Copeland Sausage Co., Inc.

COPELAND SAUSAGE CO. 49 Copeland Sausage Co., Inc. and Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North America, AFL-CIO. Case 12-CA-4826 April 23, 1971 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS JENKINS AND KENNEDY On November 24, 1970, Trial Examiner James V. Constantine issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the at- tached Trial Examiner's Decision. The Trial Examiner also found that Respondent had not engaged in certain other unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint,. and recommended that the complaint be dismissed as to them. Thereafter, the General Counsel and Re- spondent filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Deci- sion and supporting briefs. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na- tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Ex- aminer made at the hearing and finds that no prejudi- cial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Ex- aminer's Decision, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner. ORDER amended charge filed respectively on April 27, May 13, and July 30, 1970, by Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North America, AFL-CIO, herein called the Union. In substance the complaint alleges that Respondent vi- olated Section 8(a)(1) and (3), and that such conduct affects commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7), of the Act. Respondent has answered admitting some of the allega- tion of the complaint but denying that it committed any unfair labor practices. Pursuant to due notice this case was heard and tried before me at Gainesville, Florida, on September 29 and 30, 1970. All parties were represented at and participated in the trial and had full opportunity to introduce evidence, examine and cross-examine witnesses, file briefs, and offer oral argument. At the close of the case the General Counsel argued orally. A brief has been received from Respondent. This case presents the issues of whether Respondent (1) Discriminatorily discharged Jimmy M. Sheffield and Elmer Taylor because they were members of or engaged in activites on behalf of the Union, or engaged in other protected activites, or both; and (2) Discriminatorily reduced the hours of employment of Samuel W. Rains because he was a member of the Union, or engaged in union or other protected activities, or both. Upon the entire record in this case, including the stipula- tions of the parties, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. AS TO JURISDICTION Respondent, a Florida corporation, is engaged in Alachua, Florida, in slaughtering, processing, and wholesaling pork and related products. During the year preceding August 12, 1970, it purchased and received goods and products valued in excess of $50,000 directly from points outside the State of Florida. I find that Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act, and that it will effectuate the purposes of the Act to assert jurisdiction over Respondent in this proceeding. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED The Union is now, and at all times material herein has been, a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Re- lations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner and hereby orders that the Re- spondent, Copeland Sausage Co., Inc., Alachua, Florida, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order. TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE JAMES V. CONSTANTINE, Trial Examiner: This is an unfair labor practice case instituted pursuant to Section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, herein called the Act. 29 U.S.C. 160(b). It was initiated by a complaint issued on Au- gust 12, 1970, by the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board, herein called the Board, through the Acting Regional Director for Region 12 (Tampa, Florida), naming Copeland Sausage Co., Inc., as the Respondent. Said com- plaint is based on a charge, amended charge, and second 190 NLRB No. 14 III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACITCES A. General Counsel's Evidence In December 1969 and January 1970, the Union initiated an "active" campaign to organize Respondent's employees. About March 1970, one of the employees selected to serve in this campaign was Jimmy Sheffield. He was also appointed to an employee committee formed to assist the Union in organ- izing Respondent's plant. Among others, employees Elmer Taylor and Samuel Rains were also designated to serve on this committee. During said organizational drive Supervisors Russell Davis, Rubin Frazier, and Jimmy Padgett attended union meetings. In addition the Union succeeded in obtaining signed authorization cards from Jimmy Padgett, J. B. Fletcher, Rubin Frazier, and Russell Davis, all supervisors of Respondent. About a week prior to March 28, 1970, Respondent dis- tributed to its employees a pamphlet entitled "DON'T SIGN ANYTHING," and signed by James H. Swick (its president), T. Grady Alday, Jr., and Jay Herring (its vice president and secretary). (See G. C. Exh. 5.) In addition to announcing a 50 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 10-cent-an-hour increase in wages, this pamphlet insisted that "no outside party or union can give you a raise." Then during the first half of April 1970, Respondent posted on its bulletin boards literature (signed by James Swick) disparaging unions and urging employees "Don't sign the union card." (See G.C. Exh. 4) These two documents were offered as evidence of union hostility by Respondent and not as affirmative proof of any unfair labor practice. 1. The discharge of Jimmy Sheffield This employee worked in Respondent's smoked meat de- partment for 9 years and 3 months prior to his discharge. He signed a union authorization card in March 1970. As noted above, Sheffield was chosen by the Union to aid it in its campaign at Respondent's plant. Among other things Sheffield, at the request of Union Organizer Charles E. Wil- liams, arranged to hold a union meeting at Sheffield's home. About 14 employees attended this meeting, which was held on Mary 27, 1970. Sheffield himself became a union member and, in addition, signed up some employees at the March 27 meeting conducted at his home. Later he also induced other employees to join the Union, so that he had obtained in excess of 70 signed authorization cards. However, he actually dis- tributed about 112 cards to employees whom he solicited to join the Union. Sheffield attended another union meeting after March 27, 1970, held at the Buffalo Ranch. About a week before April 14, 1970, Sheffield talked during working time to Rubin Frazier, whom I find to be a supervi- sor under Section 2(11) of the Act. During the conversation Sheffield solicited Frazier to sign a union authorization card. Soon Plant Superintendent Mitchell came upon the scene and asked Sheffield to "get through" with the talking. I find that Mitchell did not overhear the conversation between Sheffield and Frazier. Three or four days following the union meeting held at his home on March 27, 1970, Sheffield happened to be talking to employee Carol Walker at work. At this point Leon Blanton, whom I find to be a supervisor of Respondent under Section 2(11) of the Act, admonished Sheffield that Sheffield was talking excessively. Thereafter, whenever Sheffield spoke to any employee while at work, and no matter where this oc- curred, Blanton "came up aside of us to see what we's assa- yin'." Such conversations by Sheffield lasted but a minute or two. Blanton had neither engaged in such surveillance of Sheffield prior to March 27, 1970, nor had he, prior to that