Iron Workers, Local 751

IRON WORKERS, LOCAL 751 665 International Association of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers, Local 751, AFL-CIO (Red-E-Steel Company, Inc.) and Joseph Milligan. Case 19-CB-1577 October 12, 1971 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS JENKINS AND KENNEDY On June 4, 1971, Trial Examiner Herman Marx issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions to the Decision, and the General Counsel filed a brief in support of the Decision. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and the brief, and the entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the findings,' conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the Recommend- ed Order of the Trial Examiner and hereby orders that Respondent, International Association of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers, Local 751, AFL-CIO, Anchorage, Alaska, its officers, agents, and representatives, take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order. I The Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the Trial Examiner It is the Board's established policy not to overrule a Trial Examiner's resolutions with respect to credibility unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence convinces us that the resolutions were incorrect Standard Dry Wall Products, Inc., 91 NLRB 544, enfd 188 F 2d 362 (C A 3) We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE HERMAN MARx, Trial Examiner: The complaint, in material substance, alleges that the Respondent, a labor organization named International Association of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers, Local 751, AFL-CIO (herein the Union or Local 751) caused two employers, Red-E-Steel Company, Inc., and Alaska State Steel Company (herein, respectively, Red-E-Steel and Alaska Steel) to discriminate against the Charging Party, Joseph Milligan, in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act' (herein the Act); and that by its said conduct, the Respondent violated Section 8(b)(2) and (1)(A) of the Act.2 The Respondent has filed an answer denying the commission of the unfair labor practices imputed to it in the complaint. Pursuant to notice duly served by the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board on all other parties, a hearing on the issues was held before me, on February 23, 1971, at Anchorage, Alaska. The Board's General Counsel and the Respondent appeared through respective counsel, and all parties were afforded a full opportunity to adduce evidence, examine and cross-examine witnesses, and submit oral argument and briefs. Upon the entire record, and my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, and having read and considered the briefs filed with me since the close of the hearing, I make the following findings of fact: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. THE EMPLOYERS INVOLVED; Jurisdiction of the Board Red-E-Steel Company, Inc., is an Alaska corporation; maintains a place of business in Anchorage, Alaska, where it is engaged in the business of steel erection for general building contractors; is, and has been at all material times, an employer within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act; in the course and conduct of its business, annually purchases and causes to be transported to Alaska from other States goods and materials exceeding $50,000 in value; and by reason of such purchases and shipments is, and has been at all material times, engaged in interstate commerce, and operations affecting such commerce, within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. Alaska State Steel Company (which is a trade name for an enterprise owned and operated by one Robert Mullins) maintains a place of business in Anchorage, Alaska; is engaged there in the business of steel erection for general building contractors; and is, and has been at all material times, an employer within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act. In the course and conduct of its business operations in 1970, Alaska State Steel Company rendered services valued, in the aggregate, at approximately $150,000 1 29 U S.C 151, et seq 2 The complaint was issued on December 28, 1970, and is based on a charge filed by Joseph Milligan with the National Labor Relations Board on September 17, 1970. Copies of the charge and complaint have been duly served on the Respondent 193 NLRB No. 92 666 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD to three enterprises, Howard S. Lease Construction Company, J. B. Warrack Company, and Woodruff Construction Company, each of which annually purchases and causes to be transported from one or more States to another State or States goods and materials valued in excess of $50,000. By reason of its said services, and of the interstate operations of the enterprises to which they were rendered, Alaska State Steel Company is, and has been at all material times, engaged in interstate commerce, and in operations affecting such commerce, within the meaning of Sections 2(6) and 2(7) of the Act. In view of the operations of Red-E-Steel Company, Inc., and Alaska State Steel Company in and affecting interstate commerce, as described above, the National Labor Relations Board has jurisdiction of the subject matter of this proceeding. H. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED The Union is, and has been at all times material here, a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Prefatory Statement Alaska Steel and Red-E-Steel are, and have been at all material times, parties to "identical" collective-bargaining agreements with the Union, each of which contains the following hiring provisions. "Employers will hire qualified workmen by calling the Union. Whenever the Employer requires workmen on any job, he will notify the local Union office either in writing or by telephone stating the location, starting time, approximate duration of the job, and the type of work to be performed and the number of workmen required." As the complaint alleges, and the answer admits, by force of these provisions, "and as a matter of practice," the Union has, at all material times, "operated an exclusive hiring hall" which has been "the exclusive source of supply of employees in the iron workers' trade for employers party to said provisions." 3 The hiring hall is located at the Union's office in Anchorage and is administered by its business agent whose duties include the dispatch or referral of workmen to fill requests by employers for labor In his office at the hiring facility, the business agent maintains "out-of-work" rosters which are, in effect, lists of qualified workmen who are registered at the hall as available for employment. The rosters are divided into various categories, including three respectively identified as "A," "B" and "C", on the basis of prescribed qualifications (not in question here), and contain entries of information in appropriate columns, including the name of the registrant, the date of registration, and a telephone number where he can be reached. The registrants are permitted by the Union to make the entries themselves and often do so. A registration is valid for 90 days, but the registrant may renew it for additional successive 90-day periods by entering the date of renewal and his initials in a prescribed column (captioned "Date of Re-register"), provided the renewal is accomplished before the expiration of the registrant's immediately preceding registration period. If a registration has expired for lack of timely renewal and he wishes to reregister, he must do so "at the bottom of the list," that is, below all unexpired registrations on the given roster. The rosters are available in the business agent's office for registration or renewal entries or inspection by those eligible for listing. From time to time, the business agent canvasses the lists, entering the phrase "over 90 days" opposite a registrant's name, and drawing a line through the name, to denote the fact of expiration of his registration; and makes up new lists to which he transfers the information pertinent to the unexpired registrations, omitting the data relating to those that have expired. Thus a "B" list (G.C. Exh. 4), effective January 16, 1970 (and hereafter termed the January 16 roster), has been superseded by one (G.C. Exh. 5), effective July 23, 1970 (and described hereafter as the July 23 roster). Registrants are dispatched by the business agent who has the duty of exhausting the "A" list first, then using the "B" list, and then the "C" roster, dispatching registrants in descending order on the given list or, in other words, in the chronological order of effective registration on the roster.4 Dispatches are customarily made at the hiring hall between 8 a.m. and 11 a.m., but registrants need not be present as a condition of referral. If a man is reached on the relevant roster, and he is not present, the business agent customarily attempts to reach him at the telephone number listed on the roster, and if he is unable to reach the registrant, passes on to the next eligible on the list. If the dispatcher knows that a registrant has a particular interest in a job for which he is eligible, the business agent will make "every effort" to reach him, calling friends of the registrant for that purpose in the event he can not be reached at the telephone number on the roster. At the times material to the issues here, the Union's business agent was Don Hancock, who assumed the post in January 1970 and held it until October 19, 1970. He has been president of the Union for about a year prior to his designation as business agent. B. The Alleged Failures To Dispatch Joseph Milligan Joseph Milligan has been a member of the Union since 1959, and has been registered at its hiring hall from time to time, usually entering the name of an Anchorage bar, Murmac Lounge, or its telephone number, as a medium for reaching him for dispatch. It is not unusual for a registrant to list a bar's telephone number for such a purpose, and in such a case, the dispatcher, as a matter of course, will attempt to reach the registrant at that number when he is eligible for dispatch. In September 1969, Milligan secured a job by his own 3 The quoted contract provisions are included in an agreement in establish that Red-E-Steel and Alaska Steel are represented by either evidence (Resp Exh 