Intl. Longshoremen's Union Local No. 8

INTL. LONGSHOREMEN'S UNION LOCAL NO. 8 477 International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union Local No. 8 and Waterway Terminals Company. Case 36-CP-48 October 1, 1971 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS JENKINS AND KENNEDY On July 7, 1971, Trial Examiner James T. Barker issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision and a supporting brief. The Charging Party filed a brief in support of the Trial Examiner's Decision. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the findings,' conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner as modified herein. We agree with the Trial Examiner that Respon- dent's picketing of Waterway was for an object of forcing or requiring Waterway to recognize or bargain with it as the representative of the former Interstate employees whom Respondent sought to force Water- way to hire to do the carloading work. We further agree that this picketing violated Section 8(b)(7)(A) of the Act. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend- ed Order of the Trial Examiner as modified below and hereby orders that International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union Local No. 8, Portland, Oregon, its officers, agents, and representatives, shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's recommended Order, as so modified: Delete from paragraph 1(a) of the Trial Examiner's recommended Order the words "on or after Novem- ber 1, 1969," and insert the words "or to be employed" before the words "by Waterway." I The Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the Trial Examiner. It is the Board's established policy not to overrule a Trial Examiner's resolutions with respect to credibility unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence convinces us that the resolutions were incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products, Inc, 91 NLRB 544, enfd. 188 F 2d 362 (C.A. 3). We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings Respondent has also excepted to certain findings of the Trial Examiner based upon the record in an earlier proceeding before this Board involving these same parties, 185 NLRB No 35. We regard these findings only as background to the issues of this case, and have not relied on them in reaching our decision here TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE JAMES T. BARKER, Trial Examiner: This matter was heard at Portland, Oregon, on February 4 and 5, 1971, pursuant to an original charge filed by Waterway Terminals Company, hereinafter called Waterway, on November 6, 1970, and an amended charge filed by Waterway on November 9, 1970. On December 23, 1970, the Regional Director of the National Labor Relations Board for Region 19 issued a complaint and notice of heanng alleging that International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union Local No. 8, hereinafter called Respondent or Local 8, had engaged in conduct in violation of Section 8(b)(7)(A) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, hereinafter called the Act. At the heanng, the counsel for the General Counsel made a closing statement and on March 22, 1971, the Respondent and Charging Party timely filed briefs with me. Upon consideration of the briefs of the parties, and upon the entire record in this case,' and my observation of the witnesses, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT I. THE BUSINESS OF WATERWAY Waterway Terminals Company has been at all times material herein an Oregon corporation maintaining its principal office and place of business in Portland, Oregon, and various other facilities in the area of Portland, Oregon. At all times material herein, Waterway has been engaged at said places of business and locations in the performance of warehousing and cargo exchange services. During the calendar year immediately preceding the issuance of the complaint herein, Waterway received in excess of $50,000 in the course and conduct of its warehousing and cargo exchange services from the Crown Zellerbach Company and other employers who themselves annually ship in excess of $50,000 in goods and materials in interstate commerce directly to States other than the State of Oregon. Upon these admitted facts, I find that at all times material herein Waterway Terminals Company has been an i Pursuant to a stipulation of the parties , I have relied upon relevant portions of the record in Cases 36-CD-64 and 36-CD-64-2 which, as fully set forth below , form the background and factual predicate for the instant proceeding. 193 NLRB No. 65 478 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. Il. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED Respondent concedes that Inlandboatmen's Union of the Pacific, hereinafter called IBU, and International Long- shoremen's and Warehousemen's Union Local No. 8 are labor organizations within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. I so find. III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The Issues The contentions of the parties The General Counsel contends that the picketing which commenced on November 6, 1970, under the direction and auspices of Respondent was for an object of forcing Waterway to recognize or bargain with Respondent in violation of Section 8(b)(7)(A) of the Act. On the other hand, Respondent contends that the picketing in question was solely for the object of preserving work for the employees who had selected Local 8 to represent them and that the picketing had no recognitional objective. B. Pertinent Facts 1. Background facts a. The prior proceeding A proceeding under Section 10(k) of the Act was initiated in Cases 36-CD-64 and 36-CD-64-2, pursuant to charges filed by Waterway and IBU alleging that Local 8 had violated Section 8(b)(4)(D) of the Act by engaging in certain proscribed activity with an object of forcing or requiring Waterway to assign disputed work of loading and unloading of railcar freight to employees represented by Local 8 rather than to employees represented by IBU. A hearing of 7 days' duration was held in December 1969 and January 1970 before Dale B. Cubbison, Hearing Officer. Thereafter, on August 27, 1970, the Board issued a Decision and Order Quashing Notice of Hearing,2 wherein it found that the picketing of Local 8 directed against Waterway was solely for the object of preserving the disputed carloading work for the employees who had been doing it and who had selected Local 8 to represent them. The Board further found that the dispute in question was not the type of controversy Congress intended the Board to resolve pursuant to Section 8(b)(4)(D) and Section 10(k) of the Act. Chairman Miller and Member McCulloch dissented from the opinion of the Board. They were of the opinion that a jurisdictional dispute was involved and that the Board should determine the merits of the dispute. However, of direct significance in the instant proceeding, at footnote 6 of its Decision, the Board majority observed: We note that we are not called upon in this proceeding to consider whether the picketing may have had a recognitional objective proscribed by Section 8(b)(7). 2 185 NLRB No 35. As a consequence, the result we reach should not imply that Waterway had no remedy under that Section of the Act. We further note that our present holding does not turn on whether Waterway's reorganization violated Section 8(a)(1), (3), or (5). b. The related court proceedings In the meantime, the picketing which had commenced on November 1, 1969, and which had given rise to the filing of the charges in the aforesaid case, was enjoined pursuant to an application filed in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon by the General Counsel under Section 10(1) of the Act. Thereafter, on October 22, 1970, following the issuance of the Board's August 27 Decision, the Court dismissed the temporary injunction which had earlier issued. c. The underlying dispute (1) The Board's decision In its decision in Cases 36-CD-64 and 36-CD--64-2, the Board found the following facts: The work which gave rise to this proceeding involves the loading and unloading of railcar freight at two of Waterway's terminals in Portland, Oregon-the 3838 N.W. Front Street terminal, and also, to a minor degree, the Columbia-Basin terminal. The facts leading up to the present dispute are as follows: Waterway, a wholly owned subsidiary of Crown Zellerbach Corporation, is a freight interchanger, loading and unloading freight at its terminals upon the request of shippers and receivers. The bulk of the freight is brought to the terminals by barge, and is transferred onto either trucks or rail cars . Most of the freight comes from