Local 933, UAW

LOCAL 933, UAW 223 Local 933, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricul- tural Implement Workers of America (UAW) and Marilyn S. Mosier and Ruby Krom Local 1, Office and Professional Employees Interna- tional Union, AFL-CIO, and Marilyn S. Mosier and Ruby Krom. Cases 25-CA-3594, 25-CA-3594-2, 25-CA-3822, 25-CB-941, and 25-CB-1005 September 20, 1971 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS FANNING AND JENKINS ed Order of the Trial Examiner and hereby orders that the Respondents, Local 933, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW), its officers , agents, successors, and assigns, and Local 1, Office and Professional Employ- ees International Union, AFL-CIO, its officers, agents, and representatives, shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner 's recommended Order. i The General Counsel has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the Trial Examiner It is the Board's established policy not to overrule a Trial Examiner's resolutions with respect to credibility unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence convinces us that the resolutions were incorrect Standard Dry Wall Products, Inc, 91 NLRB 544, enfd 188 F 2d 362 (C.A 3). We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION On March 30, 1971, Trial Examiner James M. Fitzpatrick issued his Decision in the above -entitled proceeding , finding that the Respondents had en- gaged in and were engaging in certain unfair labor practices and recommending that they cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner 's Decision. The Trial Examiner further found that the Respon- dents had not engaged in certain other unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint and recommended that the complaint be dismissed with respect to those allegations . Thereafter, the General Counsel filed limited exceptions and a supporting brief ; Respon- dent Local 1, Office and Professional Employees International Union, AFL-CIO, filed cross-excep- tions and a brief in support thereof and in opposition to the General Counsel's exceptions ; and Respondent Local 933, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW), filed a brief in opposition to the General Counsel's brief in support of exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this proceeding to a three- member panel. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed . The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision , the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in this proceeding, and hereby adopts the findings , conclusions, and recommenda- tions of the Trial Examiner.' ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend- STATEMENT OF THE CASE JAMES M. FITZPATRICK, Trial Examiner: These consoli- dated proceedings under Section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended (the Act), apse from charges filed by Marilyn S. Mosier and Ruby Krom, both individuals, against Local 933, United Automobile, Aeros- pace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW), and Local 1, Office and Professional Employees International Union, AFL-CIO, herein called Local 933 and Local 1, respectively, and collectively called Respon- dents. Based on charges filed by Mosier on December 10, 1969, the Regional Director for Region 25 on January 30, 1970, issued the initial complaint (25-CA-3594) alleging violations of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act by Local 933. Based on further charges filed by Mosier on April 3, 1970 a further complaint (25-CB-941) issued April 6 alleging violations of Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) by Local 1. Pursuant to charges filed by Krom on April 27 (amended on May 8) a further complaint (25-CA-3594-2) issued on May 8 alleging violations of Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (4) by Local 933. Respondents filed answers denying the commis- sion of unfair labor practices. A hearing was held at Indianapolis, Indiana, on May 27 and 28 and June 1, 1970. Before decision in those matters Mosier filed further charges on June 11 and 29 (amended July 20 and 22) pursuant to which a further complaint (25-CA-3822 and 25-CB-1005) issued July 30 alleging further violations of Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (4) by Local 933 and of Section 8(b)(1)(A) by Local 1. Respondents also filed answers denying the unfair labor practices alleged in this complaint. It was consolidated with the prior cases and a further hearing was held thereon at Indianapolis, Indiana, on October 13, 14, 26, and 27, 1970. Upon the entire record, my observation of the witnesses, and consideration of the briefs filed by the General Counsel and Respondents, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT I. THE OPERATIONS OF RESPONDENT EMPLOYER Local 933, the employer involved herein, is a local labor organization chartered by and affiliated with the United 193 NLRB No. 34 224 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Work- ers of America, an international labor organization, herein called UAW. Pursuant to the constitution and bylaws of UAW, Local 933 exercises the powers and privileges of a local union affiliated with it involving matters of general interest and welfare for members of Local 933 and as an affiliate of UAW is an integral part of a multistate labor organization comprising UAW and its numerous affiliated locals. Local 933 maintains its office and place of business in Indianapolis, Indiana. As a local union it represents for purposes of collective bargaining approximately 9,000 employees of Allison Division of General Motors Corpora- tion, an employer engaged in interstate commerce, with which it has a collective-bargaining agreement. During the past year it has remitted per capita taxes for its members directly to UAW in Detroit, Michigan, in an amount in excess of $100,000. During the same period UAW has received at Detroit, Michigan from Local 933 and other affiliated local unions per capita taxes in excess of $1,000,000 which have been remitted to it across state lines. Local 933's affairs are handled by its elected officers including, inter alros, the president, financial secretary and treasurer (which are full-time positions), first and second vice presidents, and recording secretary (which are part- time positions), and by a chairman of the bargaining committee (who is part-time and not elected).' To assist in the operation of the office, Local 933 has employed a staff of five secretaries and twojanitors.2 11. THE RESPONDENT UNION Local I, the Union involved herein, is a labor organiza- tion which admits to membership employees of Local 933, among others. It currently has about 125 members. It is the exclusive representative for the purpose of collective bargaining of the employees at the Indianapolis office of Local 933.3 They were initially represented by Local Industrial Union No. 1805, chartered in 1952. In or about 1959 Local 1805 merged with Respondent Local I which as the surviving labor organization has since represented the employees. Since at least 1958 Local 933 has had successive collective-bargaining agreements with either Local 1 or its predecessor Local 1805. Virtually all Local I representation of Local 933 employees for the past 3 years has been handled by Frances Bick, financial secretary of Local I As financial secretary she is paid $40 per month. She had been the president of the predecessor Local 1805, and for all but 4 years since 1952 has been chairman of the bargaining committee of either Local 1805 or its successor Local 1. According to her she has handled all representative functions for employees of Local 933 including all employee grievances and all contract negotiations. I At the time of the hearings herein the incumbent in these positions were president , James Patterson, first vice president, Arthur Sam Murray, second vice president, Eugene Crawley, financial secretary and treasurer, A C. Coleman, recording secretary Catherine Milliken, and chairman of bargaining committee , Earl Coleman 2 At the time of the initial charges herein these employees were Phyllis Becker, secretary to the president, Emma Lou Calvert, secretary to It is not clear whether anyone ever acted as a union steward at the Local 933 office. Bick claims there never was a union steward and that she performed these functions, this despite provisions in Local is constitution and bylaws allowing for stewards. Some years ago Hazel Redenbacher, senior employee in the Local 933 office, was designated "group leader" in which capacity she exercised at least some of the functions normally associated with union stewards. Thus she acted as a conduit between the employees and Bick, calling Bick when she was needed, channeling grievances to her, transmitting meeting notices from Bick to the employees, and, in preparation for contract negotiations, collecting and transmitting to Bick new proposals desired by the employees as a group. Redenbacher testified she has been less active in recent years. Although she was not referred to as steward, at least one Local 933 employee, Emma Lou Calvert, thought of her as the incumbent steward. Since 1952 Bick's full-time employment has been as a secretary in the Indianapolis office of UAW Local 23, a sister local of Respondent Local 933. In this job she is secretary to the chairman of their shop committee, performing required secretarial work for all grievances at every step of the Local 23 grievance process. III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The Issues Posed by the Pleadings Presented here are questions whether Local 933 as an employer committed independent violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act about November 25, 1969, by the conduct of its president in, inter aha, forcibly taking from employee Mosier a petition relating to the internal affairs of Local 1, causing copies to be made thereof for the use of Local 933, coercing other employees to remove their names therefrom, and instructing employees they could not circulate the petition; on January 15, 1970, threatening Local 933 employees with discharge and other reprisals for engaging in union activities or for giving testimony under the Act; and on June 10, 1970, through its second vice president also threatening employees with discharge and other reprisals for engaging in union activities or for filing charges or giving testimony under the Act. Section 8(a)(3) issues posed are whether Local 933 temporarily suspended Mosier on November 25, 1969, because she circulated the above-described petition and engaged in union activity. Section 8(a)(3) and (4) issues posed are whether Local 933, because Mosier and Krom engaged in union activity and filed charges and gave testimony under the Act, discharged or laid them off on January 15, 1970, recalled but refused to reinstate Krom the following day but did not recall or reinstate Mosier, on April 24, 1970, again laid off Krom and thereafter failed to recall her, on June 10, 1970, again discharged Mosier and thereafter failed to recall, reemploy, or reinstate her, and chairman of the bargaining committee , Hazel Redenbacher, Marilyn Mosier and Ruby Krom , secretaries in the office of the financial secretary and treasurer, and John Golioday and William Lovins, both Janitors J The bargaining unit which is admittedly appropriate for the purposes of Section 9(b) of the Act consists of all clerical employees and janitors employed at Local 933's Indianapolis office, exclusive of all professional employees, guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act LOCAL 933, UAW 225 also on June 10 refused to recall, reemploy, or reinstate Krom until July 27 when it recalled but did not reinstate her. This issues with respect to Local I are whether it violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) by arbitrarily refusing to process a grievance of Mosier on December 8, 1969, and of Mosier and Krom on June 12, 1970, and attempting in its bargaining with Local 933 on January 29, February 2, 3, and 4, and March 2, 1970, to change job classifications, which would result in lower pay for Mosier and Krom, and reduce leave of absence and paid absence allowances for employees with less than 5 years seniority (which would include both Mosier and Krom), all because Mosier sought to become a union steward in Local 1 , opposed the policies of Local I and its incumbent official Bick, filed charges and gave testimony under the Act, and because Krom assisted her. B. Background As indicated above, Local 933 is a large local. Its history has been marked by bitter intraorganizational feuding for control of its elective offices. This case is immersed in that political feuding. When Charging Party Mosier was hired on January 19, 1967, there were already three secretaries in the Local 933 office, Phyllis Becker, Emma Lou Calvert, and Hazel Redenbacher, who had been employed there for many years. Mosier was hired by John V. Loudermilk, then president of Local 933 and her brother-in -law. She understood she was hired as a secretary. She performed some secretarial work . But she replaced a retiring employee who had been classified as a record clerk . The then extant collective-bargaining agreement between Local 933 and Local I representing the employees provided for two classifications of clerical employees , record clerk and secretary, the secretary classification receiving a slightly higher wage rate. The agreement also provided for progressive wage increases based on tenure . However, Mosier was hired at the same wage rate as the other secretaries who were doing secretarial work and who had through the years progressed by seniority through the wage structure to the highest rate . The older employees, particularly Calvert and Becker, resented the fact that Mosier was newly employed at the top rate Calvert voiced this resentment to the then Local 933 president Loudermilk and to Bick, but no changes were made. Charging Party Krom was hired as a secretary on August 9, 