steel Company, Inc., supra, 184 NLRB No. 90 (TXD) (July 31, 1970). Respondent's management actually embarked on making the wage cuts effective unilaterally, in February 1970, by posting a notice in the plant after the negotiations had begun, but, on remonstrance by the Union in the following negotiating session, Respondent's lawyers indicated that the notice was withdrawn. Respondent's treatment of the matter of wages would have sufficed by itself to establish the Section 8(a)(1) and (5) findings, but there was more, as the evidence indicated, demonstrating Respondent's overall bad faith in bargaining. At the bargaining table, Respondent repudiated the tentative agreements reached on overtime and arbitration to increase its demands in both areas, compare San Antonio Machine and Supply Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 363 F.2d 633, 635-641 (C.A. 5, 1966); made impossible any meaningful discussion of a dues checkoff provision; dragged its feet in supplying information within its control, and compelled the Union to dredge up some of that information, such as that Respondent had lead- men and used such an employee classification; and brought to the table, as exemplified by the actions of Lawyer McKel- vey, a bellicose and disruptive antiunion attitude that exacer- bated disagreement and hindered negotiations.20 Away from the table, the employees were being told by their supervisors that Chairman McCann was making good the threat of the preelection promise to sit and talk, as the law required, but with no intention of entering a collective-bar- gaining agreement, and that McCann would move the plant from Tennessee to Florida without taking most of the em- ployees. They were also given notice, after the negotiations commenced, of wage cuts. Though the notice was withdrawn, the threat remained in the one and only wage proposal that the Respondent later submitted in the negotiations, providing wage cuts for a majority of the men. The employees who served on the union negotiating committee were the special targets for transmission of these "messages" from the em- ployer, including the wage cuts proposed for them; and one committeeman, employee Ivy Smith, was subject to harass- ment by his supervisor, Superintendent Hicks, to the point where the termination of Smith's job was threatened. Respondent's threats to and harassment of employees were violations of Section 8(a)(1); and, whether viewed independ- ently (see National Business Forms, 176 NLRB No. 122 (1969)), or in combination with its conduct at the bargaining " While he had to cross the picket line to park his car for his regular " After 19 bargaining sessions over a period of 6 months, Respondent drafting work which was not performed in the production shop, Hindsley and the Union had not agreed to any substantial economic or noneconomic made it quite clear that he would not cross the picket line to enter the shop item other than a grievance procedure, arrived at after the Union acceded for the performance of a striker's work. to what Respondent wanted in the matter. 18 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD table (see Peter Satori Co., 175 NLRB No. 6 (1968)), estab- lished that Respondent refused to bargain in good faith with the Union from the inception of bargaining on January 23, 1970. Respondent's total conduct, at and away from the bar- gaining table, violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. 2. Unfair labor practice strike After 4 months of the fruitless negotiating and its accom- paniment of other unfair labor practices, the employees on May 14, 1970, went on strike and have continued the strike and picketing the plant in Nashville. Respondent was ap- prised that the strike was precipitated by its lack of good-faith bargaining and harassment of the employees, and I find that the strike was an unfair labor practice strike that has been prolonged by Respondent's continued refusal thereafter to bargain in good faith. Respondent's partial answer to the strikers was violence by Chairman McCann, who, using his automobile, a blackjack, and apparently a pistol, threatened physical harm to the pickets on two occasions in May and June and took their picket signs from them. Such conduct was obviously a violation of Section 8(a)(1), and has further prolonged the unfair labor practice strike and made more difficult the advancement of the negotiations, which con- tinued at the suggestion of the Federal Mediation and Con- ciliation Service until July 10, but with no show of progress. 3. Discharge of Hindsley The discharge of employee Hindsley on June 23, 1970, was directly related to the unfair labor practice strike. Employee Hindsley worked in Respondent's drafting department, was not part of the striking production department, and did not normally perform production work. When the strike began he continued to report to his drafting department and per- formed his regular drafting duties, for which there apparently was a need notwithstanding the strike, since Respondent con- tinued to turn out some work with help in other steel plants and utilized its supervisors for some production work in its own plant. When Respondent sought to compel employee Hindsley to join the supervisors in performing the struck production work, he refused, saying openly that he would not do the work of striking employees, and he was fired. The refusal of an employee to perform the struck work of fellow striking employees, even though he has no immediate stake in the outcome of the strike , is "mutual'aid," N.L.R.B. v. Peter Cailler Kohler Swiss Chocolates Co., 130 F.2d 503, 505-506 (C.A. 2, 1942), protected by Section 7 of the Act, Houston Contractors Assn. v. N.L.R.B., 386 U.S. 664, 668 (1967), and discharge of an employee for exercising this right violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, N.L.R.B. v. Difco Laboratories, Inc. 427 F.2d 170, (C.A. 6, 1970), eng. 172 NLRB No. 235; Cooper Thermometer Co., 154 NLRB 502, 503-507 (1965). The Respondent argued that overriding business consider- ations - the emergent need to get certain orders completed - justified firing employee Hindsley for refusing to assist. However, Hindsley had not refused to perform his regular duties but only the duties of the striking employees, and there was nothing that Hindsley had done to interrupt Respon- dent's business operation. Respondent had no need to replace Hindsley, it needed replacements for striking production em- ployees, compare Cooper Thermometer Co., supra, 506.21 Moreover, President McCann's testimony was that, though he purportedly fired employee Hindsley for refusing to obey the order to perform the struck