pulp and paper mills owned by Crown Zellerbach. Although Waterway operates several freight terminals in the Pacific Northwest, the work in dispute centers only on the two above-mentioned terminals. Prior to the middle of 1968, Waterway subcontracted most of the work performed at its various terminals, exclusive of truck freight which was usually handled by the truckdrivers, to two companies-Western Transpor- tation Company, also a subsidiary of Crown Zellerbach, and Interstate Carloading Company. Western, whose employees were represented by the IBU, loaded and unloaded both barge and railcar freight at most of the Waterway terminals. With respect to the 3838 N.W. Front Street and the Columbia Basin terminals, however, Western handled only barge freight.' The railcar operations at those two terminals were per- formed by Interstate whose employees were represented by Local 8, and under a union shop contract were members of Local 8. In 1968, Waterway became Western's successor. Shortly thereafter, Waterway and the IBU negotiated a new collective-bargaining agreement which, in accord- ance with a similar provision in the old IBU - Western contract, provided, inter alia, that employees represent- I As was the case throughout its operations, the Western employees at the terminals also occasionally handled truck freight INTL. LONGSHOREMEN'S UNION LOCAL NO.8 479 ed by the IBU would load and unload railroad cars as well as barges. In accordance with this language, and with the past practice, the Waterway employees represented by the IBU continued to handle both kinds of freight at the terminals not here involved - work which they had theretofore performed as Western employees. With respect to the 3838 N.W. Front Street terminal,2 however, Waterway took over only the barge operations constituting the work previously performed by Western, and hired the former Western employees to do the work. These employees continued to transport the barge freight to an area, marked off bywhite lines, immediately adjacent to where the railroad cars were to be loaded. There, the approximately 60 Interstate employees continued to pick up the freight and carry it to the railcars. Theunloading of the cars entailed a reverse process. The Interstate employees also cleaned out the cars, stored the freight so that the loads were evenly balanced, and sealed the cars. The operations continued in this fashion until the fall of 1969.3 Then, in response to Interstate's request bra rate increase, Waterway decided to perform the previously subcontracted railcar work with its own employees. Accordingly, it notified Interstate that it was terminating the subcontract on October 31. Prior to the subcontract's termination, Local 8, in a letter to Waterwayon October 22 in effect asked that Interstate'semployees continue intheir jobs and that its collective-bargaining agreement with Interstate covering these employees remain in effect. It also offered to bargain, and requested that Waterway schedule a meeting for that purpose. By letter to the IBU dated October 23,however, Waterway agreed to the IBU's claimtothisnew railcar work which Interstate employees had been doing. Af ew dayslater,WaterwayinformedLocal 8 that it would be guilty of an unfair labor practice if it negotiated with any other union than the IBU. Waterway ignored the request to continue the Interstate employees in theirjobs. Waterway, on November 1, took over the railcar functions previously performed by the Interstate employees. But Waterway did not hire any of the Interstate employees then performing the work. Rather, it added the railcar duties to the tasks of its terminal workers, who had previously performed only the barge segment of the freight loading and unloading. Although Waterway also had to hire a substantial number of new employees to assist in performing these newly expanded duties, there is no evidence to warrant a finding that, but for one or two exceptions, it made any job offers to the former Interstate employees. Local 8 thereupon picketed Waterway with signs reading "Waterways [sic] Unfair to Longshoremen- ILWU Local 8." The picketing continued until enjoined by the United States District Court for the District of Oregon, pursuant to the Regional Director's petition under Section 10(1) of the Act. 2 It appears that the Columbia Basin terminal handles only surplus work which cannot be performed at the 3838 N W Front Street terminal, and accordingly, does not have a regular employee complement . As the controversy primarily centers on the main terminal at 3838 N.W. Front Street, it is the operations of this terminal which are described herein d All dates hereinafter refer to 1969. Upon the basis of the foregoing facts, the Board majority held as follows: Here, the evidence is insufficient to establish a traditional jurisdictional dispute between two groups of employees. The employees represented by Local 8 were terminated during the term of an existing collective- bargaining agreement as a result of Waterway's reorganization. The evidence bearing upon Local 8's objectives is limited to its letter of October 22, 1969, in which it merely demanded continued employment of those presently working and that the collective-bargain- ing agreement applicable to them be given force and effect. No other demands were made and none can be implied. On February 4, 1971, Waterway filed with the Board a motion to reopen the record in the CD proceedings. In its motion, Waterway urged the Board to reopen the record to receive additional evidence which was not in existence at the time of the Section 10(k) proceeding. In pertinent part, through its motion to reopen the record, Waterway sought to adduce testimony of statements made by Fred Huntsing- er, as agent of Local 8, at a November 2, 1970, meeting with representatives of Waterway which assertedly revealed and served to establish that "Local 8's objective is not solely the reemployment of terminated employees, but includes the broader jurisdictional objective of assigning the revised work to the ILWU rather than to the IBU." On March 16, 1971, the Board issued an order denying the motion and therein observed: Assuming, arguendo, the truth of the evidence now sought to be introduced, the Board is not persuaded that it would in any way affect the ultimate determina- tion previously reached that Local 8's dispute was essentially with Waterway over work preservation. Thus, the Board adheres to the view that although the IBU was the beneficiary of Waterway's decision not to continue the employment of the former Interstate employees, that fact does not convert Local 8's work- preservation dispute with Waterway into a jurisdiction- al dispute with the IBU within the meaning of Section 8(b)(4)(D)• (2) Factual details of the work transition As found by the Board in its decision, in response to Interstate's request for a rate increase, Waterway decided to perform the previously subcontracted railcar work with its own employees, and so notified Interstate. By letter of October 10, 1969, Waterway replied to Interstate's written request for a rate increase, in pertinent part, as follows: We fully understand your problem and in fact have been aware of your concern for some time. We have in recent months made changes in our methods of merchandise handling at the terminal involved. We believe that other method changes are feasible. We have concluded that through changes in our method of operation we can perform this carloading function at a lesser cost if it is done by Waterway Terminals Company rather than through a contractor. You are therefore advised that effective midnight October 31, 1969 Waterway Terminals Company will perform its own carloading, and the services of Interstate Carloading Company will be permanently discontinued. 