1967, also by Loudermilk and at the top rate She performed the same work as Mosier. They were assigned to the office of the financial secretary and treasurer, a position held then and now by A. C. Coleman. The senior clerical in that office was Hazel Redenbacher. A few days after she was hired Krom asked Redenbacher if the office help had a union steward . Redenbacher answered no, that she had been several years earlier but had given it up. Thereafter Krom talked to her several times about having a steward but Redenbacher replied they did not need one, that Bick would take care of them. In February 1968 Local I and Local 933 negotiated a new 2-year contract covering the office employees. In the negotiations Loudermilk as the incumbent president of Local 933 insisted upon a single classification of secretary for clericals . The parties agreed and the new collective- bargaining agreement which went into effect February 27, 1968, contained a classification of secretary but no classification of record clerk. On May 18, 1969, following a bitter campaign and an election on May 1 and 7, a new administration took control of most of the principal offices of Local 933. Loudermilk was voted out as president and James Patterson was voted in as the new president along with a slate of several other new officers. An exception to the new look was A. C. Coleman who was reelected financial secretary and treasurer. As might be expected following the defeat of the man who had hired them, Mosier and Krom were apprehensive about the security of theirjobs. This was particularly true of Mosier because of her relationship to Loudermilk and her apprehension was heightened by Patterson's conduct. At a get acquainted meeting with the other officers and the employees a few days after taking office , Patterson, according to his own testimony, looked directly at Mosier and stated, "I would like to try to get along over here, run the Union, that I was president now, and not John Loudermilk, he had Just been defeated and that's the way it was going to be over here, because I felt like I had to make that statement with his sister-in-law in the Union hall." He also admitted that a few days later he questioned her old pay vouchers, asking her if she had not used up all her sick leave. He directed Redenbacher to pull out all Mosier's pay vouchers for a year back. He then took these to his own office for detailed examinations but took no action against her based on them. A few months later, in early autumn 1969, Patterson again called the employee into his office together with Earl Coleman (chairman of the Local 933 bargaining commit- tee) and A. C. Coleman (financial secretary and treasurer of Local 933) and announced that in the interest of efficiency the employees, with the exception of Redenbacher, were being reassigned to differentjobs . Although historically the employees were not moved around, Becker, who up to then had been the president's secretary, and Calvert, who had been secretary to Earl Coleman and who testified that in her 18 years at Local 933 she had never before been reassigned, were thenceforth to work with A. C. Coleman. Krom was to be Patterson's secretary and Mosier Earl Coleman's. Krom expressed doubt that she could perform the required duties of the new assignment . According to Patterson's testimony Earl Coleman advised Mosier that he would expect her to learn the duties in his office "in a reasonable length of time," that he would have Calvert give her a list "of what she was supposed to do , and if she wasn't able to perform the job in that length of time that she would be sent back to my (Patterson's) office for reassignment on whatever I wanted to do with her ." From this I find that Mosier reasonably inferred that she risked being fired if she failed. A. C. Coleman objected that the transfers would be disruptive of operations in the financial office . As a result Patterson reconsidered and left the employees in their old jobs. Because of Patterson's attitude Mosier called Bick on several occasions during the autumn to complain that he 226 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD was calling meetings in which he would harass her. Bick took no action . Instead she advised that she could do nothing about his calling meetings, and that when Mosier felt she was being threatened with disciplinary action she should ask Patterson if she was being reprimanded, and if he replied that she was then Bick had a right to be present and Mosier should at that time ask for her representation. Mosier also suggested to Bick that a union steward was needed at the Local 933 office. Bick disagreed, saying a steward was not needed, and that she (Bick) could handle the problems. C. The Petition for Steward Shortly after Patterson's abortive move to reassign the office help, Mosier, Krom, and the two janitors Golloday and Lovins talked the situation over during working hours and concluded they needed a union steward on the spot. Uncertain as to how to proceed, Mosier called Local I recording secretary Jane Peggs and received from her instructions on what to do. On November 24 shortly after 4 p.m. Mosier prepared and circulated a typewritten petition selecting herself as steward . She, Krom, and the two janitors then signed it. Becker, Patterson's secretary, declined to sign saying it was illegal . She then told Patterson that Mosier had been chosen steward. He proceeded to question the two Janitors who were about to leave for the day, asking them if they had signed the petition . They admitted they had. Patterson wanted to know when, and, after learning that they had signed between 3:30 and 4 p.m., he commented, "That's when I am paying the bill. Is this legal or illegal, boys?" The following morning, November 25, Mosier made a xerox copy of her steward petition, including the signatures thereon, and asked Calvert, secretary of Local 933's bargaining chairman Earl Coleman, to sign. Calvert refused . She and Mosier got into an argument regarding the propriety of the petition, Calvert contending that Reden- bacher was steward and the petition was illegal . It was a noisy argument and Patterson came down the hall to inquire what was going on. Calvert offered the explanation that Mosier had just appointed herself steward, that they were arguing because Calvert said it was illegal . Mosier was holding the copy of the petition in her hand. Patterson asked to see it. She declined , claiming it was a union affair and not his business , but he insisted , saying, "As president and your boss, I have a right to see it," and grabbed it out her hand . In the process it tore . He then told Mosier to return to her office and go to work. Taking the torn petition, he proceeded toward his office, announcing on the way to Calvert, Golloday, and Lovins that there was going to be meeting in his office They followed him. He told A. C. Coleman to have Mosier and Krom come in also, showing him the petition and saying, "I want you to look what this bitch has done now." He then made copies of the petition on the xerox machine and went on to his office. The evidence indicates that A C. Coleman delayed about 30 minutes in giving Mosier and Krom word about a meeting in Patterson 's office. He also told them Bick was being called in and they should ask her to hold the meeting in his office. In any case Mosier and Krom did not appear at Patterson's meeting in his office . Only the two janitors, Becker, Calvert and Patterson were present , Redenbacher being on vacation. Patterson, putting a copy of the petition on his desk, proceeded to question Becker and Calvert as to whether or not they had been informed there was to be an election on November 24 for union steward. They both replied no. He then criticized the two janitors for signing the petition during working hours, asking them if they knew the document they signed was illegal, that he had just talked with their union representative and no clause in the contract provided for the election of, or the office of, steward. Replying they did not know it was illegal, they immediately scratched lines through their names on the torn copy of the petition. He then directed them to return to work. Patterson also directed Becker to call Bick . According to Bick, whom I credit in this regard, Becker told her on the telephone, "that they had a problem out there, Marilyn Mosier had been selected as steward, and Mr. Patterson had said for me (Bick) to come out there as soon as possible." Becker also wanted to know how Mosier had been able to get herself appointed steward without Becker knowing that such an office was open or that there was going to be a selection process . Patterson, according to his statement, also talked to Bick that morning, apparently twice within a short period of time, asking her to come out because he had a problem with one of the secretaries passing out an illegal document without permission during working hours making herself union steward . She advised him she had given no one authority to select a steward. At some time during the morning Becker at the request of Bick and with the permission of Patterson made further xerox copies of the petition on his desk. Neither these nor those made earlier by Patterson were offered in evidence. A short time after she was called Bick arrived, meeting first with Patterson in front of his office. She asked for and obtained the use of his private office for a union meeting of employees . Bick then began the meeting with Calvert, Becker, and the two janitors, Mosier and Krom not being present. After a short while Bick went to the financial secretary's office to get them, announcing that the meeting was in Patterson's office . Mosier then gave her A. C. Coleman's message to the effect that he wished the meeting to be held in his office. But Bick rejected the idea, telling them to either come to Patterson's office or forget it. They reported this development to A. C. Coleman, their supervisor, who told them to go to the meeting in Patterson's office, which they then did. In advance of their arrival Bick had been handed the copy of the petition with lines drawn through the names of Golloday and Lovins. A discussion followed regarding how Mosier had had herself selected steward, Becker and Calvert asserting they had no prior notice of the matter. Bick characterized the petition as illegal, whereupon Golloday and Lovins declared they had not known what they were signing and wanted their names removed. Bick then wrote on the document , "Please remove our names as we were misinformed." Golloday and Lovins then signed their names again under this statement. When Mosier and Krom arrived, Bick told Krom the two janitors had already removed their names from the petition and asked if she did not wish to remove her name also since it was illegal. Being LOCAL 933, UAW thus led to believe the petition was illegal, Krom drew a line through her signature and signed along with the janitors' names under Bick's writing to remove their names. At the hearing Bick asserted her basis for declaring the petition illegal was the belief (in fact erroneous) that a secret ballot was required. Neither the Local I constitution and bylaws nor the collective-bargaining agreement then in effect so provided nor was there any past practice to support Bick's position. In the 18 years Calvert had been on the job there had never been an election for steward. When Bick felt she had gotten things settled down, she invited Patterson and A. C. Coleman into the meeting. She reported to them that Golloday, Lovins, and Krom had withdrawn their signatures from the petition. A discussion followed in which Bick described Mosier's petition as illegal , adding that Local I would not recognize Mosier being chosen as steward, that there was no basis in the collective-bargaining agreement for a steward, and that under the agreement Patterson had the right to reassign secretaries. Patterson lectured Mosier for circulating an illegal petition in the office. Mosier, believing that Patterson had returned the torn copy of the petition to her shortly after he had taken it from her and that she had placed it in her handbag, raised a question as to how it got out of her handbag. Patterson claimed he had never returned it. They argued. He accused her of calling him a liar and a thief. At the hearing she denied doing so. Whether or not she did so specifically is not material because even if she did not, the whole context of the argument put his honesty in question. He responded by suspending her without pay for the balance of the day, 3- 1/2 hours. That ended the meeting. D. The December Grievances As the meeting in Patterson's office on November 25 broke up Bick commented to the assembled employees that she wanted them to know that Mosier had called Patterson a liar. As Mosier left Bick asked her if she wanted to file a grievance, but Mosier replied that she did not want Bick to represent her. Nevertheless, when at the end of that workweek Mosier found that her pay was in fact docked for 3-1/2 hours, she changed her mind about filing a grievance. On December 1 she prepared and later handed to Bick a written grievance against Local 933 claiming violation of the collective-bargaining agreement for being shorted 3-1/2 hours pay and demanding that she be paid therefore. On December 4 she filed another grievance claiming she had been verbally abused, harassed, threatened, cursed, and mistreated because she had on November 24 consulted with, and been chosen by, her fellow union members as their representative. On December 4 Krom also filed a grievance. This arose out of the following circumstances. Earlier on December 4 Patterson had called a number of employees separately into his office and asked each to sign a statement prepared by him favoring his version of the argument he had had with Mosier at the union meeting on November 25. I infer from the sequence of events that the filing of Mosier's December 1 grievance caused him to take this action in defense of his