welding work, he would not have fired Hindsley for such refusal if in other respects Hindsley had not had shortcomings as an employee; and said McCann, Respondent would have gotten along, as it did, with some other substitute doing the welding. Clearly then, employee Hindsley's refusal to obey the order respect- ing the alleged emergency work was not the sole cause of his discharge. In view of Respondent's strong union animus, retaliation against an employee who was openly sympathetic in the plant to the striking employees may well have been among the moving considerations for the discharge. While, of course, animus is not essential to a 8(a)(1) finding, its pres- ence here reinforces the finding that employee Hindsley's discharge was a violation by Respondent of Section 8(a) (1) of the Act." CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. By refusing since January 23 , 1970, to bargain in good faith with the Union as certified representative of the unit of Respondent's production and maintenance employees (found by the Board to be appropriate for collective bargaining) and by threatening employees for standing with the Union that Respondent would never sign a contract with the Union, that it would cut their wages, that it would fire employees , that it would move the plant to another location without most of the employees, and by harassing employee members of the union negotiating committee, Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act. 2. These unfair labor practices have caused an unfair labor practice strike by Respondent's bargaining unit employees. The strike has been prolonged by Respondent 's further con- tinued refusal to bargain in good faith and by Respondent threatening physical harm to picketing employees and forci- bly taking their picket signs . This threat of violence and violent action were also unfair labor practices , in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 3. In discharging employee Hindsley, one of its nonbar- gaining unit employees, because he gave mutual aid to the striking employees by refusing to perform their struck work, Respondent deprived Hindsley of rights under Section 7 of the Act and committed an unfair labor practice in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 4. The described unfair labor practices affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. THE REMEDY It will be recommended that Respondent: (1) Cease and desist from its unfair labor practices. (2) Upon request, re- sume bargaining and bargain with the Union in good faith. (3) Offer to reinstate employee Hindsley with backpay from June 23, 1970, the backpay to be computed on a quarterly basis as set forth in F W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289 (1950), approved in N.L.R.B. v. Seven Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344 (1953), with interest at 6 percent per annum as provided in Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716 (1962), approved in Philip Carey Mfg. Co. v. N.L.R.B., 331 F.2d 720 (C.A. 6, 1964), cert. denied 379 U.S. 888. (4) Offer, secondary employer's business. In the present case the concerted activity, as was similarly pointed out in N.L.R.B. v. Difco Laboratories, supra, in- Respondent's reliance on cases, such as N.L.R.B. v. Rockaway News volves only the employees of the primary employer. S u p p l y C o . , 197 F.2d 1 l 1 (C.A. 2, 1952), as justification for the discharge, " Because of the effect of the 8(a)(1) finding, including Hindsley's enti- is misplaced. In Rockaway, a secondary employer was found justified in tlement to reinstatement with backpay, and noting the absence of an 8(a)(3) discharging employees whose sympathetic activity for the striking em- allegation in the complaint, I have not found it necessary to consider also ployees of the primary employer interfered with efficient operation of the an 8(a)(3) finding. McCANN STEEL COMPANY 19 upon application, immediate and full reinstatement to his job to each of the unfair labor practice strikers who apply, dis- missing if necessary persons hired on and after May 14, 1970. In this regard Respondent shall make whole for any resulting loss of earnings any applying striker who is refused reinstate- ment within 5 days after his application , the loss of earnings to be computed as in recommendation (3) above. (5) Post the notices provided for herein. Because the Respondent by its conduct violated fundamental employee rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act, and because there appears from the manner of the commission of this conduct an attitude of opposition to the purposes of the Act and a proclivity to commit other unfair labor practices , it will be further recom- mended that the Respondent . (6) Cease and desist from in any manner infringing upon the rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act. N.L.R.B. v. Entwistle Mfg. Co., 120 F.2d 532, 536 (C.A. 4, 1941); P. R. Mallory and Co. v. N.L.R.B., 400 F.2d 956, 959-960 (C.A. 7, 1968), cert. denied 394 U.S. 918; N.L.R.B. v. Bama Company, 353 F.2d 323-324 (C.A. 5, 1965). Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, there is hereby issued the following recommended: ORDER23 Respondent , its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Failing and refusing to bargain collectively with the Union as the collective-bargaining representative of its em- ployees in a unit composed of production and maintenance employees and truckdrivers, but excluding office clerical, drafting and engineering, and field erection employees, watchmen, guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act. (b) Threatening not to bargain in good faith and threaten- ing not to sign a collective-bargaining agreement. (c) Unilaterally, and without consultation with the Union, posting notices of wage reductions , or otherwise threatening to cut wages of its employees because they stand with the Union. (d) Threatening to fire employees, or to move the plant to another location and fire employees, because they stand with the Union. (e) Harassing members of the union negotiating committee in the performance of their work in the plant and with threats of discharge. (f) Threatening physical harm, with or without weapons, to picketing employees, and taking their picket signs by force or otherwise against their will. (g) Discharging, or otherwise retaliating against, nonsuper- visory employees outside the bargaining unit who refuse to perform the work of the striking employees. (h) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed under Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action which is necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Upon