Hill Plumbing Co.

232 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Hill Plumbing Company and Local 529, United As- sociation of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipe Fitting Industry of the United States and Canada, AFL-CIO The Lane Company and Local 529, United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipe Fitting Industry of the United States and Canada, AFL-CIO.Cases 16-CA-3931, 16-CA- 4020, 16-CA-3930, and 16-CA-4019 April 30, 1971 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS FANNING AND JENKINS On September 21, 1970, Trial Examiner William W. Kapell issued his Decision in the above-entitled pro- ceeding, finding that the Respondents had engaged in certain unfair labor practices and recommending that they cease and desist therefrom and take certain affir- mative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Ex- aminer's Decision. Thereafter, the Respondents filed exceptions and a supporting brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na- tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with these cases to a three-member panel. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Ex- aminer made at the hearing and finds that no prejudi- cial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Ex- aminer's Decision, the exceptions and brief, and the entire record in these cases, and hereby adopts only those findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner consistent with this Decision and Order. Lane and Hill are parties to an associationwide con- tract with the Union. The contract requires, inter alia, that the Employer contribute 15 cents per hour worked to a health and welfare fund, and 2 cents per hour worked by journeymen to an apprenticeship training fund. Other pertinent provisions of the contract con- cern the use of the Union as a source for skilled work- men and the utilization of a grievance procedure and binding arbitration for contract disputes. Texas has a right-to-work law and, therefore, the contract does not contain a union-security clause. The Trial Examiner found that Respondents Lane and Hill had violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by: unilat- erally terminating their contracts, refusing to recognize and bargain with the Union, ceasing to contribute to the health and welfare and apprenticeship funds, and refusing to allow inspection of the payroll records. The Respondents contend that the collective-bargaining 190 NLRB No. 45 agreement was terminated when the Union oreached it. The Lane Company On December 16, 1969, Union Business Representa- tive Suggs told Lane to get rid of his nonunion em- ployees if he wanted to continue to employ union mem- bers. When Lane refused this request all of his union employees quit. Lane testified that he viewed Suggs' demand and the resignation of the union employees as a breach of the contract. In December 1969 Lane ceased making payments to the health and welfare fund. He testified that he stopped payment because he no longer employed union members, and he had never made payments for his nonunion employees. On March 31, 1970, 3% months after the cessation of benefit payments, the Union sent Lane a letter demand- ing that he recognize the Union and apply the contract. The letter also demanded that he make restitution for accrued payments and that he designate a representa- tive to meet with the Union pursuant to the grievance procedure. Lane did not reinstitute payments but he did designate a representative, William Pakis,' to meet with the Union. However, no meeting was held be- tween the Union and Lane's representative, and there was no further resort to the grievance procedures. Shortly thereafter, Lane received another letter from the Union, renewing its demands that he make restitu- tion and honor the contract. On May 14, 1970, Lane sent a letter to the Union requesting that it send him three skilled plumbers for a job on May 18. The Union sent Lane three plumbers who worked 4% days and then quit. Suggs had ordered the three plumbers to quit the job because Lane had "violated the contract." Lane made contributions to the health and welfare fund for the time the three plumbers had worked. On May 21, 1970, the Union sent a letter to Lane requesting permis- sion to inspect his payroll records. Lane refused. Hill Plumbing Company In October 1969, Hill Plumbing was performing work at a jobsite where there was a bricklayers strike. A reserved gate2 for Hill's employees was established at this jobsite. However, the union plumbers employed by Hill refused to work there,' or at any of the other Hill jobsites (where there was no picketing). All of Hill's union plumbers quit their employment. Garland Sharpless, president of Hill, testified that he considered the collective-bargaining agreement terminated when the Union breached it by refusing to allow its members to work for him. The Trial Examiner, contrary to the record, found that Lane had not designated a representative. A member of the Laborers Union picketed Hill Plumbing at the re- served gate . The record offers no explanation as to why Hill was picketed. There is no provision in the contract regarding crossing picket lines. HILL PLUMBING CO. Hill stopped making payments to the health and welfare fund in October 1969. Hill also stopped making payments to the apprenticeship fund in October 1969 (after his union apprentice quit), but resumed pay- ments in March 1970 (when he had an apprentice in school). Sometime in October 1969 Hill was picketed by the Union with signs stating that Hill had violated the contract. The record does not reveal how long the picketing continued, nor does it indicate whether the Union made any attempts to meet with representatives of Hill. It was not until March 31, 1970, 6 months after the employees left, that the Union sent Hill the same letter that it had sent to Lane. On April 6, 1970, Hill replied, accusing the Union of having breached the contract. Hill continued to employ two plumbers named Shel- ton and Rash after October 1969. Suggs testified that both of