480 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD The record of the CD proceeding establishes convincing- ly that Interstate's request for a rate increase was occasioned by continuing and increasing losses deriving from the carloading and unloading services it performed at the Front Street and Columbia Basin terminals. The evidence reveals that the arbitrary division of work between IBU and Local 8-represented employees which prevailed at the two terminals with respect to the railcar loading functions was an inefficiency factor contributing to the losses . Other factors of necessity and economy relating to Waterway's use of the new Rivergate facility of Waterway to handle giant rolls of paper which had previously been handled at the Front Street terminal served to decrease the revenues of Interstate. Bearing upon the decision of Waterway to terminate the services of Interstate is record evidence revealing that under the fixed tariffs which prevailed, Interstate was paid by the railway companies for its railcar loading and unloading services . Waterway received no portion of this payment. Neither Waterway nor Interstate was empowered to change the allocation which the railway companies made to Interstate for the loading and unloading services it performed. Interstate was unsuccessful in securing from the railways a larger allowance for the carloading and unloading work. Upon its discontinuation of the use of Interstate's services, on November 1, 1969, Waterway commenced performing all of the terminal work at the Front Street and Columbia Basin terminals with its own employees. Terminal employees were no longer confined to loading or unloading freight cars but were used in a variety of tasks relating to the loading and unloading of cargo and its storage within the terminal. Although intermingled with other terminal tasks, approximately 20 to 25 man-days of worktime, i.e., the equivalent of the services of 20 to 25 full- time employees, are expended by terminal employees performing carloading and unloading functions. Separate supervision of the carloading crew was eradicated and the approximately 185 employees who worked in the employ of Waterway in December 1969 were thereafter supervised by approximately 15 individuals in supervisory or managerial capacities. (3) A new work complement hired Sixty to seventy employees had been employed by Interstate when, on November 1, as found by the Board, Waterway took over the railcar loading functions previous- ly performed by the Interstate employees. As found, Waterway did not hire any of the Interstate employees then performing the work. On October 20, 1969, however, IBU advised Waterway by letter that it had become apprised of the fact that Waterway had informed Interstate of its intention to perform carloading work at the Front Street terminal, effective November 1, utilizing its own employees. In the letter, IBU asserted its contractual claim as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative in a bargaining unit encompassing the work classification of "railcar loading." The letter continued as follows: We would point out to you that this type of work has consistently been performed by bargaining unit person- nel whenever performed by your own employees. This was true prior to the establishment of Rivergate and has been true at Rivergate since railcar loading began there. We want there to be no question but that this is the jurisdiction of our union as established and confirmed by our Collective Bargaining Agreement and many years of past practice. The present bargaining unit employees are entitled to this work in accordance with their seniority, and those on the extra board are entitled to this work before any new hires are brought in. By letter dated October 23, 1969, Waterway replied to IBU as follows: We are fully aware of our obligation with respect to our labor agreement and we do recognize the Inlandboat- men's Union as the exclusive bargaining agent for any work performed by Waterway employees as set forth in Appendix A, Section 1, Rule B-I of our current labor agreement. It is our intention to integrate carloading with warehouse assembly and barge unloading in order to perform this work as efficiently as possible. We anticipate changing our procedures and methods to such an extent that a Terminal Worker will be required to carload products direct from the stock piles, conveyor, or barge, as circumstances and type of shipment should require. The record in the Section 10(k) proceedings establishes that on October 24, 1969, in anticipation of need for additional employees, Waterway began accepting employment appli- cations. Waterway undertook to apprise Interstate employ- ees of its interest in receiving applications from them by requesting Harry Parker, the personnel manager of Interstate, and Interstate Supervisors Garber and Hayes to "pass the word" to Interstate employees. Parker spoke with Garber and, in turn, Garber told other Interstate supervi- sors of the interest of Waterway. Garber also informed approximately 20 or 25 employees of Interstate of Waterway's interest . Between October 24 and November 1, application forms were filled out by a general class of applicants in the lunchroom used by Interstate employees. Although 163 applications were submitted to Waterway during the period, only one Interstate employee applied. He was offered employment but declined to accept. From October 24 to November 7, a total of 237 individuals applied for work at Waterway as terminal workers. Waterway hired 40 applicants as terminal workers and the balance of the employees comprising the employee complement of some 60 or 70 employees was drawn from the existing extra-board which operated under the IBU agreement. On November 7, 1969, Waterway ceased taking applications. (4) Local 8 seeks to bargain In the meantime, on October 22, Fred Huntsinger, president of 40 Local 8, wrote to Waterway as follows: As a successor employer of our members at your carloading facility at 3838 N.W. Front Avenue, Portland, Oregon, we assume that those men will continue to work in their present jobs, and that our collective bargaining agreement will remain in full force and effect. Please be advised that we are prepared to bargain with you in good faith. INTL LONGSHOREMEN'S UNION LOCAL NO.8 481 Will you please advise us as to time and place of our meeting, because it appears to us that time is of prime essence in this matter. On October 28, John Roberts, president of Waterway, responded as follows. This will reply to your letter of October 22, 1969 in which you refer to this company as a successor employer of your members at our carloading facilities. To my knowledge Waterway Terminals Company does not now and has not previously employed any of your members. The Inlandboatmeii's Union has made claim that work to which you refer falls within the provisions of their labor contract with us if performed by our employees. Our attorney has advised us that we must meet these contractual obligations and that we are not a "successor employer" We are also advised that it would be an unfair labor practice for us to negotiate with any other union than the IBU. d. The IL WU charges On November 3, 1969, Local 8 filed charges alleging that, on or about November 1, 1969, Waterway had violated Section 8(a)(1), (2), (3), and (5) of the Act by, (1) extending recognition to the IBU for the operations of Interstate in Portland, Oregon, at a time when no members of IBU were employees of the new operations; (2) discharging its employees because of their membership in Local 8; and (3) refusing to bargain with Local 8 concerning Waterway's "successor employer relationship" for its operations. In due course, on December 17, 1969, pursuant to an investigation of the aforesaid charges, the Regional Director for Region 19 dismissed the charges concluding that Waterway had made assignments of the disputed work to its employees in accordance with a valid labor agreement with IBU; that the investigation had adduced no evidence that Waterway had refused to employ any former Interstate employee because of his affiliation with Local 8; and that under Board precedent Waterway was not a successor of Interstate. Local 8 took no appeal from the determination of the Regional Director. e. The present status of IBU and Local 8 Respondent is not currently certified by the Board as collective-bargaining representative of any of the employ- ees of Waterway Similarly no charge has been filed with the Board under Section 8(a)(2) of the Act, alleging that Waterway has unlawfully recognized or assisted any labor organization. The current agreement between Waterway and IBU has been, by its terms, effective from May 1, 1969. The agreement expires on April 30, 1972. By virtue of the agreement, Waterway grants exclusive recognition to IBU as the bargaining representative for all employees employed in certain specified job classifications . The agreement expressly includes in the covered work that of "railcar loading and unloading." At times pertinent, except for clerical employees, Waterway has employed no employee in job classification not encompassed by the recognition clause of the agreement. 