Fabric Service, Inc.

540 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Fabric Services, Inc. and Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Company and Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO. Cases 11-CA-4277 and 11-CA-4278 May 25,1971 DECISION AND ORDER BY MEMBERS FANNING, BROWN, AND JENKINS On December 31, 1970, Trial Examiner Arthur Leff issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondents had engaged in certain unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint and recommending that they cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. Only Respondent Fabric Services, Inc., filed exceptions to the Trial Ex- aminer's Decision, together with a supporting brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na- tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this proceeding to a three-member panel. The parties agreed to proceed by summary judg- ment, there being no material issues of fact. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision, the ex- ceptions, the brief, and the entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recom- mendations of the Trial Examiner. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Re- lations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommended Order of the Trial Examiner and hereby orders that the Re- spondent, Fabric Services, Inc., Orangeburg, South Carolina, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, and the Respondent, Southern Bell Telephone & Tele- graph Company, Orangeburg, South Carolina, its offic- ers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the ac- tion set forth in the Trial Examiner's recommended Order. TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE ARTHUR LEFF, Trial Examiner: Upon charges duly filed on June 5, 1970, by Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO, herein called the Union, the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board, by the Regional Direc- tor of Region 11, issued a complaint, dated July 30, 1970, in the above-entitled duly consolidated cases against Fabric Ser- vices, Inc., and Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Com- pany, herein referred to respectively as Fabric Services and Southern Bell. The complaint alleged in substance that each 190 NLRB No. 105 of said Respondents had engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended-Respondent Fabric Services, by requiring Gerald O. Smoak, a Southern Bell employee, to remove a union insignia as a condition to performing services in its plant, and Respondent Southern Bell, by instructing Smoak to comply with Fabric Services' aforesaid require- ment. On August 13, 1970, each of the Respondents filed an answer to the complaint in which it conceded it was engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act and essentially admitted the complaint's factual allegations as they related to it, but denied that the admitted facts supported the com- plaint's conclusory allegations that the conduct complained of constituted unfair labor practices within the meaning of the Act Thereafter, on October 29, 1970, the General Counsel filed a motion for summary judgment and a memorandum brief in support thereof, contending that there were no factual issues in dispute requiring a hearing and requesting the issuance of a decision and order finding all violations of the Act as al- leged On October 30, 1970, an order was issued directing the parties to show cause why General Counsel's motion for summary judgment should not be granted. On November 23, 1970, the Union and each of the Respondents filed responses and accompanying memoranda, the Union's supporting the General Counsel's motion and the Respondents' opposing it. Each of the Respondents also filed a cross-motion for sum- mary judgment in its favor; Respondent Southern Bell's was supported in part by an affidavit of Henry G. Hoffmeyer, its district plant manager at Orangeburg, South Carolina In their responses Fabric Services and Southern Bell agreed with the General Counsel, in effect, that there were no material issues of fact requiring a hearing and that the issues of this proceeding should be disposed through summary judgment procedures But they contended that on the undisputed facts summary judgment should be granted in favor of the Re- spondents as a matter of law. By telegraphic notice dated November 25, 1970, the General Counsel and the Union were granted until December 7, 1970, to file responses, if any, to the Respondents' cross-motions for summary judgment. The General Counsel filed a telegraphic response on December 7, 1970 The General Counsel's motion and Respondents' cross- motions, having been duly referred to me, the duly designated Trial Examiner, for disposition, now, after consideration, I rule on them as follows It appears from the pleadings and other papers described above, and all parties agree, that there are no material or unresolved issues of fact requiring an evidentiary hearing and that the only question remaining to be resolved is whether or not the undisputed facts are sufficient to establish as a matter of law the unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint. It follows-and as to this all parties are also agreed-that sum- mary judgment is an appropriate procedure for determining the unfair labor practice issues in this case. Since, for reasons to be explicated below, I am of the opinion that the undis- puted facts of this case substantiate the unfair labor practice allegations of the complaint, I shall grant the General Coun- sel's motion and deny the Respondents' cross-motions for summary judgment. On the record of this case, consisting of the documents described above, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT I THE BUSINESSES OF THE RESPONDENTS FABRIC SERVICES 541 Fabric Services, a South Carolina corporation, manufac- tures cotton materials at its Orangeburg, South Carolina, plant, its only plant involved in this proceeding. During the last 12 months, a representative period, Fabric Services shipped finished products valued in excess of $50,000 directly to points outside the State of South Carolina. Southern Bell, a New York corporation with an office and service facilities in Orangeburg, South Carolina, where it op- erates interstate communications equipment, is part of a na- tionwide telephone system. Its annual gross volume of busi- ness from its interstate operations in the State of South Carolina is in excess of $100,000. Each of the aforesaid Respondents admits that it is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act, and it is so found. II THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III FINDINGS OF FACT The facts to which all parties, in practical effect, have stipulated as the basis for decision in this case are these: Gerald O. Smoak, a long-time member and former official of the Charging Union, which has been the certified repre- sentative of practically all Southern Bell's employees since 1944, is employed by Southern Bell at Orangeburg, South Carolina, as a PBX installer repairman. On May 19, 1970, Smoak was dispatched to Fabric Services' plant to perform work on Southern Bell's telephone communications located at that plant. He was the only Southern Bell employee sched- uled to perform work there that day. He arrived at the plant wearing a pen pocket protector which carried the legend, "CWS, IT DOESN'T COST-IT PAYS, JOIN CWA-AFL- CIO."` Some time after he began working, he was told by Fabric Services' personnel manager, Bill Taylor, that Fabric Services would not permit him to work in its plant while wearing a union pocket protector. Apparently unwilling to comply with that condition, Smoak returned to Southern Bell's work center and reported the incident to Southern Bell's supervisor, J. W. Young. Young instructed Smoak to remove his pocket protector if that was what Fabric Services wanted and to return to his assignment. Smoak complied with his supervisor's instruction, returned to Fabric Services' premises, and completed his assignment without wearing the union pocket protector. The issues presented are (1) whether Fabric Services vi- olated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by requiring Smoak to remove his union pocket protector as a condition to perform- ing services at its plant, and (2) whether Southern Bell vi- olated the same section of the Act by instructing Smoak to comply with Fabric Services' requirement. The principle has long been recognized that the right of employees to wear union insignia at work is a form of union activity safeguarded by Section 7 in the absence of a showing of "special circumstances" making a prohibitory rule neces- sary to the maintenance of employee discipline or uninter- ' The Union has attached to its papers in support of the General Coun- sel's motion what it states to be a "true and correct Xerox [exact size] copy of the actual pocket protector which was worn by employee Smoak on the day in question " The accuracy of that statement has not been challenged by any of the parties A reproduction of that Zerox copy is appended hereto as Appendix A rupted production . See, e.g., Republic Aviation Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 324 U.S. 793, Kimble Glass Co., 113 NLRB 577, enfd. 230 F.2d 484 (C.A. 6); Consolidated Casinos Corp., 164 NLRB 95. The Board has consistently held that although that right is subject to reasonable, nondiscriminatory regula- tions with respect to the wearing of unusual clothing or in- signia, it may not be curtailed simply because employees come into contact with customers in the course of their work. See, e.g., Consolidated Casinos Corp., supra; Floridan Hotel of Tampa, Inc., 137 NLRB 1484, enfd. as modified on other grounds 318 F.2d 545 (C.A. 5). And, while there are no decided cases on this point, there appears to be no reason or principle for denying to employees whose work functions carry them to the premises of others the same protection that is accorded to employees generally to wear union insignia declaring their identification with and support of their union. Board precedent also makes clear that the insignia worn need not take any particular form to enjoy the protection of the Act. Fabri-Tek, Inc., 148 NLRB 1623. The inclusion of words such as "join" or "support" "do[es] not destroy the essentially protected character of the insignia or convert [it] to the kind of solicitation that is otherwise amenable to proper [restrictive] rules" during working time. The Devilbiss Co., 102 NLRB 1317, 1321; Avildson Tools and Machine, Inc., 112 NLRB 1021; Fabri-Tek, Inc., supra. The burden of establishing "special circumstances" to justify a prohibition on the wearing of union insignia rests on the employer who would do so. Eckerds Market, Inc., 183 NLRB No. 40. Neither of the Respondents in this case makes any claim that Smoak's union pen pocket protector, because of its form, size, or lettering, was itself such as to be likely to detract from work performance or employee discipline. There is no con- tention and no evidence in this record that Smoak's wearing of the union pocket protector at the Fabric Services' plant resulted in disruptions in employee discipline or work per- formance; nor is there any that it might have led to such disruptions because of the concurrence of other events.' Simi- larly, there is no contention and no evidence that Smoak's wearing of the union pocket protector while on Fabric