these employees were carried on the union membership list, even though they had stopped paying union dues. The Union claimed that Hill had failed to make health and welfare payments for the two union employees. Neither of these employees testified at the hearing. We cannot determine from the record whether these employees still considered themselves union members or whether they had effectively resigned. On May 21, 1970, the Union sent Hill a letter requesting the opportunity to inspect his payroll records. Hill de- nied this request. The Respondents and the Union are parties to a health and welfare trust agreement. This trust agree- ment defined the employees eligible for benefits as: (a) members of Local 529, (b) any other employee whose wage rates and working conditions are established by collective-bargaining agreements between the Union and the association, and (c) business manager and/or business agents of the Union (contributions paid by the Union). Hill President Sharpless, who helped to estab- lish the fund, testified that it was established for the benefit of union employees only. Suggs testified that he was aware that Hill and Lane had never made health and welfare payments for their nonunion employees. Furthermore, he stated that there have never been any contributions made to the health and welfare fund by any employer for its nonunion employees and that nonunion employees are not covered under the present benefit program (except for "travelers"). While the health and welfare agreement is nondis- criminatory on its face, it appears that the parties have given it a discriminatory application. The testimony indicates that the Union acquiesced in such an applica- tion. The record is incomplete concerning the practice of the parties regarding payments to the apprenticeship fund. The evidence suggests an inference that the ap- prenticeship payments were made pursuant to certain practices of the parties. However, the record is void of any indications as to exactly what these practices were. 233 The duty to bargain collectively imposes an obliga- tion upon the parties not to make any unilateral modifi- cations of the terms of a contract. The short record in this case indicates that the bargaining history of the parties contains numerous instances in which each of them participated in unilateral and bilateral modifica- tions of the collective-bargaining agreement. We can- not determine from the record the exact nature of these modifications or whether particular modifications were unilateral or bilateral. Apparently, the parties have a history of following past practices and industry or area practices as additional qualifications to the basic agree- ment. The record does not contain sufficient evidence for us to determine what these practices were and what, if any, effect they had upon the bargaining relationship of the parties. The fact that it took the Union several months before it made any protest to the Respondents is indicative of the intermittent nature of their relation- ships. Based upon this record we cannot conclude that there is a viable relationship between the Respondents and the Union. Therefore, under all the evidence in this case, we find that the General Counsel has not clearly established facts which would justify a conclusion that the Respondents have violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5). Accordingly, we dismiss the complaint in its entirety. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Re- lations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that the complaint herein be, and it hereby is, dismissed in its entirety. TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASES WILLIAM W. KAPELL, Trial Examiner: These matters, proceedings under Section 10(b) of the National Labor Rela- tions Act, as amended, herein called the Act, were heard in Waco, Texas, on July 14, 1970,' with all parties participating pursuant to due notice upon an amended consolidated com- plaint2 issued by the General Counsel on June 22. The amended consolidated complaint alleges, in substance, that Hill Plumbing Company and The Lane Company, jointly referred to as Respondents, in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act unilaterally abandoned their separate collec- tive-bargaining contracts with the Union and have refused to comply with their terms concerning welfare, health, and ap- prenticeship fund payments, and to furnish data to the Union relating to wages and hours of work with respect to all em- ployees engaged in plumbing work and to benefit payments All dates hereafter refer to 1970 unless otherwise noted Based upon an original charge and a first amended charge filed in Case 16-CA-3930 on Arpil 3 and May 19, respectively, an original charge and first amended charge filed in Case 16-CA-3931 on April 3 and May 21, respectively, a charge filed in Case 16-CA-4019 on June 12, and a charge filed in Case 16-CA-4020 on June 12 All the charges were filed by Local 529, United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipe Fitting Industry of the United States and Canada, AFL-CIO, hereafter referred to as the Union 234 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD to the aforesaid funds. Respondents in their duly filed an- swers deny the commission of any unfair labor practices. All parties were represented and were afforded an oppor- tunity to adduce evidence, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to file briefs. Briefs were received from the General Counsel and Respondents and have been carefully considered. Upon the entire record in the case, and from my observation of the witnesses, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. COMMERCE At all times material herein, Edward B. Lane, Jr., has been an individual proprietor doing business under the trade name and style of The Lane Company with offices in Waco, Texas, where he is engaged as a plumbing and heating contractor. During the past 12 months, which period is representative of all times material herein, Lane in the course and conduct of his business operations