2. The alleged unlawful conduct a. The November 2 meeting On October 23, 1970,3 Fred Huntsinger, president of Local 8, placed a telephone call to John Roberts, president of Waterway. Huntsinger was in San Francisco attending a meeting when he learned of the October 22 court action dismissing the injunction against Local 8. Huntsinger informed Roberts that in light of the Board decision in the CD case he desired to meet with Roberts for the purpose of discussing the status of members of Local 8 who had worked for Interstate. Huntsinger told Roberts that he thought it was desirable to work out an arrangement to get the men back to work . A meeting was scheduled for November 2. In due course , a meeting was held on November 2 at the office of Fred Huntsinger in Portland , Oregon. The meeting commenced at approximately 2 p.m. John Roberts, Roland Fisher, Roy Snell and Paul Watkins were present on behalf of Waterway . Fisher is the vice president of Waterway while Snell and Watkins are, respectively, operating manager and personnel manager of Waterway. Fred Huntsinger and Jack Ede, business agent of the Local 8, attended on behalf of Local 8. The meeting commenced with amenities but moved quickly to substantive matters when Roberts asked Huntsinger his purposes in requesting a meeting . Huntsing- er responded that he wanted to discuss putting the former employees of Interstate who were members of Local 8 back to work. Roberts responded that this was not possible in that Waterway presently had a full complement of employees and had a collective-bargaining agreement which would preclude Waterway from acceding to Huntsinger's request. Huntsinger asserted that the Board in its CD decision had ruled that the carloading work was that of Local 8 members and that the thrust of the Board's decision was favorable to Local 8. Roberts responded that he did not believe that the Board's decision awarded the work to anyone. At this point in the conversation, Roberts observed that Waterway now had "integrated" its operation and that if Waterway was required to put the employees back to work there would be some "jurisdictional problems." Huntsinger replied that he and Dick Hillis of the IBU were friendly and the relations between Local 8 and IBU were such that he would attempt to contact Hillis to endeavor to work out an arrangement for the equitable division of the work. Huntsinger observed that on prior occasions this type of matter had been satisfactorily resolved between the two unions. Thereupon , from his office Huntsinger attempted to speak with Hillis by telephone but Hillis could not be reached. When the conversation commenced again , John Roberts reiterated that Waterway had a collective -bargaining agreement with IBU and that if Waterway placed ILWU men on the jobs, the IBU would picket Waterway. Roberts added that he had been so informed by a representative of IBU. Huntsinger responded that the IBU agreement 7 All dates herein refer to the calendar year 1970 unless specifically indicated otherwise 482 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD contained a no-strike clause which would prevent IBU from picketing. However, Roberts disagreed contending that the no-strike provision would not have the effect which Huntsinger ascribed to it. Huntsinger added, "Well, we got a lot of good men, John. Let them picket." Huntsinger further stated, "We'll gladly do the work." At this point, Paul Watkins observed that by virtue of the picketing the Company would run out of products and wouldn't have "anything to stuff in the boxcars." Huntsinger responded, "Well, we'll do that work, too." Huntsinger then leaned back and said, "That's what you were trying to get me to say." At this juncture in the conversation Paul Watkins inquired as to the nature of the former agreement between Local 8 and Interstate . Before obtaining an answer Watkins inquired whether, if Local 8 made an agreement with Waterway, it would be the "same as the Interstate Carloading Company Agreement." Huntsmger answered that because that agreement had expired in December 1969, any subsequent agreement between Local 8 and Waterway would have contained provisions "completely different." Thereafter, Fisher inquired whether if Waterway agreed to hire any of the employees in question, they could be hired "as members of IBU." Huntsinger replied that they would have to be hired as members of ILWU. As the conversation continued, Roberts pointed out to Huntsinger that Waterway was "carloading around the clock." Roberts further observed that he was aware that ILWU contract rates called for overtime pay after 6 hours. Roberts asked Huntsinger to explain the effect of the ILWU requirement as applied to Waterway's operations. Huntsinger outlined an "averaging" procedure for compensating employees. In this regard Huntsinger referred specifically to the applica- tion of such an arrangement in contracts between Local 8 and grain handlers. In context of the discussion of the no-strike provision of the IBU agreement and the discussion of the technique of averaging hours for compensation purposes , Huntsinger pointed out that the ILWU agreement did not contain a no- strike provision but, rather, contained provisions for arbitration. There followed at this juncture a general discussion of the contents of the IBU agreement and the ILWU agreement. Huntsinger asked Roberts if he had a copy of the ILWU agreement and Roberts responded that he did not but would like to have one. Accordingly, Huntsinger extracted from his briefcase a copy of an agreement between ILWU and Pacific Maritime Associa- tion and handed it to Roberts. During the discussion, at approximately this juncture, Huntsinger again underscored his desire to have the former employees of Interstate given employment by Waterway. Huntsinger stressed that he wanted an "agreement" under which the men could work. This led to a discussion of jurisdictional complications and to the necessity of "repainting" the lines on the floor of the terminal which signify the work jurisdiction of the IBU members and Local 8 members . Huntsinger reiterated that he wanted all of the former Interstate employees to be given jobs by Waterway and specified, in this regard, that this would involve approximately 70 employees. Huntsinger stressed the financial hardship that the Interstate employees had suffered and Fisher asked if all of the employees had been without work during the time following the transition to Waterway operation of the facility. Huntsinger asserted that they had been. Fisher again asked if all of the employees would have to be employed and Huntsinger asserted that all would have to be with the exception of two who were no longer available for employment. This led to a discussion of the necessity of paying back wages to the Interstate employees. Huntsinger asserted that the total back wage package would approximate $750,000. He assured the Waterway officials , however, that the matter of back wages was an individual decision for each employee, and that Local 8 was not going to take an official position with respect to the issue . Huntsinger observed that Local 8 would advise the employees to pursue the matter of back wages. He asserted, however, that he felt the employees would be less likely to do so if they were offered employment. Fisher answered that he thought to require Waterway to pay back wages in the circumstances would constitute a punitive measure . Huntsinger stated that from his understanding of practices in the filed and under applicable labor statutes that this was not so because the men were entitled to backpay. As the meeting reached its termination , Roberts informed Huntsinger that he could not reach a decision on the matters discussed without consulting further with the board of directors and with legal counsel. Roberts informed Huntsinger that he would let Huntsinger know the decision of Waterway the next day. Huntsinger agreed that, in the meantime, he would endeavor to contact Dick Hillis and let Roberts know the result of their conversation . Roberts inquired as to the consequences of an inability to reach an agreement . Huntsinger responded that if some agreement was not reached Local 8 would have to shut down "the entire operation." Huntsinger inquired if by that reference Huntsinger meant the entire Crown Zellerbach operation or just Waterway . Huntsinger assured Roberts that he was referring only to the operations of Waterway. The meeting terminated on this note. The foregoing findings with respect to the meeting of November 2 are based upon a consideration of the testimony of all of the participants in the meeting. The testimony of each vanes with respect to some facets or details of the meeting but that of the Waterway officials who testified tends to be mutually corroborative, while that of Local 8 officials, Huntsinger and Ede , tends to corroborate each other. Each witness confirms that Huntsinger defined the purpose of the meeting as being to obtain employment for the approximately 70 former employees of Interstate who did not retain their employ- ment in the transition