request, bargain collectively in good faith with the Union as the bargaining representative of all employees in the unit, described in paragraph 1(a) above, with respect to pay, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, 33 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board , the findings, conclusions , recommendations, and Order herein shall , as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations , be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions , and order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes. and, if an understanding is reached , embody it in a signed agreement. (b) Offer to employee J.C. Hindsley immediate and full reinstatement to his former job or, if the job no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position , without prejudice to his seniority or other rights and privileges, and make him whole, in the manner set forth in the section of this decision entitled "The Remedy," for any loss of earnings he may have suffered as a result of his discharge on June 23, 1970. Notify him, if he is serving in the Armed Forces of the United States, of his right to full reinstatement upon application after discharge from the Armed Forces. (c) Upon application , offer all employees, who participated in the strike which began on May 14, 1970, and who have not already been reinstated, immediate and full reinstatement to their former positions, without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges, dismissing if necessary persons hired by Respondent on and after May 14, 1970 . Make whole each such applying employee for any loss of earnings suffered, if Respondent should refuse to reinstate him, for so long as the refusal continues beginning 5 days after the employee applied for reinstatement, and computing the loss of earnings in the manner set forth in the section of this decision entitled "The Remedy." (d) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board and its agents, for examination and copying , all payroll records, social security payment records, timecards , person- nel records and reports , and all other records necessary to ascertain the backpay due under the terms of this recom- mended Order. (e) Post in its establishment at Nashville, Tennessee, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."24 Immediately upon receipt of copies of said notice, on forms to be provided by the Regional Director for Region 26 (Memphis, Tennes- see), the Respondent shall cause the copies to be signed by one of its authorized representatives and posted , the posted copies to be maintained for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to em- ployees are customarily posted . Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (f) Notify the Regional Director for Region 26, in writing, within 20 days from the date of the receipt of this Decision, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply therewith." " In the event that the Board 's Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board " shall be changed to read "Posted pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board." " In the event that the recommended Order is adopted by the Board after exceptions have been filed, notify said Regional Director, in writing, with 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply therewith. APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government WE WILL NOT fail or refuse to bargain collectively in good faith with the Union or threaten not to bargain in good faith or not to sign a collective-bargaining agree- ment. WE WILL upon request bargain collectively in good faith with the Union as the bargaining representative of all employees in the bargaining unit described below with respect to pay, hours, and other terms and condi- 20 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD tions of employment, and, if an understanding is reached, embody it in a signed agreement . The bargain- ing unit is: All of our production and maintenance employees and truckdrivers, but excluding office clerical, drafting and engineering, and field erection em- ployees, watchmen, guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act. WE WILL NOT unilaterally, without consultation with the Union, post notices of wage cuts. WE WILL NOT threaten to cut your wages because you stand with the Union. WE WILL NOT threaten to fire you or to move the plant to another location without you because you stand with the Union. WE WILL NOT harass employee members of the union negotiating committee in the performance of their work in the plant or with threats of discharge. WE WILL NOT threaten physical harm, with or with- out weapons, to picketing employees and we will not take their picket signs by force or otherwise against their will. WE WILL NOT discharge, or otherwise retaliate against, nonsupervisory employees outside the bargain- ing unit who refuse to perform the work of the striking employees. WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with your right to join, assist, or be represented by, a labor union, or interfere with any of your rights of self-organi- zation and mutual aid guaranteed under Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act. Since the Board found that we fired employee J.C. Hindsley on June 23, 1970, because of his sympathy for the strikers and his refusal to do their work while they were on strike, WE WILL offer him his old job back and give him backpay. If he is in the Armed Forces of the United States, we will notify him of his right to reinstate- ment upon application after discharge from the Armed Forces. Since the Board has found that the employees on strike since May 14, 1970, are unfair labor practice strik- ers, WE WILL offer back to each who applies his old job (if he has not already been reinstated) and will dismiss, if necessary, persons hired since May 14, 1970. If we should fail to reinstate an applying striker within 5 days after his application WE WILL pay him for any resulting loss of earnings suffered by him. Each of you is free to become or remain, or refrain from becoming or remaining, a member of Shopmen's Local Union No. 733 of the International Association of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers, AFL-CIO, or any other la- bor union. MCCANN STEEL COMPANY, INC. (Employer) Dated By (Representative) (Title) This is an official notice and must not be defaced by any- one. This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. Any questions concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions may be directed to the Board's Office, 1720 West End Building, Room 403, Nashville, Tennessee 37203, Telephone 615-242-5922.