South Texas Chapter, Associated Gen Contractors

S TEX CHAPTER, ASSOCIATED GEN. CONTRACTORS South Texas Chapter, Associated General Contractors and Laborers' International Union of North America, Local Union No. 1179. Case 23-CA-3656 May 18, 1971 DECISION AND ORDER BY MEMBERS FANNING, JENKINS, AND KENNEDY On December 22, 1970, Trial Examiner Frederick U. Reel issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceed- ing, finding that the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the at- tached Trial Examiner's Decision.Thereafter, the Re- spondent filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Deci- sion. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na- tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Ex- aminer made at the hearing and finds that no prejudi- cial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Ex- aminer's Decision, the exceptions, and the entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner, as modified below.' ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Re- lations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommended Order of the Trial Examiner as modified below and hereby or- ders that the Respondent, South Texas Chapter, As- sociated General Contractors, Corpus Christi, Texas, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's recom- mended Order as so modified. 1. Substitute the following for paragraph 2(a): "(a) Upon request, bargain with the above- named labor organization and, if an understand- ing is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agreement." 2. Substitute the attached Appendix for the Trial Examiner's Appendix. ' The Respondent excepted to the remedy recommended by the Trial Examiner that any new contract agreed upon be made retroactive. We find merit to this exception, and we will modify the order and notice accordingly H. K. Porter v N.L.R.B., 397 U.S 99 (1970), Ex-Cell-0 Corporation, 185 NLRB No 20 APPENDIX 383 NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government WE WILL bargain, upon request, with Laborers' International Union of North America, Local Un- ion No. 1179, and, if an understanding is reached, we will embody such understanding in a signed agreement. WE WILL direct our members and associate members to reinstate, upon application, any em- ployees who went on strike in October 1970. SOUTH TEXAS CHAPTER, ASSOCIATED GENERAL CONTRACTORS (Employer) Dated By (Representative) (Title) This is an official notice and must not be defaced by anyone. This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. Any questions concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions may be directed to the Board's Office, Dallas-Brazos Building, Fourth Floor, 1125 Brazos Street, Houston, Texas 77002, Telephone 713- 226-4296. TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE FREDERICK U. REEL, Trial Examiner: This case was sub- mitted upon exhibits at Corpus Christi, Texas, on November 10, 1970,' pursuant to a charge filed June 4, and a complaint issued October 1 (after the General Counsel reversed the Regional Director who had originally dismissed the charge) and amended October 15. At issue is the question whether a certain communication from the Charging Party (herein called the Union) to the Respondent (herein sometimes called the AGC) constituted a notice of "termination" of a certain contract or a notice of desire to "modify" that contract. If the former, it was timely, and the AGC's subsequent insistence that the contract had automatically renewed was tantamount to a refusal to bargain and violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. Upon the entire record and after due consideration of the briefs filed by each of the parties, I make the following: ' All dates herein refer to the year 1970 except where otherwise noted 190 NLRB No. 73 384 FINDINGS OF FACT I NATURE OF THE PARTIES, JURISDICTION DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD The AGC, a Texas corporation, acts as collective-bargain- ing agent for a number of employers engaged in Texas in the building and construction industry. These employers in the aggregate annually purchase over $1 million worth of materi- als and supplies shipped to them directly from outside the State of Texas The pleadings establish, the AGC admits, and I find that it is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. For a number of years the Union has been the statutory bargaining representative of the construction laborers em- ployed by the members and associate members of the AGC within the Union's established jurisdiction Z 11 THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE A. The Contract On May 30, 1966, the Union and AGC entered into a 4-year contract, expiring May 31, 1970, covering the con- struction laborers in the bargaining unit described above. The contract consisted of five articles, preceded by a recognition clause. Article I, captioned "Work Coverage," provided for a union referral system. Article II, "Work Jurisdiction," dealt with the settlement of jurisdictional disputes. Article III, "Working Rules," embraced hours, overtime pay, holidays, safety provisions, furnishing