position. The prepared statements read as follows: I was present at the meeting held in the President's 227 office for the office and maintenance employees of Local #933, UAW on Tuesday, November 25, 1969. I heard the accusation made by Marilyn Mosier, office employee of Local #933, UAW to Mr. James Patterson, President of Local #933, UAW accusing him of taking a paper from her purse. I heard Mr. Patterson deny this action, and I also heard Marilyn Mosier make the statement that Mr. Patterson was a liar. Becker, Calvert, Golloday, and Lovins were each asked to, and did, sign such a statement. Krom was also called in and asked to sign. She declined, saying it was not true. According to her Patterson then said, "If you don't sign you're in serious trouble. You're just the same as fired." Patterson denied that he made such a statement. Consider- ing Patterson's strong feelings and participation in the events of November 25, I credit Krom. In her grievance she claimed Patterson had threatened her and tried to force her to sign an untrue and fraudulent statement. She asked that he be instructed to stop making threats and harassing her. She and Mosier together delivered their December 4 grievance to Bick's office in her absence. Both had Loudermilk's help in preparing them. The collective-bargaining agreement then in effect provided in pertinent part that, "All grievances shall be subject to the following procedure; First: An employee having a grievance shall present it in writing to his President or designated representative; who shall attempt to settle it with the employees immediate selected Supervisor." The immediate supervisor of Mosier and Krom was A. C. Coleman. Bick did not follow this contract procedure. Instead she jumped to the second step under which grievances not satisfactorily settled at the first step were to be presented by the union representative to "an official selected by Local 933." Bick arranged with Patterson to take up the three gnevances on December 8 with Earl Coleman acting for Local 933 and with Patterson being present. In advance thereof she consulted neither Mosier or Krom about the grievances. The December 8 grievance hearing was held in Patter- son's office. Bick, with another Local 1 member to assist her, presented all three grievances. Neither Mosier nor Krom was called in until after the grievances were disposed of. With respect to Mosier's December 1 grievance based upon her 3-1/2 hour disciplinary suspension, Bick asked that she be paid for the time docked. In answer Earl Coleman rejected the grievance, presenting the four statements of Becker, Calvert, Golloday, and Lovins (which Krom refused to sign) corroborating Patterson's version that Mosier had called him a liar, and in connection with his defense said, "We reserve the right to discipline." In addition he produced Mosier's pay voucher for the week which he claimed showed that she in fact had only lost 1/2 hour's time. Bick in effect agreed with him that only 1/2 hour's pay was involved. Further, based not so much on the statements of the four other employees that Mosier had called Patterson a liar, but rather on her own view that the grievance lacked merit since she herself had been there and observed what had transpired, she withdrew Mosier's December 1 grievance noting thereon "W.D.W.O.P." 228 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD (withdrawn without prejudice). There was no further processing of it. Krom's December 4 grievance faired better . On behalf of Local 933 Earl Coleman wrote on that grievance, "I Earl N. Coleman as Rep. for Local 933 will agree that there will be no threats and harassment of the members of Local 1. Local 933 will continue to maintain discipline and efficiency of employees at all times in accordance with existing terms of existing agreement ." Bick deemed this disposition satisfactory and so noted on the grievance. Earl Coleman offered to make the same disposition of Mosier's December 4 grievance which alleged harassment in connection with her steward 's petition, although he denied there had been harassment . Bick testified she believed the grievance lacked merit and, moreover, was illegal, and not wishing to be in the position of backing Mosier in her grievance , she rejected Earl Coleman's offer to settle it, instead noting thereon "grievance untimely," and withdrew the grievance . There was no further processing of it. Mosier and Krom were then each separately called in and advised of the disposition of their grievances . Thereafter a meeting of all employees was called and the fate of the grievances explained to the entire group E. The January Separations On December 5 Catherine Milliken, Local 933's record- ing secretary, filed with the Board's Regional Office Section 8(a)(1) and (3) charges against the Allison Division of General Motors Corporation and 8(b)(1)(A) and (3) charges against Local 933 and Patterson . The gravamen of these charges was that they, acting together, had discrimi- nated against her as an employee of Allison in connection with her taking time off for union business . Ultimately the charges against Allison were withdrawn and those against Local 933 and Patterson were dismissed for insufficient evidence . Prior thereto, however , the charges were investi- gated by the Region. In response to requests made to her by two Local 933 committeemen , Al Goodman and William Hirshberger, in connection with Milliken 's dispute with Allison and Local 933 which were the subject of charges then pending with the Region, Mosier while at work in Local 933's office on January 13, 1970 typed up a statement to the effect that on December 31 Patterson had made a statement bearing on the merits of that dispute . Mosier and Krom then both signed the statement and gave it to the committeemen. The following day, January 14, a Board agent investigat- ing the Milliken charges came to the Local 933 office and took separate sworn statements from Mosier and Krom about the December 31 incident . There is no direct evidence that Patterson knew these statements were being taken, but, on the other hand, no secret was made of the fact that they were being taken. Also on January 14, the record being unclear as to what time of day or whether the time was coincidental with the taking of the Board 's statements in the Local 933 office, Patterson attended a grievance hearing (unrelated to the present matter) at the Allison plant in the course of which an Allison management official showed him a copy of the January 13 statement signed by Mosier and Krom . Seeing the statement upset him. Upon returning to Local 933's office that day Patterson did nothing further. The following morning, however, he called the Local 933 employees, including Krom but not Mosier who was on sick leave , to his office, and in the presence of the group confronted Krom with a copy of the January 13 statement, demanding to know if she had signed it. When she admitted that she had, he told her both she and Mosier were laid off, and that she could so advise the absent Mosier, adding additional comments, according to the testimony of Krom whom I credit, indicating the separations would be permanent. I find that on that occasion he fired both Krom and Mosier . Patterson admits that he reprimanded Krom for involving herself in local politics and threatened all the employees with discharge if any like statement should be made by any of them in the future . He denied he knew at that time that either Mosier or Krom had also given a statement to a Board agent . There is no question but that he had knowledge the Milliken charges were pending with the Board and that the subject matter of the January 13 statement was relevant to issues posed by the charges. In contradiction to Patterson's testimony regarding the state of his knowledge on January 15, the General Counsel recalled Mosier as a rebuttal witness. She testified that on January 13 Patterson confronted her in her office with a copy of the January 13 statement, asking her if she had signed it, and according to her she admitted she had, adding that it was related to the pending Board charges. Patterson did not thereafter specifically deny this testimony of Mosier. Nevertheless , in the circumstances, I do not credit Mosier's version regarding the state of Patterson's knowledge on January 15 because her testimony strikes me as being an afterthought, there being no explanation as to why it did not form part of her testimony during the General Counsel' s case-in-chief. Although the fact that Patterson was embarassed by having an Allison management official show him a copy of the January 13 statement logically explains his anger and the action he took against Mosier and Krom on January 15, I cannot believe he did not also know about the statements given the Board agent on January 14. They were given to the Board agent in the Local 933 conference room during office hours . They dealt with a subject of interest to many Local 933 officials and employees . The suite of offices was relatively small. The staff of officials and employees of Local 933 was small. Patterson himself was present in the office sometime on January 14 as well as on January 15. When he confronted Krom on January 15 he had two pieces of paper, one being the January 13 statement, the other unidentified . In these circumstances I infer, and find, that when he discharged Krom and Mosier on January 15 he knew they had given statements to the Board agent. After separating Krom and Mosier on January 15, Patterson reconsidered in part at least because the collective-bargaining agreement provided for a 2-week notice He immediately sent Krom a telegram , the contents of which were telephoned to her that afternoon, instructing her to report for duty the following morning. Mosier returned to work when she recovered from her illness. LOCAL 933, UAW Neither she nor Krom sustained any loss in wages as a result of Patterson 's January 15 action. After her separation on January 15 Krom on her way home went to Mosier's home and advised her about developments , including that they both had been separated. They then telephoned Bick for the purpose of instigating a grievance . Bick, however, discouraged them on the ground that if they were only laid off a grievance was not in order. Krom and Mosier considered that Bick had refused to handle the grievance . Nevertheless, Krom prepared a grievance in writing with Loudermilk 's assistance and mailed it to Bick. She claimed her dismissal was a violation of the collective-bargaining agreement as well as a violation of the settlement of her prior grievance . She requested reinstatement and to be made whole . She then proceeded to her own home where she learned of the telephone message recalling her to work the following day After receiving the grievance Bick called Paterson regarding it, learning from him that Krom was by then back to work . Both Bick and Patterson considered that this disposed of the matter and Bick did nothing further with it. Although recalled to work Krom never affirmatively withdrew the January 15 grievance Instead she called Bick to inquire what had been done about it and in effect was told by Bick that because she was back to work nothing further was in order . She asked Bick for a copy of what had been done regarding the grievance, that is, how it was settled, but she never received anything . In her own view Krom did not consider the matter satisfactorily settled. She felt that in the light of the earlier grievance which had been settled on the basis that Local 933 would not harass her, the January 15 separation was a breach of that settlement and she wanted assurance there would not be further threats and harassment . According to Bick she never withdrew this grievance of January 15. F Local I Bargaining Preparations When Mosier and Krom were first hired they understood they were employed as secretaries . Not until January of 1970 did they learn of any question regarding their classification . On or about January 20 in anticipation of the approaching end of the contract term for the Local 1 collective-bargaining agreement in effect and in accordance with her past practice in preparing for contract negotia- tions, Redenbacher solicited contract proposals from the various employees. She asked Krom and Mosier to get together what they thought should be proposed. She made the same request of Calvert and Becker . Krom and Mosier prepared a set of typed proposals which they handed to Redenbacher . She then showed these to Calvert and Becker and returned with a rough draft of different proposals from them . Her aim was to work out a common set of proposals agreeable to all employees . In discussing the Calvert-Becker proposals , Mosier and Krom indicated disagreement with certain items. These included recreation of the classifica- tion or record clerk which would include Mosier and Krom and would result in their receiving, beginning with the second year of a new contract, $5 per week less than secretaries ; a requirement of 5 years seniority before eligibility for a Christmas bonus, which would have 229 excluded Mosier and Krom; and a similar provision for a 7 days' absence allowance. Redenbacher returned to Calvert and Becker with the objections of Mosier and Krom, and, after discussing matters with them, obtained their consent to drop the objectionable proposals. She reported this development to Mosier and Krom. On the following weekend, however, she received a message from Mosier that she (Mosier) and Krom had decided to submit their own proposals. Redenbacher thereafter told Becker and Calvert to write up a set of their own proposals . I base the above findings upon the credited testimony of Redenbacher partially corrobo- rated by Calvert and Becker. Calvert and Becker then prepared a set of their own proposals and mailed them to Bick. Mosier and Krom did likewise, taking them to Bick 's office and handing them to her. Bick rejected them by dropping them into her wastebasket. Later she reconsidered, retrieved