Ser- vices' premises was associated in any way with any attempt on his part to engage in any solicitation or organizational activity on behalf of his or any other union. For that matter, there is nothing even to show that Smoak in the performance of his work at Fabric Services came into any direct contact with that company's employees.' Indeed, Fabric Services in this proceeding does not so much as seek to justify on the ground of special circumstances the action it took with respect to Smoak. Rather, it defends the complaint's unfair labor practice allegations against it solely and entirely upon the ground that because it was not Smoak's employer, it cannot, as a matter of law, be found to have violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by its action toward him. I reject that defense as without merit. I find no basis, either in the declared policy of the Act or in any delineating provi- sion of it for construing Section 8(a)(1) as safeguarding em- ployees in the exercise of the Section 7 rights only from infringements at the hands of their own employer. To the contrary, the specific language of the Act clearly manifests a legislative purpose to extend the statutory protection of Sec- ' Thus, there is nothing in the record as presented to me to indicate that any organizational campaign among Fabric Services' employees was under- way at that time The Union in its memorandum brief in support of the General Counsel's motion states there was none ' The memorandum brief filed by Southern Bell indicates the contrary It states, at p 7, that Smoak while at Fabric Services' premises "was working in a room separate and apart from Fabric Services' employees 542 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD tion 8(a)(1) beyond the immediate employer -employee rela- tionship. Thus Section 8(a)(1) makes it "an unfair labor prac- tice for an employer-to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7." And Section 2(3) declares , "The term employee shall include any employee, and shall not be limited to the employees of a particular employer, unless the Act explicitly states other- wise...... Moreover, Section 2(9), which defines "labor dis- pute" as including "any controversy ... regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relationship of employer and employee" further discloses a statutory aim to give the Act's various prohibitions a broad rather than nar- row reading, except, of course, where the prohibition is lim- ited in its internal context or is specifically restricted by other express language of the Act. See Phelps Dodge Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 313 U.S. 177, 192. Fabric Services would support its circumscribed construc- tion of Section 8(a)(1) on the Board 's decisions in Malbaff Landscape Construction Co., 172 NLRB No. 7, and the cases cited in the marginal note.' These cases all involve situations in which a respondent union was charged with violating Sec- tion 8(b)(2) in causing the loss of jobs or work of employees of one employer (employer A) by exerting pressure upon another employer (employer B); in some of them employer B was also named as a respondent and charged with a violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) by reason of the same conduct. The cited cases hold in substance that where the relationship be- tween employer A and employer B is an ordinary contractual one, in which B has no substantial control (such as a veto power) over the hire, tenure, or terms of employment of A's employees, B cannot be held liable for an 8(a)(3) violation against A's employees, nor the respondent union liable under 8(b)(2) for causing it. It is important to note, however, that in each of these cases in which employer B was charged with a violation of 8(a)(3) and (1), the 8(a)(1) allegation was sim- ply a derivative one stemming from the alleged, and dis- missed, allegation of 8(a)(3) discrimination.' I do not view the cases on which Fabric Services relies as controlling decision here. It is true that Section 8(a)(3), like Section 8(a)(1), speaks of "an employer" rather than the ' The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co, 116 NLRB 943, United Associa- tion of Journeymen and Apprentices, etc (Frick Company), 116 NLRB 119, United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices (Carrier Corp), 112 NLRB 1385, Los Angeles Building and Construction Trades Council (Standard Oil Co of California), 105 NLRB 868 ' As a historical note, it should be observed that the Board law in this area has taken a checkered course Thus the cases in the preceding footnote, all decided prior to December 1957, were expressly overruled by the Board in Northern California Chapter, Associated General Contractors of America, Inc (Musser), 119 NLRB 1026, enfd sub nom Operating Engineers, Local Union 3 v NL R.B, 266 F 2d 905 (C A D C) In Musser, the Board found in a similar factual situation that the respondent union violated Sec 8(b)(2) The Board in Musser interpreted 8(a)(3) as not requiring a proximate em- ployer-employee relationship in order to establish a violation of that section It declared the relevant questions to be whether the alleged 8(a)(3) employer had the power to effect the removal of employees (though not his own), whether he exercised that power directly or indirectly, and whether in fact discrimination resulted Musser remained the law until 1968 (See, e g , Hurd Corp , 143 NLRB 306, Moore Drop Forging, 144 NLRB 306, Looney Sheet Metal Construction Co., 160 NLRB 1635), when it was repudiated by Ma!