date, warned Sheffield that he was talking too much. On April 14, 1970, Blanton assigned Sheffield to operate the bacon machine because its regular operator was on sick leave that day. That afternoon Sheffield reported that he, Sheffield, could not come to work the next day, his day off, as he had to plant 16 acres of corn. When Blanton asked. Sheffield to come in if he could, the latter promised to work half a day. When Sheffield finished work on April 14 he talked briefly to employee Garrison. In about a minute Blanton came to Sheffield and told him to punch out since he was through for the day. So Sheffield punched out. After punching out Sheffield spoke to his cousin, another employee, for about 15 minutes. At the close of this conversa- tion Sheffield started to walk out. As he did so, Blanton came up to him and instructed Sheffield to turn in Sheffield's pass card. Upon inquiring what Blanton meant by this, Sheffield was informed that he was fired "for talkin' too much." At this Sheffield protested that he had talked no more in the past 2 weeks than in the past 9 years, and that Blanton, as supervi- sor, had observed much of such conduct. But Blanton insisted that Sheffield had been "doing a lot of talking" in the past 2 weeks. Thereupon Sheffield said to Blanton, "Me and you can settle this to-day ... I'd just like to bid you to step outside ... I'll just stomp hell outa you outside the gate." But Blan- ton declined this challenge or invitation. At no time prior to March 27, 1970, had Sheffield ever been warned or criticized about talking to other employees. Addi- tional testimony from Sheffield and other witnesses disclosed that Sheffield talked a lot before March 27, 1970, and that this habit of his did not increase or lessen after that date. Further, Sheffield and other witnesses testified that after March 27, 1970, Blanton often engaged in surveillance of Sheffield's activities in the plant, but that such conduct by Blanton did not occur prior to that date. On cross-examination Sheffield testified that, after March 27, 1970, Blanton "rode" or criticized him three times about talking to other employees. However, Sheffield testified that he also talked to employee Bryant during this period, but that Blanton did not refer to this incident until a few minutes after he discharged Sheffield. Russell Davis, a former supervisor of Respondent's cold cuts department, testified that the day after Sheffield's dis- charge Davis spoke with his supervisor, Roscoe Croley. When Davis mentioned that Sheffield had been fired, Croley replied "Yeah, you know why." At this Davis mentioned, "Well, I heard because he was in the union." This caused Croley to remark, "To me it seems like that's an awful dan- gerous thing to be in around here." And a day after the above, employee Kathryn Wood, in a conversation with Supervisor Fletcher, was told by Fletcher in substance that Sheffield, in Fletcher's opinion, was fired for being in the Union. 2. The denial of overtime to Samuel Rains Rains is employed by Respondent as a smokehouse opera- tor. His supervisor is Leon Blanton. Plant Superintendent Mitchell is Blanton's immediate supervisor. Rains signed a union authorization card at the request of employee Jimmy Sheffield; aided in organizing Respondent's employees, ad- vocating the Union and obtaining signatures to 15 or 20 authorization cards; attended three or four union meetings, including the meeting at Sheffield's home; and served on the Union's "in-plant organizing committee." Among others, employees Sheffield and Elmer Taylor also served on this committee. Also, Rains discussed the Union with a number of supervisors and asked them to sign union cards. When Rains worked a normal work day, he worked 9 hours between 7 a.m. and 5 p.m. No overtime was involved in this. However, for about 2 or 3 years prior to April 6, 1970, he also regularly worked overtime as follows: (a) Eleven hours every other Sunday and every other holiday, when he performed fire watch, "making rounds," and checking temperatures in the cooler. Sometimes he also smoked meat and unloaded trucks during such times. (b) An hour daily before 7 a.m. in preparing an inven- tory. Such inventory was used by the sales department. (c) Saturday work in the smoked meat department. The entire department usually operated on Saturdays. (d) Often on weekdays after 5 p.m., when he assisted the men who relieved him at 5 p.m. Sometime between April 2 and 6, 1970, while Rains was on vacation, Supervisor Blanton came to the home of Rains and notified him that Rains would no longer work on Sundays as Respondent had assigned such work "to the guards." In addi- tion, Blanton told Rains not to perform any more inventory work before 7 a.m. because an inventory would not be needed as early in the day as in the past. Blanton gave as the reason for the elimination of the latter overtime that the Company "was having to cut down some on the overtime." COPELAND SAUSAGE CO After March 27, 1970, when Rains attended a union meet- ing at Sheffield's home, Rains was deprived of Saturday work in the smoked meat department, although that department continued to work on Saturdays after said March 27. Further, Rains was deprived, after March 27, 1970, of that overtime which he performed after 5 p.m in assisting his relief man. The reason given to him by Supervisor Blanton to account for this action is that Respondent was cutting down on overtime. However, on one occasion after said March 27 Rains ob- served two employees from another department and five or six smoked department employees working after 5 p.m in the smoked meat department Rains also testified that Respondent's president, James Swick, told the former that he, Swick, had been led to believe that Rains "might be interested in dropping this charge." When Rains replied that he had considered such action, Swick replied that it would have to be the decision of Rains without influence from Swick, but that "if you're interested .. the only way to stop it would be to not testify." I do not construe this statement as an admission or declaration against interest by Respondent, and have disregarded it in arriving at the findings of facts made herein. On cross-examination Rains stated that about 2 weeks before testifying in this case he resumed working overtime after 5 p.m. In his opinion this occurred "due to necessity." However, he also testified that, "on several occasions" since April 1970, he has been asked to work overtime after 5 p in. and that he has worked infrequently on Saturday and Sunday since then 3. The discharge of Elmer Taylor Taylor was hired by Respondent in November 1969 to work in its smoked meat department. His duties required him to place a weight label on bacon, hams, and picnics, then pack them in crates, close the crates, and then label the crates. In March 1970, he signed a union authorization card at the solicitation of employee Jimmy Sheffield, and also attended all union meetings including one held at Sheffield's home on March 27, 1970. In addition, he distributed about 20 union authorization cards, talked about and discussed the Union to several employees, and served on the Union's "in-plant or- ganizing committee ." He succeeded in signing up seven or eight employees for the Union. At some of the union meetings Taylor noticed that some company supervisors were present. After the union meeting of March 27 at Sheffield's home, Taylor perceived that Supervisor Blanton on several occa- sions "pushed around" Taylor; i.e., found fault with minor matters On one occasion Blanton, about a week before May 4, 1970, told Taylor to stop leaving candy at his work station where