of equipment, union stewards, foremen's pay, visitation rights of the union representatives, and no-strike, no-lockout provisions. Article IV, "Wages," set forth a beginning wage scale and periodic increases for each craft on "commercial" and "industrial" work, defined the quoted terms, repeated some of the overtime and equip- ment provisions from article III, and recited that intoxication on the job was grounds for dismissal. The last wage increase on "industrial" work was effective October 1, 1966; the last increase on "commercial" work was effective November 1, 1969. Article V, "Term," contained a severability clause, reciting, inter aha, that "all language used in this contract, where susceptible to more than one meaning shall be inter- preted in a manner consistent with law," and then concluded with the following paragraph, critical to this case- This Agreement shall remain in full force and effect until the 31st of May, 1970, and thereafter from year to year or until terminated at the option of either party after thirty (30) days written notice prior to the termina- tion date of this Agreement. Any party desiring modifi- cations or changes in the Agreement to take effect shall serve written notice requesting negotiations for each proposed modification or change no sooner than sixty (60) days and no later than thirty (30) days prior to the expiration of this Agreement. ' The pleadings establish and I find that the following constitutes a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act All construction laborers of members and associate members of Re- spondent within the Union's established jurisdiction of Nueces, Aran- sas, Bee , San Patricio, Refugio, DeWitt, Goliad, Live Oak, McMullen, Jim Wells, Duval, Kleberg, Kenedy, Brooks, Jim Hogg, LaSalle and Dimmit counties , Texas , excluding guards , watchmen and supervisors as defined in the Act B. The Exchange of Correspondence and the Strike On March 26, 1970, over 60 days before the expiration of the contract, the Union's business manager wrote AGC the following letter, to which AGC made no response: In compliance with our present collective bargaining agreement, I hereby notify you of our desire to re-open the contract for negotiations. It is our desire to negotiate for all matters pertaining to wages, hours and all conditions of employment. Our committee will be available to meet at any reason- able time. We will propose a meeting date of April 9th, 1970. If it is not agreeable to you please advise us of the earliest date that a meeting can be arranged. On May 3, less than 30 days before the expiration date, the Union's representative again wrote AGC, as follows: On March 26, 1970, I wrote you a letter stating that we were ready to start on our negotiations, and also proposed an April the 9th MEETING Since I have not heard from you I am submitting another date of MAY-11-1970 to meet with you for the purpose of Negotiations. Please acknowledge receipt of this letter and let me know if you are willing to meet on the above proposed date. On May 7, AGC, without referring to the foregoing letters, wrote the following letter to the Union: Whereas the South Texas Chapter, Associated Gen- eral Contractors of America, Incorporated has received no request for modifications or changes submitted in accordance with and in respect of the Common Laborers Agreement signed into effect on the 30th day of May, 1966 by representatives of Common Laborers Local Un- ion No. 1179, AFL-CIO and South Texas Chapter, AGC, this Chapter AGC now invokes the provision of extending the expiration date to the 31st day of May, 1971 with no other modification or change which provi- sion is included in the second paragraph of Article V of said Agreement. The Union replied on May 19, quoting the letters of March 26, May 3, and May 7, and concluding: Our letter of March 26th, 1970 constituted notice in writing of termination of our contract delivered thirty (30) days prior to termination date, as required by the contract. We hereby again request that you agree to sit down with us to negotiate a contract by May 31st, 1970. There is still time to consummate an agreement before June 1st and prevent a strike and all the strife that goes along with a labor despute of this nature. If you do not sit down with us and negotiate before June 1st, 1970 it is you, the AGC Contractors who will cause the strike and all the ramifications that accompa- nies one Therefore we again request that you sit down with us and negotiate in good faith. On May 21 AGC replied, stating it would discuss any matters "other than our exercising of the privilege of continu- ing the contract for a one-year period." The letter reads as follows: In accordance with your request to meet with members of the Labor Committee of the South Texas Chapter of Associated General Contractors, please be advised that, as in the past, we always welcome the opportunity to discuss any matters which might involve our common- labor work force. We assume that this requested meeting is to discuss problems or questions unrelated to our present contract which expires on May 31, 1971. However, in the event S