in the railcar loading operation which, is found by the Board in the CD case, became effective on November 1, 1969. Further, the witnesses are in INTL. LONGSHOREMEN'S UNION LOCAL NO.8 483 agreement in confirming that the reach and meaning of the decision of the Board in the CD case was discussed; that the IBU agreement, including the no-strike clause thereof, and the limitations of that agreement upon Waterway's freedom to hire former Interstate employees was given attention; that "a jurisdictional" implication of the hire of former Interstate employees was considered; the necessity of reaching an "agreement" to resolve the issues was underscored by Huntsinger; 4 that during the meeting Huntsinger attempted to contact IBU Business Agent Hillis ; that during the discussions the ILWU agreement was presented to Roberts by Huntsinger; and that the matter of backpay and its alleged punitive aspects was discussed. Beyond the foregoing, I have carefully considered the record testimony, and have given specific consideration to the witness stand demeanor of the witnesses. In light of this, the foregoing findings with respect to the November 2 meeting, where they depart from the testimony of Huntsinger and Ede, are based upon the credited testimony of John Roberts, Roland Fisher, Roy Snell and/or Paul Watkins. In the main, except for variations in the phrasing and in description of intra-meeting chronology, the testimony of the company officials is mutually consistent. The principal departure of substance among these latter witnesses, whose version of the meeting I credit, is with respect to whether, in terms, Huntsinger demanded that Waterway enter a collective-bargaining agreement with Local 8. The testimony of Roberts and Snell infers that Huntsinger made a direct demand that Waterway negotiate a collective-bargaining agreement with Local 8, while that of Fisher and Watkins suggests that Huntsinger made no such direct demand, but, rather, stressed the need for reaching an "agreement" which would facilitate the employment of the entire group of former Interstate employees. I credit Fisher and Watkins in this regard. Fisher convincingly asserted that Huntsinger avoided the use of the term "contract," and the testimony of Huntsinger and Ede lends support to this appraisal. However, the testimony of record convinces me that the conversation during this meeting, which was not a brief or perfunctory one, did turn to a consideration and evaluation of contractual terms governing compensation, hours and terms of employment. I am convinced that Huntsinger avoided an overt demand for a negotiated collective- bargaining agreement between Waterway and Local 8, but, nonetheless, through the meeting, urged upon the Water- way officials an accommodation which, with or without the good auspices of IBU, would result in a displacement which, with or without the good auspices of IBU, would result in a displacement of IBU members in favor of Local 8 members, and under terms agreeable to Local 8. My analysis of the record, and my observation of the witnesses, requires me to reject the testimony of Huntsinger and Ede to the effect that Huntsinger was not queried as to his willingness to permit the Interstate employees to work under the terms of the IBU agreement; that no discussion 4 In light of Huntsinger's own testimony on cross-examination, the testimony of Waterway witnesses, and the concessions of Everett Ede on cross-examination when confronted by the contents of an affidavit by Huntsinger which Ede had previously adopted as his own, I do not credit transpired relating to wages, hours, or working conditions; or that there was no discussion of an "averaging" formula for computing wages. b. The November 3 telephone conversation As agreed at the November 2 meeting, on November 3 Huntsinger called Roberts. Huntsinger commenced the conversation by informing Roberts that he had met with Hillis and that they had been unable to reach any understanding with respect to Waterway's employ of the former Interstate employees. Roberts responded that he had conferred with the board of directors and legal counsel and that their decision was that the agreement with IBU precluded Waterway from hiring the employees. Roberts told Huntsinger that by hiring the employees the Company would be breaching its agreement with IBU and would be vulnerable to a suit for breach of contract. Huntsinger responded, "Well, John, you know what I have to do." Huntsinger added that it would be unnecessary for Waterway to expend money in hiring additional guards because "they were going to be orderly and play everything legal." The participants to the telephone conversation , as well as Paul Watkins who was present in Roberts' office on the occasion of the telephone call and heard Roberts' contribution to the conversation, testified concerning this incident. The testimony of each witness as to the relevant aspects of the conversation varies from that of the other. I am convinced that during the conversation, neither Huntsinger nor Roberts, in specific terms, made reference to the inability of Waterway to enter into a contract with Local 8 as the substance of testimony of Roberts and Watkins infers. On this score, I credit Huntsinger. c. The picketing At approximately 6:30 a.m., on November 6, Local 8 commenced picketing the main terminal of Waterway. The legend on some picket signs read "Waterway Unfair to Employees and to Members of ILWU, Local 8." On other signs the legend was the same except that between the words "employees" and "members" the words "and to" did not appear. By November 9, the picketing had spread to the Rivergate and Columbia Basin terminals of Waterway. On January 14, 1971, picketing ceased at all terminals by virtue of the voluntary action of Local 8. In the interim, prior to January 14, a hearing had been held before Judge Goodwin in the United States District Court in the District of Oregon, upon an application for an injunction under Section 10(1) of the Act. The temporary injunction issued on January 25, 1971. d. The correspondence In the meantime, commencing with a letter dated November 11, from Fred Huntsinger to Waterway, Local 8 and Waterway exchanged correspondence relating to the Ede's testimony to the effect that at the meeting the discussion was cast entirely in terms of working out an "arrangement" to get former Interstate employees back to work Rather, I conclude that the term "agreement" was in fact employed. 484 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD employment of former employees of Interstate and the cessation of picketing. The November I I letter read as follows: If Waterways Terminals offers employment to all of the workmen, members of Local 8 , ILWU, employed by Interstate Car Loading Company at the time Water- ways Terminals commenced car loading operations, Local 8, ILWU will cease picketing. Reinstament [Reinstatement ] of such employees is the object of the picketing now in progress. We still hold open the right of these men to their back wages. Please advise us of an early date and time for a meeting on this latter issue. By letter dated November 16, from John Roberts to Fred Huntsinger, Roberts, in pertinent part, wrote as follows: Before giving your proposal further consideration, we need to know the terms and conditions under which you propose that this employment be offered. Do you intend that these employees be offered carloading work or whatever work might be available ? Do you propose that they be offered work only at 3838 [Front Street] or at other Waterway Terminals locations? Do you propose that they be offered employment subject to the terms and conditions presently applicable to all other employees in whatever classification of employment might be offered? Assuming offers of employment were made, is your offer to cease picketing a continuing and unconditional proposal? In response, Frank Pozzi , attorney for Local 8 , wrote, in substance, that ( 1) the employees were "willing, ready, and able to work carloading or in other categories"; (2) that the employees should "be offered work in the metropolitan area of Portland, Oregon"; (3) that the employees must be "offered employment subject to such conditions as other employees in the same job classification"; and (4) that the offer to cease picketing was a continuing and unconditional proposal assuming "all the men involved will be offered employment promptly." On November 23, William F. Lubersky , attorney for Waterway, dispatched a letter to Frank Pozzi, attorney for Local 8, which read as follows: In looking over your letter of November 18, 1970 to John Roberts it seems to me that there is a possible inconsistency which