1) between the Union and two associations of association or are otherwise parties to the contract between the Union and employers, and there is some intimation by the Respondent's counsel that the associations. Red-E-Steel and Alaska Steel are parties to that agreement through the 4 Two additional rosters, "D" and "E", maintained at the hiring hall, agency of one or both associations, but the evidence does not in fact have no relevancy here IRON WORKERS , LOCAL 751 667 efforts as a welder on a project located on the North Slope of Alaska, about a thousand miles from Anchorage. The employer, an enterprise called Frontier Sand and Gravel (herein Frontier) was not unionized, and although the project was at a considerable distance from Anchorage, the fact that Milligan took a job with a nonunion employer was a focus of attention among members and officers of the Union. Hancock testified, in that regard, that "everybody (members and officers of the Union) was keeping their eyes on Milligan," "wondering why he was working for a non- union contractor," and whether he "was getting the negotiated wage scale, and fringe benefits." In short, as Hancock conceded, there was "resentment" among mem- bers of the Union over the fact that Milligan had taken the nonunion employment, and they expressed themselves to that effect to Hancock.5 Milligan worked for Frontier until some point in February 1970, and then returned to Anchorage. He registered on the January 16 roster for which he was eligible, on March 23, 1970, entering his name, the date of registration, and the name Murmac Lounge in the column provided for telephone numbers, but furnished no number. Hancock had by then become the Union's business agent and dispatcher. According to Milligan, he renewed his registration on May 12, 19706 (within the 90-day period from his initial registration date), by entering his initials followed by "5-12-70" in the column provided for reregistration dates. It may be noted, for future reference, that there are two other entries in the column, one of them "7-13-70" above the entry "5-12-70" and the other "6-16-70" below it; and that the phrase "over 90 days," purportedly to indicate expiration of Milligan's registration, has been written on the line on which he registered, although, contrary to customary practice in the case of expired registrations, no line has been drawn through his name on that list. On the morning of July 15, 1970, Hancock had occasion at the hiring hall to fill a request from Red-E-Steel for a man, and dispatched one Jim Clayson who was on the "C" list, and thus not entitled to dispatch until after the exhaustion, in turn, of the "A" and "B" rosters. Hancock did not call or otherwise attempt to communicate with Milligan regarding the job. In explanation of the omission, Hancock gave testimony to the effect that he had exhausted the "A" and "B" lists of eligibles that morning before dispatching Clayson; that Milligan was not eligible because his March 23 registration had expired, as indicated by the entry "over 90 days"; that it was he, Hancock, who had made the entry; that although he could not recall the date he had done so, it was at some point after expiration of the 90-day period; and that the purported renewal entries, including the initialled one for "5-12-70", for Milligan in the column marked "Date of Re- register" were not in the roster at the time of the expiration entry. According to Milligan, however, although he was in Anchorage throughout the period between his March 23 registration and some point in September, and looked at the roster approximately once or twice a week during that period, the first time he saw the entry "over 90 days" for his registration was when the list was produced at the hearing in this case (on February 23, 1971). This testimony, taken together with the purported reregistration entry for May 12 in the roster, places in issue the credibility of Hancock's claim to the effect the entry was made at some point subsequent to the expiration of 90 days following the March 23 registration, and that Milligan was thus not eligible for dispatch to the Red-E-Steel job, and was therefore passed over for it. The relevant credibility issues will be resolved at a later point. On August 31, 1970, Hancock processed a request for a man by Alaska Steel, and dispatched one Eddie Koontz to the job from the "B" roster. Koontz had registered on that list on July 15, and there is no question that he was junior in registration to Milligan if the latter had, in fact, renewed his March 23 registration on May 12 and July 13. Hancock testified that he does not recall whether he telephoned the Murmac Lounge with a view to reaching Milligan regarding the Alaska Steel job. Although there is no direct evidence either way, one may fairly conclude that Hancock made no effort to reach Milligan at or through the bar. Its location was known to Hancock; there is undisputed evidence that on about a half dozen occasions prior to Hancock's tenure as dispatcher, Milligan had been reached by the Union at the Murmac Lounge for dispatch purposes; and the record establishes no reason why a message left at the bar by Hancock would not have