TEX. CHAPTER, ASSOCIATED GEN CONTRACTORS 385 the subject matter which you desire to discuss relates to the contract, please be advised that we shall be ready to discuss any matters other than our exercising of the privilege of continuing the contract for a one-year period. We would appreciate being informed in advance of the particular points which you want to discuss. Please con- tact me at your convenience in order to arrange a satis- factory time for this meeting. At this point matters rested while the Union filed a charge, which was first dismissed but then reinstated on appeal with instructions from the General Counsel that a complaint issue. His letter so informing the parties was dated September 15. On September 17 the Union telegraphed AGC requesting that a bargaining session be held the next afternoon. AGC replied by telegram that it would be pleased to meet "in accordance with terms of existing agreement," but noted that the suggested date was "not possible." The telegram re- quested the Union to "please advise subjects you wish to discuss," and offered AGC's assistance in arranging for a convenient time. The Union made no formal reply. On October 7 the Union began a strike against AGC mem- bers which was apparently still in progress at the time of the hearing. The amended complaint alleges, and the amended answer denies, that the strike "was caused [or prolonged] by the unfair labor practices" alleged in the complaint, namely, AGC's refusal to bargain with the Union. From the colloquy at the hearing as well as from the correspondence quoted above, it seems a fair inference that the strike is, at least in part, in response to the AGC's position that the contract has been automatically renewed. Whether the strikers are "eco- nomic" or "unfair labor practice" strikers depends upon whether AGC's position is correct or whether its refusal to negotiate for a new contract in May 1970 violated its bargain- ing obligation. C. Analysis and Conclusions The contract required that "any party desiring modifica- tions or changes" must give "written notice requesting negotiations for each proposed modification or change" be- tween the 60th and 30th day preceding May 31, 1970; i.e., during the month of April. The contract further provided that it could be "terminated at the option of either party after thirty (30) days written notice" prior to May 31, 1970. If the Union's letter of March 26 be construed as a request for "modifications or changes," it was untimely, and as no other timely notice was given, the AGC would be correct in its position that the contract was automatically renewed for another year. If, on the other hand, that letter constituted a notice of "termination," it was timely, and AGC's refusal to bargain over a new contract would be an unfair labor prac- tice, violative of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.3 The letter of March 26 notified the AGC of the Union's "desire to reopen the contract for negotiations." This phrase, if it stood alone, would appear to look toward "modification or changes," not "termination." But the letter goes on to state the Union's "desire to negotiate for all matters pertaining to wages, hours and all conditions of employment." The ultimate issue in the case is whether this language is notice that the Union is exercising its option to terminate, or is mere particularization of desired "modification or changes." ' Possibly because of the narrow issue involved, the complaint does not allege even a "derivative" violation of Section 8(a)(1) Cf Art Metals Const Co. v NL R.B., 110 F 2d 148, 150-151 (C A 2, 1940) See also NLRB. v Express Publishing Co, 312 U S 426, 432-433, 435 (1941) It is frequently the business of the courts, and often that of the Labor Board, to construe and interpret contracts and other communications between private parties. Frequently, as here, there are no extrinsic aids to ascertain what the parties intended, either by their mutual agreement or by their several communications. When, as here, conflicts arise be- tween the parties, orderly society requires that they resort to a disinterested authority to resolve the issue. It should occa- sion no surprise that such disinterested authorities may disa- gree among themselves as to the proper construction of lan- guage, for all words are capable of "construction," and even so-called "words of art" must be defined in words which in a given context may mean one thing to one person and another to another: The instant litigation already discloses that on the critical issue here a difference once existed be- tween the Regional Director and the General Counsel. The latter prevailed by virtue of his superior position in the hier- archy which, again, orderly society has created to resolve such questions. Now the same issue comes before a Trial Examiner, selected by lot under the rotation procedures pre- scribed in the Administrative Procedure Act. If the Regional Director had been the Trial Examiner, the decision at this level would go one way; if the General Counsel had been the Trial Examiner, it would go the other. This Trial Examiner makes no claim to competence or intelligence