all employees, as well as Blanton, could and did take some, although Taylor had been doing this for a long time prior to March 27. And Blanton forbade other employees to lend a hand to Taylor, although they had been doing this before March 27. In the first week of April 1970, Taylor's family came from North Carolina to visit him. As a result Taylor sent word by another employee that he would not work that day because his family had come to see him That day Taylor brought them into the plant where they met Blanton, among others. But the next day Blanton scolded Taylor for taking off that and the preceding day and informed Taylor that Taylor was being docked $60 from his bonus money and vacation pay for such conduct. On May 4, 1970, Supervisor Blanton informed Taylor that the latter was being transferred to the job of hanging hams. But Blanton did not explain why. Protesting that he felt that he could not handle this job right, Taylor replied that he did not want it Thereupon Blanton directed Taylor to accom- 51 pany him to present such objections to Plant Superintendent Mitchell At that time Gene Noegel had the job of hanging hams. Noegel is about 42 years of age. Taylor is 36. Then Blanton and Taylor together called on Mitchell. After Blanton mentioned that Taylor opposed such transfer, Taylor asked Mitchell why he was being transferred when his work not only was satisfactory (to which Mitchell agreed) but he also volunteered to and helped on other work when his own work was slack Taylor also objected to hanging hams because "there was trouble between the other workers" in that area, and so stated to Mitchell. Mitchell replied that the employee then hanging hams was "too old" and Mitchell desired a younger man on that job. (However, according to Taylor, employee Bishop often did this work in the past ) Continuing, Mitchell insisted that Noegel's job was the only job in the plant "open" for Taylor, and that if Taylor did not want it Blanton should "figure [Taylor's] time and send [Tay- lor] on his way." Taylor was thereupon discharged. Taylor explained at the hearing that he considered himself unable to hang hams satisfactorily "because it's a faster job, a more active job," and one which he "could not handle .. right . . and keep up with it " Taylor had but 2 hours' experience in hanging hams, and it was "all I could do to keep up with one [man], let alone two." Usually hanging hams would require the person hanging the same to keep up with two men who provided the hams for such purpose. Employee Kathryn Wood testified that Supervisor Fletcher told her he knew who went to the union meeting of March 27, 1970, that Taylor was one of them, and that if Taylor did not watch out Taylor would be fired. B. Respondent's Evidence Samuel J. Mithcell, Respondent's plant superintendent, ap- peared as a witness for it. An abridgment of his testimony follows. Mitchell made the decision to discharge employee Elmer Taylor under the circumstances narrated below. One day Supervisor Blanton, accompanied by Taylor, met Mitchell on the shipping dock to discuss Blanton's "problem with Mr. Taylor." After Blanton stated that Taylor "refused to do the job," Mitchell asked Taylor for an explanation. Taylor replied that he then was cheerfully performing the hardest job in the smoked meat department, that he always did any other job he was asked to do, but that he refused to do the job Blanton assigned to him, i e., hanging hams, be- cause "there's trouble at that spot." When Mitchell asked Taylor what he meant by "trouble," the latter replied that Mitchell knew what he meant thereby Then Mitchell remarked that the employee currently hang- ing hams, Gene Noegel, had complained of being tired in the late afternoons, and "we felt that perhaps we needed a younger man for the job." Although Mitchell asked Taylor to reconsider, the latter refused to do so and insisted he would not hang hams . Thereupon Mitchell discharged Taylor. The entire conversation lasted 5 to 10 minutes. A few days before this Noegel had asked Blanton for a transfer because a fellow worker, Cato Webb, "at that loca- tion" was involved in "trouble" with Noegel. Blanton passed on this information to Mitchell, who agreed to have Noegel transferred, after Blanton and Mitchell had also discussed "personnel difficulties" involving Webb and Noegel. Mitchell explained the reduction in employee Taylor's bonuses in the following manner. Pursuant to a company policy in effect long before March and April 1970, Respond- ent deducted $10 from each of Taylor's vacation, summer, and Christmas bonuses as a penalty for each day of Taylor's unexcused absence from work. According to Mitchell, Taylor remained away from work for 2 days without being excused therefor. 52 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Also, according to Mitchell, Respondent has no written rules governing the conduct of its employees, and it has never had a policy of issuing written reprimands. But the unwritten rules are communicated to the employees, some of them at the time of hiring. One of said rules was posted on the clock and also communicated by letter to employees. However, there exists an "unwritten rule" that when talking interferes with the performance of an employee's duties, "then we ex- pect him to be corrected ... about this" by the foreman. Fur- ther, it is the company's policy "to replace," i.e., discharge, any employee who refuses to do a job assigned to him. On one occasion, when Mitchell observed employee She- ffield talking to Supervisor Frazier, Mitchell told Sheffield that since Sheffield was "not through with his work perform- ance" to "get on with it"; i.e., to stop further talking. How- ever, Mitchell said nothing to Frazier. Further, Mitchell denies he had any knowledge of the Un- ion's March 27, 1970, meeting at Sheffield's home until he heard it mentioned at the hearing in this case. Also, Mitchell testified that Supervisor Blanton had complained to him that in the past (a) Sheffield's performance on the night shift was unsatisfactory in that Sheffield failed to induce night em- ployees to begin working immediately upon punching in, and (b) he did not give adequate supervision to the operation of the smokehouse. These two insufficiencies occurred about 2 and 3 years, respectively, before Sheffield's discharge. Mitch- ell received no other complaints concerning Sheffield's work habits until March or April 1970. But Mitchell neither said anything to Sheffield regarding the above shortcomings nor asked Blanton to do anything about them; i.e., no action was taken thereon. In March or April Blanton informed Mitchell that Sheffield was talking excessively on the job. Nevertheless at no time thereafter did Blanton discuss Sheffield's discharge with Mitchell. James F. Herring, Respondent's vice president and secre- tary, also testified on its behalf. An adequate abridgment of his testimony follows. Herring made the decision to reduce the overtime of Sam Rains. It was based on reviewing monthly reports which disclosed that "some overtime ... looked considerably out of line-and, one of these particular employees was Sam Rains." The elimination of Sam's Sunday work was explained as follows by Herring. Sometime in March 1970, Herring en- countered a Mr. Moore, who had been employed as a guard by Globe Security. Globe had formerly rendered service guarding Respondent's plant but, because such service became unsatisfactory to Respondent, Globe was replaced by Yarbrough Corporation to perform this same function. Moore mentioned that Yarbrough did not retain him when it replaced Globe and that, as a retiree, aged 65, and receiving social