reached Milligan. Moreover, bearing in mind that Hancock, as he testified, does not know the Murmac Lounge's telephone number, and would have had to look for it in the telephone directory to ascertain it, it seems more likely than not that had he gone to the trouble of consulting the directory and then calling the number, he would remember the extra effort involved in attempting to reach Milligan, particularly as Milligan is the only registrant on the rosters in evidence who listed no telephone number. I find, in short, that Hancock did not attempt to reach Milligan regarding the Alaska Steel job. C. Discussion of the Issues; Concluding Findings The ultimate issue here is whether Milligan, as the General Counsel contends, was passed over for the Red-E- Steel and Alaska Steel referrals because he had been employed on "a non-union" job by Frontier. As a preliminary, it is necessary to determine whether he was effectively registered on the "B" list at the time of both referrals and entitled to pnonty in dispatch over Clayson on the first occasion, and over Koontz on the second. That determination rests on the effect to be given to the purported reregistration entries "5-12-70" and "7-13-70" for Milligan. The Respondent, it may be noted, makes no claim that Milligan's registration was invalid because he designated a location, in the form of the name of a bar, where could be reached, instead of specifying a telephone number for that purpose. In other respects, the evidence on both sides of the S Milligan testified that the type of welding work he did for Frontier employment by Frontier shared that view was not "normally" within the Union's "jurisdiction," but it does not 6 Unless otherwise indicated, all dates mentioned herein occurred in appear whether the members of the organization who resented his 1970 668 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD subject of roster entries leaves something to be desired. Milligan testified that he did not make the "6-16-70" and "7-13-70" entries that appear with the May 12 entry in the January 16 roster, but he later stated that he made the "7-13-70" notation, and that the "6-16-70" entry "looks like it could be mine." Moreover, his testimony regarding the superseding July 23 roster has manifest shortcomings. That roster was prepared by Hancock to weed out expired registrations and carry forward viable information from the preceding roster. Milligan claims that he made an entry "7-13-70" in the column captioned "Date of Re-Register" in the later roster, but he was unable to give a satisfactory reconciliation of the entry with the fact that the roster was begun, as evidenced by its date, some 10 days after July 13, and I am satisfied that it was Hancock, as he testified, who made the relevant entry.? The indicated deficiencies in Milligan's testimony (which, in my judgment, derive from a short, and at times, confused memory, rather than a purpose to deceive) place his credibility in general in jeopardy, but that by no means leads me to accept Hancock's claim to the effect that the "5-12-70" and "7-13-70" renewal entries were made by (or for) Milligan after the expiration of the March 23 registration, and after Hancock had made the notation "over 90 days." On the contrary, a number of factors persuade me of the regularity of the "5-12-70" and "7-13-70" entries, and their efficacy as extensions of the March 23 registration.8 To begin with, Milligan was in Anchorage for some six months following his March 23 registration, and sought work during that period, coming to the hiring hall about once or twice a week to check the "out-of-work list," and against that background, I find it wholly plausible that he would guard against a lapse in his registration with appropriate entries renewing it.9 For another matter, the Respondent's claim that the renewal entrees for Milligan were not in the January 16 roster when Hancock made the entry "over 90 days" rests solely on Hancock's claim to that effect, and there are features of his testimony and of his roster entries that put his credibility under a cloud. He professes an inability to recall when he made the entry "over 90 days," or to explain why, contrary to customary practice in the case of expired registrations, he did not put a line through Milligan's name in the January 16 roster. And it is noteworthy that in preparing the revised roster of July 23, Hancock placed Milligan's name in second place on the list, transferring Milligan's initial registration date, "3-23-70," from the superseded roster; 10 and that two registrants, Norm Baake and D. Vanden Brook, with initial registration dates (respectively April 28, 1970, and June 15, 1970) that antedate the July 13, 1970, entry for Milligan appear in third and fourth places, respectively, beneath Milligan's position. I The later roster also contains two entries, "7-31-70" and "9-14-70" for Milligan in the "Date of Re-Register" column According to Milligan, the first of these was made by him, but not the second It does not appear who made the latter entry 8 It is unnecessary to decide whether the purported "6-16-70" renewal entry was made by Milligan, nor whether it was effective as an