performed services valued in excess of $50,000 for firms which made sales of their products to cus- tomers located in States other than the State of Texas and which sales were valued in excess of $50,000. At all times material herein Hill Plumbing Company, a corporation duly organized under and existing by virtue of the laws of the State of Texas, has maintained its principal office and place of business in Waco, Texas, where it is en- gaged as a plumbing contractor. During the past 12 months, which period is representative of all times material herein, Hill in the course and conduct of its business operations made purchases of materials valued in excess of $50,000 from firms located in Texas, which firms had received the said materials directly from points and places in States other than the State of Texas. Respondents admit, and I find, at all times material herein, that each has been an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED Respondents admit and I find, at all times material herein, that the Union has been a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. THE ALLEGED VIOLATIONS A. Background On or about April 4, 1968, Central Texas Plumbing, Heat- ing and Air Conditiong Contractors Association of Waco, Texas, hereafter referred to as the Association, entered into a collective-bargaining contract with the Union for a term ending on March 31, 1971. The contract provides, inter alia, that the Union is the recognized representative for the pur- pose of collective bargaining as to wages, hours, and working conditions for all employees performing work covered by the contract, and that, in addition to the specified hourly wage rates for journeymen, 15 cents per hour shall be contributed to a health and welfare fund, and 2 cents per hour worked by journeymen shall be contributed to an apprenticeship train- ing fund. The collective-bargaining contract and the trust agreements set up pursuant thereto provide that payments to these funds shall be based upon the number of journeymen- plumbers employed and their hours of work. The health and welfare trust agreement defines such employees as: (a) A member of the Union; and (b) Any other employee whose wage rates and working conditions are established by a collective-bargaining agreement or supplement thereto, now or hereafter en- tered into between the Union and the Association. Both Lane and Hill Plumbing are members of the Association and covered by the collective-bargaining contract and its trust agreements. B. The Current Facts 1. The Lane Company Pursuant to the Union's collective-bargaining contract, Lane began making payments on October 1, 1968, to the Union's health and welfare fund. In December 1969 he ceased making such contributions because at the time he no longer employed union members. He testified that his union employees quit working for him following an employee meet- ing on December 16, 1969, at which Union Business Repre- sentative Suggs asked him what the nonunion employees were doing on his job to which he sarcastically replied that they were working. Suggs then allegedly asked him to get rid of the nonunion employees in order to continue having union employees work for him.' Lane viewed Suggs' demand as constituting a breach of their bargaining contract, which jus- tified his refusal to continue making payments to the health and welfare fund and terminated the contract. He admitted that his failure to notify the Union to that effect was due to an oversight on his, part. He, however, continued making payments to the apprenticeship training fund based on the wages paid to his nonunion employees, and he continued to apply the other provisions of the contract to his nonunion employees.' Thereafter, Lane received a letter dated March 31 from the Union demanding recognition, and that he apply their con- tract provisions, including immediate restitution of the requi- site contributions in arrears to the health and welfare fund. The letter also requested that he designate a representative to confer with union counsel concerning his breach of the con- tract. No payments or designation of a management repre- sentative were made by Lane pursuant to the Union's request. Shortly thereafter Lane received another letter (G.C. Exh.4) from the Union renewing its demand that he make restitution of all payments which had not been made although required by their contract, and that he also implement all other provi- sions of the contract. A day or two later on May 14, Lane requested in writing that the Union furnish three skilled plumbers to one of his jobs beginning on May 18.5 Pursuant to said request, the Union dispatched three plumber-mem- bers who worked on lane's job for 4% days and then quit. Lane resumed making contributions to the health and welfare fund for the 43/, days during which the three plumbers worked on his job, and then again discontinued making such payments after they quit. He discontinued making such payments be- cause he had no other union employees on his payroll and was under the impression that health and welfare contributions inured only to the benefit of the union members, and he therefore caesed making such payments when he no longer employed such employees. He, however, continued making contributions to the apprenticeship training fund because those payments inured to the benefit of the industry. ' Ruling was reserved on the admissibility of the foregoing testimony at the hearing. Such testimony is now admitted over the objections of the General Counsel. ° Lane's admissions to that effect made as a Rule 43(b) witness on behalf of the General Counsel are credited despite his later denials when testifying on his own behalf. ' The collective-bargaining contract provided that the Employer, when in need of employees, notify and use the Union as a source for positions covered by the contract. HILL PLUMBING CO. By letter of May 21, the Union requested permission to inspect Lane's payroll records for the preceding 6 months, which would reflect the wages, hours of work, and benefit payments based on all employees engaged in plumbing work in order to ascertain what contributions were required to be made to the trust funds. In reply, Lane telephoned Business Agent Suggs and advised him that he could not make the requested inspection because it was unnecessary. Prior to stopping payments to the health and welfare fund, Lane offered his employees the option of another health and welfare insurance plan without notifying the Union. 