security benefits, he needed additional work to supple- ment his meager income. When Herring considered that Moore could be paid "on a straight time basis" for rendering guard service on Sunday, Herring decided that "some of [Respondent's] excessive over- time" could be eliminated and Respondent could reduce ex- penses by having Moore perform Sunday guard work. So Moore was hired for such duties. However, Moore became an employee of Yarbrough, and not of Respondent. This caused Rains and John Smith, the other regular employee who alter- nated with Rains in receiving overtime Sunday work, to lose their overtime work on Sunday. Smith now infrequently re- ceives some Sunday overtime work as a watchman or guard. Soon thereafter Herring discussed with supervisors other overtime work performed by Rains. For example, Herring ascertained that Rains came in at 6 a.m. daily, thus putting in an hour of overtime each day to take the smoked meat inventory. Such inventory was given to the sales department at 7 a.m. By arranging with that department to defer using the inventory until 8 or 8:15 a.m., Herring was able to elimi- nate the daily overtime of Rains devoted to taking the inven- tory. Thus Rains could commence taking said inventory at 7 a.m., his regular starting time, at this usual rate of pay. By dispensing with this overtime, i.e., working from 6 a.m. to 7 a.m. by Rains, Respondent further cut expenses. Hence Rains was informed to commence taking the inventory at 7 a.m. rather than 6 a.m. This terminated 1 hour of his overtime daily. The assistant supervisor of Respondent's smoked meat de- partment, who I find is a supervisor under Section 2(11) of the Act, is J. B. Fletcher. He testified substantially as follows. In the first place Fletcher denies he asked employee Kathryn Wood whether she knew anything about the Union or whether she was a union member. Secondly, he denies that he ever indicated to Mrs. Wood why Sheffield was discharged or that Sheffield was discharged for union activities. Nor did he tell Wood that he knew who was attending the union meetings, or that Sam Rains was the next in line to be fired, or that Taylor had better watch out or he would also be fired. However, Fletcher signed a union card and was cognizant of union activity at Respondent's plant. Finally, during conver- sations with Mrs. Wood in which she "ragged" him about the Union, Fletcher would say that he was glad he did not have anything to do with it. Respondent's final witness, Leon Blanton, the supervisor of its smoked meat department, and a supervisor under Section 2(11) of the Act, testified in essence as follows. Blanton asserted that he discharged Jimmy Sheffield "for talking-too much while he should be working." On the day Sheffield was fired he had been talking to two employees, one of whom was Jerry Garrison. Since Sheffield at the time he spoke to Garrison, i.e., between 5:30 and 6 p.m., had finished his work, Blanton said to him, "Let's go, then." Instead of leaving, Sheffield spoke to Garrison. Soon Sheffield and Blanton walked together towards the timeclock. But Sheffield parted from Blanton before reaching the clock. Since Sheffield did not come out of the plant in the next 5 or 6 minutes, Blanton went in to seek him. When Blanton found Sheffield the latter was talking to employee Langford. Thereupon Blanton decided to "let [Sheffield] go," and so notified Sheffield. When Sheffield asked for the reason behind his discharge, Blanton replied that it was for talking. But Sheffield insisted there was another reason. Then She- ffield said to Blanton, "I ... invite you out my way and I'm gonna settle this g.d. thing with you." But Blanton declined the invitation. Not long before this Blanton ascertained that Sheffield punched out at 6:34 p.m. one day but, instead of leaving, remained to talk to employees. The next day Blanton "men- tioned this" to Sheffield. On other occasions prior to this Blanton also "reminded" Sheffield about the latter's talking to employees. In fact in the "last few months," before being terminated, which Blanton described as since February or March 1970, Sheffield's conduct had so changed that, accord- ing to Blanton, "it was nothing to turn around `most any time of the day to see him cornered somebody, talking to 'em." and Blanton "corrected [Sheffield] about that" six or eight times at least since February or March 1970. Blanton described some of the incidents for which he so "reprimanded" or "corrected" Sheffield, but they need not be narrated here. Blanton explained that, although all employees talked on the job, all but Sheffield "wouldn't leave the job" to do so. On the other hand, Sheffield "would leave his position and would go somewhere else" to talk to employees. "And it was much more so in this period of time [since about the first of March COPELAND SAUSAGE CO 53 1970] than it had been before" that Sheffield so conducted himself. On cross-examination, Blanton declared that She- ffield's talking did not become a problem until March 1970. However, Blanton at no time informed Sheffield that he ex- posed himself to the risk of discharge by his excessive talking. Blanton also recited the events leading to Elmer Taylor's discharge. They are described in this paragraph. When Blan- ton asked Taylor to hang hams the latter refused to do so because "there's a problem over there." Thereupon Blanton brought Taylor to Plant Superintendent Mitchell and told Mitchell, in Taylor's presence, that Taylor would not hang hams. Taylor repeated his refusal to Mitchell, insisting "there's a problem there . or trouble there," but declining to identify the "problem" or "trouble " When Taylor per- sisted in his refusal, notwithstanding that Mitchell asked him to "reconsider," Mitchell discharged him Blanton insisted at the trial that Taylor's transfer to the job of hanging hams was not a permanent one, but he did not so state to Taylor at any time. Further, Blanton testified that the regular employee who hanged hams, Gene Noegel, had requested a transfer because Kato Webb, another employee in the same work area, for a couple of years "was trying to hard-time" Noegel, and also because Noegel tired easily on this job Noegel implied that Webb was seeking to inflict injury on him Blanton promised to report this to his superior, Mitchell. After talking to Mitchell about this situation, Blanton and Mitchell decided to transfer Noegel to another job, but no decision was made as to who would "move into" Noegel's job Thereupon Blan- ton informed Noegel that the latter was being transferred to the packing room, "if that was satisfactory to" Noegel. The latter liked this and accepted it. Not long after , Blanton decided to assign Taylor to hanging hams. Taylor was se- lected because he had done this work once before and was dependable; but two others capable of hanging hams were passed over because they were not dependable. Taylor's work record up to this time was exemplary and he had never been reprimanded One day employee Noegel told Blanton that Taylor would not report to work that day, but offered no reason therefor. Later in the day Blanton noticed Taylor with his family at the canteen during the coffeebreak, where Taylor introduced his family to employees but not to Blanton. The next day, a Saturday, Blanton called Taylor to come in to work, but the latter stated that, because his family was visiting him from North Carolina, he would rather not work Although Blan- ton replied, "All right," nevertheless he told Taylor on the following Monday that, pursuant to company policy, Tay- lor's bonuses were being docked $60 for his absences on the preceding Friday and