Hunt Tool Co.

HUNT TOOL COMPANY 145 Hunt Tool Company and Allen Simoneaux. Case 15-CA-3943 July 20, 1971 DECISION AND ORDER BY MEMBERS FANNING, JENKINS, AND KENNEDY Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel. Upon the basis of the stipulation, the briefs, and the entire record in this case, the Board makes the following: Upon a charge filed on October 16, 1970, by Allen Simoneaux, an individual, herein called the Charging Party, the General Counsel for the National Labor Relations Board, by the Regional Director for Region 15, issued a complaint dated January 14,197 1, against the Hunt Tool Company, herein called the Respon- dent, alleging that the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. The complaint alleges in substance that on or about September 16, 1970, the Charging Party filed a lawsuit which seeks damages from Respondent, inter alia, under provisions of the Jones Act' and/or the Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act,z for alleged on-the-job injury; that on or about October 2, 1970, Respondent discharged the Charging Party and thereafter refused, and continues to refuse, to reinstate him because he filed suit against it; that the Charging Party's lawsuit was protected activity, and Respondent, by discharging and refusing to reinstate him, has engaged in, and is engaging in, unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8(a)(l) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act and has interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act. On February 8, 1971, the Respondent filed an answer admitting certain allegations in the complaint and denying that the facts admitted constituted an unfair labor practice as alleged in the complaint. The parties to this proceeding entered into a stipulation of facts and jointly moved that the proceedings be transferred to the Board, stipulating that the charge, complaint and notice of hearing, answer and stipulation of facts shall constitute the entire record and that no oral argument is necessary or desired. They further stipulated that they waived a hearing before a Trial Examiner, rulings upon motion by a Trial Examiner, and the issuance of a Trial Examiner's Decision. On April 7, 1971, the Board approved the stipulation and ordered the proceedings transferred to the Board. Thereafter, the General Counsel and the Respondent filed briefs. 1 46 U.S.C. 688. 2 33 U.S.C. 901. s There is no provision in either the Jones Act or the Longshoremen's FINDINGS OF FACT 1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT The Respondent, a Texas corporation, operates a plant in Harvey, Louisiana, where it is engaged in the business of building and repairing ships. Annually, in the course and conduct of its business operations at its Harvey facility, it purchased and received goods valued in excess of $50,000 directly from points located outside the State of Louisiana., We find, as stipulated by the parties, that' the Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) , and (7) of -the Act and that it will effectuate the policies of the Act to assert jurisdiction herein. R. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE The parties stipulated to the following facts. On or about September 16, 1970, the Charging Party, an employee of the Respondent, filed a lawsuit in the Federal District Court, Eastern District, New Orleans Division, Case 70-2645, which seeks damages from the Respondent, inter alia, under provisions of the Jones Act and/or the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, for an alleged on-the- job injury. The Charging Party was employed by the Respon- dent at the time he filed suit against it and was discharged solely for filing the suit. The Respondent has maintained a company rule that employees who file suit against it willibe discharged, except in cases where such discharge is prevented by law.3 In the suit, the Charging Party claimed that the injury he allegedly suffered permanently and totally disabled him from performing all duties on jobs he has been suited for by training and experience. The parties agreed that the degree of disability claimed by the Charging Party in no way entered into the decision to discharge or the refusal to reinstate him. However, the parties further agreed that this is without prejudice to Respondent's position that, for reasons of disability, the Charging Party would not be entitled to reinstatement or backpay. and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act that protects an employee from being discharged for availing himself of his rights under either of the statutes. 192 NLRB No. 29 146 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD The General Counsel contends, that, by filing a lawsuit under provisions of- the Jones Act 'and/or the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, the Charging Party,was- engaged in concerted activity protected by Section 7 of the Act. The- General Counsel argues that, since both the Jones `Act and the Longshoremen's and ,. Harbor Workers' Compensation Act resulted, at least in part, from the concerted efforts of employees acting through their labor organizations in lobbying for the enactment of the two laws, bringing the lawsuit would be analogous to an individual employee's assertion of a claim under a collective-bargaining agreement, which is clearly protected. The General Counsel cites Bunny Bros. Construction Company'4 ,where , an individ'u`all.,employee was discharged for submitting a contract pay' claim, and the Board held that the discharge violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, since the employee sought to implement the collective-bargain- ing ` agreement and the implementation of such an agreement by an employee is but an exten<tion of the -concerted activity that produced the agreement. However, the filing by a single employee of a purely personal claim 'under the Jones Act 'and/or the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act is far different from his filing a claim under a collective;bargaining . ^ agreement and it is., not - the Board's position that all activities,, no matter, how remote, rising out of concerted activity are protected. Accordingly, we , cannot agree with the General Counsel's contentions. The inst4it lawsuit brought under the provisions of the^ •/Jones,'°Act and/or Longshoremen's and Harbor Wdrkers' Compensation Act is not an activity ^protecteµt ' by Section 7 of the Act. We shall therefore dism'is's-the complaint. CONCLUSIONS OF _ LAW 1. Respondent is an employer , engaged in, com- merce within the meaning of Section „2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. By discharging the Charging _Partty, on October 2, 1970, Respondent did not engage in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section"8(a)(l ) 'of the Act. ,ORDER' Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the, National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that the complaint be, and hereby is, dismissed in its entirety. 4 139 NLRB 1516, 1519.