them from the wastebasket, and took them to a meeting of the employees on January 29 at which contract proposals were discussed. At this meeting Bick read aloud to the group the proposals submitted by both factions . In the past in preparing for contract negotiations she had always received a set of proposals unanimously supported by all employees, her practice being to leave to Redenbacher the chore of ironing out in advance any difference of view. Lack of unanimity was for her, therefore, a new development. At the January 29 meeting no one informed her that there had been at one point agreement at least informally. After reading out the proposals and conducting discussion with respect to them, and indicating that in the absence of unanimity she would have to act upon proposals supported by a majority, Bick put them up for a vote. A majority voted in favor of the Becker-Calvert set of proposals. Bick accepted those, rejecting the others, and in subsequent bargaining sessions they were the ones which she presented to management. G. April Separation of Krom On January 30, 1970, the initial complaint in this matter issued against Respondent Local 933, hearing at first being scheduled for March 18 and later reset for April 8. On March 2 the Charging Parties and the two janitors filed with the Board a petition seeking decertification of Local 1 as their representative . On April 6 the second complaint directed against Local 1 issued. It was consolidated with the first, being again reset for April 28. On April 10 Krom was given 2 weeks' notice that she was laid off effective April 24. Patterson called her into his office and in the presence of her supervisor A. C. Coleman and second vice president Crawley gave her 2 weeks' notice of layoff due to lack of work, a cutting down of expenses because Local 933 was $12,000 in the red (a fact which A. C. Coleman confirmed), and because there had been a continuing and substantial layoff of 933 members at Allison. She had the least seniority of any employee in the unit. In reply to her question whether she could draw unemployment compensation , Patterson told her that she could. Following her layoff Krom on April 28 filed a grievance with Bick claiming her layoff was a violation of the 230 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD settlement of her December grievance and was unfair, unjust, and illegal. Sometime after receiving this grievance Bick talked to Patterson about it. He showed her a copy of Krom's unemployment insurance application in which she had indicated that the reason for unemployment was "no work." As a result of talking with Patterson Bick apparently was convinced that Krom's grievance lacked merit and that Patterson had valid economic reasons for laying her off. At any rate she took the position with Krom that nothing could be done about her layoff status, and she did nothing further with this grievance. H. The June Separation of Mosier On May I I Patterson began a leave of absence from his duties as president of Local 933 in order to work at the UAW International's Regional Office. He remained on leave until July 21. During his absence the functions of president were carried on by first vice president Arthur Sam Murray as acting president. On May 27, 28, and June 1 the initial hearings were conducted in the present matter at which both Mosier and Krom testified. On June 9 Murray as acting president presided over a regular meeting of the Local 933 Executive Board attended by, among others, second vice president Eugene Crawley and executive board member James Persinger who with Murray were members of the same political faction as Patterson. The regular order of business was set aside to allow Local 933 attorney Lynnville Miles to speak about the status of the decertification petition against Local I and the NLRB charges of Mosier and Krom. As to Krom's case, he characterized it as cold, commenting that few such cases succeeded. During discussion Persinger, according to the minutes of the meeting, asked what they were going to do about Marilyn Mosier who had filed NLRB charges. Murray replied, according to his testimony, "I am not going to do anything. You can do your own thing." Following the meeting Murray advised Crawley he would be away from the Local 933 office the next day and that Crawley should stand in for him as acting president. Crawley agreed. Murray also advised the president's secretary, Phyllis Becker that Crawley would be acting president the next day The following morning around 9 a.m. Crawley received a call at the Local 933 hall from Murray to the effect that a certain letter to a so-called CAP committee had to go out that day. This involved sending an identical letter to some 25 or 30 members of the committee, some of whom were new and with addresses not appearing in the files in the president's office. Such new addresses could be obtained from records in the financial secretary's office where Mosier worked. In the past it had been established practice for personnel in the various offices in the union hall to come into the financial secretary's office to obtain such needed data, to use the mimeograph machine, or to obtain coffee from the coffee machine. This had resulted in friction between clericals in the financial secretary's office and the other clericals, particularly between Mosier and Becker. Sometime in May after Patterson had gone on leave, A. C. Coleman, in an effort to minimize such conflicts, met with Murray and the office employees in the hall. He obtained Murray's agreement that if any information was needed from the financial secretary's office by employees in other offices they should come to him, A. C. Coleman, and he would see that the information was furnished to them. He also privately instructed Mosier that in the event controversy developed in the financial office she should avoid confrontation by leaving the scene of the dispute. It was against this background that the events of June 10 occurred. Shortly after 10 a.m. A. C. Coleman left the union hall, advising Crawley that he would be gone for a short while. He was away 45 or 50 minutes. Shortly after his departure Becker, following Crawley's instructions, entered the financial office for the ostensible purpose of obtaining addresses of new CAP committee members from a rotary file at which Mosier was working. An argument developed between them. Becker then left to seek the aid of Crawley who returned with her and directed Mosier to move away from the file to her own desk so that Becker could use the file. After a short delay she complied and then left the scene, going down the hall to the office of recording secretary Milliken. After Becker had obtained the addresses, Crawley sought out Mosier, directing her to return to her own office. She refused to return so long as Becker was there and even after Crawley informed her Becker had left, she persisted in her refusal on the basis that Crawley was not her boss. She was emotional and intemperate in her refusal while Crawley was soft-spoken throughout. After several unsuccessful efforts to persuade her to return to her office and go back to work, he discharged her. There is some conflicting evidence as to whether she was at that time laid off or discharged. She apparently felt either that she was only laid off or that there was at least a chance that her discharge was revocable because she did not immediately leave but awaited the return of A. C. Coleman. However, his efforts to save her job were unsuccessful. Murray confirmed the discharge by telephone about midday and again in person in midafter- noon. In effect A. C. Coleman then acceded to the discharge by instructing her to go home, which she did. 1. Protests of Mosier and Krom Regarding Their Employment Status The day following her June 10 discharge Mosier sent telegrams to Local 933 and Bick requesting a hearing on her discharge as provided in the contract between Local 1 and Local 933. She also filed additional Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (4) charges with the Board. On June 12 she mailed a written grievance to Bick based on her discharge claiming it violated the collective-bargaining agreement and was also an unfair labor practice. In support of the grievance she recited the following facts, "that on June 10, 1970 at approximately 11 a.m. one Eugene P. Crawley notified me that I was off the payroll for the rest of the day and at approximately 3:30 p.m. one Arthur Murray who is vice president of Local 933, UAW notified me that I was discharged." She asked for reinstatement and to be made whole. As noted earlier herein the collective-bargaining agree- ment between Local I and Local 933, had been scheduled to expire on February 27, 1970. Sometime in advance thereof Bick had initiated the bargaining process looking LOCAL 933, UAW 231 toward a new agreement by sending Local 933 proposed terms for a new contract. On February 18 she wrote Patterson asking that the agreement about to expire be extended beyond its termination date. By letter of February 20 Patterson agreed to extend the existing contract on a day-to-day basis. The agreement continued in effect until Patterson, on April 27, (3 days after Krom's layoff took effect) wrote Bick cancelling the contract effective the next day, April 28. Among other provisions, the checkoff provisions of that agreement then became inoperative. On May 19 Krom, then in layoff status, mailed Bick a check in payment of her May dues. Mosier did likewise sometime in May On June 4, however, Bick returned Krom's uncashed check to her along with a withdrawal card from Local I in accordance with an established practice of automatically issuing withdrawal cards to employees not actually working. On June 15 she also returned Mosier's check for May dues along with a withdrawal card. In response to Mosier's June 10 telegram, Murray wrote her on June 12 that, "Your contract has been cancelled as of April 28, 1970. Will be glad to meet with you, and anyone who legally represents you, at your convenience." Thus, as to Mosier, he apparently was not rejecting the grievance process because he was willing to meet. To Bick, who had called him that same day to set up a meeting on Mosier's grievance, he took a different position. To her he wrote that the contract was cancelled, adding, "There can be no meeting with you concerning the disciplinary action taken against Marilyn Mosier, until there is a contract negotiated." Bick, also on the same day, wrote Mosier that there was no contract in effect, stating, "We will attempt to negotiate your return to work when negotiations are resumed. If you have any facts to assist in negotiations please forward to me in writing as soon as possible." This letter crossed Mosier's grievance in the mail. Thereafter Mosier considered that her written grievance had supplied the facts which Bick needed; Bick claimed otherwise, because the grievance was not specifically in response to her June 12 letter. I find that Mosier supplied the essential facts in her written grievance and that Bick could not reasonably expect a further response in answer to her letter. A few days later, about June 15, Local 933 began a program of receiving advanced dues from its members on a weekly basis resulting in additional work in the financial secretary's office. Krom heard of the additional work and that Becker had been called in for extra work on a Saturday. On the theory that she should have been recalled from layoff to perform any additional work, Krom decided to join with Mosier in protesting what they considered unfair treatment. On June 16 Krom, Mosier, and a number of her relatives, including several children, began picketing in front of Local 933's hall in protest of their alleged unfair treatment. The picketing, after the first day carried on only by Mosier and Krom, continued for about a week. Local 933 management responded to these protests about June 18 by putting out and distributing at the Allison plant a handbill signed by Murray, Crawley, and Earl Coleman giving their side of the story, defending the action they had taken with regard to both Krom and Mosier, and including language critical of Mosier's brother-in-law Loudermilk who preceded Patterson as president of Local 933. A couple of days later Mosier and Krom with some help from Loudermilk put out their own handbill in answer to that of Local 933 management and distributed it at the gate of the Allison plant. It attacked Patterson, Murray, and Crawley, referring to them as the "unholy tno,"justified Loudermilk and detailed the claimed unfair treatment of Mosier and Krom. Shortly thereafter on June 20 Krom, with Mosier on an extension, telephoned Bick to inquire what could be done on her behalf. According to Krom and Mosier, whom I credit over Bick, she in effect indicated nothing could be done, that Mosier and Krom were not members of Local 1, had no rights, and were troublemakers. Nevertheless, on June 25 Krom filed another written grievance with Bick claiming that Local 933 was using temporary employees for work for which she (Krom) should have been recalled. She asked to be reinstated and made whole. Bick replied by letter of June 29 in the same vein as she had replied to Mosier, that there was no contract in effect but that she would attempt to negotiate Krom's return from layoff when contract negotiations resumed. J. The July Recall of Krom Sometime in July, I judge from the circumstances in the earlier part of the month while Krom was still in layoff status, A. C. Coleman requested the financial secretary- treasurer of the UAW International to assign additional help to his office at Local 933 to assist with the extra work that was piling up. He received no response from this, but Becker and Calvert were from time to time assigned to assist in his office. On July 21 Patterson's leave as president ended and he returned to active direction of Local 933. Shortly thereafter Krom, having heard indirectly that Local 933's executive board had voted to recall