Saturday; i.e., $30 for each day. On one occasion Blanton found Taylor during working hours walking around the room in which the latter worked and handing out candy to the employees. Since this interfered with the work of the department Blanton "said something to [Taylor] about it." Blanton mentioned that employee Samuel Rains had en- gaged in overtime from 6 to 7 a.m. daily in taking an inven- tory. Rains also often worked overtime after 5 p in. on week- days. But others, especially women employees, worked overtime after 5 p.m. more often than Rains. In addition, Taylor worked overtime every other Sunday by engaging in guard duty and incidental work. About the first of April 1970, Blanton and Vice President and Secretary Herring routinely discussed the overtime of employees, including that of Rains. It was decided to elimi- nate some of the overtime of Rains because (a) the Sunday work had been contracted out to a guard service, and (b) the using of the inventory by the sales department was pushed back to 8 a.m., rather an 7 a.m., so that the taking of the inventory need not start before the regular starting time of 7 a.m. Nevertheless, since Rains was not used regularly after 5 p.m., no change occurred in this type of overtime work. However, on one occasion Blanton wanted to use Rains after 5 p.m but Rains had left for home. This last evidence was offered to show that Rains continued to work overtime after 5 p.m. when needed. Also, Blanton insisted that he did not deprive Rains of overtime work after 5 p in. but "it was Rains' decision not to work overtime.... That was strictly Rains' idea." Rains actually worked overtime sometimes after 5 p in. following March 28, 1970. Although Rains and Smith lost their Sunday and holiday overtime as an economy measure, Smith since has sometimes worked on Sundays on production work, but not as a guard. As noted above, Moore, an employee of the independent contractor performing the guard service, works on Sunday as a guard at $2.40 an hour Smith and Rains received $3.30 an hour when they worked as guards on Sunday. Finally, Blanton testified that he was aware of union ac- tivity at the plant but did not know that Sheffield, Taylor, and Rains participated in it prior to the alleged discrimination against them. C Concluding Findings and Discussion 1 As to the discharge of Jimmy Sheffield I am convinced and find that Sheffield was discharged because he engaged in union activity and that the reason given to him for such discharge, i.e., excessive talking during working hours, is a pretext This ultimate finding is derived from the entire record and the following subsidiary findings which I hereby find as facts. a. Respondent had knowledge of Sheffield's activities on behalf of the Union. I do not credit Respondent's contrary evidence. Of course the mere rejection of Respondent's evi- dence on this issue is not enough to establish the fact that Respondent was aware of such sphere of action by Sheffield. N.L.R.B. v. Joseph Antell, Inc., 358 F.2d 880, 883 (C.A. 1), Council of Bagel and Bialy Bakeries, 175 NLRB No. 148. The General Counsel, upon whom rests the burden of proving his case, Rubin Bros. Footwear v. N.L.R.B., 203 F 2d 486, 488 (C.A. 5), must show by affirmative evidence that Respondent was cognizant of Sheffield's conduct on behalf of the Union. But I find, crediting witnesses for the General Counsel, that several of Respondent's supervisors knew of the Union's organizational drive and which employees were actively en- gaged in assisting the Union. In addition, I find that some supervisors signed union cards and also knew that a union meeting was held at Sheffield's home. The foregoing findings warrant the inference-and I draw it-that some supervisors of Respondent had knowledge that Sheffield was active in the Union's campaign. Hence I find that such knowledge is at- tributable to the Respondent. b. Since Sheffield was active in the union movement he became a target for employer concern. By discharging She- ffield Respondent could impress employees with the futility of joining the Union. It is true that "management can dis- charge for good cause, or bad cause, or no cause at all without incurring liability under the Act " N.L.R.B. v. McGahey, 233 F 2d 406, 413 (C.A. 5) Indeed, if an employee is terminated for improper performance of his tasks no violation ensues merely because he was engaged in organizing and the em- ployer is not sorry to lose him. N.L.R.B. v. Birmingham Publishing Co., 262 F.2d 2, 9 (C A. 5). But "obviously the discharge of a leading union advocate is a most effective method of undermining a union organizational effort." N. L. N.L.R.B. v. Longhorn Transfer Service, Inc., 346 F 2d 1003, 1006 (C A. 5). 54 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD In this connection it is well to bear in mind that "Direct evidence of a purpose to discriminate is rarely obtained, espe- cially as employers acquire some sophistication about the rights of their employees under the Act; but such purpose may be established by circumstantial evidence." Corrie Cor- poration v. N.L.R.B., 375 F.2d 149, 152 (C.A. 4). Accord: Hartsell Mills v. N.L.R.B., 111 F.2d 291, 293 (C.A. 4); N.L.R.B. v. Melrose Processing Co., 351 F.2d 693, 698 (C.A. 8); Shattuck Denn Mining Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 362 F.2d 446, 470 (C.A. 9). "Nowadays it is usually a case of more subtlety. " N.L.R.B. v. NeuhoffBros., 375 F.2d 372, 374 (C.A. 5). Hence it is not unusual for an employer to emphasize an employee's real or doubtful shortcomings in justifying a dis- charge prompted by antiunion considerations. Because of this it is imperative to scrutinize the record to ascertain the true reason behind an employee's dismissal. Radio Officers' Union v. N.L.R.B., 347 U.S. 17, 50-51. I have done so. c. Respondent was hostile to unions. However, it is axi- omatic, and I rule as a matter of law, that union animus in itself does not amount to an unfair labor practice. Patently an employer may lawfully dislike and oppose unions and consti- tutionally may utter or otherwise communicate antiunion sentiments. N.L.R.B. v. Threads, Inc., 308 F.2d 1, 8 (C.A. 4); N.L.R.B. v. Howard Quarries, 362 F.2d 236 (C.A. 8); J. P. Stevens & Co., Inc., 181 NLRB No. 97. But this does not end the matter. For such union animus is a factor which may be evaluated in arriving at the actual reason inspiring a dis- charge. N. L. R. B. v. Georgia Rug Mill, 308 F.2d 89, 91 (C.A. 5); Maphis Chapman Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 368 F.2d 298, 304 (C.A. 4). d. It is true that cause existed for Sheffield's discharge, and I so find. Such cause consisted of his talking too much to other employees during working hours. But I find that such behavior continued for several years prior to March and April 1970, and that such talking did not increase in March and April 1970. Respondent's evidence to the contrary is not credited. However, it is significant that, although Sheffield engaged in excessive conversations prior to March 1970, he was not discharged therefor. Thus I find that Respondent either condoned or overlooked such conduct before March 1970. But beginning in March 1970, Respondent began to keep Sheffield's conduct under observation in order to find or dis- cover a fresh excuse to discharge him. This strongly suggests, and I find, that Respondent was building up a case against a vigorous union advocate, and that antiunion motives led to such decision. "Certainly union activity or membership con- fers no immunity against discharge ... but if the discharge was because of union activity it violates Section 8(a)(3) ... even though a valid