needs clarification. In your answer to John's third question you state that the union proposes that the persons involved be offered employ- ment "subject to such conditions as other employees in the same job classification." In our telephone conversa- tion of last Thursday you said that you recognized that this meant that they would go to work under the IBU contract and would, therefore, be subject to the union shop clause of that contract, which would mean that after 30 days from their date of employment by Waterway they would be required to become members of the IBU. In your answer to the second question , however, you indicate that the men should be "offered work in the metropolitan area of Portland , Oregon." The IBU agreement does not provide for people being employed in any particular location . If the offer of employment were made and accepted, the new employee would go on the extra board and would be given such work as was available in accordance with the extra board rules. Extra board employees are sometimes assigned to the outports as well as to one of the Portland terminals. A man might work in St . Helens one day and in Portland on another, or in Camas on one day and in Portland on another. While I see no basis upon which any of Interstate's employees would have any legal claim to employment by Waterway, we are nevertheless exploring the union's proposal as a method of eliminating the problem. In order that the union's position be clear , I would like to know whether I correctly understand it as an offer to permanently discontinue picketing if employment were to be offered to all those persons who were employed by Interstate during the payroll period immediately prior to November 1, 1969, with the further recognition that they would be employed under the terms and condi- tions of the contract covering the bargaining unit, which would mean that they would initially go on as extra board employees with all of the rights, but only those rights, enjoyed by any other employee on the extra board. If I do not correctly state the union position, would you let me know any areas in which I have not done so. By letter dated November 24, Frank Pozzi responded as follows: I thought Mr. Huntsinger's letter to John Roberts and my own letter to Mr. Roberts of November 18, 1970 were clear, but for further clarification, the proposal of Local 8 envisaged full-time employment under the IBU contract for the Interstate men, and, in return, the picketing would cease. On November 27, William Lubersky responded by letter as follows: This will acknowledge your letter of November 24, 1970. Your letter seems to confuse rather than clarify. You indicated in your earlier letter and in our discussions that Local 8 was asking only that the employees who were working for Interstate at the time of the takeover "be offered employment subject to such conditions as other employees in the same job classification," i.e. meaning the terms of the IBU contract. Your letter of November 24 refers to full-time employment. As I indicated in my letter, the terms applying to other persons hired under the IBU contract would involve assignment to the extra board. There is no way under the IBU agreement that such an employee can be guaranteed full-time employment. I still need to know whether your proposal contem- plates these people being placed on the extra board as would any other hire or whether you are seeking some special status, i.e. guarantee of full-time employment. On November 30, Frank Pozzi dispatched the following letter to William Lubersky: In response to your letter of November 27, 1970, our proposal contemplates full time employment for all of the Interstate production employees and such employ- ment to be forthwith. INTL. LONGSHOREMEN'S UNION LOCAL NO.8 485 e. Respondent's alleged objectives Fred Huntsinger testified that he entered the November 2 meeting after policy discussions with other officers of Local 8 and with delegates of the Union who were in attendance at the San Francisco caucus which Huntsinger had attended just prior to November 2. Huntsinger testified he attended the November 2 meeting, "recognizing that the [Board's CD ] decision merely indicated that the picket lines in the original case were not jurisdictional, [feeling] that the same type of action could necessarily be taken, and that the policy of the Union basically was to get the men their jobs back as a matter of trade union principle." Huntsmger further testified, in substance, that the initial picket line in 1969 had been established "(t)o get the men theirjobs back and get them back to work . . (a)nd to require a contract to be signed by Waterways [sic] Terminals with the Longshoremen Union." Huntsinger further testified that the purpose of the November 2 meeting was to reach an agreement or "understanding" between Waterway and Local 8 "to give the guys [Interstate employees] their jobs back." He denied that he envisioned reaching a formal collective-bargaining agreement with Waterway concerning the terms and conditions of employment of former Interstate employees and he further denied that the purpose of the November 6 picketing was recognitional. Conclusions The Respondent contends, in substance, that the picketing here in issue was for the sole purpose of bunging economic pressure to bear to cause Waterway to hire former employees of Interstate. Respondent asserts that this objective is established not only by credible evidence of record pertaining to the November 2 meeting but by the correspondence of Local 8 with Waterway after picketing commenced. On the other hand, the General Counsel contends that the picketing had an unlawful recognitional object and was conducted at a time when IBU possessed the status of the lawfully recognized collective-bargaining representative of the employees of Waterway and a question concerning representation could not be raised under the applicable Board contract bar rules. In this regard, the General Counsel asserts that the most recent picketing of Respon- dent was but a continuation of one aspect of the earlier picketing which led to the filing of the CD charges and to the Section 10(k) hearing and decision. In this regard, the General Counsel contends that, as Huntsinger conceded, one purpose or objective of the former picketing was to force Waterway to engage in collective-bargaining negotia- tions concerning the terms and conditions of employment of employees performing the carloading and unloading functions at the Front Street terminal. The General Counsel further asserts, in substance, that the Respondent's post-November 2 correspondence may not be viewed as the 5 Local 259, International Union, United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, UAW, AFL-CIO (Fanelli Ford Sales, Inc ), 133 NLRB 1468 In Fanelli the Board majority , in answering the contention of its dissenting member who asserted that under Lewis Food Company, 115 NLRB 890, the Board should find a recognitional object to exist and a Section 8(b)(7)(C) violation to have occurred observed as follows "It may not be gainsaid, of course , that picketing for an disclaimer of recognitional rights, but, rather, constitutes a frivolous, if disguised, effort to surplant IBU as the collective-bargaining representative of employees em- ployed at the Front Street terminal. Waterway joins the General Counsel in his principal contentions, asserting its view that the prevailing IBU contract applied as an accretion and became a bar to any question concerning representation until such time as the Waterway contract with IBU expires on April 30, 1972. Waterway cites in support of this accretion contention the absorption, coincident to the termination of the Interstate carloading contract, of the carloading functions as an integrated part of the terminal work at the Front Street terminal. Further, Waterway contends that Respondent's correspondence, viewed in its most favorable light, was, at best, an ineffectual effort to change the object of picketing which had already commenced. Additionally, contends Waterway, even if, arguendo, the picketing were to be viewed as solely for the purpose of forcing Waterway to hire former Interstate employees, this fact would be unavailing as a defense under the "total circumstance" test recognized by the Board in its decision in Fanelli Ford.5 Section 8(b)(7)(A) of the Act provides that, It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents to picket or cause to be picketed, or threaten to picket or cause to be picketed, any employer where an object thereof is forcing or requiring an employer to recognize or bargain with a labor organization as the representative of his employ- ees, or forcing