her, called Patterson to ask if she could return to work. He told her he did not know when she would be recalled; that he did not know why she wanted to come back to work there anyway, referring to some of the derogatory references used in the handbill she and Mosier had distributed, as well as the fact that they had picketed; and when she said that she had to have a job, he stated that she might as well hunt one elsewhere because he was not expecting to recall her. Nevertheless, on July 26 Krom received a telegram instructing her to come to the Local 933 hall on July 27 to talk with Patterson. She reported as directed. He told her he was not recalling her because he wanted to but because he had to; that if she wanted to return to work she would have to do so on his terms; that she did not deserve to be recalled, referring to the handbill put out by herself and Mosier. A. C. Coleman urged him to forget the past and their differences because the work was piling up and he needed help. But Patterson responded that he was forgetting nothing, that he did not want to recall Krom but that the higher ups were making him. He further told Krom that there was plenty of work for her at that time; that he was going to bring in four temporary employees until the work got caught up and then she would be out again; that after the work was caught up he might have 1 day a week or 1 day a month for her, and if she 232 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD wished to return on those terms she could . She was to go home and think about it . She then left . Shortly after she arrived home Patterson telephoned, instructing her to report to work the following morning. When Krom reported for work the next day four new temporary employees were on the job in the financial secretary's office . They worked the balance of that week, as did Krom . Thereafter she continued to work and at the time of the last hearing herein on October 27 she was still employed. Since returning she has worked from 6 to 9 hours overtime each week. K. The New Collective-Bargaining Agreement In early August Local 1, represented by Bick, and Local 933, represented by Patterson and Earl Coleman , resumed negotiations for a new collective-bargaining agreement, the decertification petition having by then been withdrawn. Following the instructions of Local l 's attorney, Bick incorporated the June grievances of Mosier and Krom into the negotiations . She contended Mosier was discharged improperly ; that management should let bygones be bygones; she asked that she be reinstated and made whole. This proposal was categorically rejected on the grounds that Mosier had been insubordinate , having refused a direct order to return to work . Management was adamant in its position, stating it would permit Local I to go on strike over the issue before giving in on it . Bick in effect then gave up on that grievance. As to Krom, Bick proposed that she be recalled with backpay . To this management responded that she had already been recalled and that management reserved the right to determine when there was enough work for employees. In effect this was a rejection of the claim for backpay, but in view of the fact that Krom was working, Bick did not press that aspect . With respect to the nature of the recall she did press for clarification whether the recall was permanent and obtained from management the statement that the recall was as permanent as any could be, that in the event of a layoff Krom as the most junior employee would be the first to go , but that they were not anticipating a layoff. Bick accepted this as an adequate disposition of that grievance. Terms of a new collective-bargaining agreement were also negotiated, agreement being reached on August 5, subject to ratification by the employees in the bargaining unit. Bick through Redenbacher then called the employees in the unit, including Mosier and Krom, to a meeting on August 8 for the purpose of considering ratification of the new contract. The weight of the evidence establishes that Bick reported to the members on the terms of the new tentative agreement and also on disposition of the grievances of Mosier and Krom and answered questions from the floor. The contract terms were put to a vote and accepted by the employees . It is clear that Bick considered the disposition of the grievances tied to the acceptance of the contract proposals . In her words it was "a package deal" and she felt that the negotiations followed by acceptance of the agreement put an end to the grievances. Although they voted to accept the contract terms , Mosier and Krom did not consider that their grievances were thereby terminated . On August 10 the new 3-year collective-bargaining agreement was signed. L. The August Rocket Local 933 regularly publishes for the information of its members a small newspaper entitled The Rocket. Among other things it contains a column written by the Local's president. In the August 1970 issue , put out in the third or fourth week of August , Patterson used this column to refer to the "constant charges" of Krom and Mosier as constituting a "serious problem." He also referred to the fact that both had picketed the union hall. And while objecting to the filing of the charges, he alluded to the fact that Krom had been brought back to "part-time work as required" but that the charges "still persist." He asserted that Local I would not come to Mosier 's defense. M. Analysis and Conclusions 1. Analysis of events of November 24 and 25 Background events prior to November 24, 1969, establish beyond doubt Patterson's pervasive personal animus toward Mosier. Upon learning from Becker late in the afternoon of November 24 that Mosier had been chosen steward by circulating a petition among the office help, Patterson proceeded to interrogate Golloday and Lovins as to whether they had signed the petition, and, when they admitted they had, he further interrogated them about when they had signed, questioning their right to do so during working hours. Considered in context, including the events which followed and the location of the interrogation in their place of employment, I find that such interrogation was coercive and a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Although the complaint did not allege these particular events as an unfair labor practice, the evidence respecting them was fully litigated at the hearing. There is no evidence of an established rule in the office against solicitation. So far as the record shows Patterson just pronounced it on this occasion . Considering that circulation of a petition regarding union affairs is an activity ordinarily protected by Section 7 of the Act and that other union activity, for example the Local 1 meeting in Patterson's office the following day, was allowed on the employer's premises during working time, I conclude there was no lawful employer regulation limiting employee rights to circulate or sign a union petition. On November 25 Patterson further violated Section 8(a)(l) when he knowingly took the petition dealing with a union matter from Mosier against her will while she and Calvert were discussing it. In so finding I do not mean to imply that he was without authority to direct them to cease their arguing, or to defer their discussion , or to return to work. In the meeting in his office which Patterson then called, he indulged in further coercive interrogation of Becker and Calvert regarding the same matter when he delved into the state of their knowledge as to whether there was to be an election for a steward. It is immaterial that he may have had reasons to think that they opposed the whole matter. The Act guarantees them freedom as employees from such LOCAL 933, UAW interference by their employer. Although not specifically alleged as an unfair labor practice, the facts were fully litigated , and I find, that such interrogation also violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Further, when he then proceeded to criticize Golloday and Lovins for signing the petition during working hours, interrogated them as to whether they knew they had signed an illegal document , and advised them in the absence of their union representatives that no clause in the collective- bargaining agreement provided for a steward or the election of one, he further interfered with their Section 7 rights and those of the other employees present . His conduct induced them to strike their names from the petition . I find that this conduct and the inducement of them to strike their names from the petition also violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. I have found that after seizing Mosier's petition and while on the way to his office Patterson stopped off to make copies of the petition . To make such copies for his own use of a document dealing with union affairs which , at that point at least, was no concern of the employer was a further implementation of the course of interfering conduct upon which he had already launched, and considering what immediately preceded it and what later followed it, I conclude that the making of such copies was, as alleged in the complaint, a further violation of Section 8(a)(1). With regard to the copies which Becker later made at the request of Bick and with the permission of Patterson , I reach a contrary conclusion . These were made at the request of, and for the benefit of, the employees ' union representative, albeit with the permission of the employer . Such conduct did not violate Section 8 (a)(1). Later in the morning of November 25 when Patterson was called into the union meeting by Bick , he further indulged himself in lecturing Mosier about the petition which he claimed was illegal . At the time he was doing this the employees present were engaging in protected activity in the president's office . He took that occasion to verbally chastise an employee for earlier engaging in protected activity which was the direct forerunner of the union meeting . I conclude that even though he was invited in to the meeting, this verbal foray on his part was an impermissible interference with the employees Section 7 rights and therefore violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. I further conclude that Patterson violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act when at the conclusion of the union meeting in his office he gave Mosier a disciplinary suspension without pay for the balance of that day. Although in appropriate circumstances disciplinary action against an employee for arguing with or maligning a management official would not be an unfair labor practice, the suspension here was surrounded by other 8(a)(1) conduct. It occurred in the course of a union meeting. Although the employee may not have been without fault in engaging in the argument culminating in her suspension, the entire confrontation with Patterson was the latest link in a chain of events stemming from her earlier protected activity and Patterson 's interference therewith . The union meeting was, in a sense, a continuation of that earlier protected activity, as was the argument in which Patterson claimed Mosier called him a liar and a thief . Moreover, although the argument occurred during a meeting on the 233 employer's premises, and even though it was during normal work hours, the employees at the meeting were not working. As an invitee at that meeting Patterson could not lawfully impose upon the protected activity there in progress the same managerial authority over employees properly available to him while they engaged in their normal duties. Patterson claimed he suspended Mosier because of what she said in this argument. If so, she was suspended because she engaged in a protected activity and the suspension was unlawful. In any case since the argument was sequentially inseparable from her continuing protective activity which began the day before, the conclusion is inescapable that she was suspended because of a dispute with her employer over that protected activity. In such circumstances the suspension was discriminatory and a violation of Section 8(a)(3). Inasmuch as Mosier's suspension occurred in the presence of the other employees and in the course of a union meeting I conclude it independently violated Section 8(a)(1). I also conclude that Patterson in asking Krom on December 4 to sign a statement favorable to him and threatening her that if she did not sign she would be "in serious trouble" and "the same as fired," he further violated Section 8(a)(1). This was not alleged as an unfair labor practice. Nevertheless, the whole sequence of events was litigated. 2. Analysis of December grievances Bick deemed the disposition of Krom's December 4 grievance to be satisfactory, her view being that about all an employee could expect to obtain on a grievance based upon alleged harassment was a promise by the employer not to harass. Since that was all that Krom asked , I agree that Bick adequately processed this grievance and was justified in considering the result satisfactory. She did not, however, have similar justification for her disposition of Mosier's December 4 grievance which she noted as untimely. The collective-bargaining agreement placed no time limits on the filing of grievances. Moreover, the evidence shows that untimeliness was not the true reason Bick withdrew the grievance . That reason was a sham. She testified that the principal reason she rejected Earl Coleman's offer to settle Mosier's harassment grievance on the same basis as he had settled Krom's was her own unwillingness to back Mosier in an action which she believed was illegal. Such belief, if she held it, had no basis in the collective-bargaining agreement nor in Local l's constitution and bylaws. Local I argues that in any case a settlement of the Krom grievance applied to all unit members and, therefore, was equally applicable to Mosier, thus constituting a favorable disposition of her December 4 grievance . While it is true that the language of the Krom disposition , as written, was broad enough to include Mosier , it is noteworthy that it was written only on Krom's grievance and not on Mosier's. Although Earl Coleman offered to make the same disposition on Mosier's grievance, that was rejected by Bick. Together these facts mean that the Krom disposition was not applicable to Mosier's; that Mosier's was disposed of in a different manner. That disposition , maneuvered by Bick, was a rejection of Mosier's December 4 grievance. 