extension of Milligan's registration 9 1 find no significance in the fact that Milligan made renewal entries at substantially less than 90-day intervals Others (for example, John Vaughn and J J Smith, as reflected in G C Exh 4) followed a similar course A Bearing in mind that job referrals are made from the roster in descending order, and that according to Hancock himself, a reregistration following an expired registration should be made at "the bottom of the list," the order in which he listed the three names on the revised roster suggests that at the time of that listing, at least, he gave effect to the May 12 entry for Milligan as a renewal of the latter's March 23 registration. To be sure, the revised roster shows lines drawn through Milligan's name and the reregistration date "7-13-70" (as well as through another purported reregistration date, "7-31-70," but not through an entry "9-14" which Milligan says he did not make), and Milligan's name is interlined farther down the list, in eighth place, with a registration date of "9-14-70"; but although Hancock had custody and control of the rosters while business agent, he does not say when, by whom, or under what circumstances lines were drawn through his name and purported reregistration dates in second place on the revised roster, nor when, by whom, and under what circumstances the interlineated insertions were made in eighth place. The absence of such informa- tion detracts from the reliability of Hancock's uncorrobo- rated claim that Milligan's March 23 registration had expired before the entry "over 90 days" was made by Hancock to signify such expiration. Moreover, ambiguity and self-contradiction appear in Hancock's testimony at material points. The thrust of some of his testimony is that he did not call Milligan for the Red- E-Steel job because the latter's March 23 registration had expired and had not been renewed by July 15, the date of Clayson's dispatch to the job; yet at other points Hancock testified that he has no recollection whether he attempted to reach Milligan before dispatching Clayson to the job. At one point, he vaguely implied that he made no attempt to reach Milligan for the Alaska Steel job because of lack of time, since "when Alaska State Steel called for men, they wanted them in the next half hour or hour"; but elsewhere Hancock testified that "I would have to say that I didn't call Mr. Milligan because . . . I regard [sic ] him as not properly on the list"; and at other points, Hancock stated that he could not recall whether he had tried to reach Milligan for dispatch to the Alaska Steel opening. Taking all factors into account, I do not credit Hancock's claim that the renewal entries for Milligan were absent from the January 16 roster at the time the notation "over 90 days" was made; and, I am convinced, and find, that Milligan's March 23 registration was effectively renewed for an additional 90-day period on May 12, 1970 by force of the entry "5-12-70," that the registration was again effectively renewed on July 13, 1970, for 90 days by reason of the entry "7-13-70"; ii that by force of the two renewal entries, he was effectively registered for dispatch to the Red-E-Steel and Alaska Steel jobs, and was entitled to registrant may be at a great distance from Anchorage when his registration expires, and it is thus reasonable that he should extend his existing registration when he can do so at his convenience rather than run the risk of expiration during an absence from Anchorage 10 According to Hancock, intermediate renewal dates (such as "5-12-70" in Milligan' s case) are not transferred to revised rosters, and it is customary to transfer only the last renewal entry. 11 The Respondent makes no claim that the renewal of July 13, 1970, lacked validity because it was not initialled . The rosters in evidence contain many uninitialled renewal entnes It is clear, in any case , that the omission IRON WORKERS, LOCAL 751 precedence over Clayson for dispatch to the Red-E-Steel opening, and over Koontz to the Alaska Steeljob; and that the failure to dispatch Milligan to either job was not based on his relative position on the roster. The reason for the omission in each instance is to be found, in my Judgment, in the "resentment" by members of the Union toward Milligan because he had taken a nonunion job with Frontier. That the attitude was widespread may be inferred from Hancock's admission that "everybody" in the Union's membership was "keeping (his) eyes" on Milligan, "wondering why he was working for a non-union contractor." To this, Hancock added that "every member there [in the Union] was keeping their eyes on me." He was an officeholder in the Union, first as president and later as business agent, and dependent on the membership for his status, and his testimony that "every member" kept his "eyes" on him because of Milligan's nonunion employment implies, in the context of circum- stances, that the membership looked to him as an officeholder, to do something about Milligan's nonunion employment. I am persuaded that Hancock was responsive to this attitude, and that his response took the form of discrimination against Milligan in job referrals from the