or requiring the employees of an employer to accept or select such labor organization as their collective bargaining representative, unless such labor organization is currently certified as the represent- ative of such employees: (A) where the employer has lawfully recognized in accordance with this Act any other labor organization and a question concerning representation may not appropriately be raised under section 9(c) of this Act. In order to prevail in this proceeding alleging a violation of Section 8(b)(7)(A) the General Counsel must establish, (1) that Waterway at all pertinent times has lawfully recognized the IBU as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of employees performing the railcar loading functions; (2) that a question concerning representation could not properly be raised under Section 9 of the Act at the time the Respondent engaged in picketing; and (3) that the picketing in question was for the purpose of securing recognition for Local 8, or of requiring Waterway to engage in collective bargaining with Local 8 concerning wages, hours, or terms or conditions of employment of employees performing the carloading functions at Waterway's Front Street and Columbia Basin terminals.6 The Respondent concedes that it is not currently certified by the Board as the collective-bargaining representative of any of the employees of Waterway and that no charge has employee's reinstatement may in some circumstances be used as a pretext for attaining recognition as collective-bargaining representative of all the employees in a certain unit But before we are willing to infer such broader objective, some more affirmative showing of such object must be made than exists here" 6 See National Maritime Union of America, AFL-CIO (Overseas Carriers Corporation), 174 NLRB No 36 486 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD been filed with the Board under Section 8(a)(2) of the Act. Moreover, the instant record accords no substantial basis for finding that the recognition accorded IBU by Waterway is other than lawful. There has existed at all pertinent times a collective-bargaining agreement between Waterway and IBU, valid on its face, extending recognition to IBU as collective-bargaining representative of employees perform- ing railcar loading functions. It is well established that in the absence of a timely and meritorious charge raising the issue, an employer's recognition of a labor organization as the collective-bargaining representative of its employees may not be collaterally challenged in a Section 8(b)(7)(A) proceeding.? To be certain, the basic collective-bargaining agreement between Waterway and IBU is not here open to challenge for it had its origins at a time prior to Waterway's assumption of the carloading work performed by Interstate at the Main Street and Columbia Basin terminals of Waterway. In connection with an evaluation of the legality of Waterway's extension of recognition to the IBU as the bargaining representative of the employees here in question, however, it is here pertinent to observe that in dismissing unfair labor practice charges filed against Waterway by Local 8, considered above, the Regional Director for Region 19, pursuant to investigation, deter- mined that, (1) Waterway had made assignments of the disputed work to its employees in accordance with a valid labor agreement with IBU; (2) that Waterway had not refused to employ former employees of Interstate because of their affiliation with Local 8; and (3) Waterway was not a successor in law to Interstate, the former employer of Local 8 members. There is much in the record of the CD proceedings supporting the conclusion that Waterway's determination to discontinue the services of Interstate and to assume the performance of the railcar loading tasks utilizing its own employees was based solely on considerations of economy. Similarly, factors of efficiency deriving from integration of work tasks under a single supervisory hierarchy appear to have been contemplated as a derivative benefit of the decision. These decisions, taken upon business judgments, afford insufficient basis for imputing to Waterway an unlawful motive designed to circumvent any potential or inchoate contractual obligation to Local 8. Concomitantly, it follows that there derives from these decisions of Waterway, or from Waterway's actions, no basis sufficient for finding that Waterway's recognition of IBU as the collective-bargaining representative of employees being employed to perform the carloading work was an unlawful stratagem for circumvention. Further, the CD record lends support to Waterway's contention that the new employee complement, by reason of its integration functionally and operationally with the existing unit of terminal employees represented by IBU became an accretion to the existing units In the circumstances, as I find that there existed at all times relevant herein, a collective-bargaining agreement between Waterway and IBU, valid on its face, and of reasonable duration, the General Counsel correctly con- 7 See International Hod Carriers, et a! (Roman Stone Construction Company), 153 NLRB 659, Local No 8280, United Mine Workers of America (Leatherwood No I Mine of Blue Diamond Coal Company), 166 NLRB 271. 8 See National Maritime Union of America, AFL-CIO, 174 NLRB No. tends that, under the Board's contract or rules, no question concerning representation could appropriately be raised.9 There remains the question whether Respondent's picketing was for an object proscribed by Section 8(b)(7)(A). I find that it was and that the picketing had a recognitional object. The evidence pertaining to the meeting of November 2 establishes that Respondent sought the immediate employment of all but two Local 8 members who had previously been employed by Interstate. Moreo- ver, it is clear from the evidence that Respondent was demanding the employment of these Local 8 adherents to the effective exclusion of an equivalent number of Waterway employees represented by IBU. While Respon- dent's agent, Huntsinger, avoided seeking, during the course of the meeting, the immediate formulation or execution of a collective-bargaining agreement granting recognition to Local 8, it is clear that he manifested a demand for an efficacious "agreement" to resolve jurisdic- tional conflicts. While vague in substantive terms, it is nonetheless patent that Huntsinger was demanding as the price for withholding pickets an arrangement which provided for the employment of Local 8 adherents, effectively accomplishing the mass displacement of IBU members. It is further essential to conclude from the evidence of record that the arrangement which Huntsinger visualized as acceptable in accomplishing these ends was one which would embrace wage terms and employment conditions satisfactory to Local 8. Thus, the record establishes that during the November 2 meeting, Huntsing- er demanded the hire of virtually all former employees of Interstate, explored with Waterway representatives sub- stantive wage and hour considerations looking toward the hire of Local 8 members; and on November 3, when Waterway informed Respondent that it could not grant Respondent's demands, Respondent confirmed its inten- tion to picket. Viewed realistically, the immediate objective of Respondent's demands and the inevitable consequence of Waterway's acquiescence would have been the establish- ment of Local 8 as the dominant voice in the representation of the 60 or 70 employees affected by the change. Because the record renders clear the fact that Respondent was seeking to force a return, at least pro Canto, to a jurisdictionally dichotomous arrangement affecting termi- nal operations which would permit Respondent to viably represent Local 8 members under employment terms agreeable to Respondent, it is not here determinative that the 60 or 70 affected employees may not have constituted a majority of the reconstituted unit of employees to which, as found, the new hires had been joined as an accretion,10 In the circumstances defined, it is essential to conclude that the picketing which sought mass displacement of IBU- represented employees in favor of Local 8 members, and on terms agreeable to Local 8, had an immediate recognitional object and was not for the sole purpose of gaining "reinstatement" or employment for Local 8 members.ii Nor does the correspondence in which the Respondent engaged, after erecting the picket line, serve to override the 36 (TXD) 9 See, e.g., Local 378, Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North America, AFL-CIO, (Waldbaum, Inc), 153 NLRB 1482. 