234 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD The satisfactory handling of Krom's grievance contrasts with the disparate result reached in both Mosier grievances. Considering that Bick was experienced in union affairs including the handling of grievances both in herjob and as a Local I official, her familiarity with the grievance procedures called for by the collective-bargaining agree- ment, her sidestepping of first step consideration with the employees' immediate supervisor , A. C. Coleman, in favor of second step consideration by a less friendly host, Earl Coleman, and the ample evidence that she was strongly opposed to Mosier's effort to become a steward , I find that Bick's handling of Mosier's grievances of December 1 and December 4 was perfunctory , arbitrary, discriminatory, and in bad faith. She thus failed to fulfill her statutory duty to the employee . Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 , 190, 191. She in effect influenced the employer to continue its existing discrimination . This as well as her failure to proceed further with the grievances violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the Act. Miranda Fuel Co., 140 NLRB 181, 186; Local 485 , International Union of Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers, AFL-CIO, 170 NLRB No. 121, 183 NLRB No. 131. 3. Analysis of the January separations The General Counsel alleges that Local 933 violated Section 8(a)(t), (3), and (4) of the Act on January 15 when Patterson separated Krom and Mosier. I conclude that such conduct did violate Section 8(a)(I). As an employee of Allison , Milliken was entitled to seek redress of her asserted grievances under the collective- bargaining agreement with Allison or in an appropriate Board proceeding. Employees also have the right to obtain and give evidence in an unfair labor practice case. Thus Milliken was entitled to obtain evidence to support her position, and Mosier and Krom as employees of Local 933 were entitled to give evidence . Interference with such rights violates Section 8(a)(1). Durahte Co., Inc., 128 NLRB 648. The discharge of two potential witnesses for Milliken and also the accompanying threat to all Local 933 employees to deal with future incidents in the same manner clearly tended to interfere with , restrain, and coerce all of them with respect to their Section 7 rights . I conclude this conduct violated Section 8(a)(1). See Kingwood Mining Co., 171 NLRB No. 24. That employees owe a duty of loyalty to their employer, a breach of which may be a legitimate reason for discharge, does not, given the facts of this case, militate against the above conclusion . The statements of Mosier and Krom did not deal with the general activities of Local 933 as a labor organization . Rather they dealt with an isolated incident concerning a particular official. It cannot be said, therefore, that the statements were generally deleterious to Local 933's stature as a labor organization in the eyes of the general public, or of the employers with which it dealt, or of its own members . Moreover, the information contained in the statements was not confidential information acquired by Krom or Mosier in the course of the performance of their jobs. Rather it was a social conversation at the coffee machine, which, although they overheard it while at their work stations during their job, had nothing directly to do with their work duties. It cannot be said that this revelation of the overheard conversation violated a duty owed to their employer. The facts here differ in this regard from those in N.L. R.B. v. Clearwater Finishing Co., 203 F.2d 938 (C.A. 4). The General Counsel also alleges that Section 8(a)(3) of the Act was violated on January 15. It is clear that Patterson's discharge of Mosier and Krom was discrimina- tion within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) if it was done for a proscribed purpose "to encourage or discourage member- ship in any labor organization." In making the statements on January 13 and 14 Mosier and Krom clearly were not engaged in activity of their own union , Local 1 , inasmuch as the statements related to activity in Local 933 of which they were not members. Patterson's conduct, therefore, did not discourage them regarding their own union activity. But the discrimination against Mosier and Krom did tend to discourage Milliken, an employee of Allison, in regard to her participation in Local 933 as a labor organization. Application of Section 8(a)(3) is not limited to situations where the union activity involved is that of the discrimina- tees. Bausch & Lomb Incorporated 150 NLRB 1357, 1370; Bausch & Lomb Incorporated, 159 NLRB 234, 235 ; cf. The Cooper Thermometer Company, 154 NLRB 502. And the statutory language makes it clear that the fact that the employer of the discriminatees is also the labor organiza- tion involved is not material because the statutory protection runs against encouragement or discouragement of membership in any labor organization . Accordingly, I conclude that Patterson's discharge of Mosier and Krom violated Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. With regard to the Section 8(a)(4) allegations , inasmuch as Patterson knew that Mosier and Krom had given statements to the Board agent on January 14, I find that their discharge was motivated in part by the fact that they had given those statements as well as the non-Board statement on January 13. The discharges for this reason were violations of Section 8(a)(4). Precision Fittings, 141 NLRB 1034; Virginia-Carolina Freight Lines, Inc., 155 NLRB 447. And even if Patterson acted only on the basis of the January 13 statement, I conclude, since he acted with knowledge that the statement dealt with the same subject matter as the pending charge and could reasonably expect that statement to be considered in the investigation of the charge, the discharges for this more limited motive likewise violated Section 8(a)(4) because , "Congress has made it clear that it wishes all persons with information about such practices to be completely free from coercion against reporting them to the Board." Nash v. Florida Industrial Commission, 389 U .S. 235, 238. See also Virginia-Carolina Freight Lines, Inc., supra. There remains the question , raised in General Counsel's brief although not specifically alleged in a complaint, of the handling of Krom's grievance of January 15. Bick testified that Krom had withdrawn it, Krom that she had not. I credit Krom. Although Bick may not have been eager to receive the grievance , once it was submitted to her in writing she promptly contacted Patterson for the purpose of arranging a grievance hearing, thus starting the grievance process. She did no more than talk with Patterson because he advised her that Krom was already back to work. Since she lost no pay Bick was of the view that the matter was satisfactorily settled and she did no more about it. I LOCAL 933, UAW 235 conclude this was a reasonable exercise of her discretion as an employee representative . To be made whole was all that Krom had asked for in her written grievance There is no evidence that Bick acted in bad faith in concluding that Krom had been made whole. I reach this conclusion even though Krom testified that she believed she had a viable grievance in spite of the fact that she had been returned to work with no loss of pay because her earlier December grievance had been settled on the basis that employees would not be harassed . She considered this further harassment and wanted assurance there would be no further threats or harassment. Although this was a tenable theory, and Krom had stated as one of the grounds of her grievance that the December grievance settlement had been violated, the relief she sought in the January 15 grievance only included being made whole. In view of this, Bick's conclusion that she had been made whole was not unreasonable . On the entire evidence I conclude that Bick's motives in handling it the way she did were not invidious and she did not thereby commit an unfair labor practice. See Local 485, International Union of Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers, AFL-CIO, supra. 4. Analysis of Local I bargaining The General Counsel alleges that in bargaining Local I attempted to cause the employer, Local 933, to accept contract proposals unfavorable to Mosier and Krom in that such proposals changed their job classifications from secretary to record clerk at a lower rate of pay and provided lesser leave of absence and paid absence allowance for them. The evidence shows that the Local 1 proposals called for the same rate of pay for the two classifications of secretary and record clerk until the second year of the proposed contract at which point rates for secretaries would increase above the rates for record clerks. With that small caveat, the factual allegations as to the terms proposed are substantiated by the evidence. The General Counsel further alleges that the reason Local I urged such terms upon Local 933 was "because Mosier sought to be designated as a steward of the Union, opposed the practices and policies of Respondent Union and its officer Bick, filed charges under the Act and because Ruby Krom and other employees assisted in such activities." The issue, then , is the lawfulness of Local l's motive in its bargaining. Looking first to the activities of Bick, I conclude that her personal motives in dealing with the contract proposals were not unlawful. Although some inference of bad-faith representation by Bick can be drawn from her handling of the December grievances and the fact that she initially rejected the contract proposals of Mosier and Krom, such inference is outbalanced by other evidence. It is clear that she reconsidered her initial rejection of the Mosier and Krom proposals and in fact did read them out, together with other proposals, at the meeting of employees January 29. The past practice was for the employees, through good offices of Redenbacher, to work up a set of proposals agreeable to all of them and to present Bick with a package having unanimous support Unanimity is what Bick hoped for and attempted to achieve at the January 29 meeting. Failing that she acted upon the next best thing, namely, a set of proposals having majority support. A preponderance of the evidence supports the conclusion that she acted in good faith in doing so and in presenting those proposals to management. Accordingly, I conclude that insofar as Bick personally was concerned no unlawful motivation was present. But Bick was not the Union. She was not even a member of the unit, only its representative , and the question remains whether Local I in the form of a majority of the unit employees in insisting on contract proposals unfavorable to Mosier and Krom were motivated by unlawful considera- tions. There was longstanding animosity between Mosier and Krom on one hand and Calvert and Becker on the other. The latter had from the beginning resented the fact that Mosier and Krom were hired in at the top rate for secretaries while older secretaries in the office had had to work years to achieve the top rate. They also resented the fact that they were classified as secretaries rather than record clerks. They opposed Mosier's effort to become union steward. Their testimony and demeanor at the hearing demonstrated their animosity. But they were only two of the seven employees in the unit. Three others, Lovins and Golloday, who were generally friendly toward Mosier and Krom, and Redenbacher , who was more or less neutral, cannot be said to have harbored unworthy motives in supporting the unfavorable proposals. Of course, neither Calvert nor Becker, nor for that matter Redenbacher, advised Bick that they had earlier been agreeable to eliminating the proposals unfavorable to Mosier and Krom. But then neither did Mosier nor Krom tell Bick that at one point there had been agreement. Considering all of the factors, the weight of the evidence does not establish that a majority of the unit employees voted for the proposals for the unlawful motives asserted by the General Counsel. Absent invidious motivation, the proposals disparate as to Mosier and Krom were not in themselves beyond that wide range of reasonableness (which) must be allowed a statutory bargaining representative in serving the unit it represents. . .." Ford Motor Company v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338. Accordingly, those allegations of the complaint should be dismissed. 