ground for dismissal might exist." N. L. N.L.R.B. v. Longhorn Transfer Service, Inc., 346 F. 2d 1003, 1006 (C.A. 5). I find that Sheffield's discharge was begotten in substantial part because of his union activity. e. Sheffield was not effectively warned that he exposed himself to the risk of discharge by his excessive talking. While it is true, and I find, that Supervisor Blanton spoke to She- ffield about his talking, at no time did Blanton warn or ad- monish Sheffield that the latter would suffer discharge if he persisted in such conduct. And I find that Respondent had no specific system of discipline whereby employees were al- erted to what Respondent considered derelictions of duty. Under such circumstances failure to warn has probative value. Talon, Inc., 170 NLRB No. 42, fn. 1; Dunclick, Inc., 159 NLRB 10, 11, fn. 1. This conclusion has been upheld by the courts. E. Anthony Sons, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 163 F.2d 22, 26-27 (C.A.D.C.); N.L.R.B. v. Melrose Co., 351 F.2d 693, 699 (C.A. 8). See N.L.R.B. v. Midtown Service Co., Inc., 425 F.2d 665, 670-671 (C.A. 2). On this aspect of the case it is also worthy to note that Sheffield was an experienced employee whose work was satis- factory. Yet he was abruptly discharged, and at 9 'time when the Union's campaign was intense. Both the abruptness, man- ner, and timing of a discharge shed light upon whether a termination is for cause or whether the asserted cause is offered as a pretext to disguise antiunion hostility which prompted the dismissal. E. Anthony Sons, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 163 F.2d 22, 26-27 (C.A.D.C.); Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Company, 142 NLRB 1083, 1085-86. "The abruptness of a discharge and its timing are persuasive evidence as to motiva- tion." N.L.R.B. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 242 F.2d 497, 502 (C.A. 2), cert. denied 355 U.S. 829. Accord: N.L.R.B. v. Hawthorn Company, 404 F.2d 1205, 1210 (C.A. 8); N.L.R.B. v. L. E. Farrell Co., 360 F.2d 205, 208 (C.A. 2). f. Nor is it necessary that activity protected by the Act be the only reason for Sheffield's discharge in order to render it unlawful. If his termination was inflicted substantially be- cause of his union activity it transgresses the Act notwith- standing that a valid ground for discipline may exist. Betts Baking Co. v. N.L.R.B., 380 F.2d 199 (C.A. 10); N.L.R.B. v. Whitin Machine Works, 204 F.2d 883, 885 (C.A. 1). I expressly find that Sheffield's union activity was a substantial or motivating-but not necessarily the only-reason for his discharge. Cf. N.L.R.B. v. Symons Mfg. Co., 328 F.2d 835, 837 (C.A. 7); N.L.R.B. v. Lexington Chair Co., 361 F.2d 283, 295 (C.A. 6). Of course I find, and rule as a matter of law, that member- ship in, or activities on behalf of, a labor organization, or both, do not immunize or shield an employee from punish- ment for cause. Metals Engineering Co., 148 NLRB 88, 90; Mitchell Transport, Inc., 152 NLRB 122, 123, affirmed sub nom. Hawkins v. N.L.R.B., 358 F.2d, 281, 283-284 (C.A. 7). But I have expressly found that the real cause for Sheffield's discharge was not because he was excessively loquacious but, rather, that it was his union activity which resulted in his discharge. Cf. Firestone Synthetic Fibers, 185 NLRB No. 118. No different result is required although I find that Sheffield invited Blanton to engage in a fight outside the plant. This is because I find that, lacking violence, such invitation does not attain such serious proportions that it disqualifies Sheffield from being reinstated. Efco Manufacturing, Inc., 108 NLRB 245, 261. Cf. Red Top, Inc., 185 NLRB No. 138. I consider Renfro Hosiery Mills, Inc., 122 NLRB 929, 930, distinguisha- ble on its facts. On this aspect of the case I accept Sheffield's version thereof and do not credit Blanton to the extent that his diverges therefrom. 2. The discharge of Elmer Taylor In my opinion, Taylor was discharged for engaging in un- ion activity; and the reason assigned for his termination, i.e., insubordination, is a pretext to dissemble the actual reason. I so find. This ultimate finding is based on the entire record and the following subsidiary findings which I hereby find as facts. a. Taylor was an active proponent of the Union. I credit his account of his union activities. Further, for the reasons given above as to why I found Respondent to have knowledge of Sheffield's union activity, I find that, prior to Taylor's dis- charge, Respondent was aware of Taylor's actions on behalf of the Union. Respondent's evidence inconsistent with this finding is not credited. b. Respondent displayed union animus. While this in itself does not offend the Act, it may be appraised along with other evidence in ascertaining the true cause of Taylor's dismissal. However, I expressly find that deducting $60 by Respondent from Taylor's bonuses does not constitute union animus. This is because I find that such deduction emanated from company COPELAND SAUSAGE CO policy, and that such policy was neither generated nor pur- sued by antiunion considerations. c Taylor actively espoused the Union As noted in the findings relating to Sheffield, union advocates often become targets of surveillance so that upon making the slightest slip they can be discharged. Supervisor Blanton often engaged in surveillance of Taylor beginning in March 1970. As an exam- ple, I find that, about a week before Taylor's discharge, Blan- ton forbade Taylor to give out candy although the latter had engaged in this habit for some time prior to this. Further, I credit employee Kathryn Wood that Supervisor Fletcher told her that Taylor was one of those attending a union meeting on March 27, 1970, and that if Taylor did not watch out Taylor would be fired As the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has pointed out, "obviously the discharge of a leading union advocate is a most effective method of undermining a union organizational effort." N.L.R.B. v. Longhorn Transfer Service, Inc., 346 F.2d 1003, 1006. d. In view of Fletcher's remark, above narrated, to Ka- thryn Wood, it is reasonable to infer-and I do so-that Taylor was transferred to Noegel's job because it was a disa- greeable one and (1) Taylor would sooner or later resign or (2) he could be discharged for declining to serve in it. I recognize that management personnel judgments may not be reviewed by the Board But they are subject to scrutiny when a discharge is "motivated-exclusively or substantially-by antiunion animus." N.L.R.B. v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 317 F.2d 912, 914 (C.A. 1). Accord: N.L.R.B. v. McGahey, 233 F.2d 406, 413 (C.A. 5). However, I find that such transfer was substantially moti- vated by antiunion considerations. Thus I credit Taylor that he had hanged hams but once before, and then only for a couple of hours; yet he was selected because he was consid- ered competent to do this work, according to Respondent. Then again, I credit him that he was told that hanging hams was the only job open to him after Noegel was assigned to Taylor's work. But obviously Taylor could have been given any other job in the plant, so that the selection of Taylor to do Noegel's work was motivated by a desire to give Taylor a job which he disliked. Further, Respondent knew that "trouble" or "a problem" existed on Noegel's job, and that Taylor feared such trouble; but nothing was said or done to allay Taylor's apprehension. Patently Respondent was out to so antagonize Taylor that he would resign or be placed in a position of insubordination warranting discharge e. I find that the transfer of Taylor was