10 Cf Gazette Printing Company, 175 NLRB No. 177 11 In reaching this conclusion, it is not essential to rely upon INTL. LONGSHOREMEN'S UNION LOCAL NO. 8 recognitional character of the picketing. As Waterway contends, whether picketing is imbued with an object of forcing "reinstatement" of employees has at the same time a recognitional object is governed by all the surrounding circumstances and facts.12 It is essential here to consider that despite the Regional Director's dismissal of its charges of unlawful conduct by Waterway in the selection of its employee complement, Respondent persisted through picketing and threats thereof in seeking a complete substitution of Local 8 members for IBU members. In the circumstances, the picketing could not reasonably be viewed as having as its purpose the protest of unfair labor practices on the part of Waterway. This is so because Respondent had no cogent legal basis, in view of the Regional Director's dismissal of its charges, which action was not appealed, for contending that Waterway had acted improperly under the Act.13 Respondent did, however, have ample basis for knowing that to grant its demands, Waterway would be required to abrogate employment, seniority and other contractual rights of the 60 or 70 IBU adherents who would, of necessity, be replaced by Waterway's acquiescence to Respondent's demands. Hav- ing found that on November 2 and 3 Respondent threatened picketing to support recognitional demands, and having further found that Respondent envisaged and advocated a return to terminal loading operations which would reestablish jurisdictional demarcations, I am not persuaded that Respondent's correspondence accurately defined the real object of the picketing. Rather, as the General Counsel and Waterway contend, I am of the opinion that the correspondence initiated after the initial charge herein must be viewed with skepticism. I find that, on the record as a whole, Respondent's actions, as additionally gauged by the character and consequences of its demands, are inconsistent with its subsequent disclaimer of a recognitional object.14 I accordingly find that Respondent's picketing was for a recognitional object proscribed by Section 8(b)(7)(A) of the Act. IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of the Respondent set forth in section III, above, occurring in connection with the operations of Waterway described in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. Huntsinger's alleged testimonial concession that the renewed picketing continued the recognitional, or collective-bargaining , objective of the initial picketing Huntsinger's testimony , considered in its entirety , must be viewed as denying the existence of such objectives My conclusion that Respondent did, in fact, harbor and act pursuant to these objectives does, however, find support in the totality of the record which requires rejection of Huntsinger's ultimate assertions 12 Local 259, International Union, United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, UA W, AFL-CIO (Fanelli Ford Sales, Inc), supra V. THE REMEDY 487 Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I shall recommend that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and the entire record in this case, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Waterway Terminals Company is an employer engaged in commerce and in operations affecting com- merce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. 2. International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union Local No. 8 and Inlandboatmen's Union of the Pacific are labor organizations within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. By picketing at the Main Street and Columbia Basin terminals of Waterway, and at other Waterway facilities in the metropolitan area of Portland, Oregon, including the Rivergate terminal of Waterway, with an object of forcing or requiring Waterway to recognize and bargain with the Respondent as the collective-bargaining representative of the employees of Waterway hired on or after November 1, 1969, to perform, inter alia, carloading and unloading functions, and with a further object of forcing or requiring such employees to accept or select the Respondent as their collective-bargaining representative, at a time when Waterway had lawfully recognized the IBU as the collective-bargaining representative of such employees, and a question concerning representation could not be raised under Section 9(c) of the Act, the Respondent has engaged in, and is engaging in, unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b)(7)(A) of the Act. 4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended: 15 ORDER Respondent, International Longshoremen's and Ware- housemen's Union Local No. 8, its officers, agents, and representatives, shall: 1. Cease and desist from picketing, or causing to be picketed, or threatening to picket the Main Street, Columbia Basin or Rivergate terminals of Waterway Terminals Company, or any other facilities of Waterway in the metropolitan area of Portland, Oregon, or of any other facility of any other employer, with an object of forcing or 13 Cf. Waiters & Bartenders Local 500, etc (Mission Valley Inn), 140 NLRB 433 14 Gazette Printing Company, supra i5 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Section 102 46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Section 102 48 of the Rules and Regulations , be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes. 488 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD requiring Waterway to recognize and bargain with the Respondent as the collective-bargaining representative of the employees employed by Waterway on or after November 1, 1969, to perform carloading and/or unload- ing functions or with a further object of forcing or requiring such employees to accept or select the Respondent as their collective-bargaining representative at a time when Water- way had lawfully recognized the IBU as the collective- bargaining representative of such employees, and a question concerning representation could not be raised under Section 9(c) of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action which is necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Post in at its business offices and meeting halls copies of the notice attached hereto and marked "Appendix." 16 Copies of said notice on forms to be provided by the Regional Director for Region 19, shall, after being duly signed by an authorized representative of the Respondent, be posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to members are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (b) Mail forthwith to the aforesaid Regional Director for Region 19, signed copies of said notice for posting by Waterway, if it is willing, in places where notices to its employees are customarily posted. (c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 19, in writing, within 20 days from the date of the receipt of this Decision, what steps have been taken to comply herewith.17 18 In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by order of the National Labor Relations Board " shall be changed to read "Posted pursuant to a judgment of the United States Court of Appeals enforcing an order of the National Labor Relations Board." 17 In the event that this recommended Order is adopted by the Board after exceptions have been filed, this provision shall be modified to read- "Notify the Regional Director for Region 19, in writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith " APPENDIX NOTICE TO MEMBERS POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government WE WILL NOT, under conditions prohibited by Section 8(b)(7)(A) of the Act, picket, or cause to be picketed, or threaten to picket, the Main Street, Columbia Basin or Rivergate terminals of Waterway Terminals Company, or any other facility of Waterway in the Portland, Oregon, metropolitan area, or any other facility of Waterway, or any other employer, where an object thereof is to force or require Waterway Terminals Company, or any other employer, to recogmze or bargain with us as the representative of employees employed to perform carloading and unloading tasks, or forcing or requiring such employees to accept or select us as their collective-bargaining representative. INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN'S AND WAREHOUSEMEN'S UNION LOCAL No. 8 (Labor Organization) Dated By (Representative) (Title) This is an official notice and must not be defaced by anyone. This Notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. Any questions concerning this Notice or compliance with its provisions, may be directed to the Board's Office, 310 Six Ten Broadway Building, 610 S.W. Broadway, Portland, Oregon, 97205. Telephone 226-3431.