5. Analysis of April separation of Krom The General Counsel alleges that Krom's April 24 layoff was discriminatory and in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (4), relying principally on the background of prior events regarding Krom and her association with Mosier and on the coincidence of timing between the layoff and the scheduled Board hearing April 28. He asserts that the reasons given at the time of the layoff notice were a pretext. There is conflicting evidence as to whether there was a lack of work in the office. Some evidence indicates that the layoff status of the large number of Local 933 employed at Allison, which had continued for many months, resulted in an increase of work at Local 933's office. Patterson and Crawley both testified to the contrary that there was insufficient work to keep all of the staff busy. However, Crawley's testimony reveals that in any case he really did not know what the employees did and was hardly in the position to make a valid judgment as to whether or not their services were needed. While the same observation cannot 236 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD be made regarding Patterson, he had harbored a precon- ception from prior to the time of his election that Local 933's office was overstaffed by about two employees, and attributed the failure of his predecessor Loudermilk to lay off these excess employees to nepotism. He himself, however, for many months after he took office continued to live with that same situation of "overstaffing" without laying off anyone. The evidence as a whole does indicate that Patterson and his fellow officers were sensitive to possible criticism from rank-and-file members of 933 regarding the size of the office staff, particularly in view of the worsening employment picture at Allison. It is also clear that at the time of Krom's layoff Local 933 finances were running substantially in the red. Considering all of these circumstances, I conclude that the General Counsel has failed to establish by a preponder- ance of the evidence that Krom's layoff was motivated by considerations barred by Section 8(a)(3) or (4). On balance I conclude that her layoff was motivated by the financial condition of Local 933 and by Patterson's political sensitivity regarding continued full employment at the union office while many Local 933 members were experiencing unemployment, especially when he himself had long taken the position that the Local's office was overstaffed. Whether he was right or wrong in this latter regard seems immaterial. The fact that Krom was chosen for layoff was due strictly to the fact that she was the junior employee. Accordingly, these allegations of the complaint should be dismissed. 6. Analysis of Mosier separation on June 10 The defense of Local 933 to the June 10 separation of Mosier is that she was discharged for cause, namely insubordination. She was clearly insubordinate if Crawley was her supervisor. Her position and that of the General Counsel is that he was not, that A. C. Coleman was her supervisor, and moreover that she did not even know Crawley was acting president on June 10. From all of the circumstances I infer that he patently was acting president on June 10 and that Mosier must have known this. Nevertheless, the general circumstances are suspicious. Considering the background of past discrimination against her and the strong animosity against her because she was the sister-in-law of the prior president associated with a rival faction in Local 933 to which her immediate supervisor A. C. Coleman also belonged, the inescapable question is whether she was set up for the discharge. Adding to the aura of suspicion is the further circumstances that at the executive board meeting the day before, Persinger, a member of the incumbent faction raised the subject of Mosier in a manner suggesting that, having filed charges, her continued presence was a problem. Murray in effect then gave approval to whatever Persinger might do about it. The next day Murray, who had been party to an understanding that data from the financial office should be gotten through A. C. Coleman, was conveniently absent from the office. His stand-in, Crawley, then instructed Becker to obtain such data knowing A. C. Coleman was absent from the office and that friction with Mosier could ensue. One might infer from this that he was looking for trouble. Be that as it may, Mosier was not fired because of the controversy in the office but because of a direction, reasonably made by Crawley, to return to work after Becker had left the financial office. Did Crawley have authority to so direct her and then fire her for failing to comply? The evidence is clear that Murray as acting president had the full authority of the office of president. I conclude from all the evidence that the second vice president, Crawley, standing in for the acting president, Murray, likewise was entitled to whatever authority the office of president carried. The duties of local union officers in regard to the supervision of local union clerical help are set forth in Article 40, Section 1 of the UAW International constitution then in effect, as follows: "The maintenance of the local union office is under the president's jurisdiction, and he employs such office help as required, subject to the approval of the local umon's executive board. When any of the office employees are performing duties at the direction and on behalf of any of the executive officers in connection with their official duties, such employees are under the supervision of such executive officer or officers until such time as the duties are completed." It is also clear from the evidence that A. C. Coleman as financial secretary was an executive officer within the meaning of this provision of the International constitution, and that Mosier when performing her duties in the financial office on June 10 was doing so at the direction and on behalf of A. C. Coleman. At the hearing Patterson took the position that the financial secretary in administering the duties of his office was subordinate to the president. The constitution does not bear him out in this. Nor does other evidence in the case which indicates that the ambit of authority as between the president and the financial secretary had long been a matter of controversy at Local 933. Accordingly, if Crawley's directions to Mosier which precipitated her discharge had related to the manner in which she performed her duties in the financial office, he might well have been on thin ice. His directions were not of that nature. He only directed her in a reasonable manner to return to work at a time when she was away from her office not working and while her immediate supervisor was away from the union hall. I conclude that such a direction was well within the ambit of general authority of the president over the office as a whole. The action of A. C. Coleman later in the day in acceding to the discharge by telling Mosier to go home appears consistent with this conclusion. And while complete loss of her job seems a severe consequence for an infraction which might have been handled by imposition of a lesser discipline , or by delay until the return of her supervisor, this record does not reveal that it was disparate treatment of Mosier. Cf. Fibers International Corporation, 181 NLRB No. 93. Considering the clear ground for discharge balanced against the suspicious circumstances suggesting a pretextu- al discharge, I conclude that the former outweighs the latter. Accordingly, I conclude that Mosier's discharge was not a violation of the Act, and the allegation of unfair labor practice based thereon should be dismissed. 7. Analysis of the recall of Krom The General Counsel contends that although Krom was LOCAL 933, UAW eventually recalled, her recall was delayed and in any case was conditional, that is temporary, and that the reasons for the delay and the conditional nature of the recall were because she had assisted Mosier, had given testimony, and had filed charges. There is insufficient evidence to connect the delay in recall or the nature of the recall to the fact that Krom had filed charges (the latest on May 8) and had testified at the first hearing. Accordingly, the allegations of a violation of Section 8(a)(4) keyed to the nature of her recall should be dismissed. The evidence establishes that commencing about June 15 there was additional work in the financial office for which Krom could have been recalled. The next day she and Mosier began picketing the union hall. In connection with her return to work July 28 Patterson made it clear that her recall was temporary and also made it clear that among the reasons he disfavored her were her participation with Mosier in picketing the union hall and the distribution of their handbill. In his own words he was forgetting nothing. He made no reference to pending charges. His remarks were directed to her picketing and handbilling. I find that her conditional recall was not reinstatement to her former position. So far as anyone knew that situation continued until early August, about August 5, when, in negotiations with Patterson and Earl Coleman, Bick obtained a clarifying statement indicating the reinstatement was permanent, subject only to layoff as the most junior employee in the event of a reduction in force not then anticipated. I find that from that point on Krom enjoyed full reinstatement. Patterson's statements in the August issue of The Rocket regarding Krom and Mosier, being of a political nature and directed to Local 933 members rather than specifically to Krom, do not amount to a renunciation of the assurance given Bick during negotiations. This conclusion is fortified by the fact that at the time of the final hearing herein in October Krom was still working regularly. Based on the foregoing I conclude that Local 933 failed to fully reinstate Krom when she was recalled July 28, continuing in this failure until the assurance amounting to full reinstatement were given August 5, and that during that period it violated Section 8(a)(1) by interfering with, restraining, and coercing her regarding her concerted activities. Inasmuch as activity in a labor organization was not involved the discrimination did not constitute a violation of Section 8(a)(3). 8. Analysis of the handling of the April and June grievances Local I urges that no cause of action for an unfair labor practice under Section 8(b)(1)(A) can be founded on grievances of Mosier and Krom which were initiated and arose out of incidents occurring during the period when no collective-bargaining agreement was in effect. The defense theory is that since the employees right to grieve arose out of the collective-bargaining agreement, they ended with the old contract and did not exist again until a new contract was executed. I conclude that this position is erroneous as a matter of law. It is true that the employees right to grieve had foundations in a long series of collective-bargaining agreements as well as under established practice during the 237 time those agreements existed. But it is also true that the viability of those rights to grieve were not defined by the duration of the contracts. Once the grievance process was established, whether by contract or otherwise, it became a term and condition of employment and as such survived the expiration of the collective-bargaining agreement which finally terminated April 28. N.L.R.B. v. Frontier Homes Corp., 371 F.2d 974, 980-981 (C.A. 8); Kingsport Publishing Corporation, 165 NLRB 694, enf. denied on other grounds, 399 F.2d 660 (C.A. 6); Local No. 611, International Chemical Workers Union, AFL-CIO, 123 NLRB 1507; cf. The Hilton-Davis Chemical Co., 185 NLRB No. 58. Local 1, then, as the employees' representative, necessarily bore responsibility during the hiatus between contracts for the protection and execution of those rights to grieve which survived the expired contract. The remaining question is whether Local 1 with regard to that responsibility ran afoul on Section 8(b)(1)(A). With respect to Krom's April grievance the evidence indicates that Bick did not exhaust available contract procedures. On the other hand she did process the grievance to the point where she felt there would be no profit in proceeding further. While this handling of the matter did not satisfy Krom, there is no evidence that Bick's motives were invidious or that she acted, or failed to act, with bad faith. Accordingly, she had discretion to dispose of the grievance on that basis. Vaca v. Sipes, supra, 191, 192. I reach a similar conclusion regarding Bick's handling of the June grievances of Mosier and Krom which she took up in August in the course of bargaining for a new contract. Although this was not as established a way of handling grievances as was the method provided for in past contracts, it was a method. And in fact Bick did pursue both grievances in the course of the bargaining. Essentially what the charging parties (and the General Counsel) object to is that her efforts did not achieve results which they deem adequate. In the case of Mosier the results were zero. In the case of Krom they were more satisfactory. But whatever the results, nowhere in the evidence regarding what transpired at the bargaining session is there a shred of evidence that Bick acted in bad faith or with invidious motives. On the contrary the evidence indicates that she vigorously pursued the interests of both grievants, and the fact that she was unsuccessful in satisfying them was in no way due to a lack of diligence or good faith on her part. While the Act protects employees from discrimination by their bargaining representative, it does not guarantee the quality of the representation they receive. Maxam Dayton, Inc., 142 NLRB 396, 418. A representative acting in good faith enjoys broad discretion in carrying out her function. Ford Motor Company v. Huffman, supra. It is clear from the total evidence that she finally gave up on the grievances. Apparently she agreed with management that one of the conditions for acceptance of the new contract would be no further processing of the grievances. This leaves open the possibility that she may have traded the interests of a grievant for some contract benefit which could not be enjoyed by that individual. At the unit meeting on August 8 she represented the proposed contract, together with the results of the grievances, as a "package 238 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD deal," the implication being that acceptance of the results of the grievance discussions was a condition to obtaining the new contract terms for the employees. It is not clear from the evidence of the negotiations dust why acceptance of the contract aspect of the bargaining had to depend upon acceptance of the grievance results. But in any case there is insufficient evidence to establish that Bick 's motives either in April or August were improper. The events of the previous November and December supporting an inference of bad faith were too remote in point of time to warrant such a finding as to her later representations By then the circumstances were not comparable to those in Local 485, International Union of Radio & Machine Workers, AFL-CIO, supra. Accordingly, the allegations of violations of Section 8(b)(1)(A) based upon the handling of these grievances should be dismissed. 