superior to those of the conscientious Federal servants who have already differed on this subject. On the other hand, subsequent re- viewing authorities, administrative and judicial, are entitled to have as part of the record before them the Trial Examiner's views for such persuasive power as may be contained therein. (The parties declined my suggestion that the case be submit- ted directly to the Board.) Also it must be noted that, when the Board speaks on these subjects, its views are entitled to particular weight as its expertise particularly qualifies it to interpret collective-bargaining agreements and correspon- dence relating thereto.' The Board on occasion adopts in whole, or in major part, the rationale of a Trial Examiner's decision, and this practice further necessitates that I set forth in some detail and in complete candor the reasoning which leads me to my result. Turning to the ultimate question of "termination" or "modification," it must be noted that the word "termination" has a somewhat different meaning in labor contracts from that which it holds in other commercial contexts. The rela- tionship between employer and bargaining representative is a continuing one. Contracts to furnish materials, to lease prop- erty, or even to perform services frequently "terminate" in the sense that the relationship between the contracting parties completely stops, and they are, upon "termination," in the legal position of strangers to one another. When a collective- bargaining contract terminates, however, the law imposes a continuing duty on both parties to attempt in good faith to reach a new agreement.' Hence in labor parlance and in the context of a continuing collective-bargaining relationship, the expression "termination" normally refers to the expiration date of an existing agreement. The contract in this case was to continue in force until May 31, 1970, "and thereafter from year to year or until terminated at the option of either party" ' The wisdom of applying strict notions of contract law to the sphere of labor management relations is debatable " Paterson Parchment Paper Co. v International Brotherhood of Paper Makers 83 F Supp 928, 929 (E D Pa, 1949) ' This generalization does not apply, of course, where the continued status of the Union as bargaining representative is challenged, but the word "termination" in a collective-bargaining concept is not limited to that situa- tion Manifestly the instant contract did not use "termination" in that lim- ited sense, for it recited that the contract could be "terminated at the option of either party " 386 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD upon 30 days' notice `prior to the termination date of this agreement." The "termination date" was May 31, 1970, or any subsequent May 31 if the contract automatically renewed. But the point is that the "termination" involved was not a cessation of relations but the end of this agreement and the negotiation of a new agreement. See Note, 17 ALR 2d 754, 755 6 The same clause of the contract also referred to notice for "negotiations" or "modifications or changes." If our forego- ing discussion is correct, what is the practical difference be- tween a notice of termination and a notice of desire to negoti- ate modifications or changes? Both necessarily lead to negotiations, and may result in changes in the terms of em- ployment. The parties must have intended some difference, for they provided different periods of notification. Moreover, in the very letter here under scrutiny the Union spoke of its "desire to reopen the contract for negotiations," and does not use the word "terminate," although in a later letter it de- scribes the crucial letter as a "notice in writing of termina- tion," and in all its correspondence it either calls for "negotia- tions" or asks the Company to "negotiate." This, then, is our conundrum: When is a request for negotiations a notice of termination, and when is it merely a request for "modifica- tions and changes"? The answer must be found in the words used by the party making the request. The Union's letter calls for negotiation of "all matters pertaining to wages, hours and all conditions of employment." This, to my mind, calls for "termination," i.e., negotiation of an entire new contract, rather than mere modifications or changes. To be sure, some elements are al- most sure to be unchanged, such as the recognition clause and other noncontroversial items. But a call for negotiation on all terms is, to my mind, more in the nature of a notice to negotiate an entire new contract (and hence a "notice of desire to terminate") than it is a notice to negotiate mere "modifications" or even "changes." See American Woolen Company, 57 NLRB 647, 649. This reading is buttressed by the further language of the contract which requires that the latter notice should request "negotiations for each proposed modification or change" (emphasis supplied), thus suggesting specific and particular revisions rather than an intent to renegotiate all terms. The Union's failure to include specific proposed modifications is further evidence that it intended its letter of March 26 as a