- baf); supra In Malbaf, the Board, in fn 4, expressly alluded to the decisions cited above that had been overruled in Musser, and in effect revitalized them It is also worthy of note that Malbaff and the cases it revitalized, unlike the case at hand, involved essentially secondary boycott situations that were sought to be brought within the compass of Sec 8(b)(2) The decision in Malbaffreflects that the Board there was largely influenced by its belief that, under the statutory scheme, Congress intended to rectify secondary abuses solely through recourse to the provisions of Sec 8(b)(4), and not reach out to Sec 8(b)(2) and 8(a)(3) as an added means of doing so employer. But the very nature of the conduct proscribed by Section 8(a)(3) provides internal justification for imparting a more restrictive construction to the words "an employer" as there used. Section 8(a)(3) is directed to "discrimination with regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condi- tion of employment." Action of that kind can only be effec- tively accomplished (or rectified) by the one who has actual and ultimate control of the hire, tenure, or terms and condi- tions of employment of employees affected thereby. No simi- lar justification exists for giving a like restrictive construction to Section 8(a)(1) in a situation where only employee Section 7 rights and no discrimination in employment is involved. In such a situation the absence of a proximate employer- employee relationship may still have a relevant bearing on the factual question as to whether the conduct complained of was of an interfering, coercive, or restraining kind. But it does not in itself supply a statutory mandate for dismissal. In the instant case, Fabrics Services, by virtue of its owner- ship of the property and its power to evict Smoak from its premises, was in a position of sufficient control effectively to enforce its direction to Smoak, in substance, either to remove his union pocket protector or get off its property and cease performing the work his employer had assigned him. Its de- mand, I find, constituted a direct interference with and re- straint of Smoak's protected right to wear a union insignia at work. Though perhaps different in degree, Fabric Services' interference with Smoak's right was not essentially different from what it would have been had Fabric Services used physi- cal force to remove Smoak' s union insignia. To exonerate Fabric Services from statutory responsibility in these circum- stances simply because Smoak was not its employee, would, I believe, subvert the clear policy and intent of the Act. Having "knowingly participate[d] in the effectuation of an unfair labor practice, [Fabric Services] place[d] itself within the orbit of the Board's corrective jurisdiction." N.L.R.B. v Gluck Brewing Co., 144 F.2d 847, 855 (C.A. 8). Accordingly, I find that Fabric Services violated Section 8(a)(1)of the Act by reason of its conduct described above. That brings us to the case against Southern Bell. I find that Southern Bell, by instructing Smoak to remove his union pocket protector and return to Fabric Services' plant to com- plete his assignment, not only acquiesced in Fabric Services' unlawful rule, but in practical and legal effect adopted it as a prohibitory rule of its own regulating its employees' con- duct when performing work on Fabric Services' premises. It imposed that prohibition without, so far as appears, making any inquiry or investigation to determine whether Fabric Services had, or even claimed, any legitimate reason to justify the stand it had taken. Southern Bell, as appears from its memorandum brief, had no general rule of its own prohibit- ing the wearing of union insignia such as was worn by Smoak, and even after the events in question continued to permit Smoak to wear such insignia "during working hours, except while in the plant of Fabric Services." It is thus apparent that Southern Bell did not itself consider that the special require- ments of its own business operations were such as to necessi- tate a ban in the wearing of union insignia . The only reason it gave Smoak for ordering him to remove his union insignia while working at Fabric Services was that he had to do so "if that is what the customer wanted." And that, essentially, is the only reason Southern Bell offers now to justify its action. Does the reason given qualify as a "special circumstance" of sufficient force to justify in law the action Southern Bell took? On the facts of this case, I think not. A desire to appease a customer does not, without more, provide sufficient busi- ness justification for the infringement of employee statutory rights. If, as appears to be the case here, Fabric Services' objection to the wearing of union insignia was without lawful FABRIC SERVICES justification, Southern Bell's action in supporting and enforc- ing it can stand in no better posture . See Ref Chem Co., 153 NLRB 488 . In my opinion, it was incumbent upon Southern Bell, at the very minimum, to satisfy itself that Fabric Ser- vices' rule had at least some colorable claim to legitimacy before subjecting its employees to the operation of that rule which trenched on their employee rights. To hold otherwise would be to dilute the statutory protection to which Southern Bell's employees are entitled by making their right to wear union insignia dependent on the whim or caprice of any of Southern Bell's customers . Nor may Southern Bell be excul- pated from liability under the statute because it acted in good faith and without union animus or willful intent to violate the Act. The law is well settled that when it is once made to appear from the primary facts that an employer has engaged in conduct which operates to interfere with an employee's statutorily protected right, it is immaterial that the employer was not motivated by antiunion bias or ill intentions.' Other arguments advanced by Southern Bell for