9 Summary of conclusions In sum I conclude that on November 24 and 25 Local 933 in the person of Patterson violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by numerous coercive interrogations of employees regarding the steward's petition, by forcibly taking the petition from employee Mosier, by instructing employees not to circulate the petition, by making copies of the petition for the employer's use, by inducing employees to remove their names from the petition, and by interfering with employees at a union meeting. He also violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act on November 25 by suspending Mosier because of her union activity; Section 8(a)(1) on December 4 by threatening employee Krom that she would be in serious trouble and the same as fired if she failed to sign a statement regarding the suspension of Mosier ; Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (4) on January 15 by discharging Krom and Mosier for giving statements relating to a matter on which a Board charge was pending; and finally, during the period July 28 to August 5, Section 8(a)(1) by only recalling Krom on a conditional basis and not reinstating her to her former permanent status because she had engaged in concerted activity. With regard to Local 1, I conclude that in the person of Bick it violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) on December 8 by failing to process with good faith Mosier's grievances, thereby causing Local 933 to continue in effect its discrimination against her. IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of Local 933 and Local I set forth in Section III , above, occurring in connectia : with the operations of Local 933 described in section 1, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Local 933 is an employer within the meaning of Section 2(2) engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and activities affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(7) of the Act. 2. Local 933 and Local I are labor organizations within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. All office clerical employees and janitors employed at Local 933's Tibbs Avenue Indianapolis, Indiana, facility, exclusive of all professional employees, guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective-bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act. 4. Local I is the exclusive representative for the purposes of collective bargaining of the employees in the aforesaid appropriate unit within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act. 5. By conduct set forth in section III, above , which has been found to constitute unfair labor practices, Local 933 interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, and discriminated against employees to discourage membership in a labor organization and because they gave testimony under the Act, and thereby engaged and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (4) of the Act, and Local I restrained and coerced employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act and caused Local 933 as an employer to discriminate against employees in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, and thereby engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the Act. 6. The unfair labor practices referred to in paragraph 5 above affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. THE REMEDY Having found that each Respondent engaged in unfair labor practices in violation of the Act, I recommend that each cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirma- tive action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. With regard to the suspension of Mosier on November 25, 1969, which I have found to be unlawful, I recommend that Local 933 make her whole for any loss of earnings suffered by reason of that discrimination in the manner set forth in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289, with interest thereon at the rate of 6 per cent per annum as set forth in Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716, and make its records available to Board agents in connection with compliance therewith . I make no similar recommendation with respect to the discrimination against Mosier and Krom on January 15, 1970, nor with regard to the discriminatory aspects of the recall of Krom on July 28, 1970, because no loss of earnings were involved . I further recommend that Local 933 and Local I post appropriate notices. Since neither Krom nor Mosier are in the Armed Forces, nor likely to be, I have omitted from the recommended Order and notices language complying with the Selective Service and the Universal Military Training and Service Act. Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, LOCAL 933, UAW and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended: 4 ORDER A. Respondent Local 933, United Automobile Aeros- pace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW), its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Coercively interrogating its employees regarding their union activities or desires or regarding other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. (b) Taking from employees against their will petitions or other documents concerning their union activities or other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. (c) Making copies for its own use of petitions or documents concerning union activity or other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection of its employees. (d) Inducing its employees to remove their names from union petitions or petitions circulated for employees' mutual aid or protection. (e) Instructing employees not to circulate petitions concerning union affairs or other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection of employees. (f) Interfering with employees at union meetings. (g) Threatening employees with serious trouble or discharge or other adverse consequences for refusing to sign statements regarding events at a union meeting. (h) Discriminating against employees in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment because of their concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. (i) Discharging or otherwise discriminating against employees in regard to their hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization. 0) Discharging or otherwise discriminating against employees because they gave testimony under the Act. (k) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to form labor organizations, to join or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any or all such activities. ' In the event no exceptions are filed as provided in Section 102 46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions , and recommended Order herein shall , as provided in Section 102 48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions , and order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes 5 In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall be changed to read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board." 239 2. Take the following affirmative action to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Make Marilyn Mosier whole for any loss of earnings she may have suffered as a result of discrimination against her on November 25, 1969 , in the manner set forth in the section entitled "The Remedy." (b) Post at its office in Indianapolis , Indiana copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix A."5 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 25, after being duly signed by Respondent's representative, shall be posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered , defaced, or covered by any other material. (c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 25, in writing, within 20 days from the date of the receipt of this Decision, what steps said Respondent has taken to comply herewith.6 B. Respondent Local 1, Office and Professional Em- ployees International Union , AFL-CIO, its officers, agents, and representatives, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of their rights under Section 7 of the Act by failing or refusing to handle their grievances because of their opposition to incumbent union representatives, or their efforts to become union representatives or their participation in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. (b) Causing or attempting to cause Local 933, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Work- ers of America (UAW) to discriminate against Marilyn Mosier in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. (c) In any like or related manner restraining or coercing employees of Local 933, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW) in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of they Act, except to the extent that such rights may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment, as authorized by Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action to effectuate the policies of the Act. (a) Post at its office and meeting hall copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix B.117 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 25, shall, after being duly signed by Respondent's representative, be posted by Respondent thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in 6 In the event that this recommended Order is adopted by the Board after exceptions have been filed, this provision shall be modified to read: "Notify the Regional Director for Region 25, in wasting , within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps said Respondent has taken to comply herewith " I In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall be changed to read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board." 240 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD conspicuous places, including all places where notices to lost as a result of her suspension on November 25, 1969, members are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (b) Notify the Regional Director for Region 25, in writing, in 20 days from the date of the receipt of this Decision, what steps said Respondent has taken to comply herewith.8 IT IS ALSO ORDERED that the complaints herein be dismissed insofar as they allege violations of the Act not specifically found. 8 In the event that this recommended Order is adopted by the Board after exceptions have been filed, this provision shall be modified to read: "Notify the Regional Director for Region 25, in writing, within 2r, -days from the date of this Order, what steps said Respondent has taken to comply herewith." APPENDIX A NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government The National Labor Relations Board having found, after a trial, that we violated Federal Law by interrogating our office employees about their union activities, by taking a union petition from an employee against her will, by making copies of it for our own use, by inducing our employees to remove their names from the petition, by instructing them not to circulate such petitions, by interfering with our employees at their union meeting, by threatening an employee with serious trouble or discharge for refusing to sign a statement regarding events at her union meeting, and by discriminating against employees because of their union activity and other concerted activity, and because they gave testimony under the National Labor Relations Act: WE WILL NOT question our employees regarding their union activities. WE WILL NOT take union petitions or documents from our employees against their will. WE WILL NOT make copies for our own use of union petitions. WE WILL NOT induce our employees to remove their names from union petitions. WE WILL NOT instruct our employees not to circulate union petitions. WE WILL NOT interfere with our employees at union meetings. WE WILL NOT threaten employees with serious trouble or with discharge for refusing to sign statements regarding events at union meetings. WE WILL NOT discharge or discriminate against employees for engaging in union activities or other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection or for giving testimony under the Act. WE WILL pay Marilyn Mosier for the earnings she plus 6 percent interest. Dated By LOCAL 933, UNITED AUTOMOBILE, AEROSPACE AND AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS OF AMERICA (UAW) (Employer) (Representative) (Title) This is an official notice and must not be defaced by anyone. This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. Any questions concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions, may be directed to the Board's Office, 614 ISTA Center, 150 West Market Street, Indianapolis, Indiana 46204, Telephone 317-633-8921. APPENDIX B NOTICE To MEMBERS POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government The National Labor Relations Board having found, after a trial, that we violated Federal Law by failing to handle certain grievances in good faith and in so doing caused an employer to discriminate against an employee: WE WILL NOT fail or refuse in good faith to process employee grievances. WE WILL NOT cause or attempt to cause Local 933, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Imple- ment Workers of America (UAW) to discriminate against Marilyn Mosier contrary to the National Labor Relations Act. LOCAL 1, OFFICE AND PROFESSIONAL EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION, AFL-CIO (Labor Organization) Dated By (Representative) (Title) This is an official notice and must not be defaced by anyone. This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. Any questions concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions, may be directed to the Board's Office, 614 ISTA Center, 150 West Market Street, Indianapolis, Indiana 46204, Telephone 317-633-8921.