notice of termination.' AGC asserts that the contract is a prehire agreement made pursuant to Section 8(f) of the Act and argues from that (a) the termination language of the contract contemplates an end to the parties' relationship under the prehire agreement, as distinguished from mere changes in the contract's provisions, and (b) such an agreement, unlike an ordinary collective agree- ment, does not give rise to a presumption of continuing majority status so that, even if the contract terminated, AGC was not guilty of a refusal to bargain because it had no continuing obligation to do so The first of these arguments rests on the premise that the "termination" referred to in the contract means a total cessation of the relationship As :ready indicated, I do not believe that that term so signifies in collective-bargaining agree- ments There is no more reason to assume that the Union here would have any more interest in any such option to "terminate" than there is to ascribe such an interest to unions in ordinary industrial contexts Stated otherwise, the expression "terminate" as distinguished from "modify" in other collec- tive agreements goes to the extent of the contemplated future negotiations, and no different result is suggested here merely because this may be a "pre-hire" agreement under Section 8(f) As to the second argument, the short answer is that the complaint alleges, and AGC in its answer admits, that "At all times since January 1, 1970, and continuing to date, Laborers' Local Union No 1179 has been the representative of employees in the [appropriate] unit, and, by virtue of Section 9(a) of the Act, has been, and is now, the exclusive representative of all the employees in said unit for the purposes of collective bargaining ' International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 181 v. Dahlem The foregoing considerations lead me to find that the AGC violated its statutory bargaining obligations by insisting that its contract was renewed to May 31, 1971, and by refusing to bargain with the Union in the spring of 1970 over a new contract. Certain other factors tend to buttress the conclusion thus reached. I note that the statute required the Union to give 60 days' notice of its desire to terminate or modify as a precondition to going out on strike. I further note that the Union's letter requested a meeting on April 9, but the ATC ignored the letter and let that date pass without any response. Had the AGC met with the employees' statutory bargaining representative on the requested date, any proposals then put forth would have been timely under any construction of the termination and modification provisions of the contract. Also, in this connection, the failure of the AGC to respond in any way to the letter of March 26 until well into May when the contract would have automatically renewed is faintly suggestive of sharp practice and inconsistent with the statu- tory objective of good-faith negotiations looking to a preser- vation of industrial peace. No doubt the AGC from its lights had good economic reasons for continuing to May 1971, rather than renegotiating in 1970, wage rates set in 1966 (and in some cases not increased since then), but the equities of the situation seem to me to reenforce my view of the law. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AGC by refusing to negotiate with the Union for a new contract in May 1970 committed an unfair labor practice affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act THE REMEDY I shall, of course, recommend an order directing AGC to cease and desist from refusing to bargain with the Union for a contract to replace that which terminated May 31, 1970. Affirmatively, the order will direct AGC, upon request, to bargain for such a contract, and to post appropriate notices. In an effort to restore as nearly as possible the status existing at the time of the unfair labor practices, I shall further direct that, if the parties reach agreement on a new contract, that agreement shall, if the Union so requests, be effective as of June 1, 1970. Finally, I shall include the traditional remedy for unfair labor practice strikers, namely, reinstatement upon application and reimbursement in the event of failure to do so, with reimbursement to be computed under the formulas of F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289, and Isis Plumb- ing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716. The remedy thus proposed is, I appreciate, of little value in undoing the effects of the unfair labor practice. Even if the Board acts with unusal speed, it is unlikely that its decision will issue appreciably before May 31, 1971, at which time even under the Company's view it is required to bargain for a new contract. Moreover, the Board's order is not self- enforcing, and, if this case should be carried to the courts, the Constr Co, 193 F 2d 470 (C A 6, 1951), relied on by the AGC sheds no particular light here That case held that a notice of desire to modify a contract was not a notice of "termination " In the case there cited, Texoma Natural Gas Co. v Oil Workers International Union, Local 463. 