permanent Respon- dent's evidence that it was temporary is not credited It is also significant that Taylor was abruptly discharged without being informed that he had to accept the transfer or be fired. This abruptness has probative value in demonstrating Respondent was anxious to get rid of Taylor before he could reflect upon the situation and accept the transfer rather than lose his job. When such abruptness is assessed in the light of Taylor's excellent work record, it is difficult to understand why Re- spondent was in a hurry to discharge Taylor rather than reason with him; for the retention of excellent workers would seem to be preferred over the discharge of an excellent worker who momentarily objects to a transfer to an admittedly un- desirable job. Such discharge seems "against [Respondent's] apparent interest." N.L.R.B. v. Joseph Antell, Inc., 358 F 2d 880, 883 (C.A. 1). Further, when such abruptness occurs at the time when the employee is actively aiding the union in its organizing drive, it is reasonable to infer-and I do so-that antiunion motives have inspired the discharge. Cf. N.L.R.B. v. Southern Elec- tronics Co., 430 F.2d 1391 (C.A. 6) This is because the abrupt dismissal of an active union advocate dunng a union campaign has compelling significance Arkansas-Louisiana 55 Gas Company, 142 NLRB 1083, 1085-86. "The abruptness of a discharge and its timing are persuasive evidence as to motivation." N.L.R.B. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 247 F.2d 497, 502 (C.A. 2), cert. denied 355 U.S. 829. See N.L.R.B. v. Longhorn Transfer Service, Inc., 346 F.2d 1003, 1006 (C A. 5). f. It is my opinion, and I find, that a false reason, i.e., insubordination, was given for Taylor's termination. This "warrants the inference that some other reason was being concealed." N.L.R.B. v. Joseph Ante!!, Inc., 358 F.2d 880, 883 (C.A 1). Accord: Sterling Aluminum v. N.L.R.B., 391 F.2d 713, 723 (C.A. 8). I draw the inference that such false reason concealed an antiunion motive underlying the dis- charge of Taylor g. As in the case of Sheffield, Taylor's discharge will be found to be discriminatory, notwithstanding that a lawful cause may exist therefor, if the substantial or motivating reason behind his dismissal involves antiunion considera- tions. I find that a substantial or motivating reason for Tay- lor's discharge is his union activity. 3. The loss of overtime by Samuel Rains On this issue I am persuaded, and find, that abolishing by Respondent of the overtime of Rains was prompted by busi- ness considerations and was not dictated or motivated by antiunion hostility. This ultimate finding is based on the en- tire record. In arriving at this decision, I have been guided by two elementary principles of law. The first is that the General Counsel has the onus of establishing that such loss of over- time is attributable to discriminatory motives. The other is that management's prerogative to operate its business will not be disturbed by the Board or the courts a. The elimination of the Sunday and holiday overtime of Rains Respondent's evidence, which I credit, demonstrates that Sunday and holiday work were taken from Rains so that it could be given to Moore, an employee of the independent contractor rendering guard service to Respondent, at a saving of 40 cents an hour to Respondent This is a business judg- ment which I will not undertake to scrutinize, regardless of its soundness. Further, I am impressed by the absence of any contention that Respondent discriminated against Smith, al- though he, like Rains, also was affected by the giving of this work to Moore and thus also lost Sunday and holiday work. No different result is required because Respondent enter- tained union animus and Rains was an activist in the union movement at the plant. While these two factors are relevant, and I have not overlooked them, I have the conviction, and find, that they are insufficient to prove that Rains was de- prived of Sunday and holiday work for reasons associated with his union activities. b. The elimination of the daily overtime from 6 a.m. to 7 a. m. As in the case of the loss of Sunday and holiday work, I find that eliminating an hour of overtime each morning was adopted as an economy measure, and not because Rains had been active in the union movement It is of the utmost impor- tance to bear in mind-and I find-that this action by Re- spondent did not in the slightest alter or affect the work schedule or assignments of Rains, for he continued to take the daily inventory . Only the time of taking the inventory was changed . In other words, Rains took the inventory at 7 a.m. rather than at 6 a.m. 56 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Since no modification occurred respecting the method of taking the inventory, it is difficult to perceive why the time of performing this task should be characterized as an antiun- ion tactic. I accept Respondent's explanation that by having Rains commence doing this work at 7 a.m., rather than 6 a.m., his pay became less for doing the same work and Re- spondent obtained a corresponding reduction in its labor costs. On the record unfolded before me I am unable to discern any discriminatory treatment of Rains in this area of the case. Accordingly, I shall recommend that this segment of the complaint be dismissed. c. The loss of Saturday work in the smoked meat department Respondent contends, and its evidence indicates, that Saturday work was taken from Rains as an economy measure after March 28, 1970. I sustain said contention, and credit the evidence in support thereof. Hence, I find that this cancella- tion of work on Saturdays by Rains was not conceived from discriminatory motives. Accordingly, I find that this branch of the complaint has not been established. It is true that subsequent to March 27, 1970, Respondent often operated on Saturdays the department in which Rains worked. But it employed only women employees, whose wages were lower than those of the males. d. The loss of daily overtime after S p.m. Admittedly Rains often worked overtime after 5 p.m. prior to March 28, 1970, and admittedly thereafter he worked very little after 5 p.m. The question is whether Respondent de- prived him of such overtime because he was active in the union movement at its plant. However, I find that the decrease in this type of overtime resulted because Rains decided not to engage in it as much as previously, and not because of any action by Respondent. This is because I credit Respondent 's evidence that at no time did it restrict the overtime which Rains could work after 5 p.m. and that Rains himself voluntarily did not seek to work after 5 p.m. In fact Respondent at least once sought out Rains to ask him to work after 5 p.m. but he had already left the plant on this occasion . Patently this exhibits a willingness by Respondent to continue to employ Rains after 5 p.m. when needed, and is inconsistent with the General Counsel's con- tention that Rains was deprived of this overtime by Respon- dent's discriminatory action against him. Accordingly, I find that this facet of the complaint has not been established , and I shall recommend that it be dismissed. IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE offer each immediate and full reinstatement to his former position or, if such is not available , one which is substantially equivalent thereto, without prejudice to their seniority and other rights and privileges. It will further be recommended that Sheffield and Taylor be made whole for any loss of earnings suffered by reason of the discrimination against them. In making Sheffield and Taylor whole Respondent shall pay