dismissal of the complaint remain to be considered. Thus, Southern Bell argues that the wearing of union insignia is entitled to statutory protection only when specifically shown to be as- sociated with the furtherance of an express purpose protected by the Act, e.g., an attempt to organize employees or to obtain from management better wages, hours, or working conditions. And as no showing of such a purpose on Smoak's part has been made in this case,' Southern Bell contends that the complaint must fail . I reject this contention as being based on too narrow a view of the statutory protection accorded the wearing of union insignia . The Board has never taken the position that the wearing of union insignia is protected only if part of a concerted campaign to organize employees or promote collective bargaining. And although the position urged by Southern Bell does find support in a decision of one court of appeals,' the Board has never followed that decision, on the contrary it has expressly indicated its nonacquiescence in the principle declared therein.' The more general and, I think, the better rationale for protecting the freedom of em- ployees to wear insignia declaring their union identity is that this is a form of expression that is basic to the full enjoyment of their right to become and remain union members.10 Southern Bell also urges that even if its action with regard to Smoak is viewed as "technically violative of the Act," the ' NLRB v Burnup and Simms, Inc, 379 U S 21, NLRB v Hudson Motor Car Co, 128 F 2d528,533 NLRB v Gluck Brewing Co, 144F 2d 847, 853 7 As evidence of the absence of any such purpose Southern Bell in its brief points out that its employees were already organized by CWA, its contract with CWA was then in midterm , Smoak was the only Southern Bell em- ployee at Fabric Services, and he worked in a room separate and apart from Fabric Services' employees ° NLRB v Harrah Club, 371 F 2d 177, 179 (C A 9) ° Standard Oil Co of California, 168 NLRB 153 ° Serv-Aar, Inc v NLRB , 395 F 2d 557, 563 (C A 10) 543 complaint against it should be dismissed because of the iso- lated nature of the occurrence , or, at least, that no order against it should be entered . I am unable to agree. The reason given for requiring Smoak to remove his union insignia-"if that is what the customer wanted"-suggests a policy on Southern Bell's part to follow blindly customers ' objections in matters of this kind without inquiring into the reason for it, and would leave open the possibility of a recurrence of the same kind of unfair labor practice if a violation is not found in this case and a cease-and-desist order entered . Moreover, the effectiveness of a cease-and-desist order against Fabric Services based on the violation committed by it might be weakened if Southern Bell is not also enjoined . However, in fashioning the remedial order , I shall take into account that Southern Bell's violation was confined to only one of its nu- merous locations and shall limit the notice posting require- ment to that location For reasons stated above, I conclude, and find , that Re- spondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by engaging in the conduct alleged in the complaint i' IV THE REMEDY Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, as amended, I recom- mend that the Respondents be ordered to cease and desist from engaging in the unfair labor practices found , and in any like or related conduct , and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and upon the entire record in the case, I make the following: 11 My view of this case would have been different had it involved a prohibition against employee solicitation or other organizational activity, instead of a prohibition against the wearing of union insignia As a corollary to its right to bar outside organizers from coming on its property (NL R B v Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U S 105), Fabric Services could have legiti- mately insisted , without any showing of special circumstances, that Smoak as an invitee on its property for a limited purpose confine himself to the purpose for which he had been allowed to enter its premises and refrain from attempts to organize its employees . Correspondingly , Southern Bell, whether or not requested by Fabric Services to do so, could have legiti- mately required Smoak to refrain from union solicitation or organizational activities among Fabric Services ' employees while on the latter's property See Sylvania Electric Products Co, 174 NLRB . No 9 This case is distin- guishable from Sylvania because it is concerned only with the question of whether Smoak's right to wear a union insignia while working was unlaw- fully infringed , there being no claim that his wearing of the insignia was in any way associated with any attempt on his part to organize Fabric Services' employees As emphasized above , the wearing of a union insignia stands in a different category than employee solicitation It is regarded as a form of employee self-expression protected by Sec 7, rather than a form of em- ployee solicitation , and under the law as developed is lawfully subject to restrictive regulation only when compelling special circumstances are shown to require it in the interest of maintaining employee discipline or production 544 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1 The Respondents are employers engaged in commerce within the meanings of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. By refusing to allow Gerald O. Smoak to work in its plant while wearing a union pen pocket protector, Fabric Services has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor prac- tices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 4. By instructing