hiring hall, as a reprisal for his employment by a nonunion contractor. In filling requests for labor by Red-E-Steel and Alaska Steel, through the hiring hall arrangements with these employers, the Union acted as their hiring agent, and thus the discrimination against Milligan is imputable in each case to the employer involved. I find, for the reasons stated, that by dispatching Clayson instead of Milligan to the Red-E-Steel job, the Union caused Red-E-Steel to discriminate against Milligan in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, thus violating Section 8(b)(2) of the Act; that by dispatching Koontz instead of Milligan to the Alaska Steel job, the Union caused Alaska Steel to discriminate against Milligan in violation of said Section 8(a)(3), thus violating Section 8(b)(2) of the Act; and that by its conduct in causing such discrimination, the Union in each case restrained and coerced employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of that Act, thereby violating Section 8(b)( 1)(A) of the statute. 12 IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The unfair labor practices of the Union set forth in section III, above, occurring in connection with the operations of Red-E-Steel Company, Inc. and Alaska State Steel Company described in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. to initial the entry for July 13, 1970, had no connection with Hancock's failure to refer Milligan to the Red-E-Steel and Alaska Steel Jobs. 12 1 find no merit in an intimation by the Respondent at the hearing that Milligan is barred from seeking relief through this proceeding because he has not sought review of the discrimination in referrals by a tripartite body, consisting of a representative of management , a representative of the Union, and an "impartial umpire," established for such a purpose under V. THE REMEDY 669 It has been found that the Union has engaged in unfair labor practices violative of Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the Act. In view of these findings, I shall recommend that the Union cease and desist from such unfair labor practices and take certain affirmative actions designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. As the Union caused Red-E-Steel Company, Inc. and Alaska State Steel Company to discriminate against Joseph Milligan in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, thereby violating Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the Act, as found above, I shall recommend that the Union make Milligan whole for any loss of pay he suffered, or may suffer, as a result of its omission to dispatch him for employment by Red-E-Steel Company, Inc. and Alaska State Steel Company between the dates of the respective omissions to refer Milligan, as found above, and the expiration of 5 days from the respective dates the Umon notifies Red-E-Steel Company, Inc. and Alaska State Steel Company, in writing, as hereafter provided, that it has no objection to the employment of Milligan; and that such loss of wages be computed in accordance with the formula and method prescribed by the Board in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289, and include interest at the rate of 6 percent per annum as provided in Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716, to which cases the parties hereto are expressly referred. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record in this proceeding, I make the following conclusions of law: 1. Red-E-Steel Company, Inc. and Alaska State Steel Company are, and have been at all material times, employers within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act. 2. The Union is, and has been at all material times, a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. By causing Red-E-Steel Company, Inc. and Alaska State Steel Company to discriminate against Joseph Milligan in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, as found above, the Union has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b)(2) of the Act. 4. By restraining and coercing employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act, as found above, the Union has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. 5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. the contract between the Union and the two associations, previously mentioned . See Sec. 10(a) of the Act and Local 469, United Assn of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Ibpefitting Industry (Joe Correa), 149 NLRB 39, 45-46. Moreover, as previously noted, the record does not establish that Red-E-Steel and Alaska Steel are parties to the contract to which the Respondent refers. 670 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD RECOMMENDED ORDER Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and upon the entire record in this proceeding, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended Order: 13 International Association of Bridge , Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers, Local 751, AFL-CIO, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Causing, or attempting to cause, Red-E-Steel Company, Inc. or Alaska State Steel Company, or any other employer who uses any of its facilities for the hire of employees , to discriminate against any employee in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. (b) In any like or related manner, restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of the right to self -organization, to form , join, or assist any labor organization , to bargain collectively with representatives of their own choosing, to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection , and to refrain from any or all such activities, except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring member- ship in a labor organization as a condition of employment, as authorized in the Act. 2 Take the following affirmative actions which , I find, will effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Make Joseph Milligan whole in the manner, according to the method , and to the extent set forth in section V, above, entitled "The Remedy." (b) Forthwith notify Red-E-Steel Company, Inc., Alaska State Steel Company, and Joseph Milligan in writing , that it has no objection to his employment. (c) Post, in conspicuous places, including places where notices to its members are customarily posted , at its office, usual membership meeting place, and hiring hall, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 19, after being signed by a duly authorized representative of the Union , be posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in such conspicuous places. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the said Union to insure that said notice is not covered , altered, or defaced by any other matenal.14 (d) Forthwith mail copies of the said notice to the said Regional Director at the office of Region 19 of the Board in Seattle, Washington, after such notices has been signed as provided above, for posting by Red -E-Steel Company, Inc. and Alaska State Steel Company, if they so agree, in places where they customarily post notices to their employees. (e) Notify the said Regional Director , in writing, within 20 days from the date of receipt of this Decision , what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith.15 13 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102 46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions, recommendations, and recommended order herein shall, as provided in Sec 102 48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the National Relations Board, and become its findings, conclusions, and order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes 14 In the event that the National Labor Relations Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall be changed to read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board " 15 In the event that this recommended Order is adopted by the National Labor Relations Board, after exceptions have been filed, Paragraph 2(e) thereof shall be modified to read "Notify the said Regional Director, in writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply therewith." APPENDIX NOTICE To MEMBERS POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government After a hearing at which all parties had an opportunity to present evidence and state their positions, the National Labor Relations Board has found that we have violated the National Labor Relations Act, and has ordered us to post this notice. The Act gives employees the following rights: To engage in self-organization To form, join, or assist any union To bargain collectively through representatives of their own choice To engage in activities together for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection To refrain from the exercise of any or all such rights. WE WILL NOT cause, or attempt to cause, Red-E-Steel Company, Inc., or Alaska Steel Company, or any other employer who uses any of our facilities to hire employees, to discriminate against any employee in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner restrain or coerce any employees in the exercise of any of the rights stated above. The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the National Labor Relations Act by refusing to dispatch Joseph Milligan for employment by Red-E-Steel Company, Inc., and Alaska State Steel Company, and has ordered us to reimburse him for any loss of pay he may have suffered because of our refusal to dispatch him. WE WILL reimburse the said Joseph Milligan for his said loss of pay, together with interest thereon, in accordance with the Board's order. WE WILL forthwith notify said Red-E-Steel Compa- ny, Inc., Alaska State Steel Company, and Joseph Milligan that we have no objection to his employment. Dated By INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BRIDGE, STRUCTURAL & ORNAMENTAL IRON WORKERS , LOCAL 751, AFL-CIO (Labor Organization) (Representative) (Title) This is an official notice and must not be defaced by anyone. This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days IRON WORKERS, LOCAL 751 671 from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, its provisions may be directed to the Board's Office, or covered by any other material. Republic Building, 1511 Third Avenue, Seattle, Washing- Any questions concerning this notice or compliance with ton 98101, Telephone 583-7473.