to each a sum of money equal to that which each would have earned as wages from the date of his layoff to the date of reinstatement or a proper offer of reinstatement, as the case may be, less his net earnings during such period . Such back- pay, if any, is to be computed on a quarterly basis in the manner established by F W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289, with interest thereon at 6 percent per annum calculated according to the formula set forth in Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716. It will also be recommended that Re- spondent preserve and make available to the Board or its agents, upon reasonable request , all pertinent records and data necessary to aid in analyzing and determining whatever backpay may be due . Finally, it will be recommended that Respondent post appropriate notices. The discriminatory discharges go "to the very heart of the Act." N.L.R.B. v. Entwistle Manufacturing Company, 120 F.2d 532, 536 (C.A. 4); L. E. Johnson Products, Inc., 179 NLRB No. 10, fn. 1. Accordingly, the Board's Order should be broad enough to prevent further infraction of the Act in any manner; and I so recommend . Cf. R & R Screen Engrav- ing, Inc., 151 NLRB 1579, 1587; A-Z Mfg. & Sales, 177 NLRB No. 98, fn. 1. Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and the entire record in this case, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 2. Respondent is an employer within the meaning of Sec- tion 2(2), and is engaged in commerce as defined in Section 2(6) and (7), of the Act. 3. By discriminating in regard to the tenure of employment of Jimmy Sheffield and Elmer Taylor, thereby discouraging membership in the Union, a labor organization, Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices condemned by Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. 4. The foregoing unfair labor practices affect commerce within the purview of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 5. Respondent has not committed any other unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint. Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the entire record in this case, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following Those activities of Respondent set forth in section III, above, found to constitute unfair labor practices, occuring in connection with its operations described in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. V. THE REMEDY As Respondent has been found to have engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I shall recommend that it cease and desist therefrom and that it take specific affirmative action, as set forth below, designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. In view of the finding that Respondent discriminated against Jimmy Sheffield and Elmer Taylor in discharging them, it will be recommended that Respondent be ordered to RECOMMENDED ORDER' Respondent, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Discouraging membership in the Union, or any other labor organization, by discharging employees or otherwise discriminating in any manner in respect to their tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment. ' In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board's Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, recommendations, and Recommended Order herein shall, as provided, in Sec. 102.48 of said Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be waived for all purposes. COPELAND SAUSAGE CO (b) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed to them by Section 7 of the Act 2 Take the following affirmative action designed to effectu- ate the policies of the Act. (a) Offer Jimmy Sheffield and Elmer Taylor immediate and full reinstatement each to his former job or, if that job no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position, without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges previously enjoyed by them, and make each whole for any loss of pay he may have suffered, with interest at the rate of 6 percent per annum, by reason of Respondent's discrimina- tion against him, as provided in the section above entitled "The Remedy." (b) Notify said Jimmy Sheffield and Elmer Taylor if pres- ently serving in the Armed Forces of the United States their right to reinstatement upon application in accordance with the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Training and Service Act, as amended, after discharge from the Armed Forces (c) Preserve and, upon reasonable request, make available to the Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all payroll records and reports and all other records necessary to ascertain the amount, if any, of backpay due under the terms of this Recommended Order. (d) Post at its plant at Alachua, Florida, copies of the notice marked "Appendix."' Copies of said notice, to be fur- nished by the Regional Director for Region 12, after being signed by a duly authorized representative of Respondent, shall be posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to em- ployees are customarily displayed. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not al- tered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (e) Notify the Regional Director for Region 12, in writing, within 20 days from the receipt of this Decision, what steps have been taken to comply herewith.' IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the complaint be dis- missed insofar as it alleges unfair labor practices not found herein. ' In the event the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall be changed to read "Posted pursuant to a judgment of the United States Court of Appeals enforcing an order of the National Labor Relations Board " ' In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, after exceptions have been filed, notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith 57 APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government WE WILL NOT discourage membership in Amal- gamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North America, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization, by discharging employees or otherwise discriminating in any manner in respect to their tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment. WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed to them by Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act. WE WILL offer Jimmy Sheffield and Elmer Taylor each immediate and full reinstatement to his former po- sition or, if such position no longer exists, to a substan- tially equivalent one, without prejudice to their seniority and other rights and privileges enjoyed by each, and make each whole for any loss of pay he may have suff- ered, with interest at the rate of 6 percent per annum, by reason of his discharge WE WILL notify said Jimmy Sheffield and Elmer Tay- lor if presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United States of their right to reinstatement upon ap- plication in accordance with the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Training and Service Act, as amended, after discharge from the Armed Forces. All our employees are free to become, remain, or refuse to become or remain members of the above-named Union, or any other labor organization. Dated By COPELAND SAUSAGE Co , INC (Employer) (Representative) (Title) This is an official notice and must not be defaced by any- one. This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. Any questions concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions may be directed to the Board's Office, Federal Building, 400 West Bay Street, Jacksonville, Florida 32202, Telephone 904-791-2168.