Gerald O. Smoak to remove his union pen pocket protector if that is what Fabric Services wanted and to go back and complete his assignment at Fabric Services, Respondent Southern Bell has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices, within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 5 The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended:12 ORDER A. The Respondent, Fabric Services , Inc., Orangeburg, South Carolina, its officers, agents, successors , and assigns, shall- 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Imposing, maintaining, or enforcing any rule or re- " In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102 46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions , and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec 102 48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes quirement prohibiting employees working on its premises from wearing union insignia. (b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restrain- ing, or coercing employees in the exercise of rights guaran- teed to them in Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action which is necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Notify Gerald 0 Smoak, Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO, and Southern Bell Telephone & Tele- graph Company, in writing, that it withdraws any objection to employees of Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Com- pany wearing union insignia while performing services at its plant. (b) Post at its plant in Orangeburg, South Carolina, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix B."'' Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Re- gion 11, after being duly signed by the Respondent's author- ized representative, shall be posted by the said Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, includ- ing all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 11, in writing, within 20 days from the receipt of this Decision, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith." " In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall be changed to read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board " 10 In the event that this recommended Order is adopted by the Board after exceptions have been filed, this provision shall be modified to read "Notify the Regional Director for Region 11, in writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith " FABRIC SERVICES B. The Respondent, Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Company, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Directing, instructing, or requiring Gerald O. Smoak, or any other of its employees, to remove or refrain from wearing union insignia while performing work at the plant of Fabric Services, Inc., or at the premises of any other cus- tomer, except where it has affirmatively been made to appear to it that special circumstances exist at the customer's prem- ises that have led, or are probably likely to lead, to disruptions in employee discipline or production resulting from the wear- ing of such insignia. (b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restrain- ing, or coercing employees in the exercise of rights guaran- teed to them in Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action which is necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Post at its facility in Orangeburg, South Carolina, co- pies of the attached notice marked "Appendix C."15 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 11, after being duly signed by the Respondent's au- thorized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, includ- ing all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (b) Notify the Regional Director for Region 11, in writing, within 20 days from the receipt of this Decision, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith.16 See In 13, supra See fn 14, supra APPENDIX A 17 DOESN'T COST -IT PAYS JOIN CWA•AFLCIO ^,^ 94__e / 545 546 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD APPENDIX B APPENDIX C NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government WE WILL NOT impose, maintain , or enforce any rule or requirement prohibiting employees working on our premises from wearing union insignia. FABRIC SERVICES, INC. (Employer) Dated By (Representative) (Title) This is an official notice and must not be defaced by any- one. This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered , defaced, or covered by any other material. Any questions concerning this notice or compliance with its provision may be directed to the Board 's Office, 1624 Wachovia Building, 301 North Main Street , Winston-Salem, North Carolina 27101, Telephone 919-723-2300. NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government WE WILL NOT direct, instruct, or require Gerald 0 Smoak or any other of our employees to remove or refrain from wearing union insignia while performing work at the plant of Fabric Services , Inc , or at the premises of any other customer, except where it has affirmatively been made to appear to us that special cir- cumstances exist at the customer 's premises that have led, or are probably likely to lead, to disruptions in employee discipline or production resulting from the wearing of such insignia. SOUTHERN BELL TELEPHONE & TELEGRAPH COMPANY (Employer) Dated By (Representative) (Title) This is an official notice and must not be defaced by any- one. This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered , defaced, or covered by any other material. Any questions concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions , may be directed to the Board 's Office, 1624 Wachovia Building, 301 North Main Street, Winston-Salem, North Carolina 27101 , Telephone 919-723-2300