2. The Hill Plumbing Company Garland Sharpless, president of Hill Plumbing Company, testified that the Company made payments to the health and welfare and apprentice training program funds until October 17, 1969, which was as long as he continued to employ union employess, and that he thereafter felt relieved of any obliga- tion to make such payments because he had terminated the contract after his union employees quit their jobs. He con- tinued to employ nonunion members and paid them directly the 15 cents an hour for health and welfare benefits and advised them to obtain any insurance they desired with it. On March 6 he resumed making payments to the apprenticeship training fund when he hired an apprentice, basing his pay- ments on the work of his nonunion journeymen employees. He applied the terms of the Union's bargaining contract as long as he employed union employees, admitted receiving letters identical and to those sent to Lane demanding pay- ments to the trust funds, and replied only to the Union's letter of March 31 by a letter of April 6 in which he accused the Union of having breached their contract. He claimed that he refused to continue making contributions to the trust funds because the Union contract was breached when his union employees refused to use a separate gate set up for them on one of his jobs where the bricklayers were striking and picket- ing the general contractor6 or work on his unpicketed jobs. He asserted that the Union ordered its members to quit work- ing for him and thereby justified his termination of the con- tract and refusal to continue making contributions to the trust funds. Business Agent Suggs testified that two of his members have been on the Hill Company payroll continuously since October 17, 1969,' but that no payments on their behalf were made to the health and welfare fund, and that Sharpless refused his request to inspect the payroll records of the Com- pany to ascertain what payments were due to the health and welfare fund. C. Conclusions Patently, the parties entered into valid collective-bargain- ing contracts in the early part of 1968, which was subse- quently supplemented by trust agreements for health, wel- fare, and apprentice training plans. These agreements were honored and implemented by Respondents until the latter part of 1969 when they refused to continue making the re- quired contributions to the trust funds. Lane contended that he justifiably terminated his contract and was, therefore, no longer obligated to make such contributions when Suggs ad- vised him in December 1969 that he would have to get rid of ' He, however, admitted that there was a Laborers' picket at the separate gate picketing his Company while the Bricklayers were picketing the general contractor ' Although these employees had stopped paying union dues, they never- theless were carried as members for a period of 12 months from the incep- tion of their arrears pursuant to the union constitution. 235 his nonunion employees if he wanted to have union em- ployees continue working for him. However, if he was no longer bound by the contract he failed to explain why he continued to apply the other provisions of the contract to his nonunion employees or why in May he requested the Union to furnish three plumbers for one of his jobs and then made the requisite trust fund payments on their behalf. It is also significant to note that at no time did he notify the Union he was terminating their contract , and he explained his failure to do so merely as an admitted oversight on his part. He also justified his unilateral termination of the contract and his refusal to make the trust fund payments on the ground that he was bound to make such payments only as long as he employed union employees. The bargaining contract, how- ever, provided that he recognized the Union as the bargaining representative of all his employees performing work de- scribed in that contract; and the health and welfare trust fund agreement defined the term "employees" on whose behalf contributions were to be made as both union employees and any other employees covered by the provisions of the collec- tive-bargaining contract. I find that Lane's contentions not only are inconsistent but also lack substance. If he wished to be relieved of his contractual and statutory obligations he should have restored to appropriate legal measures instead of taking unwarranted unilateral action. Sharpless also asserted that he terminated the contract (without notifying the Union) when the union employees quit working for the Company.' Sharpless (as well as Lane) con- tended that when the Company no longer employed union members, it was relieved of any contractual obligations to contribute to the trust funds or of any duty to recognize and bargain with the Union as the exclusive representative of its employees. Its unilateral decision to cease contributing to the trust funds and to terminate the contract and withdraw recognition of the Union based on what it construed to be justifiable grounds without resorting to appropriate legal measures was no more warranted than what Lane did.' Respondents also attacked the jurisdiction of the Board on the ground that only the courts have jurisdiction to rule on breaches of contract. I find no merit in this contention. "While it is true that a breach of contract is not ipso facto an unfair labor practice, it does not follow from this that where given conduct is of a kind otherwise condemned by the Act, it must be ruled out as an unfair labor practice simply because it happens also to be a breach of contract." C & S Industries, Inc., 158 NLRB 454, 458. Nor, as claimed by Respondents, does