Local 5795, CWA

556 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Local 5795, Communications, Workers of America, AFL-CIO (Western Electric Co., Inc.),and Christi- na C. Coogle. Case 25-CB-1 028 August 9, 1971 'DECISION AND ORDER BY MEMBERS FANNING, JENKINS, AND KENNEDY On April 7, 1971, Trial Examiner Harry Hinkes issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that Respondent had not engaged in the alleged unfair labor practices and recommending, that the complaint be ,dismissed in its entirety, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. Thereafter, the General Counsel filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision with a supporting brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and brief, and the entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions,' and recommendations of the Trial Examiner. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the Recommend- ed Order of the Trial Examiner and hereby orders that the complaint herein be, and it hereby is, dismissed in its entirety. 1 The General Counsel has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the Trial Examiner. It is the Board's established policy not to overrule a Trial Examiner's resolutions with respect to credibility unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence convinces us that the resolutions were incorrect . Standard Dry Wall Products, Inc., 91 NLRB 544, enfd. 188 F.2d 363 (C.A. 3). We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing the Trial Examiner's findings. TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE HARRY R. HIKES, Trial Examiner : The charge in this proceeding was filed by Christina C. Coogle on August 21, 1970,1 and served on or about August 24 upon Local 5795, Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO, herein- after referred to as the Respondent or Union. Pursuant to this charge a complaint was issued on December 8 alleging that the Union had fined Mrs. Coogle because she reported to her employer, Western Electric Company, Incorporated, the breach by a fellow-employee of the Company's rule against alcoholic, beverages on the job and that the disciplinary action of the - fine had a restraining and coercive effect upon her andother employees and served no legitimate union purpose, in violation of Section '8(b)(IXA) of the Act. By answer duly filed' Respondent denied the commission of-anyjunfair labor practices. A hearing was held before me in Indianapolis, Indiana, on February 4, 1971, at which all parties were afforded full opportunity to be represented, examine witnesses, and adduce relevant evidence. Briefs have been received from counsel for the Respondent and from counsel for the General Counsel and have been given careful considera- tion. Upon the.,entire record in this proceeding I make , `the following: FINDINGS of FACr 1. JURISDICTION Western Electric Company, Incorporated, a New York corporation, owns and operates a facility located in Indianapolis, Indiana. During the 12 months preceding the issuance of the complaint, a representative period, Western Electric, in the course and conduct of its business operations, manufactured and sold goods valued in excess of $50,000 which were shipped directly to customers located outside the State of Indiana. The complaint alleg Respondent's answer admits and I find that Weste Electric is now and has been at all times material herein an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. The complaint alleges, Respondent's answer admits and I find that the Union is, and has been at all times material herein a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. II. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES The essential facts of this case are not disputed. It appears that on July 16, Mrs. Coogle, an employee of Western Electric, found a bottle of some alcoholic beverage in a drawer of the machine upon which she was working. About a year earlier, when she was hired by the Company, she had been told by her supervisor of the Company's work rules among which was one prohibiting alcoholic beverages on company property. Not wanting to be blamed for the possession of the bottle, she reported her discovery to Jerry Ashby, her supervisor. Ashby, in turn, reported to John Thorlton, his immediate supervisor, whereupon they removed the bottle from the drawer and put it into Thorlton's file cabinet. The next day, July 17, Mrs. Coogle was called to Thorlton's office and asked whose bottle it was. Coogle replied that she thought it belonged to another employee, Lynn Fields, and suggested that Thorlton speak to still another employee, Kellums, about it. Thorlton spoke to Kellums and then called in employee Fields. As a result the 1 All dates hereafter are 1970 unless otherwise designated. 192 NLRB No. 85 LOCAL -5795, CWA Company took disciplinary action against employee Fields. Both Fields and Coogle were union members. In August, Mrs. ' Coogle was notified that the Union was charging her with "injury to a' feliow' union member" and was summoned to appear before the Union's trial court. Among the "Duties of Members" specified on Coogle's application for membership in the Union was "Refuses to injure fellow members." " The trial court met on September 23 and on September 28 notified Mrs. Coogle that she was guilty of the charges and fined $500. Analysis and Conclusions Section 8(bxl)(A) declares it an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents to restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. Section 7 of the Act states that employees have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection and also have