58 F Supp 132, 138-139 (N D Tex, 1943), affd. 146 F 2d 62, 64-65 (C A 5, 1944), cert denied 324 U S 872, the union wrote the company asking "to negotiate amendments to the present collective bargaining contract " The district court in that case noted that "this letter could not reasonably be construed to be a notice of termination," but further observed that the company had promptly inquired of the union if the "letter is intended as a notice of termination" and the union had replied in the negative Contrast the re- sponse, or rather nonresponse, of the AGC to the Union's letter in the instant case S TEX. CHAPTER, ASSOCIATED GEN. CONTRACTORS period from May 1970 to May 1971 will indeed be history before any compulsory process issues to remedy the refusal to bargain In short, the Company will have "won" practi- cally even if it "loses" legally, for the Company will have enjoyed the old contract for the year in dispute whatever order may be entered or enforced. Making the new contract retroactive, as I have recommended, accomplishes rather lit- tle-as the intended beneficiaries of this remedy have appar- ently been on strike, and, as strikers, are not entitled to com- pensation until they make an unconditional offer to return to work. The finding of violation protects their status as unfair labor practice strikers, but at least as of the date of the hearing this appeared somewhat academic as the statement of AGC counsel suggests that their jobs were then available. The prob- lem here is even more acute than that presented in some of the recent decisions considering the Board's power, or lack thereof, to prescribe effective remedies in bargaining cases, for the fact peculiar to this case is that the violation has a prefixed termination date which will have passed before any remedy can be brought to bear. Of course, the injunctive provisions of the Act were available, but they were not resorted to, which is not too surprising considering the procedural history of the case. These ruminations inevitably lead one to inquire why the case had to be litigated at all, and certainly suggest that, as the "defeated" party here (the AGC) has prevailed in the "real" world, the case might well end without the filing of exceptions. Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusion of law, and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended: ORDER' The Respondent, South Texas Chapter, Associated Gen- eral Contractors, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from refusing to bargain with Laborers' International Union of North America, Local Union No. ' In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Section 102 46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions, recommendations, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Section 102 48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and order, and all objections therto shall be deemed waived for all purposes 387 1179, for a new contract to replace the contract expiring May 31, 1970. 2. Take the following affirmative action, necessary to effec- tuate the policies of the Act: (a) Upon request, bargain with the above-named labor or- ganization for a contract to replace that expiring May 31, 1970, provided that if the labor organization so requests any agreement reached shall be retroactive to June 1, 1970. (b) Notify its members and associate members that, upon application, they are to reinstate to his former position (or, if that position no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position) each of the employees who went on strike in Octo- ber 1970, discharging, if necessary, employees hired subse- quent to that date. In the event any such striker is denied reinstatement within 5 days after his application, Respondent shall make him whole in the manner prescribed in the section of the Trial Examiner's Decision captioned "The Remedy." (c) Post at its offices at Corpus Christi, Texas, and mail to each of its members and associate members copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."9 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 23, after being duly signed by the Respondent's representative, shall be posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (d) Mail to the above-named labor organization signed copies of the attached notice, which that organization may duplicate and post at places where it customarily posts no- tices to its members. (e) Notify the Regional Director for Region 23, in writing, within 20 days from the receipt of this Decision, what steps have been taken to comply herewith.1° ' In the event that the Board 's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals , the words in the notice reading "POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD" shall be changed to read "POSTED PURSUANT TO A JUDGMENT OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS ENFORCING AN OR- DER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD " `° In the event that this recommended Order is adopted by the Board after exceptions have been filed, notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order , what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith