Monogram Models, Inc..

MONOGRAM MODELS, INC. Monogram Models, Inc.. and Warehouse and Mail Order Employees Union, Local No. 743, Interna- nal -Brothhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America. Case 13-CA-9Q97. August 18, 1971 DECISION AND ORDER On May 15, 1970, Trial Examiner Josephine H. Klein issued her Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial-Examiner's Decision. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision and a supporting brief. ' The National' Labor Relations Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds' that no prejudicial 'error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirm d. Tl}e Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision, the excep- tions and brief, and the, entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recom- mendations of the Trial Examiner, only to the extent consistent herewith. The complaint herein alleges that the Respondent interfered with its employees in the exercise of ^ their organizational rights, in violation of Section 8(aXl) of the Act, by prohibiting Warehouse and Mail Order Employees Union, -Local No. 743, International Brotherhood of' Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehouse- men and Helpers of'Anr'erica, hereinafter called the Union, from distributing union literature on the Respondent's. plant parking lot. Specifically, the General Counsel contends that the Respondent's refusal to allow nonemployee union organizers on the parking lot reserved for the Respondent's employees is unlawful because such refusal placed these employ- ees beyond the reach of reasonable efforts on the part of-the Union to communicate with them. The Trial Examiner found the ;violation, essentially for the reason asserted by-the General Counsel. We disagree. The Respondent is engaged in the manufacture of model hobby products and related items at its plant in Morton Grove, a 'suburb of the greater Chicago 1 The plant, which fronts on the east side of Waukegan Road, a four- lane highway, is situated on a rectangular tract of land owned by the Respondent The, tract is bounded on the north by another company and on the east and south by a public forest preserve all of which is separated from , the Respondent's property by a 7-foot high cyclone , fence., Signs placed upon ibis tifence post the Respondent's property against trespassers. There are one entrance and two arils which the Respondent's employees may use. Entrance is gained by means of a 20-foot wide, two-way access road intersecting Waukegan Road near the southern boundary of the 192 NLRB No. 99 705 metropolitan area. The Respondent employs a total of approximately 250 persons, of whom between 200 and 219 are production workers whom the Union is attempting to organize. Except for about 40 plastics department employees,- who's are evenly divided between the second and third shifts, all the production employees work the first shift which starts at 9 a.m. Approximately one half of these employees live within I to 6 miles of the Respondent's plant. The remainder live no more than 13 miles distant. The= Respondent provides private transportation for first-shift employees. Approximately 60 to 70 employ- ees, who wear uniforms-and are thus, readily, identifia- ble, avail themselves of this service, riding nonstop between the plant and designated, pickup .points within the city limits of Chicago. Approximately 10 first-shift employees walk to - work. The 90 to 100 remaining first-shift employees drive-to work in 50 to 60 private automobiles. The 40 second-and third shift employees are -not provided transportation by the Respondent. On April 30, 1969, the Union launched a campaign to organize the Respondent's plant. On that ,day, approximately I hour before the commencement of the first shift, five union organ! s- stationed .them selves on the public domain alongside the access road near the southernboundary,of-the Respondent's plant and began distributing leaflets to motorists turning off Waukegan Road into the employees' parking lot.' Some conversations ensued, between the organizers and the employee motorists., The record is unclear, however, as to how many employees were offered or accepted the leaflets. At least three pedestrians, turned them down. The two organizers who. testified. at the hearing stated that it took no more-than 10 seconds to distribute their materials into each car; that these two, between them, distributed leaflets into approximately nine of the automobiles passing into the plant; but that conversations of- any substantial duration were impracticable because of the press of traffic moving into the plant, especially in the last several minutes before the commencement of the first shift. The other three organizers did not testify, and the record is silent as to the results of their efforts. The Union returned the following morning prior to the commencement of the first shift, but failed to pass out any leaflets on that occasion. The organizers returned to the plant a third time in the afternoon of May2 in an effort to reach Respondent's property, immediately north of the point where Waukegan Road, curving, converges with Caldwell Avenue, another four-lane highway. Traffic lights control the movement of vehicles across this intersection. The access road kims easterly, 30 feet beyond the paved edge of the highway over public domain to the plant gate, and continues 200 feet beyond, terminating at the employees' parking lot. Vehicles leaving the Respondents plant may use the aforementioned access road or another, also intersecting Waukegan Road, near the -northern boundary of the Responderit's property. 706 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD the second-and third-shift employees. This effort entering the plant. In addition-to the vehicles whose aborted, however, as no employees were observed occupants accepted handbills, the organizers also entering or leaving the plant. The' Union also tendered handbills to `employess who rejected the ascertained the "locations of the designated pickup, material offered them. Moreover, there was substan- points from which the Respondent's buses transport- tial opportunity for, and achievement of, additional ed employees to the plant. At one public transit contact between union representatives and first-shift terminal, organizers talked to-employees and ^distrib- employees awaiting company transportation at 47th uted campaign literature' to approximately 10 to 15 and Kedzie. Finally, although the record does not employees on four separate occasions during the show any contact with the small number of second- month of May.2 During the same period, organizers and third shift employees, it shows only modest, union paid two visits toanother, pickup point at 47th and. efforts to reach them. Thus, consideration of the Kedzie, which serves between 44 and 50'employees. On the first occasion, union representatives distribut- ed' leaflets , and talked, to employees for 10 to 15 minutes. No leaflets were distributed during the Union's second visit -at , that ^ location. There is no evidence that the Union sought to reach the smaller numbers of employees at the remaining transporta- tion points served by the Respondent's station wagon or by taxi. Nor .is, there any evidence, than in bringing its message to employees the Union resorted to other conventional methods of - communication, such as mail, telephone, home visits, or meetings. ' - The Trial Examiner correctly states the rule in N.L.RB. v. The, Babcock & Wilcox` Company, 3 that "an employer may validly post his property against nonemployee_, distribution; of, union literature if reasonable effortsi,by the union through other availa- ble: channels of communication will enable it to reach the employees with -its 'message and if the employer's notice or -order -does not discriminate against the union by allowing other distribution." However, in then Trial, Examiner's opinion, there exist in this case record as a whole leads to the conclusion that while the plant location unquestionably, presented some obstacles to easy contact with employee's on their way to and from work, such contact^`wa's' by no means foreclosed. Indeed' it is clear that such union efforts' as are revealed did 'reach many employees at these' times. It is also claimed that other conventional methods of communication, such as mail, telephone, and-home visits, were not available and do not constitute feasible means of communication because 'ihe em- ployees here involved live in a large,metropolitan area which makes them just as inaccessible as, others who live and work wholly on an employer's property 4' We cannot subscribe to this generalization. We do not believe it wise or proper to adopta "big city rule" and a different'"smalltown rule" in applying Babcock and Wilcox, or to attempt to determine how big a city must be to justify the proposed differing application. Concededly, it may be more convenient and less expensive for the Union to use the Respondent's property for the purpose of organizingthe employees extraordinary. circumstances which necessitate union here involved. That ,was also, true under the facts of access to the Respondent's property. In part, this Babcock and Wilcox. But the test' established there was conclusion is based upon the assumption that traffic not one of relative convenience, but rather whether on Waukegan Road, with a posted speed limit of 40 "the location of a plant and the living, quarters of the m.p.h., renders 'contact between union organizers and employees place the employees, beyond the reach of motorists turning into the Respondent's premises reasonable union efforts to communicate with unsafe and impractical, and that contacts with, them...." The facts here do not, in our view, justify employees using company-furnished transportation such a conclusion, and we are unwilling to make,that were insubstantial. conclusion solely upon the basis of the plant's Although,-first-shift traffic entering- the Respon- location in ametropolitan area.5 We note moreover dent's plant was admittedly heavy at certainhoursof that, while our dissenting colleague, Member Brown, the morning and reaching the occupants of the relies in part on the Respondent'sFrefusal-to furnish- automobiles turning off Waukegan Road presented the Union with a list of,- employees' names and some difficulty,; itis undisputed that the efforts of two addresses, ^ the principles established by :the Excelsior of the five union-organizers placed campaign materi- cases were designed by, this Board to provide als into approximately 9 vehicles of the 25 to 30 seen 2 The Respondent discontinued transportation service from this pickup 1969, point, which was initiated the preceding February, on June 2,' asserting economic necessity as the reason therefor. 3.351 U.S.105,' 112. - 4 Cf. N.LItB. v. Stowe Spinning Company, et al., 336 U.S. 226; N.LR.B. v. Lake Superior Lumber Corporation, 167 F.2d' 147 `(C.A. 6); S.'& H. Grossinger's Inc., 156 NLRB 233, enfd. as modified 372 F2d 26 (C.A.' 2). 3 We note that the Trial Examiner's conclusion as to' the assurances of access to employees at what was "unavailability" of traditional alternatives, such as the use of sound trucks, organizational meetings, radio and newspaper communications ,' and-" the like are based on the urban 'setting of this case. ne' factual testimony certainly 'did not compel such a conclusion, since the union witnesses testimony vWas,, simply'that these alternative means of communication had not been tried.' " ° 6 Excelsior Underwear Inc., 156 NLRB 1236. MONOGRAM MODELS, INC. 707 deemed an appropriate point in our election process- es. In view of the foregoing, we find that the Respondent, by denying' the Union access to its premises, has not thereby engaged in unfair labor practices- within-.the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.7 Accordingly, we shall dismiss thee instant complaint. ORDER It is hereby ordered that the complaint herein be, and it hereby is, dismissed. MEMBER BROWN, dissenting: I would affirm the Trial Examiner's Decision. The Supreme Court in Babcock & Wilcox 8 clearly required that a union need only make "reasonable efforts" to reach employees through available chan- nels of communication before an employer's refusal to permit distribution of union literature on his premises becomes unlawful. This, case hinges on what constitutes "reasonable effort." The majority would seem to insist that a union attempt to reach employees through everypossible form of communication before an employer's refusal to permit distribution will be judged unlawful. This, in my opinion, requires a union to make extraordinary efforts without regard to the economic impracticability or tactical disadvantages that, in the union's view, may be inherent in certain methods of communication. The requirement of such extraordinary effort is contrary to the mandate of the Court ' and serves to inhibit a union's efforts to bring' its message to the employees, to the frustration of the employees' Section 7 rights, The facts in this case clearly indicate that the Union did attempt tor utilize available channels of communi- cation. The Union did attempt to distribute its literature to employees entering Respondent's premis- es, despite the-rapid flow of traffic; and the Union did attempt to, communicate ^ with employees at the various - transportation pickup points, despite the presence of Respondent's "supervisory personnel and its "chilling" effect. The majority wonders why mail, telephone, and home visits were not utilized by the Union, and then gratuitously remarks that such organizational techniques need not be - rendered impractical by virtue of Respondent's essentially urban work force. The issue, is not the urban environment of the employees, but rather Respon- dent's refusal, despite repeated union requests, -to make available a list o employee names and addresses. I conclude from these facts that the Union's reasonable efforts did not effectively9 allow the Union to communicate with- Respondent's em- ployees, and that Respondent's refusal to permit nonemployee union organizers access to its parking lot interfered with its employees' rights guaranteed by Section 7, in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. MEMBER JENKINS, dissenting: Contrary to the majority and in agreement with dissenting Member Brown, I would affirm the Trial Examiner's Decision and allow - the nonemployee organizers access to the Respondent's parking lot. While, as a general rule, nonemployee organizers are not entitled to such privilege, absent a showing that they cannot reach the employees by reasonable efforts through other available channels of communi- cation, I feel that the facts of this case warrant an exception to the rule. Jack M. Besser, Respondent's president, admitted that he prevented the-distribution of union literature on the public part of the access roadway leading from the edge of Waukegan, Road to Respondent's property line near the principal, auto- mobile entrance to Respondent's. parking area. I do not understand the majority to disagree'-with this. Given this to be a fact, it is plain that Respondent has unlawfully impeded the, Union in its efforts to use lawful and available channels of communication, exhaustion of which is a prerequisite to plant access. This unlawful conduct by Respondent is almost identical to that which Respondent was ordered to 7 Farah Manufacturing Company, 187 'NLRB No. 83 ; General Dynamics/Telecommunications, a division of Genera[ Dynamics Corporation, 137 NLRB 1725. Contrary to our dissenting colleague, Member Brown, we do not believe that the critical issue in this case-hinges on the question whether the Union did; in fact, make a "reasonable effort" to reach these 'employees. Whether or not such an effort was made, it is the opportunity to make such an effort because of "the location of the plant and the living quarters of the employees" which is determinative of the Union's right to approach the employer's employees on his property. Babcock & Wilcox, 351 U.S. 105, I13. In our view, those factors in this case did not preclude the Union through reasonable efforts-to communicate with these employees. - The views expressed by our dissenting colleague, Member Jenkins, raise an issue which was neither anticipated nor litigated by the parties to this proceeding and involve facts which, in the posture of this case, are irrelevant. The complaint herein specifically alleges an unlawful refusal on the part of the Respondent , "to allow non-employee union organizers to enter the Respondent's plant-parking lot,for the purpose of distributing union literature and soliciting membership in said Union ." The question thus presented to the Board for decision is narrowly drawn' whether, as a matter of fact, the Respondent's plant is geographically situated in such a manner as to require entry onto the private property of the Respondent as the only means of assuring reasonable access - to employees by nonemployee union organizers. Without addressing himself to that question, our colleague raises an issue concerning the status of compliance by the Respondent with a remedial order of the Board issued in an entirely different case. If that order were indeed ignored, as our colleague suggests ,, the Respondent's alleged recalcitrance can be speedily and effectively dealt with under well- defined contempt procedure. Raising these matters here is, in our view, not only counter-productive but inexplicable in the light of our colleague's position in Farah Manufacturing Company, sgpra where the Board found it inappropriate to grant nonemployee union organizers entry into the respondent's property although the respondent also committed unfair labor practices which, in other ways, seriously impeded legitimate access, to employees. - , B 351 U.S. 105, 112. 9 See ibid. - 708 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABWRELATIONS BOARD cease by-the Board, whose Order was enforced by the court of appeals in the prior litligation.la It is time to end the games Respondent is playing with the statute and with the rights of its employees. To do this, I think it is necessary to provide a remedy which will promptly erase the consequences of its offenses. Respondent's misconduct has, unlawfully interfered "on both occasions with the rights, of its employees to receive information about their rights of its employees to receive information about their rights under Section 7 of the Act, and has likewise cost the Union'time, money, and effort on two occasions. In, order to assure prompt vindication of the rights of the employees which thus, far Respondent has blocked, and in order to demonstrate to those employees, that the Act provides,effective protection for the exercise of their rights, I would order Respondent not only to cease and desist from its unlawful conduct but to provide access to its premises for union distribution of literature at suchpoints as may, consistent with safety and orderly ingress and egress, provide the Union with ready and easy access to the employees as they enter and leave Respondent's premises." 10 Monogram Models, Inc-, 170 NLRB 636, curd. 420 F.2d 1263. 11 The` majority obviously misconceives my position. I am not Testing wholly on 'Respondent's ignoring the prior Board Order; rather, it is Respondent's denial ,of access to its property when it unlawfully prevented the use of public property for communication purposes that forms the basis of the violation. Further, the instant case is clearly distinguishable from Farah' Manufacturing Company, where- there was no -showing that the respondent there "unlawfully impeded the union itself and where, too, the union, unlike here, had a number of in plant support is. TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE JOSEPHINE H., KLEIN, Trial Examiner: This case was tried in Chicago, Illinois, on March 3, 1970, on a complaint issued against Monogram Models, Inc., Respondent, on December 30, 1969, pursuant to a charge filed by Warehouse and Mail Order Employees Union, Local 743, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen -and Helpers of America, the Union, on May 5, 1969, alleging that Respondent, in contravention of Section 8(a)(1) of, the Act,' refused to allow representatives of the Union to solicit membership for the- Union and distribute union literature on the parking lot maintained by Respondent for its employees' use- Upon the entire record,` observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, and- consideration of the arguments and briefs on behalf of the General Counsel and Respondent, the Trial Examiner makes the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. JURISDICTIONAL,.FINDINGS A. Respondent, a Delaware corporation with-a place of business in Morton Grove; "Illinois, is engaged in "'"the manufacture of model hobby products and related items. During the last calendar year, a representative period, Respondent, in the course and conduct of its business, has manufactured and shipped goods and products valued in excess of $50,000 from inside Illinois to points directly outside Illinois. Respondent is, now, and has been at all times material herein, an employer engaged' in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6)and (7) of the Act. B. The Union is a labor organization as defined in Section 2(5) of the Act. II. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Background, Early in 1967 the Union commenced an organizational campaign directed at Respondent's production and mante- nance employees. In connection therewith, it attempted to distribute union literature on the shoulder of the highway in front of Respondent's premises and in the roadway leading into the grounds of Respondent's plant. Maintaining that the highway shoulder and the access_roadway in question were its private property, Respondent prohibited the Union's distributional. activity. An, unfair, labor practice proceeding ensued. On November 30, 1967,_Trial-Examiner Paul E., Weil decided that theroadway involved was legally a public .highway and that, therefore, Respondent's interference' with the Union's distribution of literature thereon was violative of Section 8(a)(1): 'Examiner Weil held, alternatively, that even if, the roadway in'`ques tion were private property, Respondent''s prohibition, of- the Union's distribution `would be unlawful -because "the Union has no reasonable access to - the- Respondent's employees other than that attempted by, handbil'lingat the gate." On March, 21, 1968, the Board,_ affirmed, the Examiner's decision, but,, in so, doings stated, that it„ was "Unnecessary to rule on, the alternate finding of the Trial Examiner that the Respondent's conduct would have been unlawful even if the Union organizers had been distributing literature, on the Respondent's private property." Mono- gram Models, Inc., 170 NLRB No. 84.2 On April 30, 1969, the Union again , commenced handbilling , at the roadway entrance,,of . Respondent's premises. After an initial prohibition, Jack - M. Besser, Respondent's president; met with union representatives on May 2, and' stated'his continued position, contrary to the Board's decision, that the roadway wasprivate property, on which nonemployee union organizers -could be lawfully` prohibited from distributing literature : He testified further: - however,." I, told (the union organizer II wanted to cooperate with him, I wanted to extend our help in a normal fashion, and-, I would permit them on "the 1 National Labor Relations Act, as amended (61 Stat. 136,73 Stat. 519, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 151, et seq. ). 2 On December 9, 1969, the Board's Order was enforced by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, which also refrained fiom°passing on the Trial Examiner's alternate basis for decision, 420' F.2d 1263..: MONOGRAM MODELS, INC. shoulder of theroad and in the driveway up to the point of the eastern traffic light. In itsbrief, Respondent repeats that it: permitted -the- use of a portion of its private property, despite the fact that it was under-no legal duty to permit the Union organizational activities on any part of its wholly private property. . In so stating its .position, Respondent ignores the Board's prior decision, as enforced by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit on December 9, 1969, 3 months before the present hearing. under that decision, Respondent is prohibited, from interfering with the Union's solicitation and distribution on the portion of.Respondent's property subject to -a public, easement. Plats of- the property in the present recordestablishthat the public-easement extends to the plant gate, several, feet beyond the point to which Respondent has restricted the union organizers.3 B.- The Issue It was, stipulated that Respondent has always maintained and enforced a nondiscriminatory rule prohibiting any form of solicitation or distribution on its premises by nonemployees. The question here presented is whether, as an,,exception to this rule, nonemployee union organizers must be, afforded access'to the parking,lot maintained by Respondent'for the Fuse of its employees. The answer to this question depends upon the applicability to the particular facts of, the principles enunciated as follows in NLRB. v, Babcock'& Wilcox Co., 351 U:S. 105,112: an employer may validly post his property against nonemployee, distribution of union literature if reasonable efforts by the union through other available 'channels' of communication will enable it to reach the employees with its message..} .-In these circumstances the employer may not be compelled to allow distribu- tion even under reasonable regulations... This is not a problem of always open or always closed doors for union organization on company property. ...' The employer may not affirmatively interfere with organization; the union may not always insist that the employer aid organization. But when the inaccessibility of employees makes ineffective the reasonable attempts by nonemployees to communicate with them through the usual channels, the right to exclude from property has been required -to yield. to the. extent needed to permit communication of information on the right to organize. .. The right ; of self-organization `depends in some measure on the ability of employees to learn the, advantages of'self-organization .fr"om others. 'Conse- quently, if the location of a plant and the living quarters of the employees place the, employees beyond the reach of reasonable union efforts to communicate with them, a A diagramatic representation of the premises indicates that the public easement actually includes a strip around 20 feet wide along the western edge of the premises on the visitors' parking lot. ! The charge, filed-May 5; alleged, additionally, that Respondent had denied the Union organizers access to public property, had kept their activity under surveillance, and had threatened them. These allegations were not included in the complaint. - 5 if Respondent had moved to dismiss rather than answering and presenting an"affirmative 'defense," the. most it could have secured would 709 the employer, must allow the, union to approach his employees on his property... - , C. Procedural Matters The complaint, issued on December 30, 1969, alleges that since April 30, 1969, Respondent has "refused to allow non- employee union organizers to enter the Respondent's plant parking lot for the purpose of 'distributing union literature and soliciting membership , 'in said ,Union, during an organizing campaign conducted by the "Union."4 Respon- dent admits this factual allegation . In its answer, Respon- dent "affirmatively allege[d] that non-employee union organizers are not entitled, as -a,matter of law, to have access to Respondent's private property for purposes of organizational activities,, since Respondent's employees are not beyond the reach of reasonable effortsto communicate with them at places other than on Respondent's private property!, By a "Motion for Summary Judgment" presented at the hearing, Respondent sought to attack the sufficiency of the complaint, maintaining that the_ General Counsel was required to allege not only that Respondent , had , denied access to its property but also that there were no alternative avenues , of communication with the employees available to the Union, within the principles enunciated in N.L.R.B. v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., supra. In its brief, Respondent renews its motion for summary judgment. Any possible deficiency in the complaint was supplied by the "affirmative" pleading in Respondent's answer. The complaint and answer clearly-delineated the-precise issue to be litigated. Accordingly, a "motion for summary judg- ment" , (or a ,motiona .to dismiss for, failure , to allege a violation) could not properly be granted-after Respondent's responsive answer was filed.5 (Cf: the ensuing discussion of Respondent's motion to dismiss.) At the close of 'the General Counsel's ,evidence Respon- dent moved to dismiss the complaint for the General Counsel's `r failure to " establish a prima facie case. That motion was denied and Respondent proceeded to introduce evidence. In its brief, 'Respondent renews its motion to dismiss and argues in some detail that the General Counsel was required to,, but did not, establish the nonexistence of channels for reasonable communication with- Respondent's employees' other than' through use of Respondent's employee parking lot,6 Having proceeded to introduce evidence after its motion to dismiss was denied, Respondent waived its right to a determination of the sufficiency of the General Counsel's evidence, and the case must now be decided on the record as a whole, including the-evidence presented by Respon- dent. See A & N Club v. GreatAmerican,Insurance Co., '404 be an order dismissing the complaint "with leave to amend. An amended complaintI presumably would have been filed containing the missing allegation. . a 'Respondent states that the Examiner-expressed an opinion concerning the burden of proof ormf going forward on- the, issue of alternative methods of communication. Although the transcript of the hearing is somewhat garbled at this point, it reflects the fact that the Examiner did not make any ruling of law or ,state any opinion of this issue, but simply.directed a question to counsel. - 710 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD F.2d 100, 103 (C.A.,v 6) and authorities there -cited; 5 Moore's Federal Practice (2d ed.)par. 41.13[1], page 1149.7 Accordingly, the Examiner refrains from ruling on Respondent's requestfor reconsideration of the denial of its motion to dismiss. The Examiner also refrains from ruling on the,question of the burden of proof or of going forward with "the evidence concerning alternative means of commu- nication " by, the Union with' Respondent's employees. Rather, the Examiner will ; decide whether a preponderance -of the' evidence, taken as 'a 'whole, establishes that protection of the employees' Section 7 rights requires that union organizers be allowed " access to Respondent's employee parkinglot. D. "Channels of Communication Respondent contends that the Union , has, not made reasonable,efforts to communicate with the employees and lists several suggested avenues of communication, which will here be considered. 1. Entrance roadway Respondent's premises front on the east side' of Waukegan Road, a four-lane highway.According to a'state traffic survey, in 1966 around 18,000 to `20,000vehicles passed Respondent's premises on Waukegan Road each day., I ° I . w The'- entrance- to the premises is near the southern boundary of the property, just north of- the point at which Waukegan Road, curving, converges with Caldwell Avenue (also apparently a four-lane highway) at an angle of about 25 degrees., Access to Respondent's premises ,is by a 20- foot-wide, two-way roadway perpendicular to Waukegan Road. For some distance to either side of the plant entrance there are an unpaved shoulder and rounded concrete curbs, but no sidewalks, from Waukegan Road to a plant gate. Respondent employs a total of , approximately 250 persons, of whom between 200_and 219, are production workers, whom the Union is attempting to organize. Except for; about 40 plastics department employees,, who are evenly divided, between , the, second and, third shifts, all the production employees work the first shift, which starts at 8 a.m. ,^Of 217 factory ,employees at the time of the hearing, 59 live in ,the, northern part of Chicago , about 13 miles from the plant; 50-ill the southern part of Chicago, about '8miles from the plant; 26 in Morton Grove,- approximately'1 mile from the plant; 39 in Niles, about a mile from the plant; 37 in 16 suburbs ranging from around 3 to 12 miles from the plant; and 6 in 5 other scattered suburbs. ` Some 60 to 70 employees are provided transportation to and from work in`vehicles operated by Respondent. The Company-operated-' vehicles load and unload at the employee entrance ' to the' factory building. This employee entrance is approximately 200 feet east and 100 feet.north of the plant gate, beyond a parking area used by office r According to ^ the authorities, cited , the, result would be the same whether the .Examiner had denied or reserved decision on =Respondent's motion to dismiss.Baymon Thom MoAn, ln4 v. Miranda, 409 F.2d 968„971 (C.A.1). s One photograph: in evidence shows approximately 20 automobiles on the employee parking lot . Although there is no specific testimony, to this personnel.- The company-operated vehicles travel directly between the employee entrance and,the pickup points far removed from the plant, without any_stops..It would thus be impossible for Union organizers stationed :in front of the entrance gate to communicate there with the - 60 -to 70 employees using transportation furnished by Respondent. Respondent's president testified - that-8 or ,10. employees walk to and -from work, using both -the southern entrance and an exit roadway onto Waukegan Road to the north of the` building. Union organizers Daniel Cabrera and Jose Cedre testified-that on the two mornings they spent, about 45 minutes at the entrance to the premises , they saw only two or three employees entering on foot. The remaining first-shift production workers, numbering possibly 90 to -100, travel in private automobiles . According to Besser, each,day there are 50 to 60 cars on the employee parking lot, which has a 100-car capacity. Union organizer Cedre testified that he saw possibly 25 to 30 automobiles enter the premises between 7 :05 and 7:50 a.m. on May 5.8 Although some employees apparently arrive at the plant early enough to have breakfast in the company cafeteria before commencing work, it appears that, as would be expected, the incoming traffic peaks in a brief period shortly before 8 a.m. The perpendicular distance from the entrance gate to the east boundary of the shoulder of Waukegan Road is about 20 -'feet.9 Thus, if an= automobile ` of average ' length10 entering the premises were to stop a foot or two- before reaching the gate, its rear end "Old be just about ' at- the edge of the shoulder of the road. Most employees come to the plant from the north,'thus entering the premises, by making a 'left turn off Waukegan Road. Accordingly, they cross the shoulder of the road and travel in e straight line on the plant driveway, so' that if a car entering the premises were to stop just before reaching the plant gate, a car attempting to enter biehind' it -would extend onto the paved portion of Waukegan Road-for'some 10 feet. A person attempting to give a handbill to the'driver of a car entering or leaving the premises would have to stand in the middle of the 20-foot-wide, two-way`road The 'union organiiers' testified `concerning their attempts to distribute ` literature on "the plantroad the mornings of April 30 and May 1 and the afternoon of May 2. On April 30, there were , four or five organizers present. An- attempt by one of them to talk briefly with the-drivers of one car resulted in the blowing of automobile' horns while other motorists were -required to maneuver on Waukegan Road around the car behind. The second morning the , organizers were unseccessful in Making distributions because they were limited to standing at or near the north curb while cars enter the plant grounds 'on the south lane. Their attempt to distribute on the ,plant roadway at around 3 p.m., before, the start of the second shift, on May 2 was abortive because, in the' words ` of organizer Cedre, "there is `nobody 'there, couple of minutes and officer. of the company come running out.' effect, it appears' likely that the photograph was taken on a representative day, during the first shift.] 9 ,The traffic light on the north side of the plant road is, about-8 1/2feet west of the gate, or about 11 1/2 feet east of-the edge of the shoulder. 10 The Examiner takes official notice of the fact that the overall length of American automobiles averages around 18, to 20 feet. -MONOGRAM MODELS, INC. 711 2. Bus pickup points Respondent operates , a bus between the plant and a highway intersection at 47th and Kedzie Streets in Chicago. About 6:15 to 6:30 a.m. it stops at .the northeast corner of 47th and Kedzie, where it remains for about 5 to 15 minutes, while about 44 to .50 employees board. It then proceeds, without stops, directly to the plant, where it discharges the passengers . at the employee entrance to the building, well inside the premises. There is a coffee shop on the southeast corner of 47th and Kedzie, directly across the street from the point at which Respondent's bus loads. In front of the coffee shop' is ,a public bus stop. Cedre learned of this location in telephone conversations with two employees who had signed union cards . Accompanied by two or three 'other organizers, Cedre visited the 47th and Kedzie Streets location ,on two mornings. On-the first morning he went into the coffee shop. Although it appears that some Monogram employees were in the coffee shop, Cedre did not, approach 'them there, but he distributed handbills and spoke to a group of six to eight as they left the coffee shop and proceeded to the waiting bus. A lady standing near the bus door was ' identified to Cedre as a company supervisor. The employees boarded the, bus, whereupon the door was closed just as Cedre approached; On the'next morning, Cedrespoke briefly to a small group, and apparently passed out - about six to eight handbills, while his associate took some pictures. According to Cedre's undisputed testimony,rr the employees quickly put the handbills in theirpurses in a manneridicating fear'2 At 4:45 pan., after the conclusion of the first shift, the bus loads at the employee entrance to the factorybuilding' and proceeds, without stops, to the 47th and Kedzie 'Street intersection. Respondent also provides' transportation by taxi and station wagon between the' plant and the intersection of Milwaukee and Devon Streets in Chicago. At that point, the first pickup is of "about 4 to 6" employees and the second pickup a "light number." In addition, a station wagon provides transportation for 12 people to and from Touhy and Harlem Streets. The evidence does not suggest that employees wait for `transportation at these locations for any length of time. - I There was considerable evidence 'concerning a bus pickup at the Howard Street "L" station. However, because that service was discontinued on May 29, 1969, it will not be described in detail. Suffice it to say that the area is a busy transfer point forr public transportation. On-each' of four occasions, union organizers were able to distribute, handbill 's to between 10 and 15 employees at this location. 3. The, forest preserve Abutting the eastern and 'southern boundaries 'of Respondent's premises is aforest preserve. It is , separated from Respondent's property by a 7-foothigh cyclone fence, 11 Eedre was in general an inarticulate and evasive witness. However, his testimony was essentially undisputed and credibility plays little part in the resolution of the issue here presented. 12 He testified: "I introduced-myself and,said I was from the Union, from Local 743, and I.Save them one of the leaflets , and I can say it was from scare the way they stuck it in their purse--I asked one of the ladies topped by barbed wire. The fence, maintained by Respondent, is posted with strongly worded no-trespassing signs. According to uncontradicted testimony by General Counsel's witnesses, Respondent's' employees, do not frequent the forest preserve. Testimony by' Besser established that in the forest preserve,just south of Respondent's fence, is an irregular, "wavering" lane or pathway which, to an 'indeterminate degree, is kept cleared for the use of fire trucks if necessary. However, no other vehicular traffic is, permitted and ,the "lane" appears. not to be regularly used by anybody for any purpose. The forest preserve is kept largely in aprimitive, or natural, state. There are picnic areas which can be used by members of the public, pursuant to reservation. But, so far as appears, the picnic areas are not near Respondent's property, and are not used by Monogram employees: Respondent suggests that the union organizers might stand in the forest preserve at the fence which bounds Respondent's employee , parking lot. 'From there the organizers could call the employees to the fence and converse with them. Such procedure is impracticable. The shortest distance between the fence and the employee entrance to the building is almost 150 'feet. As previously stated, the Company bus and station wagon board and discharge passengers at the door of the building: The evidence establishes that - employees= park "their own cars as near the building entrance as possible . Thus, the majority of the employees- never approach the fence. - Even , .if the employees could be called over to the fence , satisfactory communication would be unlikely. The inherently undigni- fied and conspiratorial atmosphere _ of communicating through a metal mesh -fence surmounted by barbedwire is more suited to the prison or concentration camp than to communication between free human beings. Respondent's suggestion that the forest preserve could be used as a channel of communication -between the,Union and Respondent's employees must be rejected. - - 4. The bowling emporium There are bowling alleys and associated restaurant or snack bar across Waukegan -Road 'from Respondent's premises. The union organizers testified-that there was no reason to visit `the bowliag'establishment because Respon- dent's employees did not frequent it. - Besser testified that thebowling establishment frequently closes down and changes ownership. As of the time of the hearing, it was not' in- operation. According to Besse,`, a dozen or two of Respondent's `employees occasionally frequent the bowling alley for - lunch' when it is in operation.'3 It is unlikely that employees would frequent the bowling establishment with any frequency because of the facilities maintained by Respondent. There- is a cafeteria accommodating about` 100 persons " and lunch periods are staggered over a two-hour period, permitting enjoyment of lunch in uncrowded circumstances. Coffee who was the lady standing in front of the door of the bus. She said she was a supervisor." - is "... when the bowling alley across the street, the restaurant, was in vogue, and they changed hands about every 6months, and occasionally during the warm weather the co-workers would go across the street to eat there.... I would guess perhaps a dozen, perhaps two dozen." 712 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL,LABOR RELATIONS BOARD breaks are similarly staggered. There are also vending machine facilities for food and drink. In addition, there are separate eating ,facilities for the plastics ' department. Respondent also maintains ,on the premises a grassy area, equipped with facilities for rest and .-relaxational activities, including horeshoe pitching and baseball. With such amenities provided by Respondent, it is easy to understand why the commercial venture across Waukegan Avenue has been something less than a phenomenal success. Clearly, the bowling establishment does not afford the Union any,opportunity to convey its message to Respon- dent's employees. 5. Meetings The Union has never called any meetings. In answer to questioning by-Respondent's counsel, the union representa- tives indicated that meetings were effective tools of organizing only after considerable initial contact had been, made. The, union organizers have been unsuccessful in an attempt to secure a list of the names and addresses of the employees. Thus they could not issue, mail or telephone invitations;toka meeting. Respondent suggests that the Union might issue an invitation.by the use, of a sound truck. ButlRespondent fails, to specify, where, and when a -sound truck', could be effectively deployed. The pictoral and diagramatic evidence in the .record indicates that, effective deployment would be virtually impossible. -In, any event, official,, notice can probably be taken of the fact that an increase in the noise' level on a, public highway, at a busy `intersection, rates very high on any "list-of society's offenders." a4, It is difficult to believe that the use of sound, trucks is sincerely recom- mended by, Respondent,. which has,apparently gone, to great pains to preserve and enhance the attractiveness of its premises and takes pride in the adjoining forest preserve. Respondent lists a few motels or similar establishments, within a radius of about 1-1/2 miles of the plant, in which union meetings could be held. No details as to the available facilities or costs were provided., With the residences of the employees as,scattered as are those, ofRespondent` s, employees, it is difficult to believe that, any, substantial .number ofrpeople would attend an organizational meeting in the vicinity of the plant. Attendance ;at such a meeting would necessitate either, in effect extending, the work day or -travelling substantial distances. Sine it. appears that many of, the employees are women,P,presumablly they have domestic obligations and chores which would preclude their attendance at meetings, under these circumstances. On all the evidence, it is clear that organizational meetings do notvpravide_a: practical means of communica- tion between the Union and Respondent's employees at the present time., 6. 'Radio, television and press Although Respondent has not suggested that the Union 14 There is no evidence as to whether Morton Grove is among the growing number or communities'prohibitingor restricting the use of sound trucks. ' use public media of communication,, a word should be said about such possibility. As the Board said in Solo Cup Company, 172. NLRB No. 110, on, other-, grounds, 422 F.2d 1149 (C.A. 7):; . - - 1- 11 assuming that cost was no object; in view of the number of -,different- newspapers, . radio and television stations operating in Chicago- and the surrounding areas, the ^ Union would, have _a problem -in any event deciding on the appropriate stations or'news'papers, and would not be able to reach- the employees effectively withits message through such media.... E. Discussion and Conclusion As set forth above, Respondent' appears not' yet to have 11 recognized the Union's" right of access to the area at the entrance of the premises,' as established in the prior decision., Apparently still maintaining that the Union's use of that portion of Respondent's property, subject to a public easement is -a matter of grace 'by Respondent, it has restricted distribution to the. area;west rof the traffic lights, eliminating approximately 1^l-1/2 linear feet oithe' access roadway which the Union is,entitled to use.IFor the purpose of this Dcision, however, it will be, assumed that, Respondent' will recognize and,'honor its full -obligation under the prior decision. The question thus is whether, with full access to the portion of Respondents premises subject to a public easement, the Union has available-reasonably adequate channels of effective`, communication with Respondent's employees., without :resorting to solicitation on the-`,parking 'lot which Respondent maintains for its employees. The present case closely resembles Solo Cup Co., supra. There, as here, the plant, was located, in the Chicago metropolitan area, with, "a population exceeding 4,000,000 people" and ,the employees' residences are widely scattered within Chicago and surrounding towns.islHere, as i(,Solo, "[d]espite a stop sign, located" at the'intersection of the plant roadway with : Waukegan Road, "it is yirtually impossible to, stand safely, at this intersection, , and nd successfully pass out 'literature of .ad.'; In addition, in the present case, about one-third of the production workers are beyond the reach of handbilling because,of the transporta- tion provided by Respondents The Examiner concludes that the present case is governed by Solo, Cup. Under, the Board's decision in,that., case, Respondent's ,exclusion of union organizers from the employee parking lot is violative of Section 8(a)(l). This conclusion is unaffected by the,decision of the, Court- of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit denying enforcement of the Board's Order in Solo,Cup. In, Solo, the plant in question was located within a privately owned industrial center. The owner of, the industrial, center had been joined as a respondent in the Board proceeding. and-it wascovered,by the Board's,order. The industrial center then accedes to the Board order, with the result that the union organizers could communicate with the workers outside,the employer's plant on the private property of the' industrial=center. It was on` fly All employees referred to in the course of the hearing were women. 16, See Central Hardware Co.,,- IS NIRS No. 74 (r=). MONOGRAM MODELS, INC. 713 this basis that the Court denied enforcement of the Board's order against Solo, 73 LRRM at 2791.17 Both the General Counsel and Respondent cite Priced Less Discount Foos, '162 NLRB 872. That case, however, is inapposite because it turned on enforcement of a discrim- inatory rule against union r solicitation' while other! solicitation by nonemployee's was permitted. General Dynamics/Telecommunications, 137 NLRE 1725, cited by Respondent, is also clearly distinguishable in that the issue there presented was whether a privately owned road had in effect been, dedicated to public use; the evidence clearly established that the union could and did successfully-communicate with large numbers of employees by, handbilling at five plant gates and in transit buses, by conducting meetings, and by mailing 'literature to the employees'- homes. It 'has, heretofore been found that no similar' channels of comunication are available to the Union in the present case., The complaint alleges that union organizers were denied access to the parking lot "for the purpose of distributing literature and soliciting membership." " Although access to the parking lot for the purpose of distributing literature would probably provide the ancillary opportunity to solicit membership means other than distribution of literature, it is conceivable that Respondent- might seek some means of restricting access in such a manner as to permit distribution of literature'without the opportunity for oral communica- tion. In cross-examining union organizer Cedre, Respon- dent's counsel . suggested 'the possibility of restricting Union`access -to;the roadway. While it might be possible to distribute handbills to the occupants of vehicles at that location, it would be virtually impossible to converse orally because of the natural-impatience of the employees in other vehicles. In his brief, citing Joseph Bancroft and Sons Co., 140 NLRB 1288, the General Counsel contends that the Union must be afforded the opportunity to converse with the employees, the mere ability to distribute literature being an inadequate means of communication. In Joseph Bancroft, a representation case involving employees housed on compa- ny-owned private property, the Board said: The possibility that the [union] might have reached some of the employees living on company grounds by telephone or other means and that- employees might voluntarily-have visited the petitioner's meeting hall is not, in the circumstances of the instant case, a feasible substitute for personal-solicitation. Here an organiza- tional campaign could not be carried on effectively Without the `-`seeking out" of employees and their solicitation to membership by direct contact by experienced organizers. Access to the homes of employees was therefore vital to organizational efforts. The General Counsel argues that "because of the scattered residences of Monogram employees [and] because of the prohibitive cost of seeking them out, the employees are in no better position than employees residing in a company- owned town." Generally speaking, Babcock & Wilcox and its progeny 17 "To apply the holding of Babcock & Wilcox ... is unnecessary here because the District has, consented to allow union organizers to sohcit employees on Dorchester Avenue which is owned by the Distract... . have dealt only with distribution of literature, with no specific discussion of solicitation or- other forms' of communication. Normally, where distribution of literature is possible, other forms of communication are also'feasible. But such would not be the case if a union were restricted to distribution of literature to the occupants of moving vehicles. It has generally been assumed that the distribution of material is a greater burden on 'property" than is mere conversation, an assumption ' reflected in Board law concerning solicitation and 'distribution by employees. In the Examiner's opinion, it would be unreasonable to require an employer to permit nonemployee distribution of literature on his premises-without also permitting lesser means of communication. Although the issue appears not to have been specifically raised in Solo Cup, the order in that case specifically required the respondents to permit honemployee union organizers "to distribute union litera- ture and to otherwise disseminate union information on plant premises." 11 Accordingly, on all the evidence, the Examiner specifical- ly finds that Respondent interfered with its employees' Section 7 rights `by denying union organizers access to Respondent's' premises -for the purpose` of distributing literature and otherwise communicating with the employees and'soliciting membership in the Union. CONCLUSIONS or LAW 1. Mongram Models, Inc.; is an employer within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act, -and is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. Warehouse and Mail Order Employees Union, Local No. 743, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauf- feurs, Warehousemen and' Helpers of America, isa labor organization within them eaning of-Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. By interfering with the union' organizers' right to distribute union literature to Respondent's employees and to solicit said employees to join the' Union, Respondent has interfered with its employees' exercise of rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act and has thus engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor -practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. TIm REMEDY Since the evidence establishes that the Union has no reasonably effective channels of communication with Respondent's employees off Respondent's private premis- es, the Examiner will recommend that Respondent be required to grant union organizers access to the employee parking lot. Ordinarily it would be sufficient to provide for such access in general terms, subject to "reasonable regulations" to be established by Respondent. However, in the present Since there is now a reasonable method of solicitation, the necessity of allowing union organizers to solicit employees on the steps of Solo Cup or on their parking lot no longer exists." 714 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD case there is reason to believe that such provision might lead-to further disputeand an extension of litigation, In the course of--the hearing the seeds of such further dispute were apparent in union organizer Cedre's insistence that access was,needed to the portion of the premises just outside the employee entrance to the building in the face of the suggestions by Respondent's counsel that the Union might, in any. event, be restricted to the roadway passing, the visitors' and office woerkers' parking areas or to the portion of the premises where employees' cars are parked, without being allowed to approach the employee, entrance to the building. It is deemed advisable at this point to make provisions minimizing the-area of future dispute. The present record is adequate to warrant; terms which will eliminate some of the evident; sources of potential disagreement, suggested at, the hearing._ As previously noted, ,about one-third ,of the employees (60 -to ,, 70 out, of around 200 to 219) 'board and leave Company-operated vehicles at the employee entrance to the building. It has previously been found,that there are presently no practicable means of communicating with these employees,. In the Examiner's opinion, when such a substantial proportion - of the employees, of a plant are beyond the reach of off-premise communication, the employer must, under the isle in Babcock & Wilcox, permit access to its premises `sufficient to reach that group of employees. On the evidence in the present case, it is clear that, such contact, cannot I be 'made unless the Union is permitted access to the area. of the employee parking lot adjacent to the employee entranceto the building. RECOMMENDED ORDER Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions ,of law, and upon the entire record in this case, it is, recommended that Respondent Monogram Models, Inc., its officers,,agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from:' (a) Prohibiting or, preventing union , organizers from distributing union literature and solicitating union mem- bership on Respondent's employee parking lot, including the access road thereto from Waukegan Road and the area of Respondent's outdoor premises in the vicinity of the employee ,entrance to the plant building. (b) in, aiy` like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in' the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act 2. Take the following affirmative action, which it is found will effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Grant access rights to union organizers to distribute union literature, solicit union membership, and otherwise communicate with employees in the employee parking lot and associate outside areas.of Respondent's premises south of the plant building, such area specifically to include the vicinity of the employee entrance to the factory building. (b) Post at its plant in Morton Grove, Illinois, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 19 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by, the Regional Director for Region 13, shall, after being duly signed by Respondent's authorized representative, be posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for -60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous aplaces, including all places when notices' to, employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps, shall-be -taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (c) Notify said Regional Director, in writing , within _ 20 days from the receipt of this,Decision, what steps,have been taken to comply herewith.20 is On ' cross-examination by Respondent's counsel, organizer Cedre testified: "A.,I want to come into the door where the'employees are. Q. You want to come to the door? A. Right.... A. I ' want to talk to them over here, down here (indicating). Q. It would do you-A. Do you want me to explain? This is a two-way street. You just can't stand no place to band out leaflets. TRIAL EXAMINER: He is at that point, let the record show, referring to the roadway within the premises =that -leads l to the- parking spaces.... Q. By Respondent's counsel ] Would there be any problem in your talking to people at their parked cars? ... TRIAL EXAMINER: are you suggesting, Mr. Goodman, he is at liberty to talk'to themMR. GOODMAN: No, justattempting to make some coherence of the suggestion, of what he is saying. He is saying you can only talk to employees at the, employee -entrance.... Q (By Mr. Goodman) There is no reason why you couldn't talk to somebody at the employee's car? MR. SCHNEIDER: I object. TRIAL EXAMINER: Objection sustained." The Examiner rejected. the last question because Respondent was not offering access to the parking area. However,,the question suggests that Respondent might well attempt so to restrict access to the premises. m In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Section 102.46 of the Rules ' and Regulations of the Board,, the findings, -conclusions, recommendations and Recommended Order herein, shall, as provided in Section 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted bythe Board and become its findings, conclusions, and order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes. In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading 'Tosted by Order, of, the National Labor Relations Board' shall be changed to read 'Tosted Fursuant,to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board.." ' 20 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the, Board, this provision shall-be modified to read:, "Notify the Regional Director for Region 13, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order,, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith." APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government After a, trial in which both sides had the chance to give evidence, the National Labor Relations Board found that we, Mongram. Models, Inc., violated the National Labor Relations Act and ordered us to post this notice telling our employees what we have been ordered to do and not to do in the future. The Board has ordered us to tell you that: WE wiu. permit union organizers to distribute literature, converse with our employees and solicit our employees to join a union on the employee parking lot and associated areas, including the vicinity, of the employee entrance to the plant building, The Board has ordered us to tell you that: WE WILL NOT interfere with the right of union organizers to distribute union literature, converse with our employees, and solicit our employees to join, on. the employee parking lot and associated areas, including the vicinity of the employee entrance to the plant building. In any like or related manner interfere with, restrain; MONOGRAM MODELS, INC. 715 or coerce our employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act. - All our employees are free to become or remain, or refrain from becoming or remaining, members of Ware- house and Mail Order Employees Union, Local No. 743, International ' Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and -Helpers of America, or of any other labor organization. MONOGRAM MODELS, INC. (Employer) Dated By (Representative) (Title) This is an official notice and must not be defaced by anyone. This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. Any questions concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions, may be directed to the Board's Office, 881 U.S. Courthouse and Federal Office Building, 219 South Dearborn Street, Chicago, Illinois 60604 Telephone 312-353-7572.