the right to refrain from any and all such activities. The complaint in this proceeding alleges that the Union's fine of Mrs. Coogle "had a restraining and coercive effect upon her and other Western Electric employees." " It may be conceded that the Union's imposition of a $500 fine for an employee's report of another employee's breach of a workrule would be coercive 2 in that it would tend to discourage her and other employees from such action in the future. The Act, however, does not simply render illegal all coercive acts of a union but only such coercive acts which infringe upon the rights of employees enumerated in Section 7 of the Act. There is nothing in this record to indicate that Coogle's organizational rights were infringed by the imposition of the fine, nor that she was prevented from forming, joining, or assisting a labor organization. Similarly, there is nothing in the record to indicate that the imposition of this fine prevented her from bargaining collectively through representatives of her own choosing nor that she was prevented from engaging in concerted activity. In this connection it should be noted that Coogle's "reporting" activities were not concerted activities but an action initiated solely by herself and executed by herself. Accordingly, I cannot find that the imposition of the fine against Mrs. Coogle touched upon any of her rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. There are cases indicating a broader reach of Section 8(bXl)(A). Thus, 8(bXl)(A) has been held to prohibit a union's internal rules which affect a member's employment status. N.LR.B. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co.,388 U.S. 175, 195;Local 479, Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, 151 NLRB 555, 558. Similarly, in the Skura case, supra, a union's attempt to regulate its members' access to the Board's processes was held to be violative of Section 8(bXIXA). The Supreme Court in the Wisconsin motor Corp., case, 394 U.S. 423, held that ... it has become clear that if the rule invades or frustrates an overriding policy of the labor laws the rule 557 may not be enforced, even by fine or expulsion, without, violating Section 8(bxl). There is nothing here which suggests that Coogle's fine affected her employment status or invaded or frustrated an overriding policy of the labor laws such as her access to Board's processes. The Wisconsin Motor case, however, speaks of "a properly adopted rule which reflects a legitimate union interest." The complaint alleges that the union had "no legitimate interest in obstructing enforcement of said work rule." I believe the complaint confuses the legitimacy required under the court decisions. The Wisconsin motor case referred to a union rule which reflects a legitimate union interest. The complaint, however, refers to the obstruction of a company work rule in which the union had no legitimate interest. The union rule in which the Union was required to have a legitimate interest is its rule prohibiting injury to a fellow union member. The complaint does not allege that the Union had no legitimate interest in enforcing a rule which prohibited injury to fellow members nor does there seem to be much room to argue such a proposition. Assuming the Union's rule simply prohibited a member from informing upon another member, it would appear that such a rule would represent a legitimate union interest in promoting harmony within the ranks. However, where such a rule was contrary to a company's workrule, e.g.. where the informer's work duties required him to report infractions of work rules (as, where the informant has an inspector's job or a guard's duties), such union rule would not be proper inasmuch as its application and enforcement would result in a dereliction of duties by the informer and, consequently, lead to his discharge, thus affecting his employment status. Here, however, it is not suggested the Coogle's work duties required her to report the presence of Field's bottle. The Union's fine, therefore, could not affect her employment status. As the Board said in the Wisconsin Motor case: Whether or not the Union's rule in this case is desirable or equitable is a matter we need not and do not decide. It is sufficient, in our view, that the Union deliberately restricted the enforcement of the rule to an area involving the status of a member as a member rather than as an employee. . Whether or not Coogle's reporting activities actually injured a fellow member and whether or not she is guilty of violating such rule is not the issue here. Such resolution will be made if and when the Union seeks to enforce the decision of its trial court at which time, presumably, the reasonableness of the fine will also be examined.3 For this proceeding, however, it is sufficient that the rule of the Union reflects a legitimate union interest, infringes upon no statutory labor policy and is, therefore, not violative of Section 8(bx1XA) of the Act. I shall therefore recommend dismissal of the complaint in its entirety. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW The General Counsel has not sustained his burden of proof to establish that the Respondent-Union violated 2 Charles S. Skura 148 NLRB 679. . Arrow Development Co., 185 NLRB No. 22. 558 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL, LABOI.t<"RELATIONS BOARD Section 8(bXl)(A) of .the., Act when . it fined member ,RECOMMENDED-ORDER Christina C. Coogle for having injured a fellow member: - ,' On the, basis of ; the, foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of laws I recommend that the complaint in this case be dismissed in its entirety.,