the existence of an arbitration provision in a contract prevent the prosecution of an unfair labor practice. "There is no necessary or automatic mutual exclusiveness as between the contract remedy and the unfair labor practice remedy." N.L.R.B. v. Huttig Sash & Door Co., Inc., 377 F.2d 964, 970 (C.A. 8). Any doubts as to the jurisdiction of the Board in cases involving the interpretation of a labor contract or the existence of an arbitration provision were definitely dispelled by the Supreme Court in N.L.R.B. v. C & C Plywood Corp., 385 U.S. 421, and N.L.R.B. v. Acme Industrial Co., 385 U.S. 432. ° It appears that these employees declined to continue working allegedly because of labor disputes directly affecting the Company or the jobs on which it was involved ' Thus, it was held in Ray Brooks v N.L.R B, 348 U S 96, 103, "If an employer has doubts about his duty to continue bargaining, it is his responsi- bility to petition the Board for relief, while continuing to bargain in good faith at least until the Board has given some indication that his claim has merit." 236 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Section 8(d) of the Act defines the phrase "to bargain collectively" as "the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet . and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder ... but such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession ...... It pro- vides further that where a collective-bargaining agreement is in effect, "the duty to bargain collectively shall also mean that no party to such contract shall terminate or modify such contract" unless he complies with the notice provisions to the other party, offers to meet and confer for the purpose of negotiating any changes, and gives timely notification to the specified Federal and state agencies. A refusal to bargain collectively as so defined is an unfair labor practice in viola- tion of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. It is well settled that an employer violates Section 8(a)(5) when it unilaterally changes the terms and conditions of employment without giving the union an appropriate opportunity to bargain about the change. Changes in the health, welfare, and apprenticeship training terms of the contract herein patiently affected the terms and conditions of employment. N.L.R.B. v. Huttig Sash & Door Co., supra. Thus, by refusing to make payments to the trust funds for the erroneous reason that they believed themselves relieved of the obligation to bargain because of the position taken by their union employees regarding their right not to work under certain conditions, Respondents, in effect, thereby withheld from the Union, before they were legally entitled to do so, the full measure of recognition that was contractually and statutorily due to the Union. Accordingly, Respondents' refusal to make the payments to the trust funds they were obligated to make under the existing agreements and their termination of those agreements constituted unilat- eral modifications thereof in derogation of and in violation of their obligations under Section 8(a)(5) and 8(d) of the Act. St. Louis Cordage Mills, 170 NLRB No. 7. Furthermore, with respect to the Union's demand to in- spect Respondents' payroll records to ascertain what pay- ments were due under the trust funds, there can be no ques- tion of their general obligations to provide information that is needed by the bargaining representative for the proper performance of its duties. N.L.R.B. v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149. It, therefore, follows that Respondents' refusals to permit such inspections are also violative of Section 8(a)(5). IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of each Respondent set forth in section III, above, occurring in connection with their operations de- scribed in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and sub- stantial relationship to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. Upon the foregoing findings of fact and upon the entire record, I make the following: 4. By unilaterally terminating their collective-bargaining contract with the Union, refusing to recognize and bargain with the Union as the exclusive bargaining representative of their employees, or to contribute the contractually required payments to the health and welfare and apprenticeship train- ing trust funds, or to permit inspection of their payroll records to ascertain the moneys due to said funds, Respond- ents have engaged in unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. THE REMEDY Having found that Respondents violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act, it will be recommended that they be required to cease and desist therefrom, or from any like or related conduct, and to take certain affirmative action de- signed and found necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act. Having found that Respondents violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act, it is recommended that Respondents be ordered to recognize and bargain with the Union; to permit inspection of their payroll records and to determine the moneys due to the health and welfare and apprenticeship training trust funds; and to contribute such sums found to be due to said trust funds. RECOMMENDED ORDER10 On the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law and the entire record in the cases, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, it is recommended that The Lane Company and Hill Plumbing Company, their officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Refusing to recognize and bargain collectively with Local 529, United Association of Journeymen and Appren- tices of the Plumbing and Pipe Fitting Industry of the United States and Canada, AFL-CIO; unilaterally modifying or ter- minating their existing collective-bargaining agreement with said Union; refusing to permit inspection of their payroll records to ascertain the moneys due to their health and wel- fare trust fund and apprenticeship training program trust fund; or refusing to contribute the contractually required contributions to said funds. (b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restrain- ing, or coercing their employees in the exercise of their rights under Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action which is deemed necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Recognize and bargain collectively with the aforesaid labor organization, upon request, contribute the moneys re- quired pursuant to their collective-bargaining agreement, and, upon request, permit inspection of their payroll records which indicate the contributions due to the aforesaid trust funds. (b) Post at their respective places of business copies of the appropriate attached notice marked "Appendix."" Copies of CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. At all times material herein , Respondents have been engaged in commerce as employers within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. At all times material herein , the Union has been a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. At all times material herein the Union has been, and continues to be, the exclusive bargaining representative of Respondents' employees covered by their collective-bargain- ing agreement. 10 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Section 102.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions, recommendations, and Recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Section 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions , and order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes. " In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals , the words in the notice reading "POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD" shall be changed to read "POSTED PURSUANT TO A JUDGMENT OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS ENFORCING AN OR- DER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD." HILL PLUMBING CO. said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 16, after being duly signed by authorized representa- tives of Respondents, shall be posted by them immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by them for 60 con- secutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by them to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (c) Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 20 days from the receipt of this Decision, what steps have been taken to comply herewith." " In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, this provision shall be modified to read: "Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondents have taken to comply herewith." APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government WE WILL NOT refuse to recognize and bargain coljec- tively with Local 529, United Association of Journey- men and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipe Fitting Industry of the United States and Canada, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive bargaining representative of our plumbing employees. WE WILL NOT refuse to contribute the moneys re- quired pursuant to the health and welfare and appren- ticeship training trust funds set up pursuant to the exist- ing collective-bargaining agreement between said Union and Central Texas Plumbing, Heating and Air Condi- tioning Contractors Association of Waco, Texas. WE WILL NOT refuse inspection, upon request, by the Union of our payroll records to ascertain the moneys due to the aforsaid trust funds. WE WILL contribute such sums as are found to be due to the aforsaid trust funds. ' WE WILL permit inspection of our payroll records by the Union, upon request. WE WILL NOT unilaterally change, modify, or termi- nate the terms of our existing collective-bargaining agreement affecting the terms and working conditions of any of our employees. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, coerce, or restrain our employees in the exercise of their rights under Section 7 of the Act. HILL PLUMBING COMPANY (Employer) Dated By (Representative) (Title) 237 This is an official notice and must not be defaced by any- one. This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. Any questions concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions may be directed to the Board's Office, Room 8A24, Federal Office Building, 819 Taylor Street, Fort Worth, Texas 76102, Telephone 817-334-2921. APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government I WILL NOT refuse to recognize and bargain collec- tively with Local 529, United Association of Journey- men and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipe Fitting Industry of the United States and Canada, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive bargaining representative of my plumbing employees. I WILL NOT refuse to contribute the moneys required pursuant to the health and welfare and apprenticeship training trust funds set up pursuant to the existing col- lective-bargaining agreement between said Union and Central Texas Plumbing, Heating and Air Conditioning Contractors Association of Waco, Texas. I WILL NOT refuse inspection, upon request, by the Union of my payroll records to ascertain the moneys due to the aforesaid trust funds. I WILL contribute such sums as are found to be due to the aforesaid trust funds. I WILL permit inspection of my payroll records by the Union, upon request. I WILL NOT unilaterally change, modify, or terminate the terms of my existing collective-bargaining agreement affecting the terms and working conditions of any of my employees. I WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, coerce, or restrain my employees in the exercise of their rights under Section 7 of the Act. THE LANE COMPANY (Employer) Dated By (Representative) (Title) This is an official notice and must not be defaced by any- one. This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. Any questions concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions may be directed to the Board's Office, Room 8A24, Federal